The End of National Currency

R.A. Hettinga rah at shipwright.com
Tue May 29 17:11:42 PDT 2007


Speaking of Fama, Black, and the "new" monetary economics...

Cheers,
RAH
(*And* Mark Tenney, *and* Paul Harrison, for that matter...)
-------

<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070501faessay86308/benn-steil/the-end-of-national-currency.html?mode=print>

Foreign Affairs -


The End of National Currency

By Benn Steil

>From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007

Summary: Global financial instability has sparked a surge in "monetary
nationalism" -- the idea that countries must make and control their own
currencies. But globalization and monetary nationalism are a dangerous
combination, a cause of financial crises and geopolitical tension. The
world needs to abandon unwanted currencies, replacing them with dollars,
euros, and multinational currencies as yet unborn.

Benn Steil is Director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign
Relations and a co-author of Financial Statecraft.

THE RISE OF MONETARY NATIONALISM

Capital flows have become globalization's Achilles' heel. Over the past 25
years, devastating currency crises have hit countries across Latin America
and Asia, as well as countries just beyond the borders of western Europe --
most notably Russia and Turkey. Even such an impeccably credentialed
pro-globalization economist as U.S. Federal Reserve Governor Frederic
Mishkin has acknowledged that "opening up the financial system to foreign
capital flows has led to some disastrous financial crises causing great
pain, suffering, and even violence."

The economics profession has failed to offer anything resembling a coherent
and compelling response to currency crises. International Monetary Fund
(IMF) analysts have, over the past two decades, endorsed a wide variety of
national exchange-rate and monetary policy regimes that have subsequently
collapsed in failure. They have fingered numerous culprits, from loose
fiscal policy and poor bank regulation to bad industrial policy and
official corruption. The financial-crisis literature has yielded policy
recommendations so exquisitely hedged and widely contradicted as to be
practically useless.

Antiglobalization economists have turned the problem on its head by
absolving governments (except the one in Washington) and instead blaming
crises on markets and their institutional supporters, such as the IMF --
"dictatorships of international finance," in the words of the Nobel
laureate Joseph Stiglitz. "Countries are effectively told that if they
don't follow certain conditions, the capital markets or the IMF will refuse
to lend them money," writes Stiglitz. "They are basically forced to give up
part of their sovereignty."

Is this right? Are markets failing, and will restoring lost sovereignty to
governments put an end to financial instability? This is a dangerous
misdiagnosis. In fact, capital flows became destabilizing only after
countries began asserting "sovereignty" over money -- detaching it from
gold or anything else considered real wealth. Moreover, even if the march
of globalization is not inevitable, the world economy and the international
financial system have evolved in such a way that there is no longer a
viable model for economic development outside of them.

The right course is not to return to a mythical past of monetary
sovereignty, with governments controlling local interest and exchange rates
in blissful ignorance of the rest of the world. Governments must let go of
the fatal notion that nationhood requires them to make and control the
money used in their territory. National currencies and global markets
simply do not mix; together they make a deadly brew of currency crises and
geopolitical tension and create ready pretexts for damaging protectionism.
In order to globalize safely, countries should abandon monetary nationalism
and abolish unwanted currencies, the source of much of today's instability.

THE GOLDEN AGE

Capital flows were enormous, even by contemporary standards, during the
last great period of "globalization," from the late nineteenth century to
the outbreak of World War I. Currency crises occurred during this period,
but they were generally shallow and short-lived. That is because money was
then -- as it has been throughout most of the world and most of human
history -- gold, or at least a credible claim on gold. Funds flowed quickly
back to crisis countries because of confidence that the gold link would be
restored. At the time, monetary nationalism was considered a sign of
backwardness, adherence to a universally acknowledged standard of value a
mark of civilization. Those nations that adhered most reliably (such as
Australia, Canada, and the United States) were rewarded with the lowest
international borrowing rates. Those that adhered the least (such as
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) were punished with the highest.

This bond was fatally severed during the period between World War I and
World War II. Most economists in the 1930s and 1940s considered it obvious
that capital flows would become destabilizing with the end of reliably
fixed exchange rates. Friedrich Hayek noted in a 1937 lecture that under a
credible gold-standard regime, "short-term capital movements will on the
whole tend to relieve the strain set up by the original cause of a
temporarily adverse balance of payments. If exchanges, however, are
variable, the capital movements will tend to work in the same direction as
the original cause and thereby to intensify it" -- as they do today.

The belief that globalization required hard money, something foreigners
would willingly hold, was widespread. The French economist Charles Rist
observed that "while the theorizers are trying to persuade the public and
the various governments that a minimum quantity of gold ... would suffice
to maintain monetary confidence, and that anyhow paper currency, even fiat
currency, would amply meet all needs, the public in all countries is busily
hoarding all the national currencies which are supposed to be convertible
into gold." This view was hardly limited to free marketeers. As notable a
critic of the gold standard and global capitalism as Karl Polanyi took it
as obvious that monetary nationalism was incompatible with globalization.
Focusing on the United Kingdom's interest in growing world trade in the
nineteenth century, he argued that "nothing else but commodity money could
serve this end for the obvious reason that token money, whether bank or
fiat, cannot circulate on foreign soil." Yet what Polanyi considered
nonsensical -- global trade in goods, services, and capital intermediated
by intrinsically worthless national paper (or "fiat") monies -- is exactly
how globalization is advancing, ever so fitfully, today.

The political mythology associating the creation and control of money with
national sovereignty finds its economic counterpart in the metamorphosis of
the famous theory of "optimum currency areas" (OCA). Fathered in 1961 by
Robert Mundell, a Nobel Prize-winning economist who has long been a
prolific advocate of shrinking the number of national currencies, it became
over the subsequent decades a quasi-scientific foundation for monetary
nationalism.

Mundell, like most macroeconomists of the early 1960s, had a now largely
discredited postwar Keynesian mindset that put great faith in the ability
of policymakers to fine-tune national demand in the face of what economists
call "shocks" to supply and demand. His seminal article, "A Theory of
Optimum Currency Areas," asks the question, "What is the appropriate domain
of the currency area?" "It might seem at first that the question is purely
academic," he observes, "since it hardly appears within the realm of
political feasibility that national currencies would ever be abandoned in
favor of any other arrangement."

Mundell goes on to argue for flexible exchange rates between regions of the
world, each with its own multinational currency, rather than between
nations. The economics profession, however, latched on to Mundell's
analysis of the merits of flexible exchange rates in dealing with economic
shocks affecting different "regions or countries" differently; they saw it
as a rationale for treating existing nations as natural currency areas.
Monetary nationalism thereby acquired a rational scientific mooring. And
from then on, much of the mainstream economics profession came to see
deviations from "one nation, one currency" as misguided, at least in the
absence of prior political integration.

The link between money and nationhood having been established by economists
(much in the way that Aristotle and Jesus were reconciled by medieval
scholastics), governments adopted OCA theory as the primary intellectual
defense of monetary nationalism. Brazilian central bankers have even
defended the country's monetary independence by publicly appealing to OCA
theory -- against Mundell himself, who spoke out on the economic damage
that sky-high interest rates (the result of maintaining unstable national
monies that no one wants to hold) impose on Latin American countries.
Indeed, much of Latin America has already experienced "spontaneous
dollarization": despite restrictions in many countries, U.S. dollars
represent over 50 percent of bank deposits. (In Uruguay, the figure is 90
percent, reflecting the appeal of Uruguay's lack of currency restrictions
and its famed bank secrecy.) This increasingly global phenomenon of people
rejecting national monies as a store of wealth has no place in OCA theory.

NO TURNING BACK

Just a few decades ago, vital foreign investment in developing countries
was driven by two main motivations: to extract raw materials for export and
to gain access to local markets heavily protected against competition from
imports. Attracting the first kind of investment was simple for countries
endowed with the right natural resources. (Companies readily went into war
zones to extract oil, for example.) Governments pulled in the second kind
of investment by erecting tariff and other barriers to competition so as to
compensate foreigners for an otherwise unappealing business climate.
Foreign investors brought money and know-how in return for monopolies in
the domestic market.

This cozy scenario was undermined by the advent of globalization. Trade
liberalization has opened up most developing countries to imports (in
return for export access to developed countries), and huge declines in the
costs of communication and transport have revolutionized the economics of
global production and distribution. Accordingly, the reasons for foreign
companies to invest in developing countries have changed. The desire to
extract commodities remains, but companies generally no longer need to
invest for the sake of gaining access to domestic markets. It is generally
not necessary today to produce in a country in order to sell in it (except
in large economies such as Brazil and China).

