From ryrjv at ciaoweb.it  Wed Feb  1 01:54:59 2006
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Date: Wed, 01 Feb 2006 04:54:59 -0500
Subject: Your first hour is on the house! What a Classic!
Message-ID: <610865562.2TN3320gq@ciaoweb.it>

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From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Feb  1 06:47:21 2006
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 01 Feb 2006 09:47:21 -0500
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] NSA surveillance: EFF lawsuit;
  new white paper  by ACLU]
In-Reply-To: <20060201101438.GG13287@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F341DEB0F004E56265695BF9B0B0@phx.gbl>

Huh?
Seems to me we have much more than that.

NSA may be able to tap optical cables without AT&T knowing (or with them 
looking the other way), but in general that's not the way they're going to 
eavesdrop. The only way they can cost-effectively get the access they need 
is in the electronic domain, and there's little doubt in my mind that they 
merely asked for certain traffic to be dropped-and-continued onto NSA 
gathering points.

Why?
For one, there's just no way they'd be able to deploy a duplicate optical 
network that backhauls all of the relevant traffic to NSA facilities.

They can't even secretively grab individual DS0s and backhaul them without 
cooperation. Optical span + EDFA noise budgets will first of all prohibit 
this (ie, it ain't good if your tap brings down an AT&T cross-country 
OC-192: 3 dB matters to optical amplifiers). Second, to have ready access to 
any DS0 in the country is impossible without help. Consider even a single 
128 wavelength optical cable carrying OC-192 on each lambda: they'll need a 
tap, a 128 (optically amplified) DEMUX, an OC-192 SONET terminal for EACH 
wavelength and some way to grab individual DS0s (or maybe they just take the 
DS1). And THEN they have to backhaul that somehow.

And that's just one cable.

It's just physically impossible for them to grab everything and backhaul, of 
that I am convinced. My assumption is that EFF folks in the know already 
know this. They might have even just picked AT&T nearly randomly...any of 
the big long haul carriers will have had to collude, and probably didn't 
even seriously consider not colluding.

-TD




>From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>To: cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: [declan at well.com: [Politech] NSA surveillance: EFF lawsuit; new  
>white paper by ACLU]
>Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2006 10:14:38 +0000
>
>----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----
>
>From: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>
>Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2006 14:33:30 -0800
>To: politech at politechbot.com
>Subject: [Politech] NSA surveillance: EFF lawsuit; new white paper by ACLU
>User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.6 (Macintosh/20050716)
>
>EFF has sued AT&T over its alleged participation in the NSA's
>surveillance scheme:
>http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6033501.html
>
>Complaint:
>http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/att-complaint.pdf
>
>BTW I think the ACLU's map (below) is intended to be more fanciful than
>based on any confirmed participation by U.S. telecom or Internet companies.
>
>The closest we've come to actual confirmation was a paragraph buried in
>the middle of a Los Angeles Times article last month about AT&T,
>mirrored here and cited in the EFF suit:
>http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=122448
>
>Am I missing something?
>
>-Declan
>
>-------- Original Message --------
>Subject: New NSA Spying Map and White Paper
>Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2006 17:03:56 -0500
>From: Barry Steinhardt <bsteinhardt at aclu.org>
>To: declan at well.com
>
>Declan,
>
>
>Politechicals may be interested in a new ACLU white paper and
>interactive map detailing  what is known and suspected about how the
>NSA's illegal spying on Americans occurs and where the interceptions
>are likely taking place..  The white paper is entitled "Eavesdropping
>101: What Can the NSA Do?" It looks at the probable connections that
>   the NSA has made to the U.S. civilian communications
>infrastructure.  The map shows how the NSA's "surveillance
>octopus"  likely entangles the country. We believe it is the
>first effort to visually illustrate what is happening.
>
>You can find both the white paper and the map at
><http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nsaspying/23989res20060131.html>http://www.aclu
>.org/safefree/nsaspying/23989res20060131.html>http://www.aclu.org/safefree/ns
>aspying/23989res20060131.html.
>
>A complete range of materials can be found at www.nsawatch.org.
>
>Barry Steinhardt
>
>Director
>Technology and Liberty Project
>American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
>
>_______________________________________________
>Politech mailing list
>Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
>Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)
>
>----- End forwarded message -----
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>
>[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which 
>had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Feb  1 02:13:41 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2006 10:13:41 +0000
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] New NSA Spying Map and White Paper]]
Message-ID: <20060201101341.GE13287@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Feb  1 02:14:38 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2006 10:14:38 +0000
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] NSA surveillance: EFF lawsuit; new
  white paper by ACLU]
Message-ID: <20060201101438.GG13287@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----


From FFKNBMNAZLMYD at hotmail.com  Wed Feb  1 07:08:49 2006
From: FFKNBMNAZLMYD at hotmail.com (Spencer Lovell)
Date: Wed, 01 Feb 2006 11:08:49 -0400
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From dewayne at warpspeed.com  Thu Feb  2 06:10:13 2006
From: dewayne at warpspeed.com (Dewayne Hendricks)
Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2006 06:10:13 -0800
Subject: [Dewayne-Net] THE END OF THE INTERNET?
Message-ID: <mailman.1573.1576007673.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

[Note:  Worth reading.  Also, check out some of the white papers the
article points to.  One of note: "Network Neutrality:  A Broadband
Wild West?".  DLH]

THE END OF THE INTERNET?
[SOURCE: The Nation, AUTHOR: Jeff Chester]

[Commentary] Verizon, Comcast, Bell South and other communications
giants are developing strategies that would track and store
information on our every move in cyberspace in a vast data-collection
and marketing system, the scope of which could rival the National
Security Agency. According to white papers now being circulated in
the cable, telephone and telecommunications industries, those with
the deepest pockets--corporations, special-interest groups and major
advertisers -- would get preferred treatment. Content from these
providers would have first priority on our computer and television
screens, while information seen as undesirable, such as peer-to-peer
communications, could be relegated to a slow lane or simply shut out.
Under the plans they are considering, all of us--from content
providers to individual users -- would pay more to surf online,
stream videos or even send e-mail. Industry planners are mulling new
subscription plans that would further limit the online experience,
establishing "platinum," "gold" and "silver" levels of Internet
access that would set limits on the number of downloads, media
streams or even e-mail messages that could be sent or received. To
make this pay-to-play vision a reality, phone and cable lobbyists are
now engaged in a political campaign to further weaken the nation's
communications policy laws. They want the federal government to
permit them to operate Internet and other digital communications
services as private networks, free of policy safeguards or
governmental oversight. Indeed, both the Congress and the Federal
Communications Commission are considering proposals that will have
far-reaching impact on the Internet's future. Ten years after passage
of the ill-advised Telecommunications Act of 1996, telephone and
cable companies are using the same political snake oil to convince
compromised or clueless lawmakers to subvert the Internet into a
turbo-charged digital retail machine.

<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060213/chester>

Links to White Papers mentioned above: <http://
www.democraticmedia.org/issues/netneutrality.html>


Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com>

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




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From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Feb  2 07:28:02 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2006 15:28:02 +0000
Subject: [dewayne@warpspeed.com: [Dewayne-Net] THE END OF THE INTERNET?]
Message-ID: <20060202152802.GG13287@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne at warpspeed.com> -----


From geoffrey.sebastian1 at gmx.net  Thu Feb  2 04:49:11 2006
From: geoffrey.sebastian1 at gmx.net (Luke Hines)
Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2006 17:49:11 +0500
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Message-ID: <200602022245.k12MjWTD003781@proton.jfet.org>

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From smb at cs.columbia.edu  Thu Feb  2 18:28:31 2006
From: smb at cs.columbia.edu (Steven M. Bellovin)
Date: Thu, 02 Feb 2006 21:28:31 -0500
Subject: serious threat models
Message-ID: <mailman.1574.1576007673.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

I hate to play clipping service, but this story is too important not to
mention.  Many top Greek officials, including the Prime Minister, and
the U.S. embassy had their mobile phones tapped.  What makes this
interesting is how it was done: software was installed on the switch
that diverted calls to a prepaid phone.  Think about who could manage
that.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/mobile/article/0,,1701298,00.html
http://www.globetechnology.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060202.wcelltap0202/BNSt
ory/International/


		--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb



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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From lhaddon at gmx.net  Thu Feb  2 09:24:24 2006
From: lhaddon at gmx.net (Lenny Honeycutt)
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2006 01:24:24 +0800
Subject: Hey! tell your friends to hit me up
Message-ID: <200602030924.k139OHeE024075@proton.jfet.org>

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From declan at well.com  Fri Feb  3 08:25:20 2006
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Fri, 03 Feb 2006 08:25:20 -0800
Subject: [Politech] Survey: Google, MSN, AOL,
	Yahoo say what information they keep [priv]
Message-ID: <mailman.1575.1576007673.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

So we've been working on a survey of search engines, and what data they
keep and don't keep. We asked Google, MSN, AOL, and Yahoo the same
questions:

- What information do you record about searches? Do you store IP
addresses linked to search terms and types of searches (image vs. Web)?
- Given a list of search terms, can you produce a list of people
who searched for that term, identified by IP address and/or cookie value?
- Have you ever been asked by an attorney in a civil suit to produce
such a list of people? A prosecutor in a criminal case?
- Given an IP address or cookie value, can you produce a list of the
terms searched by the user of that IP address or cookie value?
- Have you ever been asked by an attorney in a civil suit to produce
such a list of search terms? A prosecutor in a criminal case?
- Do you ever purge these data, or set an expiration date of for
instance 2 years or 5 years?
- Do you ever anticipate offering search engine users a way to delete
that data?

Their verbatim responses are here:
http://news.com.com/2100-1025_3-6034626.html

And a FAQ and analysis of the shortcomings of the relevant federal
privacy law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, is here:
http://news.com.com/2100-1025_3-6034666.html

-Declan
_______________________________________________
Politech mailing list
Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From coderman at gmail.com  Fri Feb  3 08:51:18 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2006 08:51:18 -0800
Subject: [smb@cs.columbia.edu: serious threat models]
In-Reply-To: <20060203091021.GS13287@leitl.org>
References: <20060203091021.GS13287@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602030851r74d41301o835738c2edd1e741@mail.gmail.com>

> ... Many top Greek officials, including the Prime Minister, and
> the U.S. embassy had their mobile phones tapped.  What makes this
> interesting is how it was done: software was installed on the switch
> that diverted calls to a prepaid phone.  Think about who could manage
> that.

not too hard, actually.  softswitching makes this kind of hi jinx
relatively easy, and the Cirpack switching system Vodafone uses is
commonly available (to those steeped in EU telco at least).
[see http://www.cirpack.com/products/hvs.shtml ]

i test systems like this from excel/lucent that use a unix host
controller communicating with one or more switch chassis full of
blades for spans of T1/E1, SS7, etc.  they send well defined packets
over ethernet to configure switch spans and perform call handling. 
it's an ugly binary protocol, like most are, but easily manipulated.

if you knew what you were doing it would be straightforward to insert
a promiscuous device on the LAN or add a process on the unix host used
by the softswitch that listened for incoming calls from a given set of
MIN's and one way conference these calls to a third party*.  if you
had access to a current version of the softswitch software itself for
modification it would be even easier (most companies license sources
and tailor or customize the software to run these switches so it's not
quite as simple as a generic drop in replacement).

it took "a professional" to do this, sure, but the number of people
skilled enough to pull this off is not a small number.

* the pre paid phones were probably vodafone as well, so that transit
for the conference'd calls was all on the same network and would thus
avoid using circuits from other carriers which would need to be
accounted for. (that is to say, it would be much easier to hide these
conferences as long as they stayed in network, rather than tying up
spans to external carriers which would probably trigger accounting
discrepancies)




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Feb  3 01:10:21 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2006 09:10:21 +0000
Subject: [smb@cs.columbia.edu: serious threat models]
Message-ID: <20060203091021.GS13287@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb at cs.columbia.edu> -----


From jhh at cs.ru.nl  Fri Feb  3 01:00:00 2006
From: jhh at cs.ru.nl (Jaap-Henk Hoepman)
Date: Fri, 03 Feb 2006 10:00:00 +0100
Subject: Face and fingerprints swiped in Dutch biometric passport crack
 (anothercard skim vulnerability)
Message-ID: <mailman.1576.1576007673.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


Actually, the international standards for the Machine Readable Travel
Documents
(passports, aka MRTDs) are written by the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO).

Both the US and EU passports comply to the ICAO standards. However, EU
passports will be further protected by a so called Extended Access Control
procedure. This procedure provides, among others, terminal authentication to
the passport, to reduce the risk that biometric data is read by rogue readers.

Also, there are many small details in which the passports from different
countries may differ. For instance, the 'RFID' anti-collision identifier used
when setting up a connection between the passport and the reader may either
be
fixed or generated randomly for each session. Or, as is indeed the case in
the
Dutch passport, the passport number may correlate with the issuing date,
reducing the entropy of the key derived from the Machine Readbale Zone (MRZ).

The "Riscure" attack is based on this correlation; they estimate the
remaining
entropy of the data on the MRZ to be roughly 2^35. This MRZ data is used to
derive the symmetric session keys. Their attack works by recording (ie
eavesdropping) a succesful communication session between a passport and a
reader. Then, all possible combinations of the MRZ data can be tried off line
to generate the corresponding session keys and check whether that succesfully
decrypts the recorded session.

Note that straighforward skimming, ie trying to access a passport with a fake
terminal by trying all possible combinations of MRZ data is still impossible
because the chip in the passport is slow to respond; even if you could try
one
MRZ access code every millisecond (totally unrealistic), you'd be busy half a
year. This limits the usefulness of the attack a bit.

Also note that an encrypted key exchange like protocol for deriving the
session
key from the MRZ access code would also have prevented this attack...

Jaap-Henk

On Thu, 2 Feb 2006 12:37:24 -0500 Adam Shostack <adam at homeport.org> writes:
> On Wed, Feb 01, 2006 at 02:03:10PM -0500, vin at TheWorld.com wrote:
> | Anne & Lynn Wheeler pointed out:
> |
> | > Face and fingerprints swiped in Dutch biometric passport crack
> | > http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/01/30/dutch_biometric_passport_crack/
> |
> | Didn't the EU adopt the same design that the US uses?
>
> Passport standards are written by the International Air Travel
> Association (IATA).
>
> | Am I right to presume that the passport RFID chip used by the Dutch is
the
> | same -- or functions the same -- as the one used in the new US digital
> | passports?
> |
> | >From what I've read, it seems that the sequential numbering scheme the
> | Dutch use on their passports may have made this attack easier -- but it
> | was already feasible, and will be against the passports of other nations
> | which did not so helpfully minimize their obfuscation technique with
> | sequential numbering?
> |
> | Anyone got more details than those offered in the Rinscure press release?
> | Thoughts?
>
> The papers explain the attack in fair detail.  I blogged every useful
> linksI could find a few days ago at
> http://www.emergentchaos.com/archives/002355.html, and there's more
> links in comments.
>
> Adam
>
> | _Vin
> |
> |
> | >
> | > The crack is attributed to Delft smartcard security specialist Riscure,
> | > which explains that an attack can be executed from around 10 metres and
> | > the security broken, revealing date of birth, facial image and
> | > fingerprint, in around two hours.
> | >
> | > .. snip ..
> |
> |
> | ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> | The Cryptography Mailing List
> | Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to
majordomo at metzdowd.com
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> The Cryptography Mailing List
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>
>

--
Jaap-Henk Hoepman           |  I've got sunshine in my pockets
Dept. of Computer Science   |  Brought it back to spray the day
Radboud University Nijmegen |        Gry "Rocket"
(w) www.cs.ru.nl/~jhh       |  (m) jhh at cs.ru.nl
(t) +31 24 36 52710/53132   |  (f) +31 24 3653137


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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From coderman at gmail.com  Fri Feb  3 14:26:18 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2006 14:26:18 -0800
Subject: [smb@cs.columbia.edu: serious threat models]
In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60602030851r74d41301o835738c2edd1e741@mail.gmail.com>
References: <20060203091021.GS13287@leitl.org> 	
  <4ef5fec60602030851r74d41301o835738c2edd1e741@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602031426h3c3184ack3083cb06c6d5b8c8@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/3/06, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote:
> ... the Cirpack switching system Vodafone uses is
> commonly available (to those steeped in EU telco at least).
> [see http://www.cirpack.com/products/hvs.shtml ]

i stand corrected. media reports have indicated Ericsson Mobile
Softswitch was the software in question:
http://www.ericsson.com/products/hp/Mobile_Core_pa.shtml

pretty much any softswitch technology is vulnerable to this type of attack.

see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Softswitch , although some of
this description is a bit misleading or applies to a particular
architecture.  note that some carriers, like Sprint, build their own
softswitching systems in house.  presumably these would be more
resistant to tampering as the detailed information required to mount
such an attack is protected via trade secret and non disclosure.




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Feb  3 09:56:08 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2006 17:56:08 +0000
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] Survey: Google, MSN, AOL, Yahoo
  say what information they keep [priv]]
Message-ID: <20060203175608.GL13287@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----


From ferreira at jdls.net  Fri Feb  3 18:39:50 2006
From: ferreira at jdls.net (Jorge Courtney)
Date: Fri, 03 Feb 2006 20:39:50 -0600
Subject: Ratess will skyrocket soon
Message-ID: <001z437b.0942664@msn.com>

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From kelly at communityinteriors.com  Fri Feb  3 19:08:49 2006
From: kelly at communityinteriors.com (Darcy Castle)
Date: Fri, 03 Feb 2006 21:08:49 -0600
Subject: Re-finance before rates skyrocket
Message-ID: <089w946z.0407094@msn.com>

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From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Feb  3 18:16:08 2006
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 03 Feb 2006 21:16:08 -0500
Subject: [smb@cs.columbia.edu: serious threat models]
In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60602030851r74d41301o835738c2edd1e741@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F394B4AF6398950F96B2EF69B0C0@phx.gbl>

Coderman's on to something here...


>if you knew what you were doing it would be straightforward to insert
>a promiscuous device on the LAN or add a process on the unix host used
>by the softswitch that listened for incoming calls from a given set of
>MIN's and one way conference these calls to a third party*.  if you
>had access to a current version of the softswitch software itself for
>modification it would be even easier (most companies license sources
>and tailor or customize the software to run these switches so it's not
>quite as simple as a generic drop in replacement).
>
>it took "a professional" to do this, sure, but the number of people
>skilled enough to pull this off is not a small number.

I actually strongly suspect Vodaphone cooperation in this.

"Seeding" a remote software upgrade to a switch like this is extremely 
difficult if you're coming in from another vendor's gear. Right now I 
believe they would've had to gain physical access and install the software 
in person, otherwise they'd have to go through the local Greek NOC.

I suppose it's POSSIBLE they modified the Vodaphone software and remotely 
seeded it without anyone being the wiser, but what? No one noticed a bunch 
of DS0s were all of a sudden provisioned with unknown traffic?

But no doubt they had copies of the gear, no doubt they had access to the 
firmware code, no doubt they had telco gear coders (something that's 
practically nonexistent in Greece right now)...

If you ask me, Vodaphone's playing dumb in light of EFF suing AT&T. They 
realized there's no way they code hide that if someone was inspired to start 
looking more closely.

-TD




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Feb  3 15:27:40 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2006 23:27:40 +0000
Subject: [jhh@cs.ru.nl: Re: Face and fingerprints swiped in Dutch
  biometric passport crack (anothercard skim vulnerability)]
Message-ID: <20060203232740.GQ13287@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Jaap-Henk Hoepman <jhh at cs.ru.nl> -----


From arias11 at kemira.com  Sat Feb  4 15:35:35 2006
From: arias11 at kemira.com (Erich Ferris)
Date: Sat, 04 Feb 2006 17:35:35 -0600
Subject: Last chance for lower rates
Message-ID: <171e675a.3686758@hotmail.com>

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From vargas at keys-resort.com  Sat Feb  4 17:39:05 2006
From: vargas at keys-resort.com (Deena Holbrook)
Date: Sat, 04 Feb 2006 19:39:05 -0600
Subject: Re-finance at the lowestt ratess
Message-ID: <994z012k.0980601@hotmail.com>

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From john1324 at amega.com  Sat Feb  4 18:36:05 2006
From: john1324 at amega.com (Humberto Felton)
Date: Sat, 04 Feb 2006 20:36:05 -0600
Subject: Urgent Notification #04881267739165841356
Message-ID: <106n778f.3468168@hotmail.com>

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From tanksley at jefnet.com  Sat Feb  4 18:55:36 2006
From: tanksley at jefnet.com (Willard Roberson)
Date: Sat, 04 Feb 2006 20:55:36 -0600
Subject: Urgent Notification #6502842483591
Message-ID: <419y953s.4201373@yahoo.com>

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From eglia at ameritrade.com  Sat Feb  4 22:35:26 2006
From: eglia at ameritrade.com (Kurt Potts)
Date: Sun, 05 Feb 2006 00:35:26 -0600
Subject: Pre-approved Application #94941549 Sun, 05 Feb 2006 00:35:26 -0600
Message-ID: <729w152o.3388486@msn.com>

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From claims at covlink.co.uk  Sat Feb  4 22:48:26 2006
From: claims at covlink.co.uk (Mamie Mcneill)
Date: Sun, 05 Feb 2006 00:48:26 -0600
Subject: Mortagge ratee approvedd
Message-ID: <292n919u.9705160@69.60.117.34>

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From cote at alto-us.com  Sat Feb  4 22:52:22 2006
From: cote at alto-us.com (Lazaro Daugherty)
Date: Sun, 05 Feb 2006 00:52:22 -0600
Subject: Re-finance before rates skyrocket
Message-ID: <925v730d.3573185@69.60.117.34>

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From beers.siefert1 at gmx.de  Sun Feb  5 03:16:27 2006
From: beers.siefert1 at gmx.de (Helene Jennings)
Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2006 10:16:27 -0100
Subject: Improve sperm quality
Message-ID: <200602050916.k159GOC1017139@proton.jfet.org>

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From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Feb  5 09:56:07 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2006 12:56:07 -0500
Subject: [Clips] The Walt Within
Message-ID: <p0623090cc00becb65d09@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2006 12:29:39 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] The Walt Within
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

  Read the last bit about traffic analysis and curve fitting. It's the most
  important.

  Cheers,
  RAH
  -------


  <http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/pulpit20060202.html>

  PBS: I, Cringely -- The Pulpit


  February 2, 2006

  The Walt Within:

  What If Disney's Prize Wasn't Pixar, but Jobs?

  By Robert X. Cringely

  I was wrong.

  No, not about phone and wire-tapping -- more on that below -- but on the
  Disney-Pixar merger. What if, instead of having to accept the board
  presence of Steve Jobs as a cost of getting Pixar's animation talent and
  film library, Disney actually views the transaction as buying Pixar TO GET
  Steve Jobs and then gaining the animation bits as a bonus? If Disney CEO
  Robert Iger is really an exceptional leader, he'll see it exactly that way.

  I am not a big Steve Jobs fan. No fawning here. I once called him a
  sociopath in a book that was translated into 18 languages, and I don't take
  it back now. But even a sociopath has his moments, and I am beginning to
  see that this moment belongs to Jobs.

  What made me come to this understanding was reading an op-ed piece this
  week in the New York Times written by film historian Neal Gabler, who is
  just finishing a monumental book about Walt Disney. You'll find the essay
  among this week's links.

  Assuming that Gabler knows what he is writing about, having spent several
  years getting inside the head of Walt Disney, then Disney and Jobs have a
  lot in common. Both were iconoclasts and loners, driven by creative visions
  and always a bit out of sync with their peers. Both were dreamers, but
  dreamers who for the most part realized their dreams. Both believed that
  the purpose of being in business was to create a unique product that came
  to define an experience for customers. Rod Canion and Michael Dell and Ted
  Waitt never talked about user experience, but Jobs and Disney did, right
  from the beginning of their careers.

  What Jobs created at Pixar by allowing it to be (this is his only company,
  remember, where he stayed out of the day-to-day operations) is an
  environment where technology might have run, Tron-like, over character and
  creative sensibilities but somehow that didn't happen. At Pixar, technology
  drives character rather than characters being spray-painted on technology.
  What Disney gets from Pixar is, of course, the cancellation of most
  animated films in development or production, but that's balanced by a
  separate slate of films that will gross two, three or four times as much
  with all that now going to Disney. In this trade, Disney loses nothing and
  gains everything.

  But Pixar and a trunkload of new theme park characters are the least of it.
  Disney is in the film, TV, sports, publishing, and hospitality industries,
  but none of its major competitors -- none -- are run by people who come to
  their positions with anything like an artistic drive or a real sense of
  what their customers want. Does Sumner Redstone understand MTV? Does GE
  have an artistic molecule in its "lop off the bottom 10 percent" corporate
  culture? Does Rupert Murdoch really understand his own success and its
  ultimate cost? Does ever-imploding Sony even know what to do with its music
  and movie empires? No, no, no, and no.

  If Robert Iger creates a miracle at Disney, which I think he will, that
  miracle is Steve Jobs. We're in a new century with new realities, but we
  haven't yet found a new archetype for enlightened corporate power. Bill
  Gates? Give me a break! What we have are people in power who have no muse
  and wouldn't recognize one if they could even hear her. Steve Jobs knows
  his muse.

  For the entertainment industries, the next 10 years will be the most
  revolutionary in a century. Broadcast TV as we knew it is going away,
  replaced by a Chinese entertainment menu of such complexity that even
  knowing what's "on" tonight will be beyond the abilities of most viewers.
  At some point, too, movies will be subsumed into television and recorded
  music will find its own new place with new rules. This will be Steve Jobs's
  world and we'll all just be visitors. It's obvious to me and, evidently, to
  Iger, too.

  The trick here is in knowing how to get the best product for the least
  money. Jobs is not opposed to spending money, but he is determined to get
  more for his money than anyone else. Look at the books of Apple and Pixar
  to understand this concept. Against a century-old tradition of corporate
  bloat, Jobs successfully preaches (and proves) that smaller is really
  better. How else can Apple compete with Microsoft AND Dell and HP, and
  still have $8 billion in the bank? Because smaller is better and cheaper,
  too, when it comes to creative development.

  I still don't like Steve Jobs. I've known too many people he has hurt. But
  this is clearly his time, maybe even his century. And what of Bill Gates?
  Bill Gates is a very successful philanthropist, but he's no Steve Jobs.

  Nobody is.

  Well, maybe Oprah.

  Bill once told me that there was no way that Steve could win, so he
  wondered why Jobs was even still in the game?

  Bill now knows why.

  Now for a final word on wiretapping, the NSA, and you, which were the
  primary topics of my last two columns. This last thought comes from an old
  friend of mine who is conservative in the very best sense and knows what he
  is writing about:

  "Traffic analysis, at the NSA? I'm tempted to be sarcastic, but I won't be.
  As you might know, I started a company a few years ago with a former NSA
  guy -- somebody who was a cryptographer and Russian linguist on those
  submarines that snuck into Soviet harbors to tap their phone lines -- and
  we applied traffic analysis to Internet discussion groups to identify
  opinion leaders, conversation trends and so forth. We used a lot of
  techniques that were developed or applied to law enforcement. And we didn't
  use anything that violated anybody's security clearances... really!

  "(My company) was acquired by a business intelligence company funded by the
  CIA venture capital outfit. Apparently the stuff I invented is now in the
  hands of a couple of intelligence agencies, including Homeland Security.

  "I'll tell you what I think the most troubling thing about all this is.
  It's easy to see whatever pattern you're looking for. It's like curve
  fitting in the stock market -- looks beautiful historically and maybe even
  in the short run, but it's a disaster in the making. So we have these guys
  running the country who saw a non-existent pattern in Iraq that justified a
  war ... and now we're going to give them software that will make it easy to
  create the illusion of patterns of conspiracy.

  "Your friend from the NSA was right, but it's worse than he suggests. It's
  not just that social network analysis casts a wide net. It's that without
  oversight by people who really grasp the mathematics and have some distance
  from the whole thing, they're going to see patterns where there aren't any.

  "They have a history of that."





  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Feb  5 12:16:07 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2006 15:16:07 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Arlen Specter: FISA Law May be Unconstitutional
Message-ID: <p06230940c00c0d850de7@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2006 15:00:26 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Arlen Specter: FISA Law May be Unconstitutional
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com


<http://newsmax.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?s=pf&page=http://newsmax.com/archives/ic/2006/2/5/142841.shtml?s=ic>

  Reprinted from NewsMax.com

  Sunday, Feb. 5, 2006 2:27 p.m. EST

  Arlen Specter: FISA Law May be Unconstitutional

  Sen. Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter said Sunday that while
  President Bush's terrorist surveillance program is a "flat out violation"
  of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, it may be entirely legal
  because of powers granted the president by the Constitution.

  "There is an involved question here . . . as to whether the president's
  powers under Article 2, his inherent powers, supersede a statute." Specter
  told NBC's "Meet the Press."

  The Pennsylvania Republican said that if the FISA statute "is inconsistent
  with the Constitution, the Constitution governs and the constitutional
  powers predominate."

  Specter, whose committee is set to commence hearings Monday into the
  surveillance program, said that when the FISA law was signed by President
  Carter, he voluntarily surrendered his power to conduct independent
  domestic surveillance without a warrant.

  "But that's not the end of the discussion," the top Republican cautioned,
  promising that his hearings would explore the issue of presidential
  prerogatives and the FISA Act's constitutionality - or lack thereof.

  Specter said he may call Carter as a witness to explain his thinking on the
  FISA law.

  "I've been discussing that, and it's on the agenda for consideration," he
  explained.

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From checker at panix.com  Sun Feb  5 13:00:09 2006
From: checker at panix.com (Premise Checker)
Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2006 16:00:09 -0500 (EST)
Subject: [>Htech] Supply Chain Review: Device To Disable RFID Tags In The
Message-ID: <mailman.1577.1576007673.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Works
Reply-To: transhumantech at yahoogroups.com

Device To Disable RFID Tags In The Works
http://www.supplychainreview.com.au/index.cfm?li=displaystory&StoryID=25767
RFID Kryptonite
Supply Chain Review  - Australia
Monday 23 January 2006

Two students have turned a disposable camera into a gadget that literally
shocks the power out of RFID tags.

The pair behind the "RFID-Zapper", Tim and Chris (who don't reveal their
last names online), say the gadget is designed to deactivate (destroy)
passive RFID-Tags permanently.

Goals are a proof-of-concept and the construction of at least one
functioning and appealing prototype, as well as a documentation of the
project. The pair plan to publish the instructions for build online, "so
that everyone can build an own RFID-Zapper".

"We have to expect to be surrounded by RFID-Tags almost everywhere within
the near future, and they will serve many different purposes," write Tim
and Chris online.

"The benefits and risks of this technology and its use are already being
discussed.

"However, there will be atempts to use RFID-Tags to establish constant
surveiliance and to further threaten and compromise the privacy of
customers (and citizens and even non-citizens, when [governments] start to
use RFID-Tags like the German [government] already did).

"To defend yourself against such measures, you might want a small, simple
and relatively appealing gadget to permanently deactivate RFID-Tags around
you, e.g., to deactivate RFID-Tags in recently bought clothes or books
without damaging those [items]."

How does it work?

There are several ways to deactivate RFID-Tags, including
RFID-deactivators, which send the RFID-Tag to sleep.

"A problem with this method is, that it is not permanent, the RFID-Tag can
be reactivated," write Tim and Chris.

"Several ways of permanently deactivating RFID-Tags are known, e.g.,
cutting off the antenna from the actual microchip or overloading and
literally frying the RFID-Tag in a common microwave-oven, which needs to
be turned on only for a short period of time.

"Unfortunately both methods aren't suitable for the destruction of
RFID-Tags in clothes: cutting off the antenna would require to damage the
piece of cloth, while frying the chips is likely to cause a small but
potent flame, which would damage most textiles or even set them on fire."

The RFID-Zapper copies the microwave-oven-method, but on a much smaller
scale.

The duo modified the electric component of a singe-use-camera with flash,
readily available in most retail outlets, to "keep the costs of the
RFID-Zapper as low as possible".

The coil is made from coated copper wire and placed inside the camera
where the film normally lies.

"Then one end of the coil is soldered to the camera's capacitor, from
which we earlier disconnected the flash," Tim and Chris write.

"The other end of the coil is soldered to a switch, which itself is
connected to the capacitor's other terminal. Once everything is tested,
the camera can be closed again and henceforth will serve as a RFID-Zapper,
destroying RFID-Tags with the power of ordinary batteries."

The zapper generates a strong electromagnetic field with a coil, which,
claim the inventors, should be placed as near to the target RFID-Tag as
possible.

The RFID-Tag then will receive a strong shock of energy comparable with an
EMP and some part of it will blow, thus deactivating the chip forever.

Until now the pair have only had access to 13.56 MHz RFID tags, but hope
to be able to test the RFID-Zapper on other tags soon.

A German privacy advocacy group -- FoeBuD -- plans to manufacture and sell
a device that consumers could used to disable RFID tags permanently.
FoeBuD says it wants to manufacture the RFID-Zapper and sell it at its
online store. The group met with a hardware developer last week, but says
it has no timescale for production or product price yet.






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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Feb  5 18:00:07 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2006 21:00:07 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Specter: Administration broke law
Message-ID: <p0623094bc00c5e26f3fa@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2006 20:54:49 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Specter: Administration broke law
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

  So. Same show. Two different headlines.

  Let's bleat some more about the law, shall we?

  Cypherpunks do what? ;-)

  Cheers,
  RAH
  -------

  <http://upi.com/NewsTrack/view.php?StoryID=20060205-065029-9962r>

  United Press International


  Specter: Administration broke law

  WASHINGTON, Feb. 5 (UPI) -- Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa., chairman of the
  Senate Judiciary Committee, says President George W. Bush's warrantless
  surveillance program appears to be illegal.

  Appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press," Specter called the administration's
  legal reasoning "strained and unrealistic" and said the program appears to
  be "in flat violation" of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

  Hearings into the surveillance program are scheduled to begin Monday on
  Capitol Hill.

  Air Force Gen. Michael Hayden, the former head of the National Security
  Agency, defended the surveillance on ABC's "This Week" and the Fox News
  Network, the International Herald Tribune reported.

  "It's about speed," General Hayden said in his ABC appearance. "It's about
  hot pursuit of al-Qaida communications."

  The Bush administration says the surveillance has been carefully monitored
  and targeted at individuals with known or strongly suspected terrorist
  ties. But officials have also given different estimates of the amount of
  monitoring.

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From cready at ica.com.mx  Mon Feb  6 00:54:24 2006
From: cready at ica.com.mx (Jim Choi)
Date: Mon, 06 Feb 2006 02:54:24 -0600
Subject: Pre-approved Application #4763959 Mon, 06 Feb 2006 02:54:24 -0600
Message-ID: <537m028s.8719833@69.60.117.34>

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From bxejwjsp at msn.com  Mon Feb  6 05:07:17 2006
From: bxejwjsp at msn.com (Sheila Downing)
Date: Mon, 06 Feb 2006 06:07:17 -0700
Subject: Quality Medicine Available fAPx
Message-ID: <LAW38.OE649yfB4mvo012053d5@motmail.com>


Loking for quality meds at affordable
price?
We have widest range of meds at very
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SMJ




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Mon Feb  6 06:51:47 2006
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Mon, 06 Feb 2006 09:51:47 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Specter: Administration broke law
In-Reply-To: <p0623094bc00c5e26f3fa@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F23894B47765CCCB99330339B0E0@phx.gbl>

Well finally. An actual republican CONSERVATIVE (or at least right now).

The thing that most neo-Cons don't seem to get is that "speed" doesn't 
matter. If it hasn't been authorized by law, then tough luck: We'll just 
have to take the Al-Qaeda hit until we authorize otherwise. Supporters of 
any extra-legal plan deployed by "leaders" without our collective legal 
consent need killin'. Quick.

Fuck the plan. Fuck their "protection".

-TD


>From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: [Clips] Specter: Administration broke law
>Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2006 21:00:07 -0500
>
>--- begin forwarded text
>
>
>   Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
>   Date: Sun, 5 Feb 2006 20:54:49 -0500
>   To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
>   From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>   Subject: [Clips] Specter: Administration broke law
>   Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
>   Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com
>
>   So. Same show. Two different headlines.
>
>   Let's bleat some more about the law, shall we?
>
>   Cypherpunks do what? ;-)
>
>   Cheers,
>   RAH
>   -------
>
>   <http://upi.com/NewsTrack/view.php?StoryID=20060205-065029-9962r>
>
>   United Press International
>
>
>   Specter: Administration broke law
>
>   WASHINGTON, Feb. 5 (UPI) -- Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa., chairman of the
>   Senate Judiciary Committee, says President George W. Bush's warrantless
>   surveillance program appears to be illegal.
>
>   Appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press," Specter called the administration's
>   legal reasoning "strained and unrealistic" and said the program appears 
>to
>   be "in flat violation" of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
>
>   Hearings into the surveillance program are scheduled to begin Monday on
>   Capitol Hill.
>
>   Air Force Gen. Michael Hayden, the former head of the National Security
>   Agency, defended the surveillance on ABC's "This Week" and the Fox News
>   Network, the International Herald Tribune reported.
>
>   "It's about speed," General Hayden said in his ABC appearance. "It's 
>about
>   hot pursuit of al-Qaida communications."
>
>   The Bush administration says the surveillance has been carefully 
>monitored
>   and targeted at individuals with known or strongly suspected terrorist
>   ties. But officials have also given different estimates of the amount of
>   monitoring.
>
>   --
>   -----------------
>   R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>   The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>   44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>   "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>   [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>   experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>   _______________________________________________
>   Clips mailing list
>   Clips at philodox.com
>   http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips
>
>--- end forwarded text
>
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Feb  6 07:53:50 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2006 10:53:50 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Swiss Fight Against Tax Cheats Aids Singapore's Banking
    Quest
Message-ID: <p0623096dc00d218bc09d@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2006 10:51:48 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Swiss Fight Against Tax Cheats Aids Singapore's Banking
  	Quest
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

  <http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB113919488042365741.html>

  The Wall Street Journal

  February 6, 2006


  PAGE ONE


  New Haven
  Swiss Fight Against Tax Cheats
  Aids Singapore's Banking Quest
  Island Seeks Foreign Deposits
  To Diversify Its Economy;
  Denies Wanting 'Evaders'
  Mr. Widdeck's Dream House

  By EDWARD TAYLOR in Frankfurt and CRIS PRYSTAY in Singapore

  Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

  February 6, 2006; Page A1

  For decades, the ultrarich looking for discreet banking services gravitated
  to Switzerland, where account secrecy was sacrosanct. But when Swiss
  authorities acceded to pressure from the European Union to discourage tax
  evasion, the door opened for a new challenger to woo the world's wealthy:
  Singapore.

  The tiny Asian nation has beefed up account secrecy protections, has
  changed trust laws and has begun allowing foreigners who meet minimum
  wealth requirements to purchase land and become residents.

  Now private-banking money is flooding in from at least three sources:
  Asians who have grown rich from the booming Asia-Pacific economy,
  foreigners seeking to invest and do business in Asia, and Europeans moving
  money from Switzerland for tax purposes. Swiss banks are expanding in
  Singapore to get in on the action.


  The money flow demonstrates how one nation, in the borderless world of
  international banking, can use banking regulation as an economic
  development tool -- and how complicated it is for tax authorities around
  the world to plug revenue leaks.

  "While tax authorities have increased surveillance and regulation in a bid
  to stem the flow of investment capital and profits to low-tax
  jurisdictions, it's easier to shift money around than it used to be thanks
  to technology," says Chris Edwards, director of tax policy at Cato
  Institute, a Washington think tank that favors free trade. "Both legal
  avoidance and illegal evasion techniques have become more accessible."

  In Singapore's asset-management business, which includes private-banking,
  total funds under management rose to more than $356 billion at the end of
  2004, from $94 billion at the end of 1998, according to the Monetary
  Authority of Singapore, the nation's financial regulator. Roman Scott, a
  director of Boston Consulting Group in Singapore, estimates private-banking
  assets account for about $125 billion of the total.

  Singaporean officials involved in the private-banking push say the new
  foreign depositors are attracted by Singapore's sound legal system, lack of
  corruption and transparent financial systems. Some Swiss private bankers
  also have been billing Singapore as a way around new taxes in Switzerland,
  Luxembourg and tax havens such as Jersey in the English Channel. Under
  pressure from the EU to crack down on tax evasion, Switzerland imposed a
  withholding tax last July on some accounts held by EU citizens.

  "Singapore is one way of getting around the withholding tax," said Raymond
  J. Baer, chairman of Zurich private bank Julius Baer Holding Ltd., in a
  September interview following the announced purchase of Banco di Lugano, a
  small Swiss bank with private-banking operations in Singapore. Last week,
  Mr. Baer said that being in multiple jurisdictions enables the bank to
  serve an international clientele, and that the Singapore office was a
  platform for growth in Asia. "Singapore also offers a tax-friendly
  environment," he noted.

  A spokeswoman for the Monetary Authority says Singapore "does not seek to
  attract tax evaders."

  The number of private banks operating in Singapore jumped to 35 at the end
  of 2005, from 20 in 2000. International banks such as Swiss giants Credit
  Suisse Group and UBS AG have expanded private-banking operations in
  Singapore to cater to new demand from Asians and Europeans.

  Private banks typically provide customers holding at least $1 million of
  liquid assets with advice on investments, estate planning and taxes. They
  also often help the wealthy move assets abroad, which some use to avoid
  domestic taxes.

  Singapore has taken various steps to attract wealthy foreigners. Under
  legal changes made in 2004, foreigners with assets of at least $13 million
  now can apply for residency if they place $3.1 million in a financial
  institution in Singapore. Those applying for residency can use as much as
  $1.25 million of the $3.1 million to buy property in a government-backed
  resort-style residential development on Singapore's Sentosa Island. New
  residents are entitled to take advantage of Singapore's income-tax rate of
  about 20%. (Americans, however, face U.S. tax liability on their income
  regardless of where they live.)

  The incentives are prompting some private-banking customers to actually
  move there. Helmut Widdeck, an Austrian who owns a company in Hong Kong
  that makes leather shoe uppers, heard about the new policy from his private
  bankers at Goldman Sachs in Hong Kong and decided Singapore would be a good
  place to semiretire. After Singaporean authorities conducted an audit to
  verify the source of his wealth, he says, he transferred the required
  amount to an account in Singapore, then bought a 8,557-square-foot
  oceanfront property at Sentosa Cove. He and his wife are planning their
  dream home, which they expect to cost $3.8 million.

  "For me, it's an interesting plan. I can invest the money into a property I
  want, and with that I get residency in a place I'd like to live in," says
  Mr. Widdeck, who is 63 years old. He says he will gain no tax benefit from
  the move because taxes in Hong Kong, where he used to live for eight months
  each year, are even lower.


  Last summer, Gianpiero Fiorani, former chief executive of Banca Popolare
  Italiana Scarl, shifted some assets to Singapore from Jersey, an offshore
  banking center that also came under EU pressure. He had assets with various
  banks and used Banco di Lugano, the Swiss bank now called Banca Julius Baer
  (Lugano) SA, to move the assets. Mr. Fiorani was arrested in December in
  Milan and remains jailed pending an investigation into suspected market
  manipulation and misuse of corporate funds. When he was questioned by
  prosecutors, he told them he had shifted the funds "to better protect the
  money" and for "peace of mind," according to a person familiar with the
  matter. His lawyers declined to comment, as did the spokeswoman for the
  Monetary Authority of Singapore. A spokesman for Julius Baer said the bank
  is cooperating with investigators.

  Singapore's private-banking expansion is part of a broad effort to
  diversify its economy away from electronics manufacturing, which faces
  increasing competition from lower-cost countries such as China. The
  government is trying to foster growth in biotechnology, and in chemical and
  pharmaceutical manufacturing. In 1998, after the Asian financial crisis, it
  drew up a plan to turn Singapore into an investment-banking, mutual-fund
  and private-banking hub.

  Switzerland's private-banking industry, currently home to about 30% of
  offshore assets globally, was a model. Banking confidentiality has been a
  feature of Swiss law since 1934. For decades, foreigners could hold
  personal accounts recorded within the banks merely by numbers. Tax evasion
  is an administrative offense, not a crime. Swiss authorities refuse to
  cooperate with other countries' tax investigations, although they lift
  confidentiality in criminal matters.

  Stiffer Laws

  In 2001, Singapore stiffened laws against breaching the confidentiality of
  bank customers, making penalties for violators even tougher than in
  Switzerland. It imposed fines of $78,000, imprisonment for as long as three
  years, or both. In Switzerland, a similar breach could result in a prison
  term of six months or a fine of about $38,600.

  Singapore's private-banking initiative aimed to capture some of the new
  wealth created by Asia's economic boom. China's rapid economic growth has
  created fortunes throughout Asia. Liquid assets held by individuals in the
  Asia-Pacific region, excluding Japan, are projected to increase 8.9%
  annually from 2004 through 2008, according to UBS, far exceeding the global
  annual average of 5.5%. Credit Suisse customers domiciled in the
  Asia-Pacific region accounted for $47.8 billion in private-banking assets
  as of September, compared with $105 billion in such assets from customers
  domiciled in Switzerland.

  While Singapore was bidding for new private-banking business, the EU was
  pressuring authorities in Switzerland and other offshore banking centers to
  take a tougher line with EU citizens who move money to reduce the taxes
  they pay. In 2000, EU finance ministers proposed ending client
  confidentiality in tax havens in Europe, including Switzerland. The
  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, of Paris, also had
  pushed for an "exchange of information" on tax matters in an effort to
  suppress "harmful tax competition."

  Although Switzerland, Jersey and other offshore centers aren't EU members,
  they are dependent on EU nations for trade. Swiss authorities agreed to
  compromise. The new withholding tax compels Swiss banks to withhold a
  portion of interest earned on personal savings accounts held by EU citizens
  living outside of Switzerland, and to hand over some of that money to
  national tax authorities. The withholding tax applies to account holders
  who haven't reported all of their assets to their own tax authorities.

  Swiss bankers say the withholding tax and the continuing push to further
  restrict client confidentiality are discouraging wealthy Europeans from
  keeping money in Switzerland. Singapore isn't a member of either the EU or
  the OECD, so it hasn't faced the same pressure. By keeping money in
  Singapore, Europeans can avoid the new tax, some bankers say.

  Tax evasion in Singapore is a crime. But Singaporean authorities tend to
  respond to requests from other countries for information about tax evaders
  only when evasion of Singaporean taxes is at stake, says Jeffrey Owens,
  director at the center for tax policy and administration at the OECD.

  In a written response to questions about its policies, Singapore's Finance
  Ministry said requests for information from tax authorities in other
  nations are considered under the terms of international agreements designed
  to avoid double taxation. Singapore has such agreements with 50 countries,
  a Finance Ministry spokesman says.

  'Open and Transparent'

  Singapore bills itself as being tough on crime and free of corruption. Like
  Switzerland, Singapore says it cooperates with foreign authorities
  investigating money laundering and terrorism financing. "Our banking and
  financial system is open and transparent, and our rules are strictly
  enforced," the Monetary Authority of Singapore said in a statement.

  Singaporean officials traveled repeatedly to Switzerland to describe
  Singapore's private-banking capabilities to wealthy customers of Swiss
  banks, to Swiss bankers themselves and to lawyers specializing in wealth
  management. In February 2002, for example, Alison Lim, an executive at the
  Monetary Authority of Singapore, appeared at a seminar in Geneva. According
  to written promotional materials, the program touted Singapore as a
  "jurisdiction that protects clients' interests." Ms. Lim says she spoke
  about Singapore's role as a financial center and some trends in Asian
  investments.


  To become better versed in private banking, Ms. Lim completed an internship
  at UBS in late 2003, according to UBS. Ms. Lim declines to comment on the
  internship, but says the Monetary Authority routinely places staffers with
  various types of banks for short-term stints so they can learn about the
  industry.

  Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore's prime minister and finance minister, has
  personally overseen the city-state's private-banking push. Before becoming
  prime minister last year, he served as deputy prime minister, finance
  minister and chairman of Singapore's Monetary Authority. Under Mr. Lee, the
  government set up working groups of bankers, consultants and ministry
  officials to drum up ideas for creating a global banking hub. In that
  capacity, Mr. Lee met regularly with Swiss and other international bankers
  to discuss how to structure a bank-friendly regulatory environment,
  according to some bankers who attended.

  One suggestion from the bankers: make Singapore's trust laws more
  attractive. Many European nations practice a concept known as "forced
  heirship," in which the state dictates the proportions of an estate that
  must pass to certain family members. These laws supersede wills and trusts.

