[Clips] UK Government to force handover of encryption keys

[Tyler Durden]

Let us not forget all of the methods of "deniable encryption" discussed a 
few years back. If the "wrong" key is entered, the returned "de-encrypted" 
file will look -kinda- bad but not actually be the original plaintext.

This seems all the easier with TOR-stored data.

Fortunately, it would appear that such a law should be bound to force 
development of deniable encryption tools.

-TD


>From: Sarad AV <jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com>
>To: cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: Re: [Clips] UK Government to force handover of encryption keys
>Date: Thu, 18 May 2006 22:03:17 -0700 (PDT)
>
>This clearly doesnt work. All they will manage to do
>is harass citizens.
>
>Sarad.
>
>
>--- "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote:
>
> >   "It is, as ever, almost impossible to prove
> > 'beyond a reasonable doubt'
> >   that some random-looking data is in fact
> > ciphertext, and then prove that
> >   the accused actually has the key for it, and that
> > he has refused a proper
> >   order to divulge it," pointed out encryption
> > expert Peter Fairbrother on
> >   ukcrypto, a public email discussion list.
> >
> >   Clayton backed up this point. "The police can say
> > 'We think he's a
> >   terrorist' or 'We think he's trading in kiddie
> > porn', and the suspect can
> >   say, 'No, they're love letters, sorry, I've lost
> > the key'. How much
> >   evidence do you need [to convict]? If you can't
> > decrypt [the data], then by
> >   definition you don't know what it is," said
> > Clayton.
>
>
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