[Clips] How to Interrogate Terrorists
Tyler Durden
camera_lumina at hotmail.com
Fri Feb 16 09:33:30 PST 2007
Sorry...I can't get past the title, unless of course there are some kind of
terrorist gene that can be tested for so that I can know a priori that I'm
interrogating a terrorist.
This is, of course, aside from the fact that one man's terrorist is the rest
of the world's freedom fighter theese days.
-TD
>From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: [Clips] How to Interrogate Terrorists
>Date: Sat, 10 Feb 2007 18:43:58 -0500
>
>--- begin forwarded text
>
>
> Delivered-To: rah at shipwright.com
> Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
> Date: Sat, 10 Feb 2007 18:39:58 -0500
> To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
> From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
> Subject: [Clips] How to Interrogate Terrorists
> Reply-To: clips-chat at philodox.com
> Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com
>
> <http://www.city-journal.org/printable.php?id=1727>
>
>
> City Journal
>
> How to Interrogate Terrorists
>
> Don't believe the charges. American troops treat terrorists with
> Geneva-convention politeness-perhaps too much so.
>
> Heather Mac Donald
>
> Winter 2005
>
> It didn't take long for interrogators in the war on terror to realize
>that
> their part was not going according to script. Pentagon doctrine, honed
>over
> decades of cold-war planning, held that 95 percent of prisoners would
>break
> upon straightforward questioning. Interrogators in Afghanistan, and
>later
> in Cuba and Iraq, found just the opposite: virtually none of the terror
> detainees was giving up information-not in response to direct
>questioning,
> and not in response to army-approved psychological gambits for prisoners
>of
> war.
>
> Debate erupted in detention centers across the globe about how to get
> detainees to talk. Were "stress techniques"-such as isolation or sleep
> deprivation to decrease a detainee's resistance to
>questioning-acceptable?
> Before the discussion concluded, however, the photos of prisoner abuse
>in
> Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison appeared. Though they showed the sadism of a
> prison out of control, they showed nothing about interrogation.
>
> Nevertheless, Bush-administration critics seized on the scandal as proof
> that prisoner "torture" had become routine. A master narrative-call it
>the
> "torture narrative"-sprang up: the government's 2002 decision to deny
> Geneva-convention status to al-Qaida fighters, it held, "led directly to
> the abuse of detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq," to quote the Washington
> Post. In particular, torturous interrogation methods, developed at
> Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan in illegal disregard of Geneva
>protections,
> migrated to Abu Ghraib and were manifest in the abuse photos.
>
> This story's success depends on the reader's remaining ignorant of the
> actual interrogation techniques promulgated in the war on terror. Not
>only
> were they light years from real torture and hedged around with
>bureaucratic
> safeguards, but they had nothing to do with the Abu Ghraib anarchy.
> Moreover, the decision on the Geneva conventions was irrelevant to
> interrogation practices in Iraq.
>
> No matter. The Pentagon's reaction to the scandal was swift and
>sweeping.
> It stripped interrogators not just of stress options but of traditional
> techniques long regarded as uncontroversial as well. Red tape now
>entangles
> the interrogation process, and detainees know that their adversaries'
>hands
> are tied.
>
> The need for rethinking interrogation doctrine in the war on terror will
> not go away, however. The Islamist enemy is unlike any the military has
> encountered in the past. If current wisdom on the rules of war prohibits
> making any distinction between a terrorist and a lawful combatant, then
> that orthodoxy needs to change.
>
> The interrogation debate first broke out on the frigid plains of
> Afghanistan. Marines and other special forces would dump planeloads of
> al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners into a ramshackle detention facility
>outside
> the Kandahar airport; waiting interrogators were then supposed to
>extract
> information to be fed immediately back into the battlefield-whether a
> particular mountain pass was booby-trapped, say, or where an arms cache
> lay. That "tactical" debriefing accomplished, the Kandahar interrogation
> crew would determine which prisoners were significant enough to be
>shipped
> on to the Guantanamo naval base in Cuba for high-level interrogation.
>
> Army doctrine gives interrogators 16 "approaches" to induce prisoners of
> war to divulge critical information. Sporting names like "Pride and Ego
> Down" and "Fear Up Harsh," these approaches aim to exploit a detainee's
> self-love, allegiance to or resentment of comrades, or sense of
>futility.
> Applied in the right combination, they will work on nearly everyone, the
> intelligence soldiers had learned in their training.
