[Synthetic Biology] Q. Is secret biodefense a bad idea?

[Drew Endy]

NBC news video and Washington Post front page story about the NBACC  
at Ft. Detrick.

Best,
Drew

______

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/video/2006/07/29/VI2006072900668.html

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/29/AR2006072900592_pf.html

The Secretive Fight Against Bioterror
The government is building a highly classified facility to research  
biological weapons, but its closed-door approach has raised concerns.

By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, July 30, 2006; A01

On the grounds of a military base an hour's drive from the capital,  
the Bush administration is building a massive biodefense laboratory  
unlike any seen since biological weapons were banned 34 years ago.
The heart of the lab is a cluster of sealed chambers built to contain  
the world's deadliest bacteria and viruses. There, scientists will  
spend their days simulating the unthinkable: bioterrorism attacks in  
the form of lethal anthrax spores rendered as wispy powders that can  
drift for miles on a summer breeze, or common viruses turned into  
deadly superbugs that ordinary drugs and vaccines cannot stop.
The work at this new lab, at Fort Detrick, Md., could someday save  
thousands of lives -- or, some fear, create new risks and place the  
United States in violation of international treaties. In either case,  
much of what transpires at the National Biodefense Analysis and  
Countermeasures Center (NBACC) may never be publicly known, because  
the Bush administration intends to operate the facility largely in  
secret.
In an unusual arrangement, the building itself will be classified as  
highly restricted space, from the reception desk to the lab benches  
to the cages where animals are kept. Few federal facilities,  
including nuclear labs, operate with such stealth. It is this opacity  
that some arms-control experts say has become a defining  
characteristic of U.S. biodefense policy as carried out by the  
Department of Homeland Security, NBACC's creator.
Since the department's founding in the aftermath of the Sept. 11  
attacks, its officials have dramatically expanded the government's  
ability to conduct realistic tests of the pathogens and tactics that  
might be used in a bioterrorism attack. Some of the research falls  
within what many arms-control experts say is a legal gray zone,  
skirting the edges of an international treaty outlawing the  
production of even small amounts of biological weapons.
The administration dismisses these concerns, however, insisting that  
the work of NBACC is purely defensive and thus fully legal. It has  
rejected calls for oversight by independent observers outside the  
department's network of government scientists and contractors. And it  
defends the secrecy as necessary to protect Americans.
"Where the research exposes vulnerability, I've got to protect that,  
for the public's interest," said Bernard Courtney, NBACC's scientific  
director. "We don't need to be showing perpetrators the holes in our  
defense."
Tara O'Toole, founder of the Center for Biosecurity at the University  
of Pittsburgh Medical Center and an adviser to the Defense Department  
on bioterrorism, said the secrecy fits a larger pattern and could  
have consequences. "The philosophy and practice behind NBACC looks  
like much of the rest of the administration's philosophy and  
practice: 'Our intent is good, so we can do whatever we want,' "  
O'Toole said. "This approach will only lead to trouble."
Although they acknowledge the need to shield the results of some  
sensitive projects from public view, critics of NBACC fear that  
excessive secrecy could actually increase the risk of bioterrorism.  
That would happen, they say, if the lab fosters ill-designed  
experiments conducted without proper scrutiny or if its work fuels  
suspicions that could lead other countries to pursue secret  
biological research.
The few public documents that describe NBACC's research mission have  
done little to quiet those fears. A computer slide show prepared by  
the center's directors in 2004 offers a to-do list that suggests the  
lab will be making and testing small amounts of weaponized microbes  
and, perhaps, genetically engineered viruses and bacteria. It also  
calls for "red team" exercises that simulate attacks by hostile groups.
NBACC's close ties to the U.S. intelligence community have also  
caused concern among the agency's critics. The CIA has assigned  
advisers to the lab, including at least one member of the "Z- 
Division," an elite group jointly operated with Lawrence Livermore  
National Laboratory that specializes in analyzing and duplicating  
weapons systems of potential adversaries, officials familiar with the  
program confirm.
Bioweapons experts say the nature of the research envisioned for  
NBACC demands an unusually high degree of transparency to reassure  
Americans and the rest of the world of the U.S. government's intentions.
"If we saw others doing this kind of research, we would view it as an  
infringement of the bioweapons treaty," said Milton Leitenberg, a  
senior research scholar and weapons expert at the University of  
Maryland's School of Public Policy. "You can't go around the world  
yelling about Iranian and North Korean programs -- about which we  
know very little -- when we've got all this going on."
Creating the Weapons of Terrorism
Created without public fanfare a few months after the 2001 anthrax  
attacks, NBACC is intended to be the chief U.S. biological research  