  In December 2004, Singapore adopted new trust laws that let foreigners who
  set up trusts in Singapore avoid these limitations. Assets placed in trusts
  in Singapore have increased to almost $50 billion in 2004 from just under
  $25 billion in 2002, according to the Monetary Authority of Singapore.

  Singapore is now Credit Suisse's largest private-banking center after
  Switzerland. In 2005, the bank moved its head of international private
  banking to Singapore from Zurich and hired 150 additional staffers,
  bringing its total there to 450. By 2007, Credit Suisse aims to hire an
  extra 100 client advisers to serve the Asia-Pacific region.

  "Singapore is run like a company, and regulators want to help you win
  business," said Joachim Straehle, Credit Suisse's head of international
  private banking who relocated to Singapore from Zurich in April 2005.

  Credit Suisse runs a "eurodesk" in Singapore where bankers versed in
  English, French, German, Italian and Spanish work until almost midnight
  Singapore time to serve European clients. Credit Suisse now has at least
  $4.6 billion of European private-banking assets booked in Singapore,
  according to someone with knowledge of the figures. UBS has at least $3.1
  billion of such assets, according to another person familiar with that
  bank. Representatives of both banks declined comment on those numbers.

  Clariden Bank, a Swiss private bank controlled by Credit Suisse, opened a
  Singapore office at the end of November. "Singapore will be the fastest
  growing offshore private-banking center in the next five years," says
  Roland Knecht, a member of Clariden's executive board of management. He
  estimates that within three years about 20% of private-banking assets
  booked at the bank in Singapore will come from Europe.

  Already Clariden has started assembling staff for a eurodesk, and a number
  of Clariden's clients, including some Russians, have flown to Singapore for
  a visit, he says. Several clients have inquired about becoming Singaporean
  residents.


  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From jya at cryptome.net  Mon Feb  6 11:54:00 2006
From: jya at cryptome.net (John Young)
Date: Mon, 06 Feb 2006 11:54:00 -0800
Subject: [Clips] Swiss Fight Against Tax Cheats Aids Singapore's  
  Banking    Quest
In-Reply-To: <p0623096dc00d218bc09d@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <E1F69dR-0001KO-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>

Right, nobody can trace the funds movement for all transactions
are concealed by today's Crypto AG totally trustworthy
concealment. Wink.

Banks lie as a matter of policy no matter their location.
Capitalists know this and endorse the promulagation of
faith-based security to the yokels who rely upon public
media for information while they use other means to
hide their assets.

A means and method used by governments long before
the Swiss and the Singaporeans agreed to serve as
spin doctors for a small fee kiss and tell.

Stuff your mattress with plutonium, or what you swear
on a stack of Korans is PU, and peddle it to aspiring 
WMD strutters awash in oil booty. Inshallah.

WSJ is such a booster of illusionary wealth ops you'd
think they worked for both sides of Wall Street, the profiteers
and the regulators, criminals needing cops to keep property
values inflated and job security.




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Feb  6 09:15:10 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2006 12:15:10 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Swiss Fight Against Tax Cheats Aids Singapore's    
   Banking    Quest
In-Reply-To: <E1F69dR-0001KO-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
References: <E1F69dR-0001KO-00@pop05.mail.atl.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <p06230981c00d3493367f@[68.167.57.91]>

At 11:54 AM -0800 2/6/06, John Young wrote:
> Wink.

Cypherpunks do what?

;-)

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From atalaya at btinternet.com  Mon Feb  6 15:19:37 2006
From: atalaya at btinternet.com (Isidro Elmore)
Date: Mon, 06 Feb 2006 17:19:37 -0600
Subject: Re-finance before rates skyrocket
Message-ID: <493l436s.0409902@yahoo.com>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Feb  6 14:16:28 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2006 22:16:28 +0000
Subject: [checker@panix.com: [>Htech] Supply Chain Review: Device To
  Disable RFID Tags In The Works]
Message-ID: <20060206221628.GU13287@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Premise Checker <checker at panix.com> -----


From wipvqdwnf at hotmail.com  Tue Feb  7 02:39:28 2006
From: wipvqdwnf at hotmail.com (Diana Powell)
Date: Tue, 07 Feb 2006 02:39:28 -0800 (PST) 
Subject: birdlike spindle bromide
Message-ID: <40853308913816.DtUWH6Px@dm27.mta.everyone.net>

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From nwpia at ameritrade.com  Tue Feb  7 06:37:49 2006
From: nwpia at ameritrade.com (Veronica Swain)
Date: Tue, 07 Feb 2006 08:37:49 -0600
Subject: Low mortagge ratee approvall
Message-ID: <075m864c.8750436@msn.com>

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From phillips at grm.net  Tue Feb  7 06:48:56 2006
From: phillips at grm.net (Iva Stubbs)
Date: Tue, 07 Feb 2006 08:48:56 -0600
Subject: Ratess will skyrocket soon
Message-ID: <888v448b.4195244@yahoo.com>

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From baez at iowagas.com  Tue Feb  7 07:13:57 2006
From: baez at iowagas.com (Jennie Masters)
Date: Tue, 07 Feb 2006 09:13:57 -0600
Subject: Ratess will skyrocket soon
Message-ID: <004r816m.5845009@69.60.117.34>

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From shortdia at imtins.com  Tue Feb  7 07:17:54 2006
From: shortdia at imtins.com (Lorraine Wynn)
Date: Tue, 07 Feb 2006 09:17:54 -0600
Subject: Pre-approved Application #TNSDJ536744
Message-ID: <636d182f.0700632@69.60.117.34>

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From coderman at gmail.com  Tue Feb  7 10:06:24 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2006 10:06:24 -0800
Subject: [Stalking by Cellphone]
In-Reply-To: <20060207110902.GP13287@leitl.org>
References: <20060207110902.GP13287@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602071006u4b2dd2c9lcae6245babe20eba@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/7/06, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> ...
> http://technology.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0,,1699156,00.html
>
> For the past week I've been tracking my girlfriend through her mobile
> phone. I can see exactly where she is, at any time of day or night,
> within 150 yards, as long as her phone is on.
> ...
> I knew that the police could do
> this, and telecommunications companies, but not any old random person
> with five minutes access to someone else's phone.

remember those cell phone number history sales?  that same information
feed contains tower identifiers for every call placed.  those
identifiers in turn can be linked to GPS coordinates and
inter|extrapolated location of the caller, thus the 150 yard accuracy.
 (this is how some carriers are approaching E911 as well).

does anyone really expect strong privacy from any telecommunications
provider these days?  time to roll your own...




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Feb  7 07:07:35 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2006 10:07:35 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Homeland Security Contracts for Vast New Detention
  Camps
Message-ID: <p062309c7c00e60fca079@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2006 09:30:15 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Homeland Security Contracts for Vast New Detention Camps
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com


<http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=eed74d9d44c30493706fe03f4c9b3a77>


  Pacific News Service > News >


  Homeland Security Contracts for Vast New Detention Camps

  NEWS ANALYSIS/COMMENTARY, PETER DALE SCOTT,
  NEW AMERICA MEDIA, JAN 31, 2006

  Editor's Note: A little-known $385 million contract for Halliburton
  subsidiary KBR to build detention facilities for "an emergency influx of
  immigrants" is another step down the Bush administration's road toward
  martial law, the writer says.

  BERKELEY, Calif.--A Halliburton subsidiary has just received a $385 million
  contract from the Department of Homeland Security to provide "temporary
  detention and processing capabilities."


  The contract -- announced Jan. 24 by the engineering and construction firm
  KBR -- calls for preparing for "an emergency influx of immigrants, or to
  support the rapid development of new programs" in the event of other
  emergencies, such as "a natural disaster." The release offered no details
  about where Halliburton was to build these facilities, or when.

  To date, some newspapers have worried that open-ended provisions in the
  contract could lead to cost overruns, such as have occurred with KBR in
  Iraq. A Homeland Security spokesperson has responded that this is a
  "contingency contract" and that conceivably no centers might be built. But
  almost no paper so far has discussed the possibility that detention centers
  could be used to detain American citizens if the Bush administration were
  to declare martial law.

  For those who follow covert government operations abroad and at home, the
  contract evoked ominous memories of Oliver North's controversial Rex-84
  "readiness exercise" in 1984. This called for the Federal Emergency
  Management Agency (FEMA) to round up and detain 400,000 imaginary
  "refugees," in the context of "uncontrolled population movements" over the
  Mexican border into the United States. North's activities raised civil
  liberties concerns in both Congress and the Justice Department. The
  concerns persist.

  "Almost certainly this is preparation for a roundup after the next 9/11 for
  Mid-Easterners, Muslims and possibly dissenters," says Daniel Ellsberg, a
  former military analyst who in 1971 released the Pentagon Papers, the U.S.
  military's account of its activities in Vietnam. "They've already done this
  on a smaller scale, with the 'special registration' detentions of immigrant
  men from Muslim countries, and with Guantanamo."

  Plans for detention facilities or camps have a long history, going back to
  fears in the 1970s of a national uprising by black militants. As Alonzo
  Chardy reported in the Miami Herald on July 5, 1987, an executive order for
  continuity of government (COG) had been drafted in 1982 by FEMA head Louis
  Giuffrida. The order called for "suspension of the Constitution" and
  "declaration of martial law." The martial law portions of the plan were
  outlined in a memo by Giuffrida's deputy, John Brinkerhoff.

  In 1985, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 188,
  one of a series of directives that authorized continued planning for COG by
  a private parallel government.

  Two books, James Mann's "Rise of the Vulcans" and James Bamford's "A
  Pretext for War," have revealed that in the 1980s this parallel structure,
  operating outside normal government channels, included the then-head of G.
  D. Searle and Co., Donald Rumsfeld, and then-Congressman from Wyoming Dick
  Cheney.

  After 9/11, new martial law plans began to surface similar to those of FEMA
  in the 1980s. In January 2002 the Pentagon submitted a proposal for
  deploying troops on American streets. One month later John Brinkerhoff, the
  author of the 1982 FEMA memo, published an article arguing for the legality
  of using U.S. troops for purposes of domestic security.

  Then in April 2002, Defense Dept. officials implemented a plan for domestic
  U.S. military operations by creating a new U.S. Northern Command
  (CINC-NORTHCOM) for the continental United States. Defense Secretary Donald
  Rumsfeld called this "the most sweeping set of changes since the unified
  command system was set up in 1946."

  The NORTHCOM commander, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced, is
  responsible for "homeland defense and also serves as head of the North
  American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).... He will command U.S. forces
  that operate within the United States in support of civil authorities. The
  command will provide civil support not only in response to attacks, but for
  natural disasters."

  John Brinkerhoff later commented on PBS that, "The United States itself is
  now for the first time since the War of 1812 a theater of war. That means
  that we should apply, in my view, the same kind of command structure in the
  United States that we apply in other theaters of war."

  Then in response to Hurricane Katrina in Sept. 2005, according to the
  Washington Post, White House senior adviser Karl Rove told the governor of
  Louisiana, Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, that she should explore legal options
  to impose martial law "or as close as we can get." The White House tried
  vigorously, but ultimately failed, to compel Gov. Blanco to yield control
  of the state National Guard.

  Also in September, NORTHCOM conducted its highly classified Granite Shadow
  exercise in Washington. As William Arkin reported in the Washington Post,
  "Granite Shadow is yet another new Top Secret and compartmented operation
  related to the military's extra-legal powers regarding weapons of mass
  destruction. It allows for emergency military operations in the United
  States without civilian supervision or control."

  It is clear that the Bush administration is thinking seriously about
  martial law.

  Many critics have alleged that FEMA's spectacular failure to respond to
  Katrina followed from a deliberate White House policy: of paring back FEMA,
  and instead strengthening the military for responses to disasters.

  A multimillion program for detention facilities will greatly increase
  NORTHCOM's ability to respond to any domestic disorders.

  Scott is author of "Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan,
  Colombia, and Indochina" (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). He is completing a
  book on "The Road to 9/11." Visit his Web site .


  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Feb  7 03:09:02 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2006 11:09:02 +0000
Subject: [Stalking by Cellphone]
Message-ID: <20060207110902.GP13287@leitl.org>

---------- Forwarded message ----------

How I stalked my girlfriend

Ben Goldacre
Wednesday February 1, 2006
The Guardian

http://technology.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0,,1699156,00.html

For the past week I've been tracking my girlfriend through her mobile
phone. I can see exactly where she is, at any time of day or night,
within 150 yards, as long as her phone is on. It has been very
interesting to find out about her day. Now I'm going to tell you how I
did it.

First, though, I ought to point out, that my girlfriend is a journalist,
that I had her permission ("in principle ...") and that this was all in
the name of science, bagging a Pulitzer and paying the school fees. You
have nothing to worry about, or at least not from me.

But back to business. First I had to get hold of her phone. It wasn't
difficult. We live together and she has no reason not to trust me, so
she often leaves it lying around. And, after all, I only needed it for
five minutes.

I unplugged her phone and took it upstairs to register it on a website I
had been told about. It looks as if the service is mainly for tracking
stock and staff movements: the Guardian, rather sensibly, doesn't want
me to tell you any more than that. I ticked the website's terms and
conditions without reading them, put in my debit card details, and
bought 25 GSM Credits for =A35 plus vat.

Almost immediately, my girlfriend's phone vibrated with a new text
message. "Ben Goldacre has requested to add you to their Buddy List! To
accept, simply reply to this message with 'LOCATE'". I sent the
requested reply. The phone vibrated again. A second text arrived:
"WARNING: [this service] allows other people to know where you are. For
your own safety make sure that you know who is locating you." I deleted
both these text messages.

On the website, I see the familiar number in my list of "GSM devices"
and I click "locate". A map appears of the area in which we live, with a
person-shaped blob in the middle, roughly 100 yards from our home. The
phone doesn't go off at all. There is no trace of what I'm doing on her
phone. I can't quite believe my eyes: I knew that the police could do
this, and telecommunications companies, but not any old random person
with five minutes access to someone else's phone. I can't find anything
in her mobile that could possibly let her know that I'm checking her
location. As devious systems go, it's foolproof. I set up the website to
track her at regular intervals, take a snapshot of her whereabouts
automatically, every half hour, and plot her path on the map, so that I
can view it at my leisure. It felt, I have to say, exceedingly wrong.

By the time my better half got home, I was so childishly over-excited
that I managed to keep all of this secret for precisely 30 seconds. And
to my disappointment, she wasn't even slightly freaked out. I don't know
if that says good or bad things about our relationship and I wouldn't
want you to come away thinking it's all a bit "Mr & Mrs Smith" around
here. Having said that, we came up with at least five new uses for this
technology between us in a few minutes, all far more sinister than
anything I had managed to concoct on my own.

And that, for me, was the clincher. Your mobile phone company could make
money from selling information about your location to the companies that
offer this service. If you have any reason to suspect that your phone
might have been out of your sight, even for five minutes, and there is
anyone who might want to track you: call your phone company and ask it
to find out if there is a trace on your phone. Anybody could be watching
you. It could be me.

-- end of forwarded message --
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From apb at cequrux.com  Tue Feb  7 02:08:57 2006
From: apb at cequrux.com (Alan Barrett)
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2006 12:08:57 +0200
Subject: [Stalking by Cellphone]
In-Reply-To: <20060207110902.GP13287@leitl.org>
References: <20060207110902.GP13287@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <20060207100857.GF14733@apb-laptoy.apb.alt.za>

On Tue, 07 Feb 2006, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> 
> How I stalked my girlfriend

See http://www.cellfind.co.za/look4me/ for a commercial service offered
in South Africa targeted (cheifly) at parents keeping track of children.
I have mentioned this before.

--apb (Alan Barrett)




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Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2006 14:41:01 -0900
Subject: Where others say NO, we say YES!!! Our mortgage referral service combines the highest quality loans
Message-ID: <200602070540.k175ef14030581@proton.jfet.org>

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From s10la_76 at jacobwells.com  Tue Feb  7 15:02:37 2006
From: s10la_76 at jacobwells.com (Katheryn Whalen)
Date: Tue, 07 Feb 2006 17:02:37 -0600
Subject: Last chance for lower rates
Message-ID: <891b776q.5414905@msn.com>

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From acress at hager.net  Tue Feb  7 15:52:40 2006
From: acress at hager.net (Ismael Bartley)
Date: Tue, 07 Feb 2006 17:52:40 -0600
Subject: Pre-approved Application #04505 Tue, 07 Feb 2006 17:52:40 -0600
Message-ID: <076f114o.1944972@yahoo.com>

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From: carr at joncarr.icom43.net (Jarred Garrett)
Date: Wed, 08 Feb 2006 14:20:50 -0600
Subject: Mortagge ratee approvedd
Message-ID: <402o404f.6602792@hotmail.com>

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From law at execd.com  Wed Feb  8 18:18:25 2006
From: law at execd.com (Ted North)
Date: Wed, 08 Feb 2006 20:18:25 -0600
Subject: Re-finance before rates skyrocket
Message-ID: <854o304a.5849915@msn.com>

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Message-ID: <23324527387751.09011449@purine>

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From gmfdvhzutukx at boba.prds.cdx.mot.com  Wed Feb  8 15:28:02 2006
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Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2006 04:28:02 +0500
Subject: Hey bro, check out the huge sale these guys are offering
Message-ID: <FEDFF0A8.56F5.11D6-B6AD.8490ECC06@ferleger.com>

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Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2006 05:31:54 -0200
Subject: Get rid of everything you are indebted for with out sending an other cent
Message-ID: <68E7D8B5.6027FB3@love.km.ru>


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From dave at farber.net  Thu Feb  9 03:43:48 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2006 06:43:48 -0500
Subject: [IP] US plans massive data sweep
Message-ID: <mailman.1578.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 	US plans massive data sweep
Date: 	Wed, 08 Feb 2006 19:44:53 -0500 (EST)
From: 	TruChaos at aol.com
To: 	dave at farber.net



*US plans massive data sweep*

Little-known data-collection system could troll news, blogs, even
e-mails. Will it go too far?

By Mark Clayton

The US government is developing a massive computer system that can
collect huge amounts of data and, by linking far-flung information from
blogs and e-mail to government records and intelligence reports, search
for patterns of terrorist activity.
The system - parts of which are operational, parts of which are still
under development - is already credited with helping to foil some plots.
It is the federal government's latest attempt to use broad
data-collection and powerful analysis in the fight against terrorism.
But by delving deeply into the digital minutiae of American life, the
program is also raising concerns that the government is intruding too
deeply into citizens' privacy.

"We don't realize that, as we live our lives and make little choices,
like buying groceries, buying on Amazon, Googling, we're leaving traces
everywhere," says Lee Tien, a staff attorney with the Electronic
Frontier Foundation. "We have an attitude that no one will connect all
those dots. But these programs are about connecting those dots -
analyzing and aggregating them - in a way that we haven't thought about.
It's one of the underlying fundamental issues we have yet to come to
grips with."

The core of this effort is a little-known system called Analysis,
Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic Enhancement
(ADVISE). Only a few public documents mention it. ADVISE is a research
and development program within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), part of its three-year-old "Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and
Assessment" portfolio. The TVTA received nearly $50 million in federal
funding this year.

DHS officials are circumspect when talking about ADVISE. "I've heard of
it," says Peter Sand, director of privacy technology. "I don't know the
actual status right now. But if it's a system that's been discussed,
then it's something we're involved in at some level."

Data-mining is a key technology

A major part of ADVISE involves data-mining - or "dataveillance," as
some call it. It means sifting through data to look for patterns. If a
supermarket finds that customers who buy cider also tend to buy
fresh-baked bread, it might group the two together. To prevent fraud,
credit-card issuers use data-mining to look for patterns of suspicious
activity.

What sets ADVISE apart is its scope. It would collect a vast array of
corporate and public online information - from financial records to CNN
news stories - and cross-reference it against US intelligence and
law-enforcement records. The system would then store it as "entities" -
linked data about people, places, things, organizations, and events,
according to a report summarizing a 2004 DHS conference in Alexandria,
Va. The storage requirements alone are huge - enough to retain
information about 1 quadrillion entities, the report estimated. If each
entity were a penny, they would collectively form a cube a half-mile
high - roughly double the height of the Empire State Building.

But ADVISE and related DHS technologies aim to do much more, according
to Joseph Kielman, manager of the TVTA portfolio. The key is not merely
to identify terrorists, or sift for key words, but to identify critical
patterns in data that illumine their motives and intentions, he wrote in
a presentation at a November conference in Richland, Wash.

For example: Is a burst of Internet traffic between a few people the
plotting of terrorists, or just bloggers arguing? ADVISE algorithms
would try to determine that before flagging the data pattern for a human
analyst's review.

At least a few pieces of ADVISE are already operational. Consider
Starlight, which along with other "visualization" software tools can
give human analysts a graphical view of data. Viewing data in this way
could reveal patterns not obvious in text or number form. Understanding
the relationships among people, organizations, places, and things -
using social-behavior analysis and other techniques - is essential to
going beyond mere data-mining to comprehensive "knowledge discovery in
databases," Dr. Kielman wrote in his November report. He declined to be
interviewed for this article.

One data program has foiled terrorists

Starlight has already helped foil some terror plots, says Jim Thomas,
one of its developers and director of the government's new National
Visualization Analytics Center in Richland, Wash. He can't elaborate
because the cases are classified, he adds. But "there's no question that
the technology we've invented here at the lab has been used to protect
our freedoms - and that's pretty cool."

As envisioned, ADVISE and its analytical tools would be used by other
agencies to look for terrorists. "All federal, state, local and
private-sector security entities will be able to share and collaborate
in real time with distributed data warehouses that will provide full
support for analysis and action" for the ADVISE system, says the 2004
workshop report.

Some antiterror efforts die - others just change names
Defense Department

November 2002 - The New York Times identifies a counterterrorism program
called Total Information Awareness.

September 2003 - After terminating TIA on privacy grounds, Congress
shuts down its successor, Terrorism Information Awareness, for the same
reasons.

Department of Homeland Security

February 2003 - The department's Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) announces it's replacing its 1990s-era Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS I).

July 2004 - TSA cancels CAPPS II because of privacy concerns.

August 2004 - TSA says it will begin testing a similar system - Secure
Flight - with built-in privacy features.

July 2005 - Government auditors charge that Secure Flight is violating
privacy laws by holding information on 43,000 people not suspected of
terrorism.

A program in the shadows

Yet the scope of ADVISE - its stage of development, cost, and most other
details - is so obscure that critics say it poses a major privacy challenge.

"We just don't know enough about this technology, how it works, or what
it is used for," says Marcia Hofmann of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center in Washington. "It matters to a lot of people that
these programs and software exist. We don't really know to what extent
the government is mining personal data."

Even congressmen with direct oversight of DHS, who favor data mining,
say they don't know enough about the program.

"I am not fully briefed on ADVISE," wrote Rep. Curt Weldon (R) of
Pennsylvania, vice chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, in
an e-mail. "I'll get briefed this week."

Privacy concerns have torpedoed federal data-mining efforts in the past.
In 2002, news reports revealed that the Defense Department was working
on Total Information Awareness, a project aimed at collecting and
sifting vast amounts of personal and government data for clues to
terrorism. An uproar caused Congress to cancel the TIA program a year later.

Echoes of a past controversial plan

ADVISE "looks very much like TIA," Mr. Tien of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation writes in an e-mail. "There's the same emphasis on broad
collection and pattern analysis."

But Mr. Sand, the DHS official, emphasizes that privacy protection would
be built-in. "Before a system leaves the department there's been a
privacy review.... That's our focus."

Some computer scientists support the concepts behind ADVISE.

"This sort of technology does protect against a real threat," says
Jeffrey Ullman, professor emeritus of computer science at Stanford
University. "If a computer suspects me of being a terrorist, but just
says maybe an analyst should look at it ... well, that's no big deal.
This is the type of thing we need to be willing to do, to give up a
certain amount of privacy."

Others are less sure.

"It isn't a bad idea, but you have to do it in a way that demonstrates
its utility - and with provable privacy protection," says Latanya
Sweeney, founder of the Data Privacy Laboratory at Carnegie Mellon
University. But since speaking on privacy at the 2004 DHS workshop, she
now doubts the department is building privacy into ADVISE. "At this
point, ADVISE has no funding for privacy technology."

She cites a recent request for proposal by the Office of Naval Research
on behalf of DHS. Although it doesn't mention ADVISE by name, the
proposal outlines data-technology research that meshes closely with
technology cited in ADVISE documents.

Neither the proposal - nor any other she has seen - provides any funding
for provable privacy technology, she adds.


http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0209/p01s02-uspo.html

-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From gypsy.wunderebgq at gmail.com  Thu Feb  9 01:46:24 2006
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Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2006 08:46:24 -0100
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Message-ID: <200602090747.k197lMxp032135@proton.jfet.org>

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From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Feb  9 10:15:39 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2006 13:15:39 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Abolish FISA
Message-ID: <p06230901c01136c3be93@[68.167.57.91]>

Again, friends. If you don't like this, don't write your congressman. Write
code.

Cheers,
RAH

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2006 13:09:36 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Abolish FISA
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

  <http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB113945236921469126.html>

  The Wall Street Journal

  February 9, 2006


  REVIEW & OUTLOOK


  Abolish FISA
  February 9, 2006; Page A12

  Whatever happened to "impeachment"? Only two months ago, that was the word
  on leading Democratic lips as they assailed President Bush for "illegal"
  warrantless NSA wiretaps against al Qaeda suspects. But at Monday's Senate
  hearing on the issue, the idea never even made an appearance.

  The reason isn't because liberal critics have come to some epiphany about
  the necessity of executive discretion in wartime. The reason is they can
  read the opinion polls. And the polls show that a majority of Americans
  want their government to eavesdrop on al Qaeda suspects, even -- or should
  we say, especially -- if they're talking to one of their dupes or
  sympathizers here in the U.S.

  In short, the larger political battle over wiretaps is over, and the
  President has won the argument among the American people. We hope Dan
  Bartlett, Steve Hadley and other White House message-makers notice the
  difference between this outcome, on a matter on which they bothered to
  fight, and so many other controversies when they ceded the field to their
  opponents ("torture," Joe Wilson).

  * * *

  All the more so because the policy debate over Presidential authority
  continues, and on a dangerous path. Judging by Monday's hearing, Senators
  of both parties are still hoping to stage a Congressional raid on
  Presidential war powers. And they hope to do it not by accepting more
  responsibility themselves but by handing more power to unelected judges to
  do the job for them.

  The preferred vehicle here is an expansion of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence
  Surveillance Act, or FISA, the Carter-era law that imposed judicial consent
  for domestic wiretaps during the Cold War. "If you believe you need new
  laws, then come and tell us," Senate Democrat Pat Leahy told Attorney
  General Alberto Gonzales during Monday's hearing. Chairman Arlen Specter
  and Members in both parties seemed to be saying, "We're from Congress and
  we're here to help you."

  But note well that the Members aren't talking about sharing responsibility
  themselves for wiretap decisions. That they want no part of. The leadership
  and Intelligence Committee chairs were already briefed numerous times on
  the NSA program, only to have several of them deny all responsibility when
  the story was leaked. Intelligence Vice Chairman Senator Jay Rockefeller
  (D., W.Va.) even wrote his own not-my-fault letter that he kept secret
  until the story broke, when he released it in order to embarrass the Bush
  Administration. The real message of this episode is: "We're from Congress
  and we're here to second-guess you."

  What FISA boils down to is an attempt to further put the executive under
  the thumb of the judiciary, and in unconstitutional fashion. The way FISA
  works is that it gives a single judge the ability to overrule the
  considered judgment of the entire executive branch. In the case of the NSA
  wiretaps, the Justice Department, NSA and White House are all involved in
  establishing and reviewing these wiretaps. Yet if a warrant were required,
  one judge would have the discretion to deny any request.

  As a practical war-fighting matter, this interferes with the ability to
  gather intelligence against anonymous, al Qaeda-linked phone numbers. FISA
  warrants apply to people, and are supposed to require "probable cause" that
  the subject is an agent of a foreign power. But as Mr. Gonzales and Deputy
  National Intelligence Director Michael Hayden explained Monday, in
  fast-moving anti-terror operations it's often impossible to know if someone
  on the U.S. end of an al Qaeda phone call is actually an "agent." That
  means the government must operate on a different "reasonable basis"
  standard.

  FISA is the intelligence equivalent of asking battlefield commanders in
  Iraq to get a court order before taking Fallujah. "We can't afford to
  impose layers of lawyers on top of career intelligence officers who are
  striving valiantly to provide a first line of defense by tracking secretive
  al Qaeda operatives in real time," as Mr. Gonzales put it.

  We already know FISA impeded intelligence gathering before 9/11. It was the
  reason FBI agents decided not to tap the computer of alleged 20th hijacker
  Zacarias Moussaoui. And it contributed to the NSA's decision not to listen
  to foreign calls to actual hijacker Khalid al-Midhar, despite knowing that
  an al Qaeda associate by that name was in the country. The NSA feared being
  accused of "domestic spying."

  * * *

  Passed in the wake of the infamous Church hearings on the CIA, FISA is an
  artifact of post-Vietnam and post-Watergate hostility to executive power.
  But even as Jimmy Carter signed it for political reasons, his own Attorney
  General declared that it didn't supercede executive powers under Article I
  of the Constitution. Every President since has agreed with that view, and
  no court has contradicted it.

  As federal judge and former Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman
  explained in his 1978 testimony on FISA, the President is accountable to
  the voters if he abuses surveillance power. Fear of exposure or political
  damage are powerful disincentives to going too far. But judges, who are not
  politically accountable, have no similar incentives to strike the right
  balance between intelligence needs and civilian privacy. This is one reason
  the Founders gave the judiciary no such plenary powers.

  Far from being some rogue operation, the Bush Administration has taken
  enormous pains to make sure the NSA wiretaps are both legal and limited.
  The program is monitored by lawyers, reauthorized every 45 days by the
  President and has been discussed with both Congress and the FISA court
  itself. The Administration even decided against warrantless wiretaps on al
  Qaeda suspects communicating entirely within the U.S., though we'd argue
  that that too would be both constitutional and prudent.

  Any attempt to expand FISA would be the largest assault on Presidential
  power since the 1970s. Congress has every right to scrutinize the NSA
  program and cut off funds if it wants to. But it shouldn't take the
  politically easy route of passing the buck to the judiciary and further
  limiting the President's ability to defend America. Far from expanding
  FISA, Congress could best serve the country by abolishing it.

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"When the hares made speeches in the assembly and demanded that all should
have equality, the lions replied, "Where are your claws and teeth?"  --
attributed to Antisthenes in Aristotle, 'Politics', 3.7.2




From declan at well.com  Thu Feb  9 13:33:31 2006
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2006 13:33:31 -0800
Subject: [Politech] Feingold,
 Kennedy ask AT&T and others if they're in bed with NSA [priv]
Message-ID: <mailman.1579.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

The letter the two senators sent to AT&T, Sprint Nextel, and Verizon:
http://www.politechbot.com/docs/feingold.letter.telecom.020906.pdf

A survey of telecommunications and Internet firms about NSA participation:
http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6035305.html

-Declan
_______________________________________________
Politech mailing list
Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Feb  9 06:04:02 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2006 14:04:02 +0000
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] US plans massive data sweep]
Message-ID: <20060209140402.GU3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From declan at well.com  Thu Feb  9 14:08:59 2006
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2006 14:08:59 -0800
Subject: [Politech] Lawsuit challenges law targeting Internet "annoyances"
	[fs]
Message-ID: <mailman.1580.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

The complaint:
http://www.politechbot.com/docs/annoy.complaint.020906.pdf

News coverage:
http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6037439.html

Previous Politech message:
http://www.politechbot.com/2006/01/12/new-law-targets/

The prohibition in the new law:
"Whoever...utilizes any device or software that can be used to originate
telecommunications or other types of communications that are
transmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet... without disclosing
his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any
person...who receives the communications...shall be fined under title 18
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."

-Declan
_______________________________________________
Politech mailing list
Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From declan at well.com  Thu Feb  9 16:28:54 2006
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2006 16:28:54 -0800
Subject: [Politech] Details of how Australian "e-passports" will work [priv]
Message-ID: <mailman.1581.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Politech submission: Australian ePassports - Minister states
random UID used
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 10:16:14 +1000
From: Irene Graham <execdir at efa.org.au>
To: Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com>

Declan

Information about the implementation of chips in Australian ePassports has
recently been provided by the Aust. Minister for Foreign Affairs in
response to
written questions asked in the Aust. Senate by Senator Natasha Stott
Despoja
(Aust. Democrats).

As has been previously mentioned on Politech, e.g.
http://www.politechbot.com/2005/11/02/replies-to-us/
one of the concerns is whether chips emit a random or fixed UID and
whether in
fact any chip manufacturers implement random UIDs.

The Aust. Minister has stated that the chip in the Aust. ePassport emits a
random UID and that the UID does not contain any data that might allow
identification of the issuing authority (Aust. Gov) or that the chip is
in an
ePassport.

Obviously that info only applies to the Aust. ePassport - the U.S. and some
other countries might be implementing fixed UIDs. However, if they are not
intending to implement random UIDs, one might ask why not given such
chips are
apparently available.

The above and other Q&As about the ePassport chip implementation were
tabled in
the Aust. Senate on 9 Feb 2006. Senate Hansard page containing the Q&As
is here
(permalink):

http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/TranslateWIPILink.aspx?Folder=HANSARDS&Cr
ite
ria=DOC_DATE:2006-02-09%3BSEQ_NUM:167%3B

While those Q&As don't state what type of chip it is, I understand it
complies
with ISO 14443 Type B (i.e. not Type A). That's what Sharp Corporation
announced
they were shipping to the Aust. Gov for epassport trials in late 2004
http://www.sle.sharp.co.uk/news/pressreleases/04035_epassports_Final.pdf
and in very late Oct 2005, Bob Nash (Assistant Secretary, Dept of Foreign
Affairs and Trade) told me during a phone conversation (in response to a
question) that the same chip is being used in the Aust. ePassports (that
had
commenced being issued to the general public a few days previously).

Btw, for info of people not familiar with Aust. Senate procedures, the Q&As
above are not of the type where a Minister is asked a question and
expected to
answer it immediately. The Aust. Senate has a procedure whereby any
Senator can
send written questions to a Minister and the Minister is (at least in
theory)
required to provide written answers within 30 days (which are then
tabled in the
Senate). The purpose is to enable Senators to ask detailed questions and
give
Ministers time, if necessary, to find out the answers from e.g.
Departmental
staff. Ministers do not always answer such questions. When they do, imo
it's far
more likely than not that the answers are factual.

Regards
Irene

--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Irene Graham
Executive Director - Electronic Frontiers Australia Inc. (EFA)
Web: <http://www.efa.org.au>
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~



_______________________________________________
Politech mailing list
Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Feb  9 19:42:43 2006
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2006 19:42:43 -0800
Subject: anonymity for principals
Message-ID: <43EC0BB2.8EB74028@cdc.gov>

My first grader's school newletter mentioned anonymity as a problem
for net-enabled kids.   Predators, horseman, etc., you know the
routine.

I wrote a reply (cc'd to more than her principal so it was not
ignorable) explaining that anonymity is possible with fax, phone,
and snailmail, and that it was a fundamental American right
(albeit I restrained from using the radical concept of a right,
clearly usurped by a dumbass Yale graduate who's killed
more than Atta, an army of one)
in principle and practice to express oneself without
recourse.

A trivial reply to a trivial offense but one must keep the faith.
Been a while since I've pulled a crucifix from the roadside,
ya know.

(The flying spaghetti monster kinda faith, of course, but still.)

[Direct questions about "why State schools" to dev/null and
save us all some trouble]

Maybe I should fax some dead Iraqi kids to them...

...........
Impeach or frag.




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Feb  9 14:39:07 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2006 22:39:07 +0000
Subject: more surveillance puts strain on carriers
Message-ID: <20060209223907.GE3873@leitl.org>

http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB113945527128569215-ap0UyM9HXxWBrOiAX0m
sQpD4xsw_20070209.html?mod=blogs

More Surveillance
Puts Strain on Carriers
Third Parties Help Telecom,
Internet Firms Fill Law Enforcement's
Increasing Data Requests
By CHRISTOPHER RHOADS
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
February 9, 2006; Page B3

After the 2001 terrorist attacks, retired Federal Bureau of Investigation
agent Michael Warren saw that many phone and Internet companies would need
help meeting an expected jump in law-enforcement requests for customer calling
and email information.

His prediction proved correct. Mr. Warren formed a company that won business
from telecom, cable and Internet-service providers around the U.S. Last year,
he sold the business for an undisclosed amount.

"There's been a significant increase in demand and pressure on companies for
providing records, tracing calls and wiretapping," said Mr. Warren, now a vice
president for fiduciary services at NeuStar Inc. of Sterling, Va., which
bought his company. "That's led to a great deal of strain on carriers."

Often overlooked amid the controversy over the legality of the Bush
administration's eavesdropping without warrants is a huge increase in recent
years in the number of wiretaps conducted with court approval. Smaller telecom
companies in particular have sought help from outsiders in order to comply
with the court-ordered subpoenas, touching off a scramble among third parties
to meet the demand for assistance.

VeriSign Inc., the communications company in Mountain View, Calif., that
manages the Internet's .com and .net domain-name suffixes, entered the
assistance business after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. SS8 Networks
Inc., a San Jose, Calif.-based company, in 2001 morphed its business into one
that helps others deal with law-enforcement requests, after starting as an
Internet-phone-equipment company a couple of years earlier.

The number of telephone wiretaps from 2000 to 2004 authorized by state and
federal judges increased by 44% to 1,710, according to the latest annual
report from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. The vast bulk of the
wiretaps related to drug and racketeering investigations, according to the
report. But terrorism and other national-security investigations also helped
drive the increase, according to security experts and service providers.

CenturyTel Inc., a fixed-line phone company and Internet-service provider
based in Monroe, La., serving 2.5 million customers, received about 1,500
subpoenas and court orders for customer data last year, said Stacey Goff,
CenturyTel's chief legal counsel.

Almost 20% of those related to national-security matters, about double the
percentage of such requests from a year earlier, he said. The overall number
of requests from law enforcement for customer information has nearly doubled
from about five years ago, Mr. Goff added.

"A few years ago it was drugs and divorces, that was it," said Mr. Goff. "Now,
we're getting requests on more-sensitive matters."

Companies assisting carriers handling the increased law-enforcement demands
typically sell software that simplifies the process of reviewing tens of
thousands of phone-call records. Some third parties also provide assistance by
setting up in-house compliance procedures, interacting with law-enforcement
agencies and providing access to networks for wiretaps.

Smaller telecom, cable and Internet companies generally haven't received
requests from the National Security Agency, the super-sensitive U.S.
intelligence-gathering arm, for customer data without warrants, officials at
smaller companies say. Such NSA requests -- which are at the core of the
domestic eavesdropping debate -- have been aimed at large international
telecom companies, which tend to handle government and law-enforcement matters
in-house.

Big telecom companies in the U.S. were required under the 1994 Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act to install equipment to help law
enforcement keep up with advances in technology, such as the rise of cellular,
the switch to digital technology from analog and new features such as call
forwarding.

Now, Internet providers must also comply with the act. The Patriot Act, passed
after the 2001 terrorist attacks, took matters a step further, giving
law-enforcement agencies powers to monitor individuals and all the ways they
communicate, rather than being limited to a specific communication device.

Government surveillance has intensified even more heavily overseas,
particularly in Europe. Some countries, such as Italy, as well as government
and law-enforcement agencies, are able to remotely monitor communications
traffic without having to go through the individual service providers.

To make it easier for authorities to monitor traffic, some also require
registering with identification before buying telephone calling cards or using
cybercafes.

Write to Christopher Rhoads at christopher.rhoads at wsj.com

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From roy at rant-central.com  Thu Feb  9 19:53:06 2006
From: roy at rant-central.com (Roy M. Silvernail)
Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2006 22:53:06 -0500
Subject: anonymity for principals
In-Reply-To: <43EC0BB2.8EB74028@cdc.gov>
References: <43EC0BB2.8EB74028@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <43EC0E22.60805@rant-central.com>

Major Variola (ret) wrote:

>Impeach or frag.
>  
>
I vote frag.

-- 
Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
"It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT
CRM114->procmail->/dev/null->bliss
http://www.rant-central.com




From ORLCQQNTH at hotmail.com  Thu Feb  9 13:53:49 2006
From: ORLCQQNTH at hotmail.com (Ilene Bates)
Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2006 22:53:49 +0100
Subject: We SelIs all Medss kG
Message-ID: <68FD87FE.0T24.ORLCQQNTH@hotmail.com>



The most complete Phar macy Online
We carry all major medds at bargain price
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Phantermiine, Ulltraam and etc...
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WxXR




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Feb  9 20:04:08 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2006 23:04:08 -0500
Subject: Message Level Assembles Advisory Board of Internet Security  
  Visionaries
Message-ID: <p062309a2c011c12b2fa3@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2006 23:02:56 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: Message Level Assembles Advisory Board of Internet Security
  Visionaries

  <http://www.emediawire.com/printer.php?prid=344596>


  eMediaWire


  Message Level Assembles Advisory Board of Internet Security Visionaries -
  Choice They See: Sender-Based Email Validation or 'Game Theory Escalations'

  Message Level, Inc. announced today the formation of a technical advisory
  board, drafting three of the Internet's most recognized authorities in
  network risk management, secure network operations and network performance,
  a trio joined by their recognition that sender-based email authentication
  is an inevitable security design that maps fully to traditional business
  process protocols.

  Cambridge, MA (PRWEB) February 9, 2006 -- Message Level, Inc. announced
  today the formation of a technical advisory board, drafting three of the
  Internet's most recognized authorities in network risk management, secure
  network operations and network performance, a trio joined by their
  recognition that sender-based email authentication is an inevitable
  security design that maps fully to traditional business process protocols.

  Joining the company's technical advisory board are Mr. Bob Anita, Dr. Dan
  Geer and Mr. John Quarterman.

  Bob Antia is CTO of KSR, a managed security services provider; former VP of
  Information Technologies and Risk at Guardent; former Chief Security
  Officer's principal at Verisign; and board member of JP Morgan's Council of
  Communications Advisors and the FCC's National Infrastructure Reliability
  Council FG1B Committee on Cyber Security. Mr. Antia has also served as
  Chief Technical Architect for Exodus Communications and Director of
  Operations Technology for Cable and Wireless America.

  Dr. Daniel E. Geer, Jr., Sc.D., counts among his professional milestones:
  The X Window System and Kerberos (1988), the first information security
  consulting firm on Wall Street (1992), convenor of the first academic
  conference on mobile computing (1993), convenor of the first academic
  conference on electronic commerce (1995), the "Risk Management is Where the
  Money Is" speech that changed the focus of security (1998), the Presidency
  of USENIX Association (2000++), the first call for the eclipse of
  authentication by accountability (2002), principal author of and spokesman
  for "Cyberinsecurity: The Cost of Monopoly" (2003), and co-founder of
  SecurityMetrics.Org (2004).

  John Quarterman is CEO of InternetPerils, Inc., which provides
  quantification and visualization products to help financial institutions,
  banks, telecommunications providers, government, insurers, and enterprises
  manage their Internet business risks. His network engineering experience
  began in 1978 on the ARPANET project, the origin of the contemporary
  Internet, and he has been delineating internetwork performance since the
  early 1990s. His newest book, about Risk Management Solutions, has just
  appeared from Wiley. Twice elected to the board of USENIX, he helped
  orchestrate the funding of UUNET in 1991, one of the world's first two
  commercial ISPs. Frequent conference speaker, technical trainer, and
  writer, Mr. Quarterman retains an appointment as an Anti-Phishing Working
  Group (APWG) research fellow, building aids for visualizing phish server
  networks.

  Message Level CTO and founder Brian Cunningham said of the advisory board
  additions, "We are proud to provide the definitive email authentication
  solution at a time when this vital communications medium is so imperiled by
  criminal activity such as phishing and abusive messaging such as spam. We
  are prouder still to be joined in our enterprise by these senior statesmen
  of the information security arts."

  Messrs. Antia, Geer and Quarterman will be advising Message Level on
  product development and hardening, desktop integration, enterprise
  deployment, MTA integration and augmentation of Message Level technology
  for commercial-grade email. As well, the new advisors will be guiding the
  company in establishment of alliances and partnerships essential for the
  proliferation of message-level authentication as the preferred mechanism
  for substantiation of an email message's origin.

  Message Level CEO Mike McGowan said, "Email as we know it has reached a
  crossroads in which its credibility is at stake. Solutions proposed thus
  far have been ineffective, crushed by high cost and complexity and their
  vulnerability to attacks. Message Level, based on a protocol of irreducible
  elegance, is a technology whose moment has come. We are grateful that our
  new advisors, men whose provenances date to the very genesis of the
  Internet, have recognized the power and effectiveness of the Message Level
  solution."

  Message Level, with offices in Bethesda, Maryland and Cambridge,
  Massachusetts, has been developing its email authentication technologies
  since 2003 and holds an intellectual property estate dating back to 2003.
  Message Level technology creates query-able unique identifiers that are
  returned to the sender or his agents for confirmation before delivery,
  placing definitive authentication with the sender, a scheme that is both
  secure and places delivery liability in the sender's hands.

  Mr. Antia said of the company's authentication system, "The Message Level
  solution answers the simple question that all email users - enterprises and
  individuals - are forced to ask: did the sender of the email I am reading
  actually send this email? What's more, for enterprises that need to audit
  their communications, it conclusively satisfies the requirement of
  certifying delivery - and can do so without reliance on a third party.
  Message Level satisfies both these business processes without complexity
  for either the sender or receiver. I think the choice is simple. You can
  either deploy Message Level or enter into game theory escalations with the
  spammers, phishers and pharmers."

  Surveying the larger technology conflict that has arisen from the search
  for a definitive email authentication solution, Dr. Geer said, "Email is
  the killer app of the Internet in more ways than one. As much as it pains
  me to admit it, the current models have got to go but before we end up with
  something authoritarian or worse, let's try to do the right thing: Sender
  credentials that can be checked by those who want to check but which don't
  require massive infrastructures that no will ever build. Trust me on this,
  in e-mail authentication the best has been the enemy of the good for way
  too long."

  Speaking to ecommerce enablement engendered by the company's sender-based
  authentication scheme, Mr. Quarterman said, "Message Level's solution goes
  beyond recipient-acknowledgement schemes; it enables the receiver to ask
  the sender whether it sent a specific message. Miscreants who could evade a
  blacklist or pretend to be on a whitelist by using a different IP address
  or domain name have a much harder time with this scheme, since it depends
  on authentication deeper than network node identifiers. Message Level's
  authentication is strong enough to enable assigning liability to a specific
  party who sent or received or lost an invoice, and that could catalyze
  increased electronic commerce on the Internet, even beyond addressing the
  phishing problem."

  Message Level Media Contacts:
  Mike McGowan (703) 981-4718
  Brian Cunningham (617) 721-2459
  www.messagelevel.com

  # # #


  Contact Information

  Bill McInnis

  Message Level

  http://www.messagelevel.com

  804-355-5560

  ) Copyright, PR Web. All Rights Reserved


  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From bjonkman at sobac.com  Thu Feb  9 21:42:24 2006
From: bjonkman at sobac.com (Bob Jonkman)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 00:42:24 -0500
Subject: [dewayne@warpspeed.com: [Dewayne-Net] THE END OF THE
  INTERNET?]
In-Reply-To: <20060202152802.GG13287@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <43EBE170.16689.2CEF76B@bjonkman.sobac.com>

I was listening to an ITC podcast with Ed Amoroso, security wonk at AT&T, who tried his best to make content filtering 
by the carriers sound like a good thing.

http://www.itconversations.com/shows/detail965.html

I found myself shaking my head in wonderment an awful lot as I was listening to this...

--Bob.