>
> But the Kandahar prisoners were not playing by the army rule book. They
> divulged nothing. "Prisoners overcame the [traditional] model almost
> effortlessly," writes Chris Mackey in The Interrogators, his gripping
> account of his interrogation service in Afghanistan. The prisoners
> confounded their captors "not with clever cover stories but with simple
> refusal to cooperate. They offered lame stories, pretended not to
>remember
> even the most basic of details, and then waited for consequences that
>never
> really came."
>
> Some of the al-Qaida fighters had received resistance training, which
> taught that Americans were strictly limited in how they could question
> prisoners. Failure to cooperate, the al-Qaida manuals revealed, carried
>no
> penalties and certainly no risk of torture-a sign, gloated the manuals,
>of
> American weakness.
>
> Even if a prisoner had not previously studied American detention
>policies
> before arriving at Kandahar, he soon figured them out. "It became very
> clear very early on to the detainees that the Americans were just going
>to
> have them sit there," recalls interrogator Joe Martin (a pseudonym).
>"They
> realized: 'The Americans will give us our Holy Book, they'll draw lines
>on
> the floor showing us where to pray, we'll get three meals a day with
>fresh
> fruit, do Jazzercise with the guards, . . . we can wait them out.' "
>
> Even more challenging was that these detainees bore little resemblance
>to
> traditional prisoners of war. The army's interrogation manual presumed
> adversaries who were essentially the mirror image of their captors,
> motivated by emotions that all soldiers share. A senior intelligence
> official who debriefed prisoners in the 1989 U.S. operation in Panama
> contrasts the battlefield then and now: "There were no martyrs down
>there,
> believe me," he chuckles. "The Panamanian forces were more
>understandable
> people for us. Interrogation was pretty straightforward: 'Love of
>Family'
> [an army-manual approach, promising, say, contact with wife or children
>in
> exchange for cooperation] or, 'Here's how you get out of here as fast as
> you can.' "
>
> "Love of family" often had little purchase among the terrorists,
>however-as
> did love of life. "The jihadists would tell you, 'I've divorced this
>life,
> I don't care about my family,' " recalls an interrogator at Guantanamo.
> "You couldn't shame them." The fierce hatred that the captives bore
>their
> captors heightened their resistance. The U.S. ambassador to Pakistan
> reported in January 2002 that prisoners in Kandahar would "shout
>epithets
> at their captors, including threats against the female relatives of the
> soldiers guarding them, knee marines in the groin, and say that they
>will
> escape and kill 'more Americans and Jews.' " Such animosity continued in
> Guantanamo.
>
> Battlefield commanders in Afghanistan and intelligence officials in
> Washington kept pressing for information, however. The frustrated
> interrogators constantly discussed how to get it. The best hope, they
> agreed, was to re-create the "shock of capture"-that vulnerable mental
> state when a prisoner is most frightened, most uncertain, and most
>likely
> to respond to questioning. Uncertainty is an interrogator's most
>powerful
> ally; exploited wisely, it can lead the detainee to believe that the
> interrogator is in total control and holds the key to his future. The
> Kandahar detainees, however, learned almost immediately what their
>future
> held, no matter how egregious their behavior: nothing untoward.
>
> Many of the interrogators argued for a calibrated use of "stress
> techniques"-long interrogations that would cut into the detainees' sleep
> schedules, for example, or making a prisoner kneel or stand, or
>aggressive
> questioning that would put a detainee on edge.
>
> Joe Martin-a crack interrogator who discovered that a top al-Qaida
>leader,
> whom Pakistan claimed to have in custody, was still at large and
>directing
> the Afghani resistance-explains the psychological effect of stress:
>"Let's
> say a detainee comes into the interrogation booth and he's had
>resistance
> training. He knows that I'm completely handcuffed and that I can't do
> anything to him. If I throw a temper tantrum, lift him onto his knees,
>and
> walk out, you can feel his uncertainty level rise dramatically. He's
>been
> told: 'They won't physically touch you,' and now you have. The point is
>not
> to beat him up but to introduce the reality into his mind that he
>doesn't
> know where your limit is." Grabbing someone by the top of the collar has
> had a more profound effect on the outcome of questioning than any actual
> torture could have, Martin maintains. "The guy knows: You just broke
>your
> own rules, and that's scary. He might demand to talk to my supervisor.
>I'll
> respond: 'There are no supervisors here,' and give him a maniacal
>smile."
>
> The question was: Was such treatment consistent with the Geneva
>conventions?
>
> President Bush had declared in February 2002 that al-Qaida members fell
> wholly outside the conventions and that Taliban prisoners would not
>receive
> prisoner-of-war status-without which they, too, would not be covered by
>the
> Geneva rules. Bush ordered, however, that detainees be treated humanely
>and
> in accordance with Geneva principles, to the extent consistent with
> military necessity. This second pronouncement sank in: all of the war on
> terror's detention facilities chose to operate under Geneva rules.
