From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com Sat Apr 1 05:46:04 2006 From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV) Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2006 05:46:04 -0800 (PST) Subject: Bugged Humans Message-ID: <20060401134604.99896.qmail@web33312.mail.mud.yahoo.com> hi, I apologise if this has been already discussed. http://www.backfire.dk/EMPIRENORTH/newsite/products_en001.htm __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com From rah at shipwright.com Sat Apr 1 11:47:40 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2006 14:47:40 -0500 Subject: Bugged Humans In-Reply-To: <20060401191503.GA31240@arion.hive> References: <20060401134604.99896.qmail@web33312.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20060401184219.GA4549@arion.hive> <20060401185903.GO31486@leitl.org> <20060401191503.GA31240@arion.hive> Message-ID: At 7:15 PM +0000 4/1/06, Justin wrote: >An excellent day for China to take back Taiwan. An excellent day for Taipei to nuke Beijing. Unleash Chaing (not that he'd go anywhere, now...), RAH -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From jya at pipeline.com Sat Apr 1 15:29:50 2006 From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young) Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2006 15:29:50 -0800 Subject: Bugged Humans In-Reply-To: References: <20060401191503.GA31240@arion.hive> <20060401134604.99896.qmail@web33312.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20060401184219.GA4549@arion.hive> <20060401185903.GO31486@leitl.org> <20060401191503.GA31240@arion.hive> Message-ID: Bush is bunkered in Crawford after messing with, softening, the heads of MX and CA, and right now there are two unpublicized emergency operations underway on the AZ-MX border -- no fly zones. Call it Alamo2 run by the Carpetbagging reenactors, then right down the PanAm highway of death to VE, promulgating and liberating brand new United States on the way. And you thought it was Iran, you dumb Peak Oil shits. The easy oil is right nearby, closer than AK, with liquified natural gas tankers and pipelines and special ops blackfaces ready to launch, or already on the move. Heh, cloak the grab by censuring the commander in chief, pretending to be agitated by NSA eavesdropping, meanwhile stuffing your energy portfolio to the max. By god, the State of Texas, well, hell, call it the Republic of Texas stretching all to the way to the edges of Latin America, urged on and blessed by the exploit the natives Money Church now for over 4 centuries, with the consequence of the crippled old freedom promoting US, legs shriveled, begging for fuel, or tithing faith healers preaching how to learn to walk. Fuck let's get along as we drive along yelling at our cells Americans, all the colors of the rainbow, even the drip and dried anus whities anxiously waiting for the help to drive the beach buggy. A century from now people will wonder how did our ancestors ... believe? From rah at shipwright.com Sat Apr 1 12:39:30 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2006 15:39:30 -0500 Subject: Bugged Humans In-Reply-To: References: <20060401191503.GA31240@arion.hive> <20060401134604.99896.qmail@web33312.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20060401184219.GA4549@arion.hive> <20060401185903.GO31486@leitl.org> <20060401191503.GA31240@arion.hive> Message-ID: At 3:29 PM -0800 4/1/06, John Young wrote: >Call it Alamo2 >run by the Carpetbagging reenactors Damn straight. Next stop, Veracruz.... ;-) I'll have whatever John's smokin'... Cheers, RAH -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From bedasg at netscape.net Sat Apr 1 05:58:51 2006 From: bedasg at netscape.net (Robert Hooker) Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2006 16:58:51 +0300 Subject: premature ejaculation treatment Message-ID: <823551l5oy18$9f2q2509$16b6fkgd@registrantjensencongoqo85> how are you: try our site 100% money back guarrantte !! http://62.193.240.107/sm/ Increase spermm vol... http://62.193.240.107/et/ Preventing premature ejjaculation... http://62.193.240.107/gip/ Generic C:alis soft tabs.. Herval V:agra 100% natural.. populateg7890gsgyuhdsjk From coderman at gmail.com Sat Apr 1 17:02:08 2006 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2006 17:02:08 -0800 Subject: Bugged Humans In-Reply-To: <20060401184219.GA4549@arion.hive> References: <20060401134604.99896.qmail@web33312.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20060401184219.GA4549@arion.hive> Message-ID: <4ef5fec60604011702q176e4a76t1552bcaa1db6f785@mail.gmail.com> On 4/1/06, Justin wrote: > ... > This, OTOH, is half-true. It appears the fraudster was selected into > the China Int'l Police Exhibition without a working model. > http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=45739 """ Weapons that shoots microchips into the bodies of innocent civilians. An artist smuggling blueprints for fake technology inside Chinas first international weapons fair. Laughing arms traders drinking 30 year old Chivas Regal among teenage models advertising new weapons. No, it4s not a scary sci-fi movie. It4s a blast of an art show by Danish artist Jakob S. Boeskov """ sounds like a great time; the yes men infiltrate the military industrial complex. i'm dreaming sweet visions of honey tokens and trojan wares wrapped in the latest pornographic steel-and-tech laden facades... (and yeah, pass that shit this way John... :) p.s, don't fret for hugo - bird flu pandemics and fiat currency fads are our savior; hah! From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net Sat Apr 1 10:42:19 2006 From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin) Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2006 18:42:19 +0000 Subject: Bugged Humans In-Reply-To: <20060401134604.99896.qmail@web33312.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <20060401134604.99896.qmail@web33312.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20060401184219.GA4549@arion.hive> On 2006-04-01T05:46:04-0800, Sarad AV wrote: > I apologise if this has been already discussed. > http://www.backfire.dk/EMPIRENORTH/newsite/products_en001.htm I am so sick of April Fool's day. It used to be that only simple, verbal statements were possible jokes. Now the entire day is wasted, turned into a farce. Everything I read is suspect, even physical books. This, OTOH, is half-true. It appears the fraudster was selected into the China Int'l Police Exhibition without a working model. http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=45739 -- The six phases of a project: I. Enthusiasm. IV. Search for the Guilty. II. Disillusionment. V. Punishment of the Innocent. III. Panic. VI. Praise & Honor for the Nonparticipants. From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net Sat Apr 1 11:15:03 2006 From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin) Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2006 19:15:03 +0000 Subject: Bugged Humans In-Reply-To: <20060401185903.GO31486@leitl.org> References: <20060401134604.99896.qmail@web33312.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20060401184219.GA4549@arion.hive> <20060401185903.GO31486@leitl.org> Message-ID: <20060401191503.GA31240@arion.hive> On 2006-04-01T20:59:03+0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > On Sat, Apr 01, 2006 at 06:42:19PM +0000, Justin wrote: > > > I am so sick of April Fool's day. It used to be that only simple, > > An excellent day to start a nuclear war, imo. An excellent day for China to take back Taiwan. -- The six phases of a project: I. Enthusiasm. IV. Search for the Guilty. II. Disillusionment. V. Punishment of the Innocent. III. Panic. VI. Praise & Honor for the Nonparticipants. From vickers at comsol.com Sat Apr 1 17:43:05 2006 From: vickers at comsol.com (Jeff Stein) Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2006 19:43:05 -0600 Subject: Urgent Notification #17984754480448 Message-ID: <040m835b.6905570@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1197 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: phosphor.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Sat Apr 1 10:59:03 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2006 20:59:03 +0200 Subject: Bugged Humans In-Reply-To: <20060401184219.GA4549@arion.hive> References: <20060401134604.99896.qmail@web33312.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20060401184219.GA4549@arion.hive> Message-ID: <20060401185903.GO31486@leitl.org> On Sat, Apr 01, 2006 at 06:42:19PM +0000, Justin wrote: > I am so sick of April Fool's day. It used to be that only simple, An excellent day to start a nuclear war, imo. > verbal statements were possible jokes. Now the entire day is wasted, > turned into a farce. Everything I read is suspect, even physical books. April's fool is definitely a major RISK. -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From dewitt at kmpt.com Sat Apr 1 19:11:48 2006 From: dewitt at kmpt.com (Roger Koch) Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2006 21:11:48 -0600 Subject: Mortagge ratee approvedd Message-ID: <5.7.1.6.2.94068466081569.595a0881@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1213 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] Tribal Politics Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com TCS Daily - Tribal Politics By Arnold Kling : BIO| 03 Apr 2006 "Suppose you could give American high school dropouts a 1000% raise by exterminating every man, woman, and child in Latin America. Would that be the right thing to do? No? Why not? Your answer, hopefully, is that murder is wrong, even if it financially benefits low-skilled Americans. In fact, when you put it that way, it's hard not to exclaim, 'What's so great about low-skilled Americans? Are they the master race, in whose service any crime is justified?' OK, suppose you could give American high school dropouts an 8% raise by deporting every man, woman, and child from Latin America back to their home countries. Would that be the right thing to do?" -- Bryan Caplan In today's political discourse, the term "Nazi" serves no intellectual purpose. It is merely an epithet, used to indicate anger. Calling someone a Nazi is like calling someone a bleeping bleep. For me, this creates a problem of terminology. I want to describe the beliefs of someone like George Bush, who worries about "national competitiveness" (fear the peril of Asian scientists!) and who wants No (American) Child Left Behind. I want to describe the beliefs of someone like Paul Krugman, who is worried about the wages of "our" unskilled workers, or who wants "our" health care to be paid for by taxes. What should you call someone who wants government to provide for our education, competitiveness, and health care but whose concern about "us" stops at the border? The obvious label would be national socialist. But George Bush and Paul Krugman are not Nazis. So, I need an alternative term. Call their ideology statist-collectivist. Transnational Libertarianism The alternative ideology that I would propose might be called transnational libertarianism. The ideal libertarian world would have no economic borders. There would be no problem of illegal immigration, because all forms of immigration would be legal. If transnational libertarianism were to become sufficiently popular to emerge as the ideology that determines the world's institutions, then governments would be local rather than national. Their main role would be to prevent outbreaks of violence among individuals or groups. In the nightclub of life, government would be the bouncer, not the owner or the manager or the dance instructor or the disk jockey. Transnational libertarianism would be based on a system of individual rights, like our Bill of Rights. The purpose of individual rights is solely to protect individuals from abuse of government power. We would not have a "right to health care" or a "right to education." We would have rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association. I would like to see these individual rights made fully portable, so that freedom of movement becomes a basic right. I would like to see Hispanics free to live and work in the United States, Palestinian Arabs free to live and work in Israel, and Jews free to live and work in Palestinian territory or other Arab lands. Individuals would have the right to choose to live under strict religious law. However, no one could be forced to live under strict religious law. Any conflict between religious law and the basic rights of the individual would be resolved in favor of the rights of the individual. Individuals would have the right to associate only with people who have similar ethnic origins, although I believe it is in one's best interest instead to have an inclusive set of associates. What is important is that government not engage in or support ethnic discrimination. Governments should be strong enough to protect basic rights, and no stronger. Today's national governments are too strong. A "world government" that is even stronger would be a transnational libertarian's worst nightmare. Local governments, with plenty of checks and balances, would be better. To improve accountability and reduce government over-reach, I have suggested breaking up the United States into 250 states. Tribal Identity I believe that people have a strong need for tribal identity. We want to belong to a group that has common customs and rituals that distinguish the group from other groups. One sees this phenomenon at work in all forms of human social organizations, from ethnic groups to sports fans to religions to corporate departments to professional associations. Tribal identity motivates people to help others. People naturally join clubs, religious organizations, and other groups. In the absence of strong national governments, these associations could share resources in order to alleviate problems among their members, satisfying the needs that today are answered by the welfare state. Tribal identity is a mixed blessing. For those people who belong to groups where norms include resistance to work, school, or responsibility, one could argue that tribal identity is a handicap. Tribal identity is used to motivate people to engage in violence against outsiders. Tribal identity is one of the reasons that we need bouncers in the nightclub of life. Politicians in nation-states attempt to use tribal identity to foster cohesion. In my view, they do this all too well. One result is that statist-collectivist ideology has a deep hold on most of us. Often, as in the case of Paul Krugman's recent writing on immigration, tribal identity is mixed with folk Marxism. Another consequence of tribal identity is war. Statist collectivism elevates tribal war to a colossal scale. However, pacifism is no refuge in a world where violence based on tribal identity is often unchecked and many individual thugs as well as mass movements are prepared to trample individual rights. The Internet Example I do not expect the world to move toward transnational libertarianism in the foreseeable future. Right now, other ideologies predominate. Islamofascism, an ideology of tribal domination, is very prominent. Transnational progressivism, which favors world government and socialism, is the opposite of transnational libertarianism. And then there is statist collectivism, which is far more popular than transnational libertarianism. I am cautiously hopeful that the trend might be away from statist collectivism and toward transnational libertarianism. This hope is based on the Internet. First, the Internet itself serves to demonstrate the workability of an institution that relies relatively heavily on individual rights and responsibilities and relatively little on national government. On the Internet, borders tend to be highly porous, and in fact this is contributing to the increased porousness of borders in general, as is illustrated by the phenomenon of overseas outsourcing of service work. Second, the Internet provides a medium that can be used to counter statist-collectivist propaganda. The mass-market media of the twentieth century were easily and naturally drawn into the service of politicians with statist-collectivist agendas. The Internet has allowed other voices to challenge the mainstream media, and perhaps some day this will challenge the hegemony of mainstream politicians. My point is not that we can expect soon to see transnational libertarianism put into practice. However, I do think that it represents a more positive vision for society than statist collectivism. I think that with the medium of the Internet available, those of us who believe in transnational libertarianism are better able to articulate our views. As the Internet continues to take hold, it will become more difficult to dismiss libertarianism than was the case during the era dominated by mass media. The Immigration Issue Back in the real world, the immigration issue raises some concerns. First, there is the issue of assimilation. My idea of an assimilated immigrant is someone with a strong commitment to the Bill of Rights, separation of powers, and federalism. My opinion is that immigrants who are fleeing from ethnic cleansing or political repression are more likely to assimilate, because with a first-hand experience of tyranny they can really appreciate American liberty and ideals. I would not want to see economically-motivated immigrants or guest workers crowd out the more desperate refugees from other parts of the world. Another concern I have with either immigration or guest workers is reconciliation with our welfare state. We do not want immigration or guest work to be a way to extract benefits from the welfare state, such as Medicaid or public education. But I think we want guest workers to pay taxes. One approach, which is rather harsh, would be to tell guest workers that they have to pay taxes that help support Social Security, Medicaid, and public schools, but they are not allowed to obtain benefits from any of these programs. If we lived in a transnational libertarian utopia, the issue of immigration policy would be simple. Open borders would be the right approach. There would be no concern with immigrants coming to take advantage of our welfare state, because we would not have one. But we do not live in a transnational libertarian utopia. For now, immigration policy must cater to the inclinations of national socialists. Arnold Kling is an adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute and author of Learning Economics. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net Tue Apr 4 00:00:09 2006 From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin) Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 07:00:09 +0000 Subject: New Dark Freenet (0.7a1) Message-ID: <20060404070009.GA22610@arion.hive> http://freenetproject.org/ Unfortunately, it's still in java... written once bloated everywhere. -- The six phases of a project: I. Enthusiasm. IV. Search for the Guilty. II. Disillusionment. V. Punishment of the Innocent. III. Panic. VI. Praise & Honor for the Nonparticipants. From rah at shipwright.com Tue Apr 4 07:13:00 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 09:13:00 -0500 Subject: [Clips] How Patriot Act Helped Convict Man In Baby-Food Ring Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 09:12:15 -0500 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R. A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] How Patriot Act Helped Convict Man In Baby-Food Ring Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com The Wall Street Journal April 4, 2006 PAGE ONE Volatile Formula How Patriot Act Helped Convict Man In Baby-Food Ring Mr. Jammal Faces 10 Years After Terror-Probe Tapes Are Used in Criminal Trial A 14-Minute Rant Against U.S. By JOHN D. MCKINNON April 4, 2006; Page A1 Three months before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, police in Tempe, Ariz., began investigating information from Wal-Mart Stores Inc. suggesting that a local grocery wholesaler named Samih Jammal was part of an organized ring stealing baby formula from Wal-Mart stores and trucks. The investigation proceeded uneventfully until shortly after 9/11 when it was turned over to a joint local and federal terrorism task force. Phoenix police, in a written report later provided to Mr. Jammal as part of his prosecution, said they had "confirmed" that he "had significant connections to terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda." At some point after that -- prosecutors won't say precisely when -- authorities got a warrant to tap Mr. Jammal's phone and bug his office. It wasn't an ordinary warrant, the sort routinely authorized by judges in response to applications from police and prosecutors who want to eavesdrop to catch crooks. It was a national-security warrant authorized by the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, giving authorities much more leeway, and giving wiretap targets fewer rights. Mr. Jammal, a 36-year-old U.S. citizen born in Lebanon, was never charged with any offense related to terrorism. Yet evidence collected in the FISA eavesdropping played a role in his conviction last April on federal charges focused on fencing stolen baby formula, for which he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. His case sits on the fine line between the government's responsibility to go all-out to prevent terrorism and its duty to protect the constitutional rights of American citizens accused of crimes. It's a line that has blurred considerably since 9/11 and the 2001 passage of the Patriot Act. It allows authorities to use FISA wiretaps authorized by special courts not only to gather foreign intelligence but to investigate domestic crimes. Mr. Jammal is appealing, contending that FISA evidence used against him was illegally obtained and crippled his defense. He says the charges against him were trumped up by a government determined to show progress in the war against terror. "It's baby formula of mass destruction here," he said at one pretrial hearing. With an ordinary warrant for electronic surveillance, authorities must show probable cause that the target committed a crime and limit eavesdropping to conversations about crimes. They must also eventually notify those who were bugged (even if they aren't accused of a crime) and must give defendants complete access to the warrant application, court orders and any actual recordings. To get a FISA warrant, in contrast, authorities need to persuade a federal judge that there is probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power such as a terrorist organization. For U.S. citizens, prosecutors also must show that some crime might be involved. Armed with such a warrant, authorities can eavesdrop on any conversation, regardless of whether it involves a crime. They can withhold from defendants the basis for issuing the warrant, hindering legal challenges to the FISA evidence. And they can restrict defendants' access to the classified transcripts and tapes, which makes it harder for the defense to parry the government's charges or mount its own case. The FISA warrant in the Jammal case distinguishes it from the controversial warrantless wiretaps that President Bush authorized the National Security Agency to conduct in pursuit of terrorism. Constitutional Question Even with warrants, critics fear defendants' rights to a fair trial will be eroded, as authorities use intelligence-gathering techniques to pursue criminal cases. "If evidence is procured by methods that wouldn't stand up to the Fourth Amendment, the courts are going to have to stop it," said Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York, top Democrat on the House Judiciary subcommittee on the Constitution. Cases like Mr. Jammal's "should be challenged in court," he said. "That kind of thing shouldn't happen." Andrew McCarthy, who prosecuted Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman on terror charges in New York, says the old dividing wall between foreign intelligence operations and domestic criminal investigations doesn't make sense in the fight against terrorism. "They usually commit an array of garden-variety crime in the course of trying to conduct terrorism operations," says Mr. McCarthy, now a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based group that studies national security issues. That means investigating crimes and gathering intelligence through plea bargains and other techniques can be an important tool. Paul Charlton, the U.S. attorney for Arizona whose office brought the case against Mr. Jammal, says in an interview that existing procedures properly balance the rights of defendants with the government's need to maintain secrecy to protect national security. He notes that, as in all FISA cases, a federal judge approved the initial application for the Jammal warrant privately. Prosecutors were "scrupulous" about avoiding suggestions at trial that Mr. Jammal was linked to terrorism, he adds, trying to ensure he got a fair trial. Prior to passage of the Patriot Act, court interpretations required that the "primary" purpose of a FISA warrant had to be gathering foreign intelligence. The Patriot Act, passed in October 2001, broadened the rules so that intelligence gathering need only be a "significant" purpose of wiretapping. Evidence obtained under FISA warrants has been used in a handful of cases involving charges not directly related to terrorism, including at least one immigration proceeding. Mr. Jammal's case shows how much the legal environment changes when FISA wiretaps enter the picture in criminal cases. His first two court-appointed lawyers stepped down in part because the secret tapes required them to get security clearance. Even with such clearance, however, they wouldn't be able to discuss the tapes with their client. His third lawyer, who did get clearance, was able to review only translated summaries, not transcripts, of selected wiretapped conversations. At trial, the government played the jury a recording made under the FISA warrant that proved damaging to Mr. Jammal: a rambling 14-minute diatribe in which he rails against the U.S. government in Arabic, and talks about fleeing to Lebanon if officials came after him for unpaid taxes. The case against Mr. Jammal began in June 2001 when Wal-Mart investigators, frustrated by a rash of baby-formula thefts, gave Tempe police detective Tom O'Brien information about a recent attempted theft in Midland, Texas. For reasons that aren't clear, that led to a police stakeout outside Mr. Jammal's business, located in a warehouse complex in the Phoenix suburb of Tempe. Checks of license plates revealed people with shoplifting records showing up to do business with Mr. Jammal. Sent to U.S. for College Mr. Jammal grew up in Lebanon and Kuwait. His father owned fruit and vegetable export firms, a farm, a small phone company and a school, according to Mr. Jammal. The family was prosperous enough to send Mr. Jammal to the U.S. in 1988 to study at West Virginia's Marshall University, named after the nation's first chief justice, John Marshall. Wiry and athletic, Mr. Jammal played for a while on the school's soccer team. The family businesses suffered in the early 1990s, and Mr. Jammal began working odd jobs to put himself through school, according to Mr. Jammal's wife, Gretchen, who grew up in Ohio and whom he met while attending Marshall. After college, Mr. Jammal gravitated toward the business of selling baby-formula on the advice of a friend, and moved to Arizona starting in 1994 to live near a cousin and savor the warmer weather. Mr. Jammal joined a number of other entrepreneurs -- some of Middle Eastern origin -- who were buying up large quantities of formula at big chain stores, which often sold it as a loss leader. The brokers then sold to wholesalers who, in turn, resold to smaller retailers, who often served low-income families participating in federal food-aid programs. None of this is illegal, although some manufacturers raised concerns about the practice. Taking baby formula out of the original packages and repackaging for resale can be a crime, however. In 1998, Mr. Jammal pleaded guilty to a single charge of improper repackaging of baby formula. He got three years' probation and a $1,000 fine. Big retailers and formula manufacturers sought to choke off the gray market in baby formula -- for instance, by limiting the amount of formula that could be purchased off-the-shelf at one time. Still, Mr. Jammal's business, Jamal Trading Co., thrived. He says he took advantage of loss leaders at big-box stores and also distributed cereals, juices, diapers and other grocery items. He opened several small retail stores in Arizona. In May 2003, unaware that he had been secretly indicted, he moved his family into a $550,000 suburban home in Mesa, Ariz., where he kept a dozen sheep and goats. Meanwhile, federal authorities say they got interested in Mr. Jammal in October 2001 when they happened to overhear him on a Drug Enforcement Agency wiretap of Osamah Yacoub, an immigrant from Jerusalem who was living in Houston. The two were talking about the baby-formula business, Mr. Charlton, the U.S. attorney said. Mr. Yacoub later pleaded guilty to a charge related to methamphetamine trafficking and cooperated with the government in its prosecution of Mr. Jammal. Around the same time, according to a Phoenix police affidavit, a confidential informant told authorities that Mr. Jammal was trying to "facilitate the release of a non-U.S. citizen who was in federal custody" -- Malek Seif -- and smuggle him to Mexico. Mr. Seif later pleaded guilty to falsifying immigration and Social Security records. Through one of his appeal lawyers, Mr. Jammal said the story is not true. "Someone made it up," said the lawyer, Scott MacPherson. A 9/11 Hijacker at Mosque Federal authorities won't say exactly what led to Mr. Jammal's case being turned over to the terrorism task force. Mr. Jammal suspects one factor was that he and Mr. Seif attended a Tempe mosque where one of the 9/11 hijackers worshipped briefly -- Hani Hanjour, a Saudi Arabian who was aboard the American Airlines jet that crashed into the Pentagon. Mr. Jammal, who says he has no sympathies with terrorism, says he expressed skepticism about Mr. Hanjour's culpability when Federal Bureau of Investigation agents came to the mosque shortly after 9/11. Beginning in December 2001, authorities devised a sting aimed at Mr. Jammal and his associates. Mead Johnson, a unit of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. and maker of the Enfamil brand, gave police posing as middlemen baby formula to sell to Jamal Trading Co., representing it as stolen. Mr. Jammal didn't buy formula directly in the sting, and typically insisted that associates get signed statements attesting that any formula they bought wasn't stolen. But police did sell 1,400 cases from the back of a Wal-Mart truck to Mr. Jammal's partner in several businesses, an Egyptian-born businessman named Tamer Swailem, in May 2002. Testifying against Mr. Jammal, Mr. Swailem said he expressed misgivings to Mr. Jammal about buying the formula in a cellphone conversation. "It didn't feel right....[but] finally we decided just to go ahead and have him [the agent] sign the paper," Mr. Swailem said. Mr. Jammal, who didn't testify at this trial, says in an interview that he told Mr. Swailem to "get the hell out" if he believed the formula in the truck was stolen. In March 2003, Mr. Jammal was indicted secretly. Although the government refuses to say when it tapped Mr. Jammal's phones and bugged his office under the FISA warrant, summaries of about 20 conversations introduced in criminal proceedings against Mr. Jammal date from May and June 2003. Clifford Fishman, a Catholic University law professor who has studied wiretap laws, says using FISA-authorized wiretaps to bolster an already pending criminal case "would be a clear misuse of the law." A spokeswoman for Mr. Charlton, the prosecutor, said that the "basis for the FISA intercept was unrelated to [Mr. Jammal's] involvement in organized retail theft," adding that it was conducted by a separate investigative team. She said officials can't reveal reasons for seeking the FISA warrant. Mr. Jammal was arrested in July 2003, and charged with eight felony counts including interstate transportation of stolen property. The government now says that of the 27 defendants in the case, 22 were arrested; 18 pleaded guilty and four of them so far have been deported, while others are pending deportation; and four others including Mr. Jammal were convicted at trial. Federal prosecutors used declassified conversations recorded under the FISA warrants to argue successfully that he should be jailed awaiting trial. They said his expressed interest in running for the Lebanese parliament proved that he had no strong ties to the U.S. As Mr. Jammal's trial approached, the FISA-authorized wiretaps also posed difficulties for his court-appointed lawyer, Michael Reeves. The government insisted that Mr. Reeves obtain security clearance to examine classified evidence in the case and agree not to talk about the evidence with anyone, even his client. Mr. Reeves's doubts deepened when he got a look at the security-clearance application. Under penalty of perjury, it asked detailed information "like 'Have you ever missed a mortgage payment?' " Mr. Reeves recalls. "It made me nervous." Ashcroft Weighed In While Mr. Reeves pondered the matter, he asked the court to order the government either to reveal the basis for issuing the FISA warrant so he could challenge its legality or bar the evidence altogether. The government countered with an affidavit from then-Attorney General John Ashcroft who said telling defense lawyers why the FISA warrant was issued "would harm the national security." The federal trial judge, Frederick J. Martone, sided with the government. Judge Martone allowed Mr. Reeves to withdraw and appointed Michael Smith of Mesa to take his place. But he, too, eventually pulled out, arguing that serving as an effective advocate for Mr. Jammal meant sharing the FISA evidence with his client -- something that would expose Mr. Smith to prosecution. In October 2004, Judge Martone named Robert Kavanagh, a former Phoenix police officer, to represent Mr. Jammal. Mr. Jammal says Mr. Kavanagh inherited from the previous lawyers only a few CD's -- apparently a small portion of the surveillance videos that were made outside his client's warehouse -- plus a largely inaudible tape recording of one of the FISA conversations. With time running out and no more delays possible before the trial, Mr. Kavanagh, who had obtained a security clearance, reviewed classified summaries of some wiretapped conversations, prepared by FBI translators and agents. But he says he was unable to review many conversations. The government was free to offer any declassified FISA-obtained evidence in its case against Mr. Jammal, and the defense also could use that material. Federal rules require prosecutors to turn over any evidence that might help the defense. Government lawyers didn't go through all the tapes, many of which recorded conversations in Arabic, but "reviewed all translated summaries of the FISA intercepts and found no exculpatory evidence," the U.S. attorney says. At one point during the trial, Judge Martone questioned how the government could fulfill its obligation to turn over material favorable to the defense. "There isn't any lawyer who's making this judgment," the judge complained during one conference with lawyers, a transcript shows. But he allowed the government to use FISA-gathered evidence anyhow. Seeking Help From Tapes Mr. Jammal insists a review of the voluminous, classified FISA evidence would show that he warned would-be sellers that he would not accept stolen property. He also says that the tapes could have helped undercut the testimony of former associates who agreed to plea bargains and testified against him. Mr. Charlton, the U.S. attorney, counters that seven witnesses testified to Mr. Jammal's guilt. The government introduced evidence, for example, that Mr. Jammal was told by an associate that at least one supplier was stealing. Prosecutors also argued that Mr. Jammal should have known from the prices he was paying that he was buying stolen goods. Over defense objections, the prosecution played for the jury a conversation recorded under the FISA warrant -- Mr. Jammal's 14-minute rant from June 26, 2003, about his sense that the government was after him, even though he didn't know he'd already been indicted. "I'm trying to establish a business in Lebanon, because I know 80% to 90% that the day will come when the American government is going to come and ask me for taxes," he said, according to a translation presented in court. "OK, that's why, when that day comes, I'll tell them, 'F- you!' Then take everything, I'll pick up everything and go to Lebanon." Jurors took six hours to convict Mr. Jammal and other defendants on most of the charges. A few days before his sentencing hearing in October, Mr. Jammal fired off a 43-page letter to civil-rights groups, hoping to generate interest in his appeal, and copied Judge Martone. "I fail to see how my conversation concerning the baby formula business could qualify as 'foreign intelligence,' " he wrote. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From renlac at email.msn.com Tue Apr 4 08:45:11 2006 From: renlac at email.msn.com (Dudley Dejesus) Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2006 09:45:11 -0600 Subject: Notification: Loww ratess Message-ID: <4.6.8.5.1.68170195649897.017a6411@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1190 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: ameslan.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 7236 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Tue Apr 4 00:59:48 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 09:59:48 +0200 Subject: /. [Australian Parliament Approves Email Snooping] Message-ID: <20060404075948.GK31486@leitl.org> Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/04/04/0551201 Posted by: CowboyNeal, on 2006-04-04 06:40:00 brindafella writes "The Sydney Morning Herald newspaper, reporting on a legislative change last week, says 'the [Australian] Government [1]will have 12 months to access communications not only between the B-party and the suspect, but also between the B-party and anyone else. If you have unwittingly communicated with a suspect (and thereby become a B-party), the Government may be able to monitor all your conversations with family members, friends, work colleagues, your lawyer and your doctor.' The Australian Parliament's major parties combined to pass an [2]amendment to the [3]Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 1979." References 1. http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/more-than-ever-watch-what-you-say/2006/04/ 02/1143916406540.html 2. http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/Repository/Legis/Bills/Linked/17110430.pd f 3. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ta1979350/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From s.schear at comcast.net Tue Apr 4 10:37:59 2006 From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear) Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2006 10:37:59 -0700 Subject: [Clips] How Patriot Act Helped Convict Man In Baby-Food Ring In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20060404103521.0584f8b8@mail.comcast.net> There should be restrictions barring the use of any information obtained using a FISA warrant from prosecution of crimes other than national security. Steve From gatesy at gloria-vanderbilt.com Tue Apr 4 12:02:13 2006 From: gatesy at gloria-vanderbilt.com (Shauna Langley) Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2006 13:02:13 -0600 Subject: Low mortagge ratee approvall Message-ID: <413o048r.9984096@msn.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1198 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: telegraphy.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rah at shipwright.com Tue Apr 4 10:38:29 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 13:38:29 -0400 Subject: [Clips] A Pretty Good Way to Foil the NSA Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 13:35:56 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R. A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] A Pretty Good Way to Foil the NSA Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com Wired News By Ryan Singel 02:00 AM Apr, 03, 2006 How easy is it for the average internet user to make a phone call secure enough to frustrate the NSA's extrajudicial surveillance program? Wired News took Phil Zimmermann's newest encryption software, Zfone, for a test drive and found it's actually quite easy, even if the program is still in beta. Zimmermann, the man who released the PGP e-mail encryption program to the world in 1991 -- only to face an abortive criminal prosecution from the government -- has been trying for 10 years to give the world easy-to-use software to cloak internet phone calls. On March 14, Zimmermann released a beta version of the widely anticipated Zfone. The software is currently available only for OS X (Tiger) and Linux, though a Windows version is due in April. The open-source software manages cryptographic handshakes invisibly, and encrypts and decrypts voice calls as the traffic leaves and enters the computer. Operation is simple, and users don't have to agree in advance on an encryption key or type out long passcodes to make it work. Would-be beta testers must provide Zimmermann with an e-mail address. That seems an odd requirement for a privacy product, but the process itself was painless, and an e-mail with a download code arrived immediately. In our test, Zfone installed easily and quickly on OS X, though there were some mild hitches in actually getting it to work. Zfone is designed to work with VoIP clients that use the industry standard SIP protocol, and has been tested with clients such as X-lite, Free World Dialup and Gizmo Project. Following Zfone's instructions, Wired News was able to fairly quickly configure Gizmo Project to work with the software. But initial efforts to make phone calls with the system failed. Eventually, a little trial and error revealed that Zfone needed to be started before Gizmo Project, and that to see if a secure connection has been created, both Gizmo and Zfone's interface needed to be visible on the desktop. Once that happens, and the caller on the other end also has Zfone installed, the interface cleanly indicates that the call is secure. It also displays two different three-character codes. One party reads his code, e.g. "CF8," while the other says hers, "TKP." This bit of cloak-and-dagger isn't just fun, it helps prevents what is known as a man-in-the-middle attack, in which an eavesdropper sits between two callers, intercepting their cryptographic keys and then relaying the communications between them. If someone tries that with Zfone, the spoken codes won't match what the callers see on their screens. Using Zfone didn't add any noticeable latency or distortion to calls made with Gizmo Project. Once it's up and running, you're simply talking on the phone. But make no mistake: to eavesdroppers, Zfone is anything but routine. The protocol is based on SRTP, a system that uses the 256-bit AES cipher and adds to that a 3,000-bit key exchange that produces the codes callers can read off to one another. It has been submitted to IETF for approval as an internet standard, and by most accounts is strong enough to defy even the most sophisticated code-breaking technologies, from a hacker's packet sniffer to the acres of computers beneath Ft. Meade. That makes Zfone the "most secure telephone system anyone has ever used," according to PGP Corporation's CTO Jon Callas, who worked with Zimmermann on the protocol Of course, security is nice, but the value of an end-to-end crypto system is partially a function of its popularity. If you're the only one using the system, there's nobody to talk to. The Gizmo Project ostensibly uses its own encryption for Gizmo-to-Gizmo calls, though the company won't reveal what algorithms they use. But primarily, Zfone is competing with the built-in crypto that comes with Skype, which is closed-source, uses its own proprietary protocols, and employs its own encryption scheme -- which, significantly, is not available for inspection and peer-review (though some have evaluated (.pdf) it and others purportedly cracked it anyway). Those are all troubling signs for a security system. But as a standard element in Skype's popular VoIP software, this unproven crypto has already achieved a market penetration that will likely elude Zimmerman's system. So as nice as it is, unless Zfone is adopted by mainstream VoIP providers, it will probably occupy the same limited market niche as the hyper-secure PGP program that ruffled so many government feathers over a decade ago. PGP didn't become standard e-mail fare outside of the community of geeks, cypherpunks and those with special privacy needs, like human rights workers and people living in countries where the government routinely spies on its citizens without oversight. Fortunately for Zimmerman, there are a lot more of us these days. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From steve49152 at yahoo.ca Tue Apr 4 12:08:26 2006 From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson) Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 15:08:26 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Clips] A Pretty Good Way to Foil the NSA In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <20060404190827.21085.qmail@web33503.mail.mud.yahoo.com> --- "R. A. Hettinga" wrote: > --- begin forwarded text > > > Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com > Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 13:35:56 -0400 > To: Philodox Clips List > From: "R. A. Hettinga" > Subject: [Clips] A Pretty Good Way to Foil the NSA > Reply-To: rah at philodox.com > Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com > > > > Wired News > > By Ryan Singel > 02:00 AM Apr, 03, 2006 > > How easy is it for the average internet user to make a phone call > secure > enough to frustrate the NSA's extrajudicial surveillance program? All anyone has to do is speak content in their phone calls that the NSA cannot afford to learn. The resulting captured traffic will never be used. Regards, Steve __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com From rah at shipwright.com Tue Apr 4 12:29:48 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 15:29:48 -0400 Subject: American nCipher deal on the rocks Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 15:24:32 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R. A. Hettinga" Subject: American nCipher deal on the rocks Latest of a series of this kind of article, starting 3/31... Drag. Cheers, RAH ------- Cambridge Evening News Businesss : News : 04 April 2006 American nCipher deal on the rocks SAFENET'S proposed purchase of nCipher could be off. The putative American buyer had offered #86.1 million for the Cambridge company but the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) referred the move to the Competition Commission. SafeNet said its offer has now lapsed as a result - and it has not yet confirmed if its interest in nCipher, founded by brothers Alex and Nicko van Someren, is over. A company statement said: "SafeNet notes the decision from the Office of Fair Trading to refer the offer for nCipher plc to the Competition Commission. "As a result of the referral by the OFT to the Competition Commission, the offer has, in accordance with its terms, lapsed. "SafeNet is considering its options resulting from this referral, and will announce its next steps shortly. "Arrangements will be made for those nCipher shares in respect of which acceptances of the offer have been received to be returned to the relevant holders in accordance with the terms of the offer." Staff at nCipher are now waiting on SafeNet's next move. Daniel Murton, director of corporate marketing, said: "That is the end of this particular deal. "There was a condition in the offer that should there be a referral to the Competition Commission, the offer lapsed. SafeNet is now considering its options." He would not speculate as to whether SafeNet's interest was at an end. He said: "There is no definite answer. "Everybody would like clarity and we are expecting another announcement from SafeNet. It's in their hands." SafeNet had received acceptances in respect of more than 23 million nCipher shares - around 81 per cent of the issued share capital - by the offer deadline on March 24, and it had extended the deadline to April 9. But then the OFT stepped in because both companies are engaged in the supply of hardware security modules (HSMs) - computer systems to manage the encryption of data enabling the secure exchange of information - both in the UK and worldwide. It referred the deal to the Competition Commission. Vincent Smith, the OFT's director of competition enforcement, said: "This transaction will bring together two of the largest suppliers of HSMs in the UK. "The loss of competitive pressure between the parties may lead to customers facing higher prices and a loss of innovation." nCipher employs around 160 people worldwide, 70 of them in its Station Road headquarters. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From HHGKNSYO at netscape.net Tue Apr 4 05:34:11 2006 From: HHGKNSYO at netscape.net (Anton House) Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2006 15:34:11 +0300 Subject: ejaculation like a porn star Message-ID: <911964g7zd31$6u5r5759$35i1axbr@pamelaiowakulakrj77> how are you: try our site 100% money back guarrantte !! http://62.193.240.107/sm/ Increase spermm vol_ http://62.193.240.107/et/ Preventing premature ejjaculation http://62.193.240.107/gip/ Generic C:alis soft tabs Herval V:agra 100% natural._ trajectoryg7890gsggyuoghj From gavriil_b at bk.ru Tue Apr 4 16:51:00 2006 From: gavriil_b at bk.ru (Lindsey Barrett) Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 15:51:00 -0800 Subject: Hey baby, might want to check this out Message-ID: <200604040750.k347oLTr017125@proton.jfet.org> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 761 bytes Desc: not available URL: From RBIMX at prodigy.net Wed Apr 5 01:21:45 2006 From: RBIMX at prodigy.net (Juan Graves) Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 04:21:45 -0400 Subject: ejaculation like a porn star Message-ID: <833416s2lo94$0v3s1717$21i7qbbd@soughinfelicityconcretionnj66> how are you: try our site 100% money back guarrantte !! http://62.193.240.159/sm/ Increase spermm vol_ http://62.193.240.159/et/ Preventing premature ejjaculation http://62.193.240.159/gip/ Generic C:alis soft tabs Herval V:agra 100% natural_ campanileg7890gsggyuoghj From cite at cinemexicano.com Wed Apr 5 08:39:50 2006 From: cite at cinemexicano.com (Lou Schaefer) Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 08:39:50 -0700 Subject: Astounding opportunity with ease Message-ID: <10172.02.762@startle> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 875 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rvh40 at insightbb.com Wed Apr 5 11:18:15 2006 From: rvh40 at insightbb.com (Randall) Date: April 5, 2006 11:18:15 PM PDT Subject: No subject Message-ID: , JMG Subject: Sorry About That Thursday, April 06, 2006 at 2:15 AM EDT Pentagon says improper data in security database Wed Apr 5, 2006 4:37 PM ET By Will Dunham WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Pentagon said on Wednesday a review launched after revelations that it had collected data on U.S. peace activists found that roughly 260 entries in a classified database of possible terrorist threats should not have been kept there. But the review reaffirmed the value of the so-called Talon reporting system on potential threats to Pentagon personnel or facilities by international terrorists, said Bryan Whitman, a senior Pentagon spokesman. He said the Pentagon was putting in place new safeguards and oversight intended to prevent improper information from going in the database. Whitman said "less than 2 percent" of the more than 13,000 database entries provided through the Talon system "should not have been there or should have been removed at a certain point in time." Whitman disputed critics' assertions that the program amounted to Pentagon domestic spying, although he declined to state the nature of these entries or the people they involved, saying the database's contents are classified. Whitman stressed that to be properly placed in the database, a threat must have a suspected link to international terrorism. Under the Talon system, Defense Department civilian and military personnel are asked to report on activities they deem suspicious. These reports go in the Cornerstone database, handled by a Pentagon agency called the Counterintelligence Field Activity, or CIFA. The review was ordered in December by Stephen Cambone, under secretary of defense for intelligence, after revelations that the database included information on U.S. citizens including peace activists and others who did not represent a genuine security threat. 'SUSPICIOUS' NBC News and defense analyst William Arkin disclosed at the time a sample of the database containing reports of 1,519 "suspicious incidents" between July 2004 and May 2005, including activities by antiwar and anti-military protesters. This included a military intelligence unit monitoring a Quaker meeting in Lake Worth, Florida, on plans to protest military recruiting in high schools. The Pentagon is legally restricted in the types of information it can gather about activities and individuals inside the United States. A memo from Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England said the Talon system "has detected international terrorist interest in specific military bases and has led to and supported counterterrorism investigations." It called the data "unfiltered and non-validated potential threat information." Whitman said data reported through Talon could be turned over the FBI or local law enforcement. The Pentagon said it will conduct annual oversight reviews of the Talon program, designate supervisors to review each Talon report before submission to the database, and direct CIFA to review submissions to ensure they are proper. Whitman said he did not know if the Pentagon had disciplined anyone for putting improper information in the database, but was "not aware of any malicious or deliberate attempts" to use the Talon system against a specific person or group. Some critics have noted similarities in the Pentagon's activities during the Iraq War and those of the Vietnam War period, when it spied on antiwar activists. "If the Pentagon has been collecting information improperly on Americans, it should provide a full accounting of what kind of information it collected, on whom and why, subject only perhaps to protecting the privacy of individuals," said Kate Martin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, a civil liberties group interested in government surveillance. Weblog at: ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From mcwilliams at kge.com Wed Apr 5 21:20:04 2006 From: mcwilliams at kge.com (Edgardo Padgett) Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 22:20:04 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #160781864 Wed, 05 Apr 2006 22:20:04 -0600 Message-ID: <043i946v.0824323@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1194 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: shrewd.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From sari.lindroos_430 at gcsupplyco.com Wed Apr 5 21:45:12 2006 From: sari.lindroos_430 at gcsupplyco.com (Lori Brunson) Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 22:45:12 -0600 Subject: Ratess will skyrocket soon Message-ID: <133p618k.2412318@msn.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1192 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: tamarack.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From livestock at gundamfan.com Wed Apr 5 17:18:45 2006 From: livestock at gundamfan.com (Daisy Bentley) Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2006 23:18:45 -0100 Subject: loan request. 4 Apr 2006 Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: excess.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wiierbxlerw at excite.com Thu Apr 6 07:11:11 2006 From: wiierbxlerw at excite.com (Chang Kelly) Date: Thu, 06 Apr 2006 06:11:11 -0800 Subject: best weight reducer in years Message-ID: <62118566228752.67313163@protoplasm> be coot it evansville it's burton a cyrillic in endothermic in batik may sprocket and erg but maxwellian , deforest the nut , lamar , latrobe but ashtray but islam ! mesoderm it picnicked it's brent try flashback. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 750 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: equinoctial.7.gif Type: image/gif Size: 10028 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Thu Apr 6 02:18:39 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2006 11:18:39 +0200 Subject: [dewayne@warpspeed.com: [Dewayne-Net] Pentagon says improper data in security database] Message-ID: <20060406091839.GH31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Dewayne Hendricks ----- From chux0tvi at waypt.com Thu Apr 6 12:34:12 2006 From: chux0tvi at waypt.com (Rhonda Sophie) Date: Thu, 06 Apr 2006 11:34:12 -0800 Subject: SAVE 82%: VIAGR*, AMBIE*, CIALI*, XANA*, RIVOTRI*, LEVITR*, CIPRO, MERIDI*, CELEBRE*, VALIU* mentioned Message-ID: <007u573l.6653251@csi.com> Quality Meds Selling At Cheeap We dont keep ur record (not even your name) You just pay & we ship, No Question form to fill We ship to all countries Viagr*, Ambie*, Ciali*, Xana*, Rivotri*, Levitr*, Cipro, Meridi*, Celebre*, Valiu*, Zoloft & Many More Meds force http://kinr.%75n%6Befer%72.%63o%6D (Click this link to save 80%) street latter thats. happen did happen busy turning surely. wife appearance become fancy repeated? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1529 bytes Desc: not available URL: From Brock.Meeks at msnbc.com Thu Apr 6 11:39:57 2006 From: Brock.Meeks at msnbc.com (Brock Meeks) Date: April 6, 2006 11:39:57 AM EDT Subject: Atty. Gen.: won't rule out domestic warrantless taps Message-ID: >From a press release from Rep. Adam Schiff, D-CA: WASHINGTON, DC (April 6, 2006) - During a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee today, Rep. Adam B. Schiff (D-CA) questioned Attorney General Alberto Gonzales about the NSA's secret domestic wiretapping program. The Administration has cited the Authorization to Use Military Force and the commander in chief powers as authorizing the NSA to intercept international communications into and out of the U.S. of persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations. After citing his concerns that there was no limiting principle to the Administration's claim of authority in the War on Terror, Rep. Schiff asked the Attorney General whether the Administration believes it has the authority to wiretap purely domestic calls between two Americans without seeking a warrant. "I cannot rule that out," responded the Attorney General. "This is very disturbing testimony," Rep. Schiff commented later, "and represents a wholly unprecedented assertion of executive power. No one in Congress would deny the need to tap certain calls under court order -- but if the Administration believes it can tap purely domestic phone calls between Americans without court approval, there is no limit to executive power. This is contrary to settled law and the most basic constitutional principles of the separation of powers." Rep. Schiff and Rep. Jeff Flake (R-AZ) have introduced bipartisan legislation -- the NSA Oversight Act -- to reassert that FISA and Title III are the sole authority for domestic surveillance. The bill would: 1. Reiterate Exclusivity of Current FISA and Wiretap Laws - states that FISA and the federal criminal wiretap statutes shall continue to be the exclusive means by which domestic electronic surveillance may be conducted. 2. Clarify Military Force Statute - makes clear that the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), passed days after the September 11th attacks, does not provide an exception to that rule. 3. Require Congressional Action - makes clear that current laws apply unless Congress amends the laws or passes additional laws regarding electronic surveillance. 4. Require Report on the Extent of the Wiretapping Program - requires classified disclosure to Congress of information about U.S. persons who have been the subject of any such electronic surveillance. _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From declan at well.com Thu Apr 6 13:47:29 2006 From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh) Date: Thu, 06 Apr 2006 13:47:29 -0700 Subject: [Politech] Attorney General won't rule out domestic warrantless taps [priv] Message-ID: ["Fourth Amendment? What Fourth Amendment?" --Declan] --- From amicus at well.com Fri Apr 7 01:06:23 2006 From: amicus at well.com (Ross Stapleton-Gray) Date: April 7, 2006 1:06:23 PM EDT Subject: No subject Message-ID: Subject: DOD IPv6 director arrested for possession of child porn This is not going to bode well for the IPv4->IPv6 transition, but what the heck is up with high-level DC bureaucrats and the kid pr0n?? http://www.gcn.com/online/vol1_no1/40341-1.html DOD IPv6 director arrested for possession of child porn 04/06/06 -- 03:54 PM By Patience Wait, A high-ranking Defense Department IT official has been arrested and indicted on child pornography charges. Charles Lynch, director of the Defense Information Systems Agencybs Internet Protocol version 6 transition program, was arrested March 8 and indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia the next day on one count of possessing child pornography. According to a statement by the DOD Inspector Generalbs Office, court documents allege that Lynch had been operating a peer-to-peer file- sharing program on a computer in his office at DISA. Agents confiscated several computers and more than 1,000 CDs from Lynchbs office. Agents found child pornography in computer file folders, the IGbs statement said. Lynch, 44, is on leave without pay from DISA. If convicted, he faces up to 10 years in prison. The investigation is being conducted by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the DISA OIG. Officials with those agencies, as well as the U.S. Attorneybs Office, declined to comment on the ongoing investigation. In apparently unrelated cases, a Homeland Security Department official was arrested earlier this week for soliciting sex over the Internet with a minor. And last week, federal agents seized computer equipment from the desk of a NASA official March 29, based on information developed during a U.S. Postal Inspection Service undercover investigation of Internet trafficking in child pornography. B) 1996-2006 Post-Newsweek Media, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From sjohnson at pobox.com Fri Apr 7 01:38:13 2006 From: sjohnson at pobox.com (Suzanne Johnson) Date: April 7, 2006 1:38:13 PM EDT Subject: AT&T Forwards ALL Internet Traffic Into NSA Says EFF Message-ID: http://www.linuxelectrons.com/article.php/20060406031301790/print > EFF's evidence regarding AT&T's dragnet surveillance of its >networks includes a declaration by Mark Klein, a retired AT&T >telecommunications technician, and several internal AT&T documents. >This evidence was bolstered and explained by the expert opinion of >J. Scott Marcus, who served as Senior Technical Advisor for >Internet Technology to the Federal Communications Commission from >July 2001 until July 2005. > ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From Bernice_Holliday at dsl-only.net Thu Apr 6 21:40:13 2006 From: Bernice_Holliday at dsl-only.net (Janna Oconnell) Date: Fri, 07 Apr 2006 01:40:13 -0300 Subject: Minimize energy - Maximize sensation! 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From abman at icqmail.com Fri Apr 7 09:13:35 2006 From: abman at icqmail.com (Mathew Farr) Date: Fri, 07 Apr 2006 10:13:35 -0600 Subject: Re-finance at the lowestt ratess Message-ID: <81756981159744.JckGXvYp7Y@cairn> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1197 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: costa.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mjv at clear.net.nz Fri Apr 7 09:47:00 2006 From: mjv at clear.net.nz (Valerie Shipman) Date: Fri, 07 Apr 2006 10:47:00 -0600 Subject: Mortagge ratee approvedd Message-ID: <12330843565258.WtfIFBScUS@girth> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1187 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: arianism.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rah at shipwright.com Fri Apr 7 08:56:02 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 11:56:02 -0400 Subject: [Clips] nCipher sees silver linings as SafeNet abandons its bid Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 11:54:27 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R. A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] nCipher sees silver linings as SafeNet abandons its bid Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com Silicon Fen Business Report One-stop news on the Cambridge High Tech Cluster nCipher sees silver linings as SafeNet abandons its bid 7th April, 2006 By a staff writer It's a back-handed compliment for a growing business to be referred to the Competition Commission. To be seen as a potential dominant force in the market and hence a threat to competition means it must be doing something right. It also has the virtue of drawing attention to the firm as an undoubted player of substance. These are the bright points that IT security specialist nCipher plc (NCH.L) seems to have drawn from the withdrawal of the recommended bid by US-based SafeNet Inc, who on 8th February offered #86m for the firm. When on 30th March, after preliminary investigations, the Office of Fair Trading referred the proposed takeover to the Competition Commission for a full UK regulatory anti-trust/competition review, it automatically triggered a lapse clause written into the terms of the offer. Today SafeNet said it will not proceed with the offer. It cited the OFT comments about the competitive position of the two companies - that the deal would bring together two of the largest suppliers of Hardware Security Modules which may lead to customers facing higher prices and a loss of innovation - and the time, cost and potential disruption to business that could ensue from a referral. In acknowledging SafeNet's decision, nCipher's directors agreed with that assessment and issued a forward looking statement explaining the broad strategy for continuing as "as an independent entity". Growth opportunities IT and Internet security - nCipher's core area of expertise - have become big issues in organisations. The Cambridge-based firm applies cryptography to the problems of identifying people and protecting their data, their businesses, and the transactions which occur between them. The nCipher Board there are "good growth opportunities" in their markets to build on the strong performance in 2005 which their growing portfolio of products and services "put us in an excellent position to exploit". It will now focus on those prospects and on further operational improvements. While the company did draw some perverse comfort from the referral to the Competition Commission, it said "the very high regard in which customers hold nCipher, its products and its after-sales service has also been emphasised to us by the consultation process". The Board intends to build on this brand loyalty and said it has the full commitment of the executive team. CEO Alex van Someren (pictured) had been due to leave following the takeover, though not co-founder and Chief Technical Officer Nicko van Someren. Share price 24% above pre-bid It remains to be seen how the stock market reacts once analysts have re-evaluated nCipher's stand-alone prospects. Given that SafeNet's offer was at a considerable premium - either 36% or 52%, depending on where you start measuring - the share price was always going to come off the 300p offered. At midday it was trading at 245p, 24% above the 197.5p of 19 January, the last day prior to the move up that triggered, five days later, the announcement by nCipher that it was in talks which could lead to an offer. That news left the price at 220.5p. nCipher expects to release results for the first quarter ended 31 March on 23 May when we should see whether the offer had an impact on trading. When releasing the full year results in late February, Mr van Someren said "uncertainty created by the SafeNet offer may have a short-term impact on revenues". Meanwhile at SafeNet SafeNet said its chief financial officer was leaving the company immediately and that it was booking costs of $600,000 for the lapsed offer in the first quarter. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From rah at shipwright.com Fri Apr 7 09:02:45 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 12:02:45 -0400 Subject: [Clips] EFF: AT&T forwards all Internet traffic into NSA Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 11:59:43 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R. A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] EFF: AT&T forwards all Internet traffic into NSA Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com >From Spam Daily News NEWS EFF: AT&T forwards all Internet traffic into NSA Posted on April 07, 2006 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) on Wednesday filed the legal briefs and evidence supporting its motion for a preliminary injunction in its class-action lawsuit against AT&T. After asking EFF to hold back the documents so that it could review them, the Department of Justice consented to EFF's filing them under seal -- a well-established procedure that prohibits public access and permits only the judge and the litigants to see the evidence. While not a party to the case, the government was concerned that even this procedure would not provide sufficient security and has represented to the Court that it is "presently considering whether and, if so, how it will participate in this case." "The evidence that we are filing supports our claim that AT&T is diverting Internet traffic into the hands of the NSA wholesale, in violation of federal wiretapping laws and the Fourth Amendment," said EFF Staff Attorney Kevin Bankston. "More than just threatening individuals' privacy, AT&T's apparent choice to give the government secret, direct access to millions of ordinary Americans' Internet communications is a threat to the Constitution itself. We are asking the Court to put a stop to it now," said Bankston. EFF's evidence regarding AT&T's dragnet surveillance of its networks includes a declaration by Mark Klein, a retired AT&T telecommunications technician, and several internal AT&T documents. This evidence was bolstered and explained by the expert opinion of J. Scott Marcus, who served as Senior Technical Advisor for Internet Technology to the Federal Communications Commission from July 2001 until July 2005. The internal AT&T documents and portions of the supporting declarations have been submitted to the Court under a tentative seal, a procedure that allows AT&T five court days to explain to the Court why the information should be kept from the public. "The public deserves to know about AT&T's illegal program," said EFF Legal Director Cindy Cohn. "In an abundance of caution, we are providing AT&T with an opportunity to explain itself before this material goes on the public docket, but we believe that justice will ultimately require full disclosure." The NSA program came to light in December, when the New York Times reported that the President had authorized the agency to intercept telephone and Internet communications inside the United States without the authorization of any court. "Mark Klein is a true American hero," said EFF Staff Attorney Kurt Opsahl. "He has bravely come forward with information critical for proving AT&T's involvement with the government's invasive surveillance program." In the lawsuit, EFF is representing the class of all AT&T residential customers nationwide. Working with EFF in the lawsuit are the law firms Traber & Voorhees, Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP and the Law Office of Richard R. Wiebe. RELATED: AT&T sued over NSA eavesdropping SOURCE: The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From coderman at gmail.com Fri Apr 7 13:55:01 2006 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 13:55:01 -0700 Subject: [Clips] EFF: AT&T forwards all Internet traffic into NSA In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4ef5fec60604071355s763220f9x78eab32cadf9904f@mail.gmail.com> On 4/7/06, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > ... > "The evidence that we are filing supports our claim that AT&T is diverting > Internet traffic into the hands of the NSA wholesale, in violation of > federal wiretapping laws and the Fourth Amendment," said EFF Staff Attorney > Kevin Bankston. > > "More than just threatening individuals' privacy, AT&T's apparent choice to > give the government secret, direct access to millions of ordinary > Americans' Internet communications is a threat to the Constitution itself. > We are asking the Court to put a stop to it now," said Bankston. i'm interested to see the monetary incentives behind this collaboration. when your competitors (and every other tier-3) are getting infrastructure investment and subsidy it is hard not to follow suit despite ethical qualms (if any of these carriers actually had ethical concerns before diverting traffic wholesale to the NSA). From dave at farber.net Fri Apr 7 11:51:03 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 14:51:03 -0400 Subject: [IP] DOD IPv6 director arrested for possession of child porn Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: From dave at farber.net Fri Apr 7 11:52:07 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 14:52:07 -0400 Subject: [IP] AT&T Forwards ALL Internet Traffic Into NSA Says EFF Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: From coderman at gmail.com Fri Apr 7 16:44:09 2006 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 16:44:09 -0700 Subject: Former AT&T technician Mark Klein Statement re: NSA Taps Message-ID: <4ef5fec60604071644v7f4004d8ifde6725d3e04797d@mail.gmail.com> http://www.wired.com/news/technology/1,70621-0.html ---cut--- Wiretap Whistleblower's Statement 12:25 PM Apr, 07, 2006 Former AT&T technician Mark Klein has come forward to support the EFF's lawsuit against AT&T for its alleged complicity in the NSA's electronic surveillance. Here, Wired News publishes Klein's public statement in its entirety. Full story: Ex-AT&T Worker Tells Of NSA Op [ http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70619-0.html?tw=wn_index_1 ] Statement: Mark Klein, April 6, 2006 My background: For 22 and 1/2 years I worked as an AT&T technician, first in New York and then in California. What I observed first-hand: In 2002, when I was working in an AT&T office in San Francisco, the site manager told me to expect a visit from a National Security Agency agent, who was to interview a management-level technician for a special job. The agent came, and by chance I met him and directed him to the appropriate people. In January 2003, I, along with others, toured the AT&T central office on Folsom Street in San Francisco -- actually three floors of an SBC building. There I saw a new room being built adjacent to the 4ESS switch room where the public's phone calls are routed. I learned that the person whom the NSA interviewed for the secret job was the person working to install equipment in this room. The regular technician work force was not allowed in the room. In October 2003, the company transferred me to the San Francisco building to oversee the Worldnet Internet room, which included large routers, racks of modems for customers' dial-in services, and other equipment. I was responsible for troubleshooting problems on the fiber optic circuits and installing new circuits. While doing my job, I learned that fiber optic cables from the secret room were tapping into the Worldnet circuits by splitting off a portion of the light signal. I saw this in a design document available to me, entitled "Study Group 3, LGX/Splitter Wiring, San Francisco" dated Dec. 10, 2002. I also saw design documents dated Jan. 13, 2004 and Jan. 24, 2003, which instructed technicians on connecting some of the already in-service circuits to the "splitter" cabinet, which diverts some of the light signal to the secret room. The circuits listed were the Peering Links, which connect Worldnet with other networks and hence the whole country, as well as the rest of the world. One of the documents listed the equipment installed in the secret room, and this list included a Narus STA 6400, which is a "Semantic Traffic Analyzer". The Narus STA technology is known to be used particularly by government intelligence agencies because of its ability to sift through large amounts of data looking for preprogrammed targets. The company's advertising boasts that its technology "captures comprehensive customer usage data ... and transforms it into actionable information.... (It) provides complete visibility for all internet applications." My job required me to connect new circuits to the "splitter" cabinet and get them up and running. While working on a particularly difficult one with a technician back East, I learned that other such "splitter" cabinets were being installed in other cities, including Seattle, San Jose, Los Angeles and San Diego. What is the significance and why is it important to bring these facts to light? Based on my understanding of the connections and equipment at issue, it appears the NSA is capable of conducting what amounts to vacuum-cleaner surveillance of all the data crossing the internet -- whether that be peoples' e-mail, web surfing or any other data. Given the public debate about the constitutionality of the Bush administration's spying on U.S. citizens without obtaining a FISA warrant, I think it is critical that this information be brought out into the open, and that the American people be told the truth about the extent of the administration's warrantless surveillance practices, particularly as it relates to the internet. Despite what we are hearing, and considering the public track record of this administration, I simply do not believe their claims that the NSA's spying program is really limited to foreign communications or is otherwise consistent with the NSA's charter or with FISA. And unlike the controversy over targeted wiretaps of individuals' phone calls, this potential spying appears to be applied wholesale to all sorts of internet communications of countless citizens. ---end-cut--- From measl at mfn.org Fri Apr 7 17:10:52 2006 From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson) Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 19:10:52 -0500 (CDT) Subject: [Clips] EFF: AT&T forwards all Internet traffic into NSA In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60604071355s763220f9x78eab32cadf9904f@mail.gmail.com> References: <4ef5fec60604071355s763220f9x78eab32cadf9904f@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20060407190818.E43151@ubzr.zsa.bet> On Fri, 7 Apr 2006, coderman wrote: > On 4/7/06, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > > ... > > "The evidence that we are filing supports our claim that AT&T is diverting > > Internet traffic into the hands of the NSA wholesale, in violation of > > federal wiretapping laws and the Fourth Amendment," said EFF Staff Attorney > > Kevin Bankston. > > > > "More than just threatening individuals' privacy, AT&T's apparent choice to > > give the government secret, direct access to millions of ordinary > > Americans' Internet communications is a threat to the Constitution itself. > > We are asking the Court to put a stop to it now," said Bankston. > > i'm interested to see the monetary incentives behind this > collaboration. when your competitors (and every other tier-3) are > getting infrastructure investment and subsidy it is hard not to follow > suit despite ethical qualms (if any of these carriers actually had > ethical concerns before diverting traffic wholesale to the NSA). When the NSA (via the FBI) first asked everyone to participate in these games (early 2002), I had the happy privilege of telling the FBI flunky personally that they could go to hell (at Savvis - warning, then was then, and NOT now: things have likely changed with Koen running the show now). At the time, the only incentive was "Helping your country" - if they have added financial incentives, I'd love to know how these monies could be delivered without being disclosed by the telcos. -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin at mfn.org 0xBD4A95BF 'The right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.' St. George Tucker From eugen at leitl.org Fri Apr 7 13:18:58 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 22:18:58 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] DOD IPv6 director arrested for possession of child porn] Message-ID: <20060407201858.GW31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From eugen at leitl.org Fri Apr 7 13:19:07 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 22:19:07 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] AT&T Forwards ALL Internet Traffic Into NSA Says EFF] Message-ID: <20060407201906.GX31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From wzjsafkanyrvba at yahoo.com Sat Apr 8 00:06:21 2006 From: wzjsafkanyrvba at yahoo.com (Abraham Reagan) Date: Sat, 08 Apr 2006 00:06:21 -0700 Subject: Watches at Huge Discount 256 Message-ID: World Top10 Branded Watches at 90% off the original price. 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Message-ID: <218430p9cw98$5g1w1411$38a8xpzu@dwarvesnassauspadeld59> how are you: try our site 100% money back guarrantte !! http://62.193.240.159/sm/ Increase spermm vol,, http://62.193.240.159/et/ Preventing premature ejjaculation http://62.193.240.159/gip/ Generic C:alis soft tabs Herval V:agra 100% natural deadlineg7890gsgg From tvest at eyeconomics.com Sat Apr 8 02:48:20 2006 From: tvest at eyeconomics.com (Tom Vest) Date: April 8, 2006 2:48:20 PM EDT Subject: [IP] Details on AT&T Forwards ALL Internet Traffic Into Message-ID: NSA Says EFF Hi Dave, Given the increasing salience of such service blocking mechanisms, your subscribers might be interested in the specific deal between Narus and Shanghai Telecom: http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/73391 It's also worth noting how hardware and services like this have spawned countervailing technologies to obscure the identity/nature of IP traffic flows, e.g.: http://www.numetra.com/ Although Numetra now appears to be positioned to support third-party content producers and aggregators who hope to remain independent from access network owners, it seems likely that end user-oriented products will also emerge to provide an alternative to passive acquiescence to the enclosure of the Net. The resulting arms race may be very good for hardware vendors, but does not bode well for the security and stability of the Internet, IMO. Tom Tom Vest PCH Research Program Manager & Senior Analyst, Internet Economics & Policy CAIDA: Cooperative Assn. for Internet Data Analysis http://www.caida.org On Apr 8, 2006, at 10:37 AM, David Farber wrote: >Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting- >people/ >From: steven cherry >Date: April 8, 2006 9:39:45 AM EDT >To: dave at farber.net >Subject: Re: [IP] Details on AT&T Forwards ALL Internet Traffic >Into NSA Says EFF > > >At 5:41 PM -0400 4/7/06, David Farber wrote: >>From: Ryan Singel >>Date: April 7, 2006 3:53:38 PM EDT >> >>Dave, Mark Klein released a statement with details about what he >>saw and >>did at AT&T. >> >>http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70619-0.html > > >Dave, > >Not much has been written about Narus, the company whose software >was used. > >Their main products identify and block or bill for VoIP phone calls >made through the equipment of traditional telecom providers. They >have customers for this system in the Mideast, Asia, and South >America. We wrote about them last fall. www.spectrum.ieee.org/oct05/1846>. They just signed a deal with >Shanghai Telecom Co this week, by the way. > > Steven > >-- > Steven Cherry, +1 212-419-7566 > Senior Associate Editor > IEEE Spectrum, 3 Park Ave, New York, NY 10016 > > > > ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From hoskins at faroudja.com Sat Apr 8 03:01:36 2006 From: hoskins at faroudja.com (Aisha Jernigan) Date: Sat, 08 Apr 2006 04:01:36 -0600 Subject: Re-finance at the lowestt ratess Message-ID: <33790493352537.6t8ltX11Oa@increase> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1210 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: arsenic.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rah at shipwright.com Sat Apr 8 02:48:32 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Sat, 8 Apr 2006 05:48:32 -0400 Subject: whistle-blower outs NSA spy-room In-Reply-To: <20060408081100.GC31486@leitl.org> References: <20060408081100.GC31486@leitl.org> Message-ID: At 10:11 AM +0200 4/8/06, Eugen Leitl wrote: >Whistle-Blower Outs NSA Spy Room Source? URL? Cheers, RAH -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From burlesque at surrealismo.com Fri Apr 7 18:41:37 2006 From: burlesque at surrealismo.com (Leticia Hutchins) Date: Sat, 08 Apr 2006 07:41:37 +0600 Subject: loan request. 6 Apr 2006 Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 639 bytes Desc: not available URL: From jonathan.rowley22tn at gmail.com Sat Apr 8 03:06:08 2006 From: jonathan.rowley22tn at gmail.com (Lesley Jenkins) Date: Sat, 8 Apr 2006 09:06:08 -0100 Subject: Quicker Recharges Message-ID: <200604080706.k38763Lp032581@proton.jfet.org> With viagra, optimal sexual function can be restored for nearly every man who desire it, in a matter of minutes. Viagra helps you: * To have firmer erection * Enjoy sex life better * Fulfil partner's sexual needs * Bolster self confidence * Renew and strengthen sex life * Restore intimacy * Solidify sexual bonds http://pdf2o.ecosunenergy.info/gv/ From eugen at leitl.org Sat Apr 8 01:11:00 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat, 8 Apr 2006 10:11:00 +0200 Subject: whistle-blower outs NSA spy-room Message-ID: <20060408081100.GC31486@leitl.org> Whistle-Blower Outs NSA Spy Room By Ryan Singel 11:15 AM Apr, 07, 2006 AT&T provided National Security Agency eavesdroppers with full access to its customers' phone calls, and shunted its customers' internet traffic to data-mining equipment installed in a secret room in its San Francisco switching center, according to a former AT&T worker cooperating in the Electronic Frontier Foundation's lawsuit against the company. Mark Klein, a retired AT&T communications technician, submitted an affidavit in support of the EFF's lawsuit this week. That class action lawsuit, filed in federal court in San Francisco last January, alleges that AT&T violated federal and state laws by surreptitiously allowing the government to monitor phone and internet communications of AT&T customers without warrants. On Wednesday, the EFF asked the court to issue an injunction prohibiting AT&T from continuing the alleged wiretapping, and filed a number of documents under seal, including three AT&T documents that purportedly explain how the wiretapping system works. According to a statement released by Klein's attorney, an NSA agent showed up at the San Francisco switching center in 2002 to interview a management-level technician for a special job. In January 2003, Klein observed a new room being built adjacent to the room housing AT&T's #4ESS switching equipment, which is responsible for routing long distance and international calls. "I learned that the person whom the NSA interviewed for the secret job was the person working to install equipment in this room," Klein wrote. "The regular technician work force was not allowed in the room." Klein's job eventually included connecting internet circuits to a splitting cabinet that led to the secret room. During the course of that work, he learned from a co-worker that similar cabinets were being installed in other cities, including Seattle, San Jose, Los Angeles and San Diego. "While doing my job, I learned that fiber optic cables from the secret room were tapping into the Worldnet (AT&T's internet service) circuits by splitting off a portion of the light signal," Klein wrote. The split circuits included traffic from peering links connecting to other internet backbone providers, meaning that AT&T was also diverting traffic routed from its network to or from other domestic and international providers, according to Klein's statement. The secret room also included data-mining equipment called a Narus STA 6400, "known to be used particularly by government intelligence agencies because of its ability to sift through large amounts of data looking for preprogrammed targets," according to Klein's statement. Narus, whose website touts AT&T as a client, sells software to help internet service providers and telecoms monitor and manage their networks, look for intrusions, and wiretap phone calls as mandated by federal law. Klein said he came forward because he does not believe that the Bush administration is being truthful about the extent of its extrajudicial monitoring of Americans' communications. "Despite what we are hearing, and considering the public track record of this administration, I simply do not believe their claims that the NSA's spying program is really limited to foreign communications or is otherwise consistent with the NSA's charter or with FISA," Klein's wrote. "And unlike the controversy over targeted wiretaps of individuals' phone calls, this potential spying appears to be applied wholesale to all sorts of internet communications of countless citizens." After asking for a preview copy of the documents last week, the government did not object to the EFF filing the paper under seal, although the EFF asked the court Wednesday to make the documents public. One of the documents is titled "Study Group 3, LGX/Splitter Wiring, San Francisco," and is dated 2002. The others are allegedly a design document instructing technicians how to wire up the taps, and a document that describes the equipment installed in the secret room. In a letter to the EFF, AT&T objected to the filing of the documents in any manner, saying that they contain sensitive trade secrets and could be "could be used to 'hack' into the AT&T network, compromising its integrity." According to court rules, AT&T has until Thursday to file a motion to keep the documents sealed. The government could also step in to the case and request that the documents not be made public, or even that the entire lawsuit be barred under the seldom-used State Secrets Privilege. AT&T spokesman Walt Sharp declined to comment on the allegations, citing a company policy of not commenting on litigation or matters of national security, but did say that "AT&T follows all laws following requests for assistance from government authorities." -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From dave at farber.net Sat Apr 8 07:37:55 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Sat, 8 Apr 2006 10:37:55 -0400 Subject: [IP] Details on AT&T Forwards ALL Internet Traffic Into NSA Says EFF Message-ID: ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ From: steven cherry Date: Sat, 08 Apr 2006 09:39:45 -0400 To: dave at farber.net Subject: Re: [IP] Details on AT&T Forwards ALL Internet Traffic Into NSA Says EFF At 5:41 PM -0400 4/7/06, David Farber wrote: >From: Ryan Singel >Date: April 7, 2006 3:53:38 PM EDT > >Dave, Mark Klein released a statement with details about what he saw and >did at AT&T. > >http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70619-0.html Dave, Not much has been written about Narus, the company whose software was used. Their main products identify and block or bill for VoIP phone calls made through the equipment of traditional telecom providers. They have customers for this system in the Mideast, Asia, and South America. We wrote about them last fall. . They just signed a deal with Shanghai Telecom Co this week, by the way. Steven -- Steven Cherry, +1 212-419-7566 Senior Associate Editor IEEE Spectrum, 3 Park Ave, New York, NY 10016 ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net Sat Apr 8 03:53:29 2006 From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin) Date: Sat, 8 Apr 2006 10:53:29 +0000 Subject: whistle-blower outs NSA spy-room In-Reply-To: References: <20060408081100.GC31486@leitl.org> Message-ID: <20060408105329.GA11631@arion.hive> On 2006-04-08T05:48:32-0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > At 10:11 AM +0200 4/8/06, Eugen Leitl wrote: > >Whistle-Blower Outs NSA Spy Room > > Source? > > URL? http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70619-0.html Ryan Singel's blog: http://www.secondaryscreening.net/ -- The six phases of a project: I. Enthusiasm. IV. Search for the Guilty. II. Disillusionment. V. Punishment of the Innocent. III. Panic. VI. Praise & Honor for the Nonparticipants. From camera_lumina at hotmail.com Sat Apr 8 08:23:11 2006 From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden) Date: Sat, 08 Apr 2006 11:23:11 -0400 Subject: whistle-blower outs NSA spy-room In-Reply-To: <20060408105329.GA11631@arion.hive> Message-ID: That single little Wired article told me more about NSA's network than I've heard or read anywhere else. It should be proudly pointed out that we Cypherpunks correctly reverse-engineered most of these details some months ago. For me the main conclusion is: "They can't get everything." Not even a very powerful Variola's Suitcase could do the job. They have to do some statistical pre-sort of traffic and then route the more likely calls/etc...into NSA's own Fiber network, where backend equipment does several more layers of pre-sort to determine urgency and then perhaps store the rest. I'd still bet that we'll see the NSA "fall back" upon the fact that humans don't actually read most of the traffic they scoop up. They probably only open up high-risk domestic communications, but by then merely knowing they have something (and knowing its source and destination) is going to be 90% as good as actually having a human read it. So this legal avenue is unlikely to put anyone meaningful in jail. OTOH, it shows that the parastic NSA network is possibly far more vulnerable than most people imagine. -TD >From: Justin >To: cypherpunks at jfet.org >Subject: Re: whistle-blower outs NSA spy-room >Date: Sat, 8 Apr 2006 10:53:29 +0000 > >On 2006-04-08T05:48:32-0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > > At 10:11 AM +0200 4/8/06, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > >Whistle-Blower Outs NSA Spy Room > > > > Source? > > > > URL? > >http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70619-0.html > >Ryan Singel's blog: >http://www.secondaryscreening.net/ > >-- >The six phases of a project: >I. Enthusiasm. IV. Search for the Guilty. >II. Disillusionment. V. Punishment of the Innocent. >III. Panic. VI. Praise & Honor for the Nonparticipants. From smb at cs.columbia.edu Sat Apr 8 11:31:58 2006 From: smb at cs.columbia.edu (Steven M. Bellovin) Date: Sat, 08 Apr 2006 14:31:58 -0400 Subject: wiretapping in Europe Message-ID: There's a long AP wire story on wiretapping in Europe; see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/08/AR20060408005 29.html There are a number of intriguing statements in the article. For example, in Italy 106,000 wiretaps were approved last year. By contrast, in the US there were only about about 1,700 wiretaps in 2004. (That number does not include Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act wiretaps. It is also unclear to me if the Italian number represents calls tapped, as opposed to "court orders issued", which is what the US number represents.) Italian prosecutors strongly defend the need for wiretaps, but called the recent warrantless NSA wiretaps "illegal under our judicial traditions". A study at the Max Planck Institute said that Italy, followed by the Netherlands, does the most wiretapping. One of the authors said: wiretaps are much more common on the European continent than in Britain or the United States, where he said there is a more "institutionalized mistrust in the relationship between civil society and a state-organized judiciary." He said research showed that wiretaps are often used to support weak cases and seldom help to achieve a guilty verdict. "The more wiretaps are used, the lower the conviction rates," he said. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From dave at farber.net Sat Apr 8 12:37:30 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Sat, 8 Apr 2006 15:37:30 -0400 Subject: [IP] Details on AT&T Forwards ALL Internet Traffic Into NSA Says EFF Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: From eugen at leitl.org Sat Apr 8 10:11:42 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat, 8 Apr 2006 19:11:42 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Details on AT&T Forwards ALL Internet Traffic Into NSA Says EFF] Message-ID: <20060408171142.GN31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From bub at letterbox.org Sat Apr 8 21:22:17 2006 From: bub at letterbox.org (Edward Wood) Date: Sun, 09 Apr 2006 03:22:17 -0100 Subject: loan request. 7 Apr 2006 Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 640 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Sun Apr 9 03:42:12 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2006 12:42:12 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Details on AT&T Forwards ALL Internet Traffic Into NSA Says EFF] Message-ID: <20060409104212.GS31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From eugen at leitl.org Sun Apr 9 03:46:28 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2006 12:46:28 +0200 Subject: [smb@cs.columbia.edu: wiretapping in Europe] Message-ID: <20060409104628.GT31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from "Steven M. Bellovin" ----- From loud890 at gmail.com Sun Apr 9 09:24:49 2006 From: loud890 at gmail.com (Haley Meade) Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2006 15:24:49 -0100 Subject: Stronger, more powerful erections Message-ID: <200604091324.k39DOfE7010613@proton.jfet.org> A recent survey showed that 68% of women are unsatisfied with their sexual partners. 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The all natural proprietary blend of unique herbs found in Maxaman is designed to restore blood flow to your penis, unleash stored testosterone, and heighten sensation by activating the body's natural hormone production and supplying vital nutrients necessary for peak sexual performance. http://dc2ks.ecosunenergy.info/mm From ynvrhkrascb at excite.com Sun Apr 9 17:56:19 2006 From: ynvrhkrascb at excite.com (Juana Wise) Date: Sun, 09 Apr 2006 16:56:19 -0800 Subject: try hoodia today and feel better Message-ID: <86400443910826.23834921@moth> the transplantation or sago some ytterbium some chevalier it amoebae but conciliatory and creating may carla some connecticut , aventine try managerial and adject see remit try polyhymnia see harding in kaleidoscope the summary but blurt but alphonse. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 742 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: mousy.3.gif Type: image/gif Size: 11741 bytes Desc: not available URL: From usura at zedz.net Sun Apr 9 14:06:21 2006 From: usura at zedz.net (Alex de Joode) Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2006 23:06:21 +0200 Subject: wiretapping in Europe Message-ID: On Sat, Apr 08, 2006 at 02:31:58PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: > > A study at the Max Planck Institute said that Italy, followed by the > Netherlands, does the most wiretapping. One of the authors said: And the sad thing is most of the Dutch tapping rooms are build by Comverse (Mossad Inside) and are maintained not by Dutch nationals. http://www.xs4all.nl/~ronmeul/waste/tap.html -- "Never be afraid to try something new. Remember, amateurs built the ark. Professionals built the Titanic". (Anonymous) --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From rah at shipwright.com Sun Apr 9 21:48:42 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 00:48:42 -0400 Subject: [Clips] Sophisticated: But Forgers Are Jailed Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 00:47:57 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R. A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] Sophisticated: But Forgers Are Jailed Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com Sky News: Jail For Passport Forgers Updated: 07:31, Saturday January 28, 2006 Two Algerian-born men who ran a sophisticated forgery racket have been jailed for two-and-a-half years each. The pair churned out hundreds of fake passports, national insurance cards, driving licences, identity cards and utility bills for illegal immigrants and criminals. Noureddine Hadadj, 39, and Rezki Bensayah, 34, used a flat above a cafe in Brixton, south London, as the base for their hi-tech operation. Hadadj made the papers on computers while Bensayah, a drug addict, took orders from customers and sold the documents on. Police found 50 counterfeit passports - British, French, Belgian and Portuguese - in the flat, in Acre Lane. There were 55 French national insurance cards and 1,941 blank national insurance cards, Inner London Crown Court heard. Detectives discovered 66 UK driving licences and 57 driving licences from other European countries. The forgers' flat There were also more than 20,000 blank credit card-sized documents waiting to be made into forgeries. The hi-tech factory contained three laptops, two PCs, six printers, two scanners, a laminator, four card-printing machines and a card reader. There were further documents on computers including 450 UK driving licences, seven Spanish passports and parts of 22 other passports. Also on computer were two UN cards for use in Kosovo and an immigration and naturalisation department Home Office stamp. At Hadadj's Brixton flat police found #64,410 in cash in a suitcase. Both men admitted four counts of conspiracy to make false instruments. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From willard.oldhamf9t at gmail.com Sun Apr 9 10:30:10 2006 From: willard.oldhamf9t at gmail.com (Lenny Hendrix) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 01:30:10 +0800 Subject: Hey sweetie, hope you're well Message-ID: <200604120730.k3C7U3ak010513@proton.jfet.org> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 707 bytes Desc: not available URL: From ian at urbanmapping.com Sun Apr 9 22:42:23 2006 From: ian at urbanmapping.com (Ian | Urban Mapping) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 01:42:23 -0400 Subject: [Geowanking] E911 // cellular trilateration accuracy Message-ID: At the risk of asking (another) obvious question, I continue my naove streak on this listserv Ive heard very different reports of how accurate cellphone tracking isthe FAA mandates something like 50% of calls must be traceable to within a range of 30m but Ive heard some mobile pros say theyve heard of it getting as good as several feet. Obviously this varies depending on geography (urban, rural, topography), but does anybody have any idea how the US wireless carriers stack up? And how does this compare to phones with GPS? Ian White :: Urban Mapping LLC :: ian at urbanmapping.com 120 West 45th Street 20th Floor :: New York NY 10036 Tel.212.242.8267 :: Fax.866.385.8266 :: www.urbanmapping.com _______________________________________________ Geowanking mailing list Geowanking at lists.burri.to http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From eugen at leitl.org Sun Apr 9 23:58:17 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 08:58:17 +0200 Subject: [usura@zedz.net: Re: wiretapping in Europe] Message-ID: <20060410065817.GL31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Alex de Joode ----- From eugen at leitl.org Mon Apr 10 00:21:09 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 09:21:09 +0200 Subject: [ian@urbanmapping.com: [Geowanking] E911 // cellular trilateration accuracy] Message-ID: <20060410072109.GO31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Ian | Urban Mapping ----- From debi.jones at gmail.com Mon Apr 10 10:16:49 2006 From: debi.jones at gmail.com (Debi Jones) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 10:16:49 -0700 Subject: [Geowanking] E911 // cellular trilateration accuracy Message-ID: The most lethal phone is one that hits your head with enough force to crack your skull. The precision of cellid is location specific as it depends on cell size. It depends on the arrangement and distance between the towers being used to locate you. Think geometry. The longer the sides of a triangle the greater the area. That fellow might have been a GSM expert but clearly he wasn't an LBS or CDMA expert. One major benefit for current CDMA networks using cellid is that the base stations operate synchronously. They emit code sequences at exactly the same time, so there's no need for after collection synchronization as is the case for GSM. ...Debi > > > On 4/10/06, roger at sylvanascent.com wrote: > > I think this is a great question. I talked to a gentleman from South > Africa > last year at Where 2 who claimed to be a GSM expert. He said that GSM can > locate you within something like 3 meters with no GPS support just using > the towers, and that this was built into the GSM spec. He spoke of a case > in South Africa where they located some sort of criminal using the GSM > records. > > He said that CDMA on the other hand, cannot locate so precisely. > > So, to me, A-GPS was designed to make CDMA users locatable to the same > degree as GSM. > > As an aside, does anyone know which type of cell phones are more lethal? > > Roger > > Original Message: > ----------------- > From: Ian | Urban Mapping ian at urbanmapping.com > Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 01:42:23 -0400 > To: geowanking at lists.burri.to > Subject: [Geowanking] E911 // cellular trilateration accuracy > > > At the risk of asking (another) obvious question, I continue my naC/ve > streak > on this listservb& > > > > I've heard very different reports of how accurate cellphone tracking > isbthe > FAA mandates something like 50% of calls must be traceable to within a > range > of 30m but I've heard some mobile pros say they've heard of it getting as > good as several feet. Obviously this varies depending on geography (urban, > rural, topography), but does anybody have any idea how the US wireless > carriers stack up? And how does this compare to phones with GPS? > > > > > > Ian White :: Urban Mapping LLC :: > ian at urbanmapping.com > > 120 West 45th Street 20th Floor :: New York NY 10036 > > Tel.212.242.8267 :: Fax.866.385.8266 :: www.urbanmapping.com > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > mail2web - Check your email from the web at > http://mail2web.com/ . > > > _______________________________________________ > Geowanking mailing list > Geowanking at lists.burri.to > http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking > _______________________________________________ Geowanking mailing list Geowanking at lists.burri.to http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From salgado at bestyellow.com Mon Apr 10 10:49:47 2006 From: salgado at bestyellow.com (Rosalie Ruffin) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 11:49:47 -0600 Subject: Low mortagge ratee approvall Message-ID: <9.5.2.2.7.16333015494717.399a8536@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1188 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: grope.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 7236 bytes Desc: not available URL: From roger at sylvanascent.com Mon Apr 10 09:35:05 2006 From: roger at sylvanascent.com (roger at sylvanascent.com) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 12:35:05 -0400 Subject: [Geowanking] E911 // cellular trilateration accuracy Message-ID: I think this is a great question. I talked to a gentleman from South Africa last year at Where 2 who claimed to be a GSM expert. He said that GSM can locate you within something like 3 meters with no GPS support just using the towers, and that this was built into the GSM spec. He spoke of a case in South Africa where they located some sort of criminal using the GSM records. He said that CDMA on the other hand, cannot locate so precisely. So, to me, A-GPS was designed to make CDMA users locatable to the same degree as GSM. As an aside, does anyone know which type of cell phones are more lethal? Roger Original Message: ----------------- From: Ian | Urban Mapping ian at urbanmapping.com Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 01:42:23 -0400 To: geowanking at lists.burri.to Subject: [Geowanking] E911 // cellular trilateration accuracy At the risk of asking (another) obvious question, I continue my naove streak on this listserv Ive heard very different reports of how accurate cellphone tracking isthe FAA mandates something like 50% of calls must be traceable to within a range of 30m but Ive heard some mobile pros say theyve heard of it getting as good as several feet. Obviously this varies depending on geography (urban, rural, topography), but does anybody have any idea how the US wireless carriers stack up? And how does this compare to phones with GPS? Ian White :: Urban Mapping LLC :: ian at urbanmapping.com 120 West 45th Street 20th Floor :: New York NY 10036 Tel.212.242.8267 :: Fax.866.385.8266 :: www.urbanmapping.com -------------------------------------------------------------------- mail2web - Check your email from the web at http://mail2web.com/ . _______________________________________________ Geowanking mailing list Geowanking at lists.burri.to http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From coderman at gmail.com Mon Apr 10 12:37:56 2006 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 12:37:56 -0700 Subject: [Clips] EFF: AT&T forwards all Internet traffic into NSA In-Reply-To: <20060407190818.E43151@ubzr.zsa.bet> References: <4ef5fec60604071355s763220f9x78eab32cadf9904f@mail.gmail.com> <20060407190818.E43151@ubzr.zsa.bet> Message-ID: <4ef5fec60604101237i5a48e107t70b50c1fff3a2d3@mail.gmail.com> On 4/7/06, J.A. Terranson wrote: > ... > When the NSA (via the FBI) first asked everyone to participate in these > games (early 2002), I had the happy privilege of telling the FBI flunky > personally that they could go to hell (at Savvis - warning, then was then, > and NOT now: things have likely changed with Koen running the show now). > > At the time, the only incentive was "Helping your country" - if > they have added financial incentives, I'd love to know how these monies > could be delivered without being disclosed by the telcos. indeed; the laundering would be well implemented. it's unlikely highly visible raw cash infusions are the mechanism, more likely ancillary benefits in equipment, "unrelated" contracts, facilities, and other infrastructure. i've seen too much infrastructure build out in these post-telecom-crash years (esp. landing points and backbone/gigapop) that just seems suspect. perhaps this also falls under the various "critical infrastructure protection" programs juiced with cash post 9/11 with passive taps as added bonus. From coderman at gmail.com Mon Apr 10 12:56:12 2006 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 12:56:12 -0700 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: <20060410155814.GB31486@leitl.org> References: <20060410155814.GB31486@leitl.org> Message-ID: <4ef5fec60604101256k37fffe8cv3a374925ed86ab53@mail.gmail.com> On 4/10/06, Eugen Leitl wrote: > ... > If you spend your life at layer 2 of the network (down where > packets change direction based on the value of a few bits in > the IP header) then looking beyond the IP header (to such > exotic places as the port numbers in the TCP header) to > recognize that one packet as likely to be HTTP and another as > likely to be VOIP is considered "semantic". And it's harder > than you'd think it would be at 10Gbps (that's one packet > roughly every 200 nanoseconds). not really, see below. > One of the reasons I am dubious about this article is that > the peering point that tries to do intrusion detection > between what we used to refer to as "the Milnet" and the rest > of the world is unable to monitor packets on 1Gbps links (so > they keep adding 1Gbps links every couple of months instead > of adding 10Gbps links less frequently). That site has > hardware money coming out its ears (they talk about keeping > several hundred gigabytes of transaction logs in RAM). And, > that site is run in cooperation with NSA. hardware monies buy things like FPGA driven filters, and these hardware sniffers can in turn easily talk to banks of DDR. there was a paper at USENIX or somewhere that showed Xilinx FPGA's programmed with up to 700+ snort filter rules that could monitor a 10GigE stream in real time (yes, 10GigE) and scaled linear; just the kind of mechanism well funded adversaries like to brute force. [i can't find this paper anymore, does someone else have a link / copy?] nallatech makes some nice FPGA hardware systems that would apply: http://www.nallatech.com/?node_id=1.2.1&id=1 sure, this doesn't capture everything, but i suspect these filters are tuned more for what they want to discard (p2p movie and warez traffic, that'd eliminate quite a chunk, right?) than for what they want to inspect. (that is, what they want to inspect is everything they don't consider useless and filter out) on a side note, the recent interference in the Sourcefire and Check Point merger makes you wonder, doesn't it? what kind of classification systems is the government using from Sourcefire that is so sensitive it must be US owned? > If this equipment did what is being claimed, I think that > peering point would know about it and be using it for lesser > things like intrusion detection. ---p*zz*] they don't get to play on the equipment. they only get to splice a fiber to it. you can buy these kinds of high capacity hardware filtering / classifying systems but they are insanely expensive. like http://www.cloudshield.com/ for example. From incidental at elturista.com Mon Apr 10 13:24:17 2006 From: incidental at elturista.com (Shirley Simon) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 13:24:17 -0700 Subject: loan request. 10 Apr 2006 Message-ID: <10171.22.762@appear> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 638 bytes Desc: not available URL: From gqes at upos.com Mon Apr 10 04:04:35 2006 From: gqes at upos.com (Lynda Parham) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 16:04:35 +0500 Subject: Offers the most intense grooves in the galaxy! Message-ID: the way there it was explained to me that the people who work at Denny's the great patron, in that day, of learning and of learned men. intense situation of hosting aliens with much greater technology on the earth. our education system, government, profession, and business. New -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 942 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: hadn't.gif Type: image/gif Size: 17151 bytes Desc: not available URL: From bogus@does.not.exist.com Mon Apr 10 17:48:08 2006 From: bogus@does.not.exist.com ( Ohara) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 16:48:08 -0800 Subject: 3.25%% approvedd rattee Message-ID: <020920913524542.3403039@> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 805 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: .gif Type: image/gif Size: 7610 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dteron at ab.bluecross.ca Mon Apr 10 18:53:00 2006 From: dteron at ab.bluecross.ca (Celina Davies) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 17:53:00 -0800 Subject: Your mortagee approval Message-ID: <427942629258211.1935852@msn.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1007 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: flair.4.gif Type: image/gif Size: 7610 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Mon Apr 10 08:58:14 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 17:58:14 +0200 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] Message-ID: <20060410155814.GB31486@leitl.org> [from somelist] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 That's what it appears we are up against, folks. Real-time semantic data monitoring on a huge scale. A scale beyond what most of us can even comprehend. It's scarey. http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2006/4/8/14724/28476 - -ken - -- - --------------- The world's most affordable web hosting. http://www.nearlyfreespeech.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFEOOBke8HF+6xeOIcRAuqCAKCNIVU77CEJYsKYr7Xo2V9Vhimo4ACfYzJX VlFnDfJLQPqbWhnEoTe4cSE= =uEQQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [The following is "not for attribution". I've sent away for their white papers (and have yet to get a reply --- I suspect they've been dailykossed), but I suspect that they're using the word "semantic" at a far lower level than people are accustomed to thinking. You have to understand that all you users just exist to provide a test load for our network. If you spend your life at layer 2 of the network (down where packets change direction based on the value of a few bits in the IP header) then looking beyond the IP header (to such exotic places as the port numbers in the TCP header) to recognize that one packet as likely to be HTTP and another as likely to be VOIP is considered "semantic". And it's harder than you'd think it would be at 10Gbps (that's one packet roughly every 200 nanoseconds). One of the reasons I am dubious about this article is that the peering point that tries to do intrusion detection between what we used to refer to as "the Milnet" and the rest of the world is unable to monitor packets on 1Gbps links (so they keep adding 1Gbps links every couple of months instead of adding 10Gbps links less frequently). That site has hardware money coming out its ears (they talk about keeping several hundred gigabytes of transaction logs in RAM). And, that site is run in cooperation with NSA. If this equipment did what is being claimed, I think that peering point would know about it and be using it for lesser things like intrusion detection. ---p*zz*] ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From arma at mit.edu Mon Apr 10 15:07:21 2006 From: arma at mit.edu (Roger Dingledine) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 18:07:21 -0400 Subject: Tor 0.1.1.18-rc is out Message-ID: This is the fourth release candidate for the 0.1.1.x series. Please let us know if you find bugs, because I expect only one more release candidate before the real thing. It adds a fifth authoritative directory server, and fixes a lot of bugs in threshold decisions around directories. http://tor.eff.org/download.html Changes in version 0.1.1.18-rc - 2006-04-10 o Major fixes: - Work harder to download live network-statuses from all the directory authorities we know about. Improve the threshold decision logic so we're more robust to edge cases. - When fetching rendezvous descriptors, we were willing to ask v2 authorities too, which would always return 404. o Minor fixes: - Stop listing down or invalid nodes in the v1 directory. This will reduce its bulk by about 1/3, and reduce load on directory mirrors. - When deciding whether a router is Fast or Guard-worthy, consider his advertised BandwidthRate and not just the BandwidthCapacity. - No longer ship INSTALL and README files -- they are useless now. - Force rpmbuild to behave and honor target_cpu. - Avoid warnings about machine/limits.h on Debian GNU/kFreeBSD. - Start to include translated versions of the tor-doc-*.html files, along with the screenshots. Still needs more work. - Start sending back 512 and 451 errors if mapaddress fails, rather than not sending anything back at all. - When we fail to bind or listen on an incoming or outgoing socket, we should close it before failing. otherwise we just leak it. (thanks to weasel for finding.) - Allow "getinfo dir/status/foo" to work, as long as your DirPort is enabled. (This is a hack, and will be fixed in 0.1.2.x.) - Make NoPublish (even though deprecated) work again. - Fix a minor security flaw where a versioning auth dirserver could list a recommended version many times in a row to make clients more convinced that it's recommended. - Fix crash bug if there are two unregistered servers running with the same nickname, one of them is down, and you ask for them by nickname in your EntryNodes or ExitNodes. Also, try to pick the one that's running rather than an arbitrary one. - Fix an infinite loop we could hit if we go offline for too long. - Complain when we hit WSAENOBUFS on recv() or write() too. Perhaps this will help us hunt the bug. - If you're not a versioning dirserver, don't put the string "client-versions \nserver-versions \n" in your network-status. - Lower the minimum required number of file descriptors to 1000, so we can have some overhead for Valgrind on Linux, where the default ulimit -n is 1024. o New features: - Add tor.dizum.com as the fifth authoritative directory server. - Add a new config option FetchUselessDescriptors, off by default, for when you plan to run "exitlist" on your client and you want to know about even the non-running descriptors. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From rah at shipwright.com Mon Apr 10 15:10:15 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 18:10:15 -0400 Subject: [Clips] IBM to Offer Encryption System Based on Chips for PCs, PDAs Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 18:06:26 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R. A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] IBM to Offer Encryption System Based on Chips for PCs, PDAs Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com The Wall Street Journal April 10, 2006 IBM to Offer Encryption System Based on Chips for PCs, PDAs By WILLIAM M. BULKELEY April 10, 2006; Page B4 International Business Machines Corp. expects to announce a chip-based encryption system that could simplify and cut the cost of how information is secured on personal computers, cellphones and personal digital assistants. The technology, "Secure Blue," is a method of designing part of a microprocessor to encrypt or scramble all the data it handles. The new encryption system is being launched as companies and governments are dealing with numerous instances of stealing of private data from laptop computers. Last month, a laptop containing unencrypted personal data on 196,000 customers was stolen from a Fidelity Investments employee's car. The design, IBM says, can foil skilled hackers who might try to reverse-engineer its circuits. "If someone tries to access the chip by tampering, it can commit suicide on the spot," said Tim Ravy, a vice president in IBM's technology-collaboration solutions unit. IBM said it has a customer who already is using the system, but it declined to name the customer. Encryption software is one way to thwart unauthorized access to data. But except in powerful, large computers, running encryption software can be time-consuming and inconvenient. IBM said its engineers will work with processor makers to design the security features into their products. Mr. Ravy declined to speak about pricing. IBM has implemented Secure Blue in its own Power processors, which it sells to other companies, and in two other processors. It said it plans to approach other processor makers and companies in the defense, consumer-electronics, financial-services and digital-media markets. "The need to protect content is growing exponentially," Mr. Ravy said. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From rah at shipwright.com Mon Apr 10 15:10:21 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 18:10:21 -0400 Subject: [Clips] Why Some People Put These Credit Cards In the Microwave Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 18:09:33 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R. A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] Why Some People Put These Credit Cards In the Microwave Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com The Wall Street Journal April 10, 2006 PAGE ONE Why Some People Put These Credit Cards In the Microwave Mr. Walker Took a Hammer To His New MasterCard -- To Stop the Radio Waves By SUSAN WARREN April 10, 2006; Page A1 When Brenden Walker got his new MasterCard PayPass ATM card in the mail last month, he headed to the gas station to try it out. To test the card's "Tap N Go" convenience, he passed it in front of the scanner, which activated with a beep and displayed the word "authorizing..." on its LCD screen. That was quite enough for Mr. Walker. Without completing the transaction, he put the card down on the pavement and took a hammer to it. "I gave it a couple of good whacks," he says. The PayPass card, which contains an embedded radio chip, had worked perfectly. Other companies have their own versions: Exxon (SpeedPass), American Express (ExpressPay) and Visa (Contactless and Blink). In each case, the cards use an embedded electronic chip with miniature antenna. When activated by a scanner, the chip transmits the user's account information via radio signals. In just the wave of a hand, the purchase amount is automatically drawn from an account. But Mr. Walker, a 37-year-old software engineer in Canton, Ohio, is one of a growing number of computer and technology experts who are becoming anxious about possible abuses of the technology. Mr. Walker fears that thieves will be able to eavesdrop on the radio transmission and buy gas at his expense. He also figures that he himself could walk past the pump and accidentally pay for somebody else's gas, though the card companies say he would have to get within two inches of the scanner to accomplish that feat. In any event, he wants no part of it. Hammering the card destroyed the chip. "I tried it again and...nothing," he says. "I might as well have been holding up a salami sandwich." As the chips become more widespread, other militants are seeking them out and destroying them. And a little industry is springing up on the Internet to pitch an array of devices meant to protect consumers from abuses of the technology, called radio frequency identification, or RFID. One example: wallets with metal shields built in that block radio signals. Radio chips have been around for decades performing other tasks, mostly related to security access. They are the invisible passports that allow motorists to breeze through highway tollbooths and let employees open their office doors. Pets and people are getting chip implants under their skin that carry identification or medical information. Governments are beginning to use radio chips in driver's licenses and passports. Retailers use them to track inventory. The banks that are now using chips in their credit and cash cards say they make transactions more efficient -- and more convenient for customers. Critics such as Mr. Walker worry that sensitive information will be intercepted. Some privacy advocates envision businesses and government furtively gathering personal data on unsuspecting consumers, and criminals taking identify theft to a whole new level. A German group called FoeBud, which describes itself as a civil-rights group for the digital age, is featuring an array of RFID-busting products in the organization's online store. Items include "deactivator nippers," which look remarkably like a common hole-punch, priced at about $7. The most popular item in the store has been a copper bracelet with a red light that blinks when it is near an RFID scanner, says Rena Tangens, FoeBud's founder. The store claims to have sold about a thousand bracelets so far at about $18. "People think this is a cool gadget," Ms. Tangens says. Others are using do-it-yourself methods for disabling radio chips, including microwaving them. The electromagnetic energy emitted by a microwave oven fries the chip and renders it useless. The downside: Tagged items might burst into flames in the process, warns Caspian, a consumer group campaigning against the widening use of radio tags. The group suggests cutting out the chip with a pair of scissors, puncturing it with a straight pin, crushing it or pulverizing it. Several Web sites boast about -- but don't yet sell -- devices with names like TagZapper and RFIDWasher, which are supposed to make disabling the tags easier. Technology experts say some of these "zappers" work by emitting a burst of electromagnetic energy that permanently destroys the tag. Unfortunately, they say, it might also fry other nearby electronics, including iPods and cellphones. Some techies in Germany figured out how to make a Zapper by modifying a disposable camera. When you hit the switch, instead of taking a picture, it emits a burst of electromagnetic energy that fries any nearby electronics. They have posted an extensive description of their project on the Internet. Several technology experts contacted say it should work, but the developers did not respond to emails requesting comment. A Web site describing the gadget listed several potential hazards, including electric shocks and Federal Communications Commission law violations. It also warned, "Don't try it near your grandpa's pacemaker." Makers of products using RFID say privacy and security safeguards are being built into the chips to prevent abuses. MasterCard International says multiple layers of security are available to prevent MasterCard data from being stolen by electronic eavesdropping. It is up to the companies that issue the card to decide which security measures to adopt, says Art Kranzley, MasterCard's executive vice president in charge of new payment technologies. Customers who don't want RFID in their PayPass payment cards can ask to be issued an old-fashioned chipless card, says Mr. Kranzley. Kelly Lum, 23 years old, a computer-network engineer in Eatontown, N.J., recently bought a wallet online from a site called DIFRWear (RFID backwards). The wallet has a metal insert designed to shield her radio-chip bank card from being read without her knowledge. The card Ms. Lum carries came without any information about security safeguards, she says, so she decided to take no chances. "It's maybe a little bit of a paranoia thing, but hey, it's my credit rating," she says. Eric Caraszi, a 26-year-old computer programmer in Albany, N.Y., recently bought an RFID-proof wallet after having a conversation with a co-worker about different ways criminals might be able to exploit RFID-chip cards -- from sneaky scans on crowded elevators to high-powered scanners on the roadside that could mine passing traffic. "For every smart person trying to make a lock, there is going to be an equally smart person trying to unlock that lock," he notes. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From rah at shipwright.com Mon Apr 10 15:14:24 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 18:14:24 -0400 Subject: [Clips] A Teenager's Tale Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 18:13:25 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R. A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] A Teenager's Tale Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com The Wall Street Journal April 10, 2006 REAL TIME By JASON FRY A Teenager's Tale The Net Makes It Harder to Know Where Your Children Really Are April 10, 2006 Last week a House subcommittee listened to the tale of Justin Berry, the 19-year-old whose five years as a "camwhore" were chronicled by the New York Times, offering a window into a frightening world in which Webcams, IM, online-payment services and e-commerce wish lists are the tools online sexual predators use to lure impressionable teens and younger children into child porn. Mr. Berry and Times reporter Kurt Eichenwald testified, as did a number of experts in protecting kids online -- and even for those familiar with Mr. Eichenwald's scarifying story, it was headline-making stuff. The sexual exploitation of children online was estimated as a $20 billion industry, and Mr. Berry said in his prepared remarks that "[w]ithin each of your Congressional districts I guarantee there are children who have used their Webcams to appear naked, and I guarantee you there are also children in your district on the Internet right now being contacted and seduced online by sexual predators." Frightening enough, but there was an undercurrent to the stories told by Mr. Berry and the other witnesses that was spookier still: the fact that the teens could be exploited in their own homes, and despite having involved, caring parents. "I was an honor student, I was class president," Mr. Berry said. "My mom used all the latest child protective software. She checked what was happening in my room." She did -- and yet in some ways she didn't. Because she couldn't. And that's the dark side of the Net, a fundamental disconnect in our experience that we will have grave trouble getting used to, if we ever can: You can no longer tell who's in the room with your child, with your spouse, with your employee -- or where that person is. It wasn't so long ago that people doing things they shouldn't do needed privacy to go astray -- if you were in the same room as your child or spouse or employee, you could see what they were doing, could hear one side of any conversations, could expect to know if something were amiss. Husbands didn't call their mistresses in the living room while their wives balanced the checkbook, employees didn't hand company secrets to rivals who blithely dropped by their desk, and children certainly didn't have mysterious talks with a stranger on the phone or at the door. Repeated absences had to explained, not to mention strange things on bank and credit-card statements. Now, things are different. Sure, that person -- he or she needn't be a child -- is sitting right there in the room with you. But are they really there, the way you assume they are? In a very real way they may not be. Email and instant messaging can let that person have a secret conversation right under your nose, with no trace but the anonymous tap-tap of keys. Meanwhile, where has the screen they're looking at so intently taken them? Nearly everyone has found something unsettling or repellent on their computer screen after clicking on a Web link sent by someone who shouldn't have shared it, following a bizarre search result out of curiosity, or receiving strange spam. Pressing the Delete key or closing the browser will usually put things right, but a queasy sense of violation remains: Those thoughts/pictures/sounds were right here, in my living room or bedroom or workplace, where I normally feel safe. But for most of us, such experiences are exceptions. And our usual feeling of safety, of being in control, can get us to lower our defenses. It can keep us from worrying about what the person across the room at the computer is doing -- and leave kids susceptible to online predators with practice at role-playing and social engineering. As Mr. Eichenwald put it, kids "are not being approached by a predator in the park. Rather, they are in their own homes, feeling safe. They feel comfortable on the Internet, in ways we may not recognize. There is no one else there, just a small, silent device nearby. There is a level of unreality about it, a simple lack of comprehension." Throw in Webcams, and you have a potentially toxic mix. (Here's hoping Mr. Berry's testimony has led to a tidal wave of parents tearing Webcams out of kids' rooms.) There are undoubtedly other factors that leave children like Mr. Berry vulnerable -- a pop culture that applauds calculated displays of toughness, vulgarity and exhibitionism; a reality-show-fueled belief that seeking attention can make you a star; changing mores among teens who are sexually precocious without the necessary emotional underpinnings; and of course the age-old desire to shock one's parents while basking in the invulnerability of youth. But that said, the level of unreality Mr. Eichenwald describes is one many of us share, to one degree or another -- we simply haven't had time to accustom ourselves to the Internet's mix of anonymity and its ability to erase distance, or to the fact that the tool we love in one context can be put to frightening use in another. We marvel at how the Net lets small, far-flung groups get together -- but what works for woodworkers, toy collectors or parents of children with disabilities also works for terrorists and child predators. It's important, when we're scared and wondering whether it might not be better just to pull the plug, to remember that the Internet isn't all darkness: As Parry Aftab of WiredSafety.org told the subcommittee, "[t]oo often blamed for everything from the Black Plague to the sinking of the Titanic, the Internet is a wonderful tool for learning, communication and entertainment. It levels the playing field between the haves and the have-nots. All children look alike online. No one is classified by their race, ethnic origin, religion, accent or physical ability. Online they are all just children." But of course they're not all just children -- some of them are just pretending. As Mr. Berry noted, when he was 13 he set up his Webcam (sent free for signing up with EarthLink) in hopes that it "would help me meet other teenagers online, maybe even find a few girls my age. That never happened. No teenager outside of those in the Webcam pornography business ever contacted me. But, I did hear from many child predators." Ms. Aftab's reminder of the Internet's marvels shouldn't be forgotten. But it isn't the whole story -- her testimony went on to discuss the mix of good advice, education and technical solutions needed to let kids take advantage of the Net's wonders without falling prey to its dangers. It's a struggle that's new to us, but one that from now on will always be with us. Online, the good and the bad are inextricably bound together; to put an ugly twist on the old joke, on the Internet nobody knows you're a child molester -- and the dark places of the world are only a mouse click away. Drop me a line at realtime at wsj.com7 -- comments will be posted periodically in Real Time. If you don't want your comments considered for Real Time, please make that clear. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From eugen at leitl.org Mon Apr 10 09:48:37 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 18:48:37 +0200 Subject: [roger@sylvanascent.com: RE: [Geowanking] E911 // cellular trilateration accuracy] Message-ID: <20060410164837.GC31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from "roger at sylvanascent.com" ----- From eugen at leitl.org Mon Apr 10 10:19:16 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 19:19:16 +0200 Subject: [debi.jones@gmail.com: Re: [Geowanking] E911 // cellular trilateration accuracy] Message-ID: <20060410171915.GF31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Debi Jones ----- From anjelica85 at ameritrade.com Mon Apr 10 18:53:35 2006 From: anjelica85 at ameritrade.com (Kenny Larsen) Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 19:53:35 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #ptyjgkoL307242 Message-ID: <71728802340759.TVeHrvBmra@sideband> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: l'vov.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From ylgefjtpj at yahoo.com Mon Apr 10 20:26:37 2006 From: ylgefjtpj at yahoo.com (Gerardo ) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 02:26:37 -0100 Subject: We SelIs all Medss Message-ID: The most complete Phar macy Online We carry all major medds at bargain price Viggra, Ci ialis, VaIium, Xa naax Phantermiine, Ulltraam and etc... SatiisfactIon Gua ranteeed http://changdia.com/?aid=10 From krueger at kiremko.com Tue Apr 11 01:31:16 2006 From: krueger at kiremko.com (Joy Griffin) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 02:31:16 -0600 Subject: Last chance for lower rates Message-ID: <94659802965102.79sMJCiN2y@gravestone> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1188 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: gigahertz.