At the same time, globalization has produced a compelling new reason to
invest in developing countries: to take advantage of lower production costs
by integrating local facilities into global chains of production and
distribution. Now that markets are global rather than local, countries
compete with others for investment, and the factors defining an attractive
investment climate have changed dramatically. Countries can no longer
attract investors by protecting them against competition; now, since
protection increases the prices of goods that foreign investors need as
production inputs, it actually reduces global competitiveness.

In a globalizing economy, monetary stability and access to sophisticated
financial services are essential components of an attractive local
investment climate. And in this regard, developing countries are especially
poorly positioned.

Traditionally, governments in the developing world exercised strict control
over interest rates, loan maturities, and even the beneficiaries of credit
-- all of which required severing financial and monetary links with the
rest of the world and tightly controlling international capital flows. As a
result, such flows occurred mainly to settle trade imbalances or fund
direct investments, and local financial systems remained weak and
underdeveloped. But growth today depends more and more on investment
decisions funded and funneled through the global financial system.
(Borrowing in low-cost yen to finance investments in Europe while hedging
against the yen's rise on a U.S. futures exchange is no longer exotic.)
Thus, unrestricted and efficient access to this global system -- rather
than the ability of governments to manipulate parochial monetary policies
-- has become essential for future economic development.

But because foreigners are often unwilling to hold the currencies of
developing countries, those countries' local financial systems end up being
largely isolated from the global system. Their interest rates tend to be
much higher than those in the international markets and their lending
operations extremely short -- not longer than a few months in most cases.
As a result, many developing countries are dependent on U.S. dollars for
long-term credit. This is what makes capital flows, however necessary,
dangerous: in a developing country, both locals and foreigners will sell
off the local currency en masse at the earliest whiff of devaluation, since
devaluation makes it more difficult for the country to pay its foreign
debts -- hence the dangerous instability of today's international financial
system.

Although OCA theory accounts for none of these problems, they are grave
obstacles to development in the context of advancing globalization.
Monetary nationalism in developing countries operates against the grain of
the process -- and thus makes future financial problems even more likely.

MONEY IN CRISIS

Why has the problem of serial currency crises become so severe in recent
decades? It is only since 1971, when President Richard Nixon formally
untethered the dollar from gold, that monies flowing around the globe have
ceased to be claims on anything real. All the world's currencies are now
pure manifestations of sovereignty conjured by governments. And the vast
majority of such monies are unwanted: people are unwilling to hold them as
wealth, something that will buy in the future at least what it did in the
past. Governments can force their citizens to hold national money by
requiring its use in transactions with the state, but foreigners, who are
not thus compelled, will choose not to do so. And in a world in which
people will only willingly hold dollars (and a handful of other currencies)
in lieu of gold money, the mythology tying money to sovereignty is a costly
and sometimes dangerous one. Monetary nationalism is simply incompatible
with globalization. It has always been, even if this has only become
apparent since the 1970s, when all the world's governments rendered their
currencies intrinsically worthless.

Yet, perversely as a matter of both monetary logic and history, the most
notable economist critical of globalization, Stiglitz, has argued
passionately for monetary nationalism as the remedy for the economic chaos
caused by currency crises. When millions of people, locals and foreigners,
are selling a national currency for fear of an impending default, the
Stiglitz solution is for the issuing government to simply decouple from the
world: drop interest rates, devalue, close off financial flows, and stiff
the lenders. It is precisely this thinking, a throwback to the isolationism
of the 1930s, that is at the root of the cycle of crisis that has infected
modern globalization.

Argentina has become the poster child for monetary nationalists -- those
who believe that every country should have its own paper currency and not
waste resources hoarding gold or hard-currency reserves. Monetary
nationalists advocate capital controls to avoid entanglement with foreign
creditors. But they cannot stop there. As Hayek emphasized in his 1937
lecture, "exchange control designed to prevent effectively the outflow of
capital would really have to involve a complete control of foreign trade,"
since capital movements are triggered by changes in the terms of credit on
exports and imports.