>Contrary
> to the fulminations of rights advocates and the press, writes Chris
>Mackey,
> "Every signal we interrogators got from above from the colonels at [the
> Combined Forces Land Component Command] in Kuwait to the officers at
> Central Command back in Tampa-had been . . . to observe the Conventions,
> respect prisoners' rights, and never cut corners."
>
> What emerged was a hybrid and fluid set of detention practices. As
> interrogators tried to overcome the prisoners' resistance, their
>reference
> point remained Geneva and other humanitarian treaties. But the
> interrogators pushed into the outer limits of what they thought the law
> allowed, undoubtedly recognizing that the prisoners in their control
> violated everything the pacts stood for.
>
> The Geneva conventions embody the idea that even in as brutal an
>activity
> as war, civilized nations could obey humanitarian rules: no attacking
> civilians and no retaliation against enemy soldiers once they fall into
> your hands. Destruction would be limited as much as possible to
> professional soldiers on the battlefield. That rule required,
> unconditionally, that soldiers distinguish themselves from civilians by
> wearing uniforms and carrying arms openly.
>
> Obedience to Geneva rules rests on another bedrock moral principle:
> reciprocity. Nations will treat an enemy's soldiers humanely because
>they
> want and expect their adversaries to do the same. Terrorists flout every
> civilized norm animating the conventions. Their whole purpose is to kill
> noncombatants, to blend into civilian populations, and to conceal their
> weapons. They pay no heed whatever to the golden rule; anyone who falls
> into their hands will most certainly not enjoy commissary privileges and
> wages, per the Geneva mandates. He-or she-may even lose his head.
>
> Even so, terror interrogators tried to follow the spirit of the Geneva
>code
> for conventional, uniformed prisoners of war. That meant, as the code
>puts
> it, that the detainees could not be tortured or subjected to "any form
>of
> coercion" in order to secure information. They were to be "humanely"
> treated, protected against "unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of
>any
> kind," and were entitled to "respect for their persons and their
>honour."
>
> The Kandahar interrogators reached the following rule of thumb, reports
> Mackey: if a type of behavior toward a prisoner was no worse than the
>way
> the army treated its own members, it could not be considered torture or
>a
> violation of the conventions. Thus, questioning a detainee past his
>bedtime
> was lawful as long as his interrogator stayed up with him. If the
> interrogator was missing exactly the same amount of sleep as the
> detainee-and no tag-teaming of interrogators would be allowed, the
>soldiers
> decided-then sleep deprivation could not be deemed torture. In fact,
> interrogators were routinely sleep-deprived, catnapping maybe one or two
> hours a night, even as the detainees were getting long beauty sleeps.
> Likewise, if a boot-camp drill sergeant can make a recruit kneel with
>his
> arms stretched out in front without violating the Convention Against
> Torture, an interrogator can use that tool against a recalcitrant terror
> suspect.
>
> Did the stress techniques work? Yes. "The harsher methods we used . . .
>the
> better information we got and the sooner we got it," writes Mackey, who
> emphasizes that the methods never contravened the conventions or crossed
> over into torture.
>
> Stress broke a young bomb maker, for instance. Six months into the war,
> special forces brought a young Afghan to the Kandahar facility, the
>likely
> accomplice of a Taliban explosives expert who had been blowing up aid
> workers. Joe Martin got the assignment.
>
> "Who's your friend the Americans are looking for?" the interrogation
>began.
>
> "I don't know."
>
> "You think this is a joke? What do you think I'll do?"
>
> "Torture me."
>
> So now I understand his fear, Martin recollects.
>
> The interrogation continued: "You'll stand here until you tell me your
>friend."
>
> "No, sir, he's not my friend."
>
> Martin picked up a book and started reading. Several hours later, the
>young
> Taliban was losing his balance and was clearly terrified. Moreover, he's
> got two "big hillbilly guards staring at him who want to kill him," the
> interrogator recalls.
>
> "You think THIS is bad?!" the questioning starts up again.
>
> "No, sir."
>
> The prisoner starts to fall; the guards stand him back up. If he falls
> again, and can't get back up, Martin can do nothing further. "I have no
> rack," he says matter-of-factly. The interrogator's power is an
>illusion;
> if a detainee refuses to obey a stress order, an American interrogator
>has
> no recourse.
>
> Martin risks a final display of his imaginary authority. "I get in his
> face, 'What do you think I will do next?' " he barks. In the captive's
> mind, days have passed, and he has no idea what awaits him. He discloses
> where he planted bombs on a road and where to find his associate. "The
> price?" Martin asks. "I made a man stand up. Is this unlawful coercion?"
