Fwd: Researchers Develop Quantum Processor

Eugen Leitl eugen at leitl.org
Thu Jan 12 23:50:38 PST 2006


On Thu, Jan 12, 2006 at 11:08:11PM -0800, coderman wrote:

> enjoy those pubkeys while you can suckers!

You're confusing hype with the real thing. Show me a 64 qubit register
in solid state at ~room temperature, and then we'll talk about how that
is relevant to elliptical curve crypto.

Of course NSA is pimping ECC, so they might have
their own reasons.

> (i'm waiting for someone to suggest 32KBit key sizes.  how much RAM
> does that eat?)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_cryptography

Key sizes

Since all the fastest known algorithms that allow to solve the ECDLP
(baby-step giant-step, Pollard's rho, etc.), need O(\sqrt{n}) steps, it
follows that the size of the underlying field shall be roughly twice the
security parameter. For example, for 128-bit security one needs a curve over
\mathbb{F}_q, where q \approx 2^{256}. This can be contrasted with
finite-field cryptography (e.g., DSA) which requires[11] 3072-bit public keys
and 256-bit private keys, and integer factorization cryptography (e.g., RSA)
which requires 3072-bit public and private keys. The hardest ECC scheme
(publicly) broken to date has 109-bit key (that is about 55 bits of security),
it was broken near the beginning of 2003 using over 10,000 Pentium class PCs
running continuously for over 540 days (see [12]).

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
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