New War and the Threat to Globalization

[R.A. Hettinga]

<http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=062107B>

TCS Daily -

New War and the Threat to Globalization


By James H. Joyner Jr. : BIO| 26 Jun 2007

Editor's note: TCS contributor James Joyner recently interviewed John Robb
of the Global Guerrillas blog on his new book Brave New War: The Next Stage
of Terrorism and the End of Globalization. Robb paints a picture of a
resilient enemy that morphs into something new just as we develop ways to
protect ourselves. He offers no quick fixes and argues that terrorists are
the equivalent of computer viruses: A nasty reality of modern life that
should cause us to take reasonable countermeasures but, mostly, something
we just have to live with.

Joyner: Throughout the book, you point out how easy it would be for
relatively small groups with minimal funding to create power blackouts,
disrupt our oil distribution networks, or even stage 9/11 style attacks on
a routine basis. Why do you suppose that hasn't already happened? For that
matter, we are surely more vulnerable than Jerusalem or Baghdad to suicide
bombers yet we have yet to see such attacks in our cities. Why?

Robb: To understand this, you need to understand that classic symbolic
terrorism is plagued by diminishing returns. The more you use it, the less
of an effect it has. So, in order to match or exceed previous impacts, you
need to increase the scale or breadth of the attack. The problem for al
Qaeda is that 9/11 was so big that it made exceeding it very difficult in a
post 9/11 security environment. Anything less would have damaged their
brand. Further, al Qaeda suffered serious blows during the invasion of
Afghanistan. It's taken them years to reconstitute the ability to launch
attacks.

It's also very possible that al Qaeda achieved what it wanted out of the
attack: to prod the US to overreact and embroil it in a no-win guerrilla
war in Asia (the way the Russians were defeated). However, their plans for
a guerrilla war in Afghanistan didn't pan out (at least in the short term).
Fortunately for them, Iraq did.

Since the start of the Iraq war, al Qaeda has begun to recognize the power
of systems disruption since it has worked so effectively there (developed
through an entrepreneurial process rather than centrally planned). The
attacks on Abqaiq (the Saudi refinery, if the attack was successful, we
would have $100 oil today) and the Golden Mosque last year are great
examples of infrastructure and social system disruption respectively. Why
travel to the US when you can so much more easily disrupt US efforts by
attacking closer targets. We live in a connected world.

Joyner: Like Thomas Barnett, you think the problem is more than "terrorism"
but rather forces out to disrupt the systems and rules that serve as a
framework for our global society. While Barnett is optimistic that, with
proper resolve, we can beat back those forces you conclude that we must
simply "learn to live with the threat they present" and adopt a "philosophy
of resilience that ensures that when these events do occur (and they will),
we can more easily survive their impact." Why?

Robb: Because the system shocks we will face from a heavy interconnected
world won't only originate from global guerrillas. There will be lots of
sources, from pandemics (bird flu) to global warming to peak oil to many we
can't imagine. The key to surviving them all in a way that doesn't diminish
us longer term is to decentralize resilience.

Specifically in terms of global disorder, the problem is that we can't
remake states that are being hollowed out by GGs. There isn't a
state-in-a-box solution that will work without creating more disorder in
the process. Also, I don't see the resolve at the international level.
Sure, you could blame it on Bush, but I think the world is too diverse a
place to come together on a strong rule set. All we seem to be able to do
is agree on the basics. Imagine trying to get everyone using the Internet
to agree with a strong set of rules on how it is used. Not going to happen.

So what's left? Decentralized resilience and muddling through the problems
we face as they come by diminishing their impact. No grand projects (if I
had a dollar for how many times I have heard people call for a Manhattan
project to solve xyz...), no universal comity, just messy reality.

Joyner: You argue that global guerrillas are interested in disrupting
systems and creating anarchy rather than taking over and running states.
Yet, in Clausewitzian terms, it seems both they and we are losing in terms
of achieving the political objectives that precipitated the fight. Saddam
launched a guerrilla war that not only failed to return him to power but
failed at keeping him or his sons among the living. Bin Laden and company
seem no closer to their stated goals of ending U.S. support of Israel,
toppling apostate Arab regimes, and so forth. Is it wrong to look at this
type of warfare in that way?