>
> Under a strict reading of the Geneva protections for prisoners of war,
> probably: the army forbids interrogators from even touching lawful
> combatants. But there is a huge gray area between the gold standard of
>POW
> treatment reserved for honorable opponents and torture, which consists
>of
> the intentional infliction of severe physical and mental pain. None of
>the
> stress techniques that the military has used in the war on terror comes
> remotely close to torture, despite the hysterical charges of
>administration
> critics. (The CIA's behavior remains a black box.) To declare
>non-torturous
> stress off-limits for an enemy who plays by no rules and accords no
>respect
> to Western prisoners is folly.
>
> The soldiers used stress techniques to reinforce the traditional
> psychological approaches. Jeff (a pseudonym), an interrogator in
> Afghanistan, had been assigned a cocky English Muslim, who justified the
> 9/11 attacks because women had been working in the World Trade Center.
>The
> British citizen deflected all further questioning. Jeff questioned him
>for
> a day and a half, without letting him sleep and playing on his religious
> loyalties. "I broke him on his belief in Islam," Jeff recounts. "He
> realized he had messed up, because his Muslim brothers and sisters were
> also in the building." The Brit broke down and cried, then disclosed the
> mission that al-Qaida had put him on before capture. But once the
>prisoner
> was allowed to sleep for six hours, he again "clammed up."
>
> Halfway across the globe, an identical debate had broken out, among
> interrogators who were encountering the same obstacles as the
>Afghanistan
> intelligence team. The U.S. base at Guantanamo was supposed to be
>getting
> the Afghanistan war's worst of the worst: the al-Qaida Arabs and their
>high
> Taliban allies.
>
> Usama bin Ladin's driver and bodyguard were there, along with explosives
> experts, al-Qaida financiers and recruiters, would-be suicide recruits,
>and
> the architects of numerous attacks on civilian targets. They knew about
> al-Qaida's leadership structure, its communication methods, and its
>plans
> to attack the U.S. And they weren't talking. "They'd laugh at you;
>'You've
> asked me this before,' they'd say contemptuously," reports Major General
> Michael Dunlavey, a former Guantanamo commanding officer. "Their
>resistance
> was tenacious. They'd already had 90 days in Afghanistan to get their
>cover
> stories together and to plan with their compatriots."
>
> Even more than Afghanistan, Guantanamo dissipated any uncertainty the
> detainees might have had about the consequences of noncooperation.
> Consistent with the president's call for humane treatment, prisoners
> received expert medical care, three culturally appropriate meals each
>day,
> and daily opportunities for prayer, showers, and exercise. They had mail
> privileges and reading materials. Their biggest annoyance was boredom,
> recalls one interrogator. Many prisoners disliked the move from Camp
>X-Ray,
> the first facility used at the base, to the more commodious Camp Delta,
> because it curtailed their opportunities for homosexual sex, says an
> intelligence analyst. The captives protested every perceived
>infringement
> of their rights but, as in Afghanistan, ignored any reciprocal
>obligation.
> They hurled excrement and urine at guards, used their blankets as
>garrotes,
> and created additional weapons out of anything they could get their
>hands
> on-including a sink wrenched off a wall. Guards who responded to the
> attacks-with pepper spray or a water hose, say-got punished and, in one
> case, court-martialed.
>
> Gitmo personnel disagreed sharply over what tools interrogators could
> legally use. The FBI took the most conservative position. When a bureau
> agent questioning Mohamedou Ould Slahi-a Mauritanian al-Qaida operative
>who
> had recruited two of the 9/11 pilots-was getting nothing of value, an
>army
> interrogator suggested, "Why don't you mention to him that conspiracy is
>a
> capital offense?" "That would be a violation of the Convention Against
> Torture," shot back the agent-on the theory that any covert threat
>inflicts
> "severe mental pain." Never mind that district attorneys and police
> detectives routinely invoke the possibility of harsh criminal penalties
>to
> get criminals to confess. Federal prosecutors in New York have even been
> known to remind suspects that they are more likely to keep their teeth
>and
> not end up as sex slaves by pleading to a federal offense, thus avoiding
> New York City's Rikers Island jail. Using such a method against an
>al-Qaida
> jihadist, by contrast, would be branded a serious humanitarian breach.
>
> Top military commanders often matched the FBI's restraint, however. "It
>was
> ridiculous the things we couldn't do," recalls an army interrogator.
>"One
> guy said he would talk if he could see the ocean. It wasn't approved,
> because it would be a change of scenery"-a privilege that discriminated
>in
> favor of a cooperating detainee, as opposed to being available to all,
> regardless of their behavior.