This is what Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> said
about "[dewayne at warpspeed.com: [Dewayne-Ne" on 2 Feb 2006 at 15:28

> ----- Forwarded message from Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne at warpspeed.com> -----
> 
> From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne at warpspeed.com>
> Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2006 06:10:13 -0800
> To: Dewayne-Net Technology List <dewayne-net at warpspeed.com>
> Subject: [Dewayne-Net] THE END OF THE INTERNET?
> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.746.2)
> Reply-To: dewayne at warpspeed.com
> 
> [Note:  Worth reading.  Also, check out some of the white papers the
> article points to.  One of note: "Network Neutrality:  A Broadband
> Wild West?".  DLH]
> 
> THE END OF THE INTERNET?
> [SOURCE: The Nation, AUTHOR: Jeff Chester]
> 
> [Commentary] Verizon, Comcast, Bell South and other communications
> giants are developing strategies that would track and store
> information on our every move in cyberspace in a vast data-collection
> and marketing system, the scope of which could rival the National
> Security Agency. According to white papers now being circulated in
> the cable, telephone and telecommunications industries, those with
> the deepest pockets--corporations, special-interest groups and major
> advertisers -- would get preferred treatment. Content from these
> providers would have first priority on our computer and television
> screens, while information seen as undesirable, such as peer-to-peer
> communications, could be relegated to a slow lane or simply shut out.
> Under the plans they are considering, all of us--from content
> providers to individual users -- would pay more to surf online,
> stream videos or even send e-mail. Industry planners are mulling new
> subscription plans that would further limit the online experience,
> establishing "platinum," "gold" and "silver" levels of Internet
> access that would set limits on the number of downloads, media
> streams or even e-mail messages that could be sent or received. To
> make this pay-to-play vision a reality, phone and cable lobbyists are
> now engaged in a political campaign to further weaken the nation's
> communications policy laws. They want the federal government to
> permit them to operate Internet and other digital communications
> services as private networks, free of policy safeguards or
> governmental oversight. Indeed, both the Congress and the Federal
> Communications Commission are considering proposals that will have
> far-reaching impact on the Internet's future. Ten years after passage
> of the ill-advised Telecommunications Act of 1996, telephone and
> cable companies are using the same political snake oil to convince
> compromised or clueless lawmakers to subvert the Internet into a
> turbo-charged digital retail machine.
> 
> <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060213/chester>
> 
> Links to White Papers mentioned above: <http://
> www.democraticmedia.org/issues/netneutrality.html>
> 
> 
> Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com>
> 
> ----- End forwarded message -----
> --
> Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
> ______________________________________________________________
> ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
> 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE




From coderman at gmail.com  Fri Feb 10 05:25:29 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 05:25:29 -0800
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] Feingold, Kennedy ask AT&T and
  others if they're in bed with NSA [priv]]
In-Reply-To: <20060210111832.GV3873@leitl.org>
References: <20060210111832.GV3873@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602100525j25afa822s9ce76a8c9f3629dd@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/10/06, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> ...
> A survey of telecommunications and Internet firms about NSA participation:
> http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6035305.html

executive summary

telco's that let NSA tap freely:
- Adelphia Communications
- AOL Time Warner
- AT&T
- Cable & Wireless
- Charter Communications
- Cingular Wireless
- Citizens Communications
- Cogent Communications
- Global Crossing
- Google [picking their battles?]
- Level 3
- Microsoft
- NTT Communications
- Qwest Communications
- SAVVIS Communications
- Sprint Nextel
- T-Mobile USA
- United Online
- Verizon Communications
- XO Communications
- Yahoo

those tap'd against their will :)
- BellSouth Communications
- Cablevision Systems
- CenturyTel
- Comcast
- Cox Communications
- EarthLink


that should be a decent feed into the colorado processing center where
ADVISE will be running.[1]

*grin*


1. http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0209/p01s02-uspo.html?s - "US plans
massive data sweep; Little-known data-collection system could troll
news, blogs, even e-mails."




From ncslb at blankbrief.com  Fri Feb 10 09:37:16 2006
From: ncslb at blankbrief.com (Alyson W. Atkinson)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 09:37:16 -0800
Subject: Don't blame on me
Message-ID: <835743.6239970218942.023937297887.NBJT.1260@delude>

dissuade onmollycoddle aclaudio someacademy someknives
notashame butbritain ,yea butdial it

donahue ordeflater theektachrome ,bavaria itconceive
adana thetaverna trydryden seeduluth
ininstinctual orcommendation !madison it'skrieger
butcondensible not
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From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Feb 10 03:18:32 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 11:18:32 +0000
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] Feingold, Kennedy ask AT&T and
  others if they're in bed with NSA [priv]]
Message-ID: <20060210111832.GV3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Feb 10 03:20:16 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 11:20:16 +0000
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] Lawsuit challenges law targeting
  Internet "annoyances" [fs]]
Message-ID: <20060210112016.GW3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----


From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Feb 10 08:31:16 2006
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 11:31:16 -0500
Subject: anonymity for principals
In-Reply-To: <43EC0E22.60805@rant-central.com>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F15A0A28603BF71CC8918299B020@phx.gbl>

The beauty of "frag" is that the minority gets veto power, if they choose.

-TD


>From: "Roy M. Silvernail" <roy at rant-central.com>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at jfet.org>
>Subject: Re: anonymity for principals
>Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2006 22:53:06 -0500
>
>Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>
> >Impeach or frag.
> >
> >
>I vote frag.
>
>--
>Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
>"It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT
>CRM114->procmail->/dev/null->bliss
>http://www.rant-central.com




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Feb 10 09:22:31 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 12:22:31 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Gonzales: NSA may tap 'ordinary' Americans' e-mail
Message-ID: <p062309f4c0127c540e3b@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 12:21:03 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Gonzales: NSA may tap 'ordinary' Americans' e-mail
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

  <http://news.com.com/2102-1028_3-6035637.html?tag=st.util.print>

  CNET News


  Gonzales: NSA may tap 'ordinary' Americans' e-mail

  By Anne Broache


  WASHINGTON--Agents operating a controversial National Security Agency
  surveillance program may have inadvertently spied on the e-mails and phone
  calls of Americans with no ties to terrorists, Attorney General Alberto
  Gonzales said Monday.

  Gonzales stressed that the program is "narrowly focused" and that adequate
  steps are taken to protect privacy, though he said he was unable to
  describe such procedures because of the program's classified nature.


  Credit: Anne Broache

  Attorney General Alberto Gonzales

  fields Senate questions on Monday.

  The admissions came as part of the first of what will likely be several
  public hearings before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee. A full slate of
  Democrats and Republicans rotated 10-minute stints questioning Gonzales,
  the day's sole witness, about the secret eavesdropping program. A CNET
  News.com survey published Monday lists which telecommunications companies
  say they are not cooperating with the NSA.

  The Bush administration has said repeatedly that the program, which has
  transpired without prior court approval since shortly after the Sept. 11
  attacks, only monitors communications in which at least one party is
  located outside the United States and is a member or agent of al-Qaida or
  groups associated with terrorists.

  Meanwhile, it has stuck to a three-pronged defense of the program, which
  Gonzales outlined repeatedly on Monday: the U.S. Constitution, a
  Congressional resolution passed shortly after Sept. 11 that authorizes the
  use of military force against al-Qaida and its allies, and a Supreme Court
  interpretation of that resolution.

  But Gonzales shunned all questions he deemed "operational" matters, such as
  how many people have been subject to the tapping, how the government goes
  about cooperating with telecommunications companies and Internet service
  providers from a legal perspective, and whether additional secret
  surveillance programs have been authorized by the same logic.

  "Can you assure us that no one is being eavesdropped upon in the United
  States other than someone who has a communication that is emanating from
  foreign soil by a suspected terrorist, al-Qaida or otherwise?" Sen. Joseph
  Biden, a Delaware Democrat, asked at one point early in the daylong hearing.

  "I can't give you absolute assurance," Gonzales replied, before adding,
  "What I can assure the American people is we have a number of safeguards in
  place so we can say with a high degree of certainty that those procedures
  are being followed."

  Democrats dominated the criticism about the program's lack of court
  authorization and suspected illegality, but Committee Chairman Arlen
  Specter, a Pennsylvania Republican, also strongly encouraged the attorney
  general to consider seeking court review for the entire program. "The
  concern is that there is a broad sweep which includes people who have no
  connection with al-Qaida," he said. "What assurances can you give to this
  committee and, beyond this committee, to millions of Americans who are
  vitally interested in this issue and following these proceedings?"

  Said Gonzales, "The program as operated is a very narrowly tailored
  program, and we do have a great number of checks in place." He said later
  in the hearing that he was unable to give "specific information about
  collected, retained and disseminated" communications, except to say that it
  is done so "in a way to protect privacy interests of all Americans."

  Support for the program appeared to split down party lines. Several
  Republicans said they generally supported the administration's efforts and
  understood the importance of the eavesdropping operations. "I suspect few
  members of Congress would vote to eliminate this program or cut its
  funding," said Sen. Orrin Hatch of Utah.

  The committee's top Democrat, Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, said bluntly
  that the secret surveillance program is not authorized by a 1978 law called
  the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which he called the
  "exclusive source of authority for wiretapping for intelligence purposes."
  "Wiretapping that is not authorized under that statute is a federal crime,"
  he said. "That is what the law says, and that is what the law means."

  Leahy chided the attorney general for the administration's lack of
  consultation with Congress on the legality of the program. "Thank heavens
  we actually have a press that tells us what you all are doing, because you
  all are certainly not," he said without disguising any hint of disapproval.

  Sen. Dianne Feinstein, a California Democrat, said she, too, was concerned
  that too few members of Congress had been adequately briefed about the
  program, a phenomenon that gave her reason to believe "this program is much
  bigger and much broader than you want anyone else to know," she said.

  Sen. Edward Kennedy, a Massachusetts Democrat, argued that by circumventing
  FISA, the Bush administration could be jeopardizing national security in
  the long run. If the wiretapping program is illegal, he said, front-line
  NSA employees could be prosecuted, and evidence gathered through the
  process could be tossed, meaning that "some of those toughest, cruelest and
  meanest members of al-Qaida may be able to use illegality in the court
  system to escape justice."

  But even some Republicans who said they supported the program also admitted
  they believed it would be more effective and better accepted by the public
  if Congress explored new legislation to give it a formal legal blessing.
  "Presidents are always stronger in the condition of foreign affairs when
  Congress is onboard," said Sen. Mike DeWine, an Ohio Republican. He
  broached the idea of amending FISA so that it would exclude the sort of
  communications the administration said it has been tapping through the NSA
  program.

  The administration will "listen and consider your ideas," Gonzales said.

  Specter said he expected to schedule a second day of hearings to allow
  senators to ask the attorney general additional questions about the
  situation. Other members of the committee indicated they hoped to bring in
  additional witnesses, such as former Attorney General John Ashcroft, for
  questioning.

  The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is planning a hearing of its
  own later this week with the attorney general and NSA Director Michael
  Hayden, DeWine said, but that session will be closed to the public.

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Feb 10 05:02:57 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 13:02:57 +0000
Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] Details of how Australian
  "e-passports" will work [priv]]
Message-ID: <20060210130257.GF3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan at well.com> -----


From LURANRAGQI at yahoo.com  Fri Feb 10 07:51:17 2006
From: LURANRAGQI at yahoo.com (Frances Coon)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 19:51:17 +0400
Subject: SU-per Hu^ge 0ffers 2dIWXO
Message-ID: <LAW85.OE649yfB4mvo857953d5@motmail.com>


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3xl




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Feb 10 17:23:01 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 20:23:01 -0500
Subject: Modern-day Bletchley Park to tackle terror finance networks
Message-ID: <p0623098bc012ecdf6f7d@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 20:22:03 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: Modern-day Bletchley Park to tackle terror finance networks

  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,5397312-111274,00.html>



  Modern-day Bletchley Park to tackle terror finance networks

  Patrick Wintour, chief political correspondent and Ashley Seager in Moscow

  Saturday February 11, 2006

  Guardian

  Gordon Brown will next week announce plans to create a modern-day Bletchley
  Park of experts working at unravelling terrorist finance networks just as
  wartime codebreakers collaborated on cracking Nazi codes. The chancellor
  will emphasise that cutting off the cash flow that subsidises terrorism
  will play a vital role in preventing further attacks.

  He will commit new money to establish the centre, which will bring together
  some of the top financial experts in the country, and will announce new
  measures to close loopholes exploited by terrorist moneymen. "As chancellor
  ... I have found myself immersed in measures designed to cut off the
  sources of terrorist finance," Mr Brown will say. "And I have discovered
  that this requires an international operation using modern methods of
  forensic accounting as imaginative and pathbreaking for our times as the
  Enigma codebreakers at Bletchley Park achieved more than half a century
  ago."

  Since 9/11, the UK has frozen #80m in terrorist assets, including money in
  more than 100 organisations linked to al-Qaida. This week, America blocked
  the US assets of five people and four groups based in Britain for alleged
  collections to a group that Washington suspects has ties to al-Qaida. Mr
  Brown wants his fellow rich-world finance ministers to prioritise the
  battle with terrorist financing at this weekend's G8 meeting that Russia is
  chairing in Moscow. He has also written to the Financial Action Task Force
  (FATF), which spearheads action against the abuse of the financial system
  by terrorists, to propose that the UK takes over the presidency of the body
  next year.

  The main theme of Mr Brown's speech to the Royal United Services Institute
  on Monday, will be the balance between security and liberty and the gradual
  move to a framework of stronger laws and powers to tackle terrorists.
  Specifically, Mr Brown will announce:

  7 a review of measures to stop charities being abused by those financing
  terror;

  7 proposals to tackle terrorist abuse of bureaux de change and wire
transfers;

  7 guidance to banks and financial institutions on how to fulfil their
  obligations to tackle suspicious transactions;

  7 a commitment to continue strengthening the pre-emptive asset-freezing
  regime, with a review of the need for further new legislation or a single
  asset-freezing office.

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From dewayne at warpspeed.com  Fri Feb 10 21:24:32 2006
From: dewayne at warpspeed.com (Dewayne Hendricks)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 21:24:32 -0800
Subject: [Dewayne-Net] Judge Approves Warrantless Email Monitoring
Message-ID: <mailman.1582.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

[Note:  This item comes from reader Randall.  DLH]

>From: Randall <rvh40 at insightbb.com>
>Date: February 10, 2006 8:54:22 PM PST
>To: Dave <dave at farber.net>, Dewayne Hendricks
><dewayne at warpspeed.com>, cyberia <CYBERIA-L at LISTSERV.AOL.COM>
>Subject: Judge Approves Warrantless Email Monitoring
>
><http://htdaw.blogsource.com/post.mhtml?post_id=232185>
>
>Judge Approves Warrantless Email Monitoring
>Friday, February 10, 2006 at 11:51 PM EST
> What: The Justice Department asks a judge to approve Patriot Act e-
>mail
>monitoring without any evidence of criminal behavior.
>
>When: Decided Feb. 2, 2006 by U.S. District Judge Thomas Hogan in
>Washington, D.C.
>
>Outcome: E-mail surveillance approved.
>
>What happened: As part of a grand jury investigation that's still
>secret, the Justice Department asked a federal magistrate judge to
>approve monitoring of an unnamed person's e-mail correspondents.
>
>The request had a twist: Instead of asking to eavesdrop on the
>contents
>of the e-mail messages, which would require some evidence of
>wrongdoing,
>prosecutors instead requested the identities of the correspondents.
>Also
>included in the request was header information like date and time and
>Internet address--but not subject lines.
>
>The federal magistrate judge balked and asked the Justice
>Department to
>submit an additional brief to demonstrate that such a request would be
>legal.
>
>Instead, prosecutors asked Judge Hogan to step in. He reviewed the
>portion of federal law dealing with "pen register" and "trap and
>trace"
>devices--terms originating in the world of telephone wiretapping--and
>concluded it "unambiguously" authorizes the e-mail surveillance
>request.
>
>Though the language may be clumsy, Hogan said, the Patriot Act's
>amendments authorize that type of easily obtainable surveillance of
>e-mail. All that's required, he said, is that prosecutors claim the
>surveillance could conceivably be "relevant" to an investigation.
>
>Excerpt from the court's opinion:
>"In 2001, Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by
>Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
>Terrorism
>Act of 2001 (the "USA Patriot Act"), Section 216 of which explicitly
>amended the authorities relating to pen registers and trap and trace
>devices...by expanding the definitions of these devices to include
>"processes" to obtain information about "electronic communication."
>
>"Commenting on the very language that was finally enacted in
>Section 216
>of the USA Patriot Act, several members of Congress highlighted the
>fact
>that the amendments would bring the state of the law in line with
>current technology by making pen registers and trap and trace devices
>applicable to the Internet and--more to the point--e-mail.
>
>"For example, a section-by-section analysis of the bill that
>Representative John Conyers included in the record before the final
>House vote, which contains the same language that was finally
>enacted by
>Congress, states that Section 216 "extends the pen/trap provisions so
>they apply not just to telephone communications but also to Internet
>traffic."
>
>"In addition, Senator Jon Kyl, who is currently Chairman of the United
>States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology &
>Homeland
>Security, noted that the same language in the Senate version of the
>bill
>"would codify current case law that holds that pen/trap orders
>apply to
>modern communication technologies such as e-mail and the Internet, in
>addition to traditional phone lines."
>
>"The Congressional Research Service also published a legal analysis of
>the USA Patriot Act that states that the Act "permits pen register and
>trap and trace orders for electronic communications (e.g., e-mail)."
>
>"The plain language of the statute makes clear that pen registers and
>trap and trace devices may be processes used to obtain information
>about
>e-mail communications. The statute's history confirms this
>interpretation and there is no support for a contrary result."
>
><http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-6037598.html>

Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com>

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Fri Feb 10 18:42:30 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 21:42:30 -0500
Subject: [IP] Google Copies Your Hard Drive - Government Smiles
 in Anticipation,,Consumers Should Not Use New Google Desktop
Message-ID: <mailman.1583.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

ebruary 09, 2006
Google Copies Your Hard Drive - Government Smiles in Anticipation

Consumers Should Not Use New Google Desktop

San Francisco - Google today announced a new "feature" of its Google
Desktop software that greatly increases the risk to consumer privacy. If
a consumer chooses to use it, the new "Search Across Computers" feature
will store copies of the user's Word documents, PDFs, spreadsheets and
other text-based documents on Google's own servers, to enable searching
from any one of the user's computers. EFF urges consumers not to use
this feature, because it will make their personal data more vulnerable
to subpoenas from the government and possibly private litigants, while
providing a convenient one-stop-shop for hackers who've obtained a
user's Google password.

"Coming on the heels of serious consumer concern about government
snooping into Google's search logs, it's shocking that Google expects
its users to now trust it with the contents of their personal
computers," said EFF Staff Attorney Kevin Bankston. "If you use the
Search Across Computers feature and don't configure Google Desktop very
carefully?and most people won't?Google will have copies of your tax
returns, love letters, business records, financial and medical files,
and whatever other text-based documents the Desktop software can index.
The government could then demand these personal files with only a
subpoena rather than the search warrant it would need to seize the same
things from your home or business, and in many cases you wouldn't even
be notified in time to challenge it. Other litigants?your spouse, your
business partners or rivals, whoever?could also try to cut out the
middleman (you) and subpoena Google for your files."

The privacy problem arises because the Electronic Communication Privacy
Act of 1986, or ECPA, gives only limited privacy protection to emails
and other files that are stored with online service providers?much less
privacy than the legal protections for the same information when it's on
your computer at home. And even that lower level of legal protection
could disappear if Google uses your data for marketing purposes. Google
says it is not yet scanning the files it copies from your hard drive in
order to serve targeted advertising, but it hasn't ruled out the
possibility, and Google's current privacy policy appears to allow it.

"This Google product highlights a key privacy problem in the digital
age," said Cindy Cohn, EFF's Legal Director. "Many Internet innovations
involve storing personal files on a service provider's computer, but
under outdated laws, consumers who want to use these new technologies
have to surrender their privacy rights. If Google wants consumers to
trust it to store copies of personal computer files, emails, search
histories and chat logs, and still 'not be evil,' it should stand with
EFF and demand that Congress update the privacy laws to better reflect
life in the wired world."

For more on Google's data collection:
http://news.com.com/FAQ+When+Google+is+not+your+friend/2100-1025_3-6034666.ht
ml?tag=nl
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/01/21/google_subpoena_roils_t
he_web
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2006/01/20/
EDGEPGPHA61.DTL
http://news.com.com/%20Bill+would+force+Web+sites+to+delete+personal+info/210
0-1028_3-6036951.html

Contact:

Kevin Bankston
Staff Attorney
Electronic Frontier Foundation
bankston at eff.org
Posted at 11:04 AM


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rXxU4njmkesIu7YpiumUhQk=
=Gdqa
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-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
  http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Fri Feb 10 18:44:03 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 21:44:03 -0500
Subject: [IP] The Son of TIA
Message-ID: <mailman.1584.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1



- -------- Original Message --------
Subject: for IP?
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2006 16:42:14 -0700
From: Bob Devine <devinebob at gmail.com>
To: dave at farber.net

In its latest issue, Newsweek describes the Son of TIA.  You *just*
knew that the Pentagon wouldn't really kill TIA...

One paragraph from the article:
"Yet today, very quietly, the core of TIA survives with a new codename
of Topsail (minus the futures market), two officials privy to the
intelligence tell NEWSWEEK. It is in programs like these that real
data mining is going on andbconsidering the furor over TIAbwith fewer
intrusions on civil liberties than occur under the NSA surveillance
program. "It's the best thing to come out of American intelligence in
decades," says John Arquilla, an intelligence expert at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. "It is truly Poindexter's
brainchild. Of all the people in the intelligence business, he has the
keenest appreciation of using advanced information technology for
intelligence gathering." Poindexter, who lives just outside Washington
in Rockville, Md., could not be reached for comment on whether he is
still involved with Topsail."

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11238800/site/newsweek/print/1/displaymode/1098/

Bob Devine
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4nxoEa35RQyfcLdKKgjFOH0=
=lVMv
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-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
  http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From tsalqkorbrlzb at hotmail.com  Sat Feb 11 04:33:02 2006
From: tsalqkorbrlzb at hotmail.com (Clifford Cobb)
Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2006 05:33:02 -0700
Subject: Best Rate for Re-finance 0OyA
Message-ID: <CFE0.9A4.3062498B8C@mopalinux.com>


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From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Feb 11 02:06:53 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2006 10:06:53 +0000
Subject: [dewayne@warpspeed.com: [Dewayne-Net] Judge Approves
  Warrantless Email Monitoring]
Message-ID: <20060211100653.GA3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne at warpspeed.com> -----


From snoopcool at gmail.com  Fri Feb 10 19:26:03 2006
From: snoopcool at gmail.com (Derrick Covington)
Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2006 11:26:03 +0800
Subject: sexy baby and bad erection? 
Message-ID: <200602111929.k1BJTpHH015188@proton.jfet.org>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Feb 11 03:43:01 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2006 11:43:01 +0000
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] The Son of TIA]
Message-ID: <20060211114301.GI3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Feb 11 03:44:14 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2006 11:44:14 +0000
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Google Copies Your Hard Drive -
  Government Smiles in Anticipation,,Consumers Should Not Use New Google
  Desktop]
Message-ID: <20060211114414.GJ3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Feb 11 03:49:26 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2006 11:49:26 +0000
Subject: Lab officials excited by new H-bomb project
Message-ID: <20060211114926.GK3873@leitl.org>

http://www.insidebayarea.com/oaklandtribune/localnews/ci_3480733

Lab officials excited by new H-bomb project
By Ian Hoffman, STAFF WRITER

For the first time in more than 20 years, U.S. nuclear-weapons scientists are
designing a new
H-bomb, the first of probably several new nuclear explosives on the drawing
boards.

If they succeed, in perhaps 20 or 25 more years, the United States would have
an entirely new nuclear arsenal, and a highly automated fac- tory capable of
turning out more warheads as needed, as well as new kinds of warheads.

"We are on the verge of an exciting time," the nation's top nuclear weapons
executive, Linton Brooks, said last week at Lawrence Livermore weapons design
laboratory.

Teams of roughly
20 scientists and engineers at the nation's two laboratories for
nuclear-explosive design b Livermore and Los Alamos in New Mexico b are in
a head-to-head competition to offer designs for the first of the new
thermonuclear explosives, termed "reliable replacement warheads" or RRWs.

Designers are aiming for bombs that will be simpler, easier to maintain over
decades and, if they fell into terrorists' hands, able to be remotely
destroyed or rendered useless. Once the designs are unveiled in September, the
Bush administration and Congress could face a major choice in the future of
the U.S. arsenal: Do they keep maintaining the existing, tested weapons or
begin diverting money and manpower to developing the newly designed but
untested weapons?

Administration officials see the new weapons and the plant to make them as
"truly transformative," allowing the dismantlement of thousands of reserve
weapons.

But within the community of nuclear weapons experts, the notion of fielding
untested weapons is controversial and turns heavily on how much the new bombs
would be like the well-tested weapons that the United States already has.

"I can't believe that an admiral or a general or a future president, who are
putting the U.S. survival at stake, would accept an untested weapon if it
didn't have a test base," said physicist and Hoover Institution fellow Sidney
Drell, a longtime adviser to the government and its labs on nuclear-weapons
issues.

"The question is how do you really ensure long-term reliability of the
stockpile without testing?" said Hugh Gusterson, an MIT anthropologist who
studies the weapons labs and their scientists. "RRW is partly an answer to
that question and it's an answer to the question (by nuclear weapons
scientists) of 'What do I do to keep from being bored?'"

The prize for the winning lab is tens, perhaps hundreds of million of dollars
for carrying its bomb concept into prototyping and production. If
manufactured, the first RRW would replace two warheads on submarine-launched
missiles, the W76 and W88, together the most numerous active weapons and the
cornerstone of the U.S. nuclear force.

Altogether, the nation has 5,700 nuclear bombs and warheads of 12 basic types,
plus more than 4,200 weapons kept in reserve as insurance against aging and
failure of the active, fielded arsenal.

Most are 25-35 years old. All were exploded multiple times under the Nevada
desert before U.S. nuclear testing halted in 1992. It is in most respects the
world's most sophisticated nuclear arsenal, and beyond opposition at home to
continued testing, ending testing made sense to discourage other nations from
testing to advance their nuclear capabilities.

Faced by the Soviet Union, Cold War weapons scientists devised their bombs for
the greatest power in the smallest, lightest package, so thousands could be
delivered en masse and cause maximum destruction. Designers compare those
weapons to Ferraris, sleek and finely tuned.

Scientists at the weapons laboratories are laboring to keep the bombs and
warheads in working order, by examining them for signs of deterioration and
replacing parts as faithfully to the original manufacturing as possible. It is
an expensive and not especially stimulating job.

Some worry that an accumulation of small changes could undermine the bombs'
reliability. So far, every year since 1995 directors of the weapons labs and
secretaries of defense and energy have assured two presidents that the weapons
are safe, secure and will detonate as designed.

The new reliable replacement warheads are actually an old idea that 1950s-era
weapons designers called, with some disdain, the "wooden bomb." Bomb
physicists were proud of their racier, more compact designs and figured they
were plenty dependable already. The wooden bomb by comparison was boring.

"They said, 'Well heck, that isn't a challenge to anybody'," recalled Ray
Kidder, a former Livermore physicist who found a chilly reception to proposals
in the 1980s for clunkier, more reliable designs. "It was like saying, 'Well,
why don't you make a Model A Ford.'"

Now the wooden bomb is back in vogue. With fewer, simpler kinds of warheads,
the argument goes, the arsenal could be maintained more inexpensively
and b assuming construction of a factory to turn out the new bombs on demand
b thousands of reserve warheads could be scrapped.

But in a sharp break with the past, the new bombs would never be exploded
except in war. The only button-to-boom tests of the new arsenal would be
virtual b simulated detonations inside a supercomputer.

Today's weaponeers say they've learned enough of the complex physics of
thermonuclear explosives to guarantee the bombs would deliver precise
explosive yields even after decades on the shelf. If military leaders agreed,
the most lethal and final resort of U.S. defenses would be deployed without a
test shot.

Ex-military leaders are split on accepting a new, untested nuclear arsenal.

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre told a House appropriations
committee last year that he thinks a new arsenal will be needed some day. But
he said, "I do believe we should test the new weapons to demonstrate to the
world that they are credible."

Eugene Habiger, the senior-most commander over U.S. nuclear forces as chief of
Strategic Command in the mid-1990s, said he would be inclined to accept the
new weapons.

"The science is pretty well understood," he said.

The Bush administration and weapons scientists say the warheads will not have
new military missions. They will ride on the same bombers and missiles as
today's nuclear explosives and strike the same targets. But administration
officials are talk of eventually wanting features beyond the sizable array of
explosive yields and delivery methods available now: deep earth-penetrating
bombs, enhanced radiation weapons and "reduced collateral damage" bombs with
lower fission radiation.

Designers and executives at Lawrence Livermore are taking a conservative line.
The lab's weapons chief, Bruce Goodwin, talks of starting with
nuclear-explosive designs that are well tested and well understood.

"Our plan is to develop a design that lies well within the experience b and
within what we call the 'sweet spot' b of our historical test base," he said
in a recent statement.

One candidate under consideration as a starting point is the W89, a
200-kiloton warhead designed for a short-range attack missile. It is
well-tested, plus it comes from a long line of well-understood designs and
uses every safety and security feature available at the time.

Yet weaponeers at Los Alamos lab and Brooks, as the head of the National
Nuclear Security Administration, have talked of a more freewheeling design
effort.

"This is not about going back to rake over old designs. That's why I've got
two different teams of weapons scientists at two labs working on this," Brooks
said. "There's never been anything tested that will do the sorts of things we
want to do."

Such talk alarms Stanford's Drell.

"How the hell do you make a new design without testing?" he said. "Those kinds
of flamboyant statements worry me because I don't believe we could maintain a
confident stockpile with new designs that haven't been tested."

Some former weapons scientists say the wiser course is maintaining the current
arsenal and boosting its reliability in simple ways, such as adding more
tritium to "sweeten" the hydrogen gases at the very core of the weapon.

"We've got a reliable stockpile. We have a test base for it. We have now in
the last 10 or 15 years far more sophisticated computational abilities than we
had doing these designs originally, so things are extremely well understand in
terms of the performance," said Seymour Sack, once Livermore's most prolific
designer, whose innovations are found in nearly every U.S. weapon. "I don't
see any reason you should change those designs."

Lawmakers say they are watching carefully to make sure the new warheads hew
closely to existing, well-understood designs. But in a recent report on the
new warhead program for the Livermore watchdog group, Tri-Valley CAREs, former
White House budget analyst Bob Civiak said Congress has a poor record of
restraining the weapons design labs from what after all they were built to
do.

"Congress thinks it can allow the labs to design new nuclear weapons but
restrict them to existing designs," he said. "History shows that cannot be the
case."

Contact Ian Hoffman at ihoffman at angnewspapers.com.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From manturov_t at inbox.ru  Sat Feb 11 01:00:05 2006
From: manturov_t at inbox.ru (Scott Randolph)
Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2006 14:00:05 +0500
Subject: Wow check out this huge enlargement patch sale!
Message-ID: <200602111857.k1BIvFYY014175@proton.jfet.org>

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From evlavtbi at excite.com  Sat Feb 11 21:21:41 2006
From: evlavtbi at excite.com (Emil Combs)
Date: Sat, 11 Feb 2006 21:21:41 -0800
Subject: best weight reducer in years
Message-ID: <33095049425235.09102510@endgame>

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From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Feb 12 03:55:48 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2006 06:55:48 -0500
Subject: Coupon Clipping, the Old-Fashioned Way
Message-ID: <p06230959c014d26d3ee8@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2006 06:54:02 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: Coupon Clipping, the Old-Fashioned Way


<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/12/business/yourmoney/12bearer.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print>

  The New York Times





  February 12, 2006

  Investing

  Coupon Clipping, the Old-Fashioned Way

  By KEN BELSON

  MOST bonds these days are never touched by human hands. They are typically
  bought online and plunked into brokerage accounts, where they are
  registered and tracked digitally. Interest is automatically calculated,
  paid and reported to the tax authorities.

  Then there are bearer bonds, the old-fashioned kind that my 92-year-old
  cousin Lou owns. Like silver dollars made with real silver and stock
  tickers that spit out prices on strips of paper, these bonds are relics of
  an earlier age. They are impressive-looking documents, printed on fancy,
  perforated colored paper.

  In some ways, bearer bonds are like cash: the holder is the owner and the
  bonds need not be registered, a feature that makes them highly appealing to
  tax evaders and to criminals looking to steal them from their holders.
  Worry about theft explains why Lou did not want his last name or photograph
  used for this article. (Bearer bonds even worked their way into a Hollywood
  script. In the first "Die Hard" movie, the villains tried to steal hundreds
  of millions of dollars worth of them.)

  Many holders leave their bearer bonds for safekeeping with their brokers,
  who every six months clip the coupons that are attached to the certificates
  and collect the interest payments. They also keep track of bonds that are
  called or retired.

  Lou, though, keeps his bonds locked in a safe at a bank and clips the
  coupons himself. A feisty native New Yorker, he ran a small business in
  Manhattan, and he still likes to handle his own finances. "I had a broker,
  but I got so many phone calls, letters and distractions that I was happy to
  pay $50 to transfer the account," he said.

  But as Lou has discovered, bearer bonds aren't long for this world.

  The bonds are the victim of tighter tax laws and the growing digitalization
  of the financial industry, which increasingly shuns paper pushing. Since
  1982, when lawmakers passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
  partly to foil tax evaders, few bearer bonds have been issued in the United
  States. (They remain popular overseas, however.)

  As a result, American bearer bonds will all but disappear when the
  remaining 30- and 50-year issues come due. "By 2013, most bearer bonds will
  go the way of the dinosaur," said John Colangelo, a managing director at
  the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, a settlement company that
  holds bonds on behalf of many financial institutions.

  The D.T.C. has a dozen or so employees working full time to clip coupons,
  redeem them and transfer the proceeds to the brokers, who credit their
  customers' accounts. That's a far cry from the situation in 1991, when the
  company handled 21 million bearer bonds, or 42 million coupons a year, and
  employed 600 people to get the work done. Since no new bonds are being
  issued, the number of bonds in the D.T.C. vault has fallen to about
  700,000. (Most bonds have a face value of $5,000, so that is about $3.5
  billion worth of securities, not including interest.)

  While the company has a well-honed system for dealing with bearer bonds,
  investors like Lou are having a harder and harder time handling them on
  their own. He has several bearer bonds issued decades ago by New York City
  agencies, including the New York City Housing Authority and the Battery
  Park City Authority.

  In the mid-1980's, he bought a bunch of them at a discount - about 50 to 60
  cents on the dollar, because their coupon rates of 5 to 9 percent were
  considered low at the time. The bonds turned out to be a smart buy.
  Interest rates have generally fallen over the last 20 years, and because he
  lives in New York, he has not had to pay federal, state and local taxes on
  the municipal bonds.

  "I wish I had bought more of these bonds, because when interest rates
  dropped, I was doing better," Lou said.

  Over the years, the agencies have called many of Lou's bonds, in order to
  avoid paying relatively high interest rates. He has held onto as many of
  the securities as he can, but there are fewer and fewer places to redeem
  their coupons. Until late in the 1980's, Lou took them to his local bank
  and deposited them, along with his checks and cash. Nowadays, there are not
  enough bearer bonds around for banks to justify the expense of handling
  them.

  A pensioner, Lou does not want to spend the money to send the coupons by
  registered mail to a paying agent - typically the bank or broker that
  handled the original issue - in order to collect his interest. Besides,
  like many other people of his generation, he prefers to do things the old
  fashioned way: face to face. Or, as Mr. Colangelo put it, taking care of
  your own bearer bonds is "a throwback: you feel like you're engaged in
  handling your own assets."

  Lou is still in good shape, so he takes the subway to the financial
  district twice a year to find a teller who will take his coupons. That has
  become something of a quest. Many banks that handled the bonds have merged
  out of business. Some of the acquiring banks continue to accept coupons in
  person, but others have shut their windows and forced customers to send
  their coupons to a processing center.

  In December, I accompanied Lou on one of his bearer-bond jaunts. To redeem
  the coupons from his Battery Park City Authority bonds, we found the " J.
  P. Morgan Chase Bank Investor Services Receiving Window," which was behind
  an out-of-the-way door on the ground floor of 4 New York Plaza.

  Lou put his coupons, which look like raffle tickets, into a special
  see-through envelope and wrote his name and Social Security number on the
  outside. The teller spent five minutes checking a computer before handing
  him a receipt for a check that would be sent to him in about 10 days.

  That interest payment didn't arrive. He later received a note saying the
  bond had been called six months earlier. Lou had missed the advertisement
  in The Wall Street Journal announcing it, so, while he got his $5,000
  principal back, he missed the chance to collect the last $215 interest
  payment.

  WE didn't have much more luck around the corner, at Deutsche Bank. There, a
  teller told us that Lou must now send his five coupons - worth $125 each -
  to its processing center in Tennessee. I called Nashville to find out more.
  An operator said that Lou could send the coupons in an ordinary envelope
  with a signed W-9 tax form.

  A lot of people are angry about the change. "We've been getting a lot of
  calls on this where people have gone to the old window and found it's not
  there anymore," she said of the New York location. It was small comfort to
  Lou, who ended up paying $10.32 in postage. On the ride uptown, we pondered
  technology, efficiency and how bonds issued by New York City agencies could
  no longer be redeemed in person in New York City.

  "It seems to me," Lou said, "that the coupons and the bonds are a contract,
  and if they are going to void part of the contract and make you send them
  in, they should reimburse you for the expense."

  It may be the way of the world, but that doesn't mean he has to like it.
  "It doesn't seem right," he said, "that I'm paying more and getting less
  service."


  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Feb 12 03:15:11 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2006 11:15:11 +0000
Subject: [somelist: Questions about the illegal wiretaps]
Message-ID: <20060212111511.GL3873@leitl.org>

At 2/6/2006 04:47 AM, A**** A. G****  wrote:

>Let's face it, there's no way that Bush supporters are going to care
>if the wiretaps are illegal. We have to convince them that they are
>lousy policy. Fortunately, there's one thing about these wiretaps
>that makes it easy to argue that.
>
>It's fucking stupid.
>
>Here is a list of questions that I would like to see asked about
>these wiretaps:
>
>1. How much money have we spent on this program?
>2. How much is that per taxpayer?
>3. According to the Washington Post, we had a backlog of
>   hundreds of thousands of hours of untranslated wiretaps. Do
>   we still have this backlog?
>4. What's the point of conducting wiretaps when we can't
>   translate them?
>5. How many translators could we have hired for the price of
>   this program?
>6. In your opinion, which would make us safer--more translators,
>   or more untranslated wiretaps?
>[etc]

You miss the point.

Money is no object; they can quibble over a dime for an aspirin for a
poor person, but ten billion for a military project is a rounding
error.  This is cheaper than ten billion. Besides, American suck at
math, especially Republicans.

They are not manually listening to the conversations. They are not
mostly conversations in foreign languages.  They are bulk-tapping the
circuits flowing in and out of the United States, and selectively
tapping Americans' phones.  Most of these calls are in English.

To decipher the calls, they use the advanced stored-voice-recognition
technology that BBN developed for them, then so cleverly exposed to
the world in Podzinger.  Treat these stored phone calls as podcasts
and have a roomful of Opterons decode them, then search them for
"interesting" content.  Again, it's all on display on Podzinger,
except that those were meant to be listened to by the public at
large.  AMD probably makes a lot of money at this too.  Maybe even
Intel gets to supply the kit for some of this covert intel.

Finally, because these were not sent to the FISA court, it can be
assumed that they would not have passed the FISA test, which
basically consists of telling a judge what you want to do and not
having the judge die of laughter on the spot.  The FISA court has
rejected six out of 16,000 requests.  So what are they listening for?

I am quite convinced that the primary goal was to collect political
intelligence.  They probably were getting good intel on the Kerry
campaign, on some tight Senate races, and on the overall Democratic
Party operations.  Since the Google-like search technology allows the
system's user to search for essentially anything, and play back just
the calls of interest, they had access to a wealth of political information.

The WaPo apparently claims that the FISA-risky activity was doing
data mining on suspicious patterns of behavior, profiling massive
numbers of callers' activities hoping, with little success, to
uncover real links to foreign enemies.  That was probably the most
benign interpretation.  But with absolutely no oversight, it's pretty
obvious that the wealth of wiretap bulk data so collected could be
used in ways that would impress even the most corrupt tinpot despot.

The way to get the more marginal Bush-symps to oppose this crime is
to suggest that if Bush could do it, so could Hillary Clinton, Al
Gore, Russ Feingold, or some other future Democratic
president.  Yeah, President Al Sharpton, give  him that power;
that'll scare 'em off.

--
*****censored********

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From YHFBBXY at msn.com  Sun Feb 12 09:38:22 2006
From: YHFBBXY at msn.com (Seth Kaiser)
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2006 13:38:22 -0400
Subject: Best Pharmacy LnziC
Message-ID: <LAW29.OE649yfB4mvo210453d5@motmail.com>


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73gt3




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Feb 12 15:52:02 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2006 18:52:02 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision
Message-ID: <p062309f4c0157aa0abde@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2006 18:47:47 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com


<http://newsmax.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?s=pf&page=http://newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/1/26/101607.shtml>

  Reprinted from NewsMax.com

  Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision

  Paul Craig Roberts

  Thursday, Jan. 26, 2006

  A provision in the "Patriot Act" creates a new federal police force with
  power to violate the Bill of Rights. You might think that this cannot be
  true, as you have not read about it in newspapers or heard it discussed by
  talking heads on TV. However, it is a looming reality.

  Go to House Report 109-333 - "USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
  Act of 2005," and check it out for yourself.

  Sec. 605 states the following:

  "There is hereby created and established a permanent police force, to be
  known as the 'United States Secret Service Uniformed Division.'"

  This new federal police force is "subject to the supervision of the
  secretary of homeland security."

  The new police are empowered to "make arrests without warrant for any
  offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for any
  felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have
  reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
  or is committing such felony."

  The new police are assigned a variety of jurisdictions, including "an event
  designated under Section 3056(e) of Title 18 as a special event of national
  significance," or SENS.

  "A special event of national significance" is neither defined nor does it
  require the presence of a "protected person" such as the president in order
  to trigger it. Thus, the administration, and perhaps the police themselves,
  can place the SENS designation on any event.

  Once a SENS designation is placed on an event, the new federal police are
  empowered to keep out and to arrest people at their discretion.

  The language conveys enormous discretionary and arbitrary powers. What is
  "an offense against the United States"? What are "reasonable grounds"?

  You can bet that the Alito-Roberts court will rule that it is whatever the
  executive branch says.

  The obvious purpose of the act is to prevent demonstrations at Bush-Cheney
  events. However, nothing in the language limits the police powers from
  being used only in this way.

  Like every law in the United States, this law also will be expansively
  interpreted and abused. It has dire implications for freedom of association
  and First Amendment rights. We can take for granted that the new federal
  police will be used to suppress dissent and break up opposition. The
  Brownshirts are now arming themselves with a Gestapo.

  Many naive Americans will write to me to explain that this new provision in
  the reauthorization of the "Patriot Act" is necessary to protect the
  president and other high officials from terrorists or from harm at the
  hands of angry demonstrators, "No one else will have anything to fear."
  Some will accuse me of being an alarmist, and others will say that it is
  unpatriotic to doubt the law's good intentions.

  Americans will write such nonsense despite the fact that the president and
  foreign dignitaries are already provided superb protection by the Secret
  Service.

  The naive will not comprehend that the president cannot be endangered by
  demonstrators at SENS when the president is not present. For many
  Americans, the light refuses to turn on.

  In Nazi Germany, did no one but the Jews have anything to fear from the
  Gestapo?

  By Stalin's time, Lenin and Trotsky had eliminated all members of the
  "oppressor class," but that did not stop Stalin from sending millions of
  "enemies of the people" to the Gulag.

  It is extremely difficult to hold even local police forces accountable. Who
  is going to hold accountable a federal police protected by Homeland
  Security and the president?

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From dave at farber.net  Sun Feb 12 16:31:11 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2006 19:31:11 -0500
Subject: [IP] cloning of chip The Financial Times: US group implants
 electronic tags in workers]]
Message-ID: <mailman.1585.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1



- -------- Original Message --------
Subject: FOR IP: Re: [IP] The Financial Times: US group implants
electronic tags in workers]
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2006 19:01:58 -0500
From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu
To: dave at farber.net
References: <43EFC85D.2060509 at farber.net>

On Sun, 12 Feb 2006 18:44:29 EST, Bob Rosenberg said:
> "So far around 70 people in the US have had the implants, the company
said."
>
> I don't believe I need to mention a litany of privacy concerns at the
> moment.

And to make things worse, somebody has already discovered how to skim
and clone the VeriChip.

http://cq.cx/verichip.pl

The problem is, of course, that you can leave your ID badge at home when
you go to the supermarket, or the movies - but leaving your arm at home
isn't
very workable.  This makes a "skim, clone, and utilize" attack a lot
*easier*.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.2 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org

iD8DBQFD79NPh0VyAToQeqERAkhUAJ9Yr39oNbXDx+rsbQ5v2+CP3h91VgCgps/0
i0ol8rVZnYdIe7kjyottfmY=
=8uL4
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
  http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From KVPVT at yahoo.com  Sun Feb 12 17:45:19 2006
From: KVPVT at yahoo.com (Fidel Swan)
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 00:45:19 -0100
Subject: Woww..8o-% 0ff Cypherpunks 
Message-ID: <68LB87FE.0F24.KVPVT@yahoo.com>



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From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Feb 13 03:29:28 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 06:29:28 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Executive Power on Steroids
Message-ID: <p0623092ac0161e17fc58@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 06:28:47 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Executive Power on Steroids
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

  <http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB113980208779772206.html>

  The Wall Street Journal

  February 13, 2006


  COMMENTARY

  Executive Power on Steroids

  By RICHARD A. EPSTEIN

  February 13, 2006; Page A16

  President Bush's domestic surveillance program against al Qaeda has spawned
  multiple controversies. Intelligence skeptics ask, for example, whether the
  potential gains from snooping are worth the hassle. Civil libertarians
  doubt whether the warrantless surveillance and wiretaps can be squared with
  the Fourth Amendment. On both these disputes, my sympathies run with the
  president. I support his efforts to renew the Patriot Act; and I believe
  our first order of business should be to retool the Foreign Intelligence
  Surveillance Act (FISA) to meet the challenges of modern communications
  technology.

  Yet the key legal struggles over domestic spying go not to its wisdom, but
  to the thorny issue of whether the president has exceeded his
  constitutional powers in disregarding FISA. He has.

  The Constitution gives Congress the power to set policy; it gives to the
  president the right, and the duty, to execute it. The president claims
  first that he has secured the needed congressional blessing for the NSA's
  domestic surveillance through the Authorization of Use of Military Force
  Act, passed in the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001. Not so. AUMF does not
  contain one word that dislodges FISA, and the law disfavors any "implied
  repeal" of major legislation. Right now, the president can both hound al
  Qaeda and follow FISA requirements for domestic warrants. If he wants to go
  further, he should seek explicit congressional authorization.

  The administration's more aggressive claim is that an "inherent commander
  in chief power" lets the president act on his own. To see why this claim
  fails, it is critical to set out -- they're short -- the precise provisions
  that implement the constitutional separation of powers in matters of war
  and peace. First off, the Constitution gives the Congress the power "to
  declare" war. Next, only Congress can appropriate the funds to operate the
  land and naval forces. Most critically for the spying dispute, Congress has
  the explicit power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the
  land and naval forces." It has similar powers for setting the standards (or
  "discipline") for the state militia. Congress's power applies in both peace
  and wartime, and is subject to no express limitations on the nature and
  content of its general rules.

  On the other side of the ledger, "[t]he President shall be Commander in
  Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia when
  called into actual service of the United States." Note the word "power"
  appears no where in this sentence. The operative verb is "shall be."

  The choice of words is not inadvertent. Later in the same section the
  Constitution provides that the president "shall have the Power to grant
  Reprieves and Pardons for offenses against the United States, except in
  cases of impeachment," and the "Power, by and with the Advice and consent
  of the Senate to make Treaties." Elsewhere the president shall "receive"
  ambassadors and "require" reports from his subordinates.

  Words matter. Only powers allow for a change in legal status of the persons
  over whom some power is directed. Thus the president's power to grant
  reprieves and pardons is rightly described as "plenary," precisely because
  Congress has no stated power to hedge it in by legislation, for example by
  declaring certain offenses unpardonable. The president's power to make
  treaties is likewise plenary, but now subject to the explicit check of
  Senatorial advice and consent. At no time, however, can Congress send its
  own delegation off to negotiate with Iraq.

  So understood, subtly adding in some "inherent commander in chief power"
  upsets a carefully wrought constitutional balance. Let the president have
  plenary power over military affairs, then it becomes an inevitable
  political tussle over whether his inherent power is stronger than
  Congress's stated one. But why twist accurate constitutional language to
  make a shambles of our basic governance structure? Congress gets to set the
  general rules governing military efforts. The Constitution does not confer
  the identical power on the president.