Indeed, this is precisely the path that Argentina has followed since 2002,
when the government abandoned its currency board, which tried to fix the
peso to the dollar without the dollars necessary to do so. Since writing
off $80 billion worth of its debts (75 percent in nominal terms), the
Argentine government has been resorting to ever more intrusive means in
order to prevent its citizens from protecting what remains of their savings
and buying from or selling to foreigners. The country has gone straight
back to the statist model of economic control that has failed Latin America
repeatedly over generations. The government has steadily piled on more and
more onerous capital and domestic price controls, export taxes, export
bans, and limits on citizens' access to foreign currency. Annual inflation
has nevertheless risen to about 20 percent, prompting the government to
make ham-fisted efforts to manipulate the official price data. The economy
has become ominously dependent on soybean production, which surged in the
wake of price controls and export bans on cattle, taking the country back
to the pre-globalization model of reliance on a single commodity export for
hard-currency earnings. Despite many years of robust postcrisis economic
recovery, GDP is still, in constant U.S. dollars, 26 percent below its peak
in 1998, and the country's long-term economic future looks as fragile as
ever.

When currency crises hit, countries need dollars to pay off creditors. That
is when their governments turn to the IMF, the most demonized institutional
face of globalization. The IMF has been attacked by Stiglitz and others for
violating "sovereign rights" in imposing conditions in return for loans.
Yet the sort of compromises on policy autonomy that sovereign borrowers
strike today with the IMF were in the past struck directly with foreign
governments. And in the nineteenth century, these compromises cut far more
deeply into national autonomy.

Historically, throughout the Balkans and Latin America, sovereign borrowers
subjected themselves to considerable foreign control, at times enduring
what were considered to be egregious blows to independence. Following its
recognition as a state in 1832, Greece spent the rest of the century under
varying degrees of foreign creditor control; on the heels of a default on
its 1832 obligations, the country had its entire finances placed under
French administration. In order to return to the international markets
after 1878, the country had to precommit specific revenues from customs and
state monopolies to debt repayment. An 1887 loan gave its creditors the
power to create a company that would supervise the revenues committed to
repayment. After a disastrous war with Turkey over Crete in 1897, Greece
was obliged to accept a control commission, comprised entirely of
representatives of the major powers, that had absolute power over the
sources of revenue necessary to fund its war debt. Greece's experience was
mirrored in Bulgaria, Serbia, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and, of course,
Argentina.

There is, in short, no age of monetary sovereignty to return to. Countries
have always borrowed, and when offered the choice between paying high
interest rates to compensate for default risk (which was typical during the
Renaissance) and paying lower interest rates in return for sacrificing some
autonomy over their ability to default (which was typical in the nineteenth
century), they have commonly chosen the latter. As for the notion that the
IMF today possesses some extraordinary power over the exchange-rate
policies of borrowing countries, this, too, is historically inaccurate.
Adherence to the nineteenth-century gold standard, with the Bank of England
at the helm of the system, severely restricted national monetary autonomy,
yet governments voluntarily subjected themselves to it precisely because it
meant cheaper capital and greater trade opportunities.

THE MIGHTY DOLLAR?

For a large, diversified economy like that of the United States,
fluctuating exchange rates are the economic equivalent of a minor
toothache. They require fillings from time to time -- in the form of
corporate financial hedging and active global supply management -- but
never any major surgery. There are two reasons for this. First, much of
what Americans buy from abroad can, when import prices rise, quickly and
cheaply be replaced by domestic production, and much of what they sell
abroad can, when export prices fall, be diverted to the domestic market.
Second, foreigners are happy to hold U.S. dollars as wealth.

This is not so for smaller and less advanced economies. They depend on
imports for growth, and often for sheer survival, yet cannot pay for them
without dollars. What can they do? Reclaim the sovereignty they have
allegedly lost to the IMF and international markets by replacing the
unwanted national currency with dollars (as Ecuador and El Salvador did
half a decade ago) or euros (as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro did) and
thereby end currency crises for good. Ecuador is the shining example of the
benefits of dollarization: a country in constant political turmoil has been
a bastion of economic stability, with steady, robust economic growth and
the lowest inflation rate in Latin America. No wonder its new leftist
president, Rafael Correa, was obliged to ditch his de-dollarization
campaign in order to win over the electorate. Contrast Ecuador with the
Dominican Republic, which suffered a devastating currency crisis in 2004 --
a needless crisis, as 85 percent of its trade is conducted with the United
States (a figure comparable to the percentage of a typical U.S. state's
trade with other U.S. states).