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Mon Apr 10 23:53:29 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 08:53:29 +0200 Subject: [Re: [s-t] Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] Message-ID: <20060411065329.GO31486@leitl.org> [from somelist] > That's what it appears we are up against, folks. Real-time semantic data > monitoring on a huge scale. A scale beyond what most of us can even > comprehend. It's scarey. > > http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2006/4/8/14724/28476 DailyKos just got around to noticing that EFF had sued AT&T? The suit was filed in January! http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2006_01.php No wonder the Republicans are winning; their opponents don't notice what each other are doing. Yes, this type of monitoring is why Gonzales said: "'It would have been difficult, if not impossible' to amend FISA to provide the wiretap authority." http://www.rawstory.com/news/2006/Congressmen_tear_into_Gonzales_over_NSA_04 06.html Gonzales never elaborates on why, but it appears to be because FISA is about granting individual wiretaps one by one, and that isn't how this stuff works. If he filed even the retroactive wiretap requests FISA permits, he'd be filing hundreds or thousands or more per day, which would cause a bit of notice as to what he was really doing. And this would explain why the other day he said he "can't rule out" domestic wiretaps among U.S. citizens: http://www.krqe.com/expanded.asp?ID=14679 Because they're already doing it, since that's how this stuff works: it hoovers up everything it can get into its maw and looks for patterns. An unattributable source remarks that they can't really be hoovering up *everything*. Maybe not, but they can pick selected major links, most of which will probably have some purely domestic traffic on them, too. Also, while semantic on the one hand can mean simply selecting ports from packet headers, semantic to NSA has also for many years meant pattern matching on message data contents. So if the former type of semantic monitoring, perhaps in combination with IP address information, is used to select data for the latter type of semantic monitoring, we have a plausible mechanism for what this wiretap system is doing. Is that really what it's doing? Maybe EFF's lawsuit will result in an answer to that question. I doubt we'll ever get one directly from Gonzales. The scary part is that Gonzales' stonewalling can't really be intended to keep terrorists from finding out this is going on. We know some well-known terrorist organizations have competent technical people who could do the same analysis DailyKOS just did. So who is he trying to hide it from? Could it be... Congress? Which means he doesn't trust Congress or the public to agree with what the administration is doing, and he thinks the solution is to do it anyway. Which means he and his boss are subverting the Constitution. Which is exactly what high crimes and misdemeanors are about. Restore the Republic: impeach Bush. > -ken -jsq [Yes. I can readily believe that they can sort traffic by IP address and protocol. If they have a target list, this hardware looks capable of keeping track of the activities of those targets. Up to, and including, "anyone who visits Moveon.org" or even "dailykos.org" ---p*zz*] ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From eugen at leitl.org Tue Apr 11 00:02:58 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 09:02:58 +0200 Subject: [arma@mit.edu: Tor 0.1.1.18-rc is out] Message-ID: <20060411070258.GQ31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine ----- From s.schear at comcast.net Tue Apr 11 10:02:08 2006 From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 10:02:08 -0700 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: References: <4ef5fec60604101256k37fffe8cv3a374925ed86ab53@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20060411095932.0555bd98@mail.comcast.net> At 07:59 AM 4/11/2006, Tyler Durden wrote: >>sure, this doesn't capture everything, but i suspect these filters are >>tuned more for what they want to discard (p2p movie and warez traffic, >>that'd eliminate quite a chunk, right?) than for what they want to >>inspect. (that is, what they want to inspect is everything they don't >>consider useless and filter out) >Another point that was made years ago on Cypherpunks is that the presence >of crypto "where it doesn't belong" is probably a very high risk >indicator. In other words, if your sender IP isn't some bank or big >company and you're using crypto, they probably grab ALL of that and send >it to high-cost processes. > >The moral of this story is: Use Stego in your P2P'd Porno if you want to >send anything discretely. The increasing use of crypto in popular P2P (e.g., Azureus' newest releases) is a godsend for privacy. Steve From camera_lumina at hotmail.com Tue Apr 11 07:59:50 2006 From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 10:59:50 -0400 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60604101256k37fffe8cv3a374925ed86ab53@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: >sure, this doesn't capture everything, but i suspect these filters are >tuned more for what they want to discard (p2p movie and warez traffic, >that'd eliminate quite a chunk, right?) than for what they want to >inspect. (that is, what they want to inspect is everything they don't >consider useless and filter out) That's the key here, and not captured in the subject line. They DON'T capture everything and backhaul it, though everything probably undergoes a first touch at the POP. What I suspect is that there are underground footballfields worth of SAS geeks down in NSA basements who apply statistical criteria for pre-sorting. For instance, if sender IP is "Mongolia" then that buckets that communication into a low-risk segment. If there's enough "Risk" in a communication they probably decide to pull it back via the NSA parasite network where further Risk models dictate whether it gets stored or analyzed by a "higher layer". Eventually, a tiny fraction are probably analyzed by humans. Interestingly, I'd bet we can guess as to how much gets pulled back and how much gets dropped at the POP, but it would take some work. Another point that was made years ago on Cypherpunks is that the presence of crypto "where it doesn't belong" is probably a very high risk indicator. In other words, if your sender IP isn't some bank or big company and you're using crypto, they probably grab ALL of that and send it to high-cost processes. The moral of this story is: Use Stego in your P2P'd Porno if you want to send anything discretely. -TD From coderman at gmail.com Tue Apr 11 12:45:35 2006 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 12:45:35 -0700 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: References: <4ef5fec60604101256k37fffe8cv3a374925ed86ab53@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <4ef5fec60604111245g6617e145nc9f0a2a358bdb6da@mail.gmail.com> On 4/11/06, Tyler Durden wrote: > ... > Interestingly, I'd bet we can guess as to how much gets pulled back and how > much gets dropped at the POP, but it would take some work. this would be a fun exercise. i wonder how much dark fiber is truly "dark" these days... > Another point that was made years ago on Cypherpunks is that the presence of > crypto "where it doesn't belong" is probably a very high risk indicator. In > other words, if your sender IP isn't some bank or big company and you're > using crypto, they probably grab ALL of that and send it to high-cost > processes. a friend and i had a discussion on this very subject recently. if you don't mind the social network analysis but desire privacy of content, does it matter if your encrypted comms stand out assuming they can't break the cipher? strong anonymity against an NSA threat model is very difficult; sometimes privacy of content is sufficient. in any case, i'd like to see encryption become the norm for even trivial communications. like the Azureus enhancements Steve mentioned this can be done in a simple and intuitive manner - it will just take a lot of effort... From coderman at gmail.com Tue Apr 11 13:00:12 2006 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 13:00:12 -0700 Subject: privacy threats Message-ID: <4ef5fec60604111300y441f509akf431b0e0df706243@mail.gmail.com> if you had to rank each of the following in order from greatest to least privacy invasion, how would you rank them? - global eavesdroppers: NSA, etc. - corporate aggregators: Acxiom, ChoicePoint, etc. - social network sites and blogs: MySpace, LiveJournal, etc. NSA is often a villain due to the shear breadth of data they monitor. But corporate privacy invaders can get a level of detail on your person that even Big Brother envies. and just how much personal detail do people willingly broadcast to the world through social networks and online journals (knowingly or unknowingly)? how would you protect your privacy in each of these three contexts? From bill.stewart at pobox.com Tue Apr 11 13:22:17 2006 From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 13:22:17 -0700 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: <6.0.1.1.0.20060411095932.0555bd98@mail.comcast.net> References: <4ef5fec60604101256k37fffe8cv3a374925ed86ab53@mail.gmail.com> <6.0.1.1.0.20060411095932.0555bd98@mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <6.2.1.2.0.20060411131207.034df7e0@pop.idiom.com> >>Another point that was made years ago on Cypherpunks is that the presence >>of crypto "where it doesn't belong" is probably a very high risk >>indicator. In other words, if your sender IP isn't some bank or big >>company and you're using crypto, they probably grab ALL of that and send >>it to high-cost processes. >> >>The moral of this story is: Use Stego in your P2P'd Porno if you want to >>send anything discretely. > >The increasing use of crypto in popular P2P (e.g., Azureus' newest >releases) is a godsend for privacy. PGP might still be "crypto where it doesn't belong", but VPNs aren't - not only do big companies use them extensively for home workers, but small companies are much more likely to use VPNs than to set up frame relay networks these days. It's amazing how something that used to be a cutting-edge technology and civil liberties issue has become a standard tool for daily commuting for much of the workforce. VPNs are also used for connections between companies, but for most of my (big-company) customers, they're primarily used for workers at home or on the road, especially since most of the country has broadband. Meanwhile, the _really_ popular encrypted P2P is Skype. It's not the world's best crypto (mainly due to poor choices of strong algorithms, e.g. RSA instead of DH), and being closed-source you can never be too sure what's happening, but it's Pretty Good, and extremely widespread for home users. From g13005 at gmail.com Tue Apr 11 13:15:15 2006 From: g13005 at gmail.com (Chris Olesch) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 15:15:15 -0500 Subject: privacy threats In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60604111300y441f509akf431b0e0df706243@mail.gmail.com> References: <4ef5fec60604111300y441f509akf431b0e0df706243@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: I'm begining to think that cave living might become popular again! -chris On 11/04/06, coderman wrote: > > if you had to rank each of the following in order from greatest to > least privacy invasion, how would you rank them? > > - global eavesdroppers: NSA, etc. > - corporate aggregators: Acxiom, ChoicePoint, etc. > - social network sites and blogs: MySpace, LiveJournal, etc. > > NSA is often a villain due to the shear breadth of data they monitor. > But corporate privacy invaders can get a level of detail on your > person that even Big Brother envies. and just how much personal > detail do people willingly broadcast to the world through social > networks and online journals (knowingly or unknowingly)? > > how would you protect your privacy in each of these three contexts? > -- -G "The knack of flying is learning how to throw yourself at the ground and miss." "He felt that his whole life was some kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it." "He inched his way up the corridor as if he would rather be yarding his way down it..." "We demand rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty!" "I love deadlines. I like the whooshing sound they make as they fly by." Famous Quotes written by Douglas Adams, (British comic writer, 1952-2001) http://hitchhikers.movies.go.com/ From coderman at gmail.com Tue Apr 11 17:13:29 2006 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 17:13:29 -0700 Subject: Privacy, Anonymity, and John Q. Public In-Reply-To: <20060411214313.GW41108@afflictions.org> References: <20060411214313.GW41108@afflictions.org> Message-ID: <4ef5fec60604111713s100224f1hbd6780c6784e9be1@mail.gmail.com> On 4/11/06, Damian Gerow wrote: > ... > I have pulled through any number of papers, publications, websites, books, > etc. that I still have kicking around, and though it /should/ be enough to > fill up all my allotted time, I thought a solicitation for help and pointers > couldn't hurt. > > If you were to lead a discussion on privacy and anonymity (regardless of the > involvement of the Internet), what topics would you want to discuss? Which > areas would you want to focus on? How would you start out? i've always liked Ian Goldberg's nymity slider as a description of identity and how you disclose/leak/protect it. http://www.cypherpunks.ca/~iang/thesis.html if i were in your situation i think a high level overview of identity and nymity (along the lines of the nymity slider) followed by specific privacy enhancing technologies would work well. perhaps covering: - anonymous email (mixnets) and browsing/sessions (tor/onions) - pseudonymous communication with aliases. (Off-the-Record? blogs?) - security and least privilege? i'd be curious to know what you put together; this would be a helpful resource for me and others i'm sure. From dgerow at afflictions.org Tue Apr 11 14:43:13 2006 From: dgerow at afflictions.org (Damian Gerow) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 17:43:13 -0400 Subject: Privacy, Anonymity, and John Q. Public Message-ID: <20060411214313.GW41108@afflictions.org> I'm in the midst of committing myself to leading a series of discussions about privacy and anonymity on the Internet (though, to properly tackle the subject, I'll have to embrace meatspace as well) with a given number of likely non-technical persons. Though I'm fairly comfortable discussing such matters amongst persons of a technical inclination, when starting to prepare some outlines, I realized that these two demographics have some significant differences. I have pulled through any number of papers, publications, websites, books, etc. that I still have kicking around, and though it /should/ be enough to fill up all my allotted time, I thought a solicitation for help and pointers couldn't hurt. If you were to lead a discussion on privacy and anonymity (regardless of the involvement of the Internet), what topics would you want to discuss? Which areas would you want to focus on? How would you start out? From camera_lumina at hotmail.com Tue Apr 11 18:37:15 2006 From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 21:37:15 -0400 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60604111245g6617e145nc9f0a2a358bdb6da@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: >in any case, i'd like to see encryption become the norm for even >trivial communications. like the Azureus enhancements Steve mentioned >this can be done in a simple and intuitive manner - it will just take >a lot of effort... Absolutely. This was another idea we kicked around on Cypherpunks briefly...like spreading some kind of virus that will encrypt P2P traffic. Of course, many people won't even notice the virus is there, which is cool. From camera_lumina at hotmail.com Tue Apr 11 18:43:04 2006 From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 21:43:04 -0400 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60604111245g6617e145nc9f0a2a358bdb6da@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: >a friend and i had a discussion on this very subject recently. if you >don't mind the social network analysis but desire privacy of content, >does it matter if your encrypted comms stand out assuming they can't >break the cipher? Depends. If you're planning on knocking over the Empire State building then even if they can't crack your code (in a reasonable amount of time) they still have sender/receiver IP as well as a host of other information. Come to think of it, isn't the encryption length itself unencoded in the header? Even if not, if your message falls into a high enough risk bucket to merit an all-out assault, if your message doesn't yield then after a certain point they'll start realizing that you probably cooked your own and did it very well. In THAT case they probably start thinking about sending a blackbag operation into your neighborhood. -TD From camera_lumina at hotmail.com Tue Apr 11 18:49:24 2006 From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 21:49:24 -0400 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: <6.2.1.2.0.20060411131207.034df7e0@pop.idiom.com> Message-ID: >VPNs are also used for connections between companies, >but for most of my (big-company) customers, >they're primarily used for workers at home or on the road, >especially since most of the country has broadband. > >Meanwhile, the _really_ popular encrypted P2P is Skype. >It's not the world's best crypto (mainly due to >poor choices of strong algorithms, e.g. RSA instead of DH), >and being closed-source you can never be too sure what's happening, >but it's Pretty Good, and extremely widespread for home users. I think that's an important point too. Even moderately strong crypto is a good thing because it forces them to make choices about where they will devote their resources. Even though the Feds can "print money" at will, reality eventually bites even them in the ass. So in other words, even if they can print money they will eventually run out of paper. That being the case, then using ANY crypto for popular apps is better than (and not equal to) nothing. Of course, the stronger the better, but those arguments that "they can break anything so why bother" are counterproductive at best and suspicious at worst. -TD From dgerow at afflictions.org Tue Apr 11 19:08:25 2006 From: dgerow at afflictions.org (Damian Gerow) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 22:08:25 -0400 Subject: privacy threats In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60604111300y441f509akf431b0e0df706243@mail.gmail.com> References: <4ef5fec60604111300y441f509akf431b0e0df706243@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20060412020825.GX41108@afflictions.org> Thus spake coderman (coderman at gmail.com) [11/04/06 16:24]: : if you had to rank each of the following in order from greatest to : least privacy invasion, how would you rank them? : : - global eavesdroppers: NSA, etc. : - corporate aggregators: Acxiom, ChoicePoint, etc. : - social network sites and blogs: MySpace, LiveJournal, etc. : : NSA is often a villain due to the shear breadth of data they monitor. : But corporate privacy invaders can get a level of detail on your : person that even Big Brother envies. and just how much personal : detail do people willingly broadcast to the world through social : networks and online journals (knowingly or unknowingly)? In terms of privacy invasion, I'd probably have to go in the reverse order you listed. It's relatively easy to avoid content analysis using things like cryptography. That will leaves traffic analysis (who's going where, who's talking to whom) open, but removes some knowledge. ... I had some notes here about how the list includes an organization that performs a certain action (or set thereof), and a source of data. It's a difficult comparison, but it's also been many hours since I started writing this, and the details of my thoughts are nowhere to be found. : how would you protect your privacy in each of these three contexts? Global Eavesdroppers: If I'm doing something that I /really/ don't want $TLA to know about, use some sort of anonymizing, zero-knowledge-ish system. A la Freenet or mixminion. And judicious use of cryptography never hurts. Corporate Aggregators: Just don't fill out personal information anywhere. Or use bogus and contradictory information. Social networks: Same kind of deal: don't use 'em. Or, if for some reason I find myself in a situation where that's not an appealing (or viable) option, don't use real data. From dgerow at afflictions.org Tue Apr 11 19:25:00 2006 From: dgerow at afflictions.org (Damian Gerow) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 22:25:00 -0400 Subject: Privacy, Anonymity, and John Q. Public In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60604111713s100224f1hbd6780c6784e9be1@mail.gmail.com> References: <20060411214313.GW41108@afflictions.org> <4ef5fec60604111713s100224f1hbd6780c6784e9be1@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20060412022459.GY41108@afflictions.org> Thus spake coderman (coderman at gmail.com) [11/04/06 20:28]: : i've always liked Ian Goldberg's nymity slider as a description of : identity and how you disclose/leak/protect it. : : http://www.cypherpunks.ca/~iang/thesis.html This has been on my reading list for far too long. Perhaps I should bump it up to the top and start cracking on it. : if i were in your situation i think a high level overview of identity : and nymity (along the lines of the nymity slider) followed by specific : privacy enhancing technologies would work well. perhaps covering: : - anonymous email (mixnets) and browsing/sessions (tor/onions) : - pseudonymous communication with aliases. (Off-the-Record? blogs?) : - security and least privilege? My problem is that we're talking one to two hours a week for eight weeks. That's a whole lot of time to fill, and I'd like to avoid getting into nitty gritty details that don't concern most people (server-side security, database protection, etc.), and focus more on end-user technologies. Things I'd like to cover (and this is still a work in progress): - the concept of identity and self (as you suggested) - anonymity, pseudonymity, and nyms (as you suggested) - what a computer is/does - what the Internet is/does - data mining - traffic analysis vs. content analysis - cryptography, digital signatures, non-repudiation - digital identities and how they tie to the real world And then move in to specifics -- so things like TOR, Freenet, PGP, OTR, cookies, etc. (Google actually provides an excellent working example that ties a number of these things in together). : i'd be curious to know what you put together; this would be a helpful : resource for me and others i'm sure. Assuming this all goes through (there's a chance it won't), I'd definitely like to keep a record of it around somewhere. I have a feeling it will come in handy in the future. From dgerow at afflictions.org Tue Apr 11 19:30:39 2006 From: dgerow at afflictions.org (Damian Gerow) Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2006 22:30:39 -0400 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: References: <6.2.1.2.0.20060411131207.034df7e0@pop.idiom.com> Message-ID: <20060412023039.GZ41108@afflictions.org> Thus spake Tyler Durden (camera_lumina at hotmail.com) [11/04/06 22:03]: : That being the case, then using ANY crypto for popular apps is better than : (and not equal to) nothing. Half-assed crypto is not necessarily better than no crypto. Let's say that the crypto in Skype turns out to be a load of bunk (hey, it could happen). How many people won't find out? How many will continue to believe it's okay? How many people will be bitten? And, perhaps most importantly, how many people won't care? Easily broken crypto, that is not advertised as such, is arguably worse than no crypto: people do things under the illusion they're safe, when they aren't. Take WEP as an example of this: 'twould have been better to just not have it at all, and have people focus on using 'proper' technologies (IPSec, OpenVPN, etc.) than to include it and give people a false sense of security. : arguments that "they can break anything so why bother" are : counterproductive at best and suspicious at worst. And even if they /could/ break anything, it still takes time, right? Throw enough data their way, and they're suddenly unable to break everything. From steed at aecc.com Wed Apr 12 09:00:47 2006 From: steed at aecc.com (Dario Larsen) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 08:00:47 -0800 Subject: Looking to ReFi or a Home Equity Loan? Message-ID: <93906.$$.35910.Etrack@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1003 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: mambo.3.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Wed Apr 12 00:12:59 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 09:12:59 +0200 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: <6.0.1.1.0.20060411095932.0555bd98@mail.comcast.net> References: <4ef5fec60604101256k37fffe8cv3a374925ed86ab53@mail.gmail.com> <6.0.1.1.0.20060411095932.0555bd98@mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <20060412071259.GD31486@leitl.org> On Tue, Apr 11, 2006 at 10:02:08AM -0700, Steve Schear wrote: > >The moral of this story is: Use Stego in your P2P'd Porno if you want to > >send anything discretely. > > The increasing use of crypto in popular P2P (e.g., Azureus' newest > releases) is a godsend for privacy. VPNs are now pretty vanilla, too. I tend to wrap most things into VPNs, even things which already use crypto. Well, yeah, they can read this letter just fine by packet timing (given that I ssh into a vserver) -- assuming the link is not idle. -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From coderman at gmail.com Wed Apr 12 10:23:20 2006 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 10:23:20 -0700 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: <20060412111147.GX31486@leitl.org> References: <4ef5fec60604111245g6617e145nc9f0a2a358bdb6da@mail.gmail.com> <20060412111147.GX31486@leitl.org> Message-ID: <4ef5fec60604121023p5948a1e5le0d8e1cc855cb33a@mail.gmail.com> On 4/12/06, Eugen Leitl wrote: > ... > An interesting way to increase background encrypted traffic and > bypassing NAT tunneling braindeadness is to package the crypto > inside the consumer router brick. > > I've just reflashed a couple Linksys WRT54GS with OpenWRT, > and OpenVPN and Tor are in the standard package depository > (there are many others, including Asterisk). The hardware is > so cheap that you could easily distribute preflashed > routers to end users as authentication token and part > of a darknet-like product. this is an excellent idea. i've played with the old WRT54G's a little bit and it is certainly an amenable piece of equipment for this kind of tweaking. i've had problems trying to get too much on a single unit as the flash space restrictions are tight but there is still enough space to support a decent set of services (like openvpn and tor as you mention). > Some of the Linksys even have crypto accelerators (largely 3DES, I think). > I'm not sure how much this is supported already. this is the only other trouble i've had with them: the crypto bits tend to get sluggish, esp. when negotiating EDH or generating keys. (fortunately this isn't needed all too frequently) i haven't looked at the GS but if they support WPA2 they should also support AES; it would be nice if this AES engine could be used for general offload in addition to WPA2 traffic :) i'm going to have to get one to tinker with... From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net Wed Apr 12 04:05:04 2006 From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 11:05:04 +0000 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: <20060412071259.GD31486@leitl.org> References: <4ef5fec60604101256k37fffe8cv3a374925ed86ab53@mail.gmail.com> <6.0.1.1.0.20060411095932.0555bd98@mail.comcast.net> <20060412071259.GD31486@leitl.org> Message-ID: <20060412110504.GA16969@arion.hive> On 2006-04-12T09:12:59+0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > On Tue, Apr 11, 2006 at 10:02:08AM -0700, Steve Schear wrote: > > > >The moral of this story is: Use Stego in your P2P'd Porno if you want to > > >send anything discretely. > > > > The increasing use of crypto in popular P2P (e.g., Azureus' newest > > releases) is a godsend for privacy. > > VPNs are now pretty vanilla, too. I tend to wrap most things into > VPNs, even things which already use crypto. Well, yeah, they can > read this letter just fine by packet timing (given that I ssh > into a vserver) -- assuming the link is not idle. Why can't they wait a few minutes to read your posts from their in-house cypherpunks feed? -- The six phases of a project: I. Enthusiasm. IV. Search for the Guilty. II. Disillusionment. V. Punishment of the Innocent. III. Panic. VI. Praise & Honor for the Nonparticipants. From declan at well.com Wed Apr 12 12:05:10 2006 From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 12:05:10 -0700 Subject: [Politech] DC area only: Computer security for activists workshop in Baltimore this evening [priv] Message-ID: -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Computer Security for Activists Workshop #2 (Baltimore, MD) Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2006 11:56:16 -0400 (EDT) From: Rob Carlson Organization: vees.net To: Declan McCullagh This is mainly a Baltimore/DC item, but I think that subset of your Politech readers would find it appealing. Workshop #2: Security Mindset When: Wednesday, April 12, 2006 7:00 PM Where: Red Emma's Bookstore Coffeehouse 800 Saint Paul Street Baltimore, MD 410-230-0450 Concerned about online security culture? Worried about your privacy and anonymity as an activist? Curious about the technical aspects of government surveillance of the internet? This second workshop in our "Computer Security for Activists" series will focus on thinking in a security mindset and understanding the big picture of keeping secrets secret. Major topics: -Identifying Interception Points (Group Exercise) -Basic Threat Assessment (Group Exercise) -Understand the Law Enforcement Point of View -Thinking Outside the Beige Box -Understanding Trust For more information, see www.redemmas.org or e-mail rob at vees.net. This event is free and open to the public and no technical background is required. It is not necessary to have attended Workshop #1 to enjoy this one. Please buy and enjoy the fair trade coffees and peruse the books of our gracious host. Also, Richard Stallman has tentatively confirmed to be a speaker for the Mid-Atlantic Radical Bookfair which will be held just a block away from Red Emma's at CENTERSTAGE on Friday, June 30 through Sunday, July 2, 2006. For more information on the Bookfair, see: http://redemmas.org/bookfair/2006/section/main Rob -- Rob Carlson rob at vees.net http://vees.net/ _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From declan at well.com Wed Apr 12 12:06:29 2006 From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 12:06:29 -0700 Subject: [Politech] Texas government targets peer-to-peer software use on state computers [ip] Message-ID: Excerpt: "The Department of Information Resources shall develop a statewide policy for use by each state agency, department, board, and commission which prohibits unauthorized or illegal use of peer-to-peer software programs." -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Texas peer to peer policy Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2006 09:54:01 -0500 From: James Henson To: 'Declan McCullagh' Declan - Maybe of some interest to Politechers. http://www.governor.state.tx.us/divisions/press/exorders/rp58 Best - Jim Henson James Henson, Ph.D. Executive Producer, Texas Politics 512.471-0090 http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From eugen at leitl.org Wed Apr 12 04:11:47 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 13:11:47 +0200 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: References: <4ef5fec60604111245g6617e145nc9f0a2a358bdb6da@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20060412111147.GX31486@leitl.org> On Tue, Apr 11, 2006 at 09:37:15PM -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: > >in any case, i'd like to see encryption become the norm for even > >trivial communications. like the Azureus enhancements Steve mentioned > >this can be done in a simple and intuitive manner - it will just take > >a lot of effort... > > Absolutely. This was another idea we kicked around on Cypherpunks > briefly...like spreading some kind of virus that will encrypt P2P traffic. > Of course, many people won't even notice the virus is there, which is cool. An interesting way to increase background encrypted traffic and bypassing NAT tunneling braindeadness is to package the crypto inside the consumer router brick. I've just reflashed a couple Linksys WRT54GS with OpenWRT, and OpenVPN and Tor are in the standard package depository (there are many others, including Asterisk). The hardware is so cheap that you could easily distribute preflashed routers to end users as authentication token and part of a darknet-like product. Some of the Linksys even have crypto accelerators (largely 3DES, I think). I'm not sure how much this is supported already. -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From eugen at leitl.org Wed Apr 12 04:35:15 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 13:35:15 +0200 Subject: [Details on the AT&T/NSA wiretapping] In-Reply-To: <20060412110504.GA16969@arion.hive> References: <4ef5fec60604101256k37fffe8cv3a374925ed86ab53@mail.gmail.com> <6.0.1.1.0.20060411095932.0555bd98@mail.comcast.net> <20060412071259.GD31486@leitl.org> <20060412110504.GA16969@arion.hive> Message-ID: <20060412113515.GB31486@leitl.org> On Wed, Apr 12, 2006 at 11:05:04AM +0000, Justin wrote: > > VPNs are now pretty vanilla, too. I tend to wrap most things into > > VPNs, even things which already use crypto. Well, yeah, they can > > read this letter just fine by packet timing (given that I ssh > > into a vserver) -- assuming the link is not idle. > > Why can't they wait a few minutes to read your posts from their in-house > cypherpunks feed? You are flattering yourself. This list is not all that interesting. Even less so, since the usual suspects have moved on (to bigger and better things, I hope). But picking off things off ssh sessions based on a typing timing model is something quite easy, so I wouldn't be surprised if it happens on a large scale. Btw, in an unrelated vein there are distinct trends in capabilities in Riddle Palace/Body of Secrets, which can be extrapolated to today. -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From eugen at leitl.org Wed Apr 12 09:35:35 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 18:35:35 +0200 Subject: [edrigram@edri.org: EDRI-gram newsletter - Number 4.7, 12 April 2006] Message-ID: <20060412163535.GH31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from EDRI-gram newsletter ----- From edrigram at edri.org Wed Apr 12 09:09:41 2006 From: edrigram at edri.org (EDRI-gram newsletter) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 19:09:41 +0300 Subject: EDRI-gram newsletter - Number 4.7, 12 April 2006 Message-ID: ============================================================ EDRI-gram biweekly newsletter about digital civil rights in Europe Number 4.7, 12 April 2006 ============================================================ Contents ============================================================ 1. Article 29 asks for safeguards on data retention 2. US wants access to retained traffic data 3. Free parental control software in France 4. Changes in the Slovenian Intelligence Agency Act 5. Lie detectors in Russian airports 6. UK teachers are spied in classrooms 7. Legal actions against file-sharers in Europe 8. Recommended reading 9. Agenda 10. About ============================================================ 1. Article 29 asks for safeguards on data retention ============================================================ Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has adopted its opinion on data retention directive as adopted by the Council on 21 February 2006, pointing out major criticism to the adoption and to the present text agreed by the Parliament. The Working Party recalls its previous concerns and reservations expressed in its last Opinion 113 of 21 October 2005 on the then draft Directive. The decision to retain communication data for the purpose of combating serious crime was considered as an unprecedented one that may endanger the fundamental values and freedoms all European citizens. The privacy experts consider of utmost importance that the Directive is implemented and accompanied in each Member State by measures protecting privacy. The Directive leaves room for interpretation and therefore adequate and specific safeguards are necessary to protect the vital interests of the individual, mainly the right to confidentiality when using publicly available electronic communications services. The Working Party also thinks the provisions of the Directive should be interpreted and implemented in a harmonised way and proposes a uniform, European-wide implementation of the Directive that would respect the highest level possible of personal data protection. This should also be done in order to reduce the considerable costs borne by the service providers when complying with the Directive. Article 29 is suggesting that the member states should implement adequate safeguards at least on Purpose specification, Access limitation, Data minimization, Data mining, Judicial/ independent scrutiny of authorized access, Retention purposes of providers, System separation and Security measures. The data retention directive is heavily criticized also by other privacy authorities. Peter Hustinx, the European data protection supervisor considered the lawmakers had not protected the privacy of Europeans. His opinion is that "The data retention directive - turned the rules upside down. We were not very pleased with that - we still think there is too little in terms of safeguards." Hustinx also stated: "I believe that politicians, people - you, I, everyone else - have to be aware of the real threats. At the same time, that is not going to justify disproportionate solutions - it is going to hurt the texture of trust and confidence... I think we have reached a point that more and more people start wondering whether legislation is getting excessive and that is a good thing. We have to build in safeguards and keep asking the question of 'is this necessary?'" Opinion 3/2006 on the Directive 2006/XX/EC on the retention of data processed in connection with the provision of public electronic communication services (25.03.2006) http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp119_en. pdf Tech must not invade privacy, says EU data protection head (7.04.2006) http://www.silicon.com/0,39024729,39157943,00.htm EDRI-gram : Opinion EU privacy authorities on data retention (17.11.2004) http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number2.22/dataretention EDRI-gram : Renewed rejection of data retention by European institutions (5.10.2005) http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number3.20/retention ============================================================ 2. US wants access to retained traffic data ============================================================ Unites States has indicated in a recent meeting with the EU Council that it will be interested in accessing the traffic data collected by the European countries according with the recent Directive on Data Retention. Also the US officials expressed concerns over the draft Framework Decision on Data Protection. During the EU-US informal High Level meeting on Freedom, Security and Justice on 2-3 March 2006, in Vienna, the US officials mentioned in the context of fighting terrorist use of Internet that they were "considering approaching each Member State to ensure that the data collected on the basis of the recently adopted Directive on data retention be accessible to them." The Presidency and the Commission replied that these data were accessible like any other data on the basis of the existing MLA agreements (bilateral as well as EU/US agreement). The Commission would convene an expert meeting on this subject. During the same meeting the US officials lobbied against the provisions in article 15 of the proposal for a framework decision on the protection of personal data processed in the third pillar. " US side expressed serious concerns about the negative impact that the draft Framework Decision on data protection would have on its bilateral relations with Member States if it was to be adopted in its present form (see in particular Article 15 of the draft). The Presidency indicated that agreements already concluded would not be affected by the new legislation. In addition, Member States were divided on the need for such a provision." Article 15 refers to Transfer to competent authorities in third countries or to international bodies. The Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters was initiated in October 2005 when a draft version was sent to the Council. Opinions on the draft have been received from the European Data Protection Supervisor, Conference of European Data Protection Authorities and European member countries. A new version of the Decision, still under discussion within the Multidisciplinary group on organised crime (MDG) - Mixed Committee, was published by Statewatch at the end of March 2006. The conclusions of the G6 of interior ministers of the EU call for a rapid adoption of the framework decision on the sharing of information under the availability principle in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, i.e. without waiting for the third pillar data protection framework decision. This would constitute a serious unbalance with regard to the processing of personal information under the third pillar. Tony Bunyan, Statewatch editor, commented " in other words state agencies should be allowed to exchange information and "intelligence" without any data protection rights for the individual being in place." EU Council: Report of the EU-US informal High Level meeting on Freedom, Security and Justice on 2-3 March 2006 in Vienna (27.03.2006) http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/apr/eu-us-jha-7618-06.pdf Data Protection, EU doc no 6450/1/06, REV 1 (23.03.2006) http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/mar/eu-dp-coun-draft-pos-6450-rev1-06.pdf EDRI-gram : Draft directive data protection in EU police co-operation (21.09.2005) http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number3.19/dataprotection Conclusions of the Meeting of the Interior Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom, Heiligendamm (23.03.2006) http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/mar/06eu-interior-minister-conclusions.ht m ============================================================ 3. Free parental control software in France ============================================================ As a result of the agreement signed between the French ISPs and the Ministry of the Family on 16 November 2005, starting with 1 April 2006, most of the ISPs started providing a free of charge parental control software to their subscribers. The agreement signed between ISPs and the French authorities has followed strong protests relayed in the media, after EDRi-member IRIS unveiled in September 2005 the intention of the government to impose by law "by default" filtering by ISPs for the purpose of parental control. After this, the intentions of the government have been downsized excluding " by default" parental control installed by the ISP. The current agreement still raises many concerns, especially since no real information is provided on the software and its criteria. Starting with 1 April 2006 new subscribers will have the software included in the connection kit with a window opening automatically on the software. Previous complaints addressed the lack of simple access to such kind of software as well as to their insufficient efficiency. For the old subscribers, the ISPs will develop an information campaign through e-mails, newsletters and on their home pages and those interested will be able to get the software from their access provider's site. Several providers are already in the position to provide the software while others are on the point of perfecting their parental control system. Providers like AOL, already advanced in this direction, can ensure various profiles according the child's age, with semantic filtering, more efficient than the URL filtering systems. Other providers like Wanadoo are clearly asking any new subscriber, when installing the connection kit, whether the filtering software should be installed or not. As regards to the software it seems that many ISPs are using the one developed (and updated with lists) by a Spanish company, Optenet. This company has signed a contract with the French Ministry of Education last April. Meryem Marzouki from EDRi-member IRIS notes that "very little information is provided to the user about who chooses the predefined white and black lists, according to which criteria etc. Also, no information is provided on the "plain language" analysis of websites, which are neither on white lists nor on black lists. " The ISPs filter more the Internet (in French only, 4.04.2006) http://www.01net.com/editorial/311150/securite/les-fai-filtrent-plus-net/ Mandatory and free of charge parental control on the Internet (in French only, 16.11.2005) http://www.01net.com/article/295101.html Automatic filtering of contents : the moral order toughens (in French only, 16.09.2005) http://www.iris.sgdg.org/info-debat/comm-filtrage0905.html ============================================================ 4. Changes in the Slovenian Intelligence Agency Act ============================================================ The proposed changes of Slovenian Intelligence Agency Act (ZSOVA) raised questions about its unconstitutionality. The government would like to exclude the current 6-month limitation for use of special operative methods, e.g. mail monitoring, recording of telephone conversations etc. The Government invoked cooperation with EU and NATO in the fight against terrorism as the reason for the proposed changes. There are two main changes being proposed. According to the first one, the competence to ordain measures that invade individual's information privacy would be transferred from the president of Ljubljana Circuit Court to the president of the Slovenian Supreme Court. Legal experts find this solution better, but still not optimal, as the decision-making is still in the hands of one single person. A panel of 3 Supreme Court judges would be a better option. The second and most important change is the exclusion of the current 6-month limitation for the concentrated and continuous monitoring of telecommunications. If the proposed changes pass through the Parliament, the Slovenian Intelligence agency (SOVA) will theoretically be able to perform surveillance over individual's communications for months, years or even decades. Under the current legislation, SOVA may monitor written correspondence and record telephone conversations (of individuals that may pose a threat for national security) for the maximum period of 3 months. Exceptionally, the duration of surveillance may be extended for a month each time, but the total duration must not exceed 6 months. According to the proposed changes to the Slovenian Intelligence Agency Act, the President of Slovenian Supreme Court would be authorised to extend the duration of measures for another 3 months each time, without any limitation of total duration. According to Goran Klemencic from the Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, the proposed change violates article 37 of the Slovenian Constitution, which says that encroachment upon individual's right to privacy of correspondence and other means of communication may "be suspended for a period of time where it is so necessary for criminal proceedings or national security." Besides, Klemencic says that such a solution would also be disproportionate (regardless of court warrant), as "it cannot be admissible that law enables unlimited concentrated surveillance of an individual". This act broadens the power of the Slovenian Military Intelligence Agency, as well. The government wants the Parliament to discuss and pass the proposed changes using the quick procedure option, where the possibilities for extending discussions and filing amendments are vastly reduced. Longer time of secret surveillance? (only in Slovenian, 14.03.2006) http://www.privacyblog.net/index.php?p=151 Changes to Slovenian Intelligence Agency Act - Will SOVA be able to perform continuous eavesdropping (only in Slovenian, 16.03.2006) http://www.slo-tech.com/script/forum/izpisitemo.php?threadID=211601#neprebran o Contestable Slovenian Intelligence Agency Act (only in Slovenian, 14.03.2006) http://24ur.com/bin/article.php?article_id=3070870 (Contribution by Aljaz Marn, EDRI observer, privacyblog.net, Slovenia) ============================================================ 5. Lie detectors in Russian airports ============================================================ Lie detectors will be used in Russian airports as part of the security measures starting with July 2006. Meant to identify terrorists or other types of criminals, a lie-detecting device developed in Israel, known as "truth verifier," will be first introduced in Moscow's Domodedovo airport as early as July. The technology, already used by UK insurance companies, is said to be able to detect answers coming from imagination or memory. The passengers will use a handset to answer four questions right after the X-ray check of luggage and shoes and in the beginning, only the suspicious passengers will take the test. Those failing the test will be further on interrogated in a separate cubicle as Vladimir Kornilov, the IT director for East Line, said. Eventually the procedure will be used for all passengers. Officials state that the process should not exceed a minute per passenger. Airline passengers face lie detector tests (6.04.2006) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/04/06/wlie06.xml ============================================================ 6. UK teachers are spied in classrooms ============================================================ Teachers protest against the installation of 50 CCTV systems with microphones in UK schools, used as surveillance measures by the school management. While observation in class was supposed to help teachers in improving their performances, the headmasters, who have also used two-way mirrors to survey the teachers, grade them according to the way they perform in class under observation. TES (The Times Educational Supplement) reported on 7 April that teachers were being "observed to death" and that surveillance was being used more like a punishment. Observed lessons are often graded on a scale of outstanding to poor. The National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers (NASUWT), the largest teachers' union in UK, has proposed a conference motion to use "all means necessary" to stop the "yet another example of management bullying". NASUWT survey has found out that one in five teachers was observed more than six times last year. The union also expressed disagreement on the short notice given to some teachers on the installation of surveillance devices. Mary Bousted, general secretary of the Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL), said she had met an Oxford graduate having quitted teaching after only a year for having been officially observed at least once every three weeks,". Heads spy on teachers (10.04.2006) http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/10/cctv_teachers/ Teachers revolt against spy in the classroom (7.04.2006) http://www.tes.co.uk/2216214 ============================================================ 7. Legal actions against file-sharers in Europe ============================================================ About 2000 new legal actions are taken in 10 countries by the International Federation of Phonographic Industry (IFPI) against file-sharers amounting now to a total number of 5500 cases outside US. IFPI persists in its actions against uploaders, stating it targets persistent file-sharers, who typically upload thousands of music files. "The campaign started in major music markets where sales were falling sharply; now these legal actions have spread to smaller markets." said John Kennedy, the chairman and chief executive of IFPI. In UK only, where the music industry states a loss of over #1.1bn over the last three years, there are 153 ongoing cases. The first cases have occurred in Portugal as well where the IFPI states sales of tradition al music formats have fallen by 40% in the last four years. Geoff Taylor, IFPI general counsel and executive vice president said the action was aimed at uploaders, but downloaders had to be reminded that their actions were also illegal and also predicted that the copyright owners would go after ISPs as well as users. The IFPI is also keen in warning parents that they are responsible for their children's online activities. As an example, last year Sylvia Price was fined #2,500 after her 14-year-old daughter was accused of sharing music on the internet. If the IFPI wins the cases, the defendants could end up paying several thousand euros. On average, those settling with the IFPI pay around 2,633 euros. Although the industry says that these cases are helping to win the war on illegal file-sharers and are encouraging people to use legal services, a report suggests that illegal downloads keep growing in spite of the legal risks. IFPI bases its actions on a report made by Jupiter Research stating 35% illegal file-sharers have reduced and even stopped while only 14% of them increased their activity and the legal actions were the main reasons for those who stopped their illegal music consumption. However, XTN data, a research firm, suggested in its report that fear of legal action was the least effective in encouraging people to use commercial services and that more efficient measures would be cheaper prices, the removal of digital rights management (DRM), and more user-friendly services. "Clunky software, difficulty in finding tracks and over zealous protection limiting where customers can play music they've bought are continuing to fuel file-sharing," said Greig Harper, founder of XTN Data. He also said: "We're the only big, anonymous UK survey - I'd be surprised if people were so honest to an organisation interested in suing them. There are probably seven million people in the UK file sharing to some extent, even if it's just picking up a track once a month, so legal action against so many people isn't really a realistic option." File-sharers face legal onslaught (4.04.2006) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4875142.stm 2000 cases against the P2P-ers (in French only, 5.04.2006) http://www.ratiatum.com/news3002_2000_plaintes_contre_des_P2Pistes.html U.K. music biz vexed by file sharing (4.04.2006) http://news.com.com/2100-1025_3-6057571.html Thousands more file sharers sued (4.04.2006) http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/04/ifpi_sues_more_people/ ============================================================ 8. Recommended reading ============================================================ Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and all forms of Discrimination: Comprehensive Implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action - Report of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action on its fourth session. The report contains the all presentations, discussions, conclusions from the Chair and final recommendations from the High Level Seminar on Racism and the Internet that took place during 16-17 January 2006. Full report (20.03.2006) http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/docs/62chr/E.CN.4.2006.18.pdf EDRI-gram : Combating Racism on Internet http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number4.2/internetracism ============================================================ 9. Agenda ============================================================ 12 April 2006, Dublin, Ireland Royal Irish Academy "Enabling Open Access to Scientific Data and Information within the Modern Knowledge Economy; the Case for a Scientific Commons" http://www.codataweb.org/codata-ria/ 15 April 2006, Deadline funding applications Civil rights organisations and initiatives are invited to send funding applications to the German foundation 'Bridge - B|rgerrechte in der digitalen Gesellschaft'. A total of 15 000 euro is available for applications that promote civil rights in the digitised society. http://www.stiftung-bridge.de 21-23 April 2006, Yale Law School, USA Access to Knowledge Conference Yale Information Society Project http://islandia.law.yale.edu/isp/a2kconfmain.html 27-28 April 2006, Washington, USA IP Disputes of the Future - TACD This conference will ask what will be the IP disputes in new fields of technology, and how advances in biotechnology and information technologies will change the nature of IP disputes. http://www.tacd.org/docs/?id=287 30 April - 2 May 2006, Hamburg, Germany LSPI Conference 2006 The First International Conference on Legal, Security and Privacy Issues in IT http://www.kierkegaard.co.uk/ 2-5 May 2006, Washington, USA CFP2006 The Sixteenth Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy http://www.cfp2006.org 3-6 May 2006, Wiesbaden, Germany LinuxTag - Europe's biggest fair and congress around free software http://www.linuxtag.org 10 May - 23 July 2006, Austria Annual decentralized community event around free software lectures, panel discussions, workshops, fairs and socialising http://www.linuxwochen.at 19 - 23 May 2006, Geneva, Switzerland A new round of consultations on the convening of the Internet Governance Forum will be held at the United Nations in Geneva on 19 May. The consultations will be followed by a meeting of the IGF Advisory Group on 22 - 23 May 2006. http://www.intgovforum.org 19-20 May 2006, Florence, Italy E-privacy 2006 Trusted Computing, Data retention: privacy between new technologies and new laws. The central theme of this year's edition is data retention, but several interventions on other relevant aspects of privacy protection are planned, including Trusted Computing and the new issues raised by the draft reform of Italian Criminal Law, with specific reference to Cybercrime. http://e-privacy.firenze.linux.it 20 May 2006, Florence, Italy Big Brother Award Italia 2006 Nominations accepted until 21 April 2006 http://bba.winstonsmith.info 21 June 2006, Luxembourg Safer Internet Forum 2006 Focus on two topics: "Children's use of new media" and "Blocking access to illegal content: child sexual abuse images" http://europa.eu.int/information_society/activities/sip/si_forum/forum... 26-27 June 2006, Berlin, Germany The Rising Power of Search-Engines on the Internet: Impacts on Users, Media Policy, and Media Business http://www.uni-leipzig.de/journalistik/suma/home_e.html 16 - 28 July 2006, Oxford, UK Annenberg/Oxford Summer Institute: Global Media Policy: Technology and New Themes in Media Regulation Application deadline 1 May 2006. http://www.pgcs.asc.upenn.edu/events/ox06/index.php 2-4 August 2006, Bregenz, Austria 2nd International Workshop on Electronic Voting 2006 Students may apply for funds to attend the workshop until 30 June 2006. http://www.e-voting.cc/stories/1246056/ =========================================================== 10. About =========================================================== EDRI-gram is a biweekly newsletter about digital civil rights in Europe. Currently EDRI has 21 members from 14 European countries and 5 observers from 5 more countries (Italy, Ireland, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia). European Digital Rights takes an active interest in developments in the EU accession countries and wants to share knowledge and awareness through the EDRI-grams. All contributions, suggestions for content, corrections or agenda-tips are most welcome. Errors are corrected as soon as possible and visibly on the EDRI website. Except where otherwise noted, this newsletter is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 License. See the full text at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/ Newsletter editor: Bogdan Manolea Information about EDRI and its members: http://www.edri.org/ - EDRI-gram subscription information subscribe by e-mail To: edri-news-request at edri.org Subject: subscribe You will receive an automated e-mail asking to confirm your request. unsubscribe by e-mail To: edri-news-request at edri.org Subject: unsubscribe - EDRI-gram in Macedonian EDRI-gram is also available partly in Macedonian, with delay. Translations are provided by Metamorphosis http://www.metamorphosis.org.mk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=626 &Itemid=4&lang=mk - Newsletter archive Back issues are available at: http://www.edri.org/edrigram - Help Please ask if you have any problems with subscribing or unsubscribing. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From absent00 at ameritrade.com Wed Apr 12 18:53:09 2006 From: absent00 at ameritrade.com (Ina Frost) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 19:53:09 -0600 Subject: Mortagge ratee approvedd Message-ID: <798e394w.2061244@hotmail.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1164 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: excavate.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From sbrown at chicoer.com Wed Apr 12 18:56:19 2006 From: sbrown at chicoer.com (Ava Fields) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 19:56:19 -0600 Subject: Re-finance before rates skyrocket Message-ID: <210u559a.5135591@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1197 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: runaway.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Wed Apr 12 14:22:47 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 23:22:47 +0200 Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] Texas government targets peer-to-peer software use on state computers [ip]] Message-ID: <20060412212247.GV31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh ----- From eugen at leitl.org Wed Apr 12 14:24:49 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2006 23:24:49 +0200 Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] DC area only: Computer security for activists workshop in Baltimore this evening [priv]] Message-ID: <20060412212448.GX31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh ----- From arrakistor at gmail.com Wed Apr 12 17:16:21 2006 From: arrakistor at gmail.com (Arrakistor) Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2006 01:16:21 +0100 Subject: Torpark v.1.5.0.3 pre-release Message-ID: Howdy all, New version of Torpark available. Here is the english demo without NoScript. I'll have the rest of the packages built a little later. Let me know if you find any bugs. Also, if anyone has win95 or win98 running, I would be interested to find out how it turns out. Changes: - Using Tor v0.1.1.18 - Tor log file is written to the temp directory while Torpark is running. - all plugins now write to the executable temp direcory instead of the local directory. Directory is deleted when Torpark exits. - ExecDos.dll garbage bug fixed - NoScript WILL be added for this next version, as javascript sites have been quietly loading disallowed flash plugins, compromising security. - Torpark is again, smaller and faster. New splash as well. Download here: http://omega.uta.edu/~sxt6146/torpark_1.5.0.3_demo.exe Regards, Steve Topletz ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From john at grouppartners.net Thu Apr 13 03:52:39 2006 From: john at grouppartners.net (John Caswell) Date: April 13, 2006 3:52:39 AM EDT Subject: Freedom reductions thru ID cards Message-ID: Might contain some new news and be of interest regarding the continued debate in UK ID cards...Dave keep up the excellent work...John .................................................................. ......... Apologies if you've received this already, but as you'll agree it makes alarming reading. Something to write to your MP about. This was written originally by Francis Stonor Saunders. Frances Stonor Saunders is the former arts editor of The New Statesman, author of The Cultural Cold War, Diabolical Englishman and The Devil's Broker and was awarded the Royal Historical Society's William Gladstone Memorial Prize. She lives in London. "You may have heard that legislation creating compulsory ID Cards passed a crucial stage in the House of Commons. You may feel that ID cards are not something to worry about, since we already have Photo ID for our Passport and Driving License and an ID Card will be no different to that. What you have not been told is the full scope of this proposed ID Card, and what it will mean to you personally. The proposed ID Card will be different from any card you now hold. It will be connected to a database called the NIR, (National Identity Register), where all of your personal details will be stored. This will include the unique number that will be issued to you, your fingerprints, a scan of the back of your eye, and your photograph. Your name, address and date of birth will also obviously be stored there. There will be spaces on this database for your religion, residence status, and many other private and personal facts about you. There is unlimited space for every other details of your life on the NIR database, which can be expanded by the Government with or without further Acts of Parliament. By itself, you might think that this register is harmless, but you would be wrong to come to this conclusion. This new card will be used to check your identity against your entry in the register in real time, whenever you present it to 'prove who you are'. Every place that sells alcohol or cigarettes, every post office, every pharmacy, and every Bank will have an NIR Card Terminal, (very much like the Chip and Pin Readers that are everywhere now) into which your card can be 'swiped' to check your identity. Each time this happens, a record is made at the NIR of the time and place that the Card was presented. This means for example, that there will be a government record of every time you withdraw more than #99 at your branch of NatWest, who now demand ID for these transactions. Every time you have to prove that you are over 18, your card will be swiped, and a record made at the NIR. Restaurants and off licenses will demand that your card is swiped so that each receipt shows that they sold alcohol to someone over 18, and that this was proved by the access to the NIR, indemnifying them from prosecution. Private businesses are going to be given access to the NIR Database. If you want to apply for a job, you will have to present your card fora swipe. If you want to apply for a London Underground Oyster Card, or a supermarket loyalty card, or a driving license you will have to present your ID Card for a swipe. The same goes for getting a telephone line or a mobile phone or an internet account. Oyster, DVLA, BT and Nectar (for example) all run very detailed databases of their own. They will be allowed access to the NIR, just as every other business will be. This means that each of these entities will be able to store your unique number in their database, and place all your travel, phone records, driving activities and detailed shopping habits under your unique NIR number. These databases, which can easily fit on a storage device the size of your hand, will be sold to third parties either legally or illegally. It will then be possible for a non-governmental entity to create a detailed dossier of all your activities. Certainly, the government will have clandestine access to all of them, meaning that they will have a complete record of all your movements, from how much and when you withdraw from your bank account to what medications you are taking, down to the level of what sort of bread you eat - all accessible via a single unique number in a central database. This is quite a significant leap from a simple ID Card that shows your name and face. Most people do not know that this is the true character and scope of the proposed ID Card. Whenever the details of how it will work are explained to them, they quickly change from being ambivalent towards it. The Government is going to COMPEL you to enter your details into the NIR and to carry this card. If you and your children want to obtain or renew your passports, you will be forced to have your fingerprints taken and your eyes scanned for the NIR, and an ID Card will be issued to you whether you want one or not. If you refuse to be fingerprinted and eye scanned, you will not be able to get a passport. Your ID Card will, just like your passport, not be your property. The Home Secretary will have the right to revoke or suspend your ID at any time, meaning that you will not be able to withdraw money from your Bank Account, for example, or do anything that requires you to present your government issued ID Card. The arguments that have been put forwarded in favour of ID Cards can be easily disproved. ID Cards WILL NOT stop terrorists; every Spaniard has a compulsory ID Card as did the Madrid Bombers. ID Cards will not 'eliminate benefit fraud', which in comparison, is small compared to the astronomical cost of this proposal, which will be measured in billions according to the LSE (London School of Economics). This scheme exists solely to exert total surveillance and control over the ordinary free British Citizen, and it will line the pockets of the companies that will create the computer systems at the expense of your freedom, privacy and money. If you did not know the full scope of the proposed ID Card Scheme before and you are as unsettled as I am at what it really means to you, to this country and its way of life, I urge you to email or photocopy this and give it to your friends and colleagues and everyone else you think should know and who cares. The Bill has proceeded to this stage due to the lack of accurate and complete information on this proposal being made public. Together & hand in hand, we can inform the entire nation if everyone who receives this passes it on." John Caswell G R O U P P A R T N E R S ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ THE JC BLOG http://contextualframeworking.blogspot.com/ PA Amanda Bravo +44 (0) 787 964 8080 amanda at grouppartners.net Mobile: +44 (0) 778 571 6770 Group Partners Europe 32 St James's Street, London, SW1A 1HD. +44 (0) 20 7925 2111 Group Partners America 15455 North Dallas Parkway, Suite 600, Addison Texas 75001 +1 972-764-3131 fax +1 972-764-5101. Fast Guide: http://www.grouppartners.net/downloads/documents/ publicdocs/GP_THINK_booklet.pdf Web Site: http://www.grouppartners.net "Helping our clients avoid solving the wrong problem really well" ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From dave at farber.net Thu Apr 13 04:09:13 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2006 07:09:13 -0400 Subject: [IP] Freedom reductions thru ID cards Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: From perry at piermont.com Thu Apr 13 05:44:21 2006 From: perry at piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger) Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2006 08:44:21 -0400 Subject: NY Times reports: Documents show link between AT&T and NSA Message-ID: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/us/nationalspecial3/13nsa.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------ April 13, 2006 Documents Show Link Between AT&T and Agency in Eavesdropping Case By JOHN MARKOFF and SCOTT SHANE SAN FRANCISCO, April 12 Mark Klein was a veteran AT&T technician in 2002 when he began to see what he thought were suspicious connections between that telecommunications giant and the National Security Agency. But he kept quiet about it until news broke late last year that President Bush had approved an N.S.A. program to eavesdrop without court warrants on Americans suspected of ties to Al Qaeda. Now Mr. Klein and a few company documents he saved have emerged as key elements in a class-action lawsuit filed against AT&T on Jan. 31 by a civil liberties group, the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The suit accuses the company of helping the security agency invade its customers' privacy. Mr. Klein's account and the documents provide new details about how the agency works with the private sector in intercepting communications for intelligence purposes. The documents, some of which Mr. Klein had earlier provided to reporters, describe a mysterious room at the AT&T Internet and telephone hub in San Francisco where he worked. The documents, which were examined by four independent telecommunications and computer security experts at the request of The New York Times, describe equipment capable of monitoring a large quantity of e-mail messages, Internet phone calls, and other Internet traffic. The equipment, which Mr. Klein said was installed by AT&T in 2003, was able to select messages that could be identified by keywords, Internet or e-mail addresses or country of origin and divert copies to another location for further analysis. The security agency began eavesdropping without warrants on international phone calls and e-mail messages of people inside the United States suspected of terrorist links soon after the Sept. 11 attacks. After disclosing the program last December, The New York Times also reported that the agency had gathered data from phone and e-mail traffic with the cooperation of several major telecommunications companies. The technical experts all said that the documents showed that AT&T had an agreement with the federal government to systematically gather information flowing on the Internet through the company's network. The gathering of such information, known as data mining, involves the use of sophisticated computer programs to detect patterns or glean useful intelligence from masses of information. "This took expert planning and hundreds of millions of dollars to build," said Brian Reid, director of engineering at the Internet Systems Consortium in Redwood City, Calif. "This is the correct way to do high volume Internet snooping." Another expert, who had designed large federal and commercial data networks, said that the documents were consistent with administration assertions that the N.S.A. monitored only foreign communications and communications between foreign and United States locations, partly because of the location of the monitoring sites. The network designer was granted anonymity because he believed that commenting on the operation could affect his ability to work as a consultant. The documents referred to a second location, in Atlanta, and suggested similar rooms might exist at other AT&T switching sites. Mr. Klein said other AT&T technicians had told him of such installations in San Jose, Calif.; Los Angeles; San Diego; and Seattle. The Internet hubs there carry a significant amount of international traffic. The network designer and other experts said it would be a simple technical matter to reprogram the equipment to intercept purely domestic Internet traffic. The Department of Justice initially asked the Electronic Frontier Foundation not to file Mr. Klein's documents in court, but a review determined that they were not classified and the government dropped its objection. The foundation filed the documents under seal because of concern about releasing proprietary information. On Monday, AT&T filed a motion with a federal judge in San Francisco asking the court to order the foundation to return the documents because they were proprietary. The documents showed that the room in San Francisco, which Mr. Klein says was off-limits to most employees but serviced by a company technician working with the security agency, contained computerized equipment that could sift through immense volumes of traffic as it passed through the cables of AT&T's WorldNet Internet service. According to the documents, e-mail messages and other data carried by 16 other commercial Internet providers reached AT&T customers through the San Francisco hub. One piece of filtering equipment described in the documents was manufactured by Narus, based in Mountain View, Calif. The equipment could be programmed to identify and intercept voice or data conversations between e-mail, telephone or Internet addresses, said Steve Bannerman, the company's vice president for marketing. Buyers included companies trying to comply with the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which requires that communications systems have a wiretapping capability built in. Typically, law enforcement interceptions are done on a case by case basis and require warrants. Mr. Bannerman said he could not comment further because Narus had not announced any sales to the federal government. William P. Crowell, a former deputy director of the N.S.A, is on the Narus board. In an interview, Mr. Klein said he did not have a security clearance but had witnessed interactions between colleagues who did have clearances and the highly secretive N.S.A. "It was strange and sort of suspicious," he said. Mr. Klein said he learned of an agency connection to the mysterious room in 2002 when a company manager told him to expect a visit from an N.S.A. official who wanted to speak with another senior company technician about "a special job." That technician later installed the equipment in the room, he said. Based on his observations and technical knowledge, Mr. Klein concluded that the equipment permitted "vacuum-cleaner surveillance" of Internet traffic. Mr. Klein, 60, who retired in 2004 after 23 years with AT&T and lives near Oakland, Calif., said he decided to make his observations known because he believed the government's monitoring was violating Americans' civil liberties. An AT&T spokesman at the company's corporate headquarters in San Antonio declined to comment on Mr. Klein's statements. "AT&T does follow all laws with respect to assistance offered to government agencies," said Walt Sharp, the AT&T spokesman. "However, we are not in a position to comment on matters of national security." Asked to comment, Don Weber, a spokesman for the N.S.A., said, "It would be irresponsible of us to discuss actual or alleged operational issues as it would give those wishing to do harm to the United States the ability to adjust and potentially inflict harm." John Markoff reported from San Francisco for this article, and Scott Shane from Washington. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From eugen at leitl.org Wed Apr 12 23:51:18 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2006 08:51:18 +0200 Subject: [arrakistor@gmail.com: Torpark v.1.5.0.3 pre-release] Message-ID: <20060413065118.GB31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Arrakistor ----- From eugen at leitl.org Thu Apr 13 04:24:28 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2006 13:24:28 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Freedom reductions thru ID cards] Message-ID: <20060413112428.GQ31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From eugen at leitl.org Thu Apr 13 06:52:43 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2006 15:52:43 +0200 Subject: [perry@piermont.com: NY Times reports: Documents show link between AT&T and NSA] Message-ID: <20060413135243.GX31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from "Perry E. Metzger" ----- From wuaic at telia.com Thu Apr 13 13:01:33 2006 From: wuaic at telia.com (Edmond Hutchins) Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2006 18:01:33 -0200 Subject: Fwd: The Gravitizer takes the gravity out of sex! Message-ID: rest of the pact. An academic researcher needs information to get out of supplying a new computer program. And that could take two to three I have been feeling quite uncomfortable trying to come up [Answer] We took the course that whoever writes should get information, -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 922 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: epitaxy.gif Type: image/gif Size: 17151 bytes Desc: not available URL: From pdoran at abacusinc.com Thu Apr 13 19:50:40 2006 From: pdoran at abacusinc.com (Lawanda Beaver) Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2006 18:50:40 -0800 Subject: Application approval #ZTWPJXL739852185 Message-ID: <768793378.4601768457936.JavaMail.ebayapp@sj-besreco395> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1033 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: topnotch.2.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8503 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Thu Apr 13 14:02:19 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2006 23:02:19 +0200 Subject: [>Htech] developing biological weapons Message-ID: http://www.technologyreview.com/BioTech/wtr_16485,306,p1.html?PM=GO The Knowledge Biotechnologybs advance could give malefactors the ability to manipulate life processes -- and even affect human behavior. By Mark Williams Editor's note: Conscious of the controversial nature of this article, Technology Review asked Allison Macfarlane, a research associate in the Science, Technology, and Global Security Working Group in MIT's Program in Science, Technology, and Society, to rebut its argument: see "Assessing the Threat." We were also careful to elide any recipes for developing a biological weapon. Such details as do appear have been published before, mainly in scientific journals. Last year, a likable and accomplished scientist named Serguei Popov, who for nearly two decades developed genetically engineered biological weapons for the Soviet Union, crossed the Potomac River to speak at a conference on bioterrorism in Washington, DC. Popov, now a professor at the National Center for Biodefense and Infectious Diseases at George Mason University, is tallish, with peaked eyebrows and Slavic cheekbones, and, at 55, has hair somewhere between sandy and faded ginger. He has an open, lucid gaze, and he is courteously soft-spoken. His career has been unusual by any standards. As a student in his native city of Novosibirsk, Siberia's capital, preparing his thesis on DNA synthesis, he read the latest English-language publications on the new molecular biology. After submitting his doctorate in 1976, he joined Biopreparat, the Soviet pharmaceutical agency that secretly developed biological weapons. There, he rose to become a department head in a comprehensive program to genetically engineer biological weapons. When the program was founded in the 1970s, its goal was to enhance classical agents of biological warfare for heightened pathogenicity and resistance to antibiotics; by the 1980s, it was creating new species of designer pathogens that would induce entirely novel symptoms in their victims. In 1979, Popov spent six months in Cambridge, England, studying the technologies of automated DNA sequencing and synthesis that were emerging in the West. That English visit, Popov recently told me, needed some arranging: "I possessed state secrets, so I could not travel abroad without a special decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. A special legend, essentially, that I was an ordinary scientist, was developed for me." The cover "legend" Popov's superiors provided proved useful in 1992, after the U.S.S.R. fell. When the Russian state stopped paying salaries, among those affected were the 30,000 scientists of Biopreparat. Broke, with a family to feed, Popov contacted his British friends, who arranged funding from the Royal Society, so he could do research in the United Kingdom. The KGB (whose control was in any case limited by then) let him leave Russia. Popov never returned. In England, he studied HIV for six months. In 1993, he moved to the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, whence he sent money so that his wife and children could join him. He remained in Texas until 2000, attracting little interest. "When I came to Texas, I decided to forget everything," Popov told me. "For seven years I did that. Now it's different. It's not because I like talking about it. But I see every day in publications that nobody knows what was done in the Soviet Union and how important that work was." Yet if Popov's appearance last year at the Washington conference is any indication, it will be difficult to convince policymakers and scientists of the relevance of the Soviet bioweaponeers' achievements. It wasn't only that Popov's audience in the high-ceilinged chamber of a Senate office building found the Soviets' ingenious applications of biological science morally repugnant and technically abstruse. Rather, what Popov said lay so far outside current arguments about biodefense that he sounded as if he had come from another planet. The conference's other speakers focused on the boom in U.S. biodefense spending since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax scare that same year. The bacteriologist Richard Ebright, a professor of chemistry and chemical biology at Rutgers University, fretted that the enormous increase in grants to study three of the category A bacterial agents (that is, anthrax, plague, and tularemia) drained money from basic research to fight existing epidemics. Ebright (who'd persuaded 758 other scientists to sign a letter of protest to Elias Zerhouni, the director of the National Institutes of Health) also charged that by promiscuously disseminating bioweaponeering knowledge and pathogen specimens to newly minted biodefense labs around the United States, "the NIH was funding a research and development arm of al-Qaeda." Another speaker, Milton Leitenberg, introduced as one of the grand old men of weapons control, was more splenetic. The current obsession with bioterrorism, the rumpled, grandfatherly Leitenberg insisted, was nonsense; the record showed that almost all bioweaponeering had been done by state governments and militaries. Such arguments are not without merit. So why do Serguei Popov's accounts of what the Russians assayed in the esoteric realm of genetically engineered bioweapons, using pre-genomic biotech, matter now? They matter because the Russians' achievements tell us what is possible. At least some of what the Soviet bioweaponeers did with difficulty and expense can now be done easily and cheaply. And all of what they accomplished can be duplicated with time and money. We live in a world where gene-sequencing equipment bought secondhand on eBay and unregulated biological material delivered in a FedEx package provide the means to create biological weapons. Build or Buy? There is growing scientific consensus that biotechnology -- especially, the technology to synthesize ever larger DNA sequences -- has advanced to the point that terrorists and rogue states could engineer dangerous novel pathogens. In February, a report by the Institute of Medicine and National Research Council of the National Academies entitled "Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences" argued, "In the future, genetic engineering and other technologies may lead to the development of pathogenic organisms with unique, unpredictable characteristics." Pondering the possibility of these recombinant pathogens, the authors note, "It is not at all unreasonable to anticipate that [these] biological threats will be increasingly sought after...and used for warfare, terrorism, and criminal purposes, and by increasingly less sophisticated and resourced individuals, groups, or nations." The report concludes, "Sooner or later, it is reasonable to expect the appearance of "bio-hackers.'" Malefactors would have more trouble stealing or buying the classical agents of biological warfare than synthesizing new ones. In 2002, after all, a group of researchers built a functioning polio virus, using a genetic sequence off the Internet and mail-order oligonucleotides (machine-synthesized DNA molecules no longer than about 140 bases each) from commercial synthesis companies. At the time, the group leader, Eckard Wimmer of the State University of New York at Stony Brook, warned that the technology to synthesize the much larger genome of variola major -- that is, the deadly smallpox virus -- would come within 15 years. In fact, it arrived sooner: December 2004, with the announcement of a high-throughput DNA synthesizer that could reproduce smallpox's 186,000-odd bases in 13 runs. The possibility of terrorists' gaining access to such high-end technology is worrisome. But few have publicly stated that engineering certain types of recombinant microC6rganisms using older equipment -- nowadays cheaply available from eBay and online marketplaces for scientific equipment like LabX -- is already feasible. The biomedical community's reaction to all this has been a general flinching. (The signatories to the National Academies report are an exception.) Caution, denial, and a lack of knowledge about bioweaponeering seem to be in equal parts responsible. Jens Kuhn, a virologist at Harvard Medical School, told me, "The Russians did a lot in their bioweapons program. But most of that isn't published, so we don't know what they know." On a winter's afternoon last year, in the hope of discovering just what the Russians had done, I set out along Highway 15 in Virginia to visit Serguei Popov at the Manassas campus of George Mason University. Popov came to the National Center for Biodefense after buying a book called Biohazard in 2000. This was the autobiography of Ken Alibek, Biopreparat's former deputy chief, its leading scientist, and Popov's ultimate superior. One of its passages described how, in 1989, Alibek and other Soviet bosses had attended a presentation by an unnamed "young scientist" from Biopreparat's bacterial-research complex at Obolensk, south of Moscow. Following this presentation, Alibek wrote, "the room was absolutely silent. We all recognized the implications of what the scientist had achieved. A new class of weapons had been found. For the first time, we would be capable of producing weapons based on chemical substances produced naturally by the human body. They could damage the nervous system, alter moods, trigger psychological changes, and even kill." When Popov read that, I asked him, had he recognized the "young scientist?" "Yes," he replied. "That was me." After reading Biohazard, Popov contacted Alibek and told him that he, too, had reached America. Popov moved to Virginia to work for Alibek's company, Advanced Biosystems, and was debriefed by U.S. intelligence. In 2004 he took up his current position at the National Center for Biodefense, where Alibek is a distinguished professor. Regarding the progress of biotechnology, Popov told me, "It seems to most people like something that happens in a few places, a few biological labs. Yet now it is becoming widespread knowledge." Furthermore, he stressed, it is knowledge that is Janus-faced in its potential applications. "When I prepare my lectures on genetic engineering, whatever I open, I see the possibilities to make harm or to use the same things for good -- to make a biological weapon or to create a treatment against disease." The "new class of weapons" that Alibek describes Popov's creating in Biohazard is a case in point. Into a relatively innocuous bacterium responsible for a low-mortality pneumonia, Legionella pneumophila, Popov and his researchers spliced mammalian DNA that expressed fragments of myelin protein, the electrically insulating fatty layer that sheathes our neurons. In test animals, the pneumonia infection came and went, but the myelin fragments borne by the recombinant Legionella goaded the animals' immune systems to read their own natural myelin as pathogenic and to attack it. Brain damage, paralysis, and nearly 100 percent mortality resulted: Popov had created a biological weapon that in effect triggered rapid multiple sclerosis. (Popov's claims can be corroborated: in recent years, scientists researching treatments for MS have employed similar methods on test animals with similar results.) When I asked about the prospects for creating bioweapons through synthetic biology, Popov mentioned the polio virus synthesized in 2002. "Very prominent people like [Anthony] Fauci at the NIH said, "Now we know it can be done.'" Popov paused. "You know, that's...naC/ve. In 1981, I described how to carry out a project to synthesize small but biologically active viruses. Nobody at Biopreparat had even a little doubt it could be done. We had no DNA synthesizers then. I had 50 people doing DNA synthesis manually, step by step. One step was about three hours, where today, with the synthesizer, it could be a few minutes -- it could be less than a minute. Nevertheless, already the idea was that we would produce one virus a month." Effectively, Popov said, Biopreparat had few restrictions on manpower. "If you wanted a hundred people involved, it was a hundred. If a thousand, a thousand." It is a startling picture: an industrial program that consumed tons of chemicals and marshalled large numbers of biologists to construct, over months, a few hundred bases of a gene that coded for a single protein. Though some dismiss Biopreparat's pioneering efforts because the Russians relied on technology that is now antiquated, this is what makes them a good guide to what could be done today with cheap, widely available biotechnology. Splicing into pathogens synthesized mammalian genes coding for the short chains of amino acids called peptides (that is, genes just a few hundred bases long) was handily within reach of Biopreparat's DNA synthesis capabilities. Efforts on this scale are easily reproducible with today's tools. What the Russians Did The Soviet bioweapons program was vast and labyrinthine; not even Ken Alibek, its top scientific manager, knew everything. In assessing the extent of its accomplishment -- and thus the danger posed by small groups armed with modern technology -- we are to some degree dependent on Serguei Popov's version of things. Since his claims are so controversial, a question must be answered: Many (perhaps most) people would prefer to believe that Popov is lying. Is he? Popov's affiliation with Alibek is a strike against him at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (Usamriid) at Fort Detrick, MD, where Biopreparat's former top scientist has his critics. Alibek, one knowledgeable person told me, effectively "entered the storytelling business when he came to America." Alibek's critics charge that because he received consulting fees while briefing U.S. scientists and officials, he exaggerated Soviet bioweaponeering achievements. In particular, some critics reject Alibek's claims that the U.S.S.R. had combined Ebola and other viruses -- in order to create what Alibek calls "chimeras." The necessary technology, they insist, didn't yet exist. When I interviewed Alibek in 2003, however, he was adamant that Biopreparat had weaponized Ebola. Alibek and Popov obviously have an interest in talking up Russia's bioweapons. But neither I, nor others with whom I've compared notes, have ever caught Popov in a false statement. One must listen to him carefully, however. Regarding Ebola chimeras, he told me when I first interviewed him in 2003, "You can speculate about a plague-Ebola combination. I know that those who ran the Soviet bioweapons program studied that possibility. I can talk with certainty about a synthesis of plague and Venezuelan equine encephalitis, because I knew the guy who did that." Popov then described a Soviet strategy for hiding deadly viral genes inside some milder bacterium's genome, so that medical treatment of a victim's initial symptoms from one microbe would trigger a second microbe's growth. "The first symptom could be plague, and a victim's fever would get treated with something as simple as tetracycline. That tetracycline would itself be the factor inducing expression of a second set of genes, which could be a whole virus or a combination of viral genes." In short, Popov indicated that a plague-Ebola combination was theoretically possible and that Soviet scientists had studied that possibility. Next, he made another turn of the screw: Biopreparat had researched recombinants that would effectively turn their victims into walking Ebola bombs. I had asked Popov for a picture of some worst-case scenarios, so I cannot complain that he was misleading me -- but the Russians almost certainly never created the plague-Ebola combination. One further testimonial to Popov: the man himself is all of a piece. Recalling his youth in Siberia, he told me, "I believed in the future, the whole idea of socialism, equity, and social justice. I was deeply afraid of the United States, the aggressive American military, capitalism -- all that was deeply scary." He added, "It's difficult to communicate how people in the Soviet Union thought then about themselves and how much excitement we young people had about science." Biological-weapons development was a profession into which Popov was recruited in his 20s and which informed his life and thinking for years. To ask him questions about biological weapons is to elicit a cascade of analysis of the specific cell-signaling pathways and receptors that could be targeted to induce particular effects, and how that targeting might be achieved via the genetic manipulation of pathogens. Popov is not explicable unless he is what he claims to be. Popov's research in Russia is powerfully suggestive of the strangeness of recombinant biological weapons. Because genetics and molecular biology were banned as "bourgeois science" in the U.S.S.R. until the early 1960s, Popov was among the first generation of Soviet university graduates to grow up with the new biology. When he first joined Vector, or the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology, Biopreparat's premier viral research facility near Novosibirsk, he didn't immediately understand that he had entered the bioweaponeering business. "Nobody talked about biological weapons," he told me. "Simply, it was supposed to be peaceful research, which would transition from pure science to a new microbiological industry." Matters proceeded, however. "Your boss says, "We'd like you to join a very interesting project.' If you say no, that's the end of your career. Since I was ambitious then, I went further and further. Initially, I had a dozen people working under me. But the next year I got the whole department of fifty people." In 1979, Popov received orders to start research in which small, synthesized genes coding for production of beta-endorphins -- the opioid neurotransmitters produced in response to pain, exercise, and other stress -- were to be spliced into viruses. Ostensibly, this work aimed to enhance the pathogens' virulence. Popov shrugged, recalling this. "How could we increase virulence with endorphins? Still, if some general tells you, you do it." Popov noted that the particular general who ordered the project, Igor Ashmarin, was also a molecular biologist and, later, an academician on Moscow State University's biology faculty. "Ashmarin's project sounded unrealistic but not impossible. The peptides he suggested were short, and we knew how to synthesize the DNA." Peptides, such as beta-endorphins, are the constituent parts of proteins and are no longer than 50 amino acids. Nature exploits their compactness in contexts where cell signaling takes place often and rapidly -- for instance, in the central nervous system, where peptides serve as neurotransmitters. With 10 to 20 times fewer amino acids than an average protein, peptides are produced by correspondingly smaller DNA sequences, which made them good candidates for synthesis using Biopreparat's limited means. Popov set a research team to splicing synthetic endorphin-expressing genes into various viruses, then infecting test animals. Yet the animals were unaffected. "We had huge pressure to produce these more lethal weapons," Popov said. "I was in charge of new projects. Often, it was my responsibility to develop the project, and if I couldn't, that would be my problem. I couldn't say, "No, I won't do it.' Because, then, what about your children? What about your family?" To appease their military bosses, Popov and his researchers shifted to peptides other than beta-endorphins and discovered that, indeed, microbes bearing genes that expressed myelin protein could provoke animals' immune systems to attack their own nervous systems. While the Vector team used this technique to increase the virulence of vaccinia, with the ultimate goal of applying it to smallpox, Popov was sent to Obolensk to develop the same approach with bacteria. Still, he told me, "We now know that if we'd continued the original approach with beta-endorphins, we would have seen their effect." This vision of subtle bioweapons that modified behavior by targeting the nervous system -- inducing effects like temporary schizophrenia, memory loss, heightened aggression, immobilizing depression, or fear -- was irresistibly attractive to Biopreparat's senior military scientists. After Popov's defection, the research continued. In 1993 and 1994, two papers, copublished in Russian science journals by Ashmarin and some of Popov's former colleagues, described experiments in which vaccines of recombinant tularemia successfully produced beta-endorphins in test animals and thereby increased their thresholds of pain sensitivity. These apparently small claims amount to a proof of concept: bioweapons can be created that target the central nervous system, changing perception and behavior. I asked Popov whether bioweaponeers could design pathogens that induced the type of effects usually associated with psychopharmaceuticals. "Essentially, a pathogen is only a vehicle," Popov replied. "Those vehicles are available -- a huge number of pathogens you could use for different jobs. If the drug is a peptide like endorphin, that's simple. If you're talking about triggering the release of serotonin and dopamine -- absolutely possible. To cause amnesia, schizophrenia -- yes, it's theoretically possible with pathogens. If you talk about pacification of a subject population -- yes, it's possible. The beta-endorphin was proposed as potentially a pacification agent. For more complex chemicals, you'd need the whole biological pathways that produce them. Constructing those would be enormously difficult. But any drug stimulates specific receptors, and that is doable in different ways. So instead of producing the drug, you induce the consequences. Pathogens could do that, in principle." Psychotropic recombinant pathogens may sound science fictional, but sober biologists support Popov's analysis. Harvard University professor of molecular biology Matthew Meselson is, with Frank Stahl, responsible for the historic Meselson-Stahl experiment of 1957, which proved that DNA replicated semiconservatively, as Watson and Crick had proposed. Meselson has devoted much effort to preventing biological and chemical weapons. In 2001, warning that biotechnology's advance was transforming the possibilities of bioweaponeering, he wrote in the New York Review of Books, "As our ability to modify life processes continues its rapid advance, we will not only be able to devise additional ways to destroy life but will also become able to manipulate it -- including the fundamental biological processes of cognition, development, reproduction, and inheritance." I asked Meselson if he still stood by this. "Yes," he said. After telling him of Popov's accounts of Russian efforts to engineer neuromodulating pathogens, I said I was dubious that biological weapons could achieve such specific effects. "Why?" Meselson bluntly asked. He didn't believe such agents had been created yet -- but they were possible. No one knows when such hypothetical weapons will be real. But since Popov left Russia, the range and power of biotechnological tools for manipulating genetic control circuits have grown. A burgeoning revolution in "targeting specificity" (targeting is the process of engineering molecules to recognize and bind to particular types of cells) is creating new opportunities in pharmaceuticals; simultaneously, it is advancing the prospects for chemical and biological weapons. Current research is investigating agents that target the distinct biochemical pathways in the central nervous system and that could render people sedate, calm, or otherwise incapacitated. All that targeting specificity could, in principle, also be applied to biological weapons. The disturbing scope of the resulting possibilities was alluded to by George Poste, former chief scientist at SmithKline Beecham and the sometime chairman of a task force on bioterrorism at the U.S. Defense Department, in a speech he gave to the National Academies and the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, in January 2003. According to the transcript of the speech, Poste recalled that at a recent biotech conference he had attended a presentation on agents that augment memory: "A series of aged rats were paraded with augmented memory functions.... And some very elegant structural chemistry was placed onto the board.... Then with the most casual wave of the hand the presenter said, "Of course, modification of the methyl group at C7 completely eliminates memory. Next slide, please.'" Basement Biotech The age of bioweaponeering is just dawning: almost all of the field's potential development lies ahead. The recent report by the National Academies described many unpleasant scenarios: in addition to psychotropic pathogens, the academicians imagine the misuse of "RNA interference" to perturb gene expression, of nanotechnology to deliver toxins, and of viruses to deliver antibodies that could target ethnic groups. This last is by no means ridiculous. Microbiologist Mark Wheelis at the University of California, Davis, who works with the Washington-based Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, notes in an article for Arms Control Today, "Engineering an ethnic-specific weapon targeting humans is...difficult, as human genetic variability is very high both within and between ethnic groups...but there is no reason to believe that it will not eventually be possible." But commentators have focused on speculative perils for decades. While the threats they describe are plausible, dire forecasts have become a ritual -- a way to avoid more immediate problems. Already, in 2006, much could be done. Popov's myelin autoimmunity weapon could be replicated by bioterrorists. It would be no easy feat: while the technological requirements are relatively slight, the scientific knowledge required is considerable. At the very least, terrorists would have to employ a real scientist as well as lab technicians trained to manage DNA synthesizers and tend pathogens. They would also have to find some way to disperse their pathogens. The Soviet Union "weaponized" biological agents by transforming them into fine aerosols that could be sprayed over large areas. This presents engineering problems of an industrial kind, possibly beyond the ability of any substate actor. But bioterrorists might be willing to infect themselves and walk through crowded airports and train stations: their coughs and sniffles would be the bombs of their terror campaign. Difficult as it may still be, garage-lab bioengineering is getting easier every year. In the vanguard of those who are calling attention to biotechnology's potential for abuse is George Church, Harvard Medical School Professor of Genetics. It was Church who announced in December 2004 that his research team had developed a new high-throughput synthesizer capable of constructing in one pass a DNA molecule 14,500 bases long. Church says his DNA synthesizer could make vaccine and pharmaceutical production vastly more efficient. But it could also enable the manufacture of the genomes of all the viruses on the U.S. government's "select agents" list of bioweapons. Church fears that starting with only the constituent chemical reagents and the DNA sequence of one of the select agents, someone with sufficient knowledge might construct a lethal virus. The smallpox virus variola, for instance, is approximately 186,000 bases long -- just 13 smaller DNA molecules to be synthesized with Church's technology and bound together into one viral genome. To generate infectious particles, the synthetic variola would then need to be "booted" into operation in a host cell. None of this is trivial; nevertheless, with the requisite knowledge, it could be done. I suggested to Church that someone with the requisite knowledge might not need his cutting-edge technology to do harm. A secondhand machine could be purchased from a website like eBay or LabX.com for around $5,000. Alternatively, the components -- mostly off-the-shelf electronics and plumbing -- could be assembled with a little more effort for a similar cost. Construction of a DNA synthesizer in this fashion would be undetectable by intelligence agencies. The older-generation machine would construct only oligonucleotides, which would then have to be stitched together to function as a complete gene, so only small genes could be synthesized. But small genes can be used to kill people. "People have trouble maintaining the necessary ultrapure approach even with commercial devices -- but you definitely could do some things," Church acknowledged. What things? Again, Serguei Popov's experience at Biopreparat is instructive. In 1981, Popov was ordered by Lev Sandakhchiev, Vector's chief, to synthesize fragments of smallpox. "I was against this project," Popov told me. "I thought it was an extremely blunt, stupid approach." It amounted to a pointlessly difficult stunt, he explained, to impress the Soviet military; when his researchers acquired real smallpox samples in 1983, the program was suspended. A closely related program that Popov had started, however, continued after he departed Vector for Biopreparat's Oblensk facility in the mid-1980s. This project used the poxvirus vaccinia, the relatively harmless relative of variola used as a vaccine against smallpox. Not only was vaccinia -- whose genome is very similar to variola's -- a convenient experimental stand-in for smallpox, but its giant size (by viral standards) also made it a congenial candidate to carry extra genes. In short, it was a useful model for bioweapons. For at least a decade, therefore, a team of Biopreparat scientists systematically inserted into vaccinia a variety of genes that coded for certain toxins and for peptides that act as signaling mechanisms in the immune system. Though Popov had directed that the recombinant-vaccinia program should proceed through the genes coding for immune system-modulating peptides, he left before the researchers finished with the interleukin genes. But it would be surprising if the Vector researchers did not reach the gene for interleukin-4 (IL-4), an immune-system peptide that coaxes white blood cells to increase their production of antibodies and then releases them. There is some evidence that the Russians discovered the effects of inserting the IL-4 gene into a poxvirus. Those effects are deadly. In 2001, Ian Ramshaw and a team of virologists from the Australian National University in Canberra spliced IL-4 into ectromelia, a mousepox virus, and learned that the resulting recombinant mousepox triggered massive overproduction of the IL-4 peptide. Even the immune systems of mice vaccinated against mousepox could not control the growth of the virus: a 60 percent mortality rate resulted. Other experiments have confirmed the lethality of the recombinant pathogen. The American poxvirus expert Mark Buller, of Saint Louis University in Missouri, engineered various versions of the recombinant, one of which maintained the mousepox virus's full virulence while generating excessive interleukin-4. All the mice infected with this recombinant died. The BBC reported that when asked about the Australian experiment, Sandakhchiev, Vector's director, remarked, "Of course, this is not a surprise." Because vaccinia is universally available, it is fortunate that a vaccinia-IL-4 hybrid would not be an effective biological weapon: vaccinia has limited transmissibility between humans. Still, there are other viruses that are transmissible. Smallpox, the most infamous, is nearly impossible for aspiring bioterrorists to acquire. But a herpesvirus named varicella-zoster, or common chickenpox, is easily acquired and even more infectious than smallpox.* What would happen if bioterrorists spliced IL-4 into chickenpox and released the hybrid into the general population? Perhaps nothing. Very often, the Soviet bioweaponeers successfully spliced new genes into pathogens, only to find that infected test animals showed no symptoms. One reason was that the genetically engineered microbes were often "environmentally unstable" -- that is, they did not retain the added genes. Engineering recombinant pathogens can be ineffective for other reasons, too: the foreign gene might be expressed in the "wrong" organ. But according to several virologists with knowledge of biological weapons, the result of splicing IL-4 into chickenpox might be to suppress the immune response to the disease. According to these virologists, the effect would be similar to what happens to cancer patients when they catch chickenpox. They often die -- even when treated with antiviral therapiesis companies altogether. Conveniently, without its junk DNA, IL-4 is only about 462 base pairs long. It's possible to download IL-4's genetic sequence from the Internet, use a basic synthesizer to construct it in five segments, and then assemble those segments "manually," as Popov's scientists did. The other principal tools needed would be a centrifuge -- like the $5,000 DNA synthesizer, cheaply available via Internet sites -- and a transfection kit, a small bottle filled with reagent that costs less than $200 and which would be necessary to introduce the IL-4 gene into chickenpox. Finally, the terrorists would also require an incubator and the media in which to grow the resulting cells. The total costs, including the DNA synthesizer: probably less than $10,000. *Correction: an earlier version of this story misidentified varicella-zoster, a herpesvirus, as an orthopoxvirus. Be Afraid. But of What? In the public debate about how to defend ourselves against biological weapons, the advance of biotechnology has been little discussed. Instead, most biologists and security analysts have debated the merits and shortcomings of Project BioShield, the Bush administration's $5.6 billion plan to protect the U.S. population from biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear attack. After last year's bioterrorism conference in DC, I called on Richard Ebright, whose Rutgers laboratory researches transcription initiation (the first step in gene expression), to hear why he so opposes the biodefense boom (in its current form) and why he doesn't worry about terrorists' synthesizing biological weapons. "There are now more than 300 U.S. institutions with access to live bioweapons agents and 16,500 individuals approved to handle them," Ebright told me. While all of those people have undergone some form of background check -- to verify, for instance, that they aren't named on a terrorist watch list and aren't illegal aliens -- it's also true, Ebright noted, that "Mohammed Atta would have passed those tests without difficulty." Furthermore, Ebright told me, at the time of our interview, 97 percent of the researchers receiving funds from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases to study bioweapon agents had never been funded for such work before. Few of them, therefore, had any prior experience handling these pathogens; multiple incidents of accidental release had occurred during the previous two years. s-level pathogens is scary enough, I conceded. But isn't the proliferation of bioweaponeering expertise, I asked, more worrisome? After all, what reliable means do we have of determining whether somebody set out to be a molecular biologist with the aim of developing bioweapons? "That's the most significant concern," Ebright agreed. "If al-Qaeda wished to carry out a bioweapons attack in the U.S., their simplest means of acquiring access to the materials and the knowledge would be to send individuals to train within programs involved in biodefense research." Ebright paused. "And today, every university and corporate press office is trumpeting its success in securing research funding as part of this biodefense expansion, describing exactly what's available and where." As for the threat of next-generation bioweapons agents, Ebright was dismissive: "To make an antibiotic-resistant bacterial strain is frighteningly straightforward, within reach of anyone with access to the material and knowledge of how to grow it." However, he continued, further engineering -- to increase virulence, to provide escape from vaccines, to increase environmental stability -- requires considerable skill and a far greater investment of effort and time. "It's clearly possible to engineer next-generation enhanced pathogens, as the former Soviet Union did. That there's been no bioweapons attack in the United States except for the 2001 anthrax attacks -- which bore the earmarks of a U.S. biodefense community insider -- means ipso facto that no substate adversary of the U.S. has access to the basic means of carrying it out. If al-Qaeda had biological weapons, they would release them." Milton Leitenberg, the arms control specialist, goes a step further: he says because substate groups have not used biological weapons in the past, they are unlikely to do so in the near future. Such arguments are common in security circles. Yet for many contemplating the onrush of the life sciences and biotechnology, they have limited persuasiveness. I suggested to Ebright that synthetic biology offered low-hanging fruit for a knowledgeable bioterrorist. He granted that there were scenarios with sinister potential. He allowed that biotechnology could make BioShield, which focuses on conventional select agents such as smallpox, anthrax, andill, he maintained, "a conventional bioweapons agent can potentially be massively disruptive in economic costs, fear, panic, and casualties. The need to go to the next level is outside the incentive structure of any substate organization." Even those who are intimately involved with biodefense often support this view. For an insider's perspective, I contacted Jens Kuhn, the Harvard Medical School virologist. The German-born Kuhn has worked not only at Usamriid, and at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, but also -- uniquely for a Westerner -- at Vector. Kuhn, like Ebright, is no fan of how the biodefense boom is unfolding. "When I was at Usamriid, it exemplified how a biodefense facility should be," he told me. "That's why I'm worried -- because the system worked, and the experts were concentrated at the right places, Fort Detrick and the CDC. Now this expertise gets diluted, which isn't smart." Kuhn believes, nevertheless, that some kind of national biodefense program is needed. He just doesn't think we are preparing for the right things. "Everybody makes this connection with bioterrorism, anthrax attacks, and al-Qaeda. That's completely wrong." Kuhn recalled his time at Vector and that facility's grand scale. "When you look at what the Russians did, those kinds of huge state programs with billions of dollars flowing into very sophisticated research carried on over decades -- they're the problem. If nation-states start a Manhattan Project to build the perfect biological weapon, we're in deep shit." But doesn't modern biotechnology, I asked, allow small groups to do unprecedented things in garage laboratories? Kuhn conceded, "There are a few things out there" with the potential to kill people. But weighing the probabilities, he saw the threat in these terms: "Definitely more biowarfare than bioterrorism. Definitely more the sophisticated bioweapons coming in the future than the stuff now. There's danger coming towards us and we're focusing on concerns like BioShield. I don't think that's the stuff that will save us." Is Help on the Way? The 21st century will see a biological revolution analogous to the industrial revolution of the 19th. But both its benefits and its threats will be more profound and more disruptivem threat is that genes could be hacked outside of large laboratories. This means that terrorists could create recombinant biological weapons. But the leading edge of bioweapon research has always been the work of government labs. The longer-term threat is what it always has been: national militaries. Biotechnology will furnish them with weapons of unprecedented power and specificity. George Poste, in his 2003 speech to the National Academies, warned his audience that in coming decades the life sciences would loom ever larger in national-security matters and international affairs. Poste noted, "If you actually look at the history of the assimilation of technological advance into the calculus of military affairs, you cannot find a historical precedent in which dramatic new technologies that redress military inferiority are not deployed." Harvard's Matthew Meselson has said the same and added that a world in which the new biotechnology was deployed militarily "would be a world in which the very nature of conflict had radically changed. Therein could lie unprecedented opportunities for violence, coercion, repression, or subjugation." Meselson adds, "Governments might have the objective of controlling very large numbers of people. If you have a situation of permanent conflict, people begin contemplating things that the ordinary rules of conflict don't allow. They begin to view the enemy as subhuman. Eventually, this leads to viewing people in your own culture as tools." What measures could mitigate both the near and the more distant threats of bioweaponry? BioShield, as it is now constituted, will not protect us from genetically engineered pathogens. A number of radical solutions (like somehow boosting the human immune system through generic immunomodifiers) have been proposed, but even if pursued, they might take years or decades to develop. More immediately, no one has a good idea about what should be done. Some scientists hope to arrest the spread of bioweapons knowledge. Rutgers's Richard Ebright wants to reverse what he believes to be countg guns, where you just give people a license and let them do whatever they want," he says. "Along with the license would come responsibilities for reporting." Furthermore, Church believes that just as all DNA synthesizers should be registered, so should any molecular biologists researching the select agents or the human immune system response to pathogens. "Nobody's forced to do research in those areas. If someone does, then they should be willing to have a very transparent, spotlighted research career," Church says. But enactment of Church's proposals would represent an unprecedented regulation of science. Worse, not all nations would comply. For instance, Russian biologists, some of whom are known to have worked at Biopreparat, have reportedly trained molecular-biology students at the Pasteur Institute in Tehran. More fundamentally, arresting the progress of biological-weapons research is probably impractical. Biological knowledge is all one, and therapies cannot be easily distinguished from weapons. For example, a general trend in biomedicine is to use viral vectors in gene therapy. Robert Carlson, senior scientist in the Genomation Lab and the Microscale Life Sciences Center in the Department of Electrical Engineering at the University of Washington, believes there are two options. On the one hand, we can clamp down on biodefense research, stunting our ability to respond to biological threats. Alternatively, we can continue to push the boundaries of what is known about how pathogens can be manipulated -- spreading expertise in building biological systems, for better and for worse, through experiments like Buller's assembly of a mousepox-IL4 recombinant -- so we are not at a mortal disadvantage. One day, we must hope, technology will suggest an answer. Serguei Popov has lived with these questions longer than most. When I asked him what could be done, he told me, "I don't know what kind of behavior or scientific or political measures would guarantee that the new biology won't hurt us." But the vital first step, Popov said, was for scientists to overcome their reluctance to discuss biological weapons. "Public awareness is very important. I can't say it's a solution to this problem. Frankly, I don't see any solution right now. Yet first we have to be aware." Mark Williams is a contributing writer to Technology Review. -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From eugen at leitl.org Thu Apr 13 14:10:46 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2006 23:10:46 +0200 Subject: [eugen@leitl.org: [>Htech] developing biological weapons] Message-ID: <20060413211046.GL31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Eugen Leitl ----- From pofeczsjpk at comcast.net Fri Apr 14 03:04:12 2006 From: pofeczsjpk at comcast.net (Myra Buchanan) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 02:04:12 -0800 Subject: try hoodia today and feel better Message-ID: <01657782874044.21625510@transmittance> in pyridine ! doorkeeper it communion the discus the allemand and comet it adelaide be bowel the microbial some layup on gadwall a murmur in stafford the cupful but sarcophagus or oxygen try flub ! belle see appellate. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: devolution.7.gif Type: image/gif Size: 10028 bytes Desc: not available URL: From wxxdhtpozoahnf at paonia.com Thu Apr 13 17:31:18 2006 From: wxxdhtpozoahnf at paonia.com (Kidd) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 02:31:18 +0200 Subject: we are BBB verified Message-ID: <3dunham.credentB@maze.org> The Only online pharmacy verified by BBB and approved by Visa Seal of Confidence Quality meds at quality prices, and shipping so discrete that comes fast at your doorstep Please give us an opportunity fo check us http://ebrjtb.lopked.net/?copozklzmejs not interested? you can out-out at our website From hunt at antexbiologics.com Fri Apr 14 02:03:47 2006 From: hunt at antexbiologics.com (Ana Talley) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 03:03:47 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #ryckpdL215354471 Message-ID: <321n632v.5685024@msn.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1190 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: manageable.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net Thu Apr 13 21:26:02 2006 From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 04:26:02 +0000 Subject: [eugen@leitl.org: [>Htech] developing biological weapons] In-Reply-To: <20060413211046.GL31486@leitl.org> References: <20060413211046.GL31486@leitl.org> Message-ID: <20060414042602.GA353@arion.hive> The version posted to THT and this list has a few gaps ranging in length from a few words to a couple lines. Anyone who hasn't read the article, I recommend reading it on the web. http://www.technologyreview.com/BioTech/wtr_16485,306,p1.html?PM=GO "Basement Biotech" - paragraph 16 (last para before "Be afraid...") "Be afraid, but of what" - paragraph 4, beginning. - paragraph 8, middle "Is Help On The Way?" - paragraph 1, ~3rd line - paragraph 4, ~3rd line Another article by Mark Williams from 2004: http://hspig.org/ipw-web/bulletin/bb/viewtopic.php?t=442 -- The six phases of a project: I. Enthusiasm. IV. Search for the Guilty. II. Disillusionment. V. Punishment of the Innocent. III. Panic. VI. Praise & Honor for the Nonparticipants. From holbrook at insitecom.com Fri Apr 14 05:28:51 2006 From: holbrook at insitecom.com (Lakeisha Gates) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 06:28:51 -0600 Subject: Urgent Notification #42075319552451 Message-ID: <54955192040246.pVg34dnhuv@precedent> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1192 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: abbreviate.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From s.h.khan_825 at jlindustrial.com Fri Apr 14 08:28:16 2006 From: s.h.khan_825 at jlindustrial.com (Paulette Poe) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 09:28:16 -0600 Subject: Mortagge ratee approvedd Message-ID: <86363530309324.VMeHr2X0pI@smooth> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1176 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: pentane.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rah at shipwright.com Fri Apr 14 08:07:20 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 11:07:20 -0400 Subject: [Clips] Letting the IRS Do Your Taxes for You Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: rah at shipwright.com Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 10:34:31 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R.A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] Letting the IRS Do Your Taxes for You Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com The Wall Street Journal THE AUTOMATIC 1040 The IRS might be able to fill out your return for you, based on the information it gets from other parties and past data it has on file, such as: * Your W-2 form, which includes all your wages and withheld taxes. * Your 1099 forms, which include dividends and interest from investments, bank accounts and other sources, as well as outside income. * Your 1098 form, which reports mortgage interest paid. * Your previous tax return, which includes marital status and number of dependents. Letting the IRS Do Your Taxes for You Agency Has Enough Data To Fill Out Many Returns; Tax Preparers Resist Proposal By ROBERT GUY MATTHEWS April 13, 2006; Page D1 Imagine that filing your tax return was as simple as receiving a completed form from the Internal Revenue Service, signing it, then waiting for a refund or writing a check. It isn't so far-fetched. For many of the taxpayers scrambling to meet next week's filing deadline, the IRS already has most of the data it needs on file. Since employers and banks and other financial institutions send information on earnings, interest income, dividends and mortgage interest directly to the agency, some academics and economists say the IRS should go ahead and perform the role of tax preparer -- and save many people a significant amount of time and money. A number of tax-preparation companies dispute the idea's validity and are fighting against it, as is the Bush administration, which has also expressed concern about the cost of such a program. Last year, California launched a pilot program in which it filled out state-tax returns for about 11,500 residents. It plans to duplicate the program this year for 2005 tax returns. Taking the idea national would obviously be more costly and complicated, and nobody is saying that the IRS could fill out the 130 million returns filed every year. Rather, proponents say, the government should focus on people with the simplest returns, such as single filers who don't itemize and haven't had a change in jobs or in the number of dependents from the previous year. The IRS, in those cases, would essentially plug in the numbers -- such as wages, annual interest from checking accounts, and dividends -- that it gets from employers, banks and other sources, and tabulate the results. The taxpayers would get their IRS-calculated returns in the mail and either agree with the result or redo it themselves, perhaps with the help of a commercial tax preparer. "The idea is to reduce the burden on taxpayers," says Joseph Bankman, a professor of law and business at Stanford Law School. As appealing as the idea may sound, taxpayers shouldn't expect any such change soon, due to a host of technical and political challenges. "This is something that sounds pretty easy and obvious on the surface," says Charles Rossotti, who studied the issue when he was IRS commissioner from 1997 to 2002. "But there are some very significant practical problems that rule it out." For one thing, he says, the IRS doesn't currently have the manpower or computer power to quickly handle and tabulate the reams of financial information from employers, banks and brokers in a timely way. That means potential refunds could be delayed. For example, individual taxpayers usually get W-2 forms, on which employers report wages and withheld taxes, in January, but the IRS doesn't get the forms until February. Similarly, taxpayers generally can get their 1099 information from financial institutions as early as January, but the IRS often gets 1099s as late as August. Even for the simplest of returns, documents from employers, banks and other financial institutions would have to arrive at the IRS well before the end of tax season around April 15. Mr. Bankman says the technical hurdles aren't insurmountable. Two economists, Peter Orszag of the Brookings Institution, a Washington, D.C., think tank, and Austan Goolsbee, a University of Chicago economics professor, are studying how to make it easier for the government to prepare tax returns by using information technology. They plan to publish their findings later this year as part of the Brookings-affiliated Hamilton Project, which aims to develop and promote new economic-policy ideas. The California pilot project, called "Ready Return," cost about $211,000 to run last year, and involved returns for only 11,500 people. Any federal experiment is sure to cost millions of dollars. IRS Commissioner Mark Everson says he'd rather spend any extra money on hiring more auditors and investigators to beef up enforcement. He also says that if the IRS missed some taxpayer income, there wouldn't be any incentive for the individual to supply the information. "I think it leads to the thinking 'If government already fills out some of my tax return, why should I fill out additional lines?' " says Mr. Everson. Mr. Everson's boss, Treasury Secretary John Snow, also strongly opposes IRS involvement in tax preparation, which he says would be a conflict of interest. "We aren't tax-preparation people," he told Congress earlier this month. "We're not software-development people. There is a private market out there that does that and does it well." Commercial tax preparers, worried they would lose business if the IRS moves starts filling out tax returns, also are determined to block the idea. They argue that the government doesn't have an incentive to make sure taxpayers get every tax break to which they're legally entitled. "The issue is whether it's cost-effective for the tax system and good for taxpayers," says Linda McDougall, a spokeswoman for H&R Block Inc., the nation's largest tax preparer. Intuit Inc., maker of the popular software TurboTax, has vigorously fought California's pilot program. Along with H&R Block, it successfully sued to stop a similar program from going into effect in the state in 1999. Steve Westly, chief financial officer and controller for California, says that this year's program might be derailed as well -- largely because of lobbying by the commercial tax preparers. State legislators are currently considering competing bills; one would torpedo the program, the other would expand it. Nevertheless, Mr. Westly is moving forward with the program, which will be offered to 50,000 taxpayers. To be eligible, taxpayers must be single without dependents and have had only one job last year. They also must not have earned any interest on a checking account or other investment last year. He says that 20% of tax-paying Californians fit those requirements. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From eugen at leitl.org Fri Apr 14 03:45:12 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 12:45:12 +0200 Subject: [eugen@leitl.org: [>Htech] developing biological weapons] In-Reply-To: <20060414042602.GA353@arion.hive> References: <20060413211046.GL31486@leitl.org> <20060414042602.GA353@arion.hive> Message-ID: <20060414104512.GZ31486@leitl.org> On Fri, Apr 14, 2006 at 04:26:02AM +0000, Justin wrote: > The version posted to THT and this list has a few gaps ranging in length > from a few words to a couple lines. Anyone who hasn't read the article, Sorry -- it's 2006 and the frigging cut & paste to clipboard isn't working. That's progress, I guess. I need to figure out a different mechanism for cut&paste in future. Sorry for the inconvenience. > I recommend reading it on the web. > > http://www.technologyreview.com/BioTech/wtr_16485,306,p1.html?PM=GO > > "Basement Biotech" > - paragraph 16 (last para before "Be afraid...") > > "Be afraid, but of what" > - paragraph 4, beginning. > - paragraph 8, middle > > "Is Help On The Way?" > - paragraph 1, ~3rd line > - paragraph 4, ~3rd line > > Another article by Mark Williams from 2004: > http://hspig.org/ipw-web/bulletin/bb/viewtopic.php?t=442 > > > -- > The six phases of a project: > I. Enthusiasm. IV. Search for the Guilty. > II. Disillusionment. V. Punishment of the Innocent. > III. Panic. VI. Praise & Honor for the Nonparticipants. -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From grubb at genevasi.com Fri Apr 14 12:25:58 2006 From: grubb at genevasi.com (Lorenzo Mccord) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 13:25:58 -0600 Subject: Your account #399600 Message-ID: <8.5.7.6.3.86376837765542.817a7281@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1186 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: statesmanlike.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 7236 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dexter.salzleiny8e at gmail.com Fri Apr 14 08:11:27 2006 From: dexter.salzleiny8e at gmail.com (Jonathan Mccann) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 14:11:27 -0100 Subject: Open something new for your self Message-ID: <200604141208.k3EC7xW1028148@proton.jfet.org> Cialis Soft Tabs is the new impotence treatment drug that everyone is talking about. It has benefits over Viagra and other ED treatment solutions. Here goes some reasons to choose Cialis Soft Tabs: 1. You can mix alcohol drinks with Cialis Soft Tabs without any undesired effects. 2.Cialis Soft Tabs does not make you feel dizzy or make vision blurred, so you can easily drive a car or operate heavy machinery. 3.Cialis soft tabs works much faster than any known ED treatment solution. Cialis Soft Tabs enters the bloodstream directly instead of going through the stomach, thus you need only 15 minutes till you feel the effect. Just look at the graph below If you are interested ? Just click here and Read more about it http://57z.worldsearchsite.org/ct AND ALSO Cialis Soft Tabs formula is effective for 95% of the patients. If this treatment is not effective for you, we will refund you for every unopened pack. All you have to do is send them back, and we will immediatley refund your account! From coderman at gmail.com Fri Apr 14 14:52:23 2006 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 14:52:23 -0700 Subject: [Clips] Say Hello to Voiceprinting In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4ef5fec60604141452y6f563b4fhbb629181abb750f5@mail.gmail.com> On 4/14/06, R.A. Hettinga wrote: > ... > Say Hello to Voiceprinting > Voice biometrics is poised to add more security > to phone-based transactions in Europe. we used a system like this for a retail directory assistance service called Infone. the caller could authenticate by pin, by voice, or both. the voice enrollment required the caller to say "hello, infone" three times or until a suitable voice print could be attained. then when the caller accessed the system they would simply say "hello, infone" and based on their incoming phone number the print was either accepted or rejected. the problem with these systems is that they can only select / identify an individual from a small group of possibilities and line quality / head colds can cause false negatives. for example, if more than 10 people were associated with an account the user had to enter a PIN to identify them, and then provide the "hello, infone" voice print for further authentication. it is also a non-trivial matter to tune the threshold for success/failure appropriately for a given set of users. this is all based on probabilities so you need to set the threshold high enough that the risk of false positives (impostors) is low enough to keep security/losses at acceptable limits while also preventing excessive numbers of false negatives that will annoy and aggravate your customers. still, the tech keeps getting (incrementally) better and it does provide an additional layer of defence. i'm not sure the currently excessive costs associated with this technology are worth the benefit though. (there are basically two companies who specialize in this stuff (they've bought up all the rest) and they charge a premium for these services and technologies :) From arrakistor at gmail.com Fri Apr 14 06:56:01 2006 From: arrakistor at gmail.com (Arrakistor) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 14:56:01 +0100 Subject: Official Torpark Release 1.5.0.2a Message-ID: Okay, since mozilla released a new version of firefox, i'm late on my builds. I fixed the bugs that I was emailed about. So here in all it's glory is the official Torpark 1.5.0.2a english build. The rest of the builds will be made on monday. - Fixed ExecDos bug - Extracted files written to torpark temp instead of local user temp - Fixed Tor+Torpark don't exit bugs - Browser opens as soon as a circuit is detected by deduction (Will fix with firefox extension) - Cleaner, faster, smaller - Uses tor 0.1.1.18 and firefox 1.5.0.2 - Added AdBlock filters - Added NoScript - Removes tor cache on exit http://torpark.nfshost.com/torpark_1.5.0.2a_english.exe Steve Topletz ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From vmehta at icici.com Fri Apr 14 15:09:21 2006 From: vmehta at icici.com (Lillie Saldana) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 16:09:21 -0600 Subject: Urgent Notification #114739046059 Message-ID: <9.3.0.5.9.85326165195629.341a3428@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1207 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: imperceptible.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 7236 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rah at shipwright.com Fri Apr 14 14:16:40 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 17:16:40 -0400 Subject: [Clips] Say Hello to Voiceprinting Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: rah at shipwright.com Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 17:07:47 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R.A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] Say Hello to Voiceprinting Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com The Wall Street Journal MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW Say Hello to Voiceprinting Voice biometrics is poised to add more security to phone-based transactions in Europe. By DUNCAN GRAHAM-ROWE April 14, 2006 Speech-recognition software is used today by banks and other institutions to conduct customer transactions over the phone without the need for a live customer-service representative. But such systems recognize mainly numbers and words, not individual voices. If you utter the right PIN and account number, you get through. Now a system being readied for commercialization in Europe treats an individual's voice as the gate-opener. That capability would add another security layer: While your PIN can be compromised, your voice is not so easily stolen. It could also eliminate the need to remember and recite account numbers and PINs. Owned by Surrey, U.K.-based Biometric Security, the system, called Voice Vault, requires users simply to utter their name, birth date, and a password, says Chief Technology Officer Vance Harris. The company, like others in the field, already has a handful of banks as clients, who use "voiceprinting" for internal security purposes. But Voice Vault's system will be made available to general account holders at an undisclosed European bank by December, says Mr. Harris. The system will require a user to remember a minimal amount of information, while relying instead on that person's voice for authentication. First, customers "register" their voices in a training session that involves saying words designed to capture the frequencies associated with their voice. The system then constructs a statistical model that predicts what a speech waveform would look like when the person is uttering an entirely novel sentence. Then, when that person's account is accessed over a phone, the system not only confirms that the articulated name, birth date, and password are accurate, but also checks to see if the waveforms of those utterances match the template stored with the account. Such modeling of the vocal tract is a popular approach these days for voice verification, says Aladdin Ariyaeeinia, a voice researcher at the University of Hertfordshire, England. Indeed, many companies are developing similar systems. Much farther in the future is so-called "text independent" identification, which would be so good at recognizing individual voices that you'd merely call your bank and say "What's my balance?" without having to give any other information. Voiceprints have some over other biometrics too. Mr. Ariyaeeinia notes that while some banks are now looking at using more established forms of biometrics for online banking -- fingerprints and iris scans -- these require additional hardware to perform the scans. "The great advantage of voice is that all computers and phones have the sensor built in, whereas other biometrics require additional sensors," says Mike Brookes, a signal-processing researcher at the Imperial College of Science, Technology, and Medicine in London, who specializes in voice recognition. And, he adds, voice recognition also allows you to keep your hands free. "Voice has been on the verge of breaking through for a number of years," says Mr. Brookes. He believes voice verification technology will finally start to take off, particularly with telecommunication and cellphone companies, who are keen to push e-commerce services via Internet-enabled cellphones. Another reason for the adoption of voiceprinting is the recent introduction of so-called "smart" credit and debit cards. These cards have eliminated the use of handwritten signatures for authenticating payments, and instead require customers to punch in a four-digit PIN, which is then verified against a number stored on a chip on the card. Since the recent mass introduction of these PIN-verified cards in the U.K., for example, most types of credit-card fraud have plummeted. According to figures released in February by the U.K.'s Association for Payment Clearing Services, credit-card fraud dropped by 13% in 2005. But one type of fraud continued to rise last year, by 21%: The problem lies in transactions made over the Internet, by phone, or by mail order. In these kinds of transactions, a card's information can be read out or typed in without additional authentication. The field of biometrics, in general, and voiceprinting, in particular, could go a long way toward solving this problem, Mr. Harris says. This article appeared April 11, 2006, on the Web site of Technology Review, an MIT Enterprise. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From wvxnkxh at thecomputerking.com Fri Apr 14 18:42:33 2006 From: wvxnkxh at thecomputerking.com (Emmett) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 17:42:33 -0800 Subject: Testimonials That SAYS everything Message-ID: <5.5.8.3.6.82568329543994.910a9357@69.60.117.34> %TXT_ADD -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 844 bytes Desc: not available URL: From lists at kriptik.org Fri Apr 14 17:10:45 2006 From: lists at kriptik.org (lists) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 20:10:45 -0400 Subject: [Clips] Say Hello to Voiceprinting In-Reply-To: <4ef5fec60604141452y6f563b4fhbb629181abb750f5@mail.gmail.com> References: <4ef5fec60604141452y6f563b4fhbb629181abb750f5@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <44403A05.6060606@kriptik.org> On 14 Apr 2006 14:52:23 -0700, coderman wrote: > On 4/14/06, R.A. Hettinga wrote: >> ... >> Say Hello to Voiceprinting >> Voice biometrics is poised to add more security >> to phone-based transactions in Europe. > > > still, the tech keeps getting (incrementally) better and it does > provide an additional layer of defence. i'm not sure the currently > excessive costs associated with this technology are worth the benefit > though. Yeah, this biometric seems trivial to defeat. Recording someone's voice is easy, and there is plenty of software out there for manipulating sound, which makes splicing phrases together quite simple. "Voiceprinting" is much more interesting in the context of surveillance. -Andrew From eugen at leitl.org Fri Apr 14 12:59:29 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 21:59:29 +0200 Subject: [arrakistor@gmail.com: Official Torpark Release 1.5.0.2a] Message-ID: <20060414195929.GO31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Arrakistor ----- From declan at well.com Fri Apr 14 23:34:39 2006 From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 23:34:39 -0700 Subject: [Politech] John Gilmore on DearAOL.com and user control of spam filtering [sp] Message-ID: Previous Politech messages: http://www.politechbot.com/2006/04/13/why-was-moveonorg/ http://www.politechbot.com/2006/04/13/aol-blocks-e/ -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [Politech] Why was Moveon.org blocked by AOL? Did recipients want the email messages? [sp] Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 01:53:05 -0700 From: John Gilmore To: Declan McCullagh CC: Politech >dearaol.com has this astroturf feature - load up a big list of email >addresses and put in a pitch about dearaol, we'll mail it out for you > >chances are very high that people will receive these without >soliciting them - and they'll hit report as spam. > >that WILL cause a block I think this is called the "heckler's veto". If a listener doesn't like what someone is saying, just disrupt the communication enough that nobody can hear it -- like shouting "spam!" in a crowded theatre. The architecture of today's anti-spam systems is designed to automate exactly this kind of censorship. Two guys mark a message as "spam", and a thousand recipients are censored from ever knowing that it existed. >we had a similar block in place for a while before I removed it, given that >the campaign does seem to have some legitimate, if highly uninformed and >misguided popularity. It's nice to know that Mr. Ramasubramanian has investigated whether dearaol's messages are "legitimate" enough that his system's recipients are permitted to see it -- after blocking them automatically. Who appointed him as the censor in a supposedly open medium? You did, dear readers: by insisting that "spam" was a plague and telling ISPs to "just make it go away". Most ISPs don't have anyone with a degree in constitutional law, nor do they have great insights about how to prevent communications in a medium designed to make communications rapid and cheap. The result was predictably ham-handed censorship, which has naturally evolved into self-serving censorship. ISPs get a lot of complaints about messages that arrive. They get very few complaints about messages that don't arrive, even if they were interesting personal messages, because the recipient doesn't know the message even existed. So self-serving ISPs tend to err on the side of censoring. >reasonable to ask: (a) Is each and every address receiving alerts from >dearaol.com confirmed double-opt in? First, is this "alert" a one-time message, or was each recipient added to a "list" that they'd have to unsubscribe from? Double opt-in is foolish for single messages. If I ask dearaol.com to send a note about AOL's email censorship to my friend Declan, without telling him first, is that a "spam"? For one thing, he's a reporter, my presumption is that he IS interested in unsolicited tips about newsworthy happenings. (Should I stop sending 'em, Declan? I know other reporters who'll be happy to get 'em instead.) Or should dearaol.com have sent Declan a message saying, "I have a message for you; would you like to receive it?". Only if he replies, would it send him a message. Except oops, it already did send him a message. It might as well have sent him the real message instead of wasting his time with a bogus interaction. (If he doesn't want to see the real message, he can ignore it just as well as he can ignore the "Do you want to see it?" message. And if he does want to see the real message, then it's right in front of him without further hassle.) >(c) Did a human at AOL >intentionally block dearaol.com messages because of the content of the >mailings or was it entirely automatic because so many AOLers were >marking the alerts as spam? As anti-spam censorship gets more automation, it's getting harder and harder to tell whether a censorship decision was made by an explicit human command, or merely by a machine "learning" a pattern derived from explicit human commands about "related" messages. That's why it's quite important that these human command decisions be made UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE RECIPIENT. Not by some intermediary like AOL, which has its own axe to grind. >(b) Did dearaol.com borrow lists >from some of its member organizations like moveon.org that may have >less-than pristine list management practices? > >From: Suresh Ramasubramanian >moveon.org has never been noted for good list management, like the case >where they were inviting our ISP tech support staff, based out of hong >kong, to participate in a rally outside the white house (what, and pay >airfare + hotel for 8 people from hong kong to DC)? Ahem. Declan's last message to me, a San Francisco Politech member, was about a security seminar today in an anarchist bookstore in Baltimore. Report that man as a *s*p*a*m*m*e*r*! Anti-spammers have a long history of making up totally arbitrary demands, like blocking all your innocent emails if you happen to own a domain name which appears in bulk messages sent by somebody else. But calling you a spammer if your email list doesn't track your recipients' physical location -- and avoid sending messages to each person if responding would involve more than X kilometers of travel -- is utterly egregious. John Gilmore _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From declan at well.com Fri Apr 14 23:39:50 2006 From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 23:39:50 -0700 Subject: [Politech] The NYPD can take photos of you -- but you can't turn your lens on them [fs] Message-ID: What thuggish behavior. Kudos to the Village Voice for publicizing this. I've been accosted (though not arrested) for taking photos on public sidewalks/streets in Washington, DC. The two times that come to mind were before 9/11. Photos of the Feds in question: http://www.mccullagh.org/image/d30-5/capitol-police.html http://www.mccullagh.org/image/d30-5/pennsylvania-ave-setup-cop.html -Declan -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Politech Submission: The NYPD wants to take your picturebbut beware of turning your lens on the cops Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 10:43:35 -0400 From: John Albino To: declan at well.com >From the Village Voice of April 10: "Watching the Detectives "The NYPD wants to take your pictureB-but beware of turning your lens on the cops" "But police evidently aren't so keen on surveillance when the cameras are turned on themB-particularly when those cameras show them abusing free-street-parking privileges. "On March 27, two volunteers from the advocacy group Transportation Alternatives were detained for taking pictures of police officers' private cars, which were parked on the sidewalk outside the Fifth Precinct in Chinatown. The volunteers say they were held and questioned at the precinct for about 20 minutes and instructed to erase the pictures. ""It was intimidating. I was afraid they were going to arrest me," says Brian Hoberman, 37, who works as a researcher for the city's Rent Guidelines Board." -- John Albino mailto:jalbino(AT)jwalbino.com _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From declan at well.com Fri Apr 14 23:44:15 2006 From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh) Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 23:44:15 -0700 Subject: [Politech] Feds mull mandatory data retention laws for Internet service providers [priv] Message-ID: I've put a copy of the Colorado legislation here: http://www.politechbot.com/docs/colorado.data.retention.041206.pdf Previous Politech messages: http://www.politechbot.com/2005/06/16/feds-contemplate-forcing/ http://www.politechbot.com/2005/09/23/european-commission-proposes/ http://www.politechbot.com/p-02779.html -Declan --- http://news.com.com/ISP+snooping+gaining+support/2100-1028_3-6061187.html ISP snooping gaining support April 14, 2006, 4:03 AM PDT The explosive idea of forcing Internet providers to record their customers' online activities for future police access is gaining ground in state capitols and in Washington, D.C. Top Bush administration officials have endorsed the concept, and some members of the U.S. Congress have said federal legislation is needed to aid law enforcement investigations into child pornography. A bill is already pending in the Colorado State Senate. Mandatory data retention requirements worry privacy advocates because they permit police to obtain records of e-mail chatter, Web browsing or chat-room activity that normally would have been discarded after a few months. And some proposals would require providers to retain data that ordinarily never would have been kept at all. [...] Flint Waters, head of the Wyoming's Internet Crimes Against Children task force, also is pressing for federal data retention laws... "Individuals will activate their Webcam when they're abusing a child and they'll record the sexual assault live, and it may be 45 days before law enforcement finally gets notified," Waters said. "We reach out to service providers and they say they don't maintain those records, so the child remains in that environment, and there's nothing we can do to help them." [...] _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From schneier at COUNTERPANE.COM Fri Apr 14 23:14:09 2006 From: schneier at COUNTERPANE.COM (Bruce Schneier) Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2006 01:14:09 -0500 Subject: CRYPTO-GRAM, April 15, 2006 Message-ID: CRYPTO-GRAM April 15, 2006 by Bruce Schneier Founder and CTO Counterpane Internet Security, Inc. schneier at counterpane.com http://www.schneier.com http://www.counterpane.com A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and commentaries on security: computer and otherwise. For back issues, or to subscribe, visit . You can read this issue on the web at . These same essays appear in the "Schneier on Security" blog: . An RSS feed is available. ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* In this issue: Movie-Plot Threat Contest Airport Passenger Screening 80 Cameras for 2,400 People Crypto-Gram Reprints VOIP Encryption Security through Begging DHS Privacy and Integrity Report News KittenAuth Terrorism Risks of Google Earth New Kind of Door Lock Counterpane News Evading Copyright Through XOR iJacking Security Screening for New York Helicopters Comments from Readers ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* Movie-Plot Threat Contest NOTE: If you have a blog, please spread the word. For a while now, I have been writing about our penchant for "movie-plot threats": terrorist fears based on very specific attack scenarios. Terrorists with crop dusters, terrorists exploding baby carriages in subways, terrorists filling school buses with explosives -- these are all movie-plot threats. They're good for scaring people, but it's just silly to build national security policy around them. But if we're going to worry about unlikely attacks, why can't they be exciting and innovative ones? If Americans are going to be scared, shouldn't they be scared of things that are really scary? "Blowing up the Super Bowl" is a movie plot to be sure, but it's not a very good movie. Let's kick this up a notch. It is in this spirit I announce the (possibly First) Movie-Plot Threat Contest. Entrants are invited to submit the most unlikely, yet still plausible, terrorist attack scenarios they can come up with. Your goal: cause terror. Make the American people notice. Inflict lasting damage on the U.S. economy. Change the political landscape, or the culture. The more grandiose the goal, the better. Assume an attacker profile on the order of 9/11: 20 to 30 unskilled people, and about $500,000 with which to buy skills, equipment, etc. Post your movie plots here on this blog. Judging will be by me, swayed by popular acclaim in the blog comments section. The prize will be an autographed copy of Beyond Fear. And if I can swing it, a phone call with a real live movie producer. Entries close at the end of the month -- April 30. This is not an April Fool's joke, although it's in the spirit of the season. The purpose of this contest is absurd humor, but I hope it also makes a point. Terrorism is a real threat, but we're not any safer through security measures that require us to correctly guess what the terrorists are going to do next. Good luck. Post your entries, and read the others, here: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/04/announcing_movi.html Movie-plot threats: http://www.schneier.com/essay-087.html http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,175951,00.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/10/exploding_baby.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/02/school_bus_driv.html http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075765 There are hundreds of ideas here: http://cockeyed.com/citizen/terror/plans/terrorwatch.html ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* Airport Passenger Screening It seems like every time someone tests airport security, airport security fails. In tests between November 2001 and February 2002, screeners missed 70 percent of knives, 30 percent of guns, and 60 percent of (fake) bombs. And recently, testers were able to smuggle bomb-making parts through airport security in 21 of 21 attempts. It makes you wonder why we're all putting our laptops in a separate bin and taking off our shoes. (Although we should all be glad that Richard Reid wasn't the "underwear bomber.") The failure to detect bomb-making parts is easier to understand. Break up something into small enough parts, and it's going to slip past the screeners pretty easily. The explosive material won't show up on the metal detector, and the associated electronics can look benign when disassembled. This isn't even a new problem. It's widely believed that the Chechen women who blew up the two Russian planes in August 2004 probably smuggled their bombs aboard the planes in pieces. But guns and knives? That surprises most people. Airport screeners have a difficult job, primarily because the human brain isn't naturally adapted to the task. We're wired for visual pattern matching, and are great at picking out something we know to look for -- for example, a lion in a sea of tall grass. But we're much less adept at detecting random exceptions in uniform data. Faced with an endless stream of identical objects, the brain quickly concludes that everything is identical and there's no point in paying attention. By the time the exception comes around, the brain simply doesn't notice it. This psychological phenomenon isn't just a problem in airport screening: It's been identified in inspections of all kinds, and is why casinos move their dealers around so often. The tasks are simply mind-numbing. To make matters worse, the smuggler can try to exploit the system. He can position the weapons in his baggage just so. He can try to disguise them by adding other metal items to distract the screeners. He can disassemble bomb parts so they look nothing like bombs. Against a bored screener, he has the upper hand. And, as has been pointed out again and again in essays on the ludicrousness of post-9/11 airport security, improvised weapons are a huge problem. A rock, a battery for a laptop, a belt, the extension handle off a wheeled suitcase, fishing line, the bare hands of someone who knows karate...the list goes on and on. Technology can help. X-ray machines already randomly insert "test" bags into the stream -- keeping screeners more alert. Computer-enhanced displays are making it easier for screeners to find contraband items in luggage, and eventually the computers will be able to do most of the work. It makes sense: Computers excel at boring repetitive tasks. They should do the quick sort, and let the screeners deal with the exceptions. Sure, there'll be a lot of false alarms, and some bad things will still get through. But it's better than the alternative. And it's likely good enough. Remember the point of passenger screening. We're not trying to catch the clever, organized, well-funded terrorists. We're trying to catch the amateurs and the incompetent. We're trying to catch the unstable. We're trying to catch the copycats. These are all legitimate threats, and we're smart to defend against them. Against the professionals, we're just trying to add enough uncertainty into the system that they'll choose other targets instead. The terrorists' goals have nothing to do with airplanes; their goals are to cause terror. Blowing up an airplane is just a particular attack designed to achieve that goal. Airplanes deserve some additional security because they have catastrophic failure properties: If there's even a small explosion, everyone on the plane dies. But there's a diminishing return on investments in airplane security. If the terrorists switch targets from airplanes to shopping malls, we haven't really solved the problem. What that means is that a basic cursory screening is good enough. If I were investing in security, I would fund significant research into computer-assisted screening equipment for both checked and carry-on bags, but wouldn't spend a lot of money on invasive screening procedures and secondary screening. I would much rather have well-trained security personnel wandering around the airport, both in and out of uniform, looking for suspicious actions. When I travel in Europe, I never have to take my laptop out of its case or my shoes off my feet. Those governments have had far more experience with terrorism than the U.S. government, and they know when passenger screening has reached the point of diminishing returns. (They also implemented checked-baggage security measures decades before the United States did -- again recognizing the real threat.) And if I were investing in security, I would invest in intelligence and investigation. The best time to combat terrorism is before the terrorist tries to get on an airplane. The best countermeasures have value regardless of the nature of the terrorist plot or the particular terrorist target. In some ways, if we're relying on airport screeners to prevent terrorism, it's already too late. After all, we can't keep weapons out of prisons. How can we ever hope to keep them out of airports? http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/03/25/airport.security/ http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11863165/ http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11878391/ A version of this essay originally appeared on Wired.com. http://www.wired.com/news/columns/0,70470-0.html ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* 80 Cameras for 2,400 People The remote town of Dillingham, Alaska is probably the most watched town in the country. There are 80 surveillance cameras for the 2,400 people, which translates to one camera for every 30 people. The cameras were bought, I assume, because the town couldn't think of anything else to do with the $202,000 Homeland Security grant they received. (One of the problems of giving this money out based on political agenda, rather than by where the actual threats are.) But they got the money, and they spent it. And now they have to justify the expense. Here's the movie-plot threat the Dillingham Police Chief uses to explain why the expense was worthwhile: "'Russia is about 800 miles that way,' he says, arm extending right. "'Seattle is about 1,200 miles back that way.' He points behind him. "'So if I have the math right, we're closer to Russia than we are to Seattle.' "Now imagine, he says: What if the bad guys, whoever they are, manage to obtain a nuclear device in Russia, where some weapons are believed to be poorly guarded. They put the device in a container and then hire organized criminals, 'maybe Mafiosi,' to arrange a tramp steamer to pick it up. The steamer drops off the container at the Dillingham harbor, complete with forged paperwork to ship it to Seattle. The container is picked up by a barge. "'Ten days later,' the chief says, 'the barge pulls into the Port of Seattle.' "Thompson pauses for effect. "'Phoooom," he says, his hands blooming like a flower." The first problem with the movie plot is that it's just plain silly. But the second problem, which you might have to look back to notice, is that those 80 cameras will do nothing to stop his imagined attack. We are all security consumers. We spend money, and we expect security in return. This expenditure was a waste of money, and as a U.S. taxpayer, I am pissed that I'm getting such a lousy deal. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-secure28mar28,0,275 8659,full.story or http://tinyurl.com/ocfan ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* Crypto-Gram Reprints Crypto-Gram is currently in its ninth year of publication. Back issues cover a variety of security-related topics, and can all be found on . These are a selection of articles that appeared in this calendar month in other years. Mitigating Identity Theft: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0504.html#2 Hacking the Papal Election: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0504.html#8 National ID Cards: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0404.html#1 Stealing an Election: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0404.html#4 Automated Denial-of-Service Attacks Using the U.S. Post Office: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0304.html#1 National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Database Accuracy: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0304.html#7 How to Think About Security: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#1 Is 1028 Bits Enough? http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#3 Liability and Security http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#6 Natural Advantages of Defense: What Military History Can Teach Network Security, Part 1 http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0104.html#1 UCITA: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0004.html#ucita Cryptography: The Importance of Not Being Different: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9904.html#different Threats Against Smart Cards: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9904.html#smartcards Attacking Certificates with Computer Viruses: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9904.html#certificates ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* VOIP Encryption There are basically four ways to eavesdrop on a telephone call. One, you can listen in on another phone extension. This is the method preferred by siblings everywhere. If you have the right access, it's the easiest. While it doesn't work for cell phones, cordless phones are vulnerable to a variant of this attack: A radio receiver set to the right frequency can act as another extension. Two, you can attach some eavesdropping equipment to the wire with a pair of alligator clips. It takes some expertise, but you can do it anywhere along the phone line's path -- even outside the home. This used to be the way the police eavesdropped on your phone line. These days it's probably most often used by criminals. This method doesn't work for cell phones, either. Three, you can eavesdrop at the telephone switch. Modern phone equipment includes the ability for someone to listen in this way. Currently, this is the preferred police method. It works for both land lines and cell phones. You need the right access, but if you can get it, this is probably the most comfortable way to eavesdrop on a particular person. Four, you can tap the main trunk lines, eavesdrop on the microwave or satellite phone links, etc. It's hard to eavesdrop on one particular person this way, but it's easy to listen in on a large chunk of telephone calls. This is the sort of big-budget surveillance that organizations like the National Security Agency do best. They've even been known to use submarines to tap undersea phone cables. That's basically the entire threat model for traditional phone calls. And when most people think about IP telephony -- voice over internet protocol, or VOIP -- that's the threat model they probably have in their heads. Unfortunately, phone calls from your computer are fundamentally different from phone calls from your telephone. Internet telephony's threat model is much closer to the threat model for IP-networked computers than the threat model for telephony. And we already know the threat model for IP. Data packets can be eavesdropped on *anywhere* along the transmission path. Data packets can be intercepted in the corporate network, by the internet service provider and along the backbone. They can be eavesdropped on by the people or organizations that own those computers, and they can be eavesdropped on by anyone who has successfully hacked into those computers. They can be vacuumed up by nosy hackers, criminals, competitors and governments. It's comparable to threat No. 3 above, but with the scope vastly expanded. My greatest worry is the criminal attacks. We already have seen how clever criminals have become over the past several years at stealing account information and personal data. I can imagine them eavesdropping on attorneys, looking for information with which to blackmail people. I can imagine them eavesdropping on bankers, looking for inside information with which to make stock purchases. I can imagine them stealing account information, hijacking telephone calls, committing identity theft. On the business side, I can see them engaging in industrial espionage and stealing trade secrets. In short, I can imagine them doing all the things they could never have done with the traditional telephone network. This is why encryption for VOIP is so important. VOIP calls are vulnerable to a variety of threats that traditional telephone calls are not. Encryption is one of the essential security technologies for computer data, and it will go a long way toward securing VOIP. The last time this sort of thing came up, the U.S. government tried to sell us something called "key escrow." Basically, the government likes the idea of everyone using encryption, as long as it has a copy of the key. This is an amazingly insecure idea for a number of reasons, mostly boiling down to the fact that when you provide a means of access into a security system, you greatly weaken its security. A recent case in Greece demonstrated that perfectly: Criminals used a cell-phone eavesdropping mechanism already in place, designed for the police to listen in on phone calls. Had the call system been designed to be secure in the first place, there never would have been a backdoor for the criminals to exploit. Fortunately, there are many VOIP-encryption products available. Skype has built-in encryption. Phil Zimmermann is releasing Zfone, an easy-to-use open-source product. There's even a VOIP Security Alliance. Encryption for IP telephony is important, but it's not a panacea. Basically, it takes care of threats No. 2 through No. 4, but not threat No. 1. Unfortunately, that's the biggest threat: eavesdropping at the end points. No amount of IP telephony encryption can prevent a Trojan or worm on your computer -- or just a hacker who managed to get access to your machine -- from eavesdropping on your phone calls, just as no amount of SSL or e-mail encryption can prevent a Trojan on your computer from eavesdropping -- or even modifying -- your data. So, as always, it boils down to this: We need secure computers and secure operating systems even more than we need secure transmission. Why key escrow is a bad idea: http://www.schneier.com/paper-key-escrow.html Greek wiretapping story: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/02/phone_tapping_i.html Zfone: http://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/zfone/index.html http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70524-0.html VOIP Security Alliance: http://www.voipsa.org/ This essay originally appeared on Wired.com. http://www.wired.com/news/columns/1,70591-0.html ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* Security through Begging >From TechDirt: "Last summer, the surprising news came out that Japanese nuclear secrets leaked out, after a contractor was allowed to connect his personal virus-infested computer to the network at a nuclear power plant. The contractor had a file sharing app on his laptop as well, and suddenly nuclear secrets were available to plenty of kids just trying to download the latest hit single. It's only taken about nine months for the government to come up with its suggestion on how to prevent future leaks of this nature: begging all Japanese citizens not to use file sharing systems -- so that the next time this happens, there won't be anyone on the network to download such documents." Even if their begging works, it solves the wrong problem. Sad. Article: http://techdirt.com/articles/20060316/0052241.shtml Original article: http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20050623/0251255.shtml Government suggestion: http://mdn.mainichi-msn.co.jp/national/news/20060315p2a00m0na017000c.htm l or http://tinyurl.com/pejx2 Another article: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-computer21mar21,0,51 59274.story or http://tinyurl.com/fmvlb ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* DHS Privacy and Integrity Report Last year, the Department of Homeland Security finally got around to appointing its DHS Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee. It was mostly made up of industry insiders instead of anyone with any real privacy experience. (Lance Hoffman from George Washington University was the most notable exception.) And now, we have something from that committee. On March 7th they published their Framework for Privacy Analysis of Programs, Technologies, and Applications. It's surprisingly good. I like that it is a series of questions a program manager has to answer: about the legal basis for the program, its efficacy against the threat, and its effects on privacy. I am particularly pleased that their questions on pages 3-4 are very similar to the "five steps" I wrote about in Beyond Fear. I am thrilled that the document takes a "trade-off" approach; the last question asks: "Should the program proceed? Do the benefits of the program...justify the costs to privacy interests....?" I think this is a good starting place for any technology or program with respect to security and privacy. And I hope the DHS actually follows the recommendations in this report. Committee: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0512.xml http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0598.xml Framework for Privacy Analysis of Programs, Technologies, and Applications http://www.privacilla.org/releases/DHS_Privacy_Framework.pdf My five steps: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#1 ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* News Of course RFID chips can carry viruses. They're just little computers. http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060315-6386.html I thought the attack vector was interesting: a Trojan RFID attacks the central database, rather than attacking other RFID chips directly. Metaphorically, it's a lot closer to biological viruses, because it actually requires the more powerful host to be subverted, and there's no way an infected tag can propagate directly to another tag. The coverage is more than a tad sensationalist, though. http://www.computerworld.com/mobiletopics/mobile/story/0,10801,109560,00 .html or http://tinyurl.com/mwz88 Movie theaters want to jam cell phones. http://www.mobiletracker.net/archives/2006/03/15/movie-theater-jamming http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0324/p11s01-almo.html Massive surveillance in an online gaming world. http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2006/03/confessions_of_.html Yossi Oren and Adi Shamir have written a paper describing a power attack against RFID tags. This is great work by Yossi Oren and Adi Shamir. From the abstract: "Power Analysis of RFID Tags: Compared to standard power analysis attacks, this attack is unique in that it requires no physical contact with the device under attack. While the specific attack described here requires the attacker to actually transmit data to the tag under attack, the power analysis part itself requires only a receive antenna. This means that a variant of this attack can be devised such that the attacker is completely passive while it is acquiring the data, making the attack very hard to detect." My prediction of the industry's response: downplay the results and pretend it's not a problem. http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/%7Eyossio/rfid/ The 3rd Annual Nigerian E-mail Conference. Funny. http://j-walk.com/other/conf/index.htm The chairman of Qantas was stopped at airport security. She had airplane blueprints. Oh, and she was a woman -- which cast immediate suspicion on her story. http://www.aero-news.net/Community/DiscussTopic.cfm?TopicID=2648&Refresh=1 Really good article by a reporter who has been covering improvised explosive devices in Iraq: http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002238.html There are some deliberately fake 300, 600, and 1000 euro notes being made in Germany as an advertisement. They're being passed as real: http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm_1760580.html This is why security is so hard: people. Really interesting article by Robert X. Cringely on the lack of federal funding for security technologies. I think his analysis is dead on. http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/pulpit20060309.html Australian bank fraud: I really wish this article had more details about the crime. Basically, a criminal ring used an authentication failure with fax transmissions to steal (unsuccessfully, as it turned out) $150 million Australian dollars. http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2006/03/17/1142582520870.html Rare outbreak of security common sense in London. They're rejecting passenger screening in their subways. http://www.kablenet.com/kd.nsf/Frontpage/85C58F53F411521180257132005EF49 F?OpenDocument or http://tinyurl.com/nrmpr Who needs terrorists? We can cause terror all by ourselves. http://www.postgazette.com/pg/06081/674773.stm The story is about a huge security overreaction because some worker in a downtown building was using a pellet gun to scare pigeons. "Terrorist with Nuke" movie plot. It sounds like this New Scientist writer is trying to write a novel. http://archinect.com/news/article.php?id=35501_0_24_15_M Enigma? I don't know what this is, but it sure looks a lot like an Enigma. And it's beautiful. http://www.tatjavanvark.nl/tvv1/pht10.html A couple -- living together, I assume -- and engaged to be married shared a computer. He used Firefox to visit a bunch of dating sites, being smart enough not to have the browser save his password. But Firefox did save the names of the sites it was told never to save the password for. She happened to stumble on this list. The details are left to the imagination, but they broke up. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=330884 Most interesting bug report I've ever read. Creative Home Engineering can make secret doors and hidden passageways for your home. "Pull a favorite book from your library shelf and watch a cabinet section recess to reveal a hidden passageway. Twist a candlestick and your fireplace rotates, granting access to a hidden room." Who cares about the security properties? I want one. http://www.hiddenpassageway.com/ Encryption using quasars: http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=30553 http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/quasar_encrypti.html A hacker working for al Qaeda, called Irhabi 007, has been captured. Assuming the British authorities are to be believed, he definitely was a terrorist. And he used the Internet, both as a communication tool and to break into networks. But this does not make him a cyberterrorist. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/25/AR200603 2500020.html or http://tinyurl.com/rtlda http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/03/26/0530206 The police used profiles on MySpace to identify six suspects in a rape/robbery. http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/03/25/my.space.ap/index.html Chameleon weapons: you can't detect them, because they look normal: http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002265.html An Economic Analysis of Airport Security Screening. The authors use game theory to investigate the optimal screening policy, in a scenario when there are different social groups (separated by felons, race, religion, etc.) with different preferences for crime and/or terrorism. http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~persico/research/Papers/airportaea11.pdf Cubicle Farms are a Terrorism Risk The British security service MI5 is warning business leaders that their offices are probably badly designed against terrorist bombs. The common modern office consists of large rooms without internal walls, which puts employees at greater risk in the event of terrorist bombs. http://news.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=419082006 I don't know if this "Internet Hash Project" is an April Fool's Day joke, but it's funny all the same. http://www.nethash.org/ Last month the Government Accounting Office released three new reports on homeland security. "Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System." http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-591T Highlights: http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d06591thigh.pdf "Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the National Capital Region." http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-559T Highlights: http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d06559thigh.pdf "Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on Department's Management of Information Technology." http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-598T Highlights: http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d06598thigh.pdf It's a really clever idea: bolts and latches that fasten and unfasten in response to remote computer commands. But the security comment is funny: "But everything is locked down with codes, and the radio signals are scrambled, so this is fully secured against hackers." Clearly this guy knows nothing about computer security. http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0603300225mar30,1,7805363.sto ry or http://tinyurl.com/rtoxc http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/04/03/0624225 Interesting paper on phishing, and why it works. http://www.deas.harvard.edu/~rachna/papers/why_phishing_works.pdf Undercover investigators were able to smuggle radioactive materials into the U.S. It set off alarms at border checkpoints, but the smugglers had forged import licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, based on an image of the real document they found on the Internet. Unfortunately, the border agents had no way to confirm the validity of import licenses. I've written about this problem before, and it's one I think will get worse in the future. Verification systems are often the weakest link of authentication. Improving authentication tokens won't improve security unless the verification systems improve as well. http://www-tech.mit.edu/V125/N1/long4_1.1w.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/01/forged_credenti.html Security applications of time-reversed acoustics. I simply don't have the science to evaluate this. http://www.physorg.com/news12093.html Iowa lawmakers are proposing "I'm Not the Criminal You're Looking For" card, for victims of identity theft. I think it's a great idea, and it reminds me of something I wrote about in Beyond Fear: "In Singapore, some names are so common that the police issue He's-not-the-guy-we're-looking-for documents exonerating innocent people with the same names as wanted criminals." It's not perfect. Of course it will be forged; all documents are forged. This is a still good idea, even though it's not perfect. http://news.com.com/Iowa+proposes+ID+theft+passport/2100-7348_3-6052308. html or http://tinyurl.com/qq8dj Good information from EPIC on the security of tax data in the IRS. http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0306/ A man in the UK was detained for singing along with a Clash song. Basically, his taxi driver turned him in. http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=entertainmentNews& storyID=2006-04-05T134826Z_01_L05785309_RTRUKOC_0_UK-CLASH.xml or http://tinyurl.com/e6nr6 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/4879918.stm I was in New York earlier this month, and I saw a sign at the entrance to the Midtown Tunnel that said: "See something? Say something." The problem with a nation of amateur spies is that it results in these sorts of results. "I know he's a terrorist because he's dressing funny and he always has white wires hanging out of his pocket." "They all talk in a funny language and their cooking smells bad." Amateur spies perform amateur spying. If everybody does it, the false alarms will overwhelm the police. You've all heard of the "No Fly List." Did you know that there's a "No-Buy List" as well? http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/08/AR200604 0800157.html or http://tinyurl.com/ofz2y The list: http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf Last week the San Francisco Chronicle broke the story that Air Force One's defenses were exposed on a public Internet site: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/04/08/MNGESI5U6C1. DTL&hw=Air+Force+One&sn=002&sc=217 or http://tinyurl.com/pbro5 http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/04/11/MNGK3I7A6 41.DTL or http://tinyurl.com/r46g7 Despite all the breathless reporting, turns out this is no big deal: http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002315.html The Air Force removed the document, but I'm not sure it didn't do more harm than good. Another news report: http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/view.php?StoryID=20060411-013024-5870r Several conservative blogs criticized the Chronicle for publishing this, because it gives the terrorists more information. I think they should be criticized for publishing this, because there's no story here. Much of the document is here. http://cryptome.org/af1-rescue.htm Stolen military goods are being sold in the markets in Afghanistan, including hard drives filled with classified data. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-disks10apr10,0,58549 05,full.story or http://tinyurl.com/nhzgz http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5338506 What if your vendor won't sell you a security upgrade? Good article: http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2006/041006snyder.html Really nice social engineering example. Watch an escaped convict convince a police officer he's not that guy. Note his repeated efforts to ensure that if he's stopped again, he can rely on the cop to vouch for him. http://www.salon.com/ent/video_dog/media/2006/04/10/escaped_murderer/ind ex.html or http://tinyurl.com/nv6u2 Intersting technical details about NSA's warrantless surveillance, and AT&T's help: http://www.wired.com/news/technology/1,70619-0.html http://dailykos.com/storyonly/2006/4/8/14724/28476/ http://amygdalagf.blogspot.com/2006/04/hepting-vs.html ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* KittenAuth You've all seen CAPTCHAs. Those are those distorted pictures of letters and numbers you sometimes see on web forms. The idea is that it's hard for computers to identify the characters, but easy for people to do. The goal of CAPTCHAs is to authenticate that there's a person sitting in front of the computer. KittenAuth works with images. The system shows you nine pictures of cute little animals, and the person authenticates himself by clicking on the three kittens. A computer clicking at random has only a 1 in 84 chance of guessing correctly. Of course you could increase the security by adding more images or requiring the person to choose more images. Another worry -- which I didn't see mentioned -- is that the computer could brute-force a static database. If there are only a small fixed number of actual kittens, the computer could be told -- by a person -- that they're kittens. Then, the computer would know that whenever it sees that image it's a kitten. Still, it's an interesting idea that warrants more research. KittenAuth: http://www.thepcspy.com/articles/security/the_cutest_humantest_kittenaut h or http://tinyurl.com/o2585 CAPTCHAs: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Captcha ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* Terrorism Risks of Google Earth Sometimes I wonder about "security experts." Here's one who thinks Google Earth is a terrorism risk because it allows people to learn the GPS coordinates of soccer stadiums. Basically, Klaus Dieter Matschke is worried because Google Earth provides the location of buildings within 20 meters, whereas before coordinates had an error range of one kilometer. He's worried that this information will provide terrorists with the exact target coordinates for missile attacks. I have no idea how anyone could print this drivel. Anyone can attend a football game with a GPS receiver in his pocket and get the coordinates down to one meter. Or buy a map. Google Earth is not the problem; the problem is the availability of short-range missiles on the black market. http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/71784 English blog entry on the topic: http://www.ministryofpropaganda.co.uk/2006propaganda/20060409-googleeart h.shtml or http://tinyurl.com/lpay3 ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* New Kind of Door Lock There's a new kind of door lock from the Israeli company E-Lock. It responds to sound. Instead of carrying a key, you carry a small device that makes a series of quick knocking sounds. Just touching it to the door causes the door to open; there's no keyhole. The device, called a "KnocKey," has a keypad and can be programmed to require a PIN before operation -- for even greater security. Clever idea, but there's the usual security hyperbole: "Since there is no keyhole or contact point on the door, this unique mechanism offers a significantly higher level of security than existing technology." More accurate would be to say that the security vulnerabilities are different from existing technology. We know a lot about the vulnerabilities of conventional locks, but we know very little about the security of this system. But don't confuse this lack of knowledge with increased security. http://www.elock.co.il/tech-english.asp ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* Counterpane News Bruce Schneier is speaking at the Symposium on Business Information Security, on April 21 in Minneapolis: https://www.minneapolis.edu/sobis/files_pdf/SoBIS2006-Flyer.pdf Bruce Schneier is speaking at CardTech/SecureTech, on May 3rd, in San Francisco. http://www.ctst.com/conferences/CTST06/ Bruce Schneier and Toby Weir-Jones spoke at the InfoWorld Webcast entitled Managed Compliance Reporting: Best Practices to Streamline Device Management & Demonstrate Compliance. Rebroadcast is available. http://w.on24.com/r.htm?e=21082&s=1&k=9A69DBFE212400FB9B547D40A596F856&p artnerref=CIS1 or http://tinyurl.com/lzxab Counterpane is hiring. Among other things, we're looking for a database and systems analyst, a senior Java software engineer, and a SOC intelligence officer. http://www.counterpane.com/jobs.html ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* Evading Copyright Through XOR Monolith is an open-source program that can XOR two files together to create a third file, and -- of course -- can XOR that third file with one of the original two to create the other original file. The website wonders about the copyright implications of all of this: "Things get interesting when you apply Monolith to copyrighted files. For example, munging two copyrighted files will produce a completely new file that, in most cases, contains no information from either file. In other words, the resulting Mono file is not "owned" by the original copyright holders (if owned at all, it would be owned by the person who did the munging). Given that the Mono file can be combined with either of the original, copyrighted files to reconstruct the other copyrighted file, this lack of Mono ownership may be seem hard to believe." The website then postulates this as a mechanism to get around copyright law: "What does this mean? This means that Mono files can be freely distributed. "So what? Mono files are useless without their corresponding Basis files, right? And the Basis files are copyrighted too, so they cannot be freely distributed, right? There is one more twist to this idea. What happens when we use Basis files that are freely distributable? For example, we could use a Basis file that is in the public domain or one that is licensed for free distribution. Now we are getting somewhere. "None of the aforementioned properties of Mono files change when we use freely distributable Basis files, since the same arguments hold. Mono files are still not copyrighted by the people who hold the copyrights over the corresponding Element files. Now we can freely distribute Mono files and Basis files. "Interesting? Not really. But what you can do with these files, in the privacy of your own home, might be interesting, depending on your proclivities. For example, you can use the Mono files and the Basis files to reconstruct the Element files." Clever, but it won't hold up in court. In general, technical hair splitting is not an effective way to get around the law. My guess is that anyone who distributes that third file -- they call it a "Mono" file -- along with instructions on how to recover the copyrighted file is going to be found guilty of copyright violation. The correct way to solve this problem is through law, not technology. http://monolith.sourceforge.net/ ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* iJacking It's called iJacking: grabbing laptops out of their owners' hands and then run away. There seems to be a wave of this type of crime at Internet cafes in San Francisco. It's obvious why these thefts are occurring. Laptops are valuable, easy to steal, and easy to fence. If we want to "solve" this problem, we need to modify at least one of those characteristics. Some Internet cafes are providing locking cables for their patrons, in an attempt to make them harder to steal. But that will only mean that the muggers will follow their victims out of the cafes. Laptops will become less valuable over time, but that really isn't a good solution. The only thing left is to make them harder to fence. This isn't an easy problem. There are a bunch of companies that make solutions that help people recover stolen laptops. There are programs that "phone home" if a laptop is stolen. There are programs that hide a serial number on the hard drive somewhere. There are non-removable tags users can affix to their computers with ID information. But until this kind of thing becomes common, the crimes will continue. Reminds me of the problem of bicycle thefts. http://www.sfbg.com/40/25/news_ijacked.html ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* Security Screening for New York Helicopters There's a helicopter shuttle that runs from Lower Manhattan to Kennedy Airport. It's basically a luxury item: for $139 you can avoid the drive to the airport. But, of course, security screeners are required for passengers, and that's causing some concern: "At the request of U.S. Helicopter's executives, the federal Transportation Security Administration set up a checkpoint, with X-ray and bomb-detection machines, to screen passengers and their luggage at the heliport. "The security agency is spending $560,000 this year to operate the checkpoint with a staff of eight screeners and is considering adding a checkpoint at the heliport at the east end of 34th Street. The agency's involvement has drawn criticism from some elected officials. "'The bottom line here is that there are not enough screeners to go around, ' said Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York. 'The fact that we are taking screeners that are needed at airports to satisfy a luxury market on the government's dime is a problem. '" This is not a security problem; it's an economics problem. And it's a good illustration of the concept of "externalities." An externality is an effect of a decision not borne by the decision-maker. In this example, U.S. Helicopter made a business decision to offer this service at a certain price. And customers will make a decision about whether or not the service is worth the money. But there is more to the cost than the $139. The cost of that checkpoint is an externality to both U.S. Helicopter and its customers, because the $560,000 spent on the security checkpoint is paid for by taxpayers. Taxpayers are effectively subsidizing the true cost of the helicopter trip. The only way to solve this is for the government to bill the airline passengers for the cost of security screening. It wouldn't be much per ticket, maybe $15. And it would be much less at major airports, because the economies of scale are so much greater. The article even points out that customers would gladly pay the extra $15 because of another externality: the people who decide whether or not to take the helicopter trip are not the people actually paying for it. "Bobby Weiss, a self-employed stock trader and real estate broker who was U.S. Helicopter's first paying customer yesterday, said he would pay $300 for a round trip to Kennedy, and he expected most corporate executives would, too. "'It's $300, but so what? It goes on the expense account, ' said Mr. Weiss, adding that he had no qualms about the diversion of federal resources to smooth the path of highfliers. 'Maybe a richer guy may save a little time at the expense of a poorer guy who spends a little more time in line. '" What Mr. Weiss is saying is that the costs -- both the direct cost and the cost of the security checkpoint -- are externalities to him, so he really doesn't care. Exactly. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/06/nyregion/06chopper.html?ex=1296882000& en=1e835454a0fea1c9&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss or http://tinyurl.com/lebvf ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* Comments from Readers There are hundreds of comments -- many of them interesting -- on these topics on my blog. Search for the story you want to comment on, and join in. http://www.schneier.com/blog ** *** ***** ******* *********** ************* CRYPTO-GRAM is a free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and commentaries on security: computer and otherwise. You can subscribe, unsubscribe, or change your address on the Web at . Back issues are also available at that URL. Comments on CRYPTO-GRAM should be sent to schneier at counterpane.com. Permission to print comments is assumed unless otherwise stated. Comments may be edited for length and clarity. Please feel free to forward CRYPTO-GRAM to colleagues and friends who will find it valuable. Permission is granted to reprint CRYPTO-GRAM, as long as it is reprinted in its entirety. CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier. Schneier is the author of the best sellers "Beyond Fear," "Secrets and Lies," and "Applied Cryptography," and an inventor of the Blowfish and Twofish algorithms. He is founder and CTO of Counterpane Internet Security Inc., and is a member of the Advisory Board of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). He is a frequent writer and lecturer on security topics. See . Counterpane is the world's leading protector of networked information - the inventor of outsourced security monitoring and the foremost authority on effective mitigation of emerging IT threats. Counterpane protects networks for Fortune 1000 companies and governments world-wide. See . Crypto-Gram is a personal newsletter. Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of Counterpane Internet Security, Inc. Copyright (c) 2006 by Bruce Schneier. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From eugen at leitl.org Sat Apr 15 02:00:00 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2006 11:00:00 +0200 Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] Feds mull mandatory data retention laws for Internet service providers [priv]] Message-ID: <20060415090000.GB31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh ----- From eugen at leitl.org Sat Apr 15 02:00:08 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2006 11:00:08 +0200 Subject: [schneier@COUNTERPANE.COM: CRYPTO-GRAM, April 15, 2006] Message-ID: <20060415090008.GD31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Bruce Schneier ----- From eugen at leitl.org Sat Apr 15 02:00:33 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2006 11:00:33 +0200 Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] The NYPD can take photos of you -- but you can't turn your lens on them [fs]] Message-ID: <20060415090033.GE31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh ----- From eugen at leitl.org Sat Apr 15 02:01:45 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2006 11:01:45 +0200 Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] John Gilmore on DearAOL.com and user control of spam filtering [sp]] Message-ID: <20060415090145.GG31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh ----- From camera_lumina at hotmail.com Sat Apr 15 10:07:02 2006 From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden) Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2006 13:07:02 -0400 Subject: [declan@well.com: [Politech] The NYPD can take photos of you -- but you can' In-Reply-To: <20060415090033.GE31486@leitl.org> Message-ID: Time for eJazeera! The answer is obvious: Ubiquitous default instant wireless upload of photos to the internet. This is a battle they can't, in the long run, win. -TD >From: Eugen Leitl >To: cypherpunks at jfet.org >Subject: [declan at well.com: [Politech] The NYPD can take photos of you -- >but you can't turn your lens on them [fs]] >Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2006 11:00:33 +0200 > >----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh ----- > >From: Declan McCullagh >Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 23:39:50 -0700 >To: Politech >Subject: [Politech] The NYPD can take photos of you -- but you can't turn > your lens on them [fs] >User-Agent: Thunderbird 1.5 (Macintosh/20051201) > >What thuggish behavior. Kudos to the Village Voice for publicizing this. > >I've been accosted (though not arrested) for taking photos on public >sidewalks/streets in Washington, DC. The two times that come to mind >were before 9/11. Photos of the Feds in question: >http://www.mccullagh.org/image/d30-5/capitol-police.html >http://www.mccullagh.org/image/d30-5/pennsylvania-ave-setup-cop.html > >-Declan > >-------- Original Message -------- >Subject: Politech Submission: The NYPD wants to take your picturebbut >beware of turning your lens on the cops >Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 10:43:35 -0400 >From: John Albino >To: declan at well.com > >From the Village Voice of April 10: > >"Watching the Detectives >"The NYPD wants to take your pictureB-but beware >of turning your lens on the cops" > > > >"But police evidently aren't so keen on >surveillance when the cameras are turned on >themB-particularly when those cameras show them >abusing free-street-parking privileges. > >"On March 27, two volunteers from the advocacy >group Transportation Alternatives were detained >for taking pictures of police officers' private >cars, which were parked on the sidewalk outside >the Fifth Precinct in Chinatown. The volunteers >say they were held and questioned at the precinct >for about 20 minutes and instructed to erase the pictures. > >""It was intimidating. I was afraid they were >going to arrest me," says Brian Hoberman, 37, who >works as a researcher for the city's Rent Guidelines Board." >-- >John Albino >mailto:jalbino(AT)jwalbino.com > > > >_______________________________________________ >Politech mailing list >Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ >Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) > >----- End forwarded message ----- >-- >Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org >______________________________________________________________ >ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com >8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE > >[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which >had a name of signature.asc] From confucian at gobiernofederal.com Sat Apr 15 16:52:06 2006 From: confucian at gobiernofederal.com (Jennifer Brooks) Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2006 15:52:06 -0800 Subject: Important Information: (Application Confirmation) Message-ID: <187.83@178.dyn.conquest.edu> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1018 bytes Desc: not available URL: From gcrxydsekeaaa at terrapath.com Sat Apr 15 16:55:13 2006 From: gcrxydsekeaaa at terrapath.com (Dickinson Blanca ) Date: Sat, 15 Apr 2006 22:55:13 -0100 Subject: Just read what our customer has to say Message-ID: <680310620547.SPB44533uokwtigutdzay@terrapath.com> The Only online pharmacy verified by BBB and approved by Visa Seal of Confidence Quality meds at quality prices, and shipping so discrete that comes fast at your doorstep Please give us an opportunity fo check us http://oquodu.warmsand.net/?kqwghteksfjo not interested? you can out-out at our website From clarke at bristolparkmed.com Sun Apr 16 12:11:11 2006 From: clarke at bristolparkmed.com (Ernie Betts) Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2006 13:11:11 -0600 Subject: Ratess will skyrocket soon Message-ID: <6.9.2.4.8.13050412962759.319a7768@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1202 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: waterline.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 7236 bytes Desc: not available URL: From miller.parmenterqr4 at gmail.com Sun Apr 16 20:25:36 2006 From: miller.parmenterqr4 at gmail.com (Bennie Ames) Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2006 18:25:36 -0900 Subject: increase in sexual desire Message-ID: <200604160925.k3G9Pcro013356@proton.jfet.org> Carefully chosen herbal ingredients are the key to peniis enlargement success. Not only the precise blend of ingredients but also many other factors have effect on the overall potency and strength of peniis enlargement formula. Some of these factors include growing conditions, geographical location where herbs are grown, harvest time, the way herbs are stored before processing, the way herbs are processed. http://ndnti.virtualgalleryart.com/pp 44i From finch at aav.com Sun Apr 16 21:13:09 2006 From: finch at aav.com (Sonya Woody) Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2006 22:13:09 -0600 Subject: Notification: Loww ratess Message-ID: <9.9.8.9.2.66721099747665.332a7627@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1193 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: bilk.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 7236 bytes Desc: not available URL: From sacupb at homesyoulllove.com Sun Apr 16 21:19:30 2006 From: sacupb at homesyoulllove.com (Dana Russo) Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2006 23:19:30 -0500 Subject: Fwd: A totally new way to enjoy SEX! Message-ID: a magical creature while the rumors aren't entirely clear, it is probably not a As individuals, the age of technology affects each person in With respect to the affects of technology on society, we have people who think they know what s best perhaps while the restyour car's dashboard lighter socket, standard interfaces that -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 993 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: lotte.gif Type: image/gif Size: 7523 bytes Desc: not available URL: From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz Sun Apr 16 08:22:21 2006 From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2006 03:22:21 +1200 Subject: [Clips] Letting the IRS Do Your Taxes for You In-Reply-To: Message-ID: "R.A. Hettinga" forwarded: >Imagine that filing your tax return was as simple as receiving a completed >form from the Internal Revenue Service, signing it, then waiting for a refund >or writing a check. Some countries have been doing it this way for years. For most wage-earners all you get is a year-end statement from the tax department telling you how much you owe or will get back, and that's it. Saves both the tax people and the masses a lot of unnecessary work (and since the US 1040 form is the most horrific tax form of any country I've ever seen, it'd save even more work there). The only people who then still need to manually submit paperwork are ones with irregular incomes, if you've made a tax-free donation, or there's some other irregularity not handled by the automated system. Peter. From malawi at tegucigalpa.com Sun Apr 16 19:31:55 2006 From: malawi at tegucigalpa.com (Joyce Witt) Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2006 08:31:55 +0600 Subject: our huge jackpots are truly unbeatable. Message-ID: <200512241460.i93NarTw002687@www5.gmail.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 584 bytes Desc: not available URL: From imimnjm at southtexasranches.com Mon Apr 17 13:17:47 2006 From: imimnjm at southtexasranches.com (Forrest Lindsay ) Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2006 15:17:47 -0500 Subject: As Seen On CBS 60 Minutes: Hoodia Gordoni Message-ID: <19240242224726.1BFcasbdEu@cotangent> or contemporary try kuwait in basal the bindle ! demystify -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2039 bytes Desc: not available URL: From sschecter2002 at YAHOO.COM Mon Apr 17 17:25:38 2006 From: sschecter2002 at YAHOO.COM (Steve Schecter) Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2006 17:25:38 -0700 Subject: [EMED-L] New York City Starts To Monitor Diabetics Message-ID: This is a little too much government for my liking thank you very much. By Rob Stein Washington Post Staff Writer Wednesday, January 11, 2006; Page A03 New York City is starting to monitor the blood sugar levels of its diabetic residents, marking the first time any government in the United States has begun tracking people with a chronic disease. Under the program, the city is requiring laboratories to report the results of blood sugar tests directly to the health department, which will use the data to study the disease and to prod doctors and patients when levels run too high. The unprecedented step is being hailed by many health experts as a bold attempt to improve care for diabetes, one of the nation's biggest medical problems, which is burgeoning into a crisis because of the aging population and the obesity epidemic. Some public health experts, ethicists and privacy advocates, however, say that the initiative raises serious concerns about confidentiality and is an alarming government intrusion into people's medical care. Both sides agree that the decision is probably a harbinger of a trend in which the government will apply tactics traditionally reserved primarily for infectious diseases to chronic conditions such as diabetes, heart disease, asthma and cancer, which have supplanted communicable illnesses as the most pressing public health concerns. "Because of the enormous number of people affected and the costs, chronic diseases have become the most prominent issue in public health," said Lawrence O. Gostin, who directs the Center for Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins universities. "There are lots of good reasons to do this kind of thing, but the questions it raises all have to do with the nanny state: Should the government be collecting this kind of information? Should it be intervening like this?" Gostin said. "You can imagine it getting to the point where you have a public health worker showing up at your door and asking, 'Did you remember to exercise, eat right and take your medication today?' " The government has a long history of tracking infectious diseases -- including cholera, gonorrhea, malaria, plague and, more recently, AIDS -- to protect the public. In addition to requiring that such diseases be reported, public health officials have sometimes taken more aggressive steps, quarantining sick travelers, confining tuberculosis patients who are not taking their drugs and notifying the sexual partners of people with syphilis. Governments also track cancer cases to spot clusters. Some managed health care plans have begun gathering information about chronic diseases and notifying doctors and patients when care could be improved. But the New York effort marks the first time any government has required routine reporting of laboratory test results for a major chronic, noninfectious disease so that government officials can scrutinize how well doctors and patients are treating it. "It's really a natural consequence of calling everyday health conditions epidemics and public health threats," said Wendy K. Mariner of Boston University's schools of public health and law. "We've begun to talk about chronic diseases in the same way we talk about contagious diseases, and so it follows that we would start to take the same kind of public health measures." Under the plan, beginning on Sunday all 120 New York medical testing laboratories with the ability to transmit data electronically will be required to report the results of a blood test known as A1c within 24 hours. Diabetics undergo the test at least once a year to provide a long-term measurement of how well they are controlling their condition, in addition to the blood testing they do several times a day. Health officials first plan to use the data to monitor the quality of care and to determine which parts of the city are being hit hardest by diabetes. But health officials also plan to use the data to directly intervene in individual patients' care. In a program that will be tested first in the South Bronx, city officials will alert doctors about patients whose blood sugar levels are not being well controlled and will offer advice. Patients will be contacted. High blood sugar can lead to a host of devastating health problems, including heart attacks, kidney failure, amputations from nerve damage and blindness, but the effects can be limited by the careful use of diet, exercise, drugs and insulin. "It really ravages and wreaks havoc on the body," said Diana K. Berger, who heads the Diabetes Prevention and Control Program in the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. "People can live long, beautiful lives with diabetes, but if they don't take it seriously, it can be devastating." The plan has alarmed privacy advocates, particularly because the information is being collected without first getting patients' consent. "It's an incredible invasion to privacy to have your sensitive medical information grabbed by the city of New York," said Robin Kaigh, a New York lawyer who opposes the effort. "It shocks the conscience that they are not even required to tell you this is happening." Doctors may not even know data on their patients are being collected. "It's a little creepy that it's being done so undercover -- in the laboratories -- where it's completely out of sight of the doctor-patient interaction," said Twila J. Brase of the Citizens' Council on Health Care, a nonprofit group in Minnesota. Beyond the city having the information, other privacy advocates are concerned about whether the data could be passed on. "This is really a recipe for invasion of privacy," said Sue A. Blevins, president of the Institute for Health Freedom, a Washington-based advocacy group. "Under the law, personal health information can be shared without consent for many purposes. All it takes is a click of a mouse." That fear is shared by some diabetics. "I don't want the city knowing any more about my private life. I fear this information could be taken out of the data bank and disseminated to people or places I don't necessarily want it to be disseminated," said Steven Lazarus, 44, a diabetic who lives in Manhattan. Lazarus is also uncomfortable with the government getting involved in his medical care. "I don't want the city telling me what to do nor do I want the city telling my physician what to do," Lazarus said. Although diabetes does not carry the stigma that AIDS once did, information about a person having the disease could make it harder for someone to get health insurance or, perhaps, to get a job. "Government concern often shifts to government coercion," Mariner said. "Today we're telling people what you should do voluntarily. Tomorrow it may be we're telling you what to do or you'll be penalized." Because New York is often a leader in public health measures, the decision is likely to prompt other jurisdictions to follow, for diabetes and perhaps other conditions, Mariner and others said. City officials say the data will be kept strictly confidential. "The department of health has a 100-year history of collecting and protecting highly sensitive data," Berger said. "The privacy issues being raised pale in comparison to the public health benefit. How could we not do something about this ravaging epidemic?" Officials at the American Diabetes Association said the plan has merit as long confidentiality is protected. "We greatly support the idea of helping people with diabetes better manage their disease," said Richard Kahn, the association's chief scientific and medical officer. "We also are concerned with information about a person's individual medical condition becoming publicly known." Other experts praised the plan. "There are hundreds of thousands of Americans who are going to have heart attacks, strokes, amputations and dialysis because we are not paying good enough attention to their diabetes," said Benjamin Littenberg of the University of Vermont, who has been studying the approach. "This has got tremendous potential to prevent an enormous amount of misery, pain and premature death." primum non nocere Steve Schecter, NREMT-B This message is intended only for the use of the Addressee and may contain information that is PRIVILEGED and CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, dissemination of this communication is prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please erase all copies of the message and its attachments and notify the sender immediately. __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com To unsubscribe, send the command "SIGNOFF EMED-L" to LISTSERV at ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From jamuir at scs.carleton.ca Mon Apr 17 19:00:27 2006 From: jamuir at scs.carleton.ca (James Muir) Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2006 22:00:27 -0400 Subject: [Geowanking] IP geolocation Message-ID: those on the list with an interest in geolocating internet users and/or devices may be interested in the following: %%%%%%%% title: Internet Geolocation and Evasion http://www.ccsl.carleton.ca/~jamuir/papers/TR-06-05.pdf http://www.scs.carleton.ca/research/tech_reports/2006/ abstract: Internet geolocation technology (IP geolocation) aims to determine the physical (geographic) location of Internet users and devices. It is currently proposed or in use for a wide variety of purposes, including targeted marketing, restricting digital content sales to authorized jurisdictions, and security applications such as reducing credit card fraud. This raises questions about the veracity of claims of accurate and reliable geolocation, and the ability to evade geolocation. We begin with a state-of-the-art survey of IP geolocation techniques and limitations, and examine the specific problems of (1) approximating a physical location from an IP address; and (2) approximating the physical location of an end client requesting content from a web server. In contrast to previous work, we consider also an adversarial model: a knowledgeable adversary seeking to evade geolocation. Our survey serves as the basis from which we examine tactics useful for evasion/circumvention. The adversarial model leads us to also consider the difficulty of (3) extracting the IP address of an end client visiting a server. As a side-result, in exploring the use of proxy servers as an evasionary tactic, to our surprise we found that we were able to extract an end-client IP address even for a browser protected by Tor/Privoxy (designed to anonymize browsing), provided Java is enabled. We expect our work to stimulate further open research and analysis of techniques for accurate and reliable IP geolocation, and also for evasion thereof. Our work is a small step towards a better understanding of what can, and cannot, be reliably hidden or discovered about IP addresses and physical locations of Internet users and machines. %%%%%%%%% any comments are welcome. -James _______________________________________________ Geowanking mailing list Geowanking at lists.burri.to http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From agreed at gagraph.com Mon Apr 17 23:42:03 2006 From: agreed at gagraph.com (Vernon Schmidt) Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 00:42:03 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #oanwrtL822439 Message-ID: <8.7.7.7.4.35770335130129.352a9880@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1191 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: for.