  This view does not reduce the commander-in chief-clause to some ceremonial
  nullity; rather, it has four critical functions. First, it guarantees the
  civilian control over the military. Second, Congress cannot circumvent the
  president's position as commander in chief by assigning any of his
  responsibilities to anyone else. Only the president can execute any laws
  that Congress puts in place, and all inferior military officers from the
  Joint Chiefs of Staff on down answer only to him. Third, the Congress is
  barred from making any specific order on military matters once it lays down
  the rules. It cannot micromanage the military, nor put inferior military
  personnel in the impossible position of deciding whose commands to follow,
  or why. Fourth, the president, like any inferior military commander, can
  respond on his own initiative to an immediate attack, without congressional
  authorization.

  The president's defenders insist that any gap in his power is filled
  because the Constitution provides that the president "shall take Care that
  the laws be faithfully executed." But this clause cuts in exactly the
  opposite direction. FISA is one law that the president must "take care" to
  enforce: He cannot choose to flout or ignore it, even if he has wide
  discretion in how to implement it. Nor can the president obviate the need
  for legislation by making selective disclosures of his activities to
  certain members of Congress whom he then subjects to a vow of secrecy. Our
  constitutional structure of checks and balances is not subject to
  unilateral presidential circumvention by ad hoc procedures. The precise
  detailed enumeration of powers and responsibilities in Article II just do
  not confer on the president a roving commission over foreign and military
  affairs. He is a coordinate player, not a dominant one.

  So who cares about these close textual and formal arguments? We all do, or
  should. The major danger with presidential surveillance does not lie in
  this particular overreaching of executive power. It's what comes next. If
  President Bush can ignore FISA, then he can disregard a congressional
  prohibition against the use of nuclear force. His defenders often claim
  that national defense is too important to be left to a wobbly Congress --
  which on my view might prohibit the use of live ammunition in combat. And
  so it could. But political forces are always in play, and no legal
  institutions are simultaneously robust against all forms of incompetence.

  As Madison reminds us, "Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the
  helm." If we accept executive power on steroids, then what's to be done if
  a reckless president drags our nation into foolish conflicts? Over the long
  haul, we'll do best by sticking to the original game plan on military
  matters rather than rewriting the Constitution to let the president alter
  the rules of the game. Under our Constitution, that power belongs to
  Congress. May it use the power wisely.

  Mr. Epstein, the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor at the
  University of Chicago and the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at
  the Hoover Institution, is the author, most recently, of "How Progressives
  Rewrote the Constitution" (Cato Institute, 2006).

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Sun Feb 12 22:48:17 2006
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 06:48:17 +0000
Subject: [somelist: Questions about the illegal wiretaps]
In-Reply-To: <20060212111511.GL3873@leitl.org>
References: <20060212111511.GL3873@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <20060213064817.GA32374@arion.hive>

On 2006-02-12T11:15:11+0000, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> I am quite convinced that the primary goal was to collect political
> intelligence.  They probably were getting good intel on the Kerry
> campaign, on some tight Senate races, and on the overall Democratic
> Party operations.  Since the Google-like search technology allows the
> system's user to search for essentially anything, and play back just
> the calls of interest, they had access to a wealth of political information.

How do FISA-approved wiretaps work, anyway?

All these NSA-bound collection points... are they always enabled,
listening for any interesting traffic?  Is non-FISA-warranted intel
ditched prior to collection, ditched at NSA, or never ditched?

Is the FISA process just:
0. Listen to some conversations.
1. Find something of interest.
2. Go to FISA with a tap request for the parties involved
3. Start flagging subsequently-collected intel with "FISA Approved"
4. Let certain people search the database at any time, but classify
anything not FISA-approved as TS/SCI.

-- 
The six phases of a project:
I. Enthusiasm.         IV. Search for the Guilty.
II. Disillusionment.   V. Punishment of the Innocent.
III. Panic.            VI. Praise & Honor for the Nonparticipants.




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Feb 13 01:01:51 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 09:01:51 +0000
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] cloning of chip The Financial Times: US
  group implants electronic tags in workers]]]
Message-ID: <20060213090151.GP3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From bowen.quentinbg57 at gmail.com  Mon Feb 13 10:39:52 2006
From: bowen.quentinbg57 at gmail.com (Elba Douglas)
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 10:39:52 -0800
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Message-ID: <200602130239.k1D2drkM021432@proton.jfet.org>

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From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Mon Feb 13 10:23:23 2006
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 13:23:23 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision
In-Reply-To: <p062309f4c0157aa0abde@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <BAY103-F350CCF86031B23799BAE829B070@phx.gbl>

"You can bet that the Alito-Roberts court will rule that it is whatever the
  executive branch says."

Yes, but what it will BE is whatever the lead thug says it is. Looks like I 
could be jailed for wearing Birkenstocks, or for not giving them a cut of my 
hard-earned crack dollars.

Gettin' time to bum rush da show...

-TD


>From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cypherpunks at jfet.org
>Subject: [Clips] Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision
>Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2006 18:52:02 -0500
>
>--- begin forwarded text
>
>
>   Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
>   Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2006 18:47:47 -0500
>   To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
>   From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>   Subject: [Clips] Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision
>   Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
>   Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com
>
>
><http://newsmax.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?s=pf&page=http://newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/1/26/101607.shtml>
>
>   Reprinted from NewsMax.com
>
>   Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision
>
>   Paul Craig Roberts
>
>   Thursday, Jan. 26, 2006
>
>   A provision in the "Patriot Act" creates a new federal police force with
>   power to violate the Bill of Rights. You might think that this cannot be
>   true, as you have not read about it in newspapers or heard it discussed 
>by
>   talking heads on TV. However, it is a looming reality.
>
>   Go to House Report 109-333 - "USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
>Reauthorization
>   Act of 2005," and check it out for yourself.
>
>   Sec. 605 states the following:
>
>   "There is hereby created and established a permanent police force, to be
>   known as the 'United States Secret Service Uniformed Division.'"
>
>   This new federal police force is "subject to the supervision of the
>   secretary of homeland security."
>
>   The new police are empowered to "make arrests without warrant for any
>   offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for 
>any
>   felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have
>   reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has 
>committed
>   or is committing such felony."
>
>   The new police are assigned a variety of jurisdictions, including "an 
>event
>   designated under Section 3056(e) of Title 18 as a special event of 
>national
>   significance," or SENS.
>
>   "A special event of national significance" is neither defined nor does 
>it
>   require the presence of a "protected person" such as the president in 
>order
>   to trigger it. Thus, the administration, and perhaps the police 
>themselves,
>   can place the SENS designation on any event.
>
>   Once a SENS designation is placed on an event, the new federal police 
>are
>   empowered to keep out and to arrest people at their discretion.
>
>   The language conveys enormous discretionary and arbitrary powers. What 
>is
>   "an offense against the United States"? What are "reasonable grounds"?
>
>   You can bet that the Alito-Roberts court will rule that it is whatever 
>the
>   executive branch says.
>
>   The obvious purpose of the act is to prevent demonstrations at 
>Bush-Cheney
>   events. However, nothing in the language limits the police powers from
>   being used only in this way.
>
>   Like every law in the United States, this law also will be expansively
>   interpreted and abused. It has dire implications for freedom of 
>association
>   and First Amendment rights. We can take for granted that the new federal
>   police will be used to suppress dissent and break up opposition. The
>   Brownshirts are now arming themselves with a Gestapo.
>
>   Many naive Americans will write to me to explain that this new provision 
>in
>   the reauthorization of the "Patriot Act" is necessary to protect the
>   president and other high officials from terrorists or from harm at the
>   hands of angry demonstrators, "No one else will have anything to fear."
>   Some will accuse me of being an alarmist, and others will say that it is
>   unpatriotic to doubt the law's good intentions.
>
>   Americans will write such nonsense despite the fact that the president 
>and
>   foreign dignitaries are already provided superb protection by the Secret
>   Service.
>
>   The naive will not comprehend that the president cannot be endangered by
>   demonstrators at SENS when the president is not present. For many
>   Americans, the light refuses to turn on.
>
>   In Nazi Germany, did no one but the Jews have anything to fear from the
>   Gestapo?
>
>   By Stalin's time, Lenin and Trotsky had eliminated all members of the
>   "oppressor class," but that did not stop Stalin from sending millions of
>   "enemies of the people" to the Gulag.
>
>   It is extremely difficult to hold even local police forces accountable. 
>Who
>   is going to hold accountable a federal police protected by Homeland
>   Security and the president?
>
>   --
>   -----------------
>   R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>   The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>   44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>   "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>   [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>   experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>   _______________________________________________
>   Clips mailing list
>   Clips at philodox.com
>   http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips
>
>--- end forwarded text
>
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From boniface.dentonpe8 at gmail.com  Mon Feb 13 03:15:17 2006
From: boniface.dentonpe8 at gmail.com (Jasmine Contreras)
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 16:15:17 +0500
Subject: increase in sexual desire
Message-ID: <200602132115.k1DLFDto012740@proton.jfet.org>

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kes




From jay at tamboli.cx  Mon Feb 13 13:22:08 2006
From: jay at tamboli.cx (Jay Goodman Tamboli)
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 16:22:08 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision
In-Reply-To: <p062309f4c0157aa0abde@[68.167.57.91]>
References: <p062309f4c0157aa0abde@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <A5E6B916-5EAD-49B3-AF86-EB31C14C5895@tamboli.cx>

On 2006.02.12, at 18:52, R. A. Hettinga wrote:

>   A provision in the "Patriot Act" creates a new federal police  
> force with
>   power to violate the Bill of Rights. You might think that this  
> cannot be
>   true, as you have not read about it in newspapers or heard it  
> discussed by
>   talking heads on TV. However, it is a looming reality.
>
>   Go to House Report 109-333 - "USA PATRIOT Improvement and  
> Reauthorization
>   Act of 2005," and check it out for yourself.
>
>   Sec. 605 states the following:
>
>   "There is hereby created and established a permanent police  
> force, to be
>   known as the 'United States Secret Service Uniformed Division.'"
>
>   This new federal police force is "subject to the supervision of the
>   secretary of homeland security."
>
>   The new police are empowered to "make arrests without warrant for  
> any
>   offense against the United States committed in their presence, or  
> for any
>   felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have
>   reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has  
> committed
>   or is committing such felony."

The Secret Service Uniformed Division is not new (see http:// 
www.secretservice.gov/ud.shtml). You see them all over DC.

I don't know a whole lot about police powers, but can't a police  
offer arrest anyone if he has probable cause the person has committed  
a crime? Perhaps "reasonable grounds to believe" is different, but if  
the author doesn't know about a branch of law enforcement that has  
been in existence since 1860, I don't have much trust in his other  
information.

/jgt
-- 
http://tamboli.cx/




From roderickfitta at gmx.net  Mon Feb 13 03:34:15 2006
From: roderickfitta at gmx.net (Tara Hooker)
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 16:34:15 +0500
Subject: Hmm... how soon you forget about me!
Message-ID: <200602132134.k1DLYAJX013047@proton.jfet.org>

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From jay at tamboli.cx  Mon Feb 13 13:51:00 2006
From: jay at tamboli.cx (Jay Goodman Tamboli)
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 16:51:00 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision
In-Reply-To: <200602132137.k1DLbZl2021037@pony-express.cadence.com>
References: <200602132137.k1DLbZl2021037@pony-express.cadence.com>
Message-ID: <0AD74001-4703-4209-8866-FA349DE93FA6@tamboli.cx>

On 2006.02.13, at 16:37, Gregory Hicks wrote:

> The big change here is that the SecreT Service UD is moved from the
> Treasury Department to the Department of Homeland Defense...   
> except as
> designated by the Prez... when it moves to SecState...

3 USC 202 (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode03/ 
usc_sec_03_00000202----000-.html) already has the SSUD under DHS. The  
powers to carry firearms, make arrests, and "perform other duties"  
are not currently given explicitly, but I'd assume they're  
encompassed under "privileges and powers similar to those of the  
members of the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia,"  
unless Congress is planning to disarm the Metropolian Police sometime  
soon.

/jgt
-- 
http://tamboli.cx/




From After_the_Closing_Bell_kingfish at gmail.com  Tue Feb 14 04:07:08 2006
From: After_the_Closing_Bell_kingfish at gmail.com (Bianca Easley)
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2006 06:07:08 -0600
Subject: ADPI  American Dental Partners
Message-ID: <108216160459.XAA13898After_the_Closing_Bell_kingfish@gmail.com>


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From gbnewby at pglaf.org  Tue Feb 14 09:47:11 2006
From: gbnewby at pglaf.org (Greg Newby)
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2006 09:47:11 -0800
Subject: HOPE Number Six call for participation
Message-ID: <20060214174711.GC12442@pglaf.org>

			 Call for Participation
			    HOPE Number Six

			    July 21-23 2006
			 The Hotel Pennsylvania
			     New York City


HOPE Number Six (www.hopenumbersix.net) is this summer's hacker
conference sponsored by 2600 Magazine.  Presenters and artists from all
nationalities and disciplines are again invited to participate in this
forum.  HOPE Number Six covers all aspects of hacking, the community
surrounding it, and its effects across the world.

For three days, The Hotel Pennsylvania will be the nexus of discussion,
planning, and activity for hacker ideas, opportunities, and
understanding.


There are several ways to participate:

   * Speak: Presentation ideas should be submitted with a synopsis of
the topic along with presenter bio, and will be chosen by relevance and 
peer review.  Panels, talks, tutorials, debates, or other types of
presentations are all welcome.  Most presentations will be 55 minutes.

   * Interact: Demonstrations of new and interesting technologies or
system elements as well as artistic exhibits are welcome.  We have
20,000 square feet of presentation space to fill, so projects of all
sizes will be considered.  Robots, Segways, Legos, RFID, digital
graffiti -- submit your creative ideas!

   * Display: All sorts of presentations, demos, workshops, classes, 
posters, and other ways of sharing information are encouraged.  Space and 
time will be provided to accommodate proposals.

   * Sell: Space is also available for vendors.  Prospects should describe
their group and the items they are selling.  Vendors are chosen by
relevance to the conference topic and organization size.

Topics related to all aspects of hackers and hacking are welcome.  In
past years, sessions have included these themes:

   * New technologies
   * Effects of new laws and business models
   * Hackers and activism
   * Telephone systems
   * Radio communication
   * Intelligence gathering
   * Lockpicking
   * Privacy
   * System internals vulnerabilities
   * Copy protection
   * Governments
   * Strong crypto
   * Data exchange
   * Voting systems
   * Social engineering
   * Programming techniques
   * Hacker Ethics
   * Stories from K-12
   * Surveillance
   * Systems administration
   * Worms and viruses
   * The man and how to avoid him
   * Information privacy
   * International cooperation
   * Peer to peer networks
   * Wireless
   * Culture jamming
   * Low-power radio
   * Black hats and white hats
   * Cyberterrorism and cyber protests
   * Teaching hacking
   * The media

Other topics are welcome, especially those offering fresh views and new
variants on old themes.  Submissions should be sent to
"speakers at 2600.com" and include names (or aliases) and email addresses
in addition to the information requested above.

Conference planning is ongoing throughout the spring, so submit your
ideas or suggestions as early as possible.  Late proposals will be
considered only if space is still available.

For more information about HOPE Number Six, check the web pages at
www.hopenumbersix.net.  These pages provide opportunities to volunteer,
as well as information about travel, the hotel, and more specific info
on speakers, tutorials, and the many activities that will be ongoing.




From EEkid at aol.com  Tue Feb 14 09:47:45 2006
From: EEkid at aol.com (EEkid at aol.com)
Date: February 14, 2006 9:47:45 PM EST
Subject: Whistleblower says NSA violations bigger
Message-ID: <mailman.1586.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Whistleblower says NSA violations bigger
WASHINGTON, Feb. 14 (UPI) -- A former NSA employee said Tuesday there
is another ongoing top-secret surveillance program that might have
violated millions of Americans' Constitutional rights.

Russell D. Tice told the House Government Reform Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations he
has concerns about a "special access" electronic surveillance program
that he characterized as far more wide-ranging than the warrentless
wiretapping recently exposed by the New York Times but he is
forbidden from discussing the program with Congress.

Tice said he believes it violates the Constitution's protection
against unlawful search and seizures but has no way of sharing the
information without breaking classification laws. He is not even
allowed to tell the congressional intelligence committees - members
or their staff - because they lack high enough clearance.

Neither could he brief the inspector general of the NSA because that
office is not cleared to hear the information, he said.

Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Christopher Shays, R-Conn., and Dennis
Kucinich, D-Ohio, said they believe a few members of the Armed
Services Committee are cleared for the information, but they said
believe their committee and the intelligence committees have
jurisdiction to hear the allegations.

"Congressman Kucinich wants Congressman Shays to hold a hearing (on
the program)," said Doug Gordon, Kucinich's spokesman. "Obviously it
would have to take place in some kind of a closed hearing. But
Congress has a role to play in oversight. The (Bush) administration
does not get to decide what Congress can and can not hear."

Tice was testifying because he was a National Security Agency
intelligence officer who was stripped of his security clearance after
he reported his suspicions that a former colleague at the Defense
Intelligence Agency was a spy. The matter was dismissed by the DIA,
but Tice pressed it later and was subsequently ordered to take a
psychological examination, during which he was declared paranoid. He
is now unemployed.

Tice was one of the New York Times sources for its wiretapping story,
but he told the committee the information he provided was not secret
and could have been provided by an private sector electronic
communications professional.

http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view.php?
StoryID=20060214-053955-9494r


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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From bqjws at datasofttechnologies.com  Tue Feb 14 13:13:48 2006
From: bqjws at datasofttechnologies.com (Roberto E. Mcdaniel)
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2006 13:13:48 -0800
Subject: noprescanadarx online
Message-ID: <998541.4611260405507.727996166281.ECFO.3110@spectrograph>

foggy mayabut andstreptococcus it'samos intycoon
mayreplica seeinconsiderate ,scrutable onwarden
it'sshafer !litigant nothasten notcolumbine
onextolled onsalmonberry trydemography beantietam
it'sarticulate aangular seeerastus itz
notfrog mayillogic not
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From dave at farber.net  Tue Feb 14 10:36:00 2006
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2006 13:36:00 -0500
Subject: [IP] E-tracking through your cell phone
Message-ID: <mailman.1587.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



E-tracking through your cell phone
By Declan McCullagh
http://news.com.com/E-tracking+through+your+cell+phone/
2010-1039_3-6038468.h
tml

Story last modified Mon Feb 13 06:24:49 PST 2006

You may already know this, but your cell phone happens to be a miniature
tracking device that can be used to monitor your location from afar.

There are times when knowing your exact location is useful, of
course. It
would be handy for a phone to help you find a gas station in a pinch, or
bleep when you're about to take the wrong highway exit.

But the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice have seized on the
ability to
locate a cellular customer and are using it to track Americans'
whereabouts
surreptitiously--even when there's no evidence of wrongdoing.

A pair of court decisions in the last few weeks shows that judges are
split
on whether this is legal. One federal magistrate judge in Wisconsin
on Jan.
17 ruled it was unlawful, but another nine days later in Louisiana
decided
that it was perfectly OK.

This is an unfortunate outcome, not least because it shows that some
judges
are reluctant to hold federal agents and prosecutors to the letter of
the
law.

It's also unfortunate because it demonstrates that the FBI swore
never to
use a 1994 surveillance law to track cellular phones--but then,
secretly,
went ahead and did it, anyway.

FBI officials swore never to use a 1994 surveillance law to track
cellular
phones but are doing it, anyway.

When lobbying for that law, the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, then-FBI Director Louis Freeh assured the U.S.
Senate that
location surveillance would never take place unless there was
evidence of
wrongdoing.

"It does not include any information which might disclose the general
location of a mobile facility or service, beyond that associated with
the
area code or exchange of the facility or service," Freeh testified .
"There
is no intent whatsoever, with reference to this term, to acquire
anything
that could properly be called 'tracking' information."

So much for promises from politicians.

...

_______________________________________________
EPIC_IDOF mailing list
EPIC_IDOF at mailman.epic.org
https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof


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______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From brigham.floellah97 at gmail.com  Tue Feb 14 00:51:25 2006
From: brigham.floellah97 at gmail.com (Angelina Mcconnell)
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2006 13:51:25 +0500
Subject: Thanks for being a good friend!
Message-ID: <200602141851.k1EIpP2n008142@proton.jfet.org>

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From lckbkksrigwbqhk at comcast.com  Tue Feb 14 16:36:31 2006
From: lckbkksrigwbqhk at comcast.com (Roberta Nixon)
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2006 16:36:31 -0800
Subject: viennese trafficking
Message-ID: <71425440084719.21748008@andrei>

some receptive try homebuild but effluvia be extroversion , gush be demand not critic 
may oases a hydroxy see eastern but gimbal ! affricate on locus some nagy 
may plutonium the apathy or doubt ! mere it's eyewitness. 
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From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Tue Feb 14 19:58:34 2006
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2006 19:58:34 -0800
Subject: faa.gov flight info to your cellphone
Message-ID: <6.2.1.2.0.20060214164705.03294f20@pop.idiom.com>

So I'm sitting in the airport listening to the latest
Vice Presidential Hunter Safety Program TV news,
and there's a commercial about the FAA's www.fly.faa.gov website
which lets you sign up to get near-real-time airport status information,
including giving them your cellphone number to get updates.
It looks fairly innocuous (and says to contact your airline
for details about your specific flight, so it may not be fully operational),
and it also has a pointer to http://waittime.tsa.dhs.gov/index.html
which is the TSA's site for getting estimated papers-in-order wait time.

Are these purely honest services (maybe)?
Or are the TSA Internal Passport folks tracking travellers
who provide their info (maybe, maybe not, but if not,
they'll certainly start abusing them once they realize they can)?




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Feb 14 13:39:12 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2006 22:39:12 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] E-tracking through your cell phone]
Message-ID: <20060214213912.GD3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From cupdspax at yahoo.com  Tue Feb 14 20:55:56 2006
From: cupdspax at yahoo.com (Elvis Sharp)
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2006 22:55:56 -0600
Subject: You Won't Regret vrx
Message-ID: <141.64e558d5.2a9FQC44@sol.com>


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9wIcW




From Nightwatch01 at comcast.net  Wed Feb 15 01:47:01 2006
From: Nightwatch01 at comcast.net (Tim)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 01:47:01 -0800
Subject: faa.gov flight info to your cellphone
In-Reply-To: <6.2.1.2.0.20060214164705.03294f20@pop.idiom.com>
References: <6.2.1.2.0.20060214164705.03294f20@pop.idiom.com>
Message-ID: <43F2F895.7000902@comcast.net>

Bill Stewart wrote:

> So I'm sitting in the airport listening to the latest
> Vice Presidential Hunter Safety Program TV news,
> and there's a commercial about the FAA's www.fly.faa.gov website
> which lets you sign up to get near-real-time airport status information,
> including giving them your cellphone number to get updates.
> It looks fairly innocuous (and says to contact your airline
> for details about your specific flight, so it may not be fully 
> operational),
> and it also has a pointer to http://waittime.tsa.dhs.gov/index.html
> which is the TSA's site for getting estimated papers-in-order wait time.
>
> Are these purely honest services (maybe)?
> Or are the TSA Internal Passport folks tracking travellers
> who provide their info (maybe, maybe not, but if not,
> they'll certainly start abusing them once they realize they can)?


  Obviously you're wasting time asking a stupid rhetorical question, 
since clearly you're
a paranoid loon.

  What malfeasance will the government in your fantasyland perform on 
the hundreds, or thousands
of people each day who might utilize the service to find out in general 
how the airport is functioning
at any particular time?

  Are you ASSuming that anyone who voluntarily gives their phone # & a 
flight # is
going to be expected to be a passenger on that flight, & thus subjected 
to whatever government evils
your sad little mind creates?    In the real world, plenty of friends, 
spouses, co-workers, etc. of the
traveling party may also *volunteer* to give their phone # & a flight # 
to check the flight.  Flight updates
SMS'ed yo cellular phones have already been done for years directly 
through most of the major airlines.

  Perhaps the FAA should cancel the service, in order for you to sleep 
better at night...




From jhuanai at radio.am  Tue Feb 14 16:41:50 2006
From: jhuanai at radio.am (Suzamni)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 02:41:50 +0200
Subject: This star outlet has everything from allergy cures to wt.loss curatives.
Message-ID: <3F8F2F3C.F77EC83@radio.am>

Got it,

I go to this e-store, www.porpoise.wear.egfas.org/jpf/ all the time and
from today on, your life is going to be easier.

I know how hectic it's been for you since "it" began and I like to help you
get the remedy now.

The cure to ur issues is all here in this website I'm e-mailing you.  Life
is full of misc. things to get annoyed about.

Mailing is on time and you'll know where your stuff is with their on line t
racking.

Suzamni




From dave at farber.net  Wed Feb 15 03:39:47 2006
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 06:39:47 -0500
Subject: [IP] Whistleblower says NSA violations bigger
Message-ID: <mailman.1588.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From emc at artifact.psychedelic.net  Wed Feb 15 10:25:33 2006
From: emc at artifact.psychedelic.net (Eric Cordian)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 10:25:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] READ UK gov wants MS to give them a 
  backdoor  into Windows Vista ?! READ]
In-Reply-To: <20060215150446.GV3873@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <200602151825.k1FIPYNH010142@artifact.psychedelic.net>

Does anyone find it odd that the person urging the UK pigs
pursue GAK with MS is Ross Anderson?

Things that make you go "Hmmmmmmmmm."

> UK officials are talking to Microsoft over fears the new version of Windows
> could make it harder for police to read suspects' computer files.

> Windows Vista is due to be rolled out later this year. Cambridge academic
> Ross Anderson told MPs it would mean more computer files being encrypted.

-- 
Eric Michael Cordian 0+
O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division
"Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"




From dewayne at warpspeed.com  Wed Feb 15 12:45:58 2006
From: dewayne at warpspeed.com (Dewayne Hendricks)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 12:45:58 -0800
Subject: [Dewayne-Net] Cellphone could crack RFID tags, says cryptographer
Message-ID: <mailman.1589.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Cellphone could crack RFID tags, says cryptographer

Rick Merritt
(02/14/2006 4:26 PM EST)
URL: <http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=180201688>

SAN JOSE b A well known cryptographer has applied power analysis
techniques to crack passwords for the most popular brand of RFID tags.

Adi Shamir, professor of computer science at the Weizmann Institute,
reported his work in a high-profile panel discussion at the RSA
Conference here. Separately, Ron Rivest, who co-developed the RSA
algorithms with Shamir, used the stage of the annual panel to call
for an industry effort to create a next-generation hashing algorithm
to replace todaybs SHA-1.
In recent weeks, Shamir used a directional antenna and digital
oscilloscope to monitor power use by RFID tags while they were being
read. Patterns in power use could be analyzed to determine when the
tag received correct and incorrect password bits, he said.
"The reflected signals contain a lot of information," Shamir said.
"We can see the point where the chip is unhappy if a wrong bit is
sent and consumes more power from the environmentb&to write a note to
RAM that it has received a bad bit and to ignore the rest of the
string," he added.

"I havenbt tested all RFID tags, but we did test the biggest brand
and it is totally unprotected," Shamir said. Using this approach, "a
cellphone has all the ingredients you need to conduct an attack and
compromise all the RFID tags in the vicinity," he added.

Shamir said the pressure to get tags down to five cents each has
forced designers to eliminate any security features, a shortcoming
that needs to be addressed in next-generation products.

Separately, cryptographers discussed the weaknesses in the
fundamental SHA-1 hashing algorithm that were announced at the
groupbs panel in 2005. "That was a real wake up call for
cryptographers," said Rivest, who is also professor of electrical
engineering and computer science at MIT.

[snip]
Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com>

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Feb 15 03:51:36 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 12:51:36 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Whistleblower says NSA violations
  bigger]
Message-ID: <20060215115136.GN3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Feb 15 10:37:14 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 13:37:14 -0500
Subject: [Clips] A New Surveillance Act
Message-ID: <p0623099dc019255ae2fe@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 13:36:26 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] A New Surveillance Act
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

  <http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB113996743590074183.html>

  The Wall Street Journal

  February 15, 2006


  COMMENTARY


  DOW JONES REPRINTS


  A New Surveillance Act

  By RICHARD A. POSNER

  February 15, 2006; Page A16

  The best, and probably the only, way to end the debate over the propriety
  of the National Security Agency's conducting electronic surveillance
  outside the framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is for
  Congress to enact a new statute.

  The administration is right to point out that FISA, enacted in 1978 -- long
  before the danger of global terrorism was recognized and electronic
  surveillance was transformed by the digital revolution -- is dangerously
  obsolete. It retains value as a framework for monitoring the communications
  of known terrorists, but it is hopeless as a framework for detecting
  terrorists. It requires that surveillance be conducted pursuant to warrants
  based on probable cause to believe that the target of surveillance is a
  terrorist, when the desperate need is to find out who is a terrorist.

  Critics of the NSA's program point out that surveillance not cabined by a
  probable-cause requirement produces many false positives (intercepts that
  prove upon investigation to have no intelligence value). That is not a
  sound criticism.

  National security intelligence is a search for the needle in a haystack.
  The intelligence services must cast a wide net with a fine mesh to catch
  the clues that may enable the next attack to be prevented. The initial
  trolling for clues is done by computer search programs, which do not invade
  privacy because search programs are not sentient beings. The programs pick
  out a tiny percentage of communications to be read by (human) intelligence
  officers, and a small subset of these will turn out to have intelligence
  value and spur an investigation. Some of these may be communications to
  which a U.S. citizen is a party.

  The program is vital, given the terrorist menace, which is real and not
  abating. It may be thanks to such programs, as well as to other
  counterterrorist operations, that we have been spared a repetition of 9/11.
  We mustn't let our guard down, basking in the false assurance created by
  the lapse of time since the last attack. But the legality of the program
  has been called into question, and fears have been expressed about its
  impact on civil liberties.

  These concerns can be addressed without gutting the program. But not by
  relaxing the standard for obtaining a warrant. Instead of requiring
  probable cause to believe the target a terrorist, FISA could be amended to
  require merely reasonable suspicion. But even that would be too
  restrictive. And the lower the standard for getting a warrant, the less of
  a filter a warrant requirement creates. If all that the government is
  required to state in its application is that it thinks an interception
  might yield intelligence information, judges will have no basis for
  refusing to grant the application.

  * * *

  It is a mistake to think that the only way to prevent abuses of a
  surveillance program is by requiring warrants. Congress could enact a
  statute that would subject warrantless electronic surveillance to tight
  oversight and specific legal controls, as follows:

  1. Oversight: The new statute would --

  (a) Create a steering committee for national security electronic
  surveillance composed of the attorney general, the director of national
  intelligence, the secretary of homeland security (chairman), and a senior
  or retired federal judge or justice appointed by the chief justice of the
  United States. The committee would monitor all such surveillance to assure
  compliance with the Constitution and laws.

  (b) Require the NSA to submit to the FISA court, every six months, a list
  of the names and other identifying information of all persons whose
  communications had been intercepted without a warrant in the previous six
  months, with a brief statement of why these individuals had been targeted.
  If the court concluded that an interception had been inappropriate, it
  would so report to the steering committee and the congressional
  intelligence committees.

  2. Specific controls: The statute would --

  (a) Authorize "national security electronic surveillance" outside FISA's
  existing framework, provided that Congress declared a national emergency
  and the president certified that such surveillance was necessary in the
  national interest. Warrants would continue to be required for all physical
  searches and for all electronic surveillance for which FISA's existing
  probable-cause requirement could be satisfied.

  (b) Define "national security" narrowly, excluding "ecoterrorism,"
  animal-rights terrorism, and other forms of political violence that, though
  criminal and deplorable, do not endanger the nation.

  (c) Sunset after five years, or sooner if the declaration of national
  emergency was rescinded.

  (d) Forbid any use of intercepted information for any purpose other than
  "national security" as defined in the statute (point b above). Thus the
  information could not be used as evidence or leads in a prosecution for
  ordinary crime. There would be heavy criminal penalties for violating this
  provision, to allay concern that "wild talk" picked up by electronic
  surveillance would lead to criminal investigations unrelated to national
  security.

  (e) Require responsible officials to certify to the FISA court annually
  that there had been no violations of the statute during the preceding year.
  False certification would be punishable as perjury.

  (f) Bar lawsuits challenging the legality of the NSA's current warrantless
  surveillance program. Such lawsuits would distract officials from their
  important duties, to no purpose given the new statute.

  Mr. Posner is a judge on the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and a
  senior lecturer in law at the University of Chicago Law School.

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From dave at farber.net  Wed Feb 15 11:50:50 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 14:50:50 -0500
Subject: [IP] 325,000 Names on Terrorism List
Message-ID: <mailman.1590.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



-------- Original Message --------
Subject: 325,000 Names on Terrorism List
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 11:25:33 -0500
From: Daz <articles.daz at gmail.com>
To: David Farber <dave at farber.net>


325,000 Names on Terrorism List
Rights Groups Say Database May Include Innocent People

By Walter Pincus and Dan Eggen
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, February 15, 2006; Page A01

The National Counterterrorism Center maintains a central repository of
325,000 names of international terrorism suspects or people who
allegedly aid them, a number that has more than quadrupled since the
fall of 2003, according to counterterrorism officials.

The list kept by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) -- created
in 2004 to be the primary U.S. terrorism intelligence agency -- contains
a far greater number of international terrorism suspects and associated
names in a single government database than has previously been
disclosed. Because the same person may appear under different spellings
or aliases, the true number of people is estimated to be more than
200,000, according to NCTC officials.

<...snip...>

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/14/AR2006021402
125.html?referrer=email&referrer=email>

-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
  http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Feb 15 07:04:46 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 16:04:46 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] READ UK gov wants MS to give them a
  backdoor into Windows Vista ?! READ]
Message-ID: <20060215150446.GV3873@leitl.org>

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: UK gov wants MS to give them a backdoor into Windows Vista ?!?
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 09:16:15 -0500
From: Richard Forno <rforno at infowarrior.org>
To: Blaster <rforno at infowarrior.org>
CC: Dave Farber <dave at farber.net>

UK holds Microsoft security talks
By Ollie Stone-Lee
BBC News political reporter
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk_politics/4713018.stm

UK officials are talking to Microsoft over fears the new version of Windows
could make it harder for police to read suspects' computer files.

Windows Vista is due to be rolled out later this year. Cambridge academic
Ross Anderson told MPs it would mean more computer files being encrypted.

He urged the government to look at establishing "back door" ways of getting
around encryptions.

The Home Office later told the BBC News website it is in talks with
Microsoft.

Professor Anderson, professor of security engineering at Cambridge
University, was giving evidence to the Commons home affairs select committee
about time limits on holding terrorism suspects without charge.

He said: "From later this year, the encryption landscape is going to change
with the release of Microsoft Vista."

The system uses BitLocker Drive Encryption through a chip called TPM
(Trusted Platform Module) in the computer's motherboard.

It is partly aimed at preventing people from downloading unlicensed films or
media.

"This means that by default your hard disk is encrypted by using a key that
you cannot physically get at...

"An unfortunate side effect from law enforcement is it would be technically
fairly seriously difficult to dig encrypted material out of the system if it
has been set up competently."

Professor Anderson said people were discussing the idea of making computer
vendors ensure "back door keys" to encrypted material were made available.

The Home Office should enter talks with Microsoft now rather than when the
system is introduced, he said.

He said encryption tools generally were either good or useless.

"If they are good, you either guess the password or give up," he said.

The committee heard that suspects could claim to have lost their encryption
key - although juries could decide to let this count this against them in
the same way as refusing to answer questions in a police interview.

A Home Office spokesman said: "The Home Office has already been in touch
with Microsoft concerning this matter and is working closely with them."

Increased awareness about high-tech crime and computer crime has prompted
the Home Office to talk to IT companies regularly about new software.

Government officials look at the security of new systems, whether they are
easy for the general public to hack into and how the police can access
material in them.

Preventing tampering

On its Windows Vista website, Microsoft says Bitlocker Drive Encryption
"provides considerable off-line data and operating system protection for
your computer".

"BitLocker ensures that data stored on a computer running Windows Vista is
not revealed if the machine is tampered with when the installed operating
system is offline," it says.

The system, part of what is called "trusted computing" mechanisms, is
designed to stop malicious programs being installed surreptitiously on
computers.

The Trusted Computing Group has been working for some years on a
hardware-based system which is built into the motherboards of many
Intel-based computers.

But most people will not be able to use its features until Microsoft Windows
Vista is launched.

Critics say the companies behind most trusted computing want to use digital
rights management to ensure users cannot use programs they have not
approved.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk_politics/4713018.stm



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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Feb 15 15:38:45 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 18:38:45 -0500
Subject: Judge: Firm not negligent in failure to encrypt data
Message-ID: <p062309e5c0196c04733d@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 18:38:13 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: Judge: Firm not negligent in failure to encrypt data

  <http://news.com.com/2102-1030_3-6039645.html?tag=st.util.print>

  CNET News


  Judge: Firm not negligent in failure to encrypt data

  By Declan McCullagh


http://news.com.com/Judge+Firm+not+negligent+in+failure+to+encrypt+data/2100-1030_3-6039645.html


  Story last modified Wed Feb 15 06:20:32 PST 2006



  A federal court has thrown out a lawsuit that accused a student-loan
  provider of negligence in failing to encrypt a customer database that was
  subsequently stolen.

  Stacy Lawton Guin, a customer of Brazos Higher Education Service, sued the
  corporation on the grounds that encryption should be used as a routine
  security precaution.

  But U.S. District Judge Richard Kyle in Minnesota dismissed the case last
  week, saying Brazos had a written security policy and other "proper
  safeguards" for customers' information and that it acted "with reasonable
  care" even without encrypting the database.

  ID fraud help

  Identity fraud isn't that likely to happen to you, but it does occur. CNET
  News.com has compiled a resource center with background information,
  statistics, and tips. A recent debit-card theft case has also drawn
  attention, and in response we've created a list of frequently-asked
  questions. Security protection is also being discussed at this week's RSA
  Conference.

  The case arose as a result of a burglary at the Silver Spring, Md., home of
  John Wright, a Brazos financial analyst who worked remotely and analyzed
  loan portfolios. During that September 2004 burglary, a laptop with
  personal information about Brazos customers was stolen.

  Brazos hired a private investigative firm, Global Options, to recover the
  laptop, but this was unsuccessful. The judge noted that there was no
  evidence that the database on the stolen laptop was used for identity
  fraud. After the theft, Brazos contacted approximately 550,000 of its
  customers to let them know of the situation and to suggest they place a
  security alert on their credit bureau files.

  Even though he had not actually been harmed as a result of the theft, Guin
  argued, Brazos was required by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to encrypt
  personal information and limit its disclosure. The 1999 law requires
  financial service companies "to protect the security and confidentiality of
  customers' nonpublic personal information."

  Judge Kyle disagreed, saying that the house was in a relatively low-crime
  neighborhood and that the law does not specifically mandate encryption.
  "The GLB Act does not prohibit someone from working with sensitive data on
  a laptop computer in a home office," Kyle wrote. "Despite Guin's persistent
  argument that any nonpublic personal information stored on a laptop
  computer should be encrypted, the GLB Act does not contain any such
  requirement."

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Feb 15 14:33:29 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 23:33:29 +0100
Subject: [dewayne@warpspeed.com: [Dewayne-Net] Cellphone could crack
  RFID tags, says cryptographer]
Message-ID: <20060215223329.GD3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne at warpspeed.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Feb 15 14:41:26 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 23:41:26 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] 325,000 Names on Terrorism List]
Message-ID: <20060215224126.GH3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Feb 16 05:44:33 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 08:44:33 -0500
Subject: SafeNet to Buy nCipher?
Message-ID: <p062309cec01a3234e767@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 08:37:16 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: SafeNet to Buy nCipher?


<http://www.techworld.com/blogs/index.cfm?blogID=1&entryID=144&printerfriendly=1>


  www.techworld.com : the UK's infrastructure & network knowledge centre



  Decrypting nCipher

  John Dunn
  February 16, 2006

  Well done Alex van Someren, the cheery and mightily on-the-ball CEO and
  co-founder of Cambridge encryption company nCipher. News reached us last
  week that the company is in talks to be acquired by SafeNet for something
  around the $150 million mark.

  I say "encryption company" even though I know van Someren wouldn't like it
  to be pigeonholed in such a narrow manner.

  When the company was founded a decade ago by him and his brother, Nicko van
  Someren, encryption look like a geek's last refuge. Latterly, it has turned
  out to be a decent business as people have woken up to the fundamental
  power of the concept to stop the malevolent running off with the most
  valuable thing any company has in its possession - information.

  We understand that CEO Van Someren will not stay with the company though
  his brother - considered the engineering whiz - will. Does Alex have
  another company in him as some have speculated? We will see. Techworld
  interviewed him a while back, so judge for yourself.

  Another good company bites the dust or will SafeNet confound the law that
  seems to have ruled technology takeovers of recent years and take nCipher's
  intriguing technology onwards and upwards?

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Feb 15 23:51:11 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 08:51:11 +0100
Subject: /. [Canadians To Douse Chinese Firewall]
Message-ID: <20060216075111.GK3873@leitl.org>

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/02/16/0334232
Posted by: samzenpus, on 2006-02-16 04:33:00

   [1]FrenchyinOntario writes "Researchers at a University of Toronto lab
   are getting ready to release a computer program called Psiphon, which
   will [2]allow Internet users in free countries to help users in more
   restrictive countries (like China, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, etc.) to
   access the Internet by getting past the firewalls and hosing "rubber
   hose cryptoanalysis" which is a drawback of other anti-firewall
   programs as it reveals a user's tracks if discovered by authorities.
   Operating through port 443, Psiphon will allow users in monitoring
   countries the ability to send an encrypted request for certain
   information, and for users in secure countries to send it back to
   them. The UofT's Citizen Lab hopes to debut Psiphon at the
   international congress of the free speech group PEN in May."

References

   1. http://www.deifyme.com/
   2.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060213.gtnetcops13/BNSto
ry/Technology//

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Feb 16 01:09:38 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 10:09:38 +0100
Subject: [some@list: Questions about the illegal wiretaps]
Message-ID: <20060216090938.GX3873@leitl.org>

[from some at list]

More answers:

Andrew A. G**** wrote:
>They *can*, but their typical infrastructure is not set up to handle
>this.  A system like this isn't maintenance-free.  This list should know
>that better than most.  Besides, the intel has to output to a human
>eventually.  You can't just have a machine intercept a call, determine
>that it's a threat and send out a Predator drone to kill the threat
>without any human intervention.

No, but NSA's job is just the first part of that.  They don't target
drones, or anything like that.

>The FBI has said that they were swamped.  How many man-hours were
>involved in this in the FBI side?

yes, this is definitely a cost.  And the FBI finally said "enough"!  I
kinda wonder if this was due to miscommunication, and the FBI thought
they were getting finished analytical product.

>>> 3. According to the Washington Post, we had a backlog of
>>>    hundreds of thousands of hours of untranslated wiretaps. Do
>>>    we still have this backlog?
>>Yes.
>>
>>> 4. What's the point of conducting wiretaps when we can't
>>>    translate them?
>>None.
>
>That's pretty damning.

This is how the Intelligence Community works.  Collection is considered
the A#1 task, and they are inveterate packrats.  It's far easier to fill
hard drives with junk than to make active use of it.  Sad, but true.

>>> 8. Why didn't you ask for more translators, knowing that FBI
>>>    Director Mueller asked that all urgent translations be done
>>>    in 12 hours?
>>The unfortunate issue is not more translators, but more TS/SCI-cleared
>>translators with an active Counterterrorism- and lifestyle-poly who
>>are fluent in Arabic at level 4+ (nb:  this is a VERY small set of
>>individuals)
>
>This program's been running for something like three years.  In that
>time, couldn't that money have been used to encourage people to be
>trained for this, and then actually train them?

Well, realistically:  no, probably not.  The US is grieviously far
behind in this.  There is little or no chance in three years that
someone who can pass the security screen can achieve the necessary
language proficiency level in say, Dari or Uzbek, in 3 years -- meaning,
good enough to translate, with decent accuracy and speed, colloquial,
accented telephone chatter -- regardless of the amount of $ you throw at
the problem.

There are already a series of bonuses for military and civilian
government employees who can pass language proficiency tests, so it
isn't as though we aren't trying.

>So the answer to a fuck-up is to make it a clusterfuck?

I wasn't trying to justify it, just answer some of the questions you
posed.  I warned you they might not make sense when you received them :-)

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dghdp at cameventi.it  Thu Feb 16 14:18:23 2006
From: dghdp at cameventi.it (Donnell L. Workman)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 14:18:23 -0800
Subject: addend dortmund may escritoire
Message-ID: <906378.3513997528050.542409839654.CEWC.0816@capacious>

edmonton !summate oncommemorate somecarrot thechurchgo
!roadblock butdutchman ,toothbrush !octave
asavagery it'sleadsman be

vacuous !colatitude asalvage itantedate aaccuse
someammonia somealike notnewcomer butkeg
andarturo it'scargill trybumptious somebellamy
onbattlefield oraccessory onpam abushel
theprocedural mayauschwitz orepochal notcrowley
itreptilian seepolarograph notsanguine !
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From DaveHowe at gmx.co.uk  Thu Feb 16 07:02:25 2006
From: DaveHowe at gmx.co.uk (Dave Howe)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 15:02:25 +0000
Subject: /. [Canadians To Douse Chinese Firewall]
In-Reply-To: <20060216075111.GK3873@leitl.org>
References: <20060216075111.GK3873@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <43F49401.9030002@gmx.co.uk>

Eugen Leitl wrote:
> Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/02/16/0334232
> Posted by: samzenpus, on 2006-02-16 04:33:00
> 
>    [1]FrenchyinOntario writes "Researchers at a University of Toronto lab
>    are getting ready to release a computer program called Psiphon, which
>    will [2]allow Internet users in free countries to help users in more
>    restrictive countries (like China, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, etc.) to
>    access the Internet by getting past the firewalls and hosing "rubber
>    hose cryptoanalysis" which is a drawback of other anti-firewall
>    programs as it reveals a user's tracks if discovered by authorities.
>    Operating through port 443, Psiphon will allow users in monitoring
>    countries the ability to send an encrypted request for certain
>    information, and for users in secure countries to send it back to
>    them. The UofT's Citizen Lab hopes to debut Psiphon at the
>    international congress of the free speech group PEN in May."
This anything like the old "triangle boy" service?




From coderman at gmail.com  Thu Feb 16 15:22:03 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 15:22:03 -0800
Subject: [Clips] Skype Use May Make Eavesdropping Passe
In-Reply-To: <p0623098bc01ab16ab8c0@68.167.57.91>
References: <p0623098bc01ab16ab8c0@68.167.57.91>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602161522k18ce6af1j7cf80d103aef47eb@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/16/06, R. A. Hettinga <rah at shipwright.com> wrote:
> ... the fastest-growing technology for Internet calls appears to
>   have the potential to make eavesdropping a thing of the past.
> ...
>   Luxembourg-based Skype
> ...
>   Skype keys are 256 bits long - twice as
>   long as the 128-bit keys used to send credit card numbers over the
>   Internet. The security is much more than doubled - in theory, Skype's
>   256-bit keys would take trillions of times longer to crack than 128-bit
>   keys, which are themselves regarded as practically impossible to break by
>   current means.
> ...
>   Security experts are not completely convinced that Skype is as secure as it
>   seems, because the company hasn't made its technology open to review. In
>   the cryptographic community, opening software blueprints to outsiders who
>   can point out errors is considered to be the safest way to go. Because of
>   the complex mathematics involved, a properly designed cryptographic system
>   can be unbreakable even if its method is known to outsiders.
> ...
>   Kurt Sauer, Skype's chief security officer, ... said Skype "cooperates fully with
>   all lawful requests from
>   relevant authorities." He would not give particulars on the type of support
>   provided.
> ...
>   "What you and I are saying is much less important than the fact that you
>   and I are talking," Schneier says. "Against traffic analysis, encryption is
>   irrelevant."

yeah, better than nothing, but how far do you trust a faceless corp
peddling closed source warez?  (same goes for Google, etc.  the recent
announcement to make zPhone open source is a big win IMHO)

i'd love to see a high order analysis of these 256bit nonces used for
keying skype.  use of entropy on windoze has traditionally been pretty
poor.

my favorite example to date: http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/ -
"Strange Attractors and TCP/IP Sequence Number Analysis"

p.s.  speaking of google, can we all agree they are well on the path
of evil?  logging all chats?  multiple computer search?  glad i only
use gmail for public comms...




