SSL fro hidden services

loki tiwaz loki_tiwaz at hotmail.com
Thu Oct 20 15:57:24 PDT 2005


hi,

>>>>That said, the certificate naming scheme may be way off, since there's
>>>>no concept of a valid certificate (I doubt verisign will want to sign
>>>>one for 786237261871621.onion :)

i am considering running an onion-based CA which could be used... i simply
need to make a script which allows a user to sign a certificate signing
request and produce a signed server key. the server key only needs to have
its onion address as content, nothing more is required, and a link to import
the CA key into the browser so that it can be trusted automatically by the
browser.

>>>>However, assuming the user installs your self-signed cert, it *should*
>>>>work the same unless there's something I'm missing.)
>>>>
>>>>Of course, you're really just protecting content from being sniffed
>>>>between the user and the entry node (usually, the same machine, but not
>>>>always), and the exit node and the hidden service (presumably, you
>>>>control both).
>>>>
>>>>This is my understanding of it -- if someone has a better one please
>>>>step on me without hesitation :)

yes, this is the case, and it is a valid reason to use ssl. in my opinion,
since tor already uses multi-layered encryption anyway, one more layer at
the core is not going to create that much of an extra load on the server,
and it means that there is no way the traffic can be sniffed at any point -
for example a trojan could sniff localhost traffic. also, using onion
routing defeats the one way in which SSL can be attacked, by
man-in-the-middle intermediaries on the network pathway, which of course
cannot be known within the tor network. Also, it should be noted that tor
exit nodes could potentially be modified to become men-in-the-middle,
although this would not be possible without compromising the key of the
server being contacted - another aspect of the advantage of using tor.

onion addresses are impossible to remember though - which brings me to
another idea - of a name resolution system within the tor network so simpler
names can be used. this would require a second directory system, i don't
know if it is practical or not, but i thought i should put the idea out
there because i2p has name resolution systems, and benig able to type in
oniondomainname.onion rather than u15syoa125au.onion would be nice. it would
increase the rate of take-up of hidden services, both use and hosting.

onion domains could be propagated throughout the onion network, so that
every tor node can translate a name into an onion hashed address. there
would also need to be a system to prevent name spoofing... how to ensure
there is no collisions of names would be tricky - very likely it would
require a set of authoritative name servers similar to how there is
authoritative onion directory servers.

ah dammit, i am always ideas ideas ideas and so little action...
prioritising goals is something i find difficult... i think i should make
this idea a priority, however, which means joining the dev effort and, at
the very least, defining a protocol, if not implementing code... well,
anyway, i have put the idea out now. i think that the idea is a good one.
tor is coming of age now and ideally tor should aim to provide all of the
features one would expect in an internet layer, but with the guiding
principle of protecting anonymity always ascendant. an onion-based CA would
work much better if the name-resolution system were in place, so i think it
should be the priority.

loki

_________________________________________________________________
FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar - get it now!
http://toolbar.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]





More information about the cypherpunks-legacy mailing list