It is often argued that dollarization is only feasible for small countries.
No doubt, smallness makes for a simpler transition. But even Brazil's
economy is less than half the size of California's, and the U.S. Federal
Reserve could accommodate the increased demand for dollars painlessly (and
profitably) without in any way sacrificing its commitment to U.S. domestic
price stability. An enlightened U.S. government would actually make it
politically easier and less costly for more countries to adopt the dollar
by rebating the seigniorage profits it earns when people hold more dollars.
(To get dollars, dollarizing countries give the Federal Reserve
interest-bearing assets, such as Treasury bonds, which the United States
would otherwise have to pay interest on.) The International Monetary
Stability Act of 2000 would have made such rebates official U.S. policy,
but the legislation died in Congress, unsupported by a Clinton
administration that feared it would look like a new foreign-aid program.

Polanyi was wrong when he claimed that because people would never accept
foreign fiat money, fiat money could never support foreign trade. The
dollar has emerged as just such a global money. This phenomenon was
actually foreseen by the brilliant German philosopher and sociologist Georg
Simmel in 1900. He surmised:

"Expanding economic relations eventually produce in the enlarged, and
finally international, circle the same features that originally
characterized only closed groups; economic and legal conditions overcome
the spatial separation more and more, and they come to operate just as
reliably, precisely and predictably over a great distance as they did
previously in local communities. To the extent that this happens, the
pledge, that is the intrinsic value of the money, can be reduced. ... Even
though we are still far from having a close and reliable relationship
within or between nations, the trend is undoubtedly in that direction."

But the dollar's privileged status as today's global money is not
heaven-bestowed. The dollar is ultimately just another money supported only
by faith that others will willingly accept it in the future in return for
the same sort of valuable things it bought in the past. This puts a great
burden on the institutions of the U.S. government to validate that faith.
And those institutions, unfortunately, are failing to shoulder that burden.
Reckless U.S. fiscal policy is undermining the dollar's position even as
the currency's role as a global money is expanding.

Four decades ago, the renowned French economist Jacques Rueff, writing just
a few years before the collapse of the Bretton Woods dollar-based
gold-exchange standard, argued that the system "attains such a degree of
absurdity that no human brain having the power to reason can defend it."
The precariousness of the dollar's position today is similar. The United
States can run a chronic balance-of-payments deficit and never feel the
effects. Dollars sent abroad immediately come home in the form of loans, as
dollars are of no use abroad. "If I had an agreement with my tailor that
whatever money I pay him he returns to me the very same day as a loan,"
Rueff explained by way of analogy, "I would have no objection at all to
ordering more suits from him."

With the U.S. current account deficit running at an enormous 6.6 percent of
GDP (about $2 billion a day must be imported to sustain it), the United
States is in the fortunate position of the suit buyer with a Chinese tailor
who instantaneously returns his payments in the form of loans -- generally,
in the U.S. case, as purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds. The current account
deficit is partially fueled by the budget deficit (a dollar more of the
latter yields about 20-50 cents more of the former), which will soar in the
next decade in the absence of reforms to curtail federal "entitlement"
spending on medical care and retirement benefits for a longer-living
population. The United States -- and, indeed, its Chinese tailor -- must
therefore be concerned with the sustainability of what Rueff called an
"absurdity." In the absence of long-term fiscal prudence, the United States
risks undermining the faith foreigners have placed in its management of the
dollar -- that is, their belief that the U.S. government can continue to
sustain low inflation without having to resort to growth-crushing
interest-rate hikes as a means of ensuring continued high capital inflows.

PRIVATIZING MONEY

It is widely assumed that the natural alternative to the dollar as a global
currency is the euro. Faith in the euro's endurance, however, is still
fragile -- undermined by the same fiscal concerns that afflict the dollar
but with the added angst stemming from concerns about the temptations faced
by Italy and others to return to monetary nationalism. But there is another
alternative, the world's most enduring form of money: gold.

It must be stressed that a well-managed fiat money system has considerable
advantages over a commodity-based one, not least of which that it does not
waste valuable resources. There is little to commend in digging up gold in
South Africa just to bury it again in Fort Knox. The question is how long
such a well-managed fiat system can endure in the United States. The
historical record of national monies, going back over 2,500 years, is by
and large awful.