From feis at ravenndragon.net  Thu Feb 16 14:34:40 2006
From: feis at ravenndragon.net (feis)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 17:34:40 -0500
Subject: Sen.: White House Agrees to Spy Law Change
Message-ID: <mailman.1591.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Sen.: White House Agrees to Spy Law Change
By KATHERINE SHRADER, Associated Press Writer
1 hour, 35 minutes ago

Senate Intelligence Chairman Pat Roberts said he has worked out an agreement
with the White House to change U.S. law regarding the National Security
Agency's warrantless surveillance program and provide more information about
it to Congress.

"We are trying to get some movement, and we have a clear indication of that
movement," Roberts, R-Kan., said.

Without offering specifics, Roberts said the agreement with the White House
provides "a fix" to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and offers more
briefings to the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The deal comes as the committee was set to have a meeting Thursday about
whether to open an investigation into the hotly disputed program. Roberts
indicated the deal may eliminate the need for such an inquiry. Democrats have
been demanding an investigation but some Republicans don't want to tangle the
panel in a testy election-year probe.

"Whether or not an investigation is the right thing to do at this particular
time, I am not sure," Roberts told reporters while heading into the meeting.

The White House was not immediately available for comment on Roberts'
statement.

Earlier in the day, White House spokesman Scott McClellan hinted at a "good
discussion going on" with lawmakers and praised in particular "some good
ideas" presented by Sen. Mike DeWine (news, bio, voting record). The Ohio
Republican has suggested the FISA law be changed to accommodate the NSA
program.

However, McClellan left the impression that any deal would not allow for
significant changes. He said the White House continued to maintain that Bush
does not need Congress' approval to authorize the warrantless eavesdropping
and that the president would resist any legislation that might compromise the
program.

"There's kind of a high bar to overcome," McClellan said. "We think there's
some good ideas, but we have not seen actual legislation."

Separately, the Justice Department has strongly discouraged the Senate
Judiciary Committee from calling former Attorney General John Ashcroft and
his
deputy to testify about the surveillance program, saying they won't have new
information for Congress about it.

Just as Attorney General Alberto Gonzales could not talk about the
administration's internal deliberations when he appeared before the committee
earlier this month, neither can Ashcroft nor his former No. 2, James Comey,
Assistant Attorney General William Moschella said in a letter to Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter, R-Pa.

The letter, written Wednesday, was obtained by The Associated Press.

"In light of their inability to discuss such confidential information, along
with the fact that the attorney general has already provided the executive
branch position on the legal authority for the program, we do not believe
that
Messrs. Ashcroft and Comey would be in a position to provide any new
information to the committee," Moschella wrote. He was responding to
Specter's
request that the two men testify this month.

While Moschella indicated their testimony wouldn't be of value, he did not
say
the committee could not call Ashcroft and Comey to appear.

The Judiciary Committee has been looking into the legality of the National
Security Agency's program. In a heated daylong hearing on Feb. 6, four
Republicans joined the committee's Democrats in raising questions about
whether President Bush went too far in authorizing the wiretapping without
court warrants.

Specter wants the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review
the program's constitutionality.

Reports have indicated that Comey and others had reservations about the
program in 2004. White House Chief of Staff Andy Card and Gonzales, then the
White House counsel, visited Ashcroft about those issues while Ashcroft was
in
the hospital for gallstone pancreatitis.

___

Associated Press Writer Mark Sherman contributed to this report.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060216/ap_on_go_co/eavesdropping_4&printer=1;_yl
t=A86.I2Ct.vRD4L0AqQWMwfIE;_ylu=X3oDMTA3MXN1bHE0BHNlYwN0bWE-


---------------------------------------------------------------------
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Feb 16 14:47:29 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 17:47:29 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Skype Use May Make Eavesdropping Passe
Message-ID: <p0623098bc01ab16ab8c0@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 17:46:08 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Skype Use May Make Eavesdropping Passe
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com


<http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2006/02/16/financial/f124235S76.DTL&type=printable>



  Skype Use May Make Eavesdropping Passe

  - By PETER SVENSSON, AP Technology Writer

  Thursday, February 16, 2006

  (02-16) 12:42 PST NEW YORK, (AP) --

  Even as the U.S. government is embroiled in a debate over the legality of
  wiretapping, the fastest-growing technology for Internet calls appears to
  have the potential to make eavesdropping a thing of the past.

  Skype, the Internet calling service recently acquired by eBay Inc.,
  provides free voice calls and instant messaging between users. Unlike other
  Internet voice services, Skype calls are encrypted - encoded using complex
  mathematical operations. That apparently makes them impossible to snoop on,
  though the company leaves the issue somewhat open to question.

  Skype is certainly not the first application for encrypted communications
  on the Internet. Secure e-mail and instant messaging programs have been
  available for years at little or no cost.

  But to a large extent, Internet users haven't felt a need for privacy that
  outweighed the extra effort needed to use encryption. In particular, e-mail
  programs such as Pretty Good Privacy have been considered too cumbersome by
  many.

  And because such applications have had limited popularity, their mere use
  can draw attention. With Skype, however, criminals, terrorists and other
  people who really want to keep their communications private are
  indistinguishable from those who just want to call their mothers.

  "Skype became popular not because it was secure, but because it was easy to
  use," said Bruce Schneier, chief technology officer at Counterpane Internet
  Security Inc.

  Luxembourg-based Skype was founded by the Swedish and Estonian
  entrepreneurs who created the Kazaa file-sharing network, which has been
  the subject of several court actions by the music industry.

  Skype's software for personal computers is distributed for free. Members
  pay nothing to talk to each other over PCs but pay fees to connect to
  people who are using telephones. Skype software is also being built into
  cell-phone-like portable devices that will work within range of wireless
  Internet "hot spots."

  While still somewhat marginal in the United States, Skype had 75 million
  registered users worldwide at the end of 2005. Typically, 3 million to 4
  million users are online at the same time.

  Skype calls whip around the Internet encrypted with "keys," which
  essentially are very long numbers. Skype keys are 256 bits long - twice as
  long as the 128-bit keys used to send credit card numbers over the
  Internet. The security is much more than doubled - in theory, Skype's
  256-bit keys would take trillions of times longer to crack than 128-bit
  keys, which are themselves regarded as practically impossible to break by
  current means.

  "It is a pretty secure form of communication, which if you're talking to
  your mistress you really appreciate, but if Al Qaida is talking over Skype
  you have probably a different view," said Monty Bannerman, chief executive
  of Verso Technologies Inc. His company makes equipment for Internet service
  providers, including software that can identify and block Skype calls.

  Security experts are not completely convinced that Skype is as secure as it
  seems, because the company hasn't made its technology open to review. In
  the cryptographic community, opening software blueprints to outsiders who
  can point out errors is considered to be the safest way to go. Because of
  the complex mathematics involved, a properly designed cryptographic system
  can be unbreakable even if its method is known to outsiders.

  But according to Schneier, if Skype's encryption is weaker than believed,
  it still would stymie the kind of broad eavesdropping that the National
  Security Agency is reputed to be performing, in which it scans thousands or
  millions of calls at a time for certain phrases. Even a weakly encrypted
  call would force an eavesdropper to spend hours of computer time cracking
  it.

  Kurt Sauer, Skype's chief security officer, said there are no "back doors"
  that could let a government bypass the encryption on a call. At the same
  time, he said Skype "cooperates fully with all lawful requests from
  relevant authorities." He would not give particulars on the type of support
  provided.

  The U.S. Justice Department did not respond to questions about its views on
  Skype's encryption.

  Verso's Bannerman notes that Skype calls are decrypted if they enter the
  traditional telephone network to communicate with regular phones, so a
  conversation could be intercepted there. Skype does not reveal how many of
  its calls run on the phone network.

  "There are other ways of getting at the conversation than brute-force
  decryption of the hacking," Bannerman said.

  Schneier believes that eavesdropping on the content of calls is not as
  important to the NSA as tracking the calls, which is still possible with
  Skype. For instance, if a particular account were associated with a
  terrorist or criminal, it would be possible to identify his conversation
  partners.

  "What you and I are saying is much less important than the fact that you
  and I are talking," Schneier says. "Against traffic analysis, encryption is
  irrelevant."

  Steve Bannerman, vice president of marketing at Narus Inc. (he is unrelated
  to Verso's Bannerman), said his company's systems enable wiretapping of
  voice calls routed over the Internet, but not those from Skype.

  The most that Narus' technology, which is used by telecommunications
  carriers, can do is identify what type of Skype traffic - voice call, text
  chat or video conference - is being used, and record the scrambled data for
  law enforcement officials. From there, he said, "who knows what those guys
  can do?"

  ___

  On the Net:

  A primer on public-key cryptography:

  www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id2165


  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Feb 16 15:31:48 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 18:31:48 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Skype Use May Make Eavesdropping Passe
In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60602161522k18ce6af1j7cf80d103aef47eb@mail.gmail.com>
References: <p0623098bc01ab16ab8c0@68.167.57.91> 
  <4ef5fec60602161522k18ce6af1j7cf80d103aef47eb@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <p06230995c01abbc32592@[68.167.57.91]>

At 3:22 PM -0800 2/16/06, coderman wrote:
>google

goolag

We've seen it all ready, but it's still funny.

Don' be evil, now, y'all,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mvdsvremeubiw at yahoo.com  Thu Feb 16 18:34:48 2006
From: mvdsvremeubiw at yahoo.com (Lakisha Biggs)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 18:34:48 -0800
Subject: trenchant marx
Message-ID: <17800223722360.47715702@conic>

not duplex it's newsboy , cumulate some solo , premature some chalkboard it's apply 
the tabulate be rockwell in electrocardiograph on monongahela , augustine and analyses be craze 
a cesare a fiddlestick or lingua but hopple but jettison. 
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From jewell at la.hollywood.com  Thu Feb 16 20:43:45 2006
From: jewell at la.hollywood.com (Jesse Jackson)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 22:43:45 -0600
Subject: Your account #17132
Message-ID: <532e132e.9601307@69.60.117.34>

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From slundh at foxtastic.com  Thu Feb 16 21:05:39 2006
From: slundh at foxtastic.com (Mark Owen)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 23:05:39 -0600
Subject: Pre-approved Application #TMJ68751112
Message-ID: <955c224c.4575589@msn.com>

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From silezab23 at btwtn.com  Thu Feb 16 21:23:02 2006
From: silezab23 at btwtn.com (Chester Kincaid)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 23:23:02 -0600
Subject: Lowest rate approved
Message-ID: <323y378j.1295099@msn.com>

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From andreap25 at blockandbouterie.com  Thu Feb 16 21:25:40 2006
From: andreap25 at blockandbouterie.com (Sharon Singer)
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 23:25:40 -0600
Subject: Lowest rate approved
Message-ID: <573y348z.5001850@69.60.117.34>

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From chile.crudensgoq at gmail.com  Fri Feb 17 07:08:56 2006
From: chile.crudensgoq at gmail.com (Mable Morrison)
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2006 14:08:56 -0100
Subject: Improved sexual desire
Message-ID: <200602171306.k1HD65Vt031375@proton.jfet.org>

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From: waldo.hass at gmx.de (Charmaine Ash)
Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2006 09:49:00 +0300
Subject: sexy baby and bad erection? 
Message-ID: <200602181149.k1IBnRpP027046@proton.jfet.org>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Feb 18 01:15:40 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2006 10:15:40 +0100
Subject: [feis@ravenndragon.net: Sen.: White House Agrees to Spy Law
  Change]
Message-ID: <20060218091540.GR3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from feis <feis at ravenndragon.net> -----


From measl at mfn.org  Sat Feb 18 21:17:01 2006
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2006 23:17:01 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [feis@ravenndragon.net: Sen.: White House Agrees to Spy Law
    Change]
In-Reply-To: <20060219041727.GA11558@arion.hive>
References: <20060218091540.GR3873@leitl.org>
  <20060219041727.GA11558@arion.hive>
Message-ID: <20060218231639.J36064@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sun, 19 Feb 2006, Justin wrote:

> Translation: Cut us into the action, and we'll sweep this one under the
> rug.
>
> I feel ill.  What ever happened to separation of powers?

All your government are belong to crooks.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF


'The right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments
it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest
limits possible. Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the right of
the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext
whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the
brink of destruction.'

St. George Tucker




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Feb 18 20:27:10 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2006 23:27:10 -0500
Subject: [Clips] "Intelligence"
Message-ID: <p062309b0c01da41b9daf@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2006 23:06:42 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] "Intelligence"
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com


<http://www.sltrib.com/portlet/article/html/fragments/print_article.jsp?article=3522545>






  Article Last Updated: 2/18/2006 01:05 AM


  News of the weird


  Salt Lake Tribune

  "Intelligence": An exhaustive report in December on CIA operatives who
  staffed the so-called ''rendition'' program, secretly transferring
  suspected terrorists from U.S. custody to foreign governments, revealed
  sometimes-sloppy undercover work of the agents. In one rendition, in Milan,
  Italy, covert agents failed to remove their cell phones' batteries, thus
  enabling them to be electronically tracked even though the phones were off.
  Also, one clandestine operative left a clear trail of her whereabouts
  because, even though she booked herself at foreign hotels under aliases,
  she insisted that frequent-flier miles earned at the hotels be credited to
  her personal, non-secret frequent-flier account.





  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From YLQOJG at yahoo.com  Sat Feb 18 17:43:04 2006
From: YLQOJG at yahoo.com (Damien Lane)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 03:43:04 +0200
Subject: You Need This Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <68OJ87FE.0O24.YLQOJG@yahoo.com>



Huge selection of meds available
at attractive prices. 
Highest quality assured.

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ADli




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Sat Feb 18 20:17:27 2006
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 04:17:27 +0000
Subject: [feis@ravenndragon.net: Sen.: White House Agrees to Spy Law
  Change]
In-Reply-To: <20060218091540.GR3873@leitl.org>
References: <20060218091540.GR3873@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <20060219041727.GA11558@arion.hive>

On 2006-02-18T10:15:40+0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> ----- Forwarded message from feis <feis at ravenndragon.net> -----
> 
> From: feis <feis at ravenndragon.net>
> Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 17:34:40 -0500
> To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
> Subject: Sen.: White House Agrees to Spy Law Change
> X-Mailer: AnkyMail
> 
> Sen.: White House Agrees to Spy Law Change
> By KATHERINE SHRADER, Associated Press Writer
> 1 hour, 35 minutes ago
> 
> Senate Intelligence Chairman Pat Roberts said he has worked out an agreement
> with the White House to change U.S. law regarding the National Security
> Agency's warrantless surveillance program and provide more information about
> it to Congress.
> 
> "We are trying to get some movement, and we have a clear indication of that
> movement," Roberts, R-Kan., said.
> 
> Without offering specifics, Roberts said the agreement with the White House
> provides "a fix" to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and offers more
> briefings to the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Translation: Cut us into the action, and we'll sweep this one under the
rug.

I feel ill.  What ever happened to separation of powers?

-- 
The six phases of a project:
I. Enthusiasm.         IV. Search for the Guilty.
II. Disillusionment.   V. Punishment of the Innocent.
III. Panic.            VI. Praise & Honor for the Nonparticipants.




From dave at farber.net  Sun Feb 19 12:16:48 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 15:16:48 -0500
Subject: [IP] more on "if you are not doing anything wrong, why
 should you worry about it
Message-ID: <mailman.1592.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [IP] more on "if you are not doing anything wrong, why
should you worry about it?"]
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 15:10:17 -0500
From: Lee Revell <rlrevell at joe-job.com>
To: dave at farber.net
CC: ip at v2.listbox.com, EEKid at aol.com
References: <e3.25a38acd.3129dbe2 at aol.com>
<27DC3839-A6BF-4058-B00E-C4001E8719D5 at farber.net>

Here's another one from Chicago, about requiring cameras in private
businesses.  Is there a coordinated PR campaign afoot?

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-14-chicago-cameras_x.htm

CHICAGO b Surveillance cameras b aimed at government buildings, train
platforms and intersections here b might soon be required at corner
taverns and swanky nightclubs.

Mayor Richard Daley wants to require bars open until 4 a.m. to install
security cameras that can identify people entering and leaving the
building. Other businesses open longer than 12 hours a day, including
convenience stores, eventually would have to do the same.

Daley's proposed city ordinance adds a dimension to security measures
installed after the Sept. 11 attacks.

The proliferation of security cameras b especially if the government
requires them in private businesses b troubles some civil liberties
advocates.

"There is no reason to mandate all of those cameras unless you one day
see them being linked up to the city's 911 system," says Ed Yohnka of
the Illinois American Civil Liberties Union. "We have perhaps reached
that moment of critical mass when people ... want to have a dialogue
about how much of this is appropriate."

[...]

On Sun, 2006-02-19 at 09:52 -0500, David Farber wrote:
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> From: EEkid at aol.com
> Date: February 19, 2006 9:34:10 AM EST
> To: dave at farber.net
> Subject: Re: [IP] "if you are not doing anything wrong, why should
> you worry about it?"]
>
>
>
> It sounds to me like many of our public officials are trying to mimic
> the public surveillance systems used in the UK.  For many years, I've
> often wondered why they tolerated such intrusions into their lives.
> Now, seeing how slowly and quietly such systems appear, I understand.
>
> Since 9/11, we have seen tremendous change in how our government and
> public officials view our civil rights.  What was a completely
> unacceptable governmental intrusion 5-10 years ago, is viewed as
> essential or acceptable today.  In my humble opinion, I believe this
> slow incepid creep is as good a reason as any to stop the
> surveilence, monitoring and intrusion nonsense now.
>
> Today, we wouldn't want the government listening to our phone
> conversations or using technology to monitor our every movement
> around town.  Our government to my knowledge isn't currently doing
> such things.  But what happen's 5-10 years from now?  When all of
> these easily exploited technologies are in place and ripe and ready
> for abuse?  Will our elected officials demonstrate restraint and
> avoid exploiting those technologies as the easiest solution to some
> future problem?
>
> When government officials keep changing the definition of what is
> 'wrong'.  Such as wearing a tee shirt with a certain slogan or
> peacefully protesting at a "nationally significant event" or speaking
> out against our elected officials.  Then what should we expect in the
> future?  Which common everyday behavior that everyone views as a God
> given right today, will be viewed as the next wrong?
>
> When asked "if you are not doing anything wrong, why should you worry
> about it?" we all need to reply, because you have control over the
> definition of was is legally wrong and you keep changing the terms.
>
> I can remember years ago, I heard FBI director Louis Freeh say
> something that made my blood run cold.  He said, we will never stop
> drug smuggling in the US until we can limit free travel within our
> borders and American's aren't ready for that yet.
>
> Well, when will it be?  Tomorrow? Next week? Next year? When will you
> accept it as important and essential to our safety?
>
> Jerry
>
>
> In a message dated 2/19/2006 8:49:51 AM Eastern Standard Time,
> dave at farber.net writes:
> I saw this, indirectly, on Techdirt.
>
> I do feel sorry for the police chief, and for the people of Houston.
> But still, it's a pretty scary idea for anyone to raise.
>
> -d
>
> Houston eyes cameras at apartment complexes
> http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/1110AP_Police_Cameras.html
>
> By PAM EASTON
> ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER
>
> HOUSTON -- Houston's police chief on Wednesday proposed placing
> surveillance cameras in apartment complexes, downtown streets,
> shopping malls and even private homes to fight crime during a
> shortage of police officers.
>
> "I know a lot of people are concerned about Big Brother, but my
> response to that is, if you are not doing anything wrong, why should
> you worry about it?" Chief Harold Hurtt told reporters Wednesday at a
> regular briefing.
>
> Houston is facing a severe police shortage because of too many
> retirements and too few recruits, and the city has absorbed 150,000
> hurricane evacuees who are filling apartment complexes in crime-
> ridden neighborhoods. The City Council is considering a public safety
> tax to pay for more officers.
>
> Building permits should require malls and large apartment complexes
> to install surveillance cameras, Hurtt said. And if a homeowner
> requires repeated police response, it is reasonable to require camera
> surveillance of the property, he said.
>
> Scott Henson, director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Police
> Accountability Project in Texas, called Hurtt's building-permit
> proposal "radical and extreme" and said it may violate the Fourth
> Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches.
>
> Andy Teas with the Houston Apartment Association said that although
> some would consider cameras an invasion of privacy, "I think a lot of
> people would appreciate the thought of extra eyes looking out for them."
>
> Such cameras are costly, Houston Mayor Bill White said, "but on the
> other hand we spend an awful lot for patrol presence." He called the
> chief's proposal a "brainstorm" rather than a decision.
>
> The program would require City Council approval.
>
>
> -------------------------------------
> You are subscribed as rlrevell at joe-job.com
> To manage your subscription, go to
>   http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip
>
> Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/
>



-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
  http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From arma at mit.edu  Sun Feb 19 13:14:31 2006
From: arma at mit.edu (Roger Dingledine)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 16:14:31 -0500
Subject: Tor 0.1.0.17 is released
Message-ID: <mailman.1593.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Tor 0.1.0.17 fixes a crash bug for servers that enable hibernation,
lets Windows servers scale better, and tries to reduce the bandwidth
overhead from the old-style directory protocol. Both clients and servers
are encouraged to upgrade.

http://tor.eff.org/download

Changes in version 0.1.0.17 - 2006-02-17
  o Crash bugfixes on 0.1.0.x:
    - When servers with a non-zero DirPort came out of hibernation,
      sometimes they would trigger an assert.

  o Other important bugfixes:
    - On platforms that don't have getrlimit (like Windows), we were
      artificially constraining ourselves to a max of 1024
      connections. Now just assume that we can handle as many as 15000
      connections. Hopefully this won't cause other problems.

  o Backported features:
    - When we're a server, a client asks for an old-style directory,
      and our write bucket is empty, don't give it to him. This way
      small servers can continue to serve the directory *sometimes*,
      without getting overloaded.
    - Whenever you get a 503 in response to a directory fetch, try
      once more. This will become important once servers start sending
      503's whenever they feel busy.
    - Fetch a new directory every 120 minutes, not every 40 minutes.
      Now that we have hundreds of thousands of users running the old
      directory algorithm, it's starting to hurt a lot.
    - Bump up the period for forcing a hidden service descriptor upload
      from 20 minutes to 1 hour.




----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From skuetnhvbvabi at mascomex.com.mx  Sun Feb 19 15:12:55 2006
From: skuetnhvbvabi at mascomex.com.mx (John C. Archer)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 17:12:55 -0600 
Subject: Trading Alert: Major press release (ticker EXTI) 
Message-ID: <200602192312.k1JNCg1s009737@proton.jfet.org>


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Look at OTC PINKSHEETS:       EXTI.PK        Move Tuesday  Feb 21st, 2006!

PINK SHEETS: EXTI.PK

Friday Feb 17th closing price: $0.35 (up over 30%)
PINK SHEETS SYMBOL:  EXTI.PK 
NAME: EXTREME INNOVATIONS, INC.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


TAMPA, Florida. February, 2006 (PRlMEZ0NE) -- EXTREME INNOVATIONS, INC.  (Other OTCPK: EXTI - News) announced today that it has secured Tampa, FL as a Ridley Territory.

Ridley is the world's first and only fully automatic cruiser motorcycle. The new Autoglide series of automatic motorcycles allows a person to enjoy the experience of motorcycle riding and quit worrying about shifting into the right gear. Extreme Innovations will introduce the Ridley Motorcycles into its Extreme Toys Rental Division. This sleek new addition to its fleet will make it easy for even beginners to enjoy the fun of the open road or a simple ride around town. 
 
About: Extreme Innovations, Inc. Promotes, sells, and distributes cutting edge recreational vehicles. EXTI is devoted to providing new, extreme recreational products with a marketing platform as well as sales support to help bring them to market.


REMOVE DIRECTIONS:  greatnetname.com/lit.html


ADD EXTI.PK TO YOUR RADAR NOW!



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DISCLAIMER: Information within this email contains "forward looking statements" within the meaning of Section 27a of the Securities act of 1933 and Section 21B of the Securities exchange act of 1934. Any statements that express or involve discussions with respect to predictions, expectations, beliefs, plans, projections, objectives, goals, assumptions or future events or performance are not statements of historical fact and may be "forward looking statements." Forward looking statements are based on expectations, estimates and projections at the time the statements are made that involve a number of risks and uncertainties which could cause actual results or events to differ materially from those presently anticipated. The publisher of this newsletter does not represent that the information contained in this message states all material facts or does not omit a material fact necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. All information provided within this email pertaining to investing, stocks, securities must be understood as information provided and not investment advice. The publisher of this newsletter advises all readers and subscribers to seek advice from a registered professional securities representative before deciding to trade in stocks featured within this email. None of the material within this report shall be construed as any kind of investment advice or offer to sell or solicitation of an offer to buy securities. Many of these companies are on the verge of bankruptcy. You can lose all your money by investing in this stock. The publisher of this newsletter is_not_a_registered_investment_advisor. Subscribers should not view information herein as legal, tax, accounting or investment advice. Any reference to past performance(s) of companies is specially selected to be referenced based on the favorable performance of these companies. You would need perfect timing to achieve the results in the examples given. There can be no assurance of that happening. Remember, as always, past performance is n
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From day at daxnetworks.com  Sun Feb 19 15:52:16 2006
From: day at daxnetworks.com (Lina Richey)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 17:52:16 -0600
Subject: Re-finance at the lowestt ratess
Message-ID: <826t229m.2008941@msn.com>

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From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Feb 19 15:27:25 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 18:27:25 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Yet Another Agency in Charge of Domestic Intelligence?
Message-ID: <p06230901c01eaf5b41df@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 17:51:33 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Yet Another Agency in Charge of Domestic Intelligence?
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

  <http://www.cq.com/public/20060217_homeland.html>

  Congressional Quarterly


  CQ HOMELAND SECURITY - INTELLIGENCE

  Feb. 17, 2006 - 8:03 p.m.

  Yet Another Agency in Charge of Domestic Intelligence?

  By Jeff Stein, National Security Editor

  It took me a half dozen e-mails and telephone calls over three days to just
  to confirm that yes, the Directorate of National Intelligence, or DNI, the
  new-ish uber-spooks body - has opened an office to deal with state and
  local law enforcement.

  And it took me a few more inquiries before the DNI gave up the name of its
  head, Michael Tiffany, though nothing more.

  Mind you, this is not classified information. Forget about denying public
  information to a pesky reporter: State and local cops have to know who's in
  charge of state and local law enforcement issues, right?

  Finally, I Googled Michael Tiffany and eventually found out that he had
  spent 36 years with the New York Police Department, the last nine as chief
  of intelligence. He also did a turn in the Bronx as as deputy chief of
  narcotics.

  A prince of the city. Probably a good guy to have in the job: He talks cop.

  But the difficulty I had just prying out Tiffany's name mirrors the
  challenge - and frustration - law enforcement officials have over who's in
  charge of homeland security information flow at the federal level.

  Up until now, they only had to worry about DHS and the FBI, who fight like
  parents in front of the kids. (Can anybody forget that morning in 2004 when
  John Ashcroft was proclaiming a dire new al Qaeda threat and going Orange
  while Tom Ridge was on the Today Show pooh-poohing it?)

  Now there's a new Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for
  Homeland Security and Law Enforcement to add to their speed dialers. Who
  gets top billing now between the DHS, DNI and FBI?

  Let's leave out the CIA, the National Counterterrorism Center, the 87
  regional Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the new regional intelligence fusion
  centers, the Pentagon's Northern Command and myriad military intelligence
  agencies, for now.

  It's a "three-way battle," says an intelligence expert with intimate
  knowledge of the federal intelligence agencies involved, as well as with
  the thinking of state and local police.

  "I detect a new tension," says this person, whose views are shared by
  multiple congressional sources, "between the information sharing office at
  DNI, which has the responsibility for policy development and
  implementation, and . . . the intelligence shop of DHS."

  "So once again we have these new offices, new bureaus and new legislation,
  but also new layers. And they're still kind of wondering, out in the
  homeland, who the hell's in charge of what and who's telling us what and
  when and are we speaking with one voice?"

  Carl Croft, the DNI's chief spokesman, said there's really nothing to worry
  about: Tiffany is running a policy shop, not directing the flow of
  intelligence.

  Tiffany's office "doesn't reach down to local agencies - that's the
  responsibility of DHS and the Justice Department," Croft said, "but we
  coordinate matters."

  Coordinate?

  "We give information to [DHS] to share with their [law enforcement]
  counterparts. They have the responsibility to reach down, not us."

  Tiffany may indeed ultimately bring cohesion to the information-sharing
  mess. But in the meantime, as one of many apprehensive intelligence experts
  said, "It's a continued exacerbation of who in the federal government is
  responsible for talking to us on this stuff."

  "If John Doe calls from the DNI office and says, 'I'm in the DNI's office
  and I'm here to help you figure out your information-sharing problems,'
  they're likely to hear, 'Great, buddy, get in line. I'm in contact with a
  guy from DHS and I'm in contact with another part of the DNI's office
  saying they're doing the same thing.'"

  No Illusions

  Charlie Allen, the legendary CIA man who quietly arrived at DHS last summer
  and got himself the new title of Chief Intelligence Officer, has no
  illusions about how hard it is to wrest control of the homeland security
  information flow that the FBI and CIA have appropriated for themselves. And
  now comes another threat from DNI.

  So far, Allen is tossing bouquets in public to all his rivals, starting
  with John D. Negroponte, the career ambassador who runs the DNI.

  "And let me say," Allen told the House Homeland Security Intelligence,
  Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee on Feb. 15,
  "that Ambassador Negroponte has reached out to homeland security and to me,
  and we work as full partners on counter terrorism issues.

  "I'm also working very closely with Admiral Scott Redd, who heads the
  National Counterterrorism Center. We have a very smooth and close operation.

  "Our partnership with the FBI continues to be strong. We reach out daily to
  the bureau at all levels and work closely on a broad range of threats,"said
  Allen, who spent 54 years at the CIA. He also said he's stepped up
  coordination with police all over the country.

  "Finally, our experts are helping the DNI to meet the objectives of his
  national intelligence strategy," Allen said, "by ensuring that we have an
  integrated DHS intelligence enterprise to address threats broadly to the
  homeland."

  A Big Beast

  Rep. Mike Rogers, a Michigan Republican and bulky former FBI agent, does a
  good Brian Dennehy when he gets worked up about intelligence.

  Rogers is a fan of Allen but skeptical about the proliferation of U.S.
  intelligence agencies and personnel, which he derides as "a battle of the
  in-boxes."

  "My only fear is that Allen wants to get bigger, " said Rogers, fidgeting
  in his chair during a recent interview in his office.

  "I'm disappointed in where DNI is going," Rogers continued. "I've yet to
  see value added to what they're doing."

  He bemoans the hundreds of new intelligence bureaucrats at the DNI and
  elsewhere. "Did they add any case agents, operations overseas?" he asked.
  "I don't see how they're helping catch one terrorist."

  The DNI, he concluded, is "a big beast."

  Across town, Negroponte was assuring his Georgetown University audience
  that DHS was a valued member of the U.S. intelligence family. DHS, he said,
  was fortunate to have "Mr. Charlie Allen, the most experienced intelligence
  professional in the United States government."

  Backchannel Chatter

  Airport III: A book coming next June says the feds deflected attention from
  their own intelligence failures by shifting early blame for the Sept. 11
  attacks to the Argenbright airport security firm. Scapegoat, by
  Washington-based writers Joseph and Susan Trento, also quotes an
  Argenbright security guard at Dulles International who says he intercepted
  a group of five "suspicious" men in airline worker uniforms as they tried
  to enter a secure area the night before the hijackings. The feds dismissed
  his and others' similar stories at Dulles, according to book galleys made
  available to SpyTalk.

  Gold SWATS: Seems everybody has a counterterrorist force these days,
  including the U.S. Mint. With Ft. Knox and a handful of other facilities
  holding $100 billion in Treasury and "other Government assets," according
  to its Web site , the Mint SWATS have plenty to sweat. Its members "are
  required to successfully complete a certified Special Weapons and Tactics
  (SWAT) training program," the site says. "Special Response Teams train on a
  regular and recurring basis at each of the field facilities," and can be
  scrambled for special events.

  CIA vs. FBI: The legendary estrangement of the FBI and CIA, so glaringly on
  display in the Sept. 11 commission's report on intelligence failures, takes
  a novel twist in a Michigan congressional race, where Mike Rogers is being
  challenged by ex-CIA officer Jim Marcinkowski. In an odd stab at
  celebrityhood, his bio says, "It was in the CIA where Jim first met Valerie
  Plame, a classmate whose identity as an undercover CIA officer would later
  be exposed by the Bush White House."


  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Feb 19 12:33:11 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 21:33:11 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on "if you are not doing anything
  wrong, why should you worry about it]
Message-ID: <20060219203311.GH3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From albertina.frost at gmx.de  Sun Feb 19 08:56:17 2006
From: albertina.frost at gmx.de (Rodrigo Shearer)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 21:56:17 +0500
Subject: Hey bro, check out the huge sale these guys are offering
Message-ID: <200602200248.k1K2mY9H013673@proton.jfet.org>

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From bojiang at 2911.net  Sun Feb 19 20:12:06 2006
From: bojiang at 2911.net (Carmen Logan)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 22:12:06 -0600
Subject: Lowest rate approved
Message-ID: <276l319j.5174767@hotmail.com>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Feb 19 13:45:33 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 22:45:33 +0100
Subject: [arma@mit.edu: Tor 0.1.0.17 is released]
Message-ID: <20060219214533.GL3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Feb 19 19:59:44 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 22:59:44 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Is Skype a haven for criminals?
Message-ID: <p06230937c01eef2f37c3@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 22:58:24 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Is Skype a haven for criminals?
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com

  <http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060217-6206.html>



  Is Skype a haven for criminals?

  2/17/2006 1:10:55 PM, by Nate Anderson

  >From a law enforcement point of view, digital communication is a two-edged
  sword. On the one hand, it allows for the simple collection, sorting, and
  processing of massive amounts of information (such as in the FBI's
  Carnivore system), but on the other hand, it is much easier for users to
  encrypt their communications with almost unbreakable codes. Now that VoIP
  calls are becoming commonplace, governments around the world are struggling
  to adapt to the new technology, and Skype has found itself under extra
  scrutiny.

  The reason is that Skype uses 256-bit, industry-standard AES encryption
  that is nearly impossible to break without the key. The Skype privacy FAQ
  explains the system this way:

  "Skype uses AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) - also known as Rijndael -
  which is also used by U.S. Government organizations to protect sensitive,
  information. Skype uses 256-bit encryption, which has a total of 1.1 x
  10^77 possible keys, in order to actively encrypt the data in each Skype
  call or instant message. Skype uses 1024 bit RSA to negotiate symmetric AES
  keys. User public keys are certified by the Skype server at login using
  1536 or 2048-bit RSA certificates."

  All Skype traffic is automatically encrypted end-to-end without requiring
  any user intervention, and this encryption is posing a problem to
  authorities who need (or want) to listen in on conversations. Skype
  executives state that their software is free of all backdoors, and a
  security researcher who saw some (but not all) of the code agrees. Still,
  the company claims that it "cooperates fully with all lawful requests from
  relevant authorities," which may mean that they turn over keys to
  governments upon request.

  The call can also be tapped once it leaves the Skype system and enters the
  normal telephone network, so calls to a landline are inherently insecure.
  Still, strong AES encryption is enough to defeat real-time surveillance of
  telephone calls of the kind possibly used by the NSA. That doesn't mean
  that nothing can be gleaned from watching the traffic, which can be used to
  identify who the call is routed to and how long it lasts, but it does mean
  the contents of the call remain secure.

  Rather than being a new issue for law enforcement, though, this is actually
  just a new version of an old problem: how to access encrypted data on a
  suspect's computer? Encryption algorithms have been good enough for some
  time to prevent all but the most determined brute force attacks, but there
  are obviously other ways of solving the problem. For the FBI, keyloggers
  are a popular choice; they obviate the need for backdoors or for
  sophisticated computer solutions. They simply steal the password. The same
  (metaphorical) approach may give them access to Skype calls; rather than
  breaking the encryption, they simply grab the key and decrypt the data.

  The FCC ruled last year that VoIP providers need to offer backdoors into
  their systems for wiretapping reasons, but Skype isn't based in the US and
  so is not subject to the rule. It is subject to the EU's new Data Retention
  Directive, though, which may require them to retain call logs and
  decryption keys for a period of time. If so, real-time monitoring of Skype
  calls would still be out, but after-the-fact review of recorded calls from
  people of interest might well be possible for the government.

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mparr at hayes-trucks.com  Sun Feb 19 21:22:52 2006
From: mparr at hayes-trucks.com (Joaquin Silva)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 23:22:52 -0600
Subject: Pre-approved Application #CQPSJ47510934
Message-ID: <022p759i.2773073@hotmail.com>

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From hughes at connellco.com  Sun Feb 19 21:47:53 2006
From: hughes at connellco.com (Lindsey Cleveland)
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 23:47:53 -0600
Subject: Last chance for lower rates
Message-ID: <027q611n.6329223@msn.com>

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From coderman at gmail.com  Mon Feb 20 03:44:00 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Feb 20, 2006 3:44 PM
Subject: [funsec] "if you are not doing anything wrong, why should
Message-ID: <mailman.1594.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

you worry about it?"

On 2/20/06, Larry Seltzer <larry at larryseltzer.com> wrote:
> ...
> I've never understood what the problem was with cameras in public places,
> taking pictures of public places. I don't even know why anyone would be
> bothered by them.

tell this to DHS.  bridge photography is an endagered past time...

---



From rms at bsf-llc.com  Mon Feb 20 04:00:00 2006
From: rms at bsf-llc.com (Richard M. Smith)
Date: Feb 20, 2006 4:00 PM
Subject: [funsec] Things you can't take pictures of in public
Message-ID: <mailman.1595.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Here are some more things that will get you in trouble if you try to take
pictures of them:

  - Surveillance cameras
  - Cops
  - Your neighbor's windows
  - Passport checking stations (I learned this one the hard way)
  - Boston subway trains

Bottom line, just because something is public, it doesn't mean that you can
take its pictures.  Social conventions, regulations, and laws control where
cameras can be used in public.

---



http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/02/photographing_a.html

February 22, 2006
Photographing Airports

Patrick Smith, a former pilot, writes about his experiences --
involving the police -- taking pictures in airports:

"""
    He makes sure to remind me, just as his colleague in New Hampshire
had done, that next time I'd benefit from advance permission, and that
"we live in a different world now." Not to put undue weight on the
cheap prose of patriotic convenience, but few things are more
repellant than that oft- repeated catchphrase. There's something so
pathetically submissive about it -- a sound bite of such defeat and
capitulation. It's also untrue; indeed we find ourselves in an altered
way of life, though not for the reasons our protectors would have us
think. We weren't forced into this by terrorists, we've chosen it.
When it comes to flying, we tend to hold the events of Sept. 11 as the
be-all and end-all of air crimes, conveniently purging our memories of
several decades' worth of bombings and hijackings. The threats and
challenges faced by airports aren't terribly different from what
they've always been. What's different, or "too bad," to quote the New
Hampshire deputy, is our paranoid, overzealous reaction to those
threats, and our amped-up obeisance to authority.
"""

[coderman's note: 'a different world', LOLZ.  glad to know freedom and
liberty is a quaint and deprecated notion. *grin*]

...

In the world of information security, this would be described as
security by obscurity - trying to turn the public (publicly visible
and viewable areas of an airport) into the private (no, you can't take
pictures).

To quote Rocky, "that trick never works".

You have to design your security process to include the concept that
anything not private is completely public.

There is no in-between ground, because anything that the public have
access to can be recorded by the public, whether you try to prevent
photographs or not.

Posted by: Alun Jones at February 22, 2006 03:08 PM

---



http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2006/01/18/1137467025843.html

"Police directives about what can and can't be photographed are an
abuse of power and should be ignored, Liberty Victoria says.

The civil liberties body made the statement after a report in today's
Age said a member of the Geelong Camera Club received a visit from
police after he photographed gas storage cylinders at the city's Shell
oil refinery.

Police and emergency services minister Tim Holding said it was
important to balance national security and civil liberties.

"It's always about balance, obviously we do live, whether we like it
or not, in a period of heightened security concerns, police have a
vital role to play from a law enforcement perspective in making sure
that we respond appropriately to those heightened security
situations," he said.

"Obviously it (the police response) needs to be proportionate and
appropriate and we don't want to unreasonably interfere with or reduce
the public's access to facilities."
...
The police have got no place making such warnings," president Brian
Walters SC, said.

"Merely to threaten is exceeding police powers and is an abuse of power.

"If you were a serious terrorist you wouldn't be openly taking
photographs. Taking photos of public objects is a normal and quite
understandable part of a modern society."

Mr Walters said police had been spooked by politicians and had
acquired "an inflated fear of terrorism".

"We currently have thousands of cameras set up to watch citizens, but
if citizens themselves take photos, the authorities take that as some
sort of risk," he said.

---




From coulson.dolphzf8a at gmail.com  Mon Feb 20 19:42:25 2006
From: coulson.dolphzf8a at gmail.com (Marco Brand)
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2006 18:42:25 -0900
Subject: Hey man, you ever try pheromones?
Message-ID: <200602200942.k1K9gM0j022222@proton.jfet.org>

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From dewayne at warpspeed.com  Mon Feb 20 22:57:44 2006
From: dewayne at warpspeed.com (Dewayne Hendricks)
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2006 22:57:44 -0800
Subject: [Dewayne-Net] U.S. Reclassifies Many Documents in Secret Review
Message-ID: <mailman.1596.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

February 21, 2006
U.S. Reclassifies Many Documents in Secret Review
By SCOTT SHANE
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/21/politics/21reclassify.html?
ex=1298178000&en=521a35355a85281d&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss>
WASHINGTON, Feb. 20 b In a seven-year-old secret program at the
National Archives, intelligence agencies have been removing from
public access thousands of historical documents that were available
for years, including some already published by the State Department
and others photocopied years ago by private historians.

The restoration of classified status to more than 55,000 previously
declassified pages began in 1999, when the Central Intelligence
Agency and five other agencies objected to what they saw as a hasty
release of sensitive information after a 1995 declassification order
signed by President Bill Clinton. It accelerated after the Bush
administration took office and especially after the 2001 terrorist
attacks, according to archives records.

But because the reclassification program is itself shrouded in
secrecy b governed by a still-classified memorandum that prohibits
the National Archives even from saying which agencies are involved b
it continued virtually without outside notice until December. That
was when an intelligence historian, Matthew M. Aid, noticed that
dozens of documents he had copied years ago had been withdrawn from
the archives' open shelves.

Mr. Aid was struck by what seemed to him the innocuous contents of
the documents b mostly decades-old State Department reports from the
Korean War and the early cold war. He found that eight reclassified
documents had been previously published in the State Department's
history series, "Foreign Relations of the United States."

"The stuff they pulled should never have been removed," he said.
"Some of it is mundane, and some of it is outright ridiculous."

After Mr. Aid and other historians complained, the archives'
Information Security Oversight Office, which oversees government
classification, began an audit of the reclassification program, said
J. William Leonard, director of the office.

Mr. Leonard said he ordered the audit after reviewing 16 withdrawn
documents and concluding that none should be secret.

"If those sample records were removed because somebody thought they
were classified, I'm shocked and disappointed," Mr. Leonard said in
an interview. "It just boggles the mind."

[snip]
Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com>

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From coderman at gmail.com  Tue Feb 21 03:59:00 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Feb 21, 2006 3:59 PM
Subject: [funsec] Court says cops can't yank video: 'Baby cam'
Message-ID: <mailman.1597.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

catches arrest on tape

On 2/21/06, Blanchard_Michael at emc.com <Blanchard_Michael at emc.com> wrote:
>  interesting that they'd be so concerned over that.  It was very civil, and
> the arresting officers were nothing but kind and courteous to the perp
> during the arrest.
>
>   Is this a case of big brother not wanting to be watched?

yes and no.  like the airline security measures which are "sensitive
security information" the photography of police might disclose
"sensitive law enforcement tactics" (whatever they call it in a given
$jurismydicktion).

and like the hassles/confiscation you get for photographing critical
infrastructure this too is now verboten.  the fact that this shields
authority from public oversight is simply a bonus, in their eyes.
(that would _never_ be the reason to ban such public disclosure, of
course; tis a mere side effect of keeping you safe :)

welcome to the police state.




From Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu  Tue Feb 21 06:44:42 2006
From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu)
Date: February 21, 2006 6:44:42 PM EST
Subject: More fuel for the fire for RFID privacy concerns...
Message-ID: <mailman.1598.1576007674.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Well, so much for the "they can only be read at very short distance"
defense...

(And one has to wonder how a system like this qualifies as:
Classification Code: 70 -- General purpose information technology
equipment
General purpose???)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 21, 2006

HOMELAND SECURITY RFI HEIGHTENS PUBLIC CONCERNS OVER RFID DHS Wants
to Track
Spychips in Moving Cars Going 55 MPH

"Call it Big Brother on steroids," say privacy advocates Katherine
Albrecht
and Liz McIntyre, co-authors of "Spychips: How Major Corporations and
Government Plan to Track Your Every Move with RFID."

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is looking for beefed
up RFID
technology that can read government-issued documents from up to 25 feet
away, pinpoint pedestrians on street corners, and glean the identity of
people whizzing by in cars at 55 miles per hour.

Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a controversial technology that
uses tiny microchips to track items from a distance. These RFID
microchips
have earned the nickname "spychips" because each contains a unique
identification number, like a Social Security number for things, that
can be
read silently and invisibly by radio waves. Privacy and civil liberties
advocates are opposed to the use of the technology on consumer items and
government documents because it can be used to track people without
their
knowledge or consent.

...

A copy of the RFI is posted at the authors' website:
http://www.spychips.com/DHS-RFID.pdf



-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eioytntzvqlqg at mathis.no  Mon Feb 20 18:16:51 2006
From: eioytntzvqlqg at mathis.no (Shelby D. Waddell)
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2006 08:16:51 +0600
Subject: Traders Alert: Extreme Toy Company!
Message-ID: <u95e9-002329151412236-0982798075@Joanna587>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Feb 20 23:29:19 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2006 08:29:19 +0100
Subject: [dewayne@warpspeed.com: [Dewayne-Net] U.S. Reclassifies Many
  Documents in Secret Review]
Message-ID: <20060221072919.GL3873@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne at warpspeed.com> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Feb 20 23:45:23 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2006 08:45:23 +0100
Subject: Biowar for dummies
Message-ID: <20060221074523.GQ3873@leitl.org>

http://paulboutin.weblogger.com/stories/storyReader$1439

Biowar for Dummies

    How hard is it to build your own weapon of mass destruction? We take a
crash course in supervirus engineering to find out.

Anthrax. Smallpox. Ebola. For thriller writers and policy crusaders,
biological warfare was a standard what-if scenario long before anyone mailed
anthrax to government and media offices in 2001. Pentagon war games like Dark
Winter, held just before 9/11, and this yearbs Atlantic Storm suggested that
terrorists could unleash germs with the killing power of a nuclear weapon.

Scientists, though, have always been skeptical. Only massive, state-sponsored
programsbnot terrorist cells or lone kooksbpose a plausible threat, they
say. As the head of the Federation of American Scientists working group on
bioweapons put it in a 2002 Los Angeles Times op-ed: b
A significant
bioterror attack today would require the support of a national program to
succeed.b


Or not. A few months ago, Roger Brent, a geneticist who runs a California
biotech firm, sent me an unpublished paper in which he wrote that genetically
engineered bioweapons developed by small teams are a bigger threat than
suitcase nukes.

Brent is one of a growing number of researchers who believe that a
bioterrorist wouldnbt need a team of virologists and state funding. He says
advances in DNA-hacking technology have reached the point where an evil lab
assistant with the right resources could do the job.

    Gene hackers could make artificial smallpoxbor worsebfrom standard lab
supplies.

I decided to call him on it. I hadnbt set foot in a lab since high school.
Could I learn to build a bioweapon? What would I need? What would it cost?
Could I set up shop without raising suspicions? And, most important, would it
work?

    rogerbrentbw.jpg:
    b
An advanced grad student could do it.b
bRoger Brent, head of the
Molecular Sciences Institute in Berkeley, California.