>
> Frustration with prisoner stonewalling reached a head with Mohamed
> al-Kahtani, a Saudi who had been fighting with Usama bin Ladin's
>bodyguards
> in Afghanistan in December 2001. By July 2002, analysts had figured out
> that Kahtani was the missing 20th hijacker. He had flown into Orlando
> International Airport from Dubai on August 4, 2001, but a sharp-eyed
> customs agent had denied him entry. Waiting for him at the other side of
> the gate was Mohamed Atta.
>
> Kahtani's resistance strategies were flawless. Around the first
>anniversary
> of 9/11, urgency to get information on al-Qaida grew. Finally, army
> officials at Guantanamo prepared a legal analysis of their interrogation
> options and requested permission from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
>to
> use various stress techniques on Kahtani. Their memo, sent up the
> bureaucratic chain on October 11, 2002, triggered a fierce six-month
> struggle in Washington among military lawyers, administration officials,
> and Pentagon chiefs about interrogation in the war on terror.
>
> To read the techniques requested is to understand how restrained the
> military has been in its approach to terror detainees-and how utterly
>false
> the torture narrative has been. Here's what the interrogators assumed
>they
> could not do without clearance from the secretary of defense: yell at
> detainees (though never in their ears), use deception (such as posing as
> Saudi intelligence agents), and put detainees on MREs (meals ready to
> eat-vacuum-sealed food pouches eaten by millions of soldiers, as well as
> vacationing backpackers) instead of hot rations. The interrogators
>promised
> that this dangerous dietary measure would be used only in extremis,
>pending
> local approval and special training.
>
> The most controversial technique approved was "mild, non-injurious
>physical
> contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light
> pushing," to be reserved only for a "very small percentage of the most
> uncooperative detainees" believed to possess critical intelligence. A
> detainee could be poked only after review by Gitmo's commanding general
>of
> intelligence and the commander of the U.S. Southern Command in Miami,
>and
> only pursuant to "careful coordination" and monitoring.
>
> None of this remotely approaches torture or cruel or degrading
>treatment.
> Nevertheless, fanatically cautious Pentagon lawyers revolted, claiming
>that
> the methods approved for Kahtani violated international law.
> Uncharacteristically irresolute, Rumsfeld rescinded the Guantanamo
> techniques in January 2003.
>
> Kahtani's interrogation hung fire for three months, while a Washington
> committee, with representatives from the undersecretary of defense, the
> Defense Intelligence Agency, the air force, army, navy, and marine
>corps,
> and attorneys from every branch of the military, considered how to
>approach
> the 20th hijacker.
>
> The outcome of this massive deliberation was more restrictive than the
> Geneva conventions themselves, even though they were to apply only to
> unlawful combatants, not conventional prisoners of war, and only to
>those
> held at Guantanamo Bay. It is worth scrutinizing the final 24 techniques
> Rumsfeld approved for terrorists at Gitmo in April 2003, since these are
> the techniques that the media presents as the source of "torture" at Abu
> Ghraib. The torture narrative holds that illegal methods used at
>Guantanamo
> migrated to Iraq and resulted in the abuse of prisoners there.
>
> So what were these cruel and degrading practices? For one, providing a
> detainee an incentive for cooperation-such as a cigarette or, especially
> favored in Cuba, a McDonald's Filet-O-Fish sandwich or a Twinkie unless
> specifically approved by the secretary of defense. In other words, if an
> interrogator had learned that Usama bin Ladin's accountant loved Cadbury
> chocolate, and intended to enter the interrogation booth armed with a
>Dairy
> Milk Wafer to extract the name of a Saudi financier, he needed to
> "specifically determine that military necessity requires" the use of the
> Dairy Milk Wafer and send an alert to Secretary Rumsfeld that chocolate
>was
> to be deployed against an al-Qaida operative.
>
> Similar restrictions-a specific finding of military necessity and notice
>to
> Rumsfeld-applied to other tried-and-true army psychological techniques.
> These included "Pride and Ego Down"-attacking a detainee's pride to goad
> him into revealing critical information-as well as "Mutt and Jeff," the
> classic good cop-bad cop routine of countless police shows. Isolating a
> detainee from other prisoners to prevent collaboration and to increase
>his
> need to talk required not just notice and a finding of military
>necessity
> but "detailed implementation instructions [and] medical and
>psychological
> review."
>
> The only non-conventional "stress" techniques on the final Guantanamo
>list
> are such innocuous interventions as adjusting the temperature or
> introducing an unpleasant smell into the interrogation room, but only if
> the interrogator is present at all times; reversing a detainee's sleep
> cycles from night to day (call this the "Flying to Hong Kong" approach);
> and convincing a detainee that his interrogator is not from the U.S.
>
> Note that none of the treatments shown in the Abu Ghraib photos, such as
> nudity or the use of dogs, was included in the techniques certified for
>the
> unlawful combatants held in Cuba. And those mild techniques that were
> certified could only be used with extensive bureaucratic oversight and
> medical monitoring to ensure "humane," "safe," and "lawful" application.
>
> After Rumsfeld cleared the 24 methods, interrogators approached Kahtani
> once again. They relied almost exclusively on isolation and lengthy
> interrogations. They also used some "psy-ops" (psychological
>operations).
> Ten or so interrogators would gather and sing the Rolling Stones' "Time
>Is
> on My Side" outside Kahtani's cell. Sometimes they would play a
>recording
> of "Enter Sandman" by the heavy-metal group Metallica, which brought
> Kahtani to tears, because he thought (not implausibly) he was hearing
>the
> sound of Satan.
>
> Finally, at 4 am-after an 18-hour, occasionally loud, interrogation,
>during
> which Kahtani head-butted his interrogators-he started giving up
> information, convinced that he was being sold out by his buddies. The
> entire process had been conducted under the watchful eyes of a medic, a
> psychiatrist, and lawyers, to make sure that no harm was done. Kahtani
> provided detailed information on his meetings with Usama bin Ladin, on
>Jose
> Padilla and Richard Reid, and on Adnan El Shukrijumah, one of the FBI's
> most wanted terrorists, believed to be wandering between South and North
> America.
>
> Since then, according to Pentagon officials, none of the non-traditional
> techniques approved for Kahtani has been used on anyone else at
>Guantanamo
> Bay.
>
> The final strand in the "torture narrative" is the least grounded in
>actual
> practice, but it has had the most distorting effect on the public
>debate.
> In the summer of 2002, the CIA sought legal advice about permissible
> interrogation techniques for the recently apprehended Abu Zubaydah,
>Usama
> bin Ladin's chief recruiter in the 1990s. The Palestinian Zubaydah had
> already been sentenced to death in absentia in Jordan for an abortive
>plot
> to bomb hotels there during the millennium celebration; he had arranged
>to
> obliterate the Los Angeles airport on the same night. The CIA wanted to
>use
> techniques on Zubaydah that the military uses on marines and other elite
> fighters in Survive, Evade, Resist, Escape (SERE) school, which teaches
>how
> to withstand torture and other pressures to collaborate. The techniques
>are
> classified, but none allegedly involves physical contact. (Later, the
>CIA
> is said to have used "water-boarding"-temporarily submerging a detainee
>in
> water to induce the sensation of drowning-on Khalid Sheik Mohammad, the
> mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. Water-boarding is the most extreme
>method
> the CIA has applied, according to a former Justice Department attorney,
>and
> arguably it crosses the line into torture.)
>
> In response to the CIA's request, Assistant Attorney General Jay S.
>Bybee
> produced a hair-raising memo that understandably caused widespread
>alarm.
> Bybee argued that a U.S. law ratifying the 1984 Convention Against
> Torture-covering all persons, whether lawful combatants or not-forbade
>only
> physical pain equivalent to that "accompanying serious physical injury,
> such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death," or
> mental pain that resulted in "significant psychological harm of
>significant
> duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years." More troubling still,
> Bybee concluded that the torture statute and international humanitarian
> treaties did not bind the executive branch in wartime.
>
> This infamous August "torture memo" represents the high (or low) point
>of
> the Bush administration's theory of untrammeled presidential war-making
> power. But note: it had nothing to do with the interrogation debates and
> experiments unfolding among Pentagon interrogators in Afghanistan and
>Cuba.
> These soldiers struggling with al-Qaida resistance were perfectly
>ignorant
> about executive-branch deliberations on the outer boundaries of pain and
> executive power (which, in any case, were prepared for and seen only by
>the
> CIA). "We had no idea what went on in Washington," said Chris Mackey in
>an
> interview. A Guantanamo lawyer involved in the Kahtani interrogation
>echoes
> Mackey: "We were not aware of the [Justice Department and White House]
> debates." Interrogators in Iraq were equally unaware of the Bybee memo.
>
> Nevertheless, when the Bybee analysis was released in June 2004, it
>became
> the capstone on the torture narrative, the most damning link between the
> president's decision that the Geneva conventions didn't apply to
>terrorists
> and the sadistic behavior of the military guards at Abu Ghraib. Seymour
> Hersh, the left-wing journalist who broke the Abu Ghraib story, claims
>that
> the Bybee torture memo was the "most suggestive document, in terms of
>what
> was really going on inside military prisons and detention centers."