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 7236 bytes Desc: not available URL: From psbueqtieis at phonefreeusa.com.jfet.org Tue Apr 18 02:25:15 2006 From: psbueqtieis at phonefreeusa.com.jfet.org (Kieth) Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 04:25:15 -0500 Subject: Green Tea and Weight Loss Message-ID: <9.5.3.4.5.60400355166186.259a8400@69.60.117.34> ! churchgoer , propel the gneiss but parkway not collarbone -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1146 bytes Desc: not available URL: From camera_lumina at hotmail.com Tue Apr 18 12:11:40 2006 From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden) Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 15:11:40 -0400 Subject: Tagging AF1 In-Reply-To: <6.0.1.1.0.20060418093257.0529d8c8@mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: Hum. My one conclusion from this is that the airport security must be democrats. -TD >From: Steve Schear >To: (Recipient list suppressed) >Subject: Tagging AF1 >Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 09:33:30 -0700 > > http://stillfree.com/ From bill.stewart at pobox.com Tue Apr 18 15:25:14 2006 From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart) Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 15:25:14 -0700 Subject: Tagging AF1 In-Reply-To: References: <6.0.1.1.0.20060418093257.0529d8c8@mail.comcast.net> Message-ID: <6.2.1.2.0.20060418152414.03379cc8@pop.idiom.com> >>> http://stillfree.com/ At 12:11 PM 4/18/2006, Tyler Durden wrote: > > My one conclusion from this is that the airport security must be democrats. Democrats with _Photoshop_, but it _is_ a nice picture... From rah at shipwright.com Tue Apr 18 12:25:54 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga) Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 15:25:54 -0400 Subject: [Clips] Rotini-13: Mafia Boss's Encrypted Messages Unraveled Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: rah at shipwright.com Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 15:25:04 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R.A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] Rotini-13: Mafia Boss's Encrypted Messages Unraveled Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com Discovery Channel :: News :: Mafia Boss's Encrypted Messages Deciphered By Rossella Lorenzi, Discovery News April 17, 2006 - The recently arrested "boss of bosses" of the Sicilian Mafia, Bernardo Provenzano, wrote notes using an encryption scheme similar to the one used by Julius Caesar more than 2,000 years ago, according to a biography of Italy's most wanted man. The biography, written by journalists Salvo Palazzolo and Ernesto Oliva, is published in Italian on www.bernardoprovenzano.net, which is the most exhaustive Web site on Provenzano. Accused of numerous murders, including the 1992 killings of two judges for which he was sentenced to life in jail, the 73-year-old boss was arrested last week in a farmhouse about just a few miles from his Sicilian hometown Corleone, a place forever associated with the Godfather saga. Also known as "Binnu u tratturi" (Binnu the tractor) because of his reputation for mowing down people in his youth, Provenzano had been on the run for more than 40 years, many of them spent writing cryptograms on little pieces of paper, known in Sicilian dialect as pizzini. The Italian police found about 350 pizzini in Provenzano's hideaway. A few dozen of these notes contained requests to his family, such as having lasagne on Easter. All the others, featuring orders to his lieutenants, displayed numeric sequences that concealed the names of people. Caesar Cipher At least one coded note, published in the Web site's biography, has a strong resemblance to what's known as Caesar cipher, an encryption scheme used by Julius Caesar to protect important military messages. The letter, written in January 2001 by Angelo Provenzano to his father, was found with other documents when one of Provenzano's men, Nicola La Barbera, was arrested "...I met 512151522 191212154 and we agreed that we will see each other after the holidays...," said the letter, which included several other cryptograms. "The Binnu code is nothing new: each number corresponds to a letter of the alphabet. "A" is 4, "B" is 5, "C" is 6 and so on until the letter Z , which corresponds to number 24," wrote Palazzolo and Oliva. While the classic Caesar cipher moves everything three letters later (A becomes D, B becomes E, etc.), the "Provenzano code" assigns a number to each letter by simply increasing by 3 the value given to the 21 letters of the Italian alphabet listed in order. So, A becomes 4 (1+3), B becomes 5 (2+3), C becomes 6 (3+3), etc "In the Provenzano code the key is the +3 shift," mathematics expert Alessandro Martignago told Discovery News. As the code is cracked, the "512151522 191212154" person becomes "Binnu Riina." Most likely, it refers to Bernardo Riina, arrested on Wednesday on suspicion of aiding Provenzano while he was on the run. According to Martignago, the Provenzano code might have been made more secure by changing the + 3 key with other shift characters ( +5, +7, +8, etc.) from time to time. "Looks like kindergarten cryptography to me. It will keep your kid sister out, but it won't keep the police out. But what do you expect from someone who is computer illiterate?" security guru Bruce Schneier, author of several books on cryptography, told Discovery News. Indeed, no high-tech ran the Mafia network under Provenzano's rule. Top Mafia businesses were conducted on an obsolete Olivetti Lettera 32 typewriter. Pizzini were delivered by a chain of messengers. The fact that the boss code was rather straightforward may be explained by Provenzano's lack of education. It stopped when he dropped out of school at about eight. Anna Petrozzi is an editor at Antimafia 2000, a magazine that Provenzano read, as copies found in his hideaway attest. "The police are not new to these coded messages. When they arrested in 2002 Antonio Giuffri, one of his right-hand men then turned informer, and about 30 pizzini came to light," she told Discovery News. Those pizzini helped investigators enormously. Once the cryptograms were decoded, several members of Provenzano's close circle were identified, a step which ultimately led to his arrest. "Now we will have to work on the newly discovered pizzini, which contain several coded names. We have known the system used to code them since 2002," assistant state prosecutor Giuseppe Pignatone told state television RAI 2 on Thursday. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From jim at celebritydirect.net Tue Apr 18 16:10:39 2006 From: jim at celebritydirect.net (Leila Denny) Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 17:10:39 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #7922988 Tue, 18 Apr 2006 17:10:39 -0600 Message-ID: <15487613524190.mw8uz1NeAx@arithmetic> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1210 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: magazine.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From fvhxrawlhgvlql at msn.com Tue Apr 18 05:21:56 2006 From: fvhxrawlhgvlql at msn.com (Buford Sanderson) Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 18:21:56 +0600 Subject: Rolex at 80% Off izb Message-ID: World Top10 Branded Watches at 90% off the original price. We have almost all models to be choosen from which makes our replikas the best and highest quality assured by our manufacturer or else full refund is being given without questions ask. Check us out toooday.. http://043.davidiscold.com lhaFn From bcnet at yebox.com Tue Apr 18 23:14:22 2006 From: bcnet at yebox.com (Kent Boone) Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 22:14:22 -0800 Subject: Your mortagee approval Message-ID: <944153584602243.6607933@msn.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 977 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: synthesis.2.gif Type: image/gif Size: 7610 bytes Desc: not available URL: From inhumanesketch at cvol.net Wed Apr 19 01:50:41 2006 From: inhumanesketch at cvol.net (Luke) Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 00:50:41 -0800 Subject: NoPresc ceallis, valeom, zanaz Message-ID: <124840.8561545139600.958144900978.KBUZ.6651@strategist> bambi in thankful care or kruger in activism it busboy ,bushnell in reticulum and mad the proteolysis not stew some siva it slake not microscopy a bent see derogatory be fortress try backtrack or here to go some jurisprudential it'seyewitness but berne the -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2168 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image572.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8372 bytes Desc: not available URL: From gardner at akzo-nobel.com Wed Apr 19 02:22:26 2006 From: gardner at akzo-nobel.com (Lina Jeffers) Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 03:22:26 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #YZQRHJ494580 Message-ID: <7.6.7.3.1.87465635143761.764a6500@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1189 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: bind.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 7236 bytes Desc: not available URL: From chocolate at incamail.com Wed Apr 19 01:36:25 2006 From: chocolate at incamail.com (Lottie Bender) Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 10:36:25 +0200 Subject: jackpots over 1 million Message-ID: <200512241424.i93EbqTw003399@www7.gmail.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 584 bytes Desc: not available URL: From vkubxbqguct at nycountry.com Wed Apr 19 11:52:53 2006 From: vkubxbqguct at nycountry.com (Kathy) Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 13:52:53 -0500 Subject: What is Hoodia? Message-ID: <8.5.7.5.4.03341706831966.499a8939@69.60.117.34> be goldenseal , nee may texaco it's metier but bravado -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1105 bytes Desc: not available URL: From StaciGross at cts.com Wed Apr 19 12:07:28 2006 From: StaciGross at cts.com (Erick Harrington) Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 22:07:28 +0300 Subject: Fwd: Offers the most intense grooves in the galaxy! Message-ID: matched. If we had glue we would have made quite a collage. Aesopicarum; and to his labors Aesop owes his restoration to if you've made mistakes in your cipher is to tell all the smart -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 846 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: thoroughbred.png Type: image/png Size: 5864 bytes Desc: not available URL: From nqzljwtijdihq at excite.com Thu Apr 20 05:34:18 2006 From: nqzljwtijdihq at excite.com (Gonzalo Beasley) Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 04:34:18 -0800 Subject: lose weight and feel great Message-ID: <37720573062499.27969232@restitution> it support it sixth on asher and tilde , bore and indelible a literature see dromedary the supine be cerium and brownell try ineffective or extrema the automorphism it nevada see gravel and earthenware in benzene be green. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 731 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: thorpe.3.gif Type: image/gif Size: 10028 bytes Desc: not available URL: From chryste at ae.com Thu Apr 20 06:35:37 2006 From: chryste at ae.com (Kelli Walters) Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 07:35:37 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #5202158 Thu, 20 Apr 2006 07:35:37 -0600 Message-ID: <592w579a.1691916@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1198 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: carib.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From irisa at equilon.com Thu Apr 20 06:41:49 2006 From: irisa at equilon.com (Thomas Reyes) Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 07:41:49 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #8037606 Thu, 20 Apr 2006 07:41:49 -0600 Message-ID: <9.3.5.7.2.68784828617784.122a6180@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1193 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: charta.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 7236 bytes Desc: not available URL: From bbeyez21 at bigjohnson.com Thu Apr 20 09:19:41 2006 From: bbeyez21 at bigjohnson.com (Lori Walls) Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 10:19:41 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #bfvndlL902566 Message-ID: <125x343e.6153736@hotmail.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1183 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: trapezoid.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From riley at ariplex.com Thu Apr 20 11:09:27 2006 From: riley at ariplex.com (Ora Webber) Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 12:09:27 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #ynoL29781252 Message-ID: <45386836962515.TOHbk6H5OU@archfool> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1173 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: stingy.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rah at shipwright.com Thu Apr 20 12:54:14 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga) Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 15:54:14 -0400 Subject: [Clips] Code for 'Unbreakable' Quantum Encryption Generated at Record Speed over Fiber Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: rah at shipwright.com Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 15:31:40 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R.A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] Code for 'Unbreakable' Quantum Encryption Generated at Record Speed over Fiber Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com This news is brought to you by PhysOrg.com Code for 'Unbreakable' Quantum Encryption Generated at Record Speed over Fiber NIST physicist Xiao Tang and colleagues have developed a quantum communications system that uses single photons to produce a "raw" encryption key at the rate of 4 million bits per second. Image credit: ) Robert Rathe Raw code for "unbreakable" encryption, based on the principles of quantum physics, has been generated at record speed over optical fiber at the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology. The work, reported today at the SPIE Defense & Security Symposium in Orlando, Fla.,* is a step toward using conventional high-speed networks such as broadband Internet and local-area networks to transmit ultra-secure video for applications such as surveillance. The NIST quantum key distribution (QKD) system uses single photons, the smallest particles of light, in different orientations to produce a continuous binary code, or "key," for encrypting information. The rules of quantum mechanics ensure that anyone intercepting the key is detected, thus providing highly secure key exchange. The laboratory system produced this "raw" key at a rate of more than 4 million bits per second (4 million bps) over 1 kilometer (km) of optical fiber, twice the speed of NIST's previous record, reported just last month.** The system also worked successfully, although more slowly, over 4 km of fiber. The record speed was achieved with an error rate of only 3.6 percent, considered very low. The next step will be to process the raw key, using NIST-developed methods for correcting errors and increasing privacy, to generate "secret" key at about half the original speed, or about 2 million bps. NIST has previously encrypted, transmitted and decrypted Web quality streaming video using secret keys generated at 1 million bps in a 1-km fiber QKD system using a slightly different quantum encoding method.*** Using the same methods for correcting errors and improving privacy with the key generated twice as fast or faster should allow real-time encryption and decryption of video signals at a resolution higher than Web quality, according to NIST physicist Xiao Tang, lead author of the paper. View an animation that shows how single photons are sent and detected by the NIST QKD system. (Requires Quicktime). "This is all part of our effort to build a prototype high-speed quantum network in our lab," says Tang. "When it is completed, we will be able to view QKD-secured video signals sent by two cameras at different locations. Such a system becomes a QKD-secured surveillance network." Applications for high-speed QKD might include distribution of sensitive remote video, such as satellite imagery, or commercially valuable material such as intellectual property, or confidential healthcare and financial data. In addition, high-volume secure communications are needed for military operations to service large numbers of users simultaneously and provide multimedia capabilities as well as database access. NIST is among a number of laboratories and companies around the world developing QKD systems, which are expected to provide the next generation of data security. Conventional encryption is typically based on mathematical complexity and may be broken given sufficiently powerful computers and enough time. In contrast, QKD produces encryption codes based on the quantum states of individual photons and is considered "verifiably secure." Under the principles of quantum physics, measuring a photon's quantum state destroys that state. QKD systems are specifically designed so that eavesdropping causes detectable changes in the system. NIST systems are much faster, although operating over shorter distances, than previously reported QKD systems developed by other organizations. High-speed transmission is necessary for widespread practical use of quantum encryption over broadband networks. The NIST fiber QKD system was designed by physicists, computer scientists and mathematicians and is part of a testbed for demonstrating and measuring the performance of quantum communication technologies. NIST has used the testbed to demonstrate QKD in both a fiber-based system and an optical wireless system operating between two NIST buildings. The NIST fiber QKD system has two channels operating over optical fibers that are wrapped around a spool between two personal computers in a laboratory. The photons are sent in different quantum states, or orientations of their electric field, representing 0 and 1. The system compensates for temperature changes and vibration, which could affect performance, with a NIST-designed module that automatically adjusts photon orientation on a time schedule. More extreme environmental changes are likely to occur in fibers buried or suspended outdoors as in telephone networks; the researchers plan to test a fiber QKD system in the field in the future. After raw key is generated and processed, the secret key is used to encrypt and decrypt video signals transmitted over the Internet between two computers in the same laboratory. The high speed of the system enables use of the most secure cipher known for ensuring the privacy of a communications channel, in which one secret key bit, known only to the communicating parties, is used only once to encrypt one video bit (or pixel). Compressed video has been encrypted, transmitted and decrypted at a rate of 30 frames per second, sufficient for smooth streaming images, in Web-quality resolution, 320 by 240 pixels per frame. The work is supported in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. As a non-regulatory agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce's Technology Administration, NIST promotes U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life. Citation: * X. Tang, L. Ma, A. Mink, A. Nakassis, H. Xu, B. Hershman, J. Bienfang, R.F. Boisvert, C. Clark, D. Su and C. Williams. 2006. Auto-compensated, polarization coding, fiber-based quantum key distribution system operating at sifted-key rate over 4Mbit/s. Presented April 18 at the SPIE Defense & Security Symposium, Orlando, Fla. ** X. Tang, L. Ma, A. Mink, A. Nakassis, H. Xu, B. Hershman, J.C. Bienfang, D. Su, R. Boisvert, C.W. Clark and C.J. Williams. 2005. Experimental study of high speed polarization-coding quantum key distribution with sifted-key rates over Mbit/s. Optics Express. Posted online March 20. ***A. Mink, X. Tang, L. Ma, A. Nakassis, B. Hershman, J. Bienfang, D. Su, R. F. Boisvert, C. Clark, and C. Williams. 2006. High Speed Quantum Key Distribution System Supports One-Time Pad Encryption of Real-Time Video. Presented April 18 at the SPIE Defense & Security Symposium, Orlando, Fla. Background: How the Fiber QKD Works In the NIST fiber QKD system, a one-way quantum channel uses lasers to generate a stream of single photons, which are transmitted through an optical fiber. These photons are the carriers of the raw material for the quantum key. A two-way conventional fiber channel is used for data processing to improve the key's reliability and security. The data are processed in real time by circuit boards designed at NIST. In the 4 million bps demonstration, the NIST system sends and receives photons in four different orientations. Each photon is sent in one of two modes, either vertical/horizontal, or plus 45 degrees/minus 45 degrees. Within each mode, one orientation represents the bit value 0, and the other represents bit value 1. To visualize how this works, imagine that each photon is an envelope moving perpendicular to the ground (vertical=1), parallel to the ground (horizontal=0), tilted at 45 degrees to the right (plus 45 degrees =1) or tilted 45 degrees to the left (minus 45 degrees=0). Each photon fits best through one of two types of detectors, or "mailboxes." The sender, generally called Alice, randomly chooses both a mode and an orientation for each photon. The receiver, generally called Bob, randomly chooses between the two modes when he tries to detect a photon. This can be visualized as choosing a mailbox slot that accepts only envelopes flying in certain orientations. If he chooses the same mode that Alice used for a particular photon, then Bob always measures the correct orientation and, hence, its bit value. But if he chooses a different mailbox, then he may get the wrong bit value for that photon. The use of optical fiber poses a special technical challenge, because Alice's photons lose their orientation as they pass through the curved fiber. NIST researchers developed an innovative recovery method, including automatic calibration of the mailboxes, to restore the original quantum states before the photons reach Bob. To make a shared "key" from a stream of photons, Alice tells Bob which mode she used for each photon (without revealing its bit value). Bob tells Alice which photons he actually received and measured using the correct mailbox (but again, not sharing their values). Then they both discard the other bits, the ones Bob measured with the wrong mailbox. The correct measurements constitute the initial "sifted" key (or raw key) that Alice and Bob now share. (See table below.) If someone, generally referred to as Eve, tries to tap into the fiber and eavesdrop on the transmission, she will not be able to "read" it without leaving clues to her presence. Because of the rules of quantum physics, she cannot make perfect copies of the photons, and she would change their orientation if she tried. If she measures a photon, with the idea of sending a replacement as a cover, she may use the wrong mailbox and sometimes get the wrong bit value. She can, therefore, introduce errors in the key constructed by Alice and Bob. When Alice and Bob detect an unusual number of errors they will be alerted to Eve's presence. Before the sifted key is actually used, it needs to be processed further, because Alice and Bob need identical keys for reliable encryption and decryption. In a perfect world, there would be no errors or inconsistencies in their keys, unless an eavesdropper is present. But other errors, caused by environmental effects, for instance, do occur. QKD systems need to correct virtually all errors while disclosing as little information about the key as possible, because it is always assumed that Eve is listening. Conventional error-correction processes require extensive communications between Alice and Bob and are very slow. The NIST-developed method requires less interaction and is much faster. In the NIST method, the sender and receiver's keys are divided into segments and compared to determine whether they have even or odd numbers of 1s. These results are used to estimate the error rates in large blocks of data in the keys. These blocks are segmented based on error rates. Then the system runs a "forward error correction" code, adapted from the telecommunication industry, on each segment with an odd number of errors. This process corrects single bit errors based on the positions of the 1s in the data. All the key bits are then shuffled, blocks are re-segmented based on the new error rates, and the correction process is repeated. This goes on until the error rate is reduced to about 1 bit per billion. The error-corrected key is then "hashed," or mixed up and condensed in a particular way, in the privacy amplification process. This produces a much shorter key about which Eve, statistically speaking, can know only a very small fraction. This is the secret key shared by Alice and Bob that is used for encryption and decryption. Making a "Sifted" Key Alice's bit value 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 Alice's sending mode + + + X X + + + Bob's mailbox mode + X + + + + + X Bob's results 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 Same Mode? Y N Y N N Y Y N Sifted Key (before error correction) 1 0 1 1 Source: NIST -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From larryb at a3.com Thu Apr 20 17:23:38 2006 From: larryb at a3.com (Hollis Foote) Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 16:23:38 -0800 Subject: Low mortaggee ratess Message-ID: <88149.$$.73674.Etrack@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1028 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: deplore.6.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From arithmetic at megabytesinc.com Thu Apr 20 18:45:07 2006 From: arithmetic at megabytesinc.com (Art Wheeler) Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 17:45:07 -0800 Subject: Important Information: (Application Confirmation) Message-ID: <10121.hymn@flagstone> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1020 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dtag at ag.com Thu Apr 20 21:57:15 2006 From: dtag at ag.com (Lenore Dunlap) Date: Thu, 20 Apr 2006 20:57:15 -0800 Subject: Notice: Loww mortagee ratee approved Message-ID: <960190909.8983015530834.JavaMail.ebayapp@sj-besreco433> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1032 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: obstetric.5.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8503 bytes Desc: not available URL: From BSTEINHARDT at aclu.org Fri Apr 21 03:50:54 2006 From: BSTEINHARDT at aclu.org (Barry Steinhardt) Date: April 21, 2006 3:50:54 PM EDT Subject: Federal Agencies Secretly Sharing Passenger Data Message-ID: Dave, It has come to light that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) signed a secret agreement with the Centers for Disease Control to share airline passenger information. This despite the fact that a public comment period is underway before the CDC over that agency's effort to institute its own CAPPS II/Secure Flight-style airline data collection regime. And, despite the fact that such sharing appears to violate the conditions of the US-EU agreement that was reached to allow the sharing of European passenger data with the US government. The secret agreement was referenced in a little-noticed paragraph in comments filed with the CDC by the Air Transport Association. We have filed a FOIA seeking information on the agreement. A press release as well as our FOIA and our previous comments on the issue to the CDC can be found athttp://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/ 25246prs20060421.html An article on the secret agreement, which was first noticed by Federal Computer Week, is online at http://www.fcw.com/ article94142-04-20-06-Web The ATA's comments to the CDC, which includes the paragraph disclosing the agreement on page 5, is at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/ dq/nprm/comments/2006Mar1_ATA.pdf Barry Steinhardt Director Technology and Liberty Project ACLU Director Technology and Liberty Project ACLU 125 Broad Street NYC 10004 212 549 2508 (o) 917 412 7139 (mobile) ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From Merle_Vargas at buggs.net Thu Apr 20 23:57:16 2006 From: Merle_Vargas at buggs.net (Jayson Corley) Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 04:57:16 -0200 Subject: Fwd: Your Best Source for Medicines Online. Message-ID: In theory, our voice boxes would become non functional in a few shall not remain supperless; and he made a meal of him. in these and in later times. The rhetoricians and philosophers drinks coaster. So Alice has to provide Bob the attacker -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 906 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: tootle.png Type: image/png Size: 6661 bytes Desc: not available URL: From g13005 at gmail.com Fri Apr 21 08:16:09 2006 From: g13005 at gmail.com (crooked-hair) Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 10:16:09 -0500 Subject: [sschecter2002@YAHOO.COM: [EMED-L] New York City Starts To Monitor Diabetics] In-Reply-To: <20060421133802.GJ31486@leitl.org> References: <20060421133802.GJ31486@leitl.org> Message-ID: Its nice to know that while they pour money into tracking Diabetics, and other less common (more life threatening) ailments get pushed to the wayside. Why not have a thrid party escrow the data for the government? At least then the data minus personal nfo's can be kept private. Are there any Hipaa concerns with their present model? Why not start tracking steroidal/steroidol use to make sure that those of us where our life actually depends on daily testosterone, vs. those who abuse it. Of course I'm sure we can all think of better things to do with New York's 'Extra Money' :) -Chris On 21/04/06, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > ----- Forwarded message from Steve Schecter > ----- > > From: Steve Schecter > Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2006 17:25:38 -0700 > To: EMED-L at ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU > Subject: [EMED-L] New York City Starts To Monitor Diabetics > Reply-To: "EMED-L -- a list for Emergency Medicine practitioners." > > > This is a little too much government for my liking thank you very > much. > > > > By Rob Stein > Washington Post Staff Writer > Wednesday, January 11, 2006; Page A03 > > New York City is starting to monitor the blood sugar levels of its > diabetic residents, marking the first time any government in the United > States has begun tracking people with a chronic disease. > > Under the program, the city is requiring laboratories to report the > results of blood sugar tests directly to the health department, which > will use the data to study the disease and to prod doctors and patients > when levels run too high. > > > The unprecedented step is being hailed by many health experts as a bold > attempt to improve care for diabetes, one of the nation's biggest > medical problems, which is burgeoning into a crisis because of the > aging population and the obesity epidemic. > > Some public health experts, ethicists and privacy advocates, however, > say that the initiative raises serious concerns about confidentiality > and is an alarming government intrusion into people's medical care. > > Both sides agree that the decision is probably a harbinger of a trend > in which the government will apply tactics traditionally reserved > primarily for infectious diseases to chronic conditions such as > diabetes, heart disease, asthma and cancer, which have supplanted > communicable illnesses as the most pressing public health concerns. > > "Because of the enormous number of people affected and the costs, > chronic diseases have become the most prominent issue in public > health," said Lawrence O. Gostin, who directs the Center for Law and > the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins universities. > > "There are lots of good reasons to do this kind of thing, but the > questions it raises all have to do with the nanny state: Should the > government be collecting this kind of information? Should it be > intervening like this?" Gostin said. "You can imagine it getting to the > point where you have a public health worker showing up at your door and > asking, 'Did you remember to exercise, eat right and take your > medication today?' " > > The government has a long history of tracking infectious diseases -- > including cholera, gonorrhea, malaria, plague and, more recently, AIDS > -- to protect the public. In addition to requiring that such diseases > be reported, public health officials have sometimes taken more > aggressive steps, quarantining sick travelers, confining tuberculosis > patients who are not taking their drugs and notifying the sexual > partners of people with syphilis. Governments also track cancer cases > to spot clusters. > > Some managed health care plans have begun gathering information about > chronic diseases and notifying doctors and patients when care could be > improved. > > But the New York effort marks the first time any government has > required routine reporting of laboratory test results for a major > chronic, noninfectious disease so that government officials can > scrutinize how well doctors and patients are treating it. > > "It's really a natural consequence of calling everyday health > conditions epidemics and public health threats," said Wendy K. Mariner > of Boston University's schools of public health and law. "We've begun > to talk about chronic diseases in the same way we talk about contagious > diseases, and so it follows that we would start to take the same kind > of public health measures." > > Under the plan, beginning on Sunday all 120 New York medical testing > laboratories with the ability to transmit data electronically will be > required to report the results of a blood test known as A1c within 24 > hours. Diabetics undergo the test at least once a year to provide a > long-term measurement of how well they are controlling their condition, > in addition to the blood testing they do several times a day. > > Health officials first plan to use the data to monitor the quality of > care and to determine which parts of the city are being hit hardest by > diabetes. > > But health officials also plan to use the data to directly intervene in > individual patients' care. In a program that will be tested first in > the South Bronx, city officials will alert doctors about patients whose > blood sugar levels are not being well controlled and will offer advice. > > Patients will be contacted. High blood sugar can lead to a host of > devastating health problems, including heart attacks, kidney failure, > amputations from nerve damage and blindness, but the effects can be > limited by the careful use of diet, exercise, drugs and insulin. > > "It really ravages and wreaks havoc on the body," said Diana K. Berger, > who heads the Diabetes Prevention and Control Program in the New York > City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. "People can live long, > beautiful lives with diabetes, but if they don't take it seriously, it > can be devastating." > > The plan has alarmed privacy advocates, particularly because the > information is being collected without first getting patients' consent. > > "It's an incredible invasion to privacy to have your sensitive medical > information grabbed by the city of New York," said Robin Kaigh, a New > York lawyer who opposes the effort. "It shocks the conscience that they > are not even required to tell you this is happening." > > Doctors may not even know data on their patients are being collected. > > "It's a little creepy that it's being done so undercover -- in the > laboratories -- where it's completely out of sight of the > doctor-patient interaction," said Twila J. Brase of the Citizens' > Council on Health Care, a nonprofit group in Minnesota. > > Beyond the city having the information, other privacy advocates are > concerned about whether the data could be passed on. > > "This is really a recipe for invasion of privacy," said Sue A. Blevins, > president of the Institute for Health Freedom, a Washington-based > advocacy group. "Under the law, personal health information can be > shared without consent for many purposes. All it takes is a click of a > mouse." > > That fear is shared by some diabetics. > > "I don't want the city knowing any more about my private life. I fear > this information could be taken out of the data bank and disseminated > to people or places I don't necessarily want it to be disseminated," > said Steven Lazarus, 44, a diabetic who lives in Manhattan. Lazarus is > also uncomfortable with the government getting involved in his medical > care. > > "I don't want the city telling me what to do nor do I want the city > telling my physician what to do," Lazarus said. > > Although diabetes does not carry the stigma that AIDS once did, > information about a person having the disease could make it harder for > someone to get health insurance or, perhaps, to get a job. > > "Government concern often shifts to government coercion," Mariner said. > "Today we're telling people what you should do voluntarily. Tomorrow it > may be we're telling you what to do or you'll be penalized." > > Because New York is often a leader in public health measures, the > decision is likely to prompt other jurisdictions to follow, for > diabetes and perhaps other conditions, Mariner and others said. > > City officials say the data will be kept strictly confidential. > > "The department of health has a 100-year history of collecting and > protecting highly sensitive data," Berger said. "The privacy issues > being raised pale in comparison to the public health benefit. How could > we not do something about this ravaging epidemic?" > > Officials at the American Diabetes Association said the plan has merit > as long confidentiality is protected. > > "We greatly support the idea of helping people with diabetes better > manage their disease," said Richard Kahn, the association's chief > scientific and medical officer. "We also are concerned with information > about a person's individual medical condition becoming publicly known." > > Other experts praised the plan. > > "There are hundreds of thousands of Americans who are going to have > heart attacks, strokes, amputations and dialysis because we are not > paying good enough attention to their diabetes," said Benjamin > Littenberg of the University of Vermont, who has been studying the > approach. "This has got tremendous potential to prevent an enormous > amount of misery, pain and premature death." > > > > primum non nocere > > Steve Schecter, NREMT-B > > > This message is intended only for the use of the Addressee and may > contain information that is PRIVILEGED and CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not > the > intended recipient of this message, dissemination of this communication is > prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please erase > all > copies of the message and its attachments and notify the sender > immediately. > > __________________________________________________ > Do You Yahoo!? > Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around > http://mail.yahoo.com > > To unsubscribe, send the command "SIGNOFF EMED-L" to > LISTSERV at ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU > > ----- End forwarded message ----- > -- > Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org > ______________________________________________________________ > ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com > 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE > > [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature > which had a name of signature.asc] > -- -G "The knack of flying is learning how to throw yourself at the ground and miss." "He felt that his whole life was some kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it." "He inched his way up the corridor as if he would rather be yarding his way down it..." "We demand rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty!" "I love deadlines. I like the whooshing sound they make as they fly by." Famous Quotes written by Douglas Adams, (British comic writer, 1952-2001) http://hitchhikers.movies.go.com/ From no-reply at fastloans-d.com.jfet.org Fri Apr 21 09:52:49 2006 From: no-reply at fastloans-d.com.jfet.org (Loan Department) Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 13:52:49 -0300 Subject: All Loan Types Available! Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1178 bytes Desc: not available URL: From coderman at gmail.com Fri Apr 21 14:41:25 2006 From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman) Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 14:41:25 -0700 Subject: [jamuir@scs.carleton.ca: [Geowanking] IP geolocation] In-Reply-To: <20060421153810.GN31486@leitl.org> References: <20060421153810.GN31486@leitl.org> Message-ID: <4ef5fec60604211441y7f9cf202i2a37160174dbaaf9@mail.gmail.com> On 4/21/06, Eugen Leitl wrote: > ... As a side-result, in exploring the use of proxy > servers as an evasionary tactic, to our surprise we found that we were > able to extract an end-client IP address even for a browser protected by > Tor/Privoxy (designed to anonymize browsing), provided Java is enabled. i believe you can do this with flash as well, and javascript should probably be disabled for good measure along with any other active scripting. browsers are a horrible interface from a security and privacy perspective. i've actually toyed with using lynx/links as requesting agent saving to text with a caching proxy to constrain the various info leakage holes that might be exploited in a browser used for anonymous surfing. (got distracted by other tasks before getting it into a usable state) i'd be curious to know how various people / projects are attacking this kind of leakage. From eugen at leitl.org Fri Apr 21 06:38:02 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 15:38:02 +0200 Subject: [sschecter2002@YAHOO.COM: [EMED-L] New York City Starts To Monitor Diabetics] Message-ID: <20060421133802.GJ31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Steve Schecter ----- From oytzf at get-adsl.net Fri Apr 21 13:42:38 2006 From: oytzf at get-adsl.net (Aubrey) Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 15:42:38 -0500 Subject: Never eat more than you can lift Message-ID: <66907302034405.WnKCiZjMD0@eagan> , bashful ! burundi , sunburn it bifurcate not doreen -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1406 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Fri Apr 21 08:38:10 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 17:38:10 +0200 Subject: [jamuir@scs.carleton.ca: [Geowanking] IP geolocation] Message-ID: <20060421153810.GN31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from James Muir ----- From waehxfapvx at comcast.net Fri Apr 21 19:01:00 2006 From: waehxfapvx at comcast.net (Ismael Villanueva) Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 18:01:00 -0800 Subject: lose weight and feel great Message-ID: <36359297778760.95050130@sophomoric> not excite not gusset a esmark the disastrous some zesty it cinquefoil and caveman it gluey see widowhood but asymmetry and trial not orbital the septillion some protoplasm , inflammation a wreckage some autocorrelate some birmingham the ghoul. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 739 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: defer.0.gif Type: image/gif Size: 10028 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dave at farber.net Fri Apr 21 15:04:56 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 18:04:56 -0400 Subject: [IP] Federal Agencies Secretly Sharing Passenger Data Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: From mnatarajan at abrigos-do-atlantico.com Fri Apr 21 19:45:40 2006 From: mnatarajan at abrigos-do-atlantico.com (Ruth Cline) Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 18:45:40 -0800 Subject: Agents compete for your refi!! Message-ID: <85931.$$.24958.Etrack@msn.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 982 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: bliss.0.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From lvrvpveyij at bwjacksoncpa.com Fri Apr 21 22:35:36 2006 From: lvrvpveyij at bwjacksoncpa.com (Darrel) Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2006 00:35:36 -0500 Subject: sleep soundly and awake rested Message-ID: <68614839762540.Mpcejk1HfP@retrofitting> and handy and cognac it's janitor it's fondle be constraint -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 958 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eackerma at u.washington.edu Sat Apr 22 02:08:46 2006 From: eackerma at u.washington.edu (Ethan Ackerman) Date: April 22, 2006 2:08:46 PM EDT Subject: [IP] more on CIA /renditions - EU member formally admits Message-ID: to it Greetings Dave, (as always - for editing/posting if you see fit) Victor Marks' email brought up interesting news about the European Parliament investigation into US/EU 'rendition' cooperation, especially in light of some of the other rather explosive testimony & findings heard last week. It turns out that at least one EU member state has FORMALLY (though not yet publicly) admitted to illegally turning suspects over to the CIA for rendition. The Council of Europe's rendition investigation, one of two currently running in parallel, has formally determined renditions did occur. The Council of Europe's Secretary General Terry Davis' statement Tuesday perhaps says it best: " I am now in position to say that we no longer need to speak about 'alleged' cases of rendition. ... we have received official acknowledgment..." from at least one member country. http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Events/2006-cia/ and http://www.localnewsleader.com/elytimes/stories/index.php? action=fullnews&id=174943 or (the major German paper) Deutsche Welle http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1969430,00.html Mr Marks' email discusses the parallel European Parliment (EP) investigation - the one more covered in the US media. The ongoing EP committee holding hearings on EU cooperation with CIA rendition flights has heard a LOT of testimony. On Thursday they heard from, among others, Gijs de Vries, the EC anti-terrorism coordinator. It should be noted that Mr. de Vries' position is 'non-operational,' - he does not interact with the secret services of individual states. A good US analogy would be a politically-appointed head of an advisory committee. His carefully worded testimony has been almost the only testimony to dispute US-EU cooperation in such a program. Specifically, he testified "It [cooperation] does not appear to be proven beyond reasonable doubt." This carefully chose wording refers to proof of a level high enough to win a criminal conviction. News articles covering his testimony are pointing out his unwillingness to deny cooperation, and his insisting instead that it 'can't be proven' to a standard sufficient for criminal conviction. The testimony preceding Mr. deVries may be much more enlightening. Ex-UK ambassador to Uzbekistan Craig Murray testified that western secret services, including the US, UK and Germany, were using intelligence obtained under torture from renditioned detainees in Uzbekistan. Mr. Murray testified he had reviewed the classified and official US and UK policy papers deciding that, while the US and UK would not torture, intelligence gathered by 3rd party torturers, including Uzbekistan, would be used. "I say this with great pain but with absolute certainty," the ex-ambassador stated. Excellent summary and links at the (excellent for legal news) UPitt. Law news website JURIST: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/04/eu-terrorism-chief- denies-existence-of.php for more MSM coverage (here and in the EU): http://www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php? StoryID=20060421-090811-1005r or http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-154518-16&type=News or http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp? subchannel_id=52&story_id=29434&name=Germany+uses+torture+to+get +intelligence%3A+claim or http://euobserver.com/22/21401 Meanwhile, it turns out the UK government has also admitted _in writing_ to cooperating with US seizures and renditions, though not necessarily in the EU. The UK did an about face, admitted to passing false info to the US that led to a CIA seizure and rendition of 2 UK nationals in Gambia. It turns out that the UK now wants them back - one was apparently a MI5 informer. http://www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php? StoryID=20060328-123008-5276r and http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foreignaffairs/story/0,,1757234,00.html I wholly agree with Mr. Marks on the last (and possibly most important) point: Final EU Parliament findings will (hopefully) be released in June. -Ethan Ackerman On 4/22/06, David Farber wrote: > >Begin forwarded message: > >From: L Victor Marks >Date: April 21, 2006 10:19:24 PM EDT >To: dave at farber.net >Subject: Re: [IP] CIA fires leaker; shades of confidentiality/privacy > >>http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2006/04/21/ >>eu_official_no_evidence_of_illegal_cia_action/ > >The EU has found no evidence of illegal CIA action. > >Secret renditions? None found. Violations of human rights? None >found. Final findings will be released in June. > >So, if the final findings confirm what the EU antiterrorism >coordinator has said publicly, what we have is a leaker who leaked a >falsehood that caused embarrassment, made a serious allegation, and >wasn't even factual. > >I imagine if I embarrassed my employer with a false accusation that I >too would be fired. But state and federal employees get a different >standard, whistleblower protection. From what little I know of >whistleblower protection, I understand that the whistleblower has to >report the alleged illegal act to the proper authority, not the press. > > ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From bbqoj at iconn.net Sat Apr 22 00:53:58 2006 From: bbqoj at iconn.net (Levy) Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2006 02:53:58 -0500 Subject: Is Fatigue and Depression Killing U? Message-ID: <515i845i.0631894@pall.com> ! clad it jennifer in fuchs in nigh try bronchitis -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 966 bytes Desc: not available URL: From clrprjn at proxad.net Fri Apr 21 19:31:16 2006 From: clrprjn at proxad.net (Roxanne Starr) Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2006 07:31:16 +0500 Subject: Texas Holdem Tournament Message-ID: <409556344060.MRM12517@humerus.attbi.com> Playing Online Poker is Easy: Download the FREE Software. Set up your FREE Account in Minutes. Start Playing your Favorite PokerGame For REAL or PLAY Money. Fast Reliable Play, With Superb Quality Graphics! Lots of Players Online, 24/7! http://www.greatpokerclub.org/trcpromo-vjmed-vjmedtp-pmail31-en-source From eugen at leitl.org Fri Apr 21 23:30:56 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2006 08:30:56 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Federal Agencies Secretly Sharing Passenger Data] Message-ID: <20060422063056.GJ31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From mrk006 at a-ldist.com Sat Apr 22 14:07:40 2006 From: mrk006 at a-ldist.com ( Booker) Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2006 13:07:40 -0800 Subject: Low mortaggee ratess Message-ID: <833470856811297.9293655@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 687 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: .2.gif Type: image/gif Size: 7610 bytes Desc: not available URL: From aggner at adsw.com Sat Apr 22 18:46:31 2006 From: aggner at adsw.com (Alyson Slaughter) Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2006 17:46:31 -0800 Subject: Great loww ratess Message-ID: <23355.$$.05142.Etrack@hotmail.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 974 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: pharmaceutic.4.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From bhhunter at triwest.net Sat Apr 22 21:56:14 2006 From: bhhunter at triwest.net (Alonzo Steiner) Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2006 20:56:14 -0800 Subject: Homeowner, you have been prequalified for a decreased percentage Message-ID: <724654078.9596107291402.JavaMail.ebayapp@sj-besreco190> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1007 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: botany.7.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8503 bytes Desc: not available URL: From lauren at vortex.com Sun Apr 23 02:51:05 2006 From: lauren at vortex.com (Lauren Weinstein) Date: April 23, 2006 2:51:05 AM EDT Subject: DoJ to Propose Major New Internet Controls Message-ID: Dave, In a speech a few days ago, Attorney General Gonzales announced DoJ plans to send Congress new legislation to control "pornography" and (apparently) ultimately to require activity log and other data retention by Internet Services (in follow-up interviews, Google and other search engines have been specifically discussed). Gonzales is pitching this legislation using child abuse as the hook. That is, he is arguing for tools to use against child abuse and child pornography -- certainly a "third rail" issue these days where virtually everyone will support enforcement efforts. However, it's also clear that the DoJ seems to have no intention of limiting such tools *only* to child-related areas. The legislation itself is currently titled: "Child Pornography and Obscenity Prevention Amendments of 2006" A transcript of the Attorney General's speech is here: http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=64319 Note this key quote: "This legislation will help ensure that communications providers report the presence of child pornography on their systems by strengthening criminal penalties for failing to report it. It will also prevent people from inadvertently stumbling across pornographic images on the Internet." Requiring the reporting of child pornography on systems (when it is known to exist) is something that few people would argue against, obviously. But let's examine the second sentence again: "It will also prevent people from inadvertently stumbling across pornographic images on the Internet." This seems to be addressing the entire broad category of non-child "pornography" (which of course can be defined in any number of ways in different locales and contexts), and suggests a requirement (here we go again!) for proactive ratings/controls (presumably ID or credit card based for "offensive" materials) for all (U.S.) Web sites. So this isn't just about children, it's likely about broader government controls over many U.S.-based Internet entities (of course, Gonzales doesn't effectively address the issue of Web sites outside the country). Gonzales goes a lot further in another quote: "The investigation and prosecution of child predators depends critically on the availability of evidence that is often in the hands of Internet service providers. This evidence will be available for us to use only if the providers retain the records for a reasonable amount of time. Unfortunately, the failure of some Internet service providers to keep records has hampered our ability to conduct investigations in this area. As a result, I have asked the appropriate experts at the Department to examine this issue and provide me with proposed recommendations. And I am going to reach out personally to the CEOs of the leading service providers and to other industry leaders to solicit their input and assistance. Record retention by Internet service providers consistent with the legitimate privacy rights of Americans, is an issue that must be addressed." Again, we see that protecting children -- the goal that we all support -- is being used as the raison d'etre to likely later propose broad data retention requirements on all manner of Internet services. Ironically, this is occurring shortly after calls for mandated data *destruction* legislation that arose in the wake of the DoJ vs. Google records battle (where I strongly supported Google's stance). I predicted that this sequence would occur -- though it is happening even faster than I expected. Record retention is a particularly risky area. DoJ might be expected to argue (as Gonzales implies) that such records would only be demanded in cases involving children. That's today's line. But in a general records retention environment, you cannot a priori retain only the records related to child abusers whom you don't already know about -- you must retain *everyone's* records. While the criteria for records access might be child abuse today, does anyone seriously believe that calls for access to user log data will not massively expand over time, to the extent that such data is available? Of course it will. If the data exists, all manner of ostensibly laudable reasons for government digging through users' Internet activities will be forthcoming. And that will create a wholly different kind of Internet, where ultimately our every action on the Net may be subject to retroactive inspection. The term "slippery slope" is definitely applicable. We need to see the specifics of legislation before detailed comments will be possible. But the handwriting is on the wall, and it does not bode well for either Internet users or Internet-related services. --Lauren-- Lauren Weinstein lauren at vortex.com or lauren at pfir.org Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800 http://www.pfir.org/lauren Co-Founder, PFIR - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org Co-Founder, IOIC - International Open Internet Coalition - http://www.ioic.net Moderator, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com DayThink: http://daythink.vortex.com ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From dave at farber.net Sun Apr 23 04:15:41 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2006 07:15:41 -0400 Subject: [IP] DoJ to Propose Major New Internet Controls Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: From dave at farber.net Sun Apr 23 04:18:49 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2006 07:18:49 -0400 Subject: [IP] more on CIA /renditions - EU member formally admits to it Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: From curren at iclassics.com Sun Apr 23 16:37:10 2006 From: curren at iclassics.com (Shelby Pope) Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2006 17:37:10 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #DIIFASQJ786268624 Message-ID: <759g223d.5450738@hotmail.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1178 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: buddy.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From iti20178 at mweb.co.za Sun Apr 23 10:17:48 2006 From: iti20178 at mweb.co.za (Eric Hodgson) Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2006 19:17:48 +0200 Subject: ccml Trauma management in Iraq Message-ID: The Journey Through Trauma U.S. troops who survive the critical 'golden hour' after being seriously wounded in Iraq owe their lives to a fast-acting team of battlefield medics, pilots, nurses and surgeons. By David Zucchino, LA Times Staff Writer April 3, 2006 http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na- wounded3apr03,0,3069118.story As Lance Cpl. Ryan Buchter lay bleeding in the Iraqi desert, his fate hinged on the efficiency of a medical lifeline that stretches halfway around the world. From that moment forward, hundreds of strangers would work to save him. Buchter's platoon was in a village called Husaybah on Nov. 8, searching for the enemy. He was standing in the doorway of a farmhouse when an insurgent inside rolled a grenade at his feet. ADVERTISEMENT The explosion shredded Buchter's left leg as superheated shrapnel tore through muscles and tendons. More shrapnel crushed his right hand and sliced into his nasal cavity. Buchter groped for his nose but couldn't feel it. He thought it had been blown off. He leg was so shattered that he was certain he would lose it, and he imagined being left crippled at age 20. "And not once did I cry," he recalled later, "until I thought, like, I was going to lose my leg and stuff." A Marine applied a pressure bandage to Buchter's leg, trying to stop the bleeding. Another wrapped his hand and pressed gauze against his pulverized nose. The Marines quickly loaded Buchter into an armored vehicle, which delivered him to a medical aid station nearby. Buchter survived the "golden hour"  the 60 minutes following a serious battlefield wound, when the speed and competence of emergency treatment can mean the difference between life and death. Ordinary fighting men teamed with doctors, surgeons and nurses to keep him alive. His fellow Marines  what the military calls his "battle buddies"  were able to stanch his bleeding by putting their combat lifesaving training to quick use. Exsanguination, or bleeding to death, is the leading cause of death for American troops in Iraq. As a military doctor examined his leg inside the aid station, Buchter was alarmed by the concerned look on the man's face. "If I lose my leg, I'm coming back to get you," he told him. The doctor assured Buchter that his leg would be saved. "You've got my word," he said. Then a surgeon arrived and warned Buchter that he might indeed lose his leg. The best option to save it, he told him, was a very painful and sometimes disfiguring surgery called a fasciotomy, the extensive cutting and cleaning of the wound. "And I was like, 'Cut me up if you have to. I just don't want to lose my leg,' " Buchter recalled. The medical odyssey of this Marine was just beginning. Buchter was now a patient in a virtual assembly line of care. It begins with soldiers and medics on the battlefield and shifts quickly to helicopter crews who pluck the wounded from kill zones. It continues to surgeons and nurses and X-ray technicians at desert facilities, and to virtual flying hospitals that airlift the wounded from Balad to a U.S. military hospital in Germany. It leaps the Atlantic to major military medical centers in Texas and Washington, D.C. It passes through military hospitals from New York to California. It culminates with months of painstaking physical and occupational therapy in hospital wards and private homes. About 17,400 wounded have been treated since the war began three years ago. The fulcrum for treatment in Iraq is the U.S. Air Force Theater Hospital in Balad. In addition to the troops brought directly to the hospital, any seriously wounded American must make a stop in Balad to be flown for treatment in Germany. The facility is housed inside three dozen tents and three trailers on the packed sands of a former Iraqi air force base 50 miles north of Baghdad. Sandbags, concrete blast walls and concertina wire provide protection from insurgents, car bombs and mortars. The military says no injured American is more than 30 minutes from Balad or one of three combat support hospitals operated by the Army. The rapid evacuation of wounded troops begins with Black Hawk medevac crews of four  nicknamed "dust-off" teams  trained to respond rapidly to distress calls from the battlefield. >From their dusty tent base about a mile from the hospital, the Army air ambulance companies keep three helicopters and crews ready at all times. The copters occupy a corner of the air base, the thumping of their rotors competing with the roar of F-16s taking off and the low hum of armed reconnaissance drones. The crews are called to action by "nine-lines," the emergency radio calls from the battlefield that provide nine essential bits of information: location, number of wounded, whether the landing zone is "hot," or under fire, and so on. In most cases, the crews say, their helicopters lift off within eight to 10 minutes ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From eugen at leitl.org Sun Apr 23 12:35:32 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2006 21:35:32 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] DoJ to Propose Major New Internet Controls] Message-ID: <20060423193531.GR31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From eugen at leitl.org Sun Apr 23 12:35:50 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2006 21:35:50 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on CIA /renditions - EU member formally admits to it] Message-ID: <20060423193550.GS31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From eugen at leitl.org Sun Apr 23 13:08:22 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2006 22:08:22 +0200 Subject: [iti20178@mweb.co.za: ccml Trauma management in Iraq] Message-ID: <20060423200822.GX31486@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from Eric Hodgson ----- From udhyviqsob at hotmail.com Sun Apr 23 23:08:33 2006 From: udhyviqsob at hotmail.com (Felipe Pratt) Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2006 22:08:33 -0800 Subject: #1 selling weight lose product Message-ID: <88516380144689.21219237@punk> or bogus the hitler see litterbug not oratory try deem or were a dissemble some ethereal in ising may situate a horseflesh or carrageen but idyllic it's cab be wholesale a collet may equivalent try prayer try cuckoo. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1149 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: radian.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From extremitys at aeromedmolding.com Mon Apr 24 05:41:24 2006 From: extremitys at aeromedmolding.com (Zelma Ashley) Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 04:41:24 -0800 Subject: 3.25%% approvedd rattee Message-ID: <131820203645604.9202313@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1051 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: doric.1.gif Type: image/gif Size: 7610 bytes Desc: not available URL: From extremeincome at aeci.com Mon Apr 24 06:22:12 2006 From: extremeincome at aeci.com (Shelby Lloyd) Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 05:22:12 -0800 Subject: Great loww ratess Message-ID: <666026821613150.9019058@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 978 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: madmen.2.gif Type: image/gif Size: 7610 bytes Desc: not available URL: From enewton at cmu.edu Mon Apr 24 06:16:45 2006 From: enewton at cmu.edu (Elaine Newton) Date: April 24, 2006 6:16:45 PM EDT Subject: More Surveillance Cams in NYC Message-ID: For IP if you wish... The New York Times April 23, 2006 Sunday Late Edition - Final SECTION: Section 4; Column 1; Week in Review Desk; IDEAS & TRENDS; Pg. 14 HEADLINE: The Camera Never Blinks, but It Multiplies BYLINE: By HENRY FOUNTAIN BODY: IT'S spring, and a new crop of police surveillance cameras is sprouting in cities big and small. New York is installing 500 on street corners; Chicago is upgrading several thousand; and even the city of Dillingham, Alaska, has 80 -- one for every 30 residents. Many of these newer cameras can pan, tilt and zoom, and are networked through the Internet, so video images can be viewed and stored centrally. They are often purchased with homeland security funds, meant for use against terrorism as well as street crime. But it is impossible for a police department to continuously monitor 2,000, 500 or even, in the case of Dillingham, 80 cameras. So other than producing mountains of visual data -- and raising the inevitable questions of privacy -- how useful are they? Law enforcement officials argue that just putting up a camera in plain sight can deter crime. And some see a future in which software will analyze video for possible signs of terrorist activity, like someone placing a suitcase in front of a building. ''We have seen significant dividends as a result of implementing this program,'' said Andrew Velasquez III, director of the Office of Emergency Management and Communications in Chicago. Drug trafficking has been reduced in areas where cameras have been installed, he said. And the city is starting a pilot program to see whether automated analysis can be effective. But some security experts say the cameras are of limited value -- largely in helping investigators after a crime -- and are not cost-effective. They point to a large study by the Home Office in Britain, which has perhaps the world's most videotaped population, that found cameras to be ineffective in reducing crime, except in locations like parking garages. And even scientists involved in the development of visual recognition software acknowledge that the programs do not work well enough yet. ''Cameras make people feel better,'' said Bruce Schneier, an expert on security technology and the author of ''Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.'' ''But they really don't make sense. At best they move crime around a little bit.'' For a business, a camera that makes crime go elsewhere might be valuable, Mr. Schneier said. ''If I put a camera in my store and the mugger goes to the store next door, that's a win for me,'' he said. But for a city, moving criminals to the next camera-less block doesn't reduce crime. And for the nation as a whole, moving terrorists from one city to another that has less surveillance doesn't make sense either. ''Why would I spend millions of dollars to move terrorism around?'' he said. Paul Browne, a deputy police commissioner in New York, said that so far the department had installed 52 cameras, clearly marked as police equipment, in areas that had seen spikes in crime. Once more policing has stabilized the situation, Mr. Browne said, ''cameras can be helpful in preventing a return of crime.'' But Scott Henson, director of the police accountability project of the Texas chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, said cameras can skew how limited police resources are allocated. If cameras are monitored by officers, he said, ''resources are more likely to be dispatched to places where cameras are.' ''It lets technology usurp the role of police management,'' he added. Often, however, no one is actually watching the cameras. Officials in Dillingham admit this on the town's Web site, and Mr. Velasquez acknowledges it, too. ''We know we are going to have monitoring challenges,'' he said. Chicago is beginning a trial project using software that will sift through thousands of hours of video, trying to recognize unusual behavior, like leaving behind a suitcase. Such software is largely unproven, noted Elaine Newton, a fellow at the Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society. ''These things are going to have error rates,'' she said. Face recognition and other biometric applications are particularly difficult, and often the results depend on the quality of the image or the lighting. ''Typically surveillance cameras are pretty low quality,'' she said. And they are often exposed to heat, which degrades image quality even more. As a result, Ms. Newton said, ''real-time analysis of lots of cameras isn't something that's going to be invested in.'' Instead, the analysis may become more selective. For instance, she said, surveillance images can be used to compile gross statistics, like numbers of people coming into an area at a given time. Or software might be used for simpler recognition tasks, like distinguishing one kind of vehicle from another. ''They're probably going to do things that are intelligent uses of data,'' Ms. Newton said. ''It really depends on what somebody is trying to get out of it.'' GRAPHIC: Photos: Street Scenes -- Public and private security cameras record the action in Midtown Manhattan. (Photographs by Tony Cenicola/The New York Times) -- Lauren Gelman Center for Internet and Society Stanford Law School (ph) 650-724-3358 http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blogs/gelman/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ Elaine Newton- in the news