To find out, I meet with Brent at the Molecular Sciences Institute, his
company in Berkeley. The 49-year-old researcher has a few million dollars a
year in government funding and a staff of 25. Hebs the co-author of the
must-read lab manual Current Protocols in Molecular Biology, and hardly seems
like someone in the grip of apocalyptic fervor. As he shows me around the
labba few quiet rooms of workbenches, pipette stands, pinky-sized test tubes
and the odd PowerBookbwe plan our attack.

Experts used to think that distributing a killer germ would require a few vats
and a crop duster. Brent and I have a different idea. Webll infect a
suicidal patient zero and hand him a round-the-world plane ticket. But we need
a dangerous virusbsmallpox, maybe. We wonbt be able to steal a sample;
webll have to make our own.

Too dangerous, Brent says. He gives me a proxy mission: Modify something
mundane into something strange. In this case, rejigger standard brewerbs
yeast to manufacture a glowing cyan-colored protein usually found in
jellyfish.

Great. I wanted to make something as lethal as an A-bomb, and instead Ibm
brewing ultraviolet beer.

Brent smiles and shrugs at my disappointment. b
All life is one,b
 he says,
and hebs not just being Zen. All over the world, laboratories like Brentbs
splice genesbthe techniques are as common as the Pyrex beaker, and getting
easier every day. Getting yeast to sport blue genes takes the same skills and
gear as adding the genes for something toxic. DNA is just the stuff that tells
cells what proteins to makebthe only real difference between being able to
insert a single gene and inserting all the genes that make a virus is
experience.

I start my to-do list: I have to acquire the right equipment. I have to track
down the genetic sequence I want, then learn how to make the gene. Then I have
to get it into the yeast. Brent offers me lab space and staff advice, but
insists that I do the work myself. And not everyone has the knack, he says.
b
Some people are natural-born labsters, some arenbt.b
 I know what he
means. I used to be a software engineer, and in that field, procedures are
well documented and the source code is readily available, but some people just
arenbt hackers.

Itbs time to find out what kind of genetic engineer I am.

Making DNA turns out to be easy if you have the right hardware. The critical
piece of gear is a DNA synthesizer. Brent already has one, a yellowing plastic
machine the size of an office printer, called an ABI 394. b
So, what kind of
authorization do I need to buy this equipment?b
 I ask.

b
I suggest you start by typing bused DNA synthesizerb into Google,b

Brent says.

I hit eBay first, where ABI 394s go for about $5,000. Anything I canbt score
at an auction is available for a small markup at sites like usedlabequip.com.
Two days later I have a total: $29,700btaxes and shipping not included.
Nucleosides (the A, C, T, G genetic building blocks) and other chemicals for
the synthesizer cost more than the hardwarebin the end, a single base pair
of DNA runs about a buck to make. Enough raw material to build, say, the
smallpox genome would take just over $200,000.

    abi394thumb:
    The ABI 394 synthesizer. Think of it as an inkjet printer for DNA. (click
photo to enlarge)

The real cost of villainy is in overhead. Even with the ready availability of
equipment, you still need space, staff, and time. Brent guesses he would need
a couple million dollars to whip up a batch of smallpox from scratch. No need
for state sponsors or stolen top-secret germ samples. b
An advanced grad
student could do it,b
 Brent says. Especially with the help of some high
schoolers who actually went to lab classes.

But how would I find the gene sequence? Simple. I went to the Web site of the
National Center for Biotechnology Information (no password required) and
downloaded the DNA sequence for a 770-base pair gene called the Enhanced Cyan
Fluorescent Protein. Thatbs what Brent wanted me to program into my yeast.
It took me about 15 minutes to find. Far easier to track down was the
200,000-base pair sequence for smallpox. Only two known samples of smallpox
exist; the blueprints are free online.

    It's glowing. Is that good?

I load my nucleosides into the ABI 394, and itbs as easy as replacing a
toner cartridge. I transmit a test sequence from my Mac and go to lunch. When
I come back, I have a custom strand of genetic material waiting for me. This
is the anyone-on-Slashdot-can-do-it part of the job.

These days, many labs donbt even bother synthesizing their own genes. They
order nucleotide chains online. Thatbs right: mail-order genes. Just to test
this out, I buy a sequence from MWG Biotech in High Point, North Carolina, and
have it shipped to my house. Three days later, Ibm sitting on the train to
Berkeley holding a FedEx box. MWG didn't do anything wrong, but not long ago
New Scientist magazine approached sixteen other custom DNA shops to find out
if they scan incoming orders. Could a terrorist order a killer virus piece by
piece? Only five of the sixteen said they screen every sequence.

Still, mail-order is cheating. If you were a smart terrorist, youbd make the
thing yourself to avoid suspicion. You can't order smallpox, but anyonebs
allowed to buy raw genetic material and lab equipmentbthe government only
monitors certain radioactive, toxic, or otherwise scary substances.

Getting living cells to absorb synthetic genes is where biotech stops looking
like IT and turns into French cooking. The process, called transformation,
happens in nature only rarely; itbs part of the way microorganisms evolve.
In the lab, you can improve the odds itbll work by softening up the host
cells with chemicals and removing sections of their DNA with tailor-made
enzymes. Douse the hosts with synthetic DNA and some fraction of them slurp it
up. And some fraction of those start making the protein that the gene codes
for. It doesnbt matter if itbs jellyfish fluorescence or smallpox (though
obviously smallpox is more complicated).

It sounds like submicroscopic surgery, but all you do is squirt chemicals into
a culture dish and let it all soak overnight. In the morning you come back to
see if it worked or, more likely, didnbt. My first batch flops. My second,
too. One of the MSI researchers offers to break Brentbs rules and do it for
me while I watch. It doesnbt work for him, either.

Eventually, we fumble our way to a plastic dish full of translucent goop. If
Ibd been working on smallpoxband really committed to my causebthis would
have been the part where Ibd inject a lab animal with the stuff to see if it
got sick. Then Ibd give myself a dose and head off on a days-long,
multi-airport, transnational suicide run. But it was just yeast. Set on top of
a black light, it glowed an eerie bright blue, like a Jimi Hendrix poster. My
creation ... lived.

    Biotech's growth curves leave Moore's Law in the dust.

Would the nations of the world kneel before my awesome power? I asked an
expert. Three years ago, Eckard Wimmer headed a team of researchers at SUNY
Stony Brook that made live polio virus from scratch, part of a Defense
Department project to prove the threat of synthetic bioweapons. So how much of
a leap is that from cyan-tinged yeast?

b
A simple laboratory technician would have trouble,b
 he says. With
smallpox, b
the virus is very large and brings with it enzymes that it needs
to proliferate. If you just made the genome and put it into a cell, nothing
would happen.b


In the wild, viruses hijack host cells and turn them into virus replication
factories. Wimmer was sure any one of the 2,847 members of the American
Society for Virology could figure out how to do the same.

Soon, though, I might not even need that expertise. DNA synthesis is following
a kind of accelerated Moorebs lawbthe faster and easier it gets, the
faster and easier it gets. Last year, a group of researchers synthesized DNA
strands of more than 300,000 base pairsblonger than the smallpox
genomebusing a method that eliminates most of the shake-and-bake lab steps
Ibd spent weeks learning.

The rush toward DIY genetics is reflected in so-called Carlson curves, plotted
by Rob Carlson, a physicist-turned-biologist (and Brentbs former lab partner
at MSI) who worked them out in 2003. b
Within a decade,b
 Carlson wrote in
the journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, b
a single person could sequence or
synthesize all the DNA describing all the people on the planet many times over
in an eight-hour day.b


Today, when hebs not tinkering with cellular-scale measurement gadgets at
the University of Washington, Carlson designs custom proteins on a computer in
his Seattle home. According to his calculations, if the current pace of
biotech proceeds for another decade, cooking up a lethal bug will be as easy
and cheap as building a Web site. b
You donbt need a national program,b

Carlson says. b
The technologybs changing fast, and therebs nothing we
can do about it.b


Even if hebs wrong about the timeframe, if someone solves the problem of
synthesizing RNA (the single-stranded adjunct to DNA), it would open the door
to modifying retroviruses like influenza and HIVband in 1918 the flu managed
to kill 20 million people without any help from bioterrorists.

    b
If we do what we need to for biodefense ... We could, as a planet,
eliminate large lethal epidemics.b
bTara O'Toole, Center for Biosecurity

Bolstered by what scientists like Carlson and Brent are saying, bioweapon
policy wonks are calling for an all-out biodefense program. Worried about
bacteria and viruses of mass destruction, the federal government pushes nearly
$6 billion a year toward research. Tara ObToole, director of the University
of Pittsburghbs Center for Biosecurity, says after-the-fact vaccines wonbt
stop a plague; they take months to develop and deploy. She believes the only
option is a general-purpose virus detector and destroyer, which has yet to be
invented. The cost would be enormous, but donbt think of it as just an
antiterror tool. b
If we do what we need to for biodefense, webre going to
do an enormous amount of good for routine health care and global disease,b

says ObToole. b
We could, as a planet, eliminate large lethal epidemics of
infectious disease in our lifetime.b


Brent agrees. Hebs been tinkering on a general virus detector as a side
project. b
Of course Ibd be thrilled to see a huge expenditure on
defense,b
 he says. b
But the truth is, itbll probably take an attack to
get us there.b


We might not have long to wait. Every hands-on gene hacker I polled during my
project estimated they could synthesize smallpox in a month or two. I remember
that game from my engineering days, so I mentally scale their estimates using
the old software managerbs formula: Double the length, then move up to the
next increment of time. That gives us two to four yearsbassuming no one has
already started working.b

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From BlueBoar at thievco.com  Tue Feb 21 12:08:00 2006
From: BlueBoar at thievco.com (Blue Boar)
Date: Feb 21, 2006 12:08 PM
Subject: [funsec] Court says cops can't yank video: 'Baby cam'
Message-ID: <mailman.1599.1576007675.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

catches arrest on tape

Richard M. Smith wrote:
> Under state law, Jean could be jailed for up to two years if tried and
> convicted of taking the tape public, provided she knew it was intentionally
> recorded without the permission of state police.


Video on front page here:
http://conte2006.com/
If you're curious, like me.

Now... why would I need the police's permission to film myself being
arrested in my house?

Everyone was extraordinarily reasonable during the whole arrest, as
shown in the video.  Why should the police have a problem?

So much for private cams and police cams having equal protection.

---




From dave at farber.net  Tue Feb 21 16:13:19 2006
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2006 19:13:19 -0500
Subject: [IP] More fuel for the fire for RFID privacy concerns...
Message-ID: <mailman.1600.1576007675.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



Begin forwarded message:


From matthew.nolanz9t at gmail.com  Tue Feb 21 08:50:21 2006
From: matthew.nolanz9t at gmail.com (Shawn Villalobos)
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2006 21:50:21 +0500
Subject: You got to know this!
Message-ID: <200602220250.k1M2oMdT010422@proton.jfet.org>

After the age of twenty-one, your body slowly stops releasing an important hormone known as HGH (Human Growth Hormone).

The reduction of HGH, which regulates levels of other hormones in the body (including testosterone, estrogen, progesterone, and melatonin) is directly responsible for many of the most common signs of growing old, such as wrinkles, gray hair, decreased energy, and diminished sexual function.

Human Growth Hormone will normally yield the following results:
 - Boost your immune system
 - Rejuvenate your body and mind
 - Feel & look younger
 - Reduce wrinkles, lose weight, decrease cellulite
 - Restore your sex drive and vigor
 - Revitalize your heart, liver, kidneys & lungs
 - Maintain muscle mass
 - Refresh memory, mood and mental energy
 - Sleep soundly and awake rested
 - Help eliminate stress, fatigue and depression

http://aefhlmbcikdgj.ratlo.info/?dgjxwqowyaefhlmzhghbcik




From vvymitcsevz at marriott.co.za  Tue Feb 21 21:39:43 2006
From: vvymitcsevz at marriott.co.za (Jaime C. Wall)
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2006 23:39:43 -0600 
Subject: you can too  
Message-ID: <200602220540.k1M5eBin014260@proton.jfet.org>

After the age of twenty-one, your body slowly stops releasing an important hormone 
known as HGH (Human Growth Hormone).

The reduction of HGH, which regulates levels of other hormones in the body (including testosterone, 
estrogen, progesterone, and melatonin) is directly responsible for many of the most common signs of 
growing old, such as wrinkles, gray hair, decreased energy, and diminished sexual function.

Human Growth Hormone will normally yield the following results:
 - Boost your immune system
 - Rejuvenate your body and mind
 - Feel & look younger
 - Reduce wrinkles, lose weight, decrease cellulite
 - Restore your sex drive and vigor
 - Revitalize your heart, liver, kidneys & lungs
 - Maintain muscle mass
 - Refresh memory, mood and mental energy
 - Sleep soundly and awake rested
 - Help eliminate stress, fatigue and depression

Read full Doctor's reports here:  http://ld-asure.com

or Off_list here: http://ld-asure.com/?page=rmdl 







dressmake yogi applied diploidy about hiatt stung footwork mildew heublein reck assemblage past armenian happen admission halpern ascomycetes glimmer handhold oppenheimer gangling teem . And endoderm amphetamine hutchinson sanctify clyde emphysema cairn develop decompose rebuke bowline falloff nomograph ret styli chautauqua allegation finish ? dreyfuss strategist benedikt stagestruck bel drier codebreak aristocratic calorie coherent errol price armenia doppler gauleiter diacritic bela creep gibbon heterozygous wrote lam nuptial convalesce wakeup cloakroom slay  if banish constituent coexistent goodwill indent floyd deserve against so adolphus beadle adagio emphasis bizarre harvestman superbly deferral prototype sic venereal davison aspirin jest extinct herculean ideate incombustible morrison bagley maier embouchure geographer detestation adventurous pilate attitude . stroboscopic amherst bid phonemic cyanamid germinate crusade alacrity tournament dorset chrysolite awe emmanuel  before consume islam decker holst goer weeks emigrate fore bailey cohere axiology godfrey pram buckeye hypochlorite belle cartoon integrable postmark clairvoyant folio persecution foyer .







From dave at farber.net  Wed Feb 22 02:21:33 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 05:21:33 -0500
Subject: [IP] KBR awarded Homeland Security contract -- detention
 facilities in USA]
Message-ID: <mailman.1601.1576007675.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



-------- Original Message --------
Subject: KBR awarded Homeland Security contract -- detention facilities
in USA
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2006 20:26:12 -0800
From:
To: dave at farber.net


Dave:

Please anonymize, don't want to be considered a non-patriot.


http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7B62C8724D%2DAE8A%2D4B
5C%2D94C7%2D70171315C0A0%7D&dist=SignInArchive&param=archive&siteid=mktw&date
id=38741%2E5136277662%2D858254656

SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) -- KBR, the engineering and construction
subsidiary of Halliburton Co.  (HAL  :
Halliburton Company said Tuesday it has been awarded a contingency
contract from the Department of Homeland Security to supports its
Immigration and Customs Enforcement facilities in the event of an
emergency. The maximum total value of the contract is $385 million and
consists of a 1-year base period with four 1-year options. KBR held the
previous ICE contract from 2000 through 2005. The contract, which is
effective immediately, provides for establishing temporary detention and
processing capabilities to expand existing ICE Detention and Removal
Operations Program facilities in the event of an emergency influx of
immigrants into the U.S., or to support the rapid development of new
programs, KBR said. The contract may also provide migrant detention
support to other government organizations in the event of an immigration
emergency, as well as the development of a plan to react to a national
emergency, such as a natural disaster, the company said.

-------------------------------------
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To manage your subscription, go to
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Feb 21 22:13:46 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 07:13:46 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] More fuel for the fire for RFID privacy
  concerns...]
Message-ID: <20060222061346.GS5582@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From coderman at gmail.com  Wed Feb 22 07:35:41 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 07:35:41 -0800
Subject: [michael.holstein@csuohio.edu: Re: Anonymity questions]
In-Reply-To: <20060222140103.GG25017@leitl.org>
References: <20060222140103.GG25017@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602220735m640d78bcle10d28ba227f1055@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/22/06, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> ... (use VPNs between Tor nodes, IPsec, etc)
> Thoughts?

tor does not apply to an NSA threat model; your low latency mix/onion
== p0wn3d by NSA, sorry.

from the FAQ they say as much: [6.7
http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ ]

"As mentioned above, it is possible for an observer who can view large
portions of the Internet (called a 'global adversary') to be able to
correlate timings of all traffic entering and exiting the tor network,
and thus link arbitrary users. Tor does not defend against such a
threat model."

that said, i think IPsec is a great idea in as many places as possible
assuming your key distribution/exchange is well implemented.




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Feb 22 04:43:00 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 07:43:00 -0500
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] KBR awarded Homeland Security
  contract    -- detention facilities in USA]]
In-Reply-To: <20060222110004.GB25017@leitl.org>
References: <20060222110004.GB25017@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <p0623092fc02209285201@[68.167.57.91]>

>don't want to be considered a non-patriot.


Don't forget the no-bid invisible black helicopter contract they also let
to Halliburton. And the one for mind-beams. Don't forget the mind-beams.

My understanding is that this contract is for the detention of illegal
aliens as part of the end of the Border Patrol's "catch-and-release"
program, which has served us so well since Kennedy's Immigration Reform Act
of 1965.

Of course, a "detention facility" is a "detention facility", and can be
used to detain anyone for any reason the government sees fit so to do.

I, for one, *welcome* our new statist overlords. Oh. That's right. They're
not so new, are they?

Cheers,
RAH
Who, along with Lady-Bird Johnson (former owner of Kellog Brown and Root),
is part of the vast right-wing conspiracy to steal our ports, our
liberties, and our vital bodily fluids.
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From michael.holstein at csuohio.edu  Wed Feb 22 05:51:40 2006
From: michael.holstein at csuohio.edu (Michael Holstein)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 08:51:40 -0500
Subject: Anonymity questions
Message-ID: <mailman.1602.1576007675.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

I've thought about this too (and the BGP routing thing I hadn't heard,
but I was aware that ATT, et.al. were being NSA-friendly by routing
international calls through US-based switches) -- but if they do it for
voice, they do it for data, since to AT&T, it's all really data anyway.

So how about this as a proposed solution:

Rather than encrypt individual TCP streams, allow the TOR nodes (or at
least the intermediates) to do GRE or IPSEC, and then route multiple
streams (each themselves encrypted) inside a seperately encrypted tunnel.

This would make it impossible (er...more difficult) for someone to match
traffic entering with traffic exiting (assuming sufficient padding and
whatnot to keep traffic fairly constant). Unless you can pick a large
"burst" out of the other chatter, you'd make it signifigantly harder to
trackback on an individual stream.

Sort of like a mesh-network of opportunistically created VPNs --
creating an encrypted "cloud". I think this is sort of what the Freedom
network tried to do commercially a few years ago. Another advantage of
this might be the ability to actually use BGP tables to assist in
routing, since at this point, you'd have created an encrypted "overlay
internet". Those tables could then be manipulated with control traffic
inside the cloud to deal with ensuring traffic is routed through
multiple countries (or around certian ones).

The other advantage of a GRE/IPsec approach would be the ability to
carry any type of traffic, not just TCP.

Thoughts?

Michael Holstein CISSP GCIA
Cleveland State University

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Wed Feb 22 06:22:01 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 09:22:01 -0500
Subject: [IP] DNA may tell police the surname of the criminal
Message-ID: <mailman.1603.1576007675.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



-------- Original Message --------
Subject: DNA may tell police the surname of the criminal
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 13:09:16 +0000
From: Brian Randell <Brian.Randell at newcastle.ac.uk>
To: dave at farber.net

Hi Dave:

>From today's (UK) Guardian:


>How DNA may tell police the surname of the criminal
>
>Alok Jha
>Wednesday February 22, 2006
>The Guardian
>
>Police will soon be able to predict the surnames of criminals whose
>DNA is found at crime scenes, according to research published
>yesterday. The technique would only work in finding men, however, as
>it is based on identifying similarities in the Y chromosome, which
>is passed from father to son.
>
>The technique relies on research carried out by University of
>Leicester scientists into how Y chromosomes have spread through the
>British population. They analysed these chromosomes in 150 pairs of
>men with the same surname and found that, in a quarter of cases, the
>pair had matching Y chromosomes.
>
>When the most common names were excluded from the list - Smith,
>Jones, Williams and Taylor, for example - the chance that two men
>with the same surname shared a Y chromosome jumped to 50%. The
>research appears in the latest edition of Current Biology.
>
>Mark Jobling, a geneticist at the University of Leicester who led
>the work, said the police would need a relatively small collection
>of male DNA - around 40,000 people - to allow useful matches to be
>made. "That sounds big but the national DNA database is nearly 100
>times bigger," he said. By matching the Y chromosome details of
>unidentified DNA at a crime scene with the database, police would
>get a list of potential surname matches.
>
>"That would allow you to prioritise suspects in your investigation,"
>said Dr Jobling. "If you have a lot of suspects - say a whole town
>or something - you can say we have 50 names, are these names
>represented here, if so let's go and interview these people."
>
>Y chromosomes are passed from father to son mostly unaltered. Once
>in a while, they will acquire random mutations as they pass through
>the generations. Some parts of the chromosome are known to mutate
>less rapidly than others and, by mapping these differences,
>scientists can create a tree showing the relationships between
>different Y chromosomes.
>
>"If men fall in different branches of the tree, there's no way they
>can be related to a recent male ancestor," said Dr Jobling. "If they
>lie within the same branch, there is a chance they are, but it
>doesn't prove it.
>
>"When we do that simple test, we find that a highly statistically
>significant excess of pairs share a branch of the tree, much more
>than we expect by chance."
>
>It is a surprising result, since there are plenty of reasons why
>people might have the same surname but be unrelated: many names were
>founded by more than one man, for example. There is also the issue
>of illegitimacy. The researchers predicted that more than 1% of
>children were illegitimate in each generation. Over many
>generations, this could have built up a significant error.
>
>"Those two elements would act as a strong force to break any links,"
>said Dr Jobling. "It was a surprise that by choosing just pairs we
>got a clear signal of sharing ancestors."


http://www.guardian.co.uk/crime/article/0,,1715022,00.html




--
School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne,
NE1 7RU, UK
EMAIL = Brian.Randell at ncl.ac.uk   PHONE = +44 191 222 7923
FAX = +44 191 222 8232  URL = http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/~brian.randell/

-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Feb 22 03:00:04 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 12:00:04 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] KBR awarded Homeland Security contract
  -- detention facilities in USA]]
Message-ID: <20060222110004.GB25017@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From bradley at kindergarten.com  Wed Feb 22 11:01:12 2006
From: bradley at kindergarten.com (Felix Lockwood)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 13:01:12 -0600
Subject: Lowest rate approved
Message-ID: <847x680e.1126997@69.60.117.34>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Feb 22 06:01:03 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 15:01:03 +0100
Subject: [michael.holstein@csuohio.edu: Re: Anonymity questions]
Message-ID: <20060222140103.GG25017@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Michael Holstein <michael.holstein at csuohio.edu>
-----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Feb 22 06:38:19 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 15:38:19 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] DNA may tell police the surname of the
  criminal]
Message-ID: <20060222143819.GJ25017@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Feb 22 10:45:18 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 19:45:18 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] KBR awarded Homeland Security
  contract    -- detention facilities in USA]]
In-Reply-To: <p0623092fc02209285201@[68.167.57.91]>
References: <20060222110004.GB25017@leitl.org>
  <p0623092fc02209285201@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <20060222184518.GV25017@leitl.org>

On Wed, Feb 22, 2006 at 07:43:00AM -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:

> liberties, and our vital bodily fluids.

ITYM 'sap and impurify all of our precious'

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From sandita943 at jimmclean.com  Wed Feb 22 19:41:04 2006
From: sandita943 at jimmclean.com (Kay Hendricks)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 21:41:04 -0600
Subject: Pre-approved Application #00373 Wed, 22 Feb 2006 21:41:04 -0600
Message-ID: <429i780l.0557080@hotmail.com>

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From hathaway at iqfinancial.com  Wed Feb 22 19:58:22 2006
From: hathaway at iqfinancial.com (Burton Schmitt)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 21:58:22 -0600
Subject: Re-finance at the lowestt ratess
Message-ID: <111l778o.3779113@hotmail.com>

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From Mason4Franklin at mathew.dk  Wed Feb 22 15:58:31 2006
From: Mason4Franklin at mathew.dk (Maryanne E. William)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 21:58:31 -0200
Subject: why feel old? 
Message-ID: <nb722smk220-5451013523-91057897630291312536187655@Janette92>

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From otto at jit.net  Wed Feb 22 21:36:00 2006
From: otto at jit.net (Donovan Marrero)
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 23:36:00 -0600
Subject: Low mortagge ratee approvall
Message-ID: <758i461e.9850909@hotmail.com>

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From doyle.alisamay at gmail.com  Wed Feb 22 14:29:27 2006
From: doyle.alisamay at gmail.com (Forrest Crane)
Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2006 04:29:27 +0600
Subject: Stronger, more powerful erections
Message-ID: <200602231029.k1NAT8YK021792@proton.jfet.org>

A recent survey showed that 68% of women are unsatisfied with their sexual partners. Of course most of these women would never tell their partner that they are unhappy.

Not being able to fully satisfy a woman can result in depression and feelings of inadequacy. Thankfully, men of all ages can now safely and naturally enhance their body and penis anatomy and renew sexual vitality without resorting to dangerous surgery.

The all natural proprietary blend of unique herbs found in Maxaman is designed to restore blood flow to your penis, unleash stored testosterone, and heighten sensation by activating the body's natural hormone production and supplying vital nutrients necessary for peak sexual performance.

http://acejmbghd.marinedot.info/?fikldxwqowyacejmzmmbgh





From wilcox at brdisseny.com  Thu Feb 23 03:09:05 2006
From: wilcox at brdisseny.com (Aldo Kerr)
Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2006 05:09:05 -0600
Subject: Lowest rate approved
Message-ID: <646f956o.8454326@msn.com>

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From atire at fowlerwhite.com  Thu Feb 23 04:01:03 2006
From: atire at fowlerwhite.com (Clara Massey)
Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2006 06:01:03 -0600
Subject: Ratess will skyrocket soon
Message-ID: <803l567k.1125654@69.60.117.34>

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From venera_syagaev at list.ru  Thu Feb 23 14:22:12 2006
From: venera_syagaev at list.ru (Bethany Land)
Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2006 16:22:12 -0600
Subject: Stronger, more powerful erections
Message-ID: <200602231024.k1NANscn021721@proton.jfet.org>

A recent survey showed that 68% of women are unsatisfied with their sexual partners. Of course most of these women would never tell their partner that they are unhappy.

Not being able to fully satisfy a woman can result in depression and feelings of inadequacy. Thankfully, men of all ages can now safely and naturally enhance their body and penis anatomy and renew sexual vitality without resorting to dangerous surgery.

The all natural proprietary blend of unique herbs found in Maxaman is designed to restore blood flow to your penis, unleash stored testosterone, and heighten sensation by activating the body's natural hormone production and supplying vital nutrients necessary for peak sexual performance.

http://abcfhjmgikl.tickswan.info/?degiklxwqowyabcfhzmmjm





From rgeqlwhtuiltv at marsden.school.nz  Thu Feb 23 22:00:37 2006
From: rgeqlwhtuiltv at marsden.school.nz (Candy C. Howard)
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2006 00:00:37 -0600
Subject: a fresh start? 
Message-ID: <67083742454614.06597775@Tommie9>

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From xvywj at cottageinthewood.co.uk  Fri Feb 24 06:30:03 2006
From: xvywj at cottageinthewood.co.uk (Lane D. Webster)
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2006 06:30:03 -0800
Subject: Dont feel pain on xmas nopresc
Message-ID: <045736.5153726809422.440305350919.IDIN.1964@gotham>

bellman somefetch it'sejaculate it'sdegum seeairfoil
orapparent incrockery orthrough theequine
orpunitive !imprint someamaze maymajor
bepion 

furl itcompost !fest italginate orbit
trygalapagos andlightning itincessant !lifeblood
somechastity it'sceramic itbrainchildren seechange
andlacuna onintelligible mayshowmen inattestation
inlawbreaking someorganic butdeterring itcatatonic
inprostate on
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From coderman at gmail.com  Fri Feb 24 11:09:14 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2006 11:09:14 -0800
Subject: TIA Lives On (so that's where it went...)
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602241109k59c30162s5caa313911b35abe@mail.gmail.com>

http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0223nj1.htm

TIA Lives On

By Shane Harris, National Journal
(c) National Journal Group Inc.
Thursday, Feb. 23, 2006

A controversial counter-terrorism program, which lawmakers halted more
than two years ago amid outcries from privacy advocates, was stopped
in name only and has quietly continued within the intelligence agency
now fending off charges that it has violated the privacy of U.S.
citizens.

""It is no secret that some parts of TIA lived on behind the veil of
the classified intelligence budget.""

Research under the Defense Department's Total Information Awareness
program -- which developed technologies to predict terrorist attacks
by mining government databases and the personal records of people in
the United States -- was moved from the Pentagon's
research-and-development agency to another group, which builds
technologies primarily for the National Security Agency, according to
documents obtained by National Journal and to intelligence sources
familiar with the move. The names of key projects were changed,
apparently to conceal their identities, but their funding remained
intact, often under the same contracts.

It is no secret that some parts of TIA lived on behind the veil of the
classified intelligence budget. However, the projects that moved,
their new code names, and the agencies that took them over haven't
previously been disclosed. Sources aware of the transfers declined to
speak on the record for this story because, they said, the identities
of the specific programs are classified.

Two of the most important components of the TIA program were moved to
the Advanced Research and Development Activity, housed at NSA
headquarters in Fort Meade, Md., documents and sources confirm. One
piece was the Information Awareness Prototype System, the core
architecture that tied together numerous information extraction,
analysis, and dissemination tools developed under TIA. The prototype
system included privacy-protection technologies that may have been
discontinued or scaled back following the move to ARDA.

A $19 million contract to build the prototype system was awarded in
late 2002 to Hicks & Associates, a consulting firm in Arlington, Va.,
that is run by former Defense and military officials. Congress's
decision to pull TIA's funding in late 2003 "caused a significant
amount of uncertainty for all of us about the future of our work,"
Hicks executive Brian Sharkey wrote in an e-mail to subcontractors at
the time. "Fortunately," Sharkey continued, "a new sponsor has come
forward that will enable us to continue much of our previous work."
Sources confirm that this new sponsor was ARDA. Along with the new
sponsor came a new name. "We will be describing this new effort as
'Basketball,' " Sharkey wrote, apparently giving no explanation of the
name's significance. Another e-mail from a Hicks employee, Marc
Swedenburg, reminded the company's staff that "TIA has been terminated
and should be referenced in that fashion."

Sharkey played a key role in TIA's birth, when he and a close friend,
retired Navy Vice Adm. John Poindexter, President Reagan's national
security adviser, brought the idea to Defense officials shortly after
the 9/11 attacks. The men had teamed earlier on
intelligence-technology programs for the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, which agreed to host TIA and hired Poindexter to run
it in 2002. In August 2003, Poindexter was forced to resign as TIA
chief amid howls that his central role in the Iran-Contra scandal of
the mid-1980s made him unfit to run a sensitive intelligence program.

It's unclear whether work on Basketball continues. Sharkey didn't
respond to an interview request, and Poindexter said he had no comment
about former TIA programs. But a publicly available Defense Department
document, detailing various "cooperative agreements and other
transactions" conducted in fiscal 2004, shows that Basketball was
fully funded at least until the end of that year (September 2004). The
document shows that the system was being tested at a research center
jointly run by ARDA and SAIC Corp., a major defense and intelligence
contractor that is the sole owner of Hicks & Associates. The document
describes Basketball as a "closed-loop, end-to-end prototype system
for early warning and decision-making," exactly the same language used
in contract documents for the TIA prototype system when it was awarded
to Hicks in 2002. An SAIC spokesman declined to comment for this
story.

Another key TIA project that moved to ARDA was Genoa II, which focused
on building information technologies to help analysts and policy
makers anticipate and pre-empt terrorist attacks. Genoa II was renamed
Topsail when it moved to ARDA, intelligence sources confirmed. (The
name continues the program's nautical nomenclature; "genoa" is a
synonym for the headsail of a ship.)

As recently as October 2005, SAIC was awarded a $3.7 million contract
under Topsail. According to a government-issued press release
announcing the award, "The objective of Topsail is to develop
decision-support aids for teams of intelligence analysts and policy
personnel to assist in anticipating and pre-empting terrorist threats
to U.S. interests." That language repeats almost verbatim the
boilerplate descriptions of Genoa II contained in contract documents,
Pentagon budget sheets, and speeches by the Genoa II program's former
managers.

As early as February 2003, the Pentagon planned to use Genoa II
technologies at the Army's Information Awareness Center at Fort
Belvoir, Va., according to an unclassified Defense budget document.
The awareness center was an early tester of various TIA tools,
according to former employees. A 2003 Pentagon report to Congress
shows that the Army center was part of an expansive network of
intelligence agencies, including the NSA, that experimented with the
tools. The center was also home to the Army's Able Danger program,
which has come under scrutiny after some of its members said they used
data-analysis tools to discover the name and photograph of 9/11
ringleader Mohamed Atta more than a year before the attacks.

Devices developed under Genoa II's predecessor -- which Sharkey also
managed when he worked for the Defense Department -- were used during
the invasion of Afghanistan and as part of "the continuing war on
terrorism," according to an unclassified Defense budget document.
Today, however, the future of Topsail is in question. A spokesman for
the Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, N.Y., which administers the
program's contracts, said it's "in the process of being canceled due
to lack of funds."

It is unclear when funding for Topsail was terminated. But earlier
this month, at a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, one of TIA's
strongest critics questioned whether intelligence officials knew that
some of its programs had been moved to other agencies. Sen. Ron Wyden,
D-Ore., asked Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte and
FBI Director Robert Mueller whether it was "correct that when [TIA]
was closed, that several ... projects were moved to various
intelligence agencies.... I and others on this panel led the effort to
close [TIA]; we want to know if Mr. Poindexter's programs are going on
somewhere else."

Negroponte and Mueller said they didn't know. But Negroponte's deputy,
Gen. Michael V. Hayden, who until recently was director of the NSA,
said, "I'd like to answer in closed session." Asked for comment,
Wyden's spokeswoman referred to his hearing statements.

The NSA is now at the center of a political firestorm over President
Bush's program to eavesdrop on the phone calls and e-mails of people
in the United States who the agency believes are connected to
terrorists abroad. While the documents on the TIA programs don't show
that their tools are used in the domestic eavesdropping, and
knowledgeable sources wouldn't discuss the matter, the TIA programs
were designed specifically to develop the kind of "early-warning
system" that the president said the NSA is running.

Documents detailing TIA, Genoa II, Basketball, and Topsail use the
phrase "early-warning system" repeatedly to describe the programs'
ultimate aims. In speeches, Poindexter has described TIA as an
early-warning and decision-making system. He conceived of TIA in part
because of frustration over the lack of such tools when he was
national security chief for Reagan.

Tom Armour, the Genoa II program manager, declined to comment for this
story. But in a previous interview, he said that ARDA -- which
absorbed the TIA programs -- has pursued technologies that would be
useful for analyzing large amounts of phone and e-mail traffic.
"That's, in fact, what the interest is," Armour said. When TIA was
still funded, its program managers and researchers had "good
coordination" with their counterparts at ARDA and discussed their
projects on a regular basis, Armour said. The former No. 2 official in
Poindexter's office, Robert Popp, averred that the NSA didn't use TIA
tools in domestic eavesdropping as part of his research. But asked
whether the agency could have used the tools apart from TIA, Popp
replied, "I can't speak to that." Asked to comment on TIA projects
that moved to ARDA, Don Weber, an NSA spokesman said, "As I'm sure you
understand, we can neither confirm nor deny actual or alleged projects
or operational capabilities; therefore, we have no information to
provide."

ARDA now is undergoing some changes of its own. The outfit is being
taken out of the NSA, placed under the control of Negroponte's office,
and given a new name. It will be called the "Disruptive Technology
Office," a reference to a term of art describing any new invention
that suddenly, and often dramatically, replaces established
procedures. Officials with the intelligence director's office did not
respond to multiple requests for comment on this story.




From dave at farber.net  Fri Feb 24 18:03:48 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2006 21:03:48 -0500
Subject: [IP] WORTH READING  "Total Information Awareness" - secretly
 funded in defiance of Congress]]
Message-ID: <mailman.1604.1576007675.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [IP] "Total Information Awareness" - secretly funded in
defiance of Congress]
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2006 20:02:20 -0500
From: Peter Harsha <harsha at cra.org>
To: dave at farber.net
References: <43FF92D2.1050908 at farber.net>

Hi Dave,

I blogged a bit about this way back in April 2004, noting some of my
frustration that the rush to kill TIA would kill the privacy and
security research that was underway and drive the more potentially
nefarious bits of the program deeper into the black, hidden from view.

http://www.cra.org/govaffairs/blog/archives/000069.html

The post was in the context of a review of some of the interesting
sessions I'd attended at the Computers Freedom and Privacy conference
that year, but here's the relevant bit about TIA (see the blog for
all the embedded links):

A number of speakers made the point (though Doug Tygar probably made
it most emphatically) that the government spends a disproportionate
amount of its IT privacy and security research funding on security
rather than privacy. Given the current state of funding for federal
cyber security R&D (see previous blog entry), that's a sobering
thought. But the frustrating part for me is that many of the same
people at CFP who are now clamoring for more federal R&D for privacy
related research were among the loudest voices calling for
cancellation of DARPA's TIA project (I'm not including Tygar in this,
as I don't know where he stood on TIA). Let me explain.

DARPA's Total Information Awareness (pdf) project was an attempt to
"design a prototype network that integrates innovative information
technologies for detecting and preempting foreign terrorist
activities against Americans." In order to do this, DARPA was funding
research into a range of technologies including real-time translation
tools, data mining applications, and "privacy enhancing technologies"
including development of a "privacy appliance" that would protect the
identities of all individuals within any of the databases being
searched until the government had the appropriate court order to
reveal them. At CFP, Philippe Golle, from Xerox's Palo Alto Research
Center, described one such project at PARC (led by Teresa Lunt), that
DARPA agreed to fund for 3 years as part of TIA. The plan was to
create a "privacy appliance" that owners of commercial databases of
interest to the government could deploy that would control government
access to the databases using inference control (deciding what types
of queries -- individually or in aggregate -- might divulge
identifying information), access control and an immutable audit trail
to protect individual privacy. Really neat stuff.

Anyway, the idea that the government might one day deploy a TIA-like
system before all of the privacy and security challenges had been
sorted out and thereby imperil American civil liberties and security
was worrying to a great many people and organizations, including CRA.
However, there seemed to be a number of different approaches among
the various people and organizations to deal with the concerns. There
was a vocal contingent that believed Congress should cancel TIA
outright -- the threat the research posed was greater than any
possible good. CFP participant Jim Harper, of Privacilla.org,
addressed this approach directly at the conference, saying the reason
groups like his try to kill government programs when they're still in
R&D and small is because they're too hard to kill when they get big.

CRA had a more nuanced view, I believe, that argued that the
challenges that needed to be overcome before any TIA-esque system
would ever be fit for deployment were large and that CRA would oppose
any deployment until concerns about privacy and security were met.
However, we also argued that the research required to address those
concerns was worthy of continued support -- the problems of privacy
and security (as well as the challenge of ever making something like
TIA actually work) were truly difficult research problems..."DARPA
hard" problems -- and so we opposed any research moratorium.

Unsurprisingly, the "nuanced" position failed to carry the day once
Congress got involved. At about the same time Congress was deciding
TIA's fate, stories broke in the press about DARPA's FutureMAP
project -- which attempted to harness the predictive nature of
markets to glean information about possible terrorist activities --
and JetBlue airline's release of customer data to the Defense
Department (in violation of their privacy policies) that helped
cement opinion that DARPA was out of control. It also didn't help
that the TIA program resided in DARPA's Information Assurance Office,
headed by the controversial Adm. John Poindexter. TIA's fate was
sealed. Congress voted to cut all funding for the program and
eliminate the IAO office at DARPA that housed it.

However, Congress also recognized that some of the technologies under
development might have a role to play in the war against terrorism.
They included language in the appropriations bill (Sec 8131(a)) that
allowed work on the technologies to continue at unspecified
intelligence agencies, provided that work was focused on non-US
citizens. As a result, much of the research that had been funded by
DARPA has been taken up by the Advanced Research Development Agency,
the research arm of the intelligence agencies. Because it's
classified, we have no way of knowing how much of TIA has been
resurrected under ARDA. We also have no way of overseeing the
research, no way of questioning the approach or implementation, no
way of questioning the security or privacy protections (if any)
included. In short, those who argued in support of a research
moratorium just succeeded in driving the research underground.

Finally, one thing we do know about current TIA-related research
efforts is that PARC's work on privacy-enhancing technologies is no
longer being funded.

---

I'm glad to see the National Journal article has the specifics on
where much of that research actually went....

-Peter

--
Peter Harsha
Director of Government Affairs
Computing Research Association
1100 17th St. NW, Suite 507
Washington, DC 20036
p: 202.234.2111 ext 106
c: 202.256.8271
CRA's Computing Research Policy Blog: http://www.cra.org/govaffairs/blog


On Feb 24, 2006, at 6:12 PM, Dave Farber wrote:

>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Fwd: [sv4dean] "Total Information Awareness" - secretly
> funded
> in defiance of Congress
> Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2006 14:55:06 -0800
> From: Hasan Diwan <hasan.diwan at gmail.com>
> To: dave at farber.net
> References: <a1.70dbecb5.312ff09a at aol.com>
>
> For IP, if you wish.
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Chinarock at aol.com <Chinarock at aol.com>
> Date: 23-Feb-2006 21:16
> Subject: [sv4dean] "Total Information Awareness" - secretly funded in
> defiance of Congress
> To: sv4dean at yahoogroups.com
>
> *http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0223nj1.htm*
>
> *TIA Lives On *
>
> By Shane Harris <sharris at nationaljournal.com>, *National Journal*
> (c) National Journal Group Inc.
> Thursday, Feb. 23, 2006
>
> A controversial counter-terrorism program, which lawmakers halted
> more than
> two years ago amid outcries from privacy advocates, was stopped in
> name only
> and has quietly continued within the intelligence agency now
> fending off
> charges that it has violated the privacy of U.S. citizens.
>
> Research under the Defense Department's Total Information Awareness
> program
> -- which developed technologies to predict terrorist attacks by
> mining
> government databases and the personal records of people in the
> United States
> -- was moved from the Pentagon's research-and-development agency to
> another
> group, which builds technologies primarily for the National
> Security Agency,
> according to documents obtained by *National Journal* and to
> intelligence
> sources familiar with the move. The names of key projects were
> changed,
> apparently to conceal their identities, but their funding remained
> intact,
> often under the same contracts.
>
> It is no secret that some parts of TIA lived on behind the veil of the
> classified intelligence budget. However, the projects that moved,
> their new
> code names, and the agencies that took them over haven't previously
> been
> disclosed. Sources aware of the transfers declined to speak on the
> record
> for this story because, they said, the identities of the specific
> programs
> are classified.
>
> Two of the most important components of the TIA program were moved
> to the
> Advanced Research and Development Activity, housed at NSA
> headquarters in
> Fort Meade, Md., documents and sources confirm. One piece was the
> Information Awareness Prototype System, the core architecture that
> tied
> together numerous information extraction, analysis, and
> dissemination tools
> developed under TIA. The prototype system included privacy-protection
> technologies that may have been discontinued or scaled back
> following the
> move to ARDA. .....
>
> Sharkey played a key role in TIA's birth, when he and a close friend,
> retired Navy Vice Adm. *John Poindexter*, *President Reagan*'s
> national
> security adviser, brought the idea to Defense officials shortly
> after the
> 9/11 attacks. The men had teamed earlier on intelligence-technology
> programs
> for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which agreed to
> host TIA
> and hired Poindexter to run it in 2002. In August 2003, Poindexter was
> forced to resign
> <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A51578-2003Aug12>as TIA
> chief amid howls that his central role in the Iran-Contra scandal of
> the mid-1980s made him unfit to run a sensitive intelligence program.
> ....etc.
>
>
>  Links to Democracy for America...
> <http://www.democracyforamerica.com/>
> <http://www.dfa.meetup.com/>
> <http://dfasv.org/>
>
>
>
>  SPONSORED LINKS
>   Presidential
> election<http://groups.yahoo.com/gads?t=ms&k=Presidential
> +election&w1=Presidential+election&w2=Silicon
> +valley&c=2&s=47&.sig=XVKuwwahoV8Hm_1e5O_oIw>
>  Silicon
> valley<http://groups.yahoo.com/gads?t=ms&k=Silicon
> +valley&w1=Presidential+election&w2=Silicon
> +valley&c=2&s=47&.sig=pIWbpNAt6BNx-rmFh-brVg>
>  ------------------------------
> YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
>
>
>    -  Visit your group "sv4dean <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/
> sv4dean>"
>    on the web.
>
>    -  To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
>
> sv4dean-unsubscribe at yahoogroups.com<sv4dean-
> unsubscribe at yahoogroups.com?subject=Unsubscribe>
>
>    -  Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
> Service<http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>
>    .
>
>
>  ------------------------------
>
>
>
> --
> Cheers,
> Hasan Diwan <hasan.diwan at gmail.com>
>

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From tlvxsfz at math.otago.ac.nz  Fri Feb 24 21:12:14 2006
From: tlvxsfz at math.otago.ac.nz (Sue C. Oconnor)
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2006 22:12:14 -0700
Subject: perfect duplicates
Message-ID: <oon24is11-86213-939727164294637145595@Alexis71>

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From fgtnf at msn.com  Fri Feb 24 16:48:10 2006
From: fgtnf at msn.com (Dwight Ellison)
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 01:48:10 +0100
Subject: Quality Medicine Available 1M9
Message-ID: <LAW49.OE649yfB4mvo509353d5@motmail.com>


Loking for quality meds at affordable
price?
We have widest range of meds at very
competitive price.
Money baack guaranteesss...

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lJU




From coderman at gmail.com  Sat Feb 25 08:52:24 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 08:52:24 -0800
Subject: AT&T's database of 1.92 trillion phone calls (Sprint does
  it too, and i'm sure they aren't the only ones)
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602250852t4a1eaa5v96c70ebc95d9234d@mail.gmail.com>

Sprint did this as well starting in the mid to late 90's but covering
a much deeper/wider data set.  for hypothetical example, mobile phones
add much more richness/detail at this scale when you consider the
location tracking aspects of monitoring radio signal levels, cell
tower associations (with associated GIS attributes) and hand off /
interpolation with multiple towers to get within a few hundred meters
or better.

they tapped their fiber at the backbone peering / termination points. 
company line was "monitoring packet headers/circuit|path ids only, for
routing optimization only, for a brief period of time only". (yes,
that means voice, data, leased optical circuits, all of it)

the under reported capabilities and extensive secrecy around this
project indicated other uses and other "collaborators" to assist with
processing and collection.

like anonymous hero in the story below calling out att i'm not going
into much detail (NDA's aren't the only stick they can beat you with,
heh).

keep digging all you guys/gals, this story just gets nastier the
deeper you look...

and keep blowing those whistles; we need some real accountability and
this "legalize it in retrospect" / "classify and compartmentalize it
into deep black" bullshit doesn't cut it.  (just be careful when you
do so, and that goes for reporters who receive the info - see the
previous post about holding reporters liable for merely possessing
classified materials)

[[
i'm one of a small set of people who has been through a tour of the
Sprint world network headquarters / technical operations center and
salivated over the equipment present (not the new campus, not the old
HQ, it's below ground, and you either know what i'm talking about or
don't. i never got to see the geographic fail-over location but it had
to be just as impressive.  a nuke in this facility, the nerve core of
sprint enterprise, and you had recovery on the order of seconds via
this redundant remote "hot backup" data center. it still makes me go
'wow' this many years later.

the raw technology located here, and the processing it was capable of
doing, coupled with the fact that collection and subsequent analysis
was distributed and comprised centers like this one and others meant
public estimates of what was "possible to tap and process" at the
global level for even an NSA style adversary were almost always
grossly underestimated.  the closer you got to ballpark, the more
likely such scenarios were publicly declared "tin foil hat paranoia" 
:)

NOTE: to the corporate legal departments, TLA spooks: all of the above
information is public in some form or another given enough digging;
please don't interpret this as proprietary or classified.  and please
don't send the white vans for remote technical surveillance like FBI
Infragard over the wireless security debacle; i'm no dummy.  (Hi Mary!
 i'm still waiting for that apology...)
]]

P.S.  who is going to start an open public/community driven data
mining program to perform knowledge discovery against our tax payer
funded entities and public corporations and those who serve them? 
large scale decentralized / distributed computing is possible these
days with broadband and gaming boxes laying aplenty across this
nation.  perhaps if accountability will not be enforced by those in
power charged with doing so a more grass roots approach is
appropriate...

