[Clips] nym-0.2 released (fwd)

[R.A. Hettinga]

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 Delivered-To: clips at philodox.com
 Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2005 23:10:27 -0400
 To: "Philodox Clips List" <clips at philodox.com>
 From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
 Subject: [Clips] nym-0.2 released (fwd)
 Reply-To: rah at philodox.com
 Sender: clips-bounces at philodox.com


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  Delivered-To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
  Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2005 02:18:55 +0000 (UTC)
  From: Jason Holt <jason at lunkwill.org>
  To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
  Subject: nym-0.2 released (fwd)
  Sender: owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com



  ---------- Forwarded message ----------
  Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2005 02:18:43 +0000 (UTC)
  From: Jason Holt <jason at lunkwill.org>
  To: or-talk at seul.org
  Subject: nym-0.2 released


  nym-0.2 is now available at:

  http://www.lunkwill.org/src/nym/

  My tor server is currently down, so I can't set up a public trial of
this, but
  perhaps someone else will.  This release makes the following improvements:

  * Tokens are now issued one-per-IP to clients via a "token" CGI script.
Tokens
  are still blindly issued, so nobody (including the token issuer) can
associate
  tokens with IP addresses.  The list of already-served IPs could be
 periodically
  removed, allowing users to obtain new pseudonyms on a regular basis.
(Abusers
  will then need to be re-blocked assuming they re-misbehave).

  * A token can be used to obtain a signature on a client certificate from a
  separate "CA" CGI script (potentially on a different machine).  Tokens can
 only
  be "spent" to obtain one cert.  Code to make a CA, client certs and have the
  certs signed is included.

  * The CA public key can be installed on a third web server (or proxy) to
  require that users have a valid client certificate.  Servers can maintain a
  blacklist of misbehaving client certs.  Misbehavers will then be unable to
  access the server until they obtain a new token and client cert (via a new
 IP).



  My proposal for using this to enable tor users to play at Wikipedia is as
  follows:

  1. Install a token server on a public IP.  The token server can optionally be
  provided Wikipedia's blocked-IP list and refuse to issue tokens to offending
  IPs.  Tor users use their real IP to obtain a blinded token.

  2. Install a CA as a hidden service.  Tor users use their unblinded tokens to
  obtain a client certificate, which they install in their browser.

  3. Install a wikipedia-gateway SSL web proxy (optionally also a hidden
 service)
  which checks client certs and communicates a client identifier to MediaWiki,
  which MediaWiki will use in place of the REMOTE_ADDR (client IP address) for
  connections from the proxy.  When a user misbehaves, Wikipedia admins
 block the
  client identifier just as they would have blocked an offending IP address.

   						-J

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 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'