[CSL Colloq] Signaling Vulnerabilities in Law-Enforcement

[allison at stanford.edu]

Wiretap Systems * 4:15PM, Wed Mar 08, 2006 in Gates B01
Reply-To: ee380 at shasta.stanford.edu


             Stanford EE Computer Systems Colloquium

                 4:15PM, Wednesday, Mar 08, 2006
        HP Auditorium, Gates Computer Science Building B01
                   http://ee380.stanford.edu[1]

Topic:   Signaling Vulnerabilities in Law-Enforcement Wiretap Systems

Speaker: Matt Blaze
         University of Pennsylvania

About the talk:

Telephone wiretap and dialed number recording systems are used by
law enforcement and national security agencies to collect
investigative intelligence and legal evidence. This talk will
show how many of these systems are vulnerable to simple,
unilateral countermeasures that allow wiretap targets to prevent
their call audio from being recorded and/or cause false or
inaccurate dialed digits and call activity to be logged. The
countermeasures exploit the unprotected in-band signals passed
between the telephone network and the collection system and are
effective against many of the wiretapping technologies currently
used by US law enforcement, including at least some ``CALEA''
systems. Possible remedies and workarounds will be proposed, and
the broader implications of the security properties of these
systems will be discussed.

A recent paper, as well as audio examples of several wiretapping
countermeasures, can be found at
http://www.crypto.com/papers/wiretapping/ [2].

This is joint work with Micah Sherr, Eric Cronin, and Sandy
Clark.

About the speaker:

Research: Prof Blaze's research focuses on the architecture and
design of secure systems based on cryptographic techniques,
analysis of secure systems against practical attack models, and
on finding new cryptographic primitives and techniques. This work
has led directly to several new cryptographic concepts,
including: "Remotely-Keyed Encryption," which allows the use of
inexpensive, low-bandwidth secure hardware to protect
high-bandwidth communication and stored data, "Atomic Proxy
Cryptography," which allows re-encryption by untrusted third
parties, and "Master-Key Encryption," which provides a systematic
way to design (and study) ciphers with built-in "back doors."

Prof Blaze is especially interested in the use of encryption to
protect insecure systems such as the Internet. He was a designer
of swIPe, a predecessor of the now standard IPSEC protocol for
protecting Internet traffic. Another project, CFS, investigated
and demonstrated the feasibility of including encryption as file
system service.

Contact information:

Matt Blaze
University of Pennsylvania
http://www.crypto.com[4]


Embedded Links:
[ 1 ]    http://ee380.stanford.edu
[ 2 ]    http://www.crypto.com/papers/wiretapping/
[ 3 ]    www.crypto.com
[ 4 ]    http://www.crypto.com


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