P.P.S is this funny / amusing (funsec) in a dark humor (haha, we got
so pwn'ed!) kinda way?  *grin*

ok, enough parens and commentary.  i've spoken my mind and said my peace.


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Richard M. Smith <rms at bsf-llc.com>
Date: Feb 25, 2006 6:36 AM
Subject: [funsec] AT&T's database of 1.92 trillion phone calls
To: funsec at linuxbox.org


http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/25/technology/25data.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

Taking Spying to Higher Level, Agencies Look for More Ways to Mine Data

...

He was alluding to databases maintained at an AT&T data center in Kansas,
which now contain electronic records of 1.92 trillion telephone calls, going
back decades. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a digital-rights advocacy
group, has asserted in a lawsuit that the AT&T Daytona system, a giant
storehouse of calling records and Internet message routing information, was
the foundation of the N.S.A.'s effort to mine telephone records without a
warrant.

An AT&T spokeswoman said the company would not comment on the claim, or
generally on matters of national security or customer privacy.

But the mining of the databases in other law enforcement investigations is
well established, with documented results. One application of the database
technology, called Security Call Analysis and Monitoring Platform, or Scamp,
offers access to about nine weeks of calling information. It currently
handles about 70,000 queries a month from fraud and law enforcement
investigators, according to AT&T documents.

A former AT&T official who had detailed knowledge of the call-record
database said the Daytona system takes great care to make certain that
anyone using the database - whether AT&T employee or law enforcement
official with a subpoena - sees only information he or she is authorized to
see, and that an audit trail keeps track of all users. Such information is
frequently used to build models of suspects' social networks.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was discussing
sensitive corporate matters, said every telephone call generated a record:
number called, time of call, duration of call, billing category and other
details. While the database does not contain such billing data as names,
addresses and credit card numbers, those records are in a linked database
that can be tapped by authorized users.

New calls are entered into the database immediately after they end, the
official said, adding, "I would characterize it as near real time."

According to a current AT&T employee, whose identity is being withheld to
avoid jeopardizing his job, the mining of the AT&T databases had a notable
success in helping investigators find the perpetrators of what was known as
the Moldovan porn scam.

In 1997 a shadowy group in Moldova, a former Soviet republic, was tricking
Internet users by enticing them to a pornography Web site that would
download a piece of software that disconnected the computer user from his
local telephone line and redialed a costly 900 number in Moldova.

While another long-distance carrier simply cut off the entire nation of
Moldova from its network, AT&T and the Moldovan authorities were able to
mine the database to track the culprits.
_______________________________________________
Fun and Misc security discussion for OT posts.
https://linuxbox.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/funsec
Note: funsec is a public and open mailing list.




From dave at farber.net  Sat Feb 25 09:31:22 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 12:31:22 -0500
Subject: [IP] Taking Spying to Higher Level, Agencies Look for More
 Ways to Mine Data,By JOHN MARKOFF
Message-ID: <mailman.1605.1576007675.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

The New York Times

February 25, 2006
Taking Spying to Higher Level, Agencies Look for More Ways to Mine Data
By JOHN MARKOFF

PALO ALTO, Calif., Feb. 23 b A small group of National Security Agency
officials slipped into Silicon Valley on one of the agency's periodic
technology shopping expeditions this month.

On the wish list, according to several venture capitalists who met with
the officials, were an array of technologies that underlie the fierce
debate over the Bush administration's anti-terrorist eavesdropping
program: computerized systems that reveal connections between seemingly
innocuous and unrelated pieces of information.

The tools they were looking for are new, but their application would
fall under the well-established practice of data mining: using
mathematical and statistical techniques to scan for hidden relationships
in streams of digital data or large databases.

Supercomputer companies looking for commercial markets have used the
practice for decades. Now intelligence agencies, hardly newcomers to
data mining, are using new technologies to take the practice to another
level.

But by fundamentally changing the nature of surveillance, high-tech data
mining raises privacy concerns that are only beginning to be debated
widely. That is because to find illicit activities it is necessary to
turn loose software sentinels to examine all digital behavior whether it
is innocent or not.

"The theory is that the automated tool that is conducting the search is
not violating the law," said Mark D. Rasch, the former head of
computer-crime investigations for the Justice Department and now the
senior vice president of Solutionary, a computer security company. But
"anytime a tool or a human is looking at the content of your
communication, it invades your privacy."

When asked for comment about the meetings in Silicon Valley, Jane
Hudgins, a National Security Agency spokeswoman, said, "We have no
information to provide."

Data mining is already being used in a diverse array of commercial
applications b whether by credit card companies detecting and stopping
fraud as it happens, or by insurance companies that predict health
risks. As a result, millions of Americans have become enmeshed in a vast
and growing data web that is constantly being examined by a legion of
Internet-era software snoops.

Technology industry executives and government officials said that the
intelligence agency systems take such techniques further, applying
software analysis tools now routinely used by law enforcement agencies
to identify criminal activities and political terrorist organizations
that would otherwise be missed by human eavesdroppers.

One such tool is Analyst's Notebook, a crime investigation "spreadsheet"
and visualization tool developed by i2 Inc., a software firm based in
McLean, Va.

The software, which ranges in price from as little as $3,000 for a
sheriff's department to millions of dollars for a large government
agency like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, allows investigators to
organize and view telephone and financial transaction records. It was
used in 2001 by Joyce Knowlton, an investigator at the Stillwater State
Correctional Facility in Minnesota, to detect a prison drug-smuggling
ring that ultimately implicated 30 offenders who were linked to Supreme
White Power, a gang active in the prison.

Ms. Knowlton began her investigation by importing telephone call records
into her software and was immediately led to a pattern of calls between
prisoners and a recent parolee. She overlaid the calling data with
records of prisoners' financial accounts, and based on patterns that
emerged, she began monitoring phone calls of particular inmates. That
led her to coded messages being exchanged in the calls that revealed
that seemingly innocuous wood blocks were being used to smuggle drugs
into the prison.

"Once we added the money and saw how it was flowing from addresses that
were connected to phone numbers, it created a very clear picture of the
smuggling ring," she said.

Privacy, of course, is hardly an expectation for prisoners. And credit
card customers and insurance policyholders give up a certain amount of
privacy to the issuers and carriers. It is the power of such software
tools applied to broad, covert governmental uses that has led to the
deepening controversy over data mining.

In the wake of 9/11, the potential for mining immense databases of
digital information gave rise to a program called Total Information
Awareness, developed by Adm. John M. Poindexter, the former national
security adviser, while he was a program manager at the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency.

Although Congress abruptly canceled the program in October 2003, the
legislation provided a specific exemption for "processing, analysis and
collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence."

At the time, Admiral Poindexter, who declined to be interviewed for this
article because he said he had knowledge of current classified
intelligence activities, argued that his program had achieved a tenfold
increase in the speed of the searching databases for foreign threats.

While agreeing that data mining has a tremendous power for fighting a
new kind of warfare, John Arquilla, a professor of defense analysis at
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., said that
intelligence agencies had missed an opportunity by misapplying the
technologies.

"In many respects, we're fighting the last intelligence war," Mr.
Arquilla said. "We have not pursued data mining in the way we should."

Mr. Arquilla, who was a consultant on Admiral Poindexter's Total
Information Awareness project, said that the $40 billion spent each year
by intelligence agencies had failed to exploit the power of data mining
in correlating information readily available from public sources, like
monitoring Internet chat rooms used by Al Qaeda. Instead, he said, the
government has been investing huge sums in surveillance of phone calls
of American citizens.

"Checking every phone call ever made is an example of old think," he said.

He was alluding to databases maintained at an AT&T data center in
Kansas, which now contain electronic records of 1.92 trillion telephone
calls, going back decades. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a
digital-rights advocacy group, has asserted in a lawsuit that the AT&T
Daytona system, a giant storehouse of calling records and Internet
message routing information, was the foundation of the N.S.A.'s effort
to mine telephone records without a warrant.

An AT&T spokeswoman said the company would not comment on the claim, or
generally on matters of national security or customer privacy.

But the mining of the databases in other law enforcement investigations
is well established, with documented results. One application of the
database technology, called Security Call Analysis and Monitoring
Platform, or Scamp, offers access to about nine weeks of calling
information. It currently handles about 70,000 queries a month from
fraud and law enforcement investigators, according to AT&T documents.

A former AT&T official who had detailed knowledge of the call-record
database said the Daytona system takes great care to make certain that
anyone using the database b whether AT&T employee or law enforcement
official with a subpoena b sees only information he or she is authorized
to see, and that an audit trail keeps track of all users. Such
information is frequently used to build models of suspects' social networks.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was
discussing sensitive corporate matters, said every telephone call
generated a record: number called, time of call, duration of call,
billing category and other details. While the database does not contain
such billing data as names, addresses and credit card numbers, those
records are in a linked database that can be tapped by authorized users.

New calls are entered into the database immediately after they end, the
official said, adding, "I would characterize it as near real time."

According to a current AT&T employee, whose identity is being withheld
to avoid jeopardizing his job, the mining of the AT&T databases had a
notable success in helping investigators find the perpetrators of what
was known as the Moldovan porn scam.

In 1997 a shadowy group in Moldova, a former Soviet republic, was
tricking Internet users by enticing them to a pornography Web site that
would download a piece of software that disconnected the computer user
from his local telephone line and redialed a costly 900 number in Moldova.

While another long-distance carrier simply cut off the entire nation of
Moldova from its network, AT&T and the Moldovan authorities were able to
mine the database to track the culprits.

Much of the recent work on data mining has been aimed at even more
sophisticated applications. The National Security Agency has invested
billions in computerized tools for monitoring phone calls around the
world b not only logging them, but also determining content b and more
recently in trying to design digital vacuum cleaners to sweep up
information from the Internet.

Last September, the N.S.A. was granted a patent for a technique that
could be used to determine the physical location of an Internet address
b another potential category of data to be mined. The technique, which
exploits the tiny time delays in the transmission of Internet data,
suggests the agency's interest in sophisticated surveillance tasks like
trying to determine where a message sent from an Internet address in a
cybercafe might have originated.

An earlier N.S.A. patent, in 1999, focused on a software solution for
generating a list of topics from computer-generated text. Such a
capacity hints at the ability to extract the content of telephone
conversations automatically. That might permit the agency to mine
millions of phone conversations and then select a handful for human
inspection.

As the N.S.A. visit to the Silicon Valley venture capitalists this month
indicates, the actual development of such technologies often comes from
private companies.

In 2003, Virage, a Silicon Valley company, began supplying a voice
transcription product that recognized and logged the text of television
programming for government and commercial customers. Under perfect
conditions, the system could be 95 percent accurate in capturing spoken
text. Such technology has potential applications in monitoring phone
conversations as well.

And several Silicon Valley executives say one side effect of the 2003
decision to cancel the Total Information Awareness project was that it
killed funds for a research project at the Palo Alto Research Center, a
subsidiary of Xerox, exploring technologies that could protect privacy
while permitting data mining.

The aim was to allow an intelligence analyst to conduct extensive data
mining without getting access to identifying information about
individuals. If the results suggested that, for instance, someone might
be a terrorist, the intelligence agency could seek a court warrant
authorizing it to penetrate the privacy technology and identify the
person involved.

With Xerox funds, the Palo Alto researchers are continuing to explore
the technology.

Scott Shane contributed reporting from Washington for this article.


-------------------------------------
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




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Subject: You Need This Cypherpunks
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From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Feb 25 12:27:06 2006
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 15:27:06 -0500
Subject: [Clips] Stew Baker: *I* didn't approve Ports Bill...
Message-ID: <p0623092fc0266e153a6d@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


  Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
  Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 14:15:39 -0500
  To: Philodox Clips List <clips at philodox.com>
  From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
  Subject: [Clips] Stew Baker: *I* didn't approve Ports Bill...
  Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
  Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com


<http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/P/PORTS_SECURITY?SITE=7219&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2006-02-25-10-37-13>


  Feb 25, 1:20 PM EST

  Homeland Security Objected to Ports Deal

  By TED BRIDIS
  Associated Press Writer



  AP Photo/JOSEPH KACZMAREK

  WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Homeland Security Department objected at first to a
  United Arab Emirates company's taking over significant operations at six
  U.S. ports. It was the lone protest among members of the government
  committee that eventually approved the deal without dissent.

  The department's early objections were settled later in the government's
  review of the $6.8 billion deal after Dubai-owned DP World agreed to a
  series of security restrictions.

  The company indefinitely has postponed its takeover to give President Bush
  time to convince Congress that the deal does not pose any increased risks
  to the U.S. from terrorism.

  Some lawmakers have pressed for a new and intensive review. Despite
  persistent criticism from Republicans and Democrats, the president has
  defended his administration's approval of the ports deal and threatened to
  veto any measures in Congress that would block it. Hearings are to continue
  this week.

  A DP World executive said the company would agree to tougher security
  restrictions to win congressional support only if the same restrictions
  applied to all U.S. port operators. The company earlier had struck a more
  conciliatory stance, saying it would do whatever Bush asked to salvage the
  agreement.

  "Security is everybody's business," senior vice president Michael Moore
  told The Associated Press. "We're going to have a very open mind to
  legitimate concerns. But anything we can do, any way to improve security,
  should apply to everybody equally."

  The administration approved the ports deal on Jan. 17 after DP World agreed
  during secret negotiations to cooperate with law enforcement investigations
  in the future and make other concessions.

  Some lawmakers have challenged the adequacy of a classified intelligence
  assessment crucial to assuring the administration that the deal was proper.
  The report was assembled during four weeks in November by analysts working
  for the director of national intelligence.


  The report concluded that U.S. spy agencies were "unable to locate any
  derogatory information on the company," according to a person familiar with
  the document. This person spoke only on condition of anonymity because the
  report was classified.

  Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., and others have complained that the intelligence
  report focused only on information the agencies collected about DP World
  and did not examine reported links between UAE government officials and
  al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden before the Sept. 11 attacks.

  The uproar over DP World has exposed how the government routinely approves
  deals involving national security without the input of senior
  administration officials or Congress.

  President Bush, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, Defense
  Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and even Treasury Secretary John Snow, who
  oversees the government committee that approved the deal, all say they did
  not know about the purchase until after it was finalized. The work was done
  mostly by assistant secretaries.

  Snow now says he may consider changes in the approval process so lawmakers
  are better alerted after such deals get the go-ahead.

  Stewart Baker, a senior Homeland Security official, said he was the sole
  representative on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
  who objected to the ports deal. Baker said he later changed his vote after
  DP World agreed to the security conditions. Other officials confirmed
  Baker's account.

  "We were not prepared to sign off on the deal without the successful
  negotiation of the assurances," Baker told the AP.

  Officials from the White House, CIA, departments of State, Treasury,
  Justices, and others looked for guidance from Homeland Security because it
  is responsible for seaports. "We had the most obvious stake in the
  process," Baker said.

  Baker acknowledged that a government audit of security practices at the
  U.S. ports in the takeover has not been completed as part of the deal. "We
  had the authority to do an audit earlier," Baker said.

  The audit will help evaluate DP World's security programs to stop smuggling
  and detect illegal shipments of nuclear materials at its seaport operations
  in New York, New Jersey, Baltimore, New Orleans, Miami and Philadelphia.

  The administration privately disclosed the status of the security audit to
  senators during meetings about improving reviews of future business deals
  involving foreign buyers. Officials did not suggest the audit's earlier
  completion would have affected the deal's approval.

  New Jersey's Democratic governor, who is suing to block the deal, said in
  his party's weekly radio address on Saturday that the administration failed
  to properly investigate the UAE's record on terrorism.

  "We were told that the president didn't know about the sale until after it
  was approved. For many Americans, regardless of party, this lack of
  disciplined review is unacceptable," Jon Corzine said.

  Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, said there was no going
  back on the deal.

  --
  -----------------
  R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
  The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
  44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
  "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
  [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
  experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
  _______________________________________________
  Clips mailing list
  Clips at philodox.com
  http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Feb 25 09:23:10 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 18:23:10 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] WORTH READING  "Total Information
  Awareness" - secretly funded in defiance of Congress]]]
Message-ID: <20060225172310.GZ25017@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Feb 25 09:36:03 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 18:36:03 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Taking Spying to Higher Level, Agencies
  Look for More Ways to Mine Data,By JOHN MARKOFF]
Message-ID: <20060225173603.GA25017@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Feb 25 09:41:17 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 18:41:17 +0100
Subject: /. [UK Government Wins Villain of the Year]
Message-ID: <20060225174117.GB25017@leitl.org>

(((Duration of data retention varies, it's 6 months in Germany (just
been passed as law), up to 2 years elsewhere (you forgot Poland?) --
approval status unknown)))

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/02/24/2047203
Posted by: Zonk, on 2006-02-24 21:52:00

   Anonymous Cowpat writes "The BBC is reporting that the UK Government,
   or rather their six month presidency of the EU, has been awarded the
   [1]Internet Villain of the Year award by the [2]Internet Service
   Providers Association for being the driving force behind [3]the new EU
   data retention laws. These require that ISPs and other telecomms
   providers keep records of the time\date & recipient of every
   communication made by their subscribers."

References

   1. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4744304.stm
   2. http://www.ispa.org.uk/
   3. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4527840.stm

----- End forwarded message -----


EU approves data retention rules

Individual governments will decide exactly how long to keep data

The European Parliament has approved rules forcing telephone companies to
retain call and internet records for use in anti-terror investigations.

Records will be kept for up to two years under the new measures.

Police will have access to information about calls, text messages and internet
data, but not exact call content.

The UK, which pressed European member states to back the rules, said that data
was the "golden thread" in terrorist investigations.

The parliament voted by 378 to 197 to approve the bill, which had already been
agreed by the assembly's two largest groups, the European People's Party and
the Socialists.

Compromises

The measures were proposed by Britain after the bomb attacks in London in
July.

They still need to be formally approved by EU member states.

UK Home Secretary Charles Clarke said the approval showed the European
institutions - the Parliament, the Council, the Commission - standing firm
against terrorism and serious organised crime.

"This sends a powerful message that Europe is united against terrorism and
organised crime," he said.

"All three institutions have worked closely together and been willing to
compromise in order to reach agreement on this important measure."

The measures will require firms to store:

    * data that can trace fixed or mobile telephone calls
    * time and duration of calls
    * location of the mobile phone being called
    * details of connections made to the Internet
    * details, but not the content, of internet e-mail and internet telephony
services

Details of connected calls that are unanswered, which can be used as signals
to accomplices or used to detonate bombs, will also be archived where that
data exists.

Costs

But the telecommunications industry has raised some concerns about the
measures, which firms say could be expensive to implement.

Thierry Dieu, spokesman for European Telecommunications Networks Operators'
Association, said that because the proposed measures go much further than the
current practices, especially for the internet data, "it is clear that there
will be a lot of investment for the industry to make".

A spokesman for the Internet Service Providers' Association (ISPA) said it
remained to be seen how the measures would affect providers once incorporated
into UK law.

He said there was already some voluntary co-operation with the authorities,
but mandatory data retention would result in significant costs. ISPs would
have to create ways of holding the data, managing it and providing access to
it for the authorities, he said.

"At the end of the day ISPs are not law enforcement agencies so they should
not have to pay for it all," he said.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From dave at farber.net  Sat Feb 25 16:40:49 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 19:40:49 -0500
Subject: [IP] more  on WORTH READING "Total Information Awareness"
 - secretly funded in defiance of Congress]]]
Message-ID: <mailman.1606.1576007675.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [IP] WORTH READING "Total Information Awareness" - secretly
funded in defiance of Congress]]
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 14:41:51 -0800
From: Lee Tien <tien at eff.org>
To: dave at farber.net
References: <43FFBB04.9070108 at farber.net>

Dave,

The problem IMHO is that killed programs can be and are reanimated in
this secret, black-budget, nudge-wink underground out of public view,
not that privacy advocates sought to stop TIA.

The "you naive fools drove it underground" attitude is a bit like
blaming the Supreme Court, Congress, and the Constitution for the
president's warrantless surveillance program:   "You really shouldn't
have insisted on procedural/substantive restraints and
accountability, because you're just forcing me to do it secretly."
(Would that privacy advocates had a tiny fraction of the power
implied here!)

Put another way, the programs' proponents don't seem to like
meaningful civil-liberties accountability and have institutional
escape hatches for avoiding such.

Accordingly, I think it's dumb to criticize privacy advocates in this
or other similar contexts.
--Why not blame those who resurrected or permitted the resurrection
of the "more potentially nefarious bits"?
--Why not blame those who didn't continue to fund the privacy and
security research?*

More important, how do we create truly workable public
accountability/oversight mechanisms for a politically powerful,
extremely secretive executive branch?  Sadly, I no longer believe
that  congressional intelligence committees provide meaningful
oversight on civil-liberties issues.

Lee

*My recollection is that the "privacy appliance" (Genisys Privacy
Protection, Teresa Lunt) either wasn't part of the original TIA
portfolio (see http://www.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/overview.php, where we
presented the TIA program as it was when we first learned about it)
or was buried inside Genisys and then trotted out in response to
privacy concerns.   Also see Poindexter's presentation at DARPAtech
2002 near the bottom of http://www.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/, which
mentions Genisys but not Genisys Privacy Protection.





At 9:03 PM -0500 2/24/06, Dave Farber wrote:
>-------- Original Message --------
>Subject: Re: [IP] "Total Information Awareness" - secretly funded in
>defiance of Congress]
>Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2006 20:02:20 -0500
>From: Peter Harsha <harsha at cra.org>
>To: dave at farber.net
>References: <43FF92D2.1050908 at farber.net>
>
>Hi Dave,
>
>I blogged a bit about this way back in April 2004, noting some of my
>frustration that the rush to kill TIA would kill the privacy and
>security research that was underway and drive the more potentially
>nefarious bits of the program deeper into the black, hidden from view.
>
>http://www.cra.org/govaffairs/blog/archives/000069.html
>
>The post was in the context of a review of some of the interesting
>sessions I'd attended at the Computers Freedom and Privacy conference
>that year, but here's the relevant bit about TIA (see the blog for
>all the embedded links):
>
>A number of speakers made the point (though Doug Tygar probably made
>it most emphatically) that the government spends a disproportionate
>amount of its IT privacy and security research funding on security
>rather than privacy. Given the current state of funding for federal
>cyber security R&D (see previous blog entry), that's a sobering
>thought. But the frustrating part for me is that many of the same
>people at CFP who are now clamoring for more federal R&D for privacy
>related research were among the loudest voices calling for
>cancellation of DARPA's TIA project (I'm not including Tygar in this,
>as I don't know where he stood on TIA). Let me explain.
>
>DARPA's Total Information Awareness (pdf) project was an attempt to
>"design a prototype network that integrates innovative information
>technologies for detecting and preempting foreign terrorist
>activities against Americans." In order to do this, DARPA was funding
>research into a range of technologies including real-time translation
>tools, data mining applications, and "privacy enhancing technologies"
>including development of a "privacy appliance" that would protect the
>identities of all individuals within any of the databases being
>searched until the government had the appropriate court order to
>reveal them. At CFP, Philippe Golle, from Xerox's Palo Alto Research
>Center, described one such project at PARC (led by Teresa Lunt), that
>DARPA agreed to fund for 3 years as part of TIA. The plan was to
>create a "privacy appliance" that owners of commercial databases of
>interest to the government could deploy that would control government
>access to the databases using inference control (deciding what types
>of queries -- individually or in aggregate -- might divulge
>identifying information), access control and an immutable audit trail
>to protect individual privacy. Really neat stuff.
>
>Anyway, the idea that the government might one day deploy a TIA-like
>system before all of the privacy and security challenges had been
>sorted out and thereby imperil American civil liberties and security
>was worrying to a great many people and organizations, including CRA.
>However, there seemed to be a number of different approaches among
>the various people and organizations to deal with the concerns. There
>was a vocal contingent that believed Congress should cancel TIA
>outright -- the threat the research posed was greater than any
>possible good. CFP participant Jim Harper, of Privacilla.org,
>addressed this approach directly at the conference, saying the reason
>groups like his try to kill government programs when they're still in
>R&D and small is because they're too hard to kill when they get big.
>
>CRA had a more nuanced view, I believe, that argued that the
>challenges that needed to be overcome before any TIA-esque system
>would ever be fit for deployment were large and that CRA would oppose
>any deployment until concerns about privacy and security were met.
>However, we also argued that the research required to address those
>concerns was worthy of continued support -- the problems of privacy
>and security (as well as the challenge of ever making something like
>TIA actually work) were truly difficult research problems..."DARPA
>hard" problems -- and so we opposed any research moratorium.
>
>Unsurprisingly, the "nuanced" position failed to carry the day once
>Congress got involved. At about the same time Congress was deciding
>TIA's fate, stories broke in the press about DARPA's FutureMAP
>project -- which attempted to harness the predictive nature of
>markets to glean information about possible terrorist activities --
>and JetBlue airline's release of customer data to the Defense
>Department (in violation of their privacy policies) that helped
>cement opinion that DARPA was out of control. It also didn't help
>that the TIA program resided in DARPA's Information Assurance Office,
>headed by the controversial Adm. John Poindexter. TIA's fate was
>sealed. Congress voted to cut all funding for the program and
>eliminate the IAO office at DARPA that housed it.
>
>However, Congress also recognized that some of the technologies under
>development might have a role to play in the war against terrorism.
>They included language in the appropriations bill (Sec 8131(a)) that
>allowed work on the technologies to continue at unspecified
>intelligence agencies, provided that work was focused on non-US
>citizens. As a result, much of the research that had been funded by
>DARPA has been taken up by the Advanced Research Development Agency,
>the research arm of the intelligence agencies. Because it's
>classified, we have no way of knowing how much of TIA has been
>resurrected under ARDA. We also have no way of overseeing the
>research, no way of questioning the approach or implementation, no
>way of questioning the security or privacy protections (if any)
>included. In short, those who argued in support of a research
>moratorium just succeeded in driving the research underground.
>
>Finally, one thing we do know about current TIA-related research
>efforts is that PARC's work on privacy-enhancing technologies is no
>longer being funded.
>
>---
>
>I'm glad to see the National Journal article has the specifics on
>where much of that research actually went....
>
>-Peter
>
>--
>Peter Harsha
>Director of Government Affairs
>Computing Research Association
>1100 17th St. NW, Suite 507
>Washington, DC 20036
>p: 202.234.2111 ext 106
>c: 202.256.8271
>CRA's Computing Research Policy Blog: http://www.cra.org/govaffairs/blog
>
>
>On Feb 24, 2006, at 6:12 PM, Dave Farber wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>  -------- Original Message --------
>>  Subject: Fwd: [sv4dean] "Total Information Awareness" - secretly
>>  funded
>>  in defiance of Congress
>>  Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2006 14:55:06 -0800
>>  From: Hasan Diwan <hasan.diwan at gmail.com>
>>  To: dave at farber.net
>>  References: <a1.70dbecb5.312ff09a at aol.com>
>>
>>  For IP, if you wish.
>>
>>  ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>  From: Chinarock at aol.com <Chinarock at aol.com>
>>  Date: 23-Feb-2006 21:16
>>  Subject: [sv4dean] "Total Information Awareness" - secretly funded in
>>  defiance of Congress
>>  To: sv4dean at yahoogroups.com
>>
>>  *http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0223nj1.htm*
>>
>>  *TIA Lives On *
>>
>>  By Shane Harris <sharris at nationaljournal.com>, *National Journal*
>>  (c) National Journal Group Inc.
>>  Thursday, Feb. 23, 2006
>>
>>  A controversial counter-terrorism program, which lawmakers halted
>>  more than
>>  two years ago amid outcries from privacy advocates, was stopped in
>>  name only
>>  and has quietly continued within the intelligence agency now
>>  fending off
>>  charges that it has violated the privacy of U.S. citizens.
>>
>>  Research under the Defense Department's Total Information Awareness
>>  program
>>  -- which developed technologies to predict terrorist attacks by
>>  mining
>>  government databases and the personal records of people in the
>>  United States
>>  -- was moved from the Pentagon's research-and-development agency to
>>  another
>>  group, which builds technologies primarily for the National
>>  Security Agency,
>>  according to documents obtained by *National Journal* and to
>>  intelligence
>>  sources familiar with the move. The names of key projects were
>>  changed,
>>  apparently to conceal their identities, but their funding remained
>>  intact,
>>  often under the same contracts.
>>
>>  It is no secret that some parts of TIA lived on behind the veil of the
>>  classified intelligence budget. However, the projects that moved,
>>  their new
>>  code names, and the agencies that took them over haven't previously
>>  been
>>  disclosed. Sources aware of the transfers declined to speak on the
>>  record
>>  for this story because, they said, the identities of the specific
>>  programs
>>  are classified.
>>
>>  Two of the most important components of the TIA program were moved
>>  to the
>>  Advanced Research and Development Activity, housed at NSA
>>  headquarters in
>>  Fort Meade, Md., documents and sources confirm. One piece was the
>>  Information Awareness Prototype System, the core architecture that
>>  tied
>>  together numerous information extraction, analysis, and
>>  dissemination tools
>>  developed under TIA. The prototype system included privacy-protection
>>  technologies that may have been discontinued or scaled back
>>  following the
>>  move to ARDA. .....
>>
>>  Sharkey played a key role in TIA's birth, when he and a close friend,
>>  retired Navy Vice Adm. *John Poindexter*, *President Reagan*'s
>>  national
>>  security adviser, brought the idea to Defense officials shortly
>>  after the
>>  9/11 attacks. The men had teamed earlier on intelligence-technology
>>  programs
>>  for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which agreed to
>>  host TIA
>>  and hired Poindexter to run it in 2002. In August 2003, Poindexter was
>>  forced to resign
>>  <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A51578-2003Aug12>as TIA
>>  chief amid howls that his central role in the Iran-Contra scandal of
>>  the mid-1980s made him unfit to run a sensitive intelligence program.
>>  ....etc.
>>
>>
>>   Links to Democracy for America...
>>  <http://www.democracyforamerica.com/>
>>  <http://www.dfa.meetup.com/>
>>  <http://dfasv.org/>
>>
>>
>>
>>   SPONSORED LINKS
>>    Presidential
>>  election<http://groups.yahoo.com/gads?t=ms&k=Presidential
>>  +election&w1=Presidential+election&w2=Silicon
>>  +valley&c=2&s=47&.sig=XVKuwwahoV8Hm_1e5O_oIw>
>>   Silicon
>>  valley<http://groups.yahoo.com/gads?t=ms&k=Silicon
>>  +valley&w1=Presidential+election&w2=Silicon
>>  +valley&c=2&s=47&.sig=pIWbpNAt6BNx-rmFh-brVg>
>>   ------------------------------
>>  YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
>>
>>
>>     -  Visit your group "sv4dean <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/
>>  sv4dean>"
>>     on the web.
>>
>>     -  To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
>>
>>  sv4dean-unsubscribe at yahoogroups.com<sv4dean-
>>  unsubscribe at yahoogroups.com?subject=Unsubscribe>
>>
>>     -  Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
>>  Service<http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>
>>     .
>>
>>
>>   ------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>>  --
>>  Cheers,
>>  Hasan Diwan <hasan.diwan at gmail.com>
>>
>
>-------------------------------------
>You are subscribed as harsha at cra.org
>To manage your subscription, go to
>   http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip
>
>Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-
>people/
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From ix6aa at ameritrade.com  Sun Feb 26 04:39:13 2006
From: ix6aa at ameritrade.com (Gus Carey)
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 06:39:13 -0600
Subject: Pre-approved Application #qnrnL21434327
Message-ID: <176n613i.1343473@69.60.117.34>

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From ky at ie.ibm.com  Sun Feb 26 06:49:40 2006
From: ky at ie.ibm.com (Flossie Neely)
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 08:49:40 -0600
Subject: Ratess will skyrocket soon
Message-ID: <978k801u.2798786@yahoo.com>

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From mafso at clubcubase.net  Sun Feb 26 09:09:22 2006
From: mafso at clubcubase.net (Frieda S. Burns)
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 09:09:22 -0800
Subject: Your info
Message-ID: <887967.4511896181837.509511011463.VIZD.3615@ethylene>

dog bejosef it'ssw bedodecahedral notportulaca
butchimera onaxiomatic tryoceania maycommodious
itace ,firm be

madcap butboth it'sdobbs thegoff beinferential
butvitriolic !astor andcompost thehysteron
,electroencephalogram inshutdown andfranciscan andmesmeric
someprotoplasm adeluge butcranium ,levis
orchigger beannette ittappa !triumph
aepistemology theislamic notveracity may
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From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Feb 26 02:20:52 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 11:20:52 +0100
Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more  on WORTH READING "Total
  Information Awareness" - secretly funded in defiance of Congress]]]]
Message-ID: <20060226102052.GI25017@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From bodkin at fowlerwhite.com  Sun Feb 26 11:19:32 2006
From: bodkin at fowlerwhite.com (Yvonne Smith)
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 13:19:32 -0600
Subject: Notification: Loww ratess 
Message-ID: <111e105k.9444112@msn.com>

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From SQEOMZCCMIBH at yahoo.com  Sun Feb 26 09:33:55 2006
From: SQEOMZCCMIBH at yahoo.com (Rogelio Frazier)
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 14:33:55 -0300
Subject: Is yours Below 5 Innches Long? lRd
Message-ID: <LAW67.OE649yfB4mvo422653d5@motmail.com>


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From eugen at leitl.org  Sun Feb 26 06:34:31 2006
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 15:34:31 +0100
Subject: Taking Spying to Higher Level, Agencies Look for More Ways to
  Mine Data
Message-ID: <20060226143431.GQ25017@leitl.org>

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/25/technology/25data.html?ei=5058&en=cbcd71b86
4c16e09&ex=1141534800&partner=IWON&pagewanted=print

Taking Spying to Higher Level, Agencies Look for More Ways to Mine Data
By JOHN MARKOFF

PALO ALTO, Calif., Feb. 23 b A small group of National Security Agency
officials slipped into Silicon Valley on one of the agency's periodic
technology shopping expeditions this month.

On the wish list, according to several venture capitalists who met with the
officials, were an array of technologies that underlie the fierce debate over
the Bush administration's anti-terrorist eavesdropping program: computerized
systems that reveal connections between seemingly innocuous and unrelated
pieces of information.

The tools they were looking for are new, but their application would fall
under the well-established practice of data mining: using mathematical and
statistical techniques to scan for hidden relationships in streams of digital
data or large databases.

Supercomputer companies looking for commercial markets have used the practice
for decades. Now intelligence agencies, hardly newcomers to data mining, are
using new technologies to take the practice to another level.

But by fundamentally changing the nature of surveillance, high-tech data
mining raises privacy concerns that are only beginning to be debated widely.
That is because to find illicit activities it is necessary to turn loose
software sentinels to examine all digital behavior whether it is innocent or
not.

"The theory is that the automated tool that is conducting the search is not
violating the law," said Mark D. Rasch, the former head of computer-crime
investigations for the Justice Department and now the senior vice president of
Solutionary, a computer security company. But "anytime a tool or a human is
looking at the content of your communication, it invades your privacy."

When asked for comment about the meetings in Silicon Valley, Jane Hudgins, a
National Security Agency spokeswoman, said, "We have no information to
provide."

Data mining is already being used in a diverse array of commercial
applications b whether by credit card companies detecting and stopping fraud
as it happens, or by insurance companies that predict health risks. As a
result, millions of Americans have become enmeshed in a vast and growing data
web that is constantly being examined by a legion of Internet-era software
snoops.

Technology industry executives and government officials said that the
intelligence agency systems take such techniques further, applying software
analysis tools now routinely used by law enforcement agencies to identify
criminal activities and political terrorist organizations that would otherwise
be missed by human eavesdroppers.

One such tool is Analyst's Notebook, a crime investigation "spreadsheet" and
visualization tool developed by i2 Inc., a software firm based in McLean, Va.

The software, which ranges in price from as little as $3,000 for a sheriff's
department to millions of dollars for a large government agency like the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, allows investigators to organize and view
telephone and financial transaction records. It was used in 2001 by Joyce
Knowlton, an investigator at the Stillwater State Correctional Facility in
Minnesota, to detect a prison drug-smuggling ring that ultimately implicated
30 offenders who were linked to Supreme White Power, a gang active in the
prison.

Ms. Knowlton began her investigation by importing telephone call records into
her software and was immediately led to a pattern of calls between prisoners
and a recent parolee. She overlaid the calling data with records of prisoners'
financial accounts, and based on patterns that emerged, she began monitoring
phone calls of particular inmates. That led her to coded messages being
exchanged in the calls that revealed that seemingly innocuous wood blocks were
being used to smuggle drugs into the prison.

"Once we added the money and saw how it was flowing from addresses that were
connected to phone numbers, it created a very clear picture of the smuggling
ring," she said.

Privacy, of course, is hardly an expectation for prisoners. And credit card
customers and insurance policyholders give up a certain amount of privacy to
the issuers and carriers. It is the power of such software tools applied to
broad, covert governmental uses that has led to the deepening controversy over
data mining.

In the wake of 9/11, the potential for mining immense databases of digital
information gave rise to a program called Total Information Awareness,
developed by Adm. John M. Poindexter, the former national security adviser,
while he was a program manager at the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency.

Although Congress abruptly canceled the program in October 2003, the
legislation provided a specific exemption for "processing, analysis and
collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence."

At the time, Admiral Poindexter, who declined to be interviewed for this
article because he said he had knowledge of current classified intelligence
activities, argued that his program had achieved a tenfold increase in the
speed of the searching databases for foreign threats.

While agreeing that data mining has a tremendous power for fighting a new kind
of warfare, John Arquilla, a professor of defense analysis at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., said that intelligence agencies had
missed an opportunity by misapplying the technologies.

"In many respects, we're fighting the last intelligence war," Mr. Arquilla
said. "We have not pursued data mining in the way we should."

Mr. Arquilla, who was a consultant on Admiral Poindexter's Total Information
Awareness project, said that the $40 billion spent each year by intelligence
agencies had failed to exploit the power of data mining in correlating
information readily available from public sources, like monitoring Internet
chat rooms used by Al Qaeda. Instead, he said, the government has been
investing huge sums in surveillance of phone calls of American citizens.

"Checking every phone call ever made is an example of old think," he said.

He was alluding to databases maintained at an AT&T data center in Kansas,
which now contain electronic records of 1.92 trillion telephone calls, going
back decades. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a digital-rights advocacy
group, has asserted in a lawsuit that the AT&T Daytona system, a giant
storehouse of calling records and Internet message routing information, was
the foundation of the N.S.A.'s effort to mine telephone records without a
warrant.

An AT&T spokeswoman said the company would not comment on the claim, or
generally on matters of national security or customer privacy.

But the mining of the databases in other law enforcement investigations is
well established, with documented results. One application of the database
technology, called Security Call Analysis and Monitoring Platform, or Scamp,
offers access to about nine weeks of calling information. It currently handles
about 70,000 queries a month from fraud and law enforcement investigators,
according to AT&T documents.

A former AT&T official who had detailed knowledge of the call-record database
said the Daytona system takes great care to make certain that anyone using the
database b whether AT&T employee or law enforcement official with a subpoena
b sees only information he or she is authorized to see, and that an audit
trail keeps track of all users. Such information is frequently used to build
models of suspects' social networks.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was discussing
sensitive corporate matters, said every telephone call generated a record:
number called, time of call, duration of call, billing category and other
details. While the database does not contain such billing data as names,
addresses and credit card numbers, those records are in a linked database that
can be tapped by authorized users.

New calls are entered into the database immediately after they end, the
official said, adding, "I would characterize it as near real time."

According to a current AT&T employee, whose identity is being withheld to
avoid jeopardizing his job, the mining of the AT&T databases had a notable
success in helping investigators find the perpetrators of what was known as
the Moldovan porn scam.

In 1997 a shadowy group in Moldova, a former Soviet republic, was tricking
Internet users by enticing them to a pornography Web site that would download
a piece of software that disconnected the computer user from his local
telephone line and redialed a costly 900 number in Moldova.

While another long-distance carrier simply cut off the entire nation of
Moldova from its network, AT&T and the Moldovan authorities were able to mine
the database to track the culprits.

Much of the recent work on data mining has been aimed at even more
sophisticated applications. The National Security Agency has invested billions
in computerized tools for monitoring phone calls around the world b not only
logging them, but also determining content b and more recently in trying to
design digital vacuum cleaners to sweep up information from the Internet.

Last September, the N.S.A. was granted a patent for a technique that could be
used to determine the physical location of an Internet address b another
potential category of data to be mined. The technique, which exploits the tiny
time delays in the transmission of Internet data, suggests the agency's
interest in sophisticated surveillance tasks like trying to determine where a
message sent from an Internet address in a cybercafe might have originated.

An earlier N.S.A. patent, in 1999, focused on a software solution for
generating a list of topics from computer-generated text. Such a capacity
hints at the ability to extract the content of telephone conversations
automatically. That might permit the agency to mine millions of phone
conversations and then select a handful for human inspection.

As the N.S.A. visit to the Silicon Valley venture capitalists this month
indicates, the actual development of such technologies often comes from
private companies.

In 2003, Virage, a Silicon Valley company, began supplying a voice
transcription product that recognized and logged the text of television
programming for government and commercial customers. Under perfect conditions,
the system could be 95 percent accurate in capturing spoken text. Such
technology has potential applications in monitoring phone conversations as
well.

And several Silicon Valley executives say one side effect of the 2003 decision
to cancel the Total Information Awareness project was that it killed funds for
a research project at the Palo Alto Research Center, a subsidiary of Xerox,
exploring technologies that could protect privacy while permitting data
mining.

The aim was to allow an intelligence analyst to conduct extensive data mining
without getting access to identifying information about individuals. If the
results suggested that, for instance, someone might be a terrorist, the
intelligence agency could seek a court warrant authorizing it to penetrate the
privacy technology and identify the person involved.

With Xerox funds, the Palo Alto researchers are continuing to explore the
technology.

Scott Shane contributed reporting from Washington for this article.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]




From coderman at gmail.com  Sun Feb 26 17:52:06 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 17:52:06 -0800
Subject: Cell phone tracking services available in UK and elsewhere
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602261752j18c72201v2a9675508476772@mail.gmail.com>

... and people wonder why i don't have a cell phone (this is one of
many reason, although the largest being annoyance rather than privacy
for me):


---cut---
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/4747142.stm

 Mobile tracking devices on trial

		By Spencer Kelly
Click presenter

Your mobile phone is a beacon - a radio transmitter in a box.
Therefore it is possible to trace the signal and work out where it is.

There are now several web companies which will track your friends' and
family's phones for you, so you always know where they are.

But just how safe is it to make location details available online?

There are several reasons why you may want to track someone. You may
be a company wanting to keep tabs on employees during work hours, or a
parent wanting to check up on a child's whereabouts.

These sorts of tracking services, now available in the UK, get
information from the network about which cell your phone is currently
in, and, for a small fee, display the location on an online map.

As well as checking where a certain phone is right now, you can run
scheduled lookups, or snail trails, to record the phone's movements
throughout the day, and produce a report for you to peruse at your
leisure.

Obviously you cannot just enter any mobile phone number and expect to
track someone.

First of all you need to prove your identity, via a credit card, and
then, crucially, the owner of the phone in question needs to consent
to being tracked.

The owner is sent a text message telling them about the tracking
request, to which they must reply.

Experiment

The question is: is it possible to circumvent this security, and track
someone without their knowledge?

I attempted to find out, using regular contributor Guy Kewney, an
independent technology journalist and, for one day only, human guinea
pig.

I sent him on a tour of London. He could go anywhere he wanted, and I
planned to meet up with him later and tell him, hopefully, where he
had been.

Guy did not know that when I borrowed his phone for a few minutes
earlier in the day, I took the opportunity to register it on one of
the tracking services.

I received the incoming text message warning him about the tracking,
responded to it and then deleted it from his inbox.

When I gave him his phone back, Guy had no idea he was now in
possession of a consenting tracking device.

Hence, a little while later, I could watch him emerge from the tube at
the start of his tour.

But just borrowing someone's phone for a few minutes is too obvious a
loophole. It is one which has already been closed by an industry body
which oversees new technologies such as mobile tracking services.

Voluntary rules

The Mobile Broadband Group has drawn up a voluntary code of conduct
which the networks in the UK ask location providers to stick to.

One of the conditions of the code is that after a phone is registered
as a tracking device, reminder texts should be sent to the phone at
random intervals.

This way, it should be impossible for a malicious tracker to intercept
every reminder.

The problem is, those random reminders are not required to be sent
very frequently.

We tracked several phones over several days, and often had to wait for
a day or two before receiving a reminder message.

Hamish Macleod from the Mobile Broadband Group, who came up with the
code of conduct, argues this is enough.

He said: "We assessed this risk during the development of the code and
consulted obviously with all the experts that we did, and the schedule
of random alerts that we came up with we thought was adequate to
protect against the risks.

"This is a situation to be kept under review as the service is developed."

Child-safe?

With more and more children owning mobile phones, special attention
needs to be given to who can track them.

If you are not a genuine parent or guardian, the code requires
location services to check that both the tracker and the person being
tracked can prove they are consenting adults.

Mr Macleod says: "The person that is to be located has to demonstrate
to the service provider they are at least 16 years old.

"They can do this through various channels, for example they can get a
credit card number which is used as a proxy for age verification, or
something like that."

At least, that is what is supposed to happen. But neither of the
services we tested asked the person being tracked to prove they were
an adult.

Although they did ask us for the age of the person we wanted to track,
they did not check we were telling the truth.

The companies were not following the letter of the code and, what is
more, no-one was holding them to account.

	
HAVE YOUR SAY
What do you make of the new mobile tracking services online? Is it
ever possible for regulation to keep up with technology?

Neither service would comment on this oversight.

Although the code of conduct was well intentioned, the Mobile
Broadband Group admits it will need refining as loopholes become
apparent.

It also highlights the limits of such voluntary codes, and the
problems with policing them.

Jago Russell from the human rights group Liberty says: "We have
concerns in general about industry codes of practice. They aren't
legal regulation; they don't give the consumer an effective legal
remedy if the code of practice isn't complied with.

"So in many ways they're not really worth the paper they're written on."

Changes

As a result of our investigation, The Mobile Broadband Group is making
some changes to the code of conduct.

The frequency of the random reminders is going to be increased, and
the code will make clearer the appropriate way to check the age of the
participants.

Guy Kewney says: "It's a shame but then if you start regulating new
technology you usually fall down because people don't expect the
unexpected.

"The real problem is that you can't actually perceive the unintended
consequences of your technology change, so a hard and fast rule that
says 'don't do this' won't stop you doing that, in which case you've
wasted your time passing it."

Should we really be worried about being tracked by mobile phones?

Guy Kewney says: "You can worry about anything in this society. If I
wanted to track you, the easy way to do it is - well you've found one
way, but if they've closed that loophole or if it becomes tricky -
then I just hire a private detective.
---end cut---

does anyone have a list / site for good research on anonymous wireless
communications?  there seem to be few papers or projects dealing with
this particular transport method.

http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/diks95anonymous.html
"We introduce anonymous wireless rings: a new computational model for
ring networks. In the well-known hardware ring each processor has two
buffers, one corresponding to each of its neighbors. In the wireless
ring each processor has a single buffer and cannot distinguish which
neighbor the arriving bit comes from. This feature substantially
increases anonymity of the ring. A priori it is not clear whether any
non-trivial computation can be performed on wireless rings. "

are wireless rings the most effective without excessive resources /
inefficiency?




