rah at shipwright.com
Fri Jan 28 20:42:48 PST 2005
SecurityFocus COLUMNISTS 293
< http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/293 >
By Scott Granneman Jan 19 2005 01:11PM PT
Back in the 1970s, long before the revolution that would eventually topple
him from power, the Shah of Iran was one of America's best friends (he was
a dictator who brutally repressed his people, but he was anti-communist,
and that made him OK in our book). Wanting to help out a good friend, the
United States government agreed to sell Iran the very same intaglio presses
used to print American currency so that the Shah could print his own high
quality money for his country. Soon enough, the Shah was the proud owner of
some of the best money printing machines in the world, and beautiful
Iranian Rials proceeded to flow off the presses.
All things must come to an end, and the Shah was forced to flee Iran in
1979 when the Ayatollah Khomeini's rebellion brought theocratic rule to
Iran. Everyone reading this undoubtedly knows the terrible events that
followed: students took American embassy workers hostage for over a year as
Iran declared America to be the "Great Satan," while evidence of US
complicity in the Shah's oppression of his people became obvious, leading
to a break in relations between the two countries that continues to worsen
to this day.
During the early 90s, counterfeit $100 bills began to flood the Mideast,
eventually spreading around the world. Known as "superbills" or
"superdollars" by the US Treasury due to the astounding quality of the
forgeries, these $100 bills became a tremendous headache not only for the
US and its economy, but also for people all over the world that depend on
the surety of American money. Several culprits have been suggested as
responsible for the superbills, including North Korea and Syria, but many
observers think the real culprit is the most obvious suspect: an Iranian
government deeply hostile to the United States ... and even worse, an
Iranian government possessing the very same printing presses used to create
If you've ever wondered just why American currency was redesigned in the
1990s, now you know. In the 1970s, the US rewarded an ally with a special
machine; in the 1990s, the US had to change its money because that ally was
no longer an ally, and that special machine was now a weapon used to attack
the US's money supply, where it really hurts. As an example of the law of
unintended consequences, it's powerful, and it illustrates one of the main
results of that law: that those unintended consequences can really bite
back when you least expect them.
Unprepared and unready
Sometimes unintended consequences occur from the best of intentions. For
instance, Denny's is known for being open 24 hours a day, every day,
always. The story goes that in 1998, for the first time in 35 years,
Denny's decided to close its doors on Christmas, but there was a big
problem: since Denny's was always open, many stores didn't have locks on
the doors, so they couldn't close.
Likewise, email was invented in 1971 and was immediately embraced as a
great way to communicate with folks all over the world. Since virtually
everyone on the Net pretty much knew each other at the time, email was
developed without a lot of safeguards. Spoofing the sender? Not a real
issue. False headers? Why in the world would anyone want to do that?
Purposely misspelled words in the subject to get past filters? First of
all, what the heck are filters, and why would someone want to spell
something weird to get past one?
It was a more innocent age, but that innocence was lost long ago, thanks
to a trickle ... no, a stream ... no, a flood, an absolutely Biblical flood
of garbage, scams, lies, ads, swindles, and just plain crap. In fact, it's
gotten so bad that MX Logic, an antispam vendor, now estimates that 75% of
all email is spam, while in same article Postini Inc. jacks that number up
to 88% of all email. Think about that: only about 1 in 10 emails is
legitimate. That's truly pathetic, almost enraging, and it's finally
leading (slowly, oh so slowly) to necessary changes - not in the legal
system, since the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 seems to have done virtually nothing
to stem the tide - but in email infrastructure, to things like Microsoft's
proposed Sender ID, Yahoo's Domain Keys, and Sender Policy Framework. Of
course, at this time there's no consensus on the solution, and with patents
and other contentious issues of so-called intellectual property acting as
flies in the ointment, we may never reach a unified approach to the problem
of spam. Naturally, that just helps the spammers. But they don't mind -
they're busy helping each other.
Fast forward from 1971 to 2005. Would the inventors recognize the
monstrosity they innocently unleashed upon the world?
Making things easier for the bad guys
Bruce Schneier, in his excellent Beyond Fear, reports that drivers in
Russia have made interesting choices that have not always resulted in
improving their situations. Crime is a large and growing problem in Russia,
and one of the biggest threats is in the area of auto theft. To combat car
theft, automobile owners installed car alarms. The result? Thieves waited
until the owner approached the car to turn off the alarm, and then shot
him, took his keys, and drove away in the car. Round one to the bad guys.
Fine. So car owners quit using alarms, and instead installed security
systems that made cars virtually impossible to hotwire. Ah ha! Round two to
the good guys. Not so fast - since cars were extremely difficult to
hotwire, thieves turned to carjackings instead, which is far more likely to
result in injury or death to the car owner. Round three to the bad guys,
and once again we see how "security" sometimes serves only to make things
easier for the criminals.
A similar thing has popped up recently with one of my favorite bugaboos,
DRM. I'm opposed to DRM for quite a number of reasons (if you're looking
for an excellent list of those reasons, read Cory Doctorow's brilliant
dissection of DRM), and now there's a new one: because it actually helps
the bad guys.
Microsoft has touted its Windows Media Player (or WMP) as an industy- and
DRM-friendly app that supports so-called "protected" media files.
Basically, if you try to play a DRM-laden Windows media file, WMP checks to
see if you have a valid license to do so. If you do, the file plays; if you
don't, WