/. [Intel Adds DRM to New Chips]

Eugen Leitl eugen at leitl.org
Thu Jun 2 01:50:36 PDT 2005

On Thu, Jun 02, 2005 at 12:26:09PM +0200, DiSToAGe wrote:

> yes, with "you" I meen "you being an hardware maker"

Yes, the hardware maker hides the secret in a bit of tamperproof hardware you
buy. That's the whole idea of digital restriction management -- taking away
things you could do with the hardware and data you paid for.

If it wasn't for the tremendous abuse potential that this functionality
just begs for, DRM would be actually be a good solution for motivating
customers to reimburse content creators, and ensure sustainability of
the creative process.

Would. In some alternative universe, somewhere. Where the cow leaped over the
moon. Not in this universe.

> > Why do you think a system designed to contain and keep a secret will
> > a convenient backdoor?
> >
> not a backdoor, we forget to much that every system is only 1 and 0
> through electricity and physical circuits. If you can make them you can

Every system is only made from some 100-odd different atoms.

> watch them (with time and monney i agree). Perhaps thinking that datas

The point of a tamper-proof storage for secrets is that it takes ridiculous
amounts of work to break it open, and to extract the secret in one piece.
And you'll only get that *one* secret. So much easier to exploit
the analog hole (but watch out for watermarks).

> (certs, instructions) can be "hidden" behind a physical thing is only a
> dream ? I ask myself if not every cryptosystem where you must have

The stone you stubbed your toe upon is also just a dream. Still hurts,
doesn't it?

> something "hidden" or "physically not accessible" in point of the
> process is not sure ?

All of cryptography is based on keeping secrets. The hiding secrets in
tamperproof hardware angle is that everybody owns safes but not their

Sounds ridiculously difficult to sell, doesn't it? It helps if you lie about
it, and paint the safes in gaudy colors, and make them useful for lots of
other, pretty and shiny things.

But the lying about it bit is crucial.

Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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