At the turn of the twentieth century -- the height of the gold standard --
Simmel commented, "Although money with no intrinsic value would be the best
means of exchange in an ideal social order, until that point is reached the
most satisfactory form of money may be that which is bound to a material
substance." Today, with money no longer bound to any material substance, it
is worth asking whether the world even approximates the "ideal social
order" that could sustain a fiat dollar as the foundation of the global
financial system. There is no way effectively to insure against the
unwinding of global imbalances should China, with over a trillion dollars
of reserves, and other countries with dollar-rich central banks come to
fear the unbearable lightness of their holdings.

So what about gold? A revived gold standard is out of the question. In the
nineteenth century, governments spent less than ten percent of national
income in a given year. Today, they routinely spend half or more, and so
they would never subordinate spending to the stringent requirements of
sustaining a commodity-based monetary system. But private gold banks
already exist, allowing account holders to make international payments in
the form of shares in actual gold bars. Although clearly a niche business
at present, gold banking has grown dramatically in recent years, in tandem
with the dollar's decline. A new gold-based international monetary system
surely sounds far-fetched. But so, in 1900, did a monetary system without
gold. Modern technology makes a revival of gold money, through private gold
banks, possible even without government support.

COMMON CURRENCIES

Virtually every major argument recently leveled against globalization has
been leveled against markets generally (and, in turn, debunked) for
hundreds of years. But the argument against capital flows in a world with
150 fluctuating national fiat monies is fundamentally different. It is
highly compelling -- so much so that even globalization's staunchest
supporters treat capital flows as an exception, a matter to be
intellectually quarantined until effective crisis inoculations can be
developed. But the notion that capital flows are inherently destabilizing
is logically and historically false. The lessons of gold-based
globalization in the nineteenth century simply must be relearned. Just as
the prodigious daily capital flows between New York and California, two of
the world's 12 largest economies, are so uneventful that no one even
notices them, capital flows between countries sharing a single currency,
such as the dollar or the euro, attract not the slightest attention from
even the most passionate antiglobalization activists.

Countries whose currencies remain unwanted by foreigners will continue to
experiment with crisis-prevention policies, imposing capital controls and
building up war chests of dollar reserves. Few will repeat Argentina's
misguided efforts to fix a dollar exchange rate without the dollars to do
so. If these policies keep the IMF bored for a few more years, they will be
for the good.

But the world can do better. Since economic development outside the process
of globalization is no longer possible, countries should abandon monetary
nationalism. Governments should replace national currencies with the dollar
or the euro or, in the case of Asia, collaborate to produce a new
multinational currency over a comparably large and economically diversified
area.

Europeans used to say that being a country required having a national
airline, a stock exchange, and a currency. Today, no European country is
any worse off without them. Even grumpy Italy has benefited enormously from
the lower interest rates and permanent end to lira speculation that
accompanied its adoption of the euro. A future pan-Asian currency, managed
according to the same principle of targeting low and stable inflation,
would represent the most promising way for China to fully liberalize its
financial and capital markets without fear of damaging renminbi speculation
(the Chinese economy is only the size of California's and Florida's
combined). Most of the world's smaller and poorer countries would clearly
be best off unilaterally adopting the dollar or the euro, which would
enable their safe and rapid integration into global financial markets.
Latin American countries should dollarize; eastern European countries and
Turkey, euroize. Broadly speaking, this prescription follows from relative
trade flows, but there are exceptions; Argentina, for example, does more
eurozone than U.S. trade, but Argentines think and save in dollars.

Of course, dollarizing countries must give up independent monetary policy
as a tool of government macroeconomic management. But since the Holy Grail
of monetary policy is to get interest rates down to the lowest level
consistent with low and stable inflation, an argument against dollarization
on this ground is, for most of the world, frivolous. How many Latin
American countries can cut interest rates below those in the United States?
The average inflation-adjusted lending rate in Latin America is about 20
percent. One must therefore ask what possible boon to the national economy
developing-country central banks can hope to achieve from the ability to
guide nominal local rates up and down on a discretionary basis. It is like
choosing a Hyundai with manual transmission over a Lexus with automatic:
the former gives the driver more control but at the cost of inferior
performance under any condition.

As for the United States, it needs to perpetuate the sound money policies
of former Federal Reserve Chairs Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan and return
to long-term fiscal discipline. This is the only sure way to keep the
United States' foreign tailors, with their massive and growing holdings of
dollar debt, feeling wealthy and secure. It is the market that made the
dollar into global money -- and what the market giveth, the market can
taketh away. If the tailors balk and the dollar fails, the market may
privatize money on its own.


 

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"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
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experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'





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