institution engaged in something called "science-based threat  
assessment." It seeks to quantitatively answer one of the most  
difficult questions in biodefense: What's the worst that can happen?
To truly answer that question, there is little choice, current and  
former NBACC officials say: Researchers have to make real biological  
weapons.
"De facto, we are going to make biowarfare pathogens at NBACC in  
order to study them," said Penrose "Parney" Albright, former Homeland  
Security assistant secretary for science and technology.
Other government agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control  
and Prevention, study disease threats such as smallpox to discover  
cures. By contrast, NBACC (pronounced EN-back) attempts to get inside  
the head of a bioterrorist. It considers the wide array of potential  
weapons available. It looks for the holes in society's defenses where  
an attacker might achieve the maximum harm. It explores the risks  
posed by emerging technologies, such as new DNA synthesizing  
techniques that allow the creation of genetically altered or man-made  
viruses. And it tries in some cases to test the weapon or delivery  
device that terrorists might use.
Research at NBACC is already underway, in lab space that has been  
outsourced or borrowed from the Army's sprawling biodefense campus at  
Fort Detrick in Frederick. It was at this compound that the U.S.  
government researched and produced offensive biological weapons from  
the 1940s until President Richard M. Nixon halted research in 1969.  
The Army continues to conduct research on pathogens there.
In June, construction began on a $128 million, 160,000-square-foot  
facility inside the same heavily guarded compound. Space inside the  
eight-story, glass-and-brick structure will be divided between  
NBACC's two major divisions: a forensic testing center tasked with  
using modern sleuthing techniques to identify the possible culprits  
in future biological attacks; and the Biothreat Characterization  
Center, or BTCC, which seeks to predict what such attacks will look  
like.
It is the BTCC's wing that will host the airtight, ultra-secure  
containment labs where the most controversial research will be done.  
Homeland Security officials won't talk about specific projects  
planned or underway. But the 2004 computer slide show -- posted  
briefly on a Homeland Security Web site before its discovery by  
agency critics prompted an abrupt removal -- offers insight into  
NBACC's priorities.
The presentation by NBACC's then-deputy director, Lt. Col. George  
Korch, listed 16 research priorities for the new lab. Among them:
"Characterize classical, emerging and genetically engineered  
pathogens for their BTA [biological threat agent] potential.
"Assess the nature of nontraditional, novel and nonendemic induction  
of disease from potential BTA.
"Expand aerosol-challenge testing capacity for non-human primates.
"Apply Red Team operational scenarios and capabilities."
Courtney, the NBACC science director, acknowledged that his work  
would include simulating real biological threats -- but not just any  
threats.
"If I hear a noise on the back porch, will I turn on the light to  
decide whether there's something there, or go on my merry way?"  
Courtney asked. "But I'm only going to do [research] if I have  
credible information that shows it truly is a threat. It's not going  
to be dreamed up out of the mind of a novelist."
Administration officials note that there is a tradition for this kind  
of biological risk assessment, one that extends at least to the  
Clinton administration. In the late 1990s, for example, a clandestine  
project run by the Defense Department re-created a genetically  
modified, drug-resistant strain of the anthrax bacteria believed to  
have been made by Soviet bioweaponeers. Such research helped the  
government anticipate and prepare for emerging threats, according to  
officials familiar with the anthrax study.
Some arms-control experts see the comparison as troubling. They  
argued, then and now, that the work was a possible breach of a U.S.- 
negotiated international law.
Legal and Other Pitfalls
The Bush administration argues that its biodefense research complies  
with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the 1972 treaty  
outlawing the manufacture of biological weapons, because U.S. motives  
are pure.
"All the programs we do are defensive in nature," said Maureen  
McCarthy, Homeland Security's director of research and development,  
who oversees NBACC. "Our job is to ensure that the civilian  
population of the country is protected, and that we know what the  
threats are."
Current and former administration officials say that compliance with  
the treaty hinges on intent, and that making small amounts of  
biowarfare pathogens for study is permitted under a broad  
interpretation of the treaty. Some also argue that the need for a  
strong biodefense in an age of genetic engineering trumps concerns  
over what they see as legal hair-splitting.
"How can I go to the people of this country and say, 'I can't do this  
important research because some arms-control advocate told me I  
can't'?" asked Albright, the former Homeland Security assistant  
secretary.
But some experts in international law believe that certain  
experiments envisioned for the lab could violate the treaty's ban on  
developing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining microbes "of types  
and in quantities that have no justification" for peaceful purposes.
"The main problem with the 'defensive intent' test is that it does  