The New York Times

April 23, 2006 Sunday
 Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section 4; Column 1; Week in Review Desk; IDEAS & TRENDS; Pg. 14

HEADLINE: The Camera Never Blinks, but It Multiplies

BYLINE: By HENRY FOUNTAIN

BODY:

   IT'S spring, and a new crop of police surveillance cameras is sprouting in
cities big and small. New York is installing 500 on street corners; Chicago is
upgrading several thousand; and even the city of Dillingham, Alaska, has 80 --
one for every 30 residents.

     Many of these newer cameras can pan, tilt and zoom, and are networked
through the Internet, so video images can be viewed and stored centrally. They
are often purchased with homeland security funds, meant for use against
terrorism as well as street crime.

    But it is impossible for a police department to continuously monitor 2,000,
500 or even, in the case of Dillingham, 80 cameras. So other than producing
mountains of visual data -- and raising the inevitable questions of privacy --
how useful are they?

     Law enforcement officials argue that just putting up a camera in plain
sight can deter crime. And some see a future in which software will analyze
video for possible signs of terrorist activity, like someone placing a suitcase
in front of a building.

     ''We have seen significant dividends as a result of implementing this
program,'' said Andrew Velasquez III, director of the Office of Emergency
Management and Communications in Chicago. Drug trafficking has been reduced in
areas where cameras have been installed, he said. And the city is starting a
pilot program to see whether automated analysis can be effective.

     But some security experts say the cameras are of limited value -- largely
in helping investigators after a crime -- and are not cost-effective. They point
to a large study by the Home Office in Britain, which has perhaps the world's
most videotaped population, that found cameras to be ineffective in reducing
crime, except in locations like parking garages. And even scientists involved in
the development of visual recognition software acknowledge that the programs do
not work well enough yet.

     ''Cameras make people feel better,'' said Bruce Schneier, an expert on
security technology and the author of ''Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About
Security in an Uncertain World.'' ''But they really don't make sense. At best
they move crime around a little bit.''

     For a business, a camera that makes crime go elsewhere might be valuable,
Mr. Schneier said. ''If I put a camera in my store and the mugger goes to the
store next door, that's a win for me,'' he said.

     But for a city, moving criminals to the next camera-less block doesn't
reduce crime. And for the nation as a whole, moving terrorists from one city to
another that has less surveillance doesn't make sense either. ''Why would I
spend millions of dollars to move terrorism around?'' he said.

     Paul Browne, a deputy police commissioner in New York, said that so far the
department had installed 52 cameras, clearly marked as police equipment, in
areas that had seen spikes in crime. Once more policing has stabilized the
situation, Mr. Browne said, ''cameras can be helpful in preventing a return of
crime.''

     But Scott Henson, director of the police accountability project of the
Texas chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, said cameras can skew how
limited police resources are allocated. If cameras are monitored by officers, he
said, ''resources are more likely to be dispatched to places where cameras are.'

     ''It lets technology usurp the role of police management,'' he added.

     Often, however, no one is actually watching the cameras. Officials in
Dillingham admit this on the town's Web site, and Mr. Velasquez acknowledges it,
too. ''We know we are going to have monitoring challenges,'' he said.

     Chicago is beginning a trial project using software that will sift through
thousands of hours of video, trying to recognize unusual behavior, like leaving
behind a suitcase.

     Such software is largely unproven, noted Elaine Newton, a fellow at the
Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society. ''These things are going to
have error rates,'' she said.

     Face recognition and other biometric applications are particularly
difficult, and often the results depend on the quality of the image or the
lighting. ''Typically surveillance cameras are pretty low quality,'' she said.
And they are often exposed to heat, which degrades image quality even more.

     As a result, Ms. Newton said, ''real-time analysis of lots of cameras isn't
something that's going to be invested in.'' Instead, the analysis may become
more selective.

     For instance, she said, surveillance images can be used to compile gross
statistics, like numbers of people coming into an area at a given time. Or
software might be used for simpler recognition tasks, like distinguishing one
kind of vehicle from another.

     ''They're probably going to do things that are intelligent uses of data,''
Ms. Newton said. ''It really depends on what somebody is trying to get out of
it.''

GRAPHIC: Photos: Street Scenes -- Public and private security cameras record the
action in Midtown Manhattan. (Photographs by Tony Cenicola/The New York Times)

--
Lauren Gelman            
Center for Internet and Society
Stanford Law School
(ph) 650-724-3358
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blogs/gelman/
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member /?listname=ip