>
> But not only is the Bybee memo irrelevant to what happened in Abu
>Ghraib;
> so, too, are the previous interrogation debates in Afghanistan and Cuba.
> The abuse at Abu Ghraib resulted from the Pentagon's failure to plan for
> any outcome of the Iraq invasion except the most rosy scenario, its
>failure
> to respond to the insurgency once it broke out, and its failure to keep
> military discipline from collapsing in the understaffed Abu Ghraib
> facility. Interrogation rules were beside the point.
>
> As the avalanche of prisoners taken in the street fighting overwhelmed
>the
> inadequate contingent of guards and officers at Abu Ghraib, order within
> the ranks broke down as thoroughly as order in the operation of the
>prison
> itself. Soldiers talked back to their superiors, refused to wear
>uniforms,
> operated prostitution and bootlegging rings, engaged in rampant and
>public
> sexual misbehavior, covered the facilities with graffiti, and indulged
>in
> drinking binges while on duty. No one knew who was in command. The
>guards'
> sadistic and sexualized treatment of prisoners was just an extension of
>the
> chaos they were already wallowing in with no restraint from above.
> Meanwhile, prisoners regularly rioted; insurgents shelled the compound
> almost daily; the army sent only rotten, bug-infested rations; and the
> Iraqi guards sold favors to the highest bidders among the insurgents.
>
> The idea that the abuse of the Iraqi detainees resulted from the
> president's decision on the applicability of the Geneva conventions to
> al-Qaida and Taliban detainees is absurd on several grounds. Everyone in
> the military chain of command emphasized repeatedly that the Iraq
>conflict
> would be governed by the conventions in their entirety. The
>interrogation
> rules that local officers developed for Iraq explicitly stated that they
> were promulgated under Geneva authority, and that the conventions
>applied.
> Moreover, almost all the behavior shown in the photographs occurred in
>the
> dead of night among military police, wholly separate from
>interrogations.
> Most abuse victims were not even scheduled to be interrogated, because
>they
> were of no intelligence value. Finally, except for the presence of dogs,
> none of the behavior shown in the photos was included in the
>interrogation
> rules promulgated in Iraq. Mandated masturbation, dog leashes, assault,
>and
> stacking naked prisoners in pyramids-none of these depredations was an
> approved (or even contemplated) interrogation practice, and no
>interrogator
> ordered the military guards to engage in them.
>
> It is the case that intelligence officers in Iraq and Afghanistan were
> making use of nudity and phobias about dogs at the time. Nudity was not
> officially sanctioned, and the official rule about dogs only allowed
>their
> "presence" in the interrogation booth, not their being sicced on naked
> detainees. The argument that such techniques contributed to a
> dehumanization of the detainees, which in turn led to their abuse, is
>not
> wholly implausible. Whether or not those two particular stressors are
>worth
> defending (and many interrogators say they are not), their abuse should
>not
> discredit the validity of other stress techniques that the military was
> cautiously experimenting with in the months before Abu Ghraib.
>
> That experiment is over. Reeling under the PR disaster of Abu Ghraib,
>the
> Pentagon shut down every stress technique but one-isolation-and that can
>be
> used only after extensive review. An interrogator who so much as
>requests
> permission to question a detainee into the night could be putting his
> career in jeopardy. Even the traditional army psychological approaches
>have
> fallen under a deep cloud of suspicion: deflating a detainee's ego,
> aggressive but non-physical histrionics, and good cop-bad cop have been
> banished along with sleep deprivation.
>
> Timidity among officers prevents the energetic application of those
> techniques that remain. Interrogation plans have to be triple-checked
>all
> the way up through the Pentagon by officers who have never conducted an
> interrogation in their lives.
>
> In losing these techniques, interrogators have lost the ability to
>create
> the uncertainty vital to getting terrorist information. Since the Abu
> Ghraib scandal broke, the military has made public nearly every record
>of
> its internal interrogation debates, providing al-Qaida analysts with an
> encyclopedia of U.S. methods and constraints. Those constraints make
> perfectly clear that the interrogator is not in control. "In reassuring
>the
> world about our limits, we have destroyed our biggest asset: detainee
> doubt," a senior Pentagon intelligence official laments.
>
> Soldiers on the ground are noticing the consequences. "The Iraqis
>already
> know the game. They know how to play us," a marine chief warrant officer
> told the Wall Street Journal in August. "Unless you catch the Iraqis in
>the
> act, it is very hard to pin anything on anyone . . . . We can't even use
> basic police interrogation tactics."