Robb: It is a little more complicated if you look at the larger picture,
beyond the US vs. Islamic frame. In the wider picture, the bulk of the
groups that are challenging states are gaining from the exercise. They are
gaining autonomy, wealth, etc. There is also a tendency for the groups
involved in an open source insurgency to cancel each other's political
goals. None of them is large enough to dictate to the others, and hence
nobody fully gets what they want. They only get the opportunity to pursue
them (in a strange way, what the market-state is supposed to be about).

Joyner: You say that the Global War on Terror could take down the United
States as a Superpower in much the same way that the Soviet Union collapsed
in the 1980s, "driven to bankruptcy by a foe it couldn't compete with
economically." Granting that we're spending quite literally more money than
every other country on the planet combined on defense, we're still spending
a historically low percentage of our GDP. How do we get to the point of
bankruptcy?

Robb: The larger context is that the combination of entitlement programs
and defense is squeezing out everything else. Eventually even defense will
get the squeeze as entitlements and debt run amok with the budget. That
isn't too far out. Further, the global economy we compete in is only going
to get more competitive. Additionally, corporations are globalizing
(becoming less tied to the US). Ever watch how states compete for a
factory? They bleed each other to death with tax giveaways. Our ability to
raise taxes only gets more and more difficult over time.

Finally, with systems disruption, it is possible to single out a country or
a corporation for punishment. That disruption could drastically harm that
country's ability to compete on a global scale. I don't think most people
realize how quickly a relative decline (either through slower growth or
outright contraction) could happen in the current and future economic
environments. Things are getting faster, not slower.

Joyner: You argue that we are not seeing a "clash of civilizations" and
that "religiosity is only a veneer on the conflict." Do you think al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and the various sectarian guerrillas in Iraq would exist
absent Islamist motivation? Or would there simply be other groups of
disaffected guerrillas instead?

Robb: No. They are religiously motivated. But they are only a part of the
growing conflict and cannot characterize the entire opposition.

Joyner: In your chapter on the "long tail" of the global guerrilla
movement, you include transnational gangs such as the Aryan Brotherhood and
MS-13 and contend that they "will challenge the United States for control."
How so?

Robb: We have seen this in action in Brazil and Mexico. The PCC grew from
little more than a prison gang to a massive network in less than a decade.
It's not too much of a stretch to see these rapidly growing gangs get
substantially stronger as they tap into vast pools of "black
globalization." Add systems disruption to that and they could even
manufacture their own growth dynamic.

Joyner: You note that we are "living in a world where networks are at the
center of our existence" and rightly note the incredible vulnerability that
brings. At the same time, you see the Internet and the open source movement
as models for restructuring ourselves to adapt to our new security
environment. Presumably, then, you don't see a Battlestar Galactica
scenario where we cut ourselves off from networked technologies for
security purposes?

Robb: While a cabin in the woods is attractive, I don't want to live there
year round. Most people would probably agree. To get the benefits of modern
life, we need to stay connected. In order to stay connected, we need to be
resilient at a level that we can influence.

Joyner: You want "market-states" to get out the way and "provide
market-based incentives" that would provide individuals, firms, and
localities the means of providing for their own security. You give some
examples for how that has worked in the technology world and even for
disaster preparedness. What sorts of responses do you see in the realm of
counter-terrorism?

Robb: If the attacks are from systems disruptions, the resilience model I
develop works nicely. If it is from classic symbolic terrorism, then good
old fashioned police work and special ops works fine. We just need to be
smarter about the information systems we use to make this happen (i.e.,
build a platform that makes a diverse ecosystem possible).

Joyner: Your "Rethinking Security" chapter, which describes how society
should adapt to our new environment, has a lot of high-level ideas but is
not fleshed out nearly to the level of detail as the remainder of the book.
Is this a function of the black swan problem? Is a sequel in the offing?

Robb: Exactly. The black swan problem defies anyone to posit that any
single solution would work. It requires complex solutions that can only be
constructed through an ecosystem of participants. I also think that I am
not smart enough to solve everyone's problems. I can offer a philosophy of
approach, but I'm not about to tell everybody in the world what to do.

I think a sequel on resilient communities would be lots of fun. There's
lots of innovation in that area already. Now if we could only find a way to
make it evolve more quickly.

James H. Joyner, Jr., Ph.D., a former Army officer and combat veteran of
Desert Storm, writes about public policy issues at Outside the Beltway. See
his review of Robb's new book for the Washington Examiner.

-- 
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R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'