not reflect what the treaty actually says," said David Fidler, an  
Indiana University School of Law professor and expert on the  
bioweapons convention. The treaty, largely a U.S. creation, does not  
make a distinction between defensive and offensive activities, Fidler  
said.
More practically, arms experts say, future U.S. governments may find  
it harder to object if other countries test genetically engineered  
pathogens and novel delivery systems, invoking the same need for  
biodefense.
Already, they say, there is evidence abroad of what some are calling  
a "global biodefense boom." In the past five years, numerous  
governments, including some in the developing world -- India, China  
and Cuba among them -- have begun building high-security labs for  
studying the most lethal bacteria and viruses.
"These labs have become a status symbol, a prestige item," said Alan  
Pearson, a biologist at the Center for Arms Control and Non- 
Proliferation. "A big question is: Will these labs have transparency?"
Secrecy May Have a Price
When it opens in two years, the NBACC lab will house an impressive  
collection of deadly germs and teams of scientists in full-body  
"spacesuits" to work with them. It will also have large aerosol-test  
chambers where animals will be exposed to deadly microbes. But the  
lab's most controversial feature may be its secrecy.
Homeland Security officials disclosed plans to contractors and other  
government agencies to classify the entire lab as a Sensitive  
Compartmented Information Facility, or SCIF.
In common practice, a SCIF (pronounced "skiff") is a secure room  
where highly sensitive information is stored and discussed. Access to  
SCIFs is severely limited, and all of the activity and conversation  
inside is presumed to be restricted from public disclosure. There are  
SCIFs in the U.S. Capitol, where members of Congress are briefed on  
military secrets. In U.S. nuclear labs, computers that store weapons  
data are housed inside SCIFs.
Homeland Security officials plan to operate all 160,000 square feet  
of NBACC as a SCIF. Because of the building's physical security  
features -- intended to prevent the accidental release of dangerous  
pathogens -- it was logical to operate it as a SCIF, McCarthy said.
"We need to protect information at a level that is appropriate,"  
McCarthy added, saying she expects much of the lab's less-sensitive  
work to be made public eventually.
But some biodefense experts, including some from past  
administrations, viewed the decision as a mistake.
"To overlay NBACC with a default level of high secrecy seems like  
overkill," said Gerald L. Epstein, a former science adviser to the  
White House's National Security Council and now a senior fellow with  
the Center for Strategic and International Studies. While accepting  
that some secrecy is needed, he said the NBACC plan "sends a message  
that is not at all helpful."
NBACC officials also have resisted calls for the kind of broad,  
independent oversight that many experts say is necessary to assure  
other countries and the American public about their research.
Homeland Security spokesmen insist that NBACC's work will be  
carefully monitored, but on the department's terms.
"We have our own processes to scrutinize our research, and it  
includes compliance to the bioweapons convention guidelines as well  
as scientific oversight," said Courtney, the NBACC scientific director.
In addition to the department's internal review boards, the agency  
will bring in small groups of "three or four scientists" on an ad-hoc  
basis to review certain kinds of potentially controversial  
experiments, Courtney said. The review panels will be "independent,"  
Courtney said, but he noted that only scientists with government  
security clearances will be allowed to participate.
Some experts have called for unusual forms of oversight, including  
panels of well-respected, internationally known scientists and  
observers from overseas. While allowing that the results of some  
experiments should be kept confidential, O'Toole, of the Center for  
Biosecurity, argues that virtually everything else at NBACC should be  
publicly accountable if the United States is to be a credible leader  
in preventing the proliferation of bioweapons.
"We're going to have to lean over backward," O'Toole said. "We have  
no leverage among other nation-states if we say, 'We can do whatever  
we want, but you can't. We want to see your biodefense program, but  
you can't see ours.' "
In recent weeks, NBACC's first officially completed project has drawn  
criticism, not because of its methods or procedures, but because  
heavy classification has limited its usefulness.
The project was an ambitious attempt to assess and rank the threats  
posed by dozens of different pathogens and delivery systems, drawing  
on hundreds of studies and extensive computer modeling. When  
delivered to the White House in January, it was the most extensive  
survey of its kind, and one that could guide the federal government  
in making decisions about biodefense spending.
Six months later, no one outside a small group of officials and  
advisers with top security clearances has seen the results.
"Something this important shouldn't be secret," said Thomas V.  
Inglesby, an expert at the Center for Biosecurity who serves on a  
government advisory board that was briefed on the results. "How can  
we make policy decisions about matters of this scale if we're  
operating in the dark?"
Tomorrow: A new era of engineered microbes.



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