avoiding replay attack resistance w/o seq nos or challenge response

[Major Variola (ret)]

At 01:28 AM 11/29/05 -0800, Morlock Elloi wrote:
>Put a real-timestamp inside encrypted payload and decide how tolerant
you
>should be.

Thanks.  That's a good way of using a single piece of state, instead
of one per source, or per session.  It does
provide the adversary with a known plaintext however, which
a random nonce doesn't, for large values of length(nonce).

I'm thinking the requirement for random state is *fundamental*
in a *deep sense* to replay attack prevention.

I am of course aware of the Netscape-sequence-no break
of ancient times, as Schneier says in _Secrets and Lies_,
the work of "attackers" performing a "publicity" attack.

Aside: was told unabashedly by a suit at work that when the local
(unregulated,
out of control) WiFi cxns are down, folks use some other net,
which is suspected to belong to some other corp sharing the building.
LMAO.

Be seeing you -No 6

I got you babe --a senator who thought a tree would yield.

----
Impeach or frag.