>
> And now the rights advocates, energized by the Abu Ghraib debacle, are
> making one final push to halt interrogation altogether. In the New York
> Times's words, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is
>now
> condemning the thoroughly emasculated interrogation process at
>Guantanamo
> Bay as a "system devised to break the will of the prisoners [and] make
>them
> wholly dependent on their interrogators." In other words, the ICRC
>opposes
> traditional interrogation itself, since all interrogation is designed to
> "break the will of prisoners" and make them feel "dependent on their
> interrogators." But according to an ICRC report leaked to the Times,
>"the
> construction of such a system, whose stated purpose is the production of
> intelligence, cannot be considered other than an intentional system of
> cruel, unusual and degrading treatment and a form of torture."
>
> But contrary to the fantasies of the international-law and human rights
> lobbies, a world in which all interrogation is illegal and rights are
> indiscriminately doled out is not a safer or more just world. Were the
> United States to announce that terrorists would be protected under the
> Geneva conventions, it would destroy any incentive our ruthless enemies
> have to comply with the laws of war. The Washington Post and the New
>York
> Times understood that truth in 1987, when they supported President
>Ronald
> Reagan's rejection of an amendment to the Geneva conventions that would
> have granted lawful-combatant status to terrorists. Today, however,
>those
> same opinion makers have done an about-face, though the most striking
> feature of their denunciations of the Bush administration's Geneva
> decisions is their failure to offer any explanation for how al-Qaida
>could
> possibly be covered under the plain meaning of the text.
>
> The Pentagon is revising the rules for interrogation. If we hope to
>succeed
> in the war on terror, the final product must allow interrogators to use
> stress techniques against unlawful combatants. Chris Mackey testifies to
> how "ineffective schoolhouse methods were in getting prisoners to talk."
>He
> warns that his team "failed to break prisoners who I have no doubt knew
>of
> terrorist plots or at least terrorist cells that may one day do us harm.
> Perhaps they would have talked if faced with harsher methods."
>
> The stress techniques that the military has used to date are not
>torture;
> the advocates can only be posturing in calling them such. On its
>website,
> Human Rights Watch lists the effects of real torture: "from pain and
> swelling to broken bones, irreparable neurological damage, and chronic
> painful musculoskeletal problems . . . [to] long-term depression,
> post-traumatic stress disorder, marked sleep disturbances and
>alterations
> in self-perceptions, not to mention feelings of powerlessness, of fear,
> guilt and shame." Though none of the techniques that Pentagon
>interrogators
> have employed against al-Qaida comes anywhere close to risking such
> effects, Human Rights Watch nevertheless follows up its list with an
> accusation of torture against the Bush administration.
>
> The pressure on the Pentagon to outlaw stress techniques won't abate, as
> the American Civil Liberties Union continues to release formerly
>classified
> government documents obtained in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
> concerning detention and interrogation. As of late December, the memos
>have
> merely confirmed that the FBI opposes stress methods, though the press
> breathlessly portrays them as confirming "torture."
>
> Human Rights Watch, the ICRC, Amnesty International, and the other
> self-professed guardians of humanitarianism need to come back to
>earth-to
> the real world in which torture means what the Nazis and the Japanese
>did
> in their concentration and POW camps in World War II; the world in which
> evil regimes, like those we fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, don't follow
> the Miranda rules or the Convention Against Torture but instead gas
> children, bury people alive, set wild animals on soccer players who
>lose,
> and hang adulterous women by truckloads before stadiums full of
>spectators;
> the world in which barbarous death cults behead female aid workers, bomb
> crowded railway stations, and fly planes filled with hundreds of
>innocent
> passengers into buildings filled with thousands of innocent and
> unsuspecting civilians. By definition, our terrorist enemies and their
> state supporters have declared themselves enemies of the civilized order
> and its humanitarian rules. In fighting them, we must of course hold
> ourselves to our own high moral standards without, however, succumbing
>to
> the utopian illusion that we can prevail while immaculately observing
>every
> precept of the Sermon on the Mount. It is the necessity of this fallen
> world that we must oppose evil with force; and we must use all the
>lawful
> means necessary to ensure that good, rather than evil, triumphs.
>
>
> --
> -----------------
> R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
> "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
> [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
> experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
> _______________________________________________
> Clips mailing list
> Clips at philodox.com
> http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips
>
>--- end forwarded text
>
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
_________________________________________________________________
Play Flexicon: the crossword game that feeds your brain. PLAY now for FREE.
http://zone.msn.com/en/flexicon/default.htm?icid=flexicon_hmtagline
More information about the cypherpunks-legacy
mailing list