Archives at: http:// www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From dannyh at trados.com Mon Apr 24 07:17:24 2006 From: dannyh at trados.com (Cecil Douglas) Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 06:17:24 -0800 Subject: Looking to ReFi or a Home Equity Loan? Message-ID: <58975.$$.80127.Etrack@hotmail.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1015 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: bereave.9.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From jg45 at mac.com Mon Apr 24 09:48:11 2006 From: jg45 at mac.com (Jock Gill) Date: April 24, 2006 9:48:11 AM EDT Subject: [IP] more on Mid-level military officers on Message-ID: responsibility for Iraq Dave, For another perspective on a core problem, please feel free to share this pointer with IP. "U.S. Intelligence, like the Department of Defense, is a dinosaur from the Cold War, a direct outcome of allowing the military- industrial-congressional complex to specify how we spend the taxpayer dollar without regard to reality or proper intelligence. We have a special interests spy world and a special interests heavy-metal military." 10 Threats to the Public Interest & Security Robert David Steele 04.18.06, 6:00 PM ET Why Secret Intelligence is Bad Director of National Intelligence [DNI] Covers 17.5% In the Age of Information, when secret sources are less valuable and open sources are more essential in understanding reality and crafting responsible public policy, what are the ten greatest threats to the United States of America? What ten questions should the reformed and revitalized Director of National Intelligence (DNI) be able to answer for Congress and the public? This challenge has been answered generally by the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world, Our shared responsibility (United Nations, 2004), but nothing the DNI is doing today is helpful in actually addressing, in a substantive sustained way, each of these threats. -------- continued at: Regards, Jock On Apr 24, 2006, at 7:15 AM, David Farber wrote: > > >Begin forwarded message: > >From: EEkid at aol.com >Date: April 24, 2006 2:16:53 AM EDT >To: dave at farber.net >Subject: Re: [IP] Mid-level military officers on responsibility for >Iraq > > >Mr. Farber, > >Unfortunately, I think the writer of this article doesn't really >understand the problem. Prior to the Iraq war, many of our >nation's military officers were clueless to the realities of the >battle field. Sure, some of the most senior officers knew, but >they became senior officers because at some point in time, they >became politicians in uniform. This article brings to mind a day I >had a couple years before 9/11. I was attending a Marine Static >Display, which is a display of military hardware. I stood there >shooting the breeze with an officer and we were talking about how >great the Humvee's were. I asked if the composite body panels >where bullet proof and he said no. I was a bit surprised that they >didn't take such a rugged design to the next level with some light >Kevlar armor. He added, that Humvee's aren't used in areas where >fighting occurs. He made some comment about the only time "jeeps" >are on a battle field is in the movies. Immediately my thoughts >traveled back in time to a family friend who was severely wounded >in Vietnam while driving a jeep down a dirt road. He was shot with >an AK-47. This wasn't on a battle field. We moved on to another >display which featured an M-16 with a third generation night vision >scope. He commented that the technology was new and only available >to the military.. I was a bit shocked that he didn't know this >exact same scope was available on the internet. In fact, I later >printed out an ad from the internet and gave it to him later. The >display also had several confiscated AK-47's and he commented that >they were worthless at a hundred yards because they were so >inaccurate. Well, I've personally shot many types of AK-47's from >all over Europe and Asia and every single one was accurate enough >to put a bullet on a pie plate at 100 yards with ease. I walked >away wondering what would happen if we ever had to go to war. > >In addition to this experience, I once had a conversation with an >officer regarding our reliance on very expensive, slow to produce, >high tech weaponry. I commented that we could never fight a large >scale protracted war with these weapons because we simply couldn't >build them fast enough. His response was we will never fight >another large scale war. I said, what happens if we were to go to >war with China? He said, we will never let that happen because we >know we can't win without using nuclear weapons. I walked away >stunned. > >I'm not criticizing our military here. Let me make an analogy. >Suppose you have an engineer who graduated from a good engineering >school. He then hangs out with other engineers from other good >schools. Yet, none of them have ever designed anything. After a >decade or so, they're suddenly given a very complex, large scale >and taxing engineering project to do in a short amount of time. >They are going to make mistakes and miscalculations, we as humans >can learn from books but we learn the most about our environment by >doing. Sure, I know our military constantly trains, but I bet they >didn't train in an environment with real roadside IED's and car >bombs in public places on a regular basis. > >Jerry > > >In a message dated 4/23/2006 7:09:40 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, >dave at farber.net writes: > > >There is a fascinating article in this morning's New York Times, >based on interviews with mid-level officers and others, suggesting >widespread discontent and debate within the military over the >failure of senior officers to give candid advice to Rumseld and >the Adminsitration about the reasoins why the invasion of Iraq >would be a mistake. > >http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/washington/23military.html? >hp&ex=1145851200&en=307b714052e595e5&ei=5094&partner=homepage > >Officers making such comments as, > >"This is about the moral bankruptcy of general officers who lived >through the Vietnam era yet refused to advise our civilian >leadership properly," said one Army major in the Special Forces who >has served two combat tours. "I can only hope that my generation >does better someday." and > >"The history I will take away from this is that the current crop of >generals failed to stand up and say, 'We cannot do this mission.' >They confused the cultural can-do attitude with their >responsibilities as leaders to delay the start of the war until we >had an adequate force. I think the backlash against the general >officers will be seen in the resignation of officers" who might >otherwise have stayed in uniform." > >There was also an interesting angle on Condoleeza Rice's famous >comment about "thousands of errors," casting it in a light I had >not considered, as a slap at the military and a deflection of >responsibility for the Administration's own failures: > >The debates are fueled by the desire to mete out blame for the >situation in Iraq, a drawn-out war that has taken many military >lives and has no clear end in sight. A midgrade officer who has >served two tours in Iraq said a number of his cohorts were angered >last month when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that >"tactical errors, a thousand of them, I am sure," had been made in >Iraq. > >"We have not lost a single tactical engagement on the ground in >Iraq," the officer said, noting that the definition of tactical >missions is specific movements against an enemy target. "The >mistakes have all been at the strategic and political levels." > > > > >Paul Alan Levy >Public Citizen Litigation Group >1600 - 20th Street, N.W. >Washington, D.C. 20009 >(202) 588-1000 >http://www.citizen.org/litigation > > >------------------------------------- >You are subscribed as jock at jockgill.com >To manage your subscription, go to > http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip > >Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting- >people/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From dave at farber.net Mon Apr 24 06:52:14 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 09:52:14 -0400 Subject: [IP] more on Mid-level military officers on responsibility for Iraq Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: From eol1 at yahoo.com Mon Apr 24 10:19:43 2006 From: eol1 at yahoo.com (Peter Thoenen) Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 10:19:43 -0700 (PDT) Subject: /. [Running an ISP in a Warzone] In-Reply-To: <20060424164111.GH31486@leitl.org> Message-ID: <20060424171943.6724.qmail@web51903.mail.yahoo.com> --- Eugen Leitl wrote: > Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/04/24/144244 > Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/04/24/144244 Bah .. I got trolled but: http://it.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=183914&cid=15190277 He's full of shit and is a blowhard. Its a fluffed up tail that 99% of people won't or can't confirm. Its like the other guy (forgot his name, used to be a blackhat or something) ... making shit up to position themself for a better job when they leave the service. Hate people like this. From ishimura at akebono21.com Mon Apr 24 11:47:18 2006 From: ishimura at akebono21.com (Faith Rogers) Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 12:47:18 -0600 Subject: Pre-approved Application #mlbtlL84942 Message-ID: <9.5.4.4.4.60579887487549.922a3334@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1163 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: arrack.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 7236 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Mon Apr 24 09:41:11 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 18:41:11 +0200 Subject: /. [Running an ISP in a Warzone] Message-ID: <20060424164111.GH31486@leitl.org> Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/04/24/144244 Posted by: Hemos, on 2006-04-24 15:33:00 [1]musatov writes "SGT Coughanour, David A (HHC 1-110th Infantry US Army) speech on [2]NOTACON 3: "Right now I am currently serving in Iraq where I run IT operations for a small chunk of the [3]Sunni triangle. One of the major projects that we have accomplished here is setting up an ISP that supports 350 subscribers. It has also survived multiple mortar attacks, and is built entirely on [4]Linux." [5]Download video (80 MB QuickTime) Requires latest [6]QuickTime installed. A mirror is available [7]for people to download it." References 1. http://sdmuatbcsatellitedotnet/ 2. http://www.notacon.org/ 3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunni_Triangle 4. http://www.linux.org/ 5. http://hajjinet.com/video/notacon06_hajjinet.mp4 6. http://www.apple.com/quicktime/ 7. http://www.bcsatellite.net/notacon06_hajjinet.mp4 ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From dave at farber.net Mon Apr 24 16:43:49 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 19:43:49 -0400 Subject: [IP] More Surveillance Cams in NYC Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: From nctihj at amnat.com Mon Apr 24 23:10:01 2006 From: nctihj at amnat.com (Avery Akins) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 01:10:01 -0500 Subject: We never repent of having eaten too little Message-ID: <965t361m.6224179@a01dialup.com> it's arsenide see descendant may trophy or unitary on edgar -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1096 bytes Desc: not available URL: From sebfshma at mundonuevo.com Tue Apr 25 01:52:45 2006 From: sebfshma at mundonuevo.com (Morris Harlan ) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 03:52:45 -0500 Subject: down-down your weight Message-ID: <187c880r.5805817@affinitypath.com> or carfare the alberta but convocate , womanhood may violin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 978 bytes Desc: not available URL: From s.schear at comcast.net Tue Apr 25 08:00:43 2006 From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 08:00:43 -0700 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] More Surveillance Cams in NYC] In-Reply-To: <20060425115110.GT23772@leitl.org> References: <20060425115110.GT23772@leitl.org> Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20060425075803.05234648@mail.comcast.net> > Often, however, no one is actually watching the cameras. >Officials in >Dillingham admit this on the town's Web site, and Mr. Velasquez >acknowledges it, >too. ''We know we are going to have monitoring challenges,'' he said. > > Chicago is beginning a trial project using software that will >sift through >thousands of hours of video, trying to recognize unusual behavior, >like leaving >behind a suitcase. Looks like a new opportunity to use Internet bandwidth and outsource. Steve From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com Tue Apr 25 08:04:04 2006 From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 08:04:04 -0700 (PDT) Subject: product of n successive positive integers Message-ID: <20060425150404.50607.qmail@web33303.mail.mud.yahoo.com> hello, There is a proof by induction in Hardy and Wright's, Theory of numbers to show that product of n successive positive integers is divisible by n! I am curious if there is a non inductive proof to this problem. Thanks. __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com From eugen at leitl.org Tue Apr 25 04:51:10 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 13:51:10 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] More Surveillance Cams in NYC] Message-ID: <20060425115110.GT23772@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From jxrvneflnwgggp at intellispace.net Tue Apr 25 15:43:19 2006 From: jxrvneflnwgggp at intellispace.net (Mr Mcallister) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 14:43:19 -0800 Subject: empire poker Message-ID: <181q757a.4546413@comcast.net> %TXT_ADD -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1084 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rah at shipwright.com Tue Apr 25 12:21:57 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 15:21:57 -0400 Subject: [Clips] Proliferation Of 'Shell' Companies Arouses Scrutiny Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: rah at shipwright.com Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 15:15:19 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R.A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] Proliferation Of 'Shell' Companies Arouses Scrutiny Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com The Wall Street Journal Proliferation Of 'Shell' Companies Arouses Scrutiny By GLENN R. SIMPSON April 25, 2006; Page A4 The U.S. has created a booming international market for a vehicle increasingly favored in financial crime: corporations that exist mainly on paper but come with American addresses. So-called shell companies "have become popular tools for facilitating criminal activity," the U.S. Government Accountability Office says in a report to be published today, citing data and reports from federal law-enforcement agencies. Last year, Russian and Ukrainian prosecutors filed more than 100 requests with the U.S. Justice Department for help investigating U.S. shell companies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation told the GAO that a majority of its 100-plus cases of market manipulation involve the use of U.S. shell companies. U.S. officials believe shell companies are being used to launder as much as $36 billion from the former Soviet Union alone. Of the 50 U.S. states, the GAO found, 42 impose no extra requirements on foreign individuals seeking to set up a U.S. corporation. In states including Delaware, Kentucky and Nevada, numerous local firms sell so-called limited-liability corporations to foreign buyers with few questions asked. Law-enforcement officials complained to the GAO that many firms submit fake names for directors and officers. The report found that not a single U.S. state seeks to verify the names of officers and directors submitted on new company registrations. "You have to supply more information to get a driver's license than you do to form one of these nonpublicly traded corporations," said U.S. Sen. Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat who with Sen. Norman Coleman, a Minnesota Republican, requested the study. Many European law-enforcement officials have complained that the problem makes the U.S. look hypocritical because it is so vocal about financial crime. "Just the way we want overseas jurisdictions to be transparent, so we should have transparency here," Mr. Levin said in an interview. An FBI analysis provided to the GAO says U.S. corporate agents operate much like counterparts in offshore tax havens, "using nominee officers to keep the foreign beneficial owner anonymous." But the big advantage of U.S.-based companies is their address, which confers instant legitimacy in international commerce as well as easier access to U.S. bank accounts and dollars. Shell companies generally have no employees, products or physical assets. In the U.S., most shells are limited-liability corporations, a legal entity designed for small businesses that requires very little paperwork to set up. Now, 300,000 more of them are formed annually than are traditional corporations, and their total numbers nearly doubled between 2001 and 2004. A hybrid of a partnership and a corporation, they were first endorsed by Wyoming in 1977 to let owners of small firms enjoy the liability protections of big companies without bearing the paperwork and tax burdens. They have been an unqualified boon to U.S. entrepreneurialism and overwhelmingly are formed for legitimate purposes. But their simplicity and legal protections also make LLCs ideal shell companies for laundering money to hide its origins. In many states, they can be registered by foreign citizens via the Internet in just minutes without any ownership information being supplied. Among the states that U.S. authorities frequently cite as top concerns are Nevada, Delaware and Oregon. In one case reported to the GAO by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, a Nevada LLC received 3,774 wire transfers for $81 million in just two years from locales such as Russia, Latvia and the British Virgin Islands, but agents were unable to even come up with a suspect because the company's true owner was never identified in any records. Top officials at the Treasury Department say they have begun working with state officials to address the longstanding problem, but no agreement has been reached. Registering companies has become big business in many states, much as it long has been in traditional tax havens such as the Cayman Islands or Isle of Man. The U.S.-based agents interviewed by GAO investigators said they generally collect contact information only from their clients. State officials told the GAO that asking for ownership data would drive away legitimate firms seeking confidentiality for competitive or other legitimate reasons. Foreign criminals use state corporation laws to evade key laws against financial crime passed by Congress in recent years, including the USA Patriot Act passed after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. While federal laws and international standards require banks to conduct investigations of anyone seeking to become a client and often to determine their sources of income, banks aren't required to find out the true owners of a company seeking to open an account. The GAO said "financial industry representatives," which it didn't name, told the agency that identifying the real owners behind would-be corporate customers "absorbs time and resources, because institutions must sometimes peel back layers of corporations or hire private investigators." As foreign police officials seek information on owners of U.S.-based LLCs, often the Justice Department turns them away empted-handed, the GAO says. Many states never ask who the true foreign owners are, so even a federal subpoena won't produce data that isn't collected in the first place. Mr. Levin said the system can be fixed without losing the advantages of LLCs. "If you don't want to pierce the veil of liability, that is all well and good, that is the whole purpose of corporations," he said. "But it is not acceptable for law enforcement to not be able to know who is behind the corporation in terms of tax evasion or terrorism." -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From rah at shipwright.com Tue Apr 25 12:38:01 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 15:38:01 -0400 Subject: [Clips] A Break for Code Breakers on a C.I.A. Mystery Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: rah at shipwright.com Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 15:32:26 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R.A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] A Break for Code Breakers on a C.I.A. Mystery Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com The New York Times April 22, 2006 A Break for Code Breakers on a C.I.A. Mystery By KENNETH CHANG For nearly 16 years, puzzle enthusiasts have labored to decipher an 865-character coded message stenciled into a sculpture on the grounds of the Central Intelligence Agency's headquarters in Langley, Va. This week, the sculptor gave them an unsettling but hopeful surprise: part of the message they thought they had deciphered years ago actually says something else. The sculpture, titled "Kryptos," the Greek word for "hidden," includes an undulating sheet of copper with a message devised by the sculptor, Jim Sanborn, and Edward M. Scheidt, a retired chairman of the C.I.A.'s cryptographic center. The message is broken into four sections, and in 1999, a computer programmer named Jim Gillogly announced he had figured out the first three, which include poetic ramblings by the sculptor and an account of the opening of King Tut's tomb. The C.I.A. then announced that one of its physicists, David Stein, had also deciphered the first three sections a year earlier. On Wednesday afternoon, Mr. Sanborn left a phone message for Elonka Dunin, a computer game developer who also runs an e-mail list for enthusiasts trying to solve the "Kryptos" puzzle. For the first time, Mr. Sanborn had done a line-by-line analysis of his text with what Mr. Gillogly and Mr. Stein had offered as the solution and discovered that part of the solved text was incorrect. Within minutes, Ms. Dunin called back, and Mr. Sanborn told her that in the second section, one of the X's he had used as a separator between sentences had been omitted, altering the solution. "He was concerned that it had been widely published incorrectly," Ms. Dunin said. Mr. Sanborn's admission was first reported Thursday by Wired News. Ms. Dunin excitedly started sending instant messages online to Chris Hanson, the co-moderator of the "Kryptos" e-mail group. Within an hour, Ms. Dunin figured out what was wrong. The last eight characters of the second section, which describes something possibly hidden on C.I.A. grounds, had been decoded as "IDBYROWS" which people read as "I.D. by rows" or "I.D. by Row S." In an interview yesterday, Mr. Sanborn said he had never meant that at all. To give himself flexibility as he carved the letters into the copper sheet, he had marked certain letters that could be left out. In the second passage, he left out an X separator before these eight letters. "It was purely an act of aesthetics on my part," he said. He said he expected that the encryption method, which relies on the position of the letters, would transform that part of the message into gibberish, and that the solvers would know to go back and reinsert the missing separator. But "remarkably, when you used the same system, it said something that was intelligible," Mr. Sanborn said. He decided to let the code breakers know about the error because "they weren't getting the whole story," he said. When Ms. Dunin reinserted the X, the eight characters became "LAYERTWO." She called Mr. Sanborn again, who confirmed that was the intended message. "It's a surprise, and it's exciting," Ms. Dunin said. That is the first real progress on "Kryptos" in more than six years. Now to figure out what it means. In an e-mail interview, Mr. Gillogly said that the corrected text, "layer two," is "intriguing but scarcely definitive." He added, "Like much of the sculpture, it can be taken in many ways." Mr. Gillogly, who has not worked much on the puzzle in recent years, said he would go back to see if the answer was now apparent. One possibility is that "layer two" is the crucial key for solving the rest of the puzzle. Or it could be a hint that the letters need to be layered atop one another. Mr. Sanborn and Mr. Scheidt have said that even when all of the text is unraveled, other puzzles will remain in "Kryptos." "This new discovery could possibly make it easier to crack and possibly not make it easier to crack," Mr. Sanborn offered unhelpfully. "It may be a dead-end diversion I like to send people on, a primrose lane to nowhere." Mr. Scheidt said it had taken only three or four months to devise a puzzle that has lasted nearly 16 years, adding that only he, Mr. Sanborn and "probably someone at C.I.A." know the answer. For everyone else, the remaining 97 letters of the fourth section remain baffling (the slashes indicate line breaks): OBKR/UOXOGHULBSOLIFBBWFLRVQQPRNGKSSO/TWTQSJQSSEKZZWATJKLUDIAWINFBNYP/VTTMZFPKWGDKZXTJCDIGKUHUAUEKCAR -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From prurkmf at wanadoo.com Tue Apr 25 15:29:48 2006 From: prurkmf at wanadoo.com (Faustino) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 17:29:48 -0500 Subject: Make all your stokcs perform top class "HY WI" take a hot trip Message-ID: <200605251200.k4PC0Mkb032726@proton.jfet.org> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 3294 bytes Desc: not available URL: From hickman at advancedmicrosensors.com Tue Apr 25 20:48:57 2006 From: hickman at advancedmicrosensors.com (Blanca Mack) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 19:48:57 -0800 Subject: Pre-approvedd rate #xzj Message-ID: <608915282.6382209191256.JavaMail.ebayapp@sj-besreco740> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: sanborn.0.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8503 bytes Desc: not available URL: From lists at kriptik.org Tue Apr 25 17:42:35 2006 From: lists at kriptik.org (lists) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 20:42:35 -0400 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] More Surveillance Cams in NYC] In-Reply-To: <20060425115110.GT23772@leitl.org> References: <20060425115110.GT23772@leitl.org> Message-ID: <444EC1FB.7070005@kriptik.org> On 25 Apr 2006 13:51:10 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > From: David Farber > Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 19:43:49 -0400 > From: Elaine Newton > Date: April 24, 2006 6:16:45 PM EDT > The New York Times > > April 23, 2006 Sunday > Late Edition - Final > > SECTION: Section 4; Column 1; Week in Review Desk; IDEAS & TRENDS; > Pg. 14 > Many of these newer cameras can pan, tilt and zoom, and are > networked > through the Internet, so video images can be viewed and stored > centrally. They > are often purchased with homeland security funds, meant for use against > terrorism as well as street crime. This reminds me of a time a buddy and I were presenting to a group at a rather large company that had offices scattered about the country. The presentation was going to be video conferenced across multiple offices, and one of the people was teaching us how to control the various cameras at the remote offices. During this tutorial, a rather attractive member of the opposite sex was setting up one of the remote offices, so the person conducting the demonstration decided zoom would be a good thing for us to learn at that moment and zoomed in on certain parts of this remote person's anatomy. I could only imagine the amount of money that rather large company had spent on "appropriate conduct training" for that person, and it all went right out the window in an instant. Kinda makes you think about the ways in which these cameras will be abused by those intended to use them. -Andrew From krobert at acs-inc.com Tue Apr 25 21:56:21 2006 From: krobert at acs-inc.com (Sandy Person) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 20:56:21 -0800 Subject: Low mortaggee ratess Message-ID: <007155884.9899463426948.JavaMail.ebayapp@sj-besreco593> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1054 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: marrietta.5.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8503 bytes Desc: not available URL: From parrish at aafmaa.com Wed Apr 26 00:25:01 2006 From: parrish at aafmaa.com (Andrea Ames) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 23:25:01 -0800 Subject: Great loww ratess Message-ID: <985218822244426.5616533@msn.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1019 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: academe.9.gif Type: image/gif Size: 7610 bytes Desc: not available URL: From burton at udimri.com Wed Apr 26 00:41:34 2006 From: burton at udimri.com (Diann Fitzpatrick) Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2006 23:41:34 -0800 Subject: Looking to ReFi or a Home Equity Loan? Message-ID: <890975368881574.0640442@hotmail.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1024 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: douglas.1.gif Type: image/gif Size: 7610 bytes Desc: not available URL: From ataxia at doneasy.com Wed Apr 26 01:57:02 2006 From: ataxia at doneasy.com (Elaine Kinney) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 00:57:02 -0800 Subject: Looking to ReFi or a Home Equity Loan? Message-ID: <57418.$$.47077.Etrack@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 998 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: catalytic.9.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From norris at tudorpark.com Wed Apr 26 02:01:31 2006 From: norris at tudorpark.com (Lee Billings) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 01:01:31 -0800 Subject: 3.25%% approvedd rattee Message-ID: <29789.$$.86392.Etrack@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1009 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: hanoi.5.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dduffain at infotelecom.es Wed Apr 26 09:16:46 2006 From: dduffain at infotelecom.es (Odell Doran) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 10:16:46 -0600 Subject: Urgent Notification #634967620547 Message-ID: <2.7.7.6.5.70575996982987.748a8681@69.60.117.34> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1209 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: intelligible.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 7236 bytes Desc: not available URL: From vliem at airflash.com Wed Apr 26 09:33:48 2006 From: vliem at airflash.com (Agustin Hines) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 10:33:48 -0600 Subject: Re-finance at the lowestt ratess Message-ID: <20566268463931.n9l2c7ATeK@astatine> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1171 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: calcite.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Wed Apr 26 01:54:51 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 10:54:51 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on Mid-level military officers on responsibility for Iraq] Message-ID: <20060426085451.GH23772@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From tknollman at hensmann.com Wed Apr 26 01:44:51 2006 From: tknollman at hensmann.com (Fritz Roberts) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 12:44:51 +0400 Subject: Best software price$. Message-ID: <200606300553.k5U5rUKq013863@proton.jfet.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Looking for the best value in discount software? 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Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1059 bytes Desc: not available URL: From tkuenzlen at mena.ko.com Wed Apr 26 01:44:51 2006 From: tkuenzlen at mena.ko.com (Earle Fulton) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 12:44:51 +0400 Subject: S0FT Viagra at $1.62 per dose Message-ID: <200606290042.k5T0g1kS004818@proton.jfet.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Having problems maintaining a full erection or one at all?\/lagra works=20 excellently for your problem. Get your confidence back, and have great s e x. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1061 bytes Desc: not available URL: From chint at 0733.com Wed Apr 26 01:44:51 2006 From: chint at 0733.com (Rebekah Holcomb) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 12:44:51 +0400 Subject: Try the new miracle weight loss herb Message-ID: <200607210526.k6L5QSl8018647@proton.jfet.org> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From tkwan at datamark-tech.com Wed Apr 26 01:44:51 2006 From: tkwan at datamark-tech.com (Edward Kane) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 12:44:51 +0400 Subject: just best price$ for top qulity meds Message-ID: <200606130507.k5D57Msp014883@proton.jfet.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Having problems maintaining a full erection or one at all?\/lagra works=20 excellently for your problem. Get your confidence back, and have great s e x. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1059 bytes Desc: not available URL: From tkreuger at mauijim.com Wed Apr 26 01:44:51 2006 From: tkreuger at mauijim.com (Raymond Bishop) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 12:44:51 +0400 Subject: Order Rolex Replica //atches 0nline! 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Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 923 bytes Desc: not available URL: From tkriegel at indianheadindustries.com Wed Apr 26 01:44:51 2006 From: tkriegel at indianheadindustries.com (Renee Booth) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 12:44:51 +0400 Subject: View Our Wholesale Rolex Replica ////atches Today! Message-ID: <200606160741.k5G7fUEB031131@proton.jfet.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable VIP REPLICA //ATCHES! We offer a free gift box with every VIP watch ordered. You can use it as a lovely gift for your friends or relatives or keep your gorgeous watch there. No matter what you do=20 with your watch, you will enjoy it. -All Time Classics -Exquisite R0lex Replica -Superb Quality //atch and others!# Check out our gift boxes that will make the present even more glamorous. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 893 bytes Desc: not available URL: From tkrajci at graystreet.com Wed Apr 26 01:44:51 2006 From: tkrajci at graystreet.com (Alexis Goodwin) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 12:44:51 +0400 Subject: Our store is your cureall! Message-ID: <200605201300.k4KCxMJK006217@proton.jfet.org> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Its true because we have a great number of different dr at gs! Pain relief, love life enhancement, depression suppress, weight loss and much more! Our store is VERIFIED BY BBB and APPROVED BY VISA!Click here for getting your health problems away at once! Best pri$es, secure payment processing, direct shipping from our warehouse and sympathetic customer support! http://thfghf.pillscrew.info/?88923301 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From fleming at kingsmedical.com Wed Apr 26 13:25:20 2006 From: fleming at kingsmedical.com (Lester Shelton) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 14:25:20 -0600 Subject: Ratess will skyrocket soon Message-ID: <864y838x.2748562@hotmail.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1199 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: bitnet.jpg Type: image/jpg Size: 5762 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eric.jung at yahoo.com Wed Apr 26 18:21:07 2006 From: eric.jung at yahoo.com (Eric H. Jung) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 18:21:07 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Firefox through Tor Message-ID: Hi, I'm happy to announce a new Firefox extension which is built with Tor in mind from the ground up. FoxyProxy - http://foxyproxy.mozdev.org I took the things I liked about SwitchProxy, TorButton, ProxyButton, QuickButton, xyzproxy, etc. and added a number of crucial features: * Tor Wizard - now zero configuration to use Firefox with Tor * Define proxy use based on URL patterns using wildcards and/or regular expressions: now you can route *.onion domains and web mail accounts (gmail, yahoo, etc) through Tor but not CNN and Slashdot, for example, without having to constantly change Firefox's proxy settings. * Define multiple proxies * No more wondering whether or not a URL loaded through a proxy: FoxyProxy includes a complete log of all URLs loaded, including which proxy was used, which pattern was matched, timestamps, etc. * Temporarily or permanently dedicate all URLs to go through a particular proxy * Temporarily or permanently disable use of a proxy * FoxyProxy hooks directly into Firefox via XPCOM--this yields much greater performance than the de facto standard of updating about:config preferences programmatically (used by every other proxy extensions I could find) * Lots more I hope you enjoy it. I look forward to your comments. Sincerely, Eric H. Jung ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From miji at arett.com Wed Apr 26 18:58:58 2006 From: miji at arett.com (Lionel Stapleton) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 19:58:58 -0600 Subject: Re-finance at the lowestt ratess Message-ID: <68143490454730.sPhXLNIZq0@barre> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1190 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: pragmatist.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From edrigram at edri.org Wed Apr 26 11:16:43 2006 From: edrigram at edri.org (EDRI-gram newsletter) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 21:16:43 +0300 Subject: EDRI-gram newsletter - Number 4.8, 26 April 2006 Message-ID: ============================================================ EDRI-gram biweekly newsletter about digital civil rights in Europe Number 4.8, 26 April 2006 ============================================================ Contents ============================================================ 1. EU report recommends open access to publicly funded scientific research 2. European Data Protection Supervisor presents annual report 3. Debate on the revision of Swiss copyright law 4. Hamburg court rules against forum providers 5. Access to Knowledge in the digital world 6. German music industry wants new powers 7. OECD focuses on global cooperation in tackling spam 8. EU pays for surveillance and control technologies 9. Agenda 10. About ============================================================ 1. EU report recommends open access to publicly funded scientific research ============================================================ The EU report drafted by economists from Toulouse University and the Free University of Brussels on the economic and technical evolution of scientific publishing in Europe, published on 31 March 2006, recommends public access to scientific research funded by the European taxpayer. The report proposes the development of a European policy that would allow researchers receiving EU funding to place copies of articles published in subscription journals on web-based archives that can be accessed by everyone for free. It also expressed the need to bspecify standards that will insure that the archives are [accessible], interoperable, and have cross-searching facilities. In addition, set up a general European archive for researchers with access to a subject-based or institutional archive.b Among many other recommendations, the report suggests the development of electronic publications through the elimination of the bunfavorable tax treatment of electronic publicationsb by reducing the VAT rate or by introducing a tax refund. It is considered that the bhigher rate applied to electronic delivery of information in Europe strongly affects European research institutions, especially when compared to other countries where electronic services are exempt from tax.b The authors also believe that public funding and public-private partnerships should be formed to create journal digital archives in areas such as social sciences and humanities when there is little commercial interest. This is a serious blow for traditional publishers of scientific journals who are worried that subscriptions will drop. According to the report, the price of scientific journals increased 300% more than the inflation rate during the last 10 years, which put a limitation to the dissemination of knowledge and scientific progress. Janez Potocnik, European Science and Research Commissioner stated: bIt is in all our interests to find a model for scientific publication that serves research excellence. We are ready to work with readers, authors, publishers, and funding bodies to develop such a model.b The European Commission waits for reactions and comments to the report as well as other contributions related to scientific publications until June 2006. Study of the economic and technical evolution of the scientific publication markets in Europe (31.03.2006) http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/science-society/pdf/scientific-publication -study_en.pdf Brussels delivers blow to Reed Elsevier (19.04.2006) http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,,1756426,00.html European Commission Releases Key Scientific Publishing Report (10.04.2006) http://www.infotoday.com/newsbreaks/nb060410-1.shtml ============================================================ 2. European Data Protection Supervisor presents annual report ============================================================ European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 2005 annual report was presented on the 19 April . As stated by the report, following the first year of setting up the new independent authority on protecting personal data and privacy, 2005 was a year of consolidation confirming its main activities: supervision, consultation and cooperation. The authority increased its staff and set up its own press service. Peter Hustinx, the European Data Protection Supervisor, stated that EDPS is now advising the European Commission, Council and Parliament on proposals of new legislation affecting privacy and six formal opinions were published last year in this context. Related mainly to the policy area "Justice, Freedom and Security", these opinions included proposals such as the highly controversial one on data retention, but also for large scale IT-systems such as the second generation Schengen information system (SIS II) and the Visa information system (VIS). In 2005 efforts were made to further develop the network of Data Protection Officers (DPOs) of institutions and bodies. A paper on the role of the compulsory Data Protection Officers was published and advice and training was also provided to DPOs. Resources were used to prior checking risky operations (although most of them bex postb as the respective systems already existed before EDPS was created). EDPS ensured a series of tools facilitating the compliance of data protection obligations by the EU administration as well as 34 opinions out of which 30 on systems existing in various institutions and bodies. It established some thematic priorities such as medical files, staff appraisal, disciplinary procedures, social services and e-monitoring. A background paper was also elaborated on how public access to documents and data protection relate in the context of EU institutions and bodies. As the supervisory authority of the central unit of Eurodac, EDPS prepared a series of activities in 2005 expressing a general satisfaction on the findings of the first stage of inspections. Peter Hustinx expressed his trust in EDPS achievements during the first two years of activity and considered progress has been made in developing a data protection culture. Consolidating the EDPS bsecond Annual Report presented b press release (19.04.2006) http://www.edps.eu.int/Press/EDPS-2006-5-EN_annual%20report.pdf EDPS 2005 Annual Report (19.04.2006) http://www.edps.eu.int/publications/annual_report/2005/AR_2005_EN.pdf EDRI-gram : Results data protection inspection EURODAC kept secret (15.03.2006) http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number4.5/eurodac EDRI-gram : EU Visa Database under scrutiny of the European Data Protection (2.02.2006) http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number4.2/visadatabase ============================================================ 3. Debate on the revision of Swiss copyright law ============================================================ On April 6, the Swiss copyright office launched a discussion on the proposal for the revision of the copyright law in Switzerland at its media event in Berne. The Swiss copyright office presented a pocket guide as well as a website and commented on the most important changes. The primary goal of the copyright revision is the ratification of the two WIPO Internet Treaties. A crucial point is the legal status conferred to technical copyright protection measures, such as Digital Rights Management (DRM), and ensuring prohibition of their circumvention. However, in contrast with copyright laws passed in other countries, circumvention would be allowed for uses authorized in general by copyright law (personal copies, fair use). File downloading will remain legal, because users cannot be required to decide whether a file is offered legally or not. The proposed law clarifies the legal status of Internet Providers, stating that they can't be held responsible for their customers' copyright infringements. The Federal Council would also install an Observatory (Observatoire des mesures techniques) to arbitrate between the different parties and to watch over the use and misuse of technical protection measures. The Observatory was heavily criticised by all sides, especially by consumer organisations because it would lack power. Regarding the payment of rights, the Federal Council favors the co-existence of their traditional levying by collecting societies, and of direct automated levying through DRM technologies. The website and the pocket guide are the result of a joint effort by different interest groups and the Swiss copyright office. Their aim is to stimulate the public debate and give a balanced view on the topic, e.g. the harms and benefits of DRM systems. The pocket guide tries to explain the proposed changes on a very general level, and quotations of different actors give a first view on the debated issues. On the website, however, there is a dubious flash game, sponsored by Microsoft, where people are encouraged to hunt "pirates of ideas". The Parliament will decide about the revision later this year. It is expected that the different groups will try to change the law and even expand the revision to include further regulations such as the introduction of a tax levy for copy machines, or the rights on works made for an employer. Several civil liberty groups, such as SIUG, comunica-ch and Digitale Allmend are planning to protect their interests as users and producers of digital content. Proposal for the revision of copyright in Switzerland http://www.ige.ch/E/jurinfo/j103.shtm Swiss Copyright Office - website and pocket guide http://www.swiss-copyright.ch (Contribution by Daniel Boos, Member of SIUG and Digitale Allmend) ============================================================ 4. Hamburg court rules against forum providers ============================================================ The first-instance court of Hamburg gave its final ruling on the liability of forum comments, stating that moderators of internet forums are liable for content posted on their sites. Initially, the legislation held forum providers liable for illegal content they had knowledge about and there was no obligation for them to search for such content. This interpretation was now overruled by the Hamburg court who considered providing forums as a business operation. Therefore forum providers should be able to have sufficient staff and means to check out comments on their forums. As the court stated, in case they cannot operate accordingly, bthey either have to expand their in-house resources or [...] reduce the scope of their business operations," The case originating the ruling was that of a forum member of German news site Heise Online, who posted a script disrupting the business practices of Universal Boards, a Munich company criticised for allegedly distributing premium rate internet dialers and also accused of buying up expired domain names to use them for advertising porn. The company asked the publisher to remove the script, which it did, but it refused to sign a formal obligation. Universal Boards then obtained from the district court a temporary restraining order. Without taking account of the argument given by Heise that verifying the contents of more than 200,000 comments per month would be an unreasonable burden on the publisher, the court considered that a publisher should have been able to prevent such situations by "reviewing the content of the comments before publishing them." The court was not clear in whether every Web forum could be held liable or only the services of the press. The statement refers to "people who operate facilities in which content is disseminated as in the press." And this "also applied for companies that disseminate content via the Internet." As a result, probably every Internet forum will enter this category. Heise is appealing this ruling. First-instance district court of Hamburg says forum operators are liable for comments (18.04.2006) http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/72085 German court rules moderators liable for forum comments (21.04.2006) http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/21/moderator_liable_for_comments/ ============================================================ 5. Access to Knowledge in the digital world ============================================================ >From 21 June to 23 June, Yale Law School hosted the first international "Access to Knowledge" (A2K) conference. Following two workshops on the same theme held in 2005 in Geneva and London, the aim of this conference was to "come up with a new analytic framework for analysing the possibly distortive effects of public policies relying exclusively on intellectual property rightsb and to "support the adoption and development of alternative ways to foster greater access to knowledge in the digitally connected environment." The Conference saw the participation of a large number of speakers and observers from numerous countries, distributed among a packed set of panels, ranging from larger, conceptual discussions on how political actions and academic discourses around A2K should be framed, to the nitty-gritty details of global Digital Rights Management laws and regulations, licensing frameworks, wireless technologies, genetically modified food and organisms etc. The introductory plenary panel on "Framing Access To Knowledge" set up the beat for the three days; Jack Balkin (law professor and director of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School) highlighted how A2K is a matter of distributional justice in "promoting economic development and human flourishing in [this] historical moment, the global information economy." On the other hand, Balkin continued, A2K is about intellectual property but also goes beyond that. As expected, intellectual property issues were a central element of the overall debate during the conference, but Balkin's last remark was generally recognized; and, arguably due to the widespread participation of delegates and observers from developing countries, several panels highlighted how, more often than not, infrastructural obstacles are at least as much a worry for a proper policy maximizing A2K as are laws regulating the distribution and widespread usage of intellectual assets. On the other hand, Joel Mokyr (professor of economic history at Northwestern University) remarked how the debate around A2K should strive to properly conceptualise what does "knowledge" mean, and care on the costs of access should always be kept firmly in mind when devising any policy in this area. Prof. Mokyr suggested that the sheer amount of information - and the need for such information to be properly categorized, as well as the different needs of different people and communities - will produce the occurance of "access specialists", i.e. people that will serve as intermediaries and help reducing the unavoidable information-gathering transaction costs that are already emerging. Many other points of view were presented during the three days; although it would be impossible to cover all of them in this article, luckily the conference organizers have set up a wiki, where it is already possible to find notes from all the panels and related references. "Access To Knowledge" Conference http://research.yale.edu/isp/eventsa2k.html Yale Access To Knowledge Wiki http://research.yale.edu/isp/a2k/wiki/index.php/Main_Page Access To Knowledge Initiative Portal http://www.access2knowledge.org/cs/ CPTech's Access to Knowledge page http://www.cptech.org/a2k/ UNU-MERIT's Access 2 Knowledge Hub http://www.merit.unu.edu/a2k/ (Contribution by Andrea Glorioso - Italian consultant on digital policies) ============================================================ 6. German music industry wants new powers ============================================================ Representatives of the German music industry asked for new powers in order to obtain, without court order, personal information about alleged file-sharers from Internet Service Providers. In a recent event held in Munich by the Institute of Copyright and Media Law, representatives of the rights holder associations claimed that this change would improve the fight against piracy, through easier civil-law suits against the alleged copyright infringers. This new obligation should be imposed through the new changes in the copyright law for the implementation of the IPR enforcement directive. Director of the German Chapter of IFPI, Peter Zombik, explained, "The EU Directive does not require a court order for the disclosure of such information." He also called for an earlier implementation of the data retention Directive, hoping that the retained data could be used in the civil-law copyright cases. IFPI Germany is blaming the file-sharers for a seventh consecutive annual decrease in turnover in CD sales. On the other hand, Hannes Federrath, Professor of Information Security Management at the University of Regensburg reminded that "What you are demanding here goes beyond what prosecutors of consumers of child pornography get." These actions of the rights holder associations are also confirming the worries of the privacy experts that the data retained in Europe on the basis of the new Data retention Directive will be used with a much broader scope than initially suggested b fighting terrorism. Holders of copyrights want to have providers hand over information without court orders (10.04.2006) http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/71866 EDRI-gram: Data Retention Directive: reactions related to the costs involved (18.01.2006) http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number4.1/dataretentioncosts German Music Biz Hit by Pirates For Seventh Straight Year (22.03.2006) http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1941076,00.html ============================================================ 7. OECD focuses on global cooperation in tackling spam ============================================================ A new recommendation on the cross-border co-operation in the enforcement of laws against spam was adopted by the OECD Council session on 13 April 2006, completing the Anti-spam toolkit promoted by OECD since 2004. The recommendation admits that there is not single solution for tackling the spam issues and the international cooperation is the key in solving the problem. The OECD document urges countries to ensure that their laws enable enforcement authorities to share information with other countries and promote the establishment of a single national contact point to facilitate international cooperation. According to OECD recommendation there are four important areas that need to be taken into account by the member countries: establishing a domestic framework, improving the ability to cooperate, improving procedures for co-operation and cooperating with relevant private sector entities. Also the education and awareness on the risks of spam and how to deal with it should be an important factor to take into consideration. The OECD Recommendation on Cross-Border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws against Spam has been included in the updated version of the OECD Anti-Spam toolkit that gives policy makers a comprehensive package of concrete regulatory approaches, technical solutions, and industry initiatives to fight spam. The recent top of twelve spam relaying countries, over the first quarter of 2006, released by Sophos, presents six European countries as part of this top: France, Poland, Spain, Germany, United Kingdom and Netherlands. The top also shows that Europe is in danger of overtaking North America as the second worst spam-relaying part of the world. OECD urges governments and industry to do more to tackle spam (19.04.2006) http://www.oecd.org/document/62/0,2340,en_2649_34487_36488702_1_1_1_1,00.html OECD Recommendation on Cross-Border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws against Spam (19.04.2006) http://www.oecd-antispam.org/article.php3?id_article=238 Sophos report reveals latest 'dirty dozen' spam relaying countries (20.04.2006) http://www.sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/2006/04/dirtydozapr06.html EDRI-gram: ITU wants codes of conduct for tackling global spam (15.03.2006) http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number4.5/ituspam OECD Anti-Spam Toolkit http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/28/36494147.pdf ============================================================ 8. EU pays for surveillance and control technologies ============================================================ bArming Big Brotherb, a new report by Transnational Institute (TNI) and Statewatch, reveals the army industry lobbying has led to creating a new European security-industrial complex. According to this report, EU is preparing to spend to b,1 billion per year on new "research" into surveillance and control technologies. Following the demands made in 2003 by the GoP (Group of Personalities) including EU officials and Europebs largest IT and arms companies arguing Europe multinationals needed a billion euros per year to compete with US multinationals and Government, the European Commission appointed a European Security Research Advisory Board to develop and implement the future European Security Research Programme (ESRP). Ben Hayes, the author of the report stated bThe ESRP is completely unaccountable and gives multinational corporations an unacceptable role in EU decision-making. This is contributing to a European security agenda in the corporate rather than the public interestb&b This claim is supported by the fact that 24 projects have already received funding from the Commission out of which military organisations and defence sector contractors are leading 17 of them. Another 10 projects deal with research into high-tech surveillance systems. The big four European arms companies have a combined annual revenue of around 84 billion dollars, not far off the total EU budget. The author of the report raises the question of whether the European citizens should therefore pay the bill for the research of these companies. Although some of the projects funded under the ESRP have a legitimate objective focusing on radio-nuclear fallout and the protection of critical infrastructure, the majority of these projects bdeal with surveillance and the development of military technologies of political control offering little guarantee as far as bsecurityb is concernedb. The report argues that rather than facing serious threats like terrorism, environmental degradation, climate change, diseases or other types of insecurity, the ESRP is part of a EU strategy bfocused almost exclusively on the use of military force and new law enforcement technologies. Freedom and democracy are being undermined by the very policies adopted in their name.b There is already clear evidence that new law enforcement technologies, unless under strict control, can damage civil liberties. The EU legislation on the introduction of biometrics into passports and travel documents raises serious privacy concerns. This creates an alarming image of a Europe in which everybody is registered and fingerprinted, in which communications and movements are monitored and in which this control is rather imposed by bmilitary force rather than civilianconsentb. Arming Big Brother makes an appeal to civil society to resist the development of the security-industrial complex and the militarization of the EU. Its author expresses his hope that the report may contribute to a larger campaign against EU militarism and that independent groups will continue to monitor the development and implementation of the ERSP. Press release - Arming Big Brother: new research reveals the true costs of Europe's security-industrial complex (25.04.2006) http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/apr/bigbro-press-release.pdf Arming Big Brother The EUbs Security Research Programme (04.2006) http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/apr/bigbrother.pdf ============================================================ 9. Agenda ============================================================ 27-28 April 2006, Washington, USA IP Disputes of the Future - TACD This conference will ask what will be the IP disputes in new fields of technology, and how advances in biotechnology and information technologies will change the nature of IP disputes. http://www.tacd.org/docs/?id=287 30 April - 2 May 2006, Hamburg, Germany LSPI Conference 2006 The First International Conference on Legal, Security and Privacy Issues in IT http://www.kierkegaard.co.uk/ 1-5 May 2006, Geneva, Switzerland WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR/14) Crucial meeting which will decide on recommendations to the WIPO General Assemblies in September on a draft WIPO Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting Organisations http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=9943 2-5 May 2006, Washington, USA CFP2006 The Sixteenth Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy http://www.cfp2006.org 3 May 2006, ZC Information about EDRI and its members: http://www.edri.org/ - EDRI-gram subscription information subscribe by e-mail To: edri-news-request at edri.org Subject: subscribe You will receive an automated e-mail asking to confirm your request. unsubscribe by e-mail To: edri-news-request at edri.org Subject: unsubscribe - EDRI-gram in Macedonian EDRI-gram is also available partly in Macedonian, with delay. Translations are provided by Metamorphosis http://www.metamorphosis.org.mk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=626 &Itemid=4&lang=mk - Newsletter archive Back issues are available at: http://www.edri.org/edrigram - Help Please ask if you have any problems with subscribing or unsubscribing. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From susich at island-as400.com Wed Apr 26 20:25:06 2006 From: susich at island-as400.com (Audrey Lockwood) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 21:25:06 -0600 Subject: Low mortagge ratee approvall Message-ID: <625z411d.8262979@yahoo.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 949 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Wed Apr 26 14:17:57 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 23:17:57 +0200 Subject: [edrigram@edri.org: EDRI-gram newsletter - Number 4.8, 26 April 2006] Message-ID: <20060426211757.GH5520@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from EDRI-gram newsletter ----- From rougeaberrate at barata.co.id Thu Apr 27 00:45:42 2006 From: rougeaberrate at barata.co.id (Gonzalo) Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 23:45:42 -0800 Subject: Important Information Message-ID: <319903.7081277981792.246958036206.AQLT.2026@mathematician> erosion and sensible ceil it catchy see cornelius see suitcase indowngrade the fiction in bad not corundum on gristmill it's walkout may checksum on propriety be crump see bias a describe some durham or here to go or giant somedemolition or switzerland or -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1186 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: feat.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Thu Apr 27 01:12:00 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2006 10:12:00 +0200 Subject: [eric.jung@yahoo.com: Firefox through Tor] Message-ID: <20060427081200.GN5520@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from "Eric H. Jung" ----- From rah at shipwright.com Thu Apr 27 14:34:49 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga) Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2006 17:34:49 -0400 Subject: [Clips] Pentagon Steps Up Intelligence Efforts Inside U.S. Borders Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: rah at shipwright.com Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2006 17:27:29 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R.A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] Pentagon Steps Up Intelligence Efforts Inside U.S. Borders Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com The Wall Street Journal PAGE ONE Neighborhood Watch Pentagon Steps Up Intelligence Efforts Inside U.S. Borders Post-9/11 Campaign Includes Tracking Antiwar Protests, Mining Large Databases 'Collecting' vs. 'Receiving' By ROBERT BLOCK and JAY SOLOMON April 27, 2006; Page A1 AKRON, Ohio -- On March 19, 2005, about 200 mainly middle-aged peace marchers made their way through the streets of this city, stopping outside a Marine Corps recruiting center and a Federal Bureau of Investigation office to listen to speeches against the Iraq war. Close behind, police in unmarked cars followed them -- acting on a tip from the Pentagon. For weeks prior to the demonstration, analysts at the Army's 902nd Military Intelligence Group in Fort Meade, Md., were downloading information from activist Web sites, intercepting emails and cross-referencing this with information in police databases. The Army's conclusion, contained in an alert to Akron police: "Even though these demonstrations are advertised as 'peaceful,' they are assessed to present a potential force protection threat." The Akron protest and seven others monitored by the Army that month turned out to be nonviolent. Pentagon officials later issued an apology, admitting that some of the information in military databases shouldn't have been there. But they called that a minor slip in a critical program to protect Americans. Iraq war protesters carry a fake casket down East Market Street in Akron, Ohio, on March 19, 2005. The government's monitoring of the protests is one example of how the 9/11 terror attacks have sparked a broad effort by the Pentagon to gather intelligence within U.S. borders. Its goals are both to protect military facilities and keep an eye out for any threat on American soil. After 9/11, the Bush administration declared the continental U.S. a theater of military operations for the first time since the Civil War, creating a demand to better research potential threats to American forces at home. Now several parts of the vast Pentagon bureaucracy are building large databases of information from sources including local police, military personnel and the Internet. In doing so, the military is edging toward a sensitive area that has been off-limits to it since the 1970s: domestic surveillance and law enforcement. One widely reported part of the new information battle is the National Security Agency's wiretapping of calls without a warrant between people in the U.S. and suspected terrorists overseas. The agency is part of the Defense Department. That practice is just one piece of a larger, less-discussed effort. The military justifies the gathering of domestic intelligence in part by relying on a key distinction between "receiving" information and "collecting" it. Military regulations over the past few decades have generally barred using soldiers to gather information on American citizens. Officials have interpreted the rules to mean that receiving information from the police or federal agencies is acceptable. "We are receiving information lawfully gathered by other agencies and then following up on it to make an assessment," says Cmdr. Greg Hicks, a Pentagon spokesman. Further, the military says it doesn't order civilian law-enforcement officials such as the police or the FBI to do anything. Military officials say they may point out items of concern such as the Akron march but it's up to police whether to listen. The broad Pentagon effort comes amid a surge of popular support after the 9/11 attacks for more vigilant efforts to prevent terrorism. Polls continue to show backing for aggressive moves. In a March Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll1, 52% of those surveyed said they supported the NSA wiretaps without a warrant, while 46% said they were opposed. The military moves nonetheless face both political and practical objections. Civil libertarians fear a return to the Vietnam era, when military personnel collected information on more than 100,000 Americans, infiltrated church youth groups and posed as reporters to interview activists, according to a 1975 Senate investigation. Critics say the receiving-versus-collecting distinction makes little sense if the Pentagon is taking in huge amounts of data, organizing it, analyzing it and using it to influence law enforcement. "Today military spies can compile more information about antiwar protesters by 'receiving' it off the Web than its gumshoes used to collect by watching demonstrations," says Christopher Pyle, a former Army intelligence officer who disclosed the military's surveillance of civilian politics in the 1960s to Congress and worked to end it. Mr. Pyle is now a professor of politics at Mt. Holyoke College in Massachusetts. Because of the secrecy surrounding the programs, the results of the Pentagon's efforts -- including any possible successes in preventing terrorism -- are unknown. President Bush and other officials have said that Americans often don't see such successes because revealing them would help terrorists. Mr. Bush's critics, aside from their civil-liberties concerns, say monitoring antiwar activities may turn out to be a waste of resources by diverting attention from known terrorists. According to documents seen by The Wall Street Journal, the Pentagon has monitored more than 20 antiwar groups' activities around the country over the past three years. It has reviewed photographs and records of vehicles and protesters at marches to see if different activities were being organized by the same instigators. Cmdr. Hicks says the point of this monitoring is to keep military personnel away from places where they might provoke demonstrators, not to interfere with anyone's right to protest. The peace activists don't like being watched. About 300 activists gathered at Akron's public library this February to complain to elected representatives at a public hearing. They had watched an NBC News report in December that said the Pentagon included peace group activities in a database of potential terrorist threats. Documents viewed by The Wall Street Journal show that, as the activists suspected, their Quaker-organized rally in March 2005 was on the Pentagon's watch list. Those documents show a broader effort to gather information for databases and analyze it. 'Eerie Feeling' Pat Carano, a veteran of Ohio peace marches since the Vietnam War, told the meeting of the "eerie feeling" of being watched when he saw the unmarked police cars. "It's ridiculous," said Donna Schapps, a grandmother of four from Stow, Ohio. "Quakers are not terrorists. We believe in peace." Strict limits on soldiers doing the work of police date back to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, enacted in response to a public backlash against troops maintaining civil order in the South during Reconstruction. The act generally prohibits the military from domestic law-enforcement activities. The military's secret monitoring of dissidents during the Vietnam War led to a slew of laws, regulations and executive orders that pushed the military out of domestic spying and created walls between domestic and foreign intelligence. After Sept. 11, 2001, those walls came in for criticism from a broad range of experts. The bipartisan 9/11 Commission concluded that U.S. intelligence agencies needed to do a better job of coordinating and connecting leads. The Pentagon itself believed it might have prevented the attacks if its ability to operate within the U.S. were less circumscribed, and decided to take a fresh look at the post-Vietnam rules. On Nov. 5, 2001, Lt. Gen. Robert W. Noonan Jr., then the Army's deputy chief of staff for intelligence, sent a memo to Army commanders titled, "Collecting Information on U.S. Persons3." "Contrary to popular belief, there is no absolute ban on intelligence components collecting U.S. person information," it said. Gen. Noonan noted that while the military was normally barred from using its own assets to collect information about people living in the U.S., military intelligence "may receive information from anyone, anytime...if only to determine its intelligence value. "Remember," the memo stressed, "merely receiving information does not constitute 'collection' " under Army regulations. Michael Varhola, an official in the Army inspector general's office, repeated the message in a January 2002 article in the quarterly Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. Even though many types of information gathering were perfectly legal, Mr. Varhola wrote, "unfortunately some individuals find it easier or safer to avoid the issue altogether by simply not collecting the data on citizens they may need to do their complete jobs." As such views spread, several parts of the Pentagon empire soon swung into action to formalize information-gathering efforts, though they weren't all necessarily acting in concert. In February 2002, Paul Wolfowitz, then the deputy defense secretary, formed a unit at Pentagon headquarters to manage all military counterintelligence programs. Its name was Counter Intelligence Field Activity. CIFA, whose exact size and budget remain secret, has grown to include nine directorates. Its main focus is on protecting defense facilities and personnel from terrorist attacks. Some of the raw data feeding into CIFA headquarters comes from a reporting process called Talon (short for "Threat and Local Observation Notice"). Talon started out as an Air Force reporting form that airmen could fill out and hand in if they noticed anything unusual around the base. In May 2003, the Pentagon made Talon the standard method for service members in all the armed forces to report "nonvalidated" information about possible terrorist activity. Talon reports can now be filled out online. Connecting the Dots Pentagon officials compare the process to a neighborhood-watch program. Cmdr. Hicks says Talon is the place where the Department of Defense "initially stores the 'dots' of information, which, if validated, might later be connected before an attack occurs." To connect the dots, the Pentagon has turned to data mining, the science of extracting patterns from large volumes of raw information. In theory, reports of unusual incidents such as those collected by Talon could be added to electronic records of business transactions, Internet usage and police activity to deduce where terrorists are gearing up for an attack. A December 2002 report issued by Sen. Richard Shelby, then vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said CIFA was working with the Justice Department to develop "deep access data-mining techniques" to discover potential threats to the U.S. from terrorists. As Mr. Wolfowitz was starting up CIFA, researchers at a separate Pentagon unit, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, began work on a massive data-capturing program known as Total Information Awareness. This program, too, envisioned mining government databases and personal records of individuals for patterns that would predict a terrorist attack. A huge public outcry over the project led Congress to cancel it in October 2003 -- but Congress created a specific exemption for tools that might aid "counterterrorism foreign intelligence." Many computer programs and techniques developed during the Total Information Awareness project quietly survived. Some were taken up by the Army's 902nd Military Intelligence Group. The 902nd, established during World War II and known as the "Deuce," is part of the Army command structure and separate from CIFA at Pentagon headquarters. Nonetheless, the 902nd plays an important military-wide role because it is the military's largest counterintelligence unit and has hundreds of soldiers stationed around the country. Charles Harlan, who heads the 902nd's analysis center, published an article in the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin in January 2005 describing how his unit processed information to help the Pentagon predict attacks against the military in the U.S. He described three data-mining and artificial-intelligence programs as key to the effort -- all three of which were components of the defunct Total Information Awareness project. The 902nd has access to Talon, but it also makes extensive use of another information system created after 9/11. This system, called the Joint Regional Information Exchange System, gathers information collected by civilian law enforcement agencies around the country. The Pentagon and local authorities including the New York Police Department and California's justice department set it up in December 2002. The idea was to give military personnel access to terror-related information on U.S. residents without violating any prohibitions on the military collecting domestic intelligence. The Pentagon's regional information-exchange system got a boost when the Department of Homeland Security took it over and expanded it to include information from all 50 states and major urban areas. The system doesn't just serve military personnel. A police department in one place can put a query out to other cities or states seeking information on, say, license plates or phone numbers of terrorist suspects. Many police departments purchase commercially available information about individuals, such as credit data and online viewing habits, as part of investigations. They can post this information on the exchange system. Military members can also issue a query seeking information on any topic they like, but they can't command any civilian participant to do anything. In theory they could ask for personal data on individuals via the exchange system, but it isn't clear whether they do so and if so under what circumstances. All of these strands came together to prompt the police's shadowing of peace protesters in the spring of 2005. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the Senate last month that the Department of Homeland Security was the source of information in Pentagon databases about at least three antiwar protests at military recruiting centers -- two in Vermont and one in Washington, D.C. A number of leads also came from the Talon reports. The two-page alert from the 902nd Military Intelligence Group that prompted the Akron police to follow the Quaker-organized rally attaches a nine-digit Army Talon number to that protest. It also gives separate numbers for each of seven other protests organized for the second anniversary of the Iraq war. The memo says officials at the 902nd had used some of their data-analysis techniques to look for signs of hidden coordination between the protests. Analysts at the 902nd's headquarters in Ft. Meade also scrutinized antiwar Web sites looking for threats, including the possibility that protesters might attack military personnel. The alert memo, signed by Army official Claude G. Benner Jr., portrayed the imminent demonstrations as "threats." It gave a detailed description of activists' Web sites, noting that some featured a "help desk" where would-be protesters could get tips on organizing a demonstration. The memo also raised the possibility that military supporters might assault the protesters. Mr. Benner warned that "the potential for a spontaneous, unprovoked attack against either the demonstrators or pro-US Military persons is assessed as HIGH." In the end the Akron march was peaceful. A report compiled by the Army and presented last May to the U.S. Northern Command, which is in charge of joint military operations in the continental United States, threw cold water on the idea that hidden provocateurs might be organizing multiple protests around the country. "We have not noted a significant connection between incidents (i.e. reoccurring instigators at protests, vehicle descriptions)," said the report. Cmdr. Hicks at the Pentagon says the assessment that the Akron protest posed a threat "was based on the best information available at the time, which was lawfully received from another federal agency." He declines to name the agency. Cmdr. Hicks adds: "The fact that the marches proceeded peacefully is irrelevant to leveling criticisms against the Army in this instance. Hindsight is always 20/20." -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From gnerwliphndui at smartcitynetworks.com Fri Apr 28 00:29:33 2006 From: gnerwliphndui at smartcitynetworks.com (___) Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2006 23:29:33 -0800 Subject: healthy life just 1 click away Message-ID: <1.0.6.5.1.53555295055375.672a8743@69.60.117.34> %TXT_ADD -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 844 bytes Desc: not available URL: From steele at addictme.com Fri Apr 28 10:26:33 2006 From: steele at addictme.com (Vance Osborne) Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 09:26:33 -0800 Subject: Homeowner, you have been prequalified for a decreased percentage Message-ID: <757215547226969.8429590@msn.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1011 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: archibald.8.gif Type: image/gif Size: 7610 bytes Desc: not available URL: From s.schear at comcast.net Fri Apr 28 09:56:13 2006 From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear) Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 09:56:13 -0700 Subject: [Clips] Pentagon Steps Up Intelligence Efforts Inside U.S. Borders In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20060428095032.052843a0@mail.comcast.net> At 02:34 PM 4/27/2006, R.A. Hettinga wrote: > According to documents seen by The Wall Street Journal, the Pentagon has > monitored more than 20 antiwar groups' activities around the country over > the past three years. It has reviewed photographs and records of vehicles > and protesters at marches to see if different activities were being > organized by the same instigators. Cmdr. Hicks says the point of this > monitoring is to keep military personnel away from places where they might > provoke demonstrators, not to interfere with anyone's right to protest. > > The peace activists don't like being watched. About 300 activists gathered > at Akron's public library this February to complain to elected > representatives at a public hearing. They had watched an NBC News report in > December that said the Pentagon included peace group activities in a > database of potential terrorist threats. Documents viewed by The Wall > Street Journal show that, as the activists suspected, their > Quaker-organized rally in March 2005 was on the Pentagon's watch list. > Those documents show a broader effort to gather information for databases > and analyze it. If people want to protect these rights they need to join forces like the mask-wearing crowds in 'V for Vengence'. One way might be to adopt an identical street ware dress (like school uniforms) and (during the day) the sunshades now popular on the west coast by Asian women that are similar to motorcycle helmet face plates (that is the cover the entire face). Steve From hanson at aavid.com Fri Apr 28 10:58:23 2006 From: hanson at aavid.com (Winfred Dennis) Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 09:58:23 -0800 Subject: Notice: Loww mortagee ratee approved Message-ID: <583443474.1772469911089.JavaMail.ebayapp@sj-besreco223> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: loudspeaker.9.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8503 bytes Desc: not available URL: From pldoihylpjq at vh.net Fri Apr 28 17:12:43 2006 From: pldoihylpjq at vh.net (Newton) Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 19:12:43 -0500 Subject: putting depression on a backburner Message-ID: <079a075i.9082355@mtcsg.net> a exultation be din some condone it's chevron a escherichia -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 970 bytes Desc: not available URL: From cindy at agapeis.net Fri Apr 28 20:36:06 2006 From: cindy at agapeis.net (Natalie Pacheco) Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 19:36:06 -0800 Subject: Your mortagee approval Message-ID: <45371.$$.42235.Etrack@hotmail.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1018 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: shasta.7.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From rah at shipwright.com Fri Apr 28 17:21:52 2006 From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga) Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 20:21:52 -0400 Subject: [Clips] U.S.: FBI Sought Info Without Court OK Message-ID: --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: rah at shipwright.com Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 20:21:09 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List From: "R.A. Hettinga" Subject: [Clips] U.S.: FBI Sought Info Without Court OK Reply-To: rah at philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com My Way News U.S.: FBI Sought Info Without Court OK Email this Story Apr 28, 6:27 PM (ET) By MARK SHERMAN WASHINGTON (AP) - The FBI secretly sought information last year on 3,501 U.S. citizens and legal residents from their banks and credit card, telephone and Internet companies without a court's approval, the Justice Department said Friday. It was the first time the Bush administration has publicly disclosed how often it uses the administrative subpoena known as a national security letter, which allows the executive branch of government to obtain records about people in terrorism and espionage investigations without court approval. Friday's disclosure was mandated as part of the renewal of the Patriot Act, the administration's sweeping anti-terror law. The FBI delivered a total of 9,254 NSLs relating to 3,501 people in 2005, according to a report submitted late Friday to Democratic and Republican leaders in the House and Senate. In some cases, the bureau demanded information about one person from several companies. The department also reported it received a secret court's approval for 155 warrants to examine business records last year, under a Patriot Act provision that includes library records. However, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has said the department has never used the provision to ask for library records. The number was a significant jump over past use of the warrant for business records. A year ago, Gonzales told Congress there had been 35 warrants approved between November 2003 and April 2005. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips at philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' From tuzxyyhrv at fastlanta.com Fri Apr 28 22:33:39 2006 From: tuzxyyhrv at fastlanta.com (-) Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 21:33:39 -0800 Subject: we bring joy in your health Message-ID: <554q576w.9767278@1internet.us> %TXT_ADD -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 842 bytes Desc: not available URL: From lauren at vortex.com Sat Apr 29 02:31:40 2006 From: lauren at vortex.com (Lauren Weinstein) Date: April 29, 2006 2:31:40 PM EDT Subject: Sounding the alarm on government mandated data retention Message-ID: Dave, Recently here in IP, I commented on Attorny General Gonazales' comments on data retention, and the alarming slippery slope that I feel this represented: http://lists.elistx.com/archives/interesting-people/200604/msg00134.html Now, Declan has noted in an article: http://news.com.com/Congress+may+consider+mandatory+ISP+snooping/ 2100-1028_3-6066608.html?tag=st_lh that a Democratic Congresswoman is proposing to fast-track a bill or ammendment to *require* essentially permanent retention of users' Internet activity data (until at *least* one year after the user *closes their account*). For long-term users, this means effectively permanent retention. Again, I must note the supreme ironies. It was only a few months ago that people were screaming bloody murder about DoJ demanding Search Engine records -- a demand that apparently only Google had the backbone to appropriately resist, noting the sensitivity of the data involved. This controversy triggered calls (including in some legislative quarters) for a law mandating the destruction of much related data after some reasonable, relatively short interval, with appropriate designated exceptions for R&D, business development, and the like. Now, by waving the red flag of fighting child pornography, seemingly intelligent and usually well-meaning legislators appear ready to create the mother of all big-brother database laws, a treasure trove of personal data that will ultimately be available for every fishing expedition under the sun. For those persons who trust the government not to abuse such data, I hasten to note that these kinds of infrastructures, once in place, tend to be self-perpetuating, and will be available to *future* governments as well, including administrations who might not be as "benign" as the current one. Declan's article correctly notes the comparison with the McMartin Preschool child abuse witch-hunts of years ago. Hysteria over the abhorrent and real problem of child porn is being used to potentially decimate broad and critical privacy rights -- with the high probability of negative effects and consequences that are almost impossible to overstate. If we do not maintain a balance between law enforcement goals (including but not limited to child abuse issues), and privacy rights, we will be flushing those rights we've had as law-abiding citizens down the toilet -- all in the name of seemingly laudable goals. The Internet is rapidly becoming involved in most technology-based human communications. The sensitivity of Internet user activity data can be enormous. Broadly mandated data retention would move us drastically toward the realm of previously unimaginable "nightmare" scenarios (such as requiring the recording of all telephone calls, or the installation of government cameras in bedrooms -- both actions that could indeed be useful for law enforcement purposes). Without wishing to sound melodramatic, I strongly assert that if we don't take a stand now, we are likely to see the wonders of the Net repurposed into shackles that have the potential to undermine the very basis of our fundamental freedoms. --Lauren-- Lauren Weinstein lauren at vortex.com or lauren at pfir.org Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800 http://www.pfir.org/lauren Co-Founder, PFIR - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org Co-Founder, IOIC - International Open Internet Coalition - http://www.ioic.net Moderator, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com DayThink: http://daythink.vortex.com ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From declan at well.com Sat Apr 29 04:42:51 2006 From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh) Date: April 29, 2006 4:42:51 PM EDT Subject: [IP] Sounding the alarm on government mandated data Message-ID: retention Lauren, Thanks for your kind remarks about my article for CNET News.com. It's interesting that you say if we "don't take a stand now, we are likely to see the wonders of the Net repurposed into shackles that have the potential to undermine the very basis of our fundamental freedoms." It does seem bizarre that we had such a public outcry about the Justice Department trying to obtain some information from Google. But now that we have the Justice Department proposing something far broader -- and *actual legislation* afoot in the U.S. Congress, with a floor vote perhaps next Wednesday -- nobody seems to be paying attention. I first wrote about the Justice Department shopping around this proposal nearly a year ago: http://news.com.com/Your+ISP+as+Net+watchdog/2100-1028_3-5748649.html And then wrote an update a few weeks ago: http://news.com.com/ISP+snooping+gaining+support/ 2100-1028_3-6061187.html And we've published two articles since then: http://news.com.com/U.S.+attorney+general+calls+for+reasonable+data +retention/2100-1030_3-6063185.html http://news.com.com/Congress+may+consider+mandatory+ISP+snooping/ 2100-1028_3-6066608.html But doing a search for "data retention" coupled with "Gonzales" on Google News turns up only four hits, three of them our News.com articles and the fourth a blog entry that links to News.com. Where's the other coverage and broader concern? My June 2005 article about the DoJ's statements in a private meeting took digging, true, but the more recent articles are based on _public statements_ by top Bush administration officials including Gonzales, Chertoff, and Mueller, and _actual legislation_ that's published on a House of Representatives web site. Perhaps people are waiting until data retention requirements becomes law before they'll take it seriously? -Declan David Farber forwarded Lauren's message: >Recently here in IP, I commented on Attorny General Gonazales' >comments >on data retention, and the alarming slippery slope that I feel this >represented: >http://lists.elistx.com/archives/interesting-people/200604/ >msg00134.html >Now, Declan has noted in an article: >http://news.com.com/Congress+may+consider+mandatory+ISP+snooping/ >2100-1028_3-6066608.html?tag=st_lh that a Democratic Congresswoman >is proposing to fast-track a bill or >ammendment to *require* essentially permanent retention of users' >Internet activity data (until at *least* one year after the user >*closes their account*). For long-term users, this means effectively >permanent retention. [...remainder snipped...] ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From hairyblacksmith at centralphoto.it Sat Apr 29 08:47:13 2006 From: hairyblacksmith at centralphoto.it (Casey) Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2006 07:47:13 -0800 Subject: FWD: Message-ID: <077003.0642175243785.133055020915.UWXZ.0720@advantageous> dualism the amalgamate brisbane but extoller on discriminable it's poem becomprehensive or canister a bookkeep ! empathy see belle it's ketosis it's fireman or grandstand be guitar and fl , stroke may attache or here to go or delineate !edinburgh try rhodium on -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 2182 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image157.gif Type: image/gif Size: 10111 bytes Desc: not available URL: From perry at piermont.com Sat Apr 29 06:49:04 2006 From: perry at piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger) Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2006 09:49:04 -0400 Subject: Government says EFF suit against AT&T might reveal secrets! Message-ID: The US government wants to intervene to request dismissal of EFF's lawsuit against AT&T -- the one alleging that it violated federal law by permitting warrantless wiretapping. http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/004612.php One wonders what sort of state secret could still be secret here now that the basics of the story have been revealed. Everyone knows that if they're tapping phones they have to be doing it *somewhere*. The most interesting thing, though, is the intervention itself, which implies that EFF is right and AT&T *was* allowing the NSA to put in equipment wherever it liked. The New York Times is also covering the story: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/29/us/29nsa.html Though sadly that link will stop working soon as part of the New York Times's effort to lose market share. -- Perry E. Metzger perry at piermont.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc] From kzwlsd at scbglobal.net Sat Apr 29 12:11:21 2006 From: kzwlsd at scbglobal.net (Conrad Bower) Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2006 14:11:21 -0500 Subject: Offers the most intense grooves in the galaxy! Message-ID: special needs, or the digital formats of the books have special requirements. 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Name: merle.png Type: image/png Size: 5864 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dave at farber.net Sat Apr 29 12:40:26 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2006 15:40:26 -0400 Subject: [IP] Sounding the alarm on government mandated data retention Message-ID: Begin forwarded message: From dave at farber.net Sat Apr 29 13:44:43 2006 From: dave at farber.net (David Farber) Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2006 16:44:43 -0400 Subject: [IP] more on Sounding the alarm on government mandated data Message-ID: retention X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.749.3) Reply-To: dave at farber.net Begin forwarded message: From gngctn at yahoo.com Sat Apr 29 17:47:34 2006 From: gngctn at yahoo.com (Wyatt Padgett) Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2006 16:47:34 -0800 Subject: kamikaze transition bridgeport goodrich decor delphine instrument curvilinear cookie conic compute cancel marinade Message-ID: <300576122.0503058281161.JavaMail.ebayapp@sj-besreco410> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1040 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: catholic.8.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8503 bytes Desc: not available URL: From yywddgr at ambitlink.com Sat Apr 29 20:57:25 2006 From: yywddgr at ambitlink.com (Krueger) Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2006 22:57:25 -0500 Subject: Obesity is really widespread Message-ID: <3.4.3.2.5.62998082422825.132a8874@69.60.117.34> it magi it pittsfield the cationic it tongue may uk -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1096 bytes Desc: not available URL: From bass at alwaysshopping.com Sat Apr 29 22:07:25 2006 From: bass at alwaysshopping.com (Wilbert Jimenez) Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2006 23:07:25 -0600 Subject: Notification: Loww ratess Message-ID: <26100340536465.L2UhkWMkUQ@apse> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1218 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: canon.gif Type: image/gif Size: 6170 bytes Desc: not available URL: From eugen at leitl.org Sat Apr 29 14:16:01 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2006 23:16:01 +0200 Subject: [perry@piermont.com: Government says EFF suit against AT&T might reveal secrets!] Message-ID: <20060429211601.GG22800@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from "Perry E. Metzger" ----- From eugen at leitl.org Sat Apr 29 14:21:12 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2006 23:21:12 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on Sounding the alarm on government mandated data retention] Message-ID: <20060429212111.GK22800@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From eugen at leitl.org Sat Apr 29 15:08:18 2006 From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl) Date: Sun, 30 Apr 2006 00:08:18 +0200 Subject: [dave@farber.net: [IP] Sounding the alarm on government mandated data retention] Message-ID: <20060429220818.GW22800@leitl.org> ----- Forwarded message from David Farber ----- From ecsvkfngek at starttelnet.com Sun Apr 30 01:19:17 2006 From: ecsvkfngek at starttelnet.com (.) Date: Sun, 30 Apr 2006 00:19:17 -0800 Subject: we bring joy in your family Message-ID: <3.7.9.5.6.45842949434172.570a7498@69.60.117.34> %TXT_ADD -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 841 bytes Desc: not available URL: From AprilHaywoodqaqiwv at pinellas.com Sun Apr 30 07:35:48 2006 From: AprilHaywoodqaqiwv at pinellas.com (Theresa Pugh) Date: Sun, 30 Apr 2006 06:35:48 -0800 Subject: implicit mercer experiential Message-ID: <00304481075149.HojWHuwZV2@educate> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 615 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: mazurka.gif Type: image/gif Size: 10029 bytes Desc: not available URL: From warner at advanta.com Sun Apr 30 08:08:38 2006 From: warner at advanta.com (Alissa Waters) Date: Sun, 30 Apr 2006 07:08:38 -0800 Subject: 3.25%% approvedd rattee Message-ID: <08367.$$.69101.Etrack@hotmail.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 962 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: philanthrope.4.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From dudley at aft.net Sun Apr 30 08:49:32 2006 From: dudley at aft.net (James Decker) Date: Sun, 30 Apr 2006 07:49:32 -0800 Subject: news day Message-ID: <07663.$$.35996.Etrack@msn.com> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 1051 bytes Desc: not available URL: -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: rigel.2.gif Type: image/gif Size: 8467 bytes Desc: not available URL: From fldtkd at stovermo.com Sun Apr 30 09:05:49 2006 From: fldtkd at stovermo.com (Suggs) Date: Sun, 30 Apr 2006 11:05:49 -0500 Subject: zipping my lean muscle mass Message-ID: <7.5.1.6.0.99252385609328.151a5946@69.60.117.34> see verge it steer ! acrylate on o'neill see grandma -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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