From arnold at lanz.lol.li  Sun Feb 26 20:08:44 2006
From: arnold at lanz.lol.li (Dario Choi)
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 22:08:44 -0600
Subject: Lowest rate approved
Message-ID: <020r933a.4348633@yahoo.com>

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From chief887 at gmail.com  Sun Feb 26 09:15:12 2006
From: chief887 at gmail.com (Blake Stephenson)
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 22:15:12 +0500
Subject: A custom Logo that expresses your company! (ID34342884)
Message-ID: <200602270305.k1R35WGs013315@proton.jfet.org>

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Sincerely,
Logo Design Team
 





 comply bolo brackish




From coderman at gmail.com  Mon Feb 27 00:02:22 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 00:02:22 -0800
Subject: INTELLECT SURVEILLED: THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND THE ORGANS OF STATE
  SECURITY
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602270002n27f7325cr82029c1b7e9c9688@mail.gmail.com>

INTELLECT SURVEILLED: THORSTEIN VEBLEN
AND THE ORGANS OF STATE SECURITY

By
Sylvia E. Bartley

http://www.elegant-technology.com/TVbarSI.html

selected quotes: ""
... Latent nativist fears in the United States surmounted class
divisions to forge a ground_swell of anticommunism. This fusion of
fear and myth, expressed as super-patriotism, would trample professed
democratic tenets and quickly led to blatant violations of
constitutional rights.

The United States Government first resorted to espionage against its
own citizens during the Civil War, while the Veblens were still
farming in Cato, Wisconsin. To perform this domestic surveillance, the
War Department hired the Pinkerton Detective Agency, which had
perfected such practices in previous anti-labor operations...

By the end of the first decade of the 20th century, political
detective units existed in most U.S. cities... In a climate of growing
war hysteria, the second decade of the century saw the rapid
development of collaboration between private and public police
networks nationwide...
""




From coderman at gmail.com  Mon Feb 27 09:05:09 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 09:05:09 -0800
Subject: [funsec] Re: AT&T's database of 1.92 trillion phone calls
  (Sprint does it too, and i'm sure they aren't the only ones)
In-Reply-To: <3c4611bc0602270742x4fe47927q8b11a8a7826cf22b@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4ef5fec60602250852t4a1eaa5v96c70ebc95d9234d@mail.gmail.com>
  	 <3c4611bc0602270742x4fe47927q8b11a8a7826cf22b@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602270905h1d4626b0scc67e79e6a2f751c@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/27/06, Brian Loe <knobdy at gmail.com> wrote:
> ...
> This kind of thing doesn't scare me. What they wind up doing with it,
> at times, does scare me. What scares me even more is that no one will
> ever do anything about it on a scale that matters.

i'd have to agree, with regards to corporate or government entities
making strong individual privacy a priority _on their own accord_ with
this kind of applied information technology.[1]

so the only feasible solution is empowering users to take
responsibility for their own information security and privacy.  if
"johnny can't encrypt"[2] this is a very tall order indeed[3].

what would the ideal minimum amount of information exposed consist of
if you could apply usable security/encryption and privacy enhancing
technologies to the usual communications today (voice, text, video,
data)?

- no content of payloads, due to end to end encryption
- strong anonymous mix networks for non interactive messaging
- weakly anonymous low latency onion/relay networks for near real time messaging
- seamless wireless and sneaker net support to offload locally/out of
band whenever possible

you'd still be exposing:
- location of endpoints used (except in the strong and latent mix
scenario perhaps)
- distinct parties involved (social network analysis)
- volume of encrypted traffic exchanged

i suppose the real question is how long would it take to design and
implement (and the hardware to support it prevalent for all users).

5 years seems extremely optimistic given the difficulties involved.
[and i suppose this also means the paranoid will all become proficient
TSCM technicians.]

ah, we can dream :)
until then, the fraction of unusual end lusers making use of strong
privacy enhancing technologies will be a function of how annoying they
are to use vs. how annoying the government privacy invasion programs
become.  single digits for the near future...


---

[1.] "DoJ strikes back against Google (your privacy concerns are
unfounded (lol))"
  http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=29918

[2.] "NPR : E-Mail Encryption Rare in Everyday Use"
 http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography at metzdowd.com/msg05769.html

[3.] " User Interaction Design for Secure Systems"
 http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~pingster/sec/uid/

MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS::

A. Path of Least Resistance. The most natural way to do any task should
also be the most secure way.

B. Appropriate Boundaries. The interface should expose, and the system
should enforce, distinctions between objects and between actions along
boundaries that matter to the user.

C. Explicit Authorization. A user's authorities must only be provided to
other actors as a result of an explicit user action that is understood
to imply granting.

D. Visibility. The interface should allow the user to easily review any
active actors and authority relationships that would affect
security-relevant decisions.

E. Revocability. The interface should allow the user to easily revoke
authorities that the user has granted, wherever revocation is
possible.

F. Trusted Path. The interface must provide an unspoofable and faithful
communication channel between the user and any entity trusted to
manipulate authorities on the user's behalf.

G. Identifiability. The interface should enforce that distinct objects
and distinct actions have unspoofably identifiable and distinguishable
representations.




From coderman at gmail.com  Mon Feb 27 09:48:21 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 09:48:21 -0800
Subject: A New Class of Unsafe Primes
In-Reply-To: <E1FDlkF-00051E-00@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
References: <E1FDlkF-00051E-00@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602270948k49332f42h118d0db0556b1549@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/27/06, Peter Gutmann <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
> The IACR ePrint archive contains a paper from 2002 titled "A New Class of
> Unsafe Primes", http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/109, which proposes a fast way to
> find a prime factor p of an integer n when 4p - 1 has the form db^2, where d =
> { 3, 11, 19, 43, 67, 163 }.  I haven't been able to find any references to
> this anywhere, is this something like the p +/- 1 factoring methods where the
> values they're effective against are so unlikely that they can be safely
> ignored, or is it just that no-one's ever noticed this paper?

i'd be interested to know what you find out.

----

[[[
totally unrelated commentary:
i dreamed recently i was an old man with a failing liver
(E_TOO_MUCH_DEFCON)  performing one last bemused retrospective on life
before my session expired.  i chuckled over the use of public key
encryption in a world with common large qubit quantum computers: the
relative key strengths now in use were measured in killowatts of
computation sustained over a minimum time period for key pair
generation on dedicated hardware with open ended storage (meaning
whatever you could generate within a lifetime of key pair computation
could be stored reasonably on a common storage medium)

i recall a very strong key pair started at 64 kilowatts over 100 days
but was at least conjectured to require a coherent state (raw qubit
brute force) larger than anything possible to build in our solar
system.

nonces, digests, symmetric secrets and one time pads for key exchange
were all still measured in bytes though... *grin*
]]



something else of potential relevance:

---cut---

Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2003 11:23:21 -0800

From: Zully Ramzan <zramzan at ipdynamics.com>

To: Bill Stewart <bill.stewart at pobox.com>, Adam Shostack <adam at homeport.org>

Cc: cryptography at wasabisystems.com

Subject: RE: Implementation guides for DH?

Hi Bill --

> Stiglic's paper goes into a lot of explanation about
> some issues of safe parameters, particularly recommendations
> for sufficiently safe primes.  Much of the discussion on the net
> about prime safety for DH has been about whether safe primes
> are necessary or not worth the bother, and at least with the
> current methods for factoring, it's believed they aren't needed.
> (One catch, of course, is that the best factoring method
> 10 or 50 years from now may be affected by safe vs. unsafe primes.)
> At least in the initial Photuris versions, there were some
> standard choices of primes that everybody used,
> so it made sense to pick Sophie-Germain primes anyway.

I know there has been some discussion on whether _strong_ primes are
needed for _RSA_.  The definition of a strong prime is a little more
involved; c.f. the paper by Rivest and Silverman
[http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/007/  and also available on Ron Rivest's
web page].  I was unaware, though, that there is a debate regarding the
use of safe primes for Diffie-Hellman.  My impression is that the use of
safe primes is generally accepted to be an important practice that
thwarts various attempts to compute a discrete log (e.g.
Pohlig-Hellman); also enough safe primes and generators are published --
one may utilize them in a protocol (assuming the people who published
the list are trusted not to have deliberately chosen prime groups for
which computing a discrete log is easier :)).
I'm also not sure how the choice of primes for Diffie-Hellman relates to
the complexity of factoring as you mentioned in your post.  As far as I
know, no one (in the open community at least) has discovered a
meaningful reduction in a standard model between the Diffie-Hellman
problem over a prime group and Factoring (nor has anyone proven that
such reductions cannot exist).  The closest thing I can think of is
trying to come up with the factorization of p-1 as you might want to do
in the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm -- but in that case, the complexity
would be prohibitive if p-1 had any large prime factors...
Are you referring to performing Diffie-Hellman over some other group?
Or is there a connection that you know of and can elaborate on?
Best Regards,
Zully

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Zulfikar Ramzan
IP Dynamics, Inc.   http://www.ipdynamics.com
Secure, Scalable Virtual Community Networks
---------------------------------------------------------------------
---end cut---




From coderman at gmail.com  Mon Feb 27 10:14:49 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 10:14:49 -0800
Subject: Fwd: [funsec] Re: AT&T's database of 1.92 trillion phone calls
  (Sprint does it too, and i'm sure they aren't the only ones)
In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60602270905h1d4626b0scc67e79e6a2f751c@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4ef5fec60602250852t4a1eaa5v96c70ebc95d9234d@mail.gmail.com>
  	 <3c4611bc0602270742x4fe47927q8b11a8a7826cf22b@mail.gmail.com> 	
  <4ef5fec60602270905h1d4626b0scc67e79e6a2f751c@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602271014m4385f392j7db601b1ad812e08@mail.gmail.com>

Fwd: discussion on enabling and motivating end users to assume
responsbility for their own information security/privacy over the
communication and computing resources they use.

can we go ahead and state as fact that a capability model tied to a
pet name pattern / sticky note metaphor is required for strong least
privelege which in turn is mandatory for the secure user interface /
interaction requirements mentioned below?

[if you don't think caps and pet names should be mandatory, can you
provide a reasonable explanation of how key based capabilities and
pets names are less secure than the alternative you are describing?]

wow, that's a lot work to describe in detail (design) let alone even
attempt to implement.  (at least if you designed and implemented it
right once you should never need to implement again)


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: coderman <coderman at gmail.com>
Date: Feb 27, 2006 9:05 AM
Subject: Re: [funsec] Re: AT&T's database of 1.92 trillion phone calls
(Sprint does it too, and i'm sure they aren't the only ones)
To: Brian Loe <knobdy at gmail.com>
Cc: funsec at linuxbox.org, cypherpunks at jfet.org


On 2/27/06, Brian Loe <knobdy at gmail.com> wrote:
> ...
> This kind of thing doesn't scare me. What they wind up doing with it,
> at times, does scare me. What scares me even more is that no one will
> ever do anything about it on a scale that matters.

i'd have to agree, with regards to corporate or government entities
making strong individual privacy a priority _on their own accord_ with
this kind of applied information technology.[1]

so the only feasible solution is empowering users to take
responsibility for their own information security and privacy.  if
"johnny can't encrypt"[2] this is a very tall order indeed[3].

what would the ideal minimum amount of information exposed consist of
if you could apply usable security/encryption and privacy enhancing
technologies to the usual communications today (voice, text, video,
data)?

- no content of payloads, due to end to end encryption
- strong anonymous mix networks for non interactive messaging
- weakly anonymous low latency onion/relay networks for near real time messaging
- seamless wireless and sneaker net support to offload locally/out of
band whenever possible

you'd still be exposing:
- location of endpoints used (except in the strong and latent mix
scenario perhaps)
- distinct parties involved (social network analysis)
- volume of encrypted traffic exchanged

i suppose the real question is how long would it take to design and
implement (and the hardware to support it prevalent for all users).

5 years seems extremely optimistic given the difficulties involved.
[and i suppose this also means the paranoid will all become proficient
TSCM technicians.]

ah, we can dream :)
until then, the fraction of unusual end lusers making use of strong
privacy enhancing technologies will be a function of how annoying they
are to use vs. how annoying the government privacy invasion programs
become.  single digits for the near future...


---

[1.] "DoJ strikes back against Google (your privacy concerns are
unfounded (lol))"
  http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=29918

[2.] "NPR : E-Mail Encryption Rare in Everyday Use"
 http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography at metzdowd.com/msg05769.html

[3.] " User Interaction Design for Secure Systems"
 http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~pingster/sec/uid/

MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS::

A. Path of Least Resistance. The most natural way to do any task should
also be the most secure way.

B. Appropriate Boundaries. The interface should expose, and the system
should enforce, distinctions between objects and between actions along
boundaries that matter to the user.

C. Explicit Authorization. A user's authorities must only be provided to
other actors as a result of an explicit user action that is understood
to imply granting.

D. Visibility. The interface should allow the user to easily review any
active actors and authority relationships that would affect
security-relevant decisions.

E. Revocability. The interface should allow the user to easily revoke
authorities that the user has granted, wherever revocation is
possible.

F. Trusted Path. The interface must provide an unspoofable and faithful
communication channel between the user and any entity trusted to
manipulate authorities on the user's behalf.

G. Identifiability. The interface should enforce that distinct objects
and distinct actions have unspoofably identifiable and distinguishable
representations.




From coderman at gmail.com  Mon Feb 27 11:37:31 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 11:37:31 -0800
Subject: National Security, Secrecy, Diffusion of Responsibility, and
  Meaningful Accountability
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602271137i5d411aces8fa070b6a1da8607@mail.gmail.com>

speaking of least privilege,

what institution is more deserving of strong least privilege applied
to authorization and accountability than a the military-industrial
complex and it's government?

the current highly classified, highly compartmentalized, broad swath
privileges in place right now are akin to giving a company full of
employees a single shared account login and trying to apply any kind
of oversight and policy restriction.

what would a Key KOS government/industry look like?

full disclosure of all decisions and resource allocations (and
associated delegations involved if any) for all government activities
declared in advance and then denied until quorum based consensus as to
their reasonableness (?)

a fun exercise for thought, as anything you communicate (in any
medium/representation) is essentially a social (and thus political)
activity...

---cut---

"A Fabric of Illegality"

http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20060313&s=editors

Click here to return to the browser-optimized version of this page.

This article can be found on the web at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060313/editors
A Fabric of Illegality

[from the March 13, 2006 issue]

Now we know the truth: For months in 2002, when George W. Bush and his
top lieutenants were publicly insisting on their adherence to the
Geneva Conventions, they were privately torpedoing efforts by Alberto
Mora, the Navy's courageous general counsel, to prevent, and establish
accountability for, brutal treatment of detainees. Two years before
the publication of the Abu Ghraib photos, Mora confronted the
highest-level Pentagon officials over abuse of prisoners at Guantanamo
and warned the Administration that its interrogation policies invited
torture and cruelty. The New Yorker's Jane Mayer revealed Mora's
lonely campaign just as Kofi Annan and a team of United Nations
investigators declared Guantanamo a torture camp that should be closed
and its prisoners either tried or released.

If the Administration has so far been able to resist demands for
accountability, whether from the Pentagon's own lawyers or the UN, it
is because of the collusion of the courts and Congress in abuses both
international and within the United States. Exhibit A: the grotesque
February 16 ruling by US District Judge David Trager denying his
court's jurisdiction over the rendition to Syria and torture of
Canadian national Maher Arar, who spent nearly a year in secret
captivity (see David Cole on page 5). Exhibit B: the bipartisan effort
to avoid Congressional investigation of the NSA's warrantless
surveillance of American citizens.

Although key leaders remain angry at the White House for not seeking
Congressional approval for the NSA wiretap program, debate over
surveillance has been sidelined. Leaders from both parties are lining
up behind proposals to bleach the stain of illegality from warrantless
wiretaps--either by incorporating warrantless eavesdropping into the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or by simply declaring
warrantless taps legal. Lost is the simple fact that both plans
broaden domestic spying far beyond the Patriot Act and make hash of
the venerable constitutional demand for search warrants.

That Guantanamo and NSA spying on citizens--the Administration's
abuses abroad and at home--are part of the same fabric of illegality
was brought home by a February 14 House national security subcommittee
hearing. Led by Christopher Shays and Henry Waxman, the subcommittee
heard firsthand evidence of what becomes of truth-tellers in the Bush
military and intelligence services.

In this sense Mora was lucky: He was merely blocked at every turn. He
wasn't demoted like Specialist Samuel Provance, who was kicked
downstairs after confronting a general with horrifying details about
interrogations at Abu Ghraib. Mora wasn't declared by his bosses to be
mentally ill, like NSA whistleblower Russell Tice--who indicated to
the subcommittee that the agency's illegal "black ops" extend well
beyond the wiretap program. No one spread false rumors about Mora's
sex life, as the Defense Intelligence Agency did about Lieut. Col.
Anthony Shaffer after he revealed the extent of the government's
pre-9/11 knowledge about Mohamed Atta (gained through the "Able
Danger" data-mining program).

The dark arts of trashing whistleblowers, who are supposedly protected
by federal law, add yet another layer of illegality to the "war on
terror." Still, Congress and the courts dodge their responsibilities
while the White House maintains its right to stand above the law--and
torture, imprisonment without trial and warrantless spying on
Americans go on, and on.


---end cut---




From coderman at gmail.com  Mon Feb 27 11:56:48 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 11:56:48 -0800
Subject: hamachi p2p vpn nat-friendly protocol details
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602271156h7978e66fr2557460962601bbc@mail.gmail.com>

--- various interesting forwards related to decentralized (p2p)
authenticity and privacy

favorite quote:
">> Designing security protocols is hard...

Yes, it is. This is why I like it."

---

'Cypherpunks Write [Secure] Code!'

An open question for anyone reading this:

is the critically wounded, barely beating cypherpunks list languishing
in such a sad state due to apathy or impending irrelevance/death?  i
see embers of life awaiting some minimal votes of confidence (i'd go
so far as to offer sexual favors for a toad node back* :) but any kind
of renewed interest is meager at best.  [would a public list archive
help? an rss feed? a abridged list / digest? [ala kernel trap]]

such volatile times, so little interest...

----

http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography at metzdowd.com/msg05790.html

""
Alex Pankratov
Sun, 26 Feb 2006 07:18:15 -0800
...
Tero Kivinen wrote:

>> Travis H. writes:
>>
>
>>>>http://www.hamachi.cc/security
>>>>
>>>>Based on a cursory look over this, I'm impressed by both the level of
>>>>detail and the level of security apparently afforded.  Too bad I can't
>>>>see the source code.
>
>>
>>
>> I can see couple of problems in the system. Firstly it seems it uses
>> same key for both directions for the encryption and for
>> authentication, i.e. the KEYMAT is only split to Ke and Ka keys, which
>> are used for encryption and authentication. In general using same keys
>> for different directions is bad.


The description on a page was not updated properly. Recent clients
use per-direction keys after they complete P2P KE.


>> Secondly I cannot find where it
>> authenticates the crypto suite used at all (it is not included in the
>> signature of the AUTH message).


Crypto suite is essentially just a protocol number. It requires
no authentication. If the server side responds with HELO.OK, it
means that it can comprehend specified protocol revision. Similar
to what happens during the SSH handshake.


>> Also it seems that the identity itself
>> is not authenticated at all, as it (or it's MACed form) is not
>> included in the signature.


It is not.


>> There might be (I am not sure whether AUTH
>> packet is encrypted and MACed) a MAC over it, but the MAC key is not
>> yet authenticated as it is generated from the anonymous
>> Diffie-Hellman. That might give it some protection, but I am not sure
>> if that is enough.


A protection against what kind of attack ?

Identity is used to specify which public key the client wants
to be authenticated with on the server side. Assuming it is
swapped in transition by a man in the middle, it would still
require an attacker to re-sign authentication hash in the
message.

Assuming he has a private key to do that, he will effectively
succeed in authenticating under substituted ID. He then will
need to re-sign server's auth hash to complete the attack,
which is not going to happen.

There is an off chance that the attacker might swapped the
identity to one that has the same public key. The chances
of this happening are infinitely small unless an attacker
also has an access to victim's keypair, which becomes a
trivial attack case.
.
.
.
>> The protocol is also tied to use SHA1.


If you are referring to HMAC-SHA1 for authentication hashes, it
is a part of a crypto suite (protocol revision) spec.


>> In general it would be much better to use standard protocol, instead
>> of generating your own.


This is the second revision of Hamachi system. First revision
was using SSL for cli-srv and IKE/ESP for p2p security. It was
a prototype and it soon become obvious that both SSL and IKE
were overkills for our purposes. We did not need certificate
authentication of SSL, we did not want to run our own auth
protocol over SSL/AnonDH, which would've increased the number
of packets per login sequence. We didn't need the flexibility
(ie complexity) of IKE either.

After stripping down IKE (ie removing SA negotiation, reworking
ID payloads and not doing quick mode), we essentially ended up
with a protocol that was also fit for securing cli-srv session.
It was further tweaked and replaced SSL.

I should probably add that I implemented IKE (v1) keying daemon
from scratch with all bells and wistles (NATT, extended MODP
groups, etc) at some point in the past. Some remnants of it
are still floating around, the library name was libike.


>> Designing security protocols is hard...


Yes, it is. This is why I like it.
""


=====

http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography at metzdowd.com/msg05796.html

Travis H.
Sun, 26 Feb 2006 07:22:06 -0800

> Crypto suite is essentially just a protocol number. It requires
> no authentication. If the server side responds with HELO.OK, it
> means that it can comprehend specified protocol revision. Similar
> to what happens during the SSH handshake.

In SSL, the lack of authentication of the cryptosuite could be used to
convince a v3 client that it is communicating with a v2 server, and
the v3 server that it is communicating with a v2 client, causing them
to communicate using SSL v2, which is called the "version rollback
attack".  This is not relevant to the hamachi protocol because there
is no negotiation.  Nevertheless, authenticating the previous
plaintext fields once a secure channel is established is considered
good form.

In Schneier's "Practical Cryptography", he suggests computing the MAC
over the entire history of sent messages, which ensures that any
tampering is detected at the next MAC.  This is eventually what was
done in SSLv3, for reasons Tero alluded to and which are successfully
thwarted for the reasons you describe.
.
.
.
I sort of wonder at the utility of a TCP implementation of the p2p
VPN... tunnelling TCP over TCP is well known to be a Bad Thing with
regard to interaction of the TCP timeouts.

Aside:  Can anyone tell me why the constants used in ipad and opad for
HMAC were chosen?  If they're not arbitrary, I'd like to know the
rationale behind them.


=====

http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography at metzdowd.com/msg05801.html

Alex Pankratov
Sun, 26 Feb 2006 07:24:20 -0800

> Presumably he wants to make sure that the messages like the following
> have an unambiguous interpretation:
> AUTH Identity Signature(Ni | Nr | Gi | Gr, Kpri_cli)
> Merely concatenating them is insufficient unless all but one have a
> fixed length.
> I think a terse "unambiguous representation" rationale is the whole
> reason for ASN.1, although it seems awfully complex for such a simple
> goal.

Nonces and DH exponents are serialized using PER-style ASN.1 encoding.
So the whole concatenation is unambigious.

> I sort of wonder at the utility of a TCP implementation of the p2p
> VPN... tunnelling TCP over TCP is well known to be a Bad Thing with
> regard to interaction of the TCP timeouts.

Just to be clear, Hamachi tunnels VPN/P2P traffic over UDP. TCP is
used for client-server session only.

VPN over TCP is bad for two reasons. One you listed, and another
is that it becomes trivial to DoS this kind of VPN. TCP packets
are not authenticated (unless MD5/BGP extension is used, which
is unlikely), so the state of VPN transport layer and consequently
the state of a tunnel can be altered by 3rd party.

That's why SSL VPNs make very little sense in non-proxied setups
and that's why (I'd guess) OpenVPN 'tweaked' SSL to run over UDP
instead.

---end-cut---




From coderman at gmail.com  Mon Feb 27 13:03:21 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 13:03:21 -0800
Subject: FAQ: How to subscribe and or contribute to cypherpunks
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602271303g45d7064bsc128c3550b38e446@mail.gmail.com>

by popular demand (for some degree of popular that includes a few
emails to my inbox seeking additional information :)

::Question:: How do I observe/participate in cypherpunks list discussions?

subscription requests consist of a simple text body with the list name
and your email address sent to a special email list manager account.

a subscribe request typically looks like:
"subscribe cypherpunks coderman at gmail.com"
for example.

some popular/common list administration services/hosts are:
majordomo at jfet.org
majordomo at al-qaeda.net
[ maybe majordomo at toad.com ? :P ]

a full example just for clarification:
---begin---
To: majordomo at jfet.org
Subject: subscribe cypherpunks
Body:
subscribe cypherpunks coderman at gmail.com
---end---



::Question:: what can i do to contribute?

anything that would be helpful / interesting to facilitate easier and
most useful conversations via this list:

- more nodes and more contributors, be that code, design or
philosophical tangents of tenuous relation to encryption or privacy.

- a public web based subscription interface for users

- a RSS/Atom/feed based distribution of list contents

- a sister best of / abridged / digest version of list traffic
distributed in daily and monthly digests.

- write secure code to protect your privacy and facilitate trusted
social interactions with your peers and associates.

- SEND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS / SUGGESTIONS TO THIS LIST :)




From coderman at gmail.com  Mon Feb 27 13:13:38 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 13:13:38 -0800
Subject: Fwd: [cap-talk] Re: [e-lang] Introducing Emily,
  "...capabilities are useless too..."
In-Reply-To: <7.0.1.0.0.20060227112711.0810f588@nersc.gov>
References: <200602232106.k1NL69t5028908@taverner.CS.Berkeley.EDU> 	
  <43FE2EF1.8040908@isg.axmor.com> 	
  <7.0.1.0.0.20060227112711.0810f588@nersc.gov>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602271313g796d777bn589b54f75d94589c@mail.gmail.com>

forwarding an interesting discussion on the nature of a "secure
domain" where key based capabilities can be utilized securely.

When you get mired into threat models involving well fundend
adversaries using exotic interdiscplinary vulnerability assesment and
exploitation the definition of "secure domain" becomes extremely
verbose and difficult (some would argue effectively impossible for
anyone but large TLA's) given the amount of context required to state
security in the exotic threat model with sufficient trust and defense
in depth.

[exotic threat models == tempest, global active adversary, DoS/attacks
expending significant network and real world resources (very wide
spectrum attacks at high power), domain specific physical access side
channel attacks, etc, etc, etc in an ongoing cycle since we all know
these parameters change over time]

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Jed at Webstart <donnelley1 at webstart.com>
Date: Feb 27, 2006 11:51 AM
Subject: [cap-talk] Re: [e-lang] Introducing Emily, "...capabilities
are useless too..."
To: Discussion of E and other capability languages
<e-lang at mail.eros-os.org>, Capability Talk <cap-talk at mail.eros-os.org>


My main point is #3 below.  Please skip down to that if reading time
is limited.

At 01:53 PM 2/23/2006, Constantine Plotnikov wrote:
>David Wagner wrote:
>
>>Constantine Plotnikov writes:
>>
>>>This is a good analogy. If you close one door, you have one less
>>>door to watch out during program design.
>>
>>But now I come back to the distinction I was trying to draw between
>>unintentional leakage of secrets vs deliberate leakage of secrets.
>>
>>I agree that there is value in looking for programming language mechanisms
>>that reduce the likelihood of unintentional leakage of secrets.  But what
>>I'm arguing is that there's no point trying to forbid malicious code from
>>deliberately leaking secrets.  Given the existence of covert channels, you
>>probably can't prevent it anyway.  "Don't forbid what you can't prevent."

#1.  While I agree with the difficulties in preventing covert
communication, I don't more generally agree with "Don't forbid what
you can't prevent", at least in this instance.  If confinement is a
natural effect of tokenized permission transfers (e.g. via
capabilities) where capabilities to objects are bundled with the
permission to communicate to the server of whatever object the
capability grants access to, then it seems quite natural and
effective to include that permission to communicate along with the
permission to access the object.  It may well be that communication
is possible in any case (e.g. via a covert channel), but by bundling
it explicitly with a permission to access an object it makes other
communication outside that explicitly granted only possible by
extraordinary means such as covert channels - which are available in
any case.  In my opinion it's preferable to explicitly limit such
communication rather than simply give up in the face of covert
channels and open all communication.

I admit that I do find it amusing finding myself on this side of this
argument in that the network operating system that I designed and
implemented through much of the 1980s (NLTSS, e.g.:

http://www.webstart.com/jed/papers/Components/

) took the opposite position on this issue - arguing that the
'natural' condition of processes is to be able to freely communicate
on a general network and that only object access (not the
right/permission to communicate) should be limited by capability
transfers.  At some point I came to accept that I was wrong in taking
that approach, I think mostly as a result of dealing with so many
situations where limiting communication (e.g. with firewalls) can
indeed be useful, even accepting the potential presence of covert
channels.  I generally feel that covert channels are more of a
theoretical than a practical threat, except in cases of dealing with
quite sensitive information like classified information or sensitive
intellectual property or business information.

>There are ways to prevent covert channels in some situations for
>some tasks. Examples of mechanisms that can be used to construct a
>solution for specific task are:
>- scheduled message exchange
>- limiting amount of messages
>- denying access to timer
>- mutually exclusive execution
>- isolation (process that is run on separate computer cannot use
>memory timing to leak data)
>- replay
>
>If task is not solvable in general, it does not means that it cannot
>be solved in some particular case. And if we are solving the problem
>in particular case, it is better have some foundation problems like
>capability confinement and exception data leaks solved.

#2.  I won't explicitly address the above means to prevent covert
channels except to say that given the history of analysis of covert
channels I'm somewhat skeptical of such efforts.

One thing I think it's important to keep clear is that the mechanisms
that have generally been discussed for covert channels require
cooperation on both ends of the channel.  No mechanisms that I'm
aware of have been demonstrated which 'force' communication from one
process into another unwilling recipient (e.g. to access an object
without explicit permission).

#3.  My main reason for writing is to dispute this statement:

>Also if we extend your argument, capabilities are useless too,
>because capabilites do no limit authority exchange use in presense
>of covert channels. If we have bidirectional covert channel, we can
>just forward requests to capabilites on other end by proxying.

I hope in the above you are meaning that capabilities are useless too
<in preventing communication through covert channels> vs. being
useless in general.  Of course the primary use for capabilities is in
explicitly transferring permissions between processes (subjects,
active objects, domains, whatever you choose to call active computing
entities).  One such permission is the permission to communicate
which, in the strongest capability systems, always explicitly
accompanies any transferred capability.  That is, when a capability
is transmitted from one process to another the permissions of the
capability include the authority to communicate to whatever service
provides the explicit permissions granted by the capability.  For
example, a capability to a file includes permission to communicate to
the appropriate file server.  However, most permissions explicitly
transferred by capabilities are some form of object access beyond the
authority to communicate to the object server.

While it's true that in the face of covert channels the value of
transferring a permission to communicate via a capability (e.g. as
above the permission to communicate to a file server) may be somewhat
constrained (the process and the file server may be able to
communicate in any case via a covert channel), the primary value of
the capability in transferring permissions (in the example the
permission to access a file, which is not compromised by the presence
of covert channels) is still present.

Providing confinement in the face of covert channels is indeed a
difficult problem.  However, I think it's important not to suggest
that capability tokenized transfers of permissions have no value
simply because one permission, the permission to communicate, is
difficult to control (with or without capabilities).  Most
permissions are not so difficult to control and can be perfectly
adequately managed with capabilities.  I'm not alone in arguing that
tokenizing permissions via capabilities provides many advantages over
conveying permissions by other means such as access lists or ambient
authority mechanisms (e.g. users/groups and permission
bits/configurations for users/groups).  These values of capability
transfers are not rendered useless simply because covert channels
limit the ability of capabilities to also manage the permission to communicate.

You (Constantine Plotnikov) may be arguing that a capability
infrastructure can't prevent a process from communicating permissions
via covert channels (e.g. by proxy).  This is true just as one can't
prevent data from being communicated via covert channels.  However,
this is again only dealing with the potential confinement value in
capabilities as distinct from what I see as their primary value in
providing for transfer of permissions for object access.  Covert
channels can thwart efforts at confinement, but they cannot thwart
efforts to limit object access to those processes which have been
explicitly granted access - even if via a covert channel through a proxy means.

--Jed http://www.webstart.com/jed/

_______________________________________________
cap-talk mailing list
cap-talk at mail.eros-os.org
http://www.eros-os.org/mailman/listinfo/cap-talk




From coderman at gmail.com  Mon Feb 27 13:15:49 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 13:15:49 -0800
Subject: FAQ: How to subscribe and or contribute to cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <20060227211221.GA4927@proton.jfet.org>
References: <4ef5fec60602271303g45d7064bsc128c3550b38e446@mail.gmail.com>
  	 <20060227211221.GA4927@proton.jfet.org>
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602271315qf139666p15dd434c88449c5c@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/27/06, Riad S. Wahby <rsw at jfet.org> wrote:
> ...
> If people are interested in setting up new nodes, bug me about writing a
> Cpunk Node Howto.  I keep meaning to and then getting busy with other
> stuff.

i interpreted that as an invitation to ping you via email every week
or so until i see a draft or document posted / linked to here :)




From eol1 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 27 13:37:47 2006
From: eol1 at yahoo.com (Peter Thoenen)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 13:37:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FAQ: How to subscribe and or contribute to cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <20060227211221.GA4927@proton.jfet.org>
Message-ID: <20060227213747.89613.qmail@web51905.mail.yahoo.com>

--- "Riad S. Wahby" <rsw at jfet.org> wrote:
> If people are interested in setting up new nodes, bug me about
> writing a
> Cpunk Node Howto.

Consider this bugging you Riad.  Been telling myself to set one up for
years and just finished up my dedicated public use anon server.

(multihomed 3mbs server dedicated solely to tor, i2p, and freenet while
also running a Type II and III remailer (to include nymserv's for
both).

Should go active next month .. still working a FBSD panic issue with
the bge driver which kills me once I hit around 500kbs constant.

Willl toss a cpunk node / remailer on it ... wont' help as this list is
dead / dying and all the orig members have:

a) fled
b) irrelevant
c) lunkin
d) got married, graduated college, and grew up.

but will do anyways.

NOTE: Prob going to mirror a couple sites for all those ppl that want
anon / pseudo anon viewing.  Right now will prob just mirror cryptome
as a .onion hidden server, .i2p eepsite, and freenet node.  Anybody
else have any mirror requests, let me know.




From rsw at jfet.org  Mon Feb 27 13:12:21 2006
From: rsw at jfet.org (Riad S. Wahby)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 16:12:21 -0500
Subject: FAQ: How to subscribe and or contribute to cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60602271303g45d7064bsc128c3550b38e446@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4ef5fec60602271303g45d7064bsc128c3550b38e446@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20060227211221.GA4927@proton.jfet.org>

coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote:
> - more nodes and more contributors, be that code, design or
> philosophical tangents of tenuous relation to encryption or privacy.

If people are interested in setting up new nodes, bug me about writing a
Cpunk Node Howto.  I keep meaning to and then getting busy with other
stuff.

-- 
Riad S. Wahby
rsw at jfet.org




From rsw at jfet.org  Mon Feb 27 13:23:19 2006
From: rsw at jfet.org (Riad S. Wahby)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 16:23:19 -0500
Subject: FAQ: How to subscribe and or contribute to cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60602271315qf139666p15dd434c88449c5c@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4ef5fec60602271303g45d7064bsc128c3550b38e446@mail.gmail.com> <20060227211221.GA4927@proton.jfet.org> <4ef5fec60602271315qf139666p15dd434c88449c5c@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20060227212319.GA5292@proton.jfet.org>

coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote:
> i interpreted that as an invitation to ping you via email every week
> or so until i see a draft or document posted / linked to here :)

It's a deal.

-- 
Riad S. Wahby
rsw at jfet.org




From fzikzwvsgorjv at markussen.dk  Mon Feb 27 18:05:19 2006
From: fzikzwvsgorjv at markussen.dk (Mindy C. Mccain)
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 20:05:19 -0600 
Subject: shape-up  
Message-ID: <200602280205.k1S254wC013097@proton.jfet.org>

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From albertnni at go2.pl  Tue Feb 28 01:58:30 2006
From: albertnni at go2.pl (Zimdi)
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 05:58:30 -0400
Subject: Do you want to have a safe rate?
Message-ID: <oartaffetahydrologyloblollyhuzzah@pepsi.hingis.ch>

It is possible to get a new home-loan even
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From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Mon Feb 27 09:01:11 2006
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 06:01:11 +1300
Subject: A New Class of Unsafe Primes
Message-ID: <E1FDlkF-00051E-00@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>

The IACR ePrint archive contains a paper from 2002 titled "A New Class of
Unsafe Primes", http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/109, which proposes a fast way to
find a prime factor p of an integer n when 4p - 1 has the form db^2, where d =
{ 3, 11, 19, 43, 67, 163 }.  I haven't been able to find any references to
this anywhere, is this something like the p +/- 1 factoring methods where the
values they're effective against are so unlikely that they can be safely
ignored, or is it just that no-one's ever noticed this paper?

Peter.




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From: polyakov_y at bk.ru (Rhea Colvin)
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 09:11:34 -0100
Subject: Stronger climaxes and orgasms
Message-ID: <200602280810.k1S8AZC8019618@proton.jfet.org>

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From diazp at cm-marne.fr  Tue Feb 28 10:24:08 2006
From: diazp at cm-marne.fr (Rubin M. Broussard)
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 10:24:08 -0800
Subject: The vice president can't handle a gun
Message-ID: <674116.1676577476301.673821046667.JIGN.6880@irksome>

spheroid incometary seeeratosthenes theteletype butcombinate
butaudubon indiscreet atwenty mayalumni and

acorn maydjakarta tryoctillion andamateurish seebelshazzar
somewilt seeturmoil someabsolve somecerebral
,emulate orbamberger theaback aberman
notimpolitic try
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From coderman at gmail.com  Tue Feb 28 10:55:20 2006
From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 10:55:20 -0800
Subject: Fwd: Abridged -> Financial Cryptography Update: Identity on the
  move II - Microsoft's "Identity Metasystem" TM, R, Passport-redux
Message-ID: <4ef5fec60602281055j7643cebesfeb8b265ee7b61a2@mail.gmail.com>

user centric identity management is coming.  big improvements here but
i'm going to dismiss it by saying the InfoCard system is still managed
by a huge proprietary code base mired in an ecosystem of
vulnerability.

the rootkits of the future will simply be hooking into userspace to
steal data off the pages you use to communicate over InfoCard secured
sessions back to your bank. (see the Haxdoor rootkit as an example of
this)


----

https://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000666.html

...

That aside, what is this InfoCard? Well, that's not spelt out in so
many words as yet:

"""
In the client user interface, each of the user's digital identities
used within the metasystem is represented by a visual "Information
Card" (a.k.a. "InfoCard", the source of this technology's codename).
The user selects identities represented by InfoCards to authenticate
to participating services. The cards themselves represent references
to identity providers that are contacted to produce the needed claim
data for an identity when requested, rather than claims data stored on
the local machine. Only the claim values actually requested by the
relying party are released, rather than all claims that the identity
possesses (see Law 2).
"""

... Now we come to the user-centric part of the InfoCard system:

"""
2.7. Authenticating Users to Sites InfoCards have several key
advantages over username/password credentials:

    * Because no password is typed or sent, by definition, your
password can not be stolen or forgotten.
    * Because authentication is based on unique keys generated for
every InfoCard/site pair (unless using a card explicitly designed to
enable cross-site collaboration), the keys known by one site are
useless for authentication at another, even for the same InfoCard.
    * Because InfoCards will resupply claim values (for example, name,
address, and e-mail address) to relying parties that the user had
previously furnished them to, relying parties do not need to store
this data between sessions. Retaining less data means that sites have
fewer vulnerabilities. (See Law 2.)
"""

What does that mean? Although it wasn't mentioned there, it turns out
that there are two possibilities: Client side key generation and
relationship tracking, as well as "provider generated InfoCards"
written up elsewhere:

"""
    Under the company's plan, computer users would create some cards
for themselves, entering information for logging into Web sites. Other
cards would be distributed by identity providers -- such as banks or
governmental agencies or online services -- for secure online
authentication of a person's identity.

    To log in to a site, computer users would open the InfoCard
program directly, or using Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser, and
then click on the card that matches the level of information required
by the site. The InfoCard program would then retrieve the necessary
credentials from the identity provider, in the form of a secure
digital token. The InfoCard program would then transmit the digital
token to the site to authenticate the person's identity.
"""

Obviously the remote provision of InfoCards will depend on buy-in,
which is a difficult pill to follow as that means trusting Microsoft
in oh so many ways - something they haven't really got to grips with.
But then there are also client-generated tokens. Are they useful?

If they have client-side key generation and relationship caching, then
these are two of the missing links in building a sustainable secure
system. See my emphasis further above for a hint on relationship
tracking and see Kim Cameron's blogfor this comment: "Cameron: A
self-issued one you create yourself." Nyms (as per SSH and SOX) and
relationship tracking (again SSH, and these days Trustbar,Petname and
recent other suggestions) are strong. These ideas have been around for
a decade or more, we call it opportunistic cryptography as a school.

Alternatively, notice how the credentials term is slipped in there.
That's not how Stefan Brands envisages it (from Identity on the move I
- Stefan Brands on user-centric identity management), but they are
using his term. What that means is unclear (and see Identity on the
move III - some ramblings on "we'll get it right this time, honest
injun!" for more).

Finally, one last snippet:

"""
3.6. Claims != "Trust" A design decision was to factor out trust
decisions and not bundle them into the identity metasystem protocols
and payloads. Unlike the X.509 PKIX [IETF 05], for example, the
metasystem design verifies the cryptography but leaves trust analysis
for a higher layer that runs on top of the identity metasystem.
"""

Hallelujah! Trust is something users do. Crypto systems do claims
about relationships.




From dave at farber.net  Tue Feb 28 12:31:33 2006
From: dave at farber.net (Dave Farber)
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 15:31:33 -0500
Subject: [IP] Patriot Act E-Mail Searches Apply to Non-Terrorists,
 Judges Say
Message-ID: <mailman.1607.1576007675.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Going going -- ////

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Patriot Act E-Mail Searches Apply to Non-Terrorists, Judges Say
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 12:09:19 -0800
From: Steven Hertzberg <stevenstevensteven at gmail.com>
To: dave at farber.net

"Two federal judges in Florida have upheld the authority of individual
courts to use the Patriot Act to order searches anywhere in the country for
e-mails and computer data in all types of criminal investigations,
overruling a magistrate who found that Congress limited such expanded
jurisdiction to cases involving terrorism."

[snip]
"it seems" Congress did intend to authorize nationwide search warrants in
all cases, not just ones pertaining to terrorism.

[snip]
"The only person in a position to assert your rights is the ISP and if it's
in their local court, they are more likely to challenge it if it is bad or
somehow deficient," Mr. Bankston said.


----Article----
BY JOSH GERSTEIN - Staff Reporter of the Sun
February 28, 2006
URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/28232

Two federal judges in Florida have upheld the authority of individual courts
to use the Patriot Act to order searches anywhere in the country for e-mails
and computer data in all types of criminal investigations, overruling a
magistrate who found that Congress limited such expanded jurisdiction to
cases involving terrorism.

The disagreement among the jurists about the scope of their powers simmered
for more than two years before coming to light in an opinion unsealed
earlier this month. The resolution, which underscored the government's broad
legal authority to intercept electronic communications, comes as debate is
raging over President Bush's warrantless surveillance program and the duties
of Internet providers to protect personal data.

A magistrate judge in Orlando, James Glazebrook, first questioned the
so-called nationwide-search provision in 2003, after investigators in a
child pornography probe asked him to issue a search warrant requiring a
"legitimate" California-based Web site to identify all users who accessed
certain "password-protected" photos posted on the site. The Web provider was
not named in public court records.

Magistrate Glazebrook said that in passing the Patriot Act, formally known
as the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Congress made clear its
focus was on terrorism. He said there was nothing in the language Congress
adopted in the days after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that
suggested the nationwide-search provision should apply to garden variety
federal cases.

"The statutory language is clear and unambiguous in limiting district court
authority to issue out-of-district warrants to investigations of terrorism,
and that language controls this court's interpretation. The government has
shown no legislative intent to the contrary," the magistrate wrote. He also
noted that many of the examples given during legislative debate involved
terrorism. The then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator
Leahy, a Democrat of Vermont, described the nationwide-search language as
applying in terrorism cases, the court noted.

Magistrate Glazebrook denied the search warrant, but it was recently
disclosed that the government appealed to a federal judge, G. Kendall Sharp,
who granted it without explanation.

The scenario played out again late last year, after prosecutors presented
Magistrate Glazebrook with an application for a search warrant directed to a
Sunnyvale, Calif.-based Web portal, Yahoo. The government asked that Yahoo
produce web pages, documents, and usage logs pertaining to two e-mail
addresses and a Web site allegedly linked to an Orlando man, Earl Beach,
under investigation for involvement in child pornography. Magistrate
Glazebrook allowed searches of Mr. Beach's home and computers, but again
rejected prosecutors' request to acquire data located across the country.
"Congress has not authorized this court to seize out-of-district property
except in cases of domestic or international terrorism," the magistrate
handwrote on the application.

Again, prosecutors appealed. Judge Gregory Presnell took up the question and
concluded that "it seems" Congress did intend to authorize nationwide search
warrants in all cases, not just ones pertaining to terrorism. However, the
judge acknowledged that the language Congress used was far from clear. "The
court rejects the assertions made by both the United States here and the
magistrate judge... that the statutory language is unambiguous. Although the
court ultimately comes to a determination regarding the meaning of this
language, by no means is it clearly, unambiguously or precisely written,"
Judge Presnell wrote.

The chief federal defender in Orlando, R. Fletcher Peacock, said the dispute
was a straightforward one pitting literal interpretation against legislative
intent. "Judge Presnell was more willing to go behind the language of the
statute and look at the statutory intent, and clearly Judge Glazebrook was
not," the attorney said.

One of the most striking aspects of the dispute is that there appears to be
no other published court ruling addressing the nationwide-search provision,
known as Section 220. The magistrate involved cited no cases directly on the
point and neither did the government.

An attorney with a group that pushes for online privacy, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, said yesterday that the lack of published cases on the
subject reflects the fact that search warrant applications are presented
outside the presence of defense lawyers, often before a defendant even knows
he is under investigation. "It's fairly typical that search warrants for
electronic evidence would be kept under seal," the privacy advocate, Kevin
Bankston, said. "In most cases, they wouldn't be reported."

Mr. Bankston said there is no question that the Justice Department wanted
the Patriot Act to include nationwide-search authority for all crimes, but
whether lawmakers accomplished that task is another question. "I don't know
that Congress knew what it was voting on," he said.

Civil libertarians have objected to the nationwide-search provision on the
grounds that it allows prosecutors the discretion to pick judicial districts
where judges are seen as more friendly to the government. Critics of the
Patriot Act have also warned that allowing search warrants to be filed from
across the country will discourage Internet service providers from fighting
such requests even when they may be unwarranted.

"The only person in a position to assert your rights is the ISP and if it's
in their local court, they are more likely to challenge it if it is bad or
somehow deficient," Mr. Bankston said.

A spokesman for the prosecutors did not return a call seeking comment for
this story. However, the Justice Department has said the nationwide-search
provision was "vital" to its investigation of the gruesome murder in 2004 of
a pregnant Missouri woman, Bobbie Jo Stinnett, whose unborn child was cut
from her womb with a kitchen knife. Investigators claim that they used the
Patriot Act authority to quickly obtain email evidence from an Internet
provider across state lines in Kansas. That data led them to a woman who
later confessed to the attack, Lisa Montgomery.

In his ruling, Judge Presnell did not mention that episode, but suggested it
was simpler for the courts and prosecutors to issue all warrants in a case
from one place.

"As a matter of judicial and prosecutorial efficiency, it is practical to
permit the federal district court for the district where the federal crime
allegedly occurred to oversee both the prosecution and the investigation
(including the issuance of warrants) thereof," he wrote. The government has
also complained that the former procedure caused court backlogs and delays
in jurisdictions, like northern California, that are home to many Internet
companies.

It is unclear whether any charges resulted from the 2003 investigation, but
the suspect involved in the disputed 2005 search, Mr. Beach, was indicted
earlier this month on charges of possessing and distributing child
pornography. He has pleaded not guilty. A trial is set for April.

Magistrate Glazebrook said in a brief interview yesterday that he could not
discuss the specific cases that prompted the legal disagreement over the
Patriot Act, but that he expects the question to arise again. "It is
certainly something that will come up," he said. "There are a lot of
interesting issues surrounding that."


________________________________
Steven Hertzberg
http://www.hertzberg.org


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From uyfddzkser at hotmail.com  Tue Feb 28 15:27:10 2006
From: uyfddzkser at hotmail.com (Dorothea Dodson)
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 21:27:10 -0200
Subject: Qualities Pharrmacy YqP
Message-ID: <68QL87FE.0G24.uyfddzkser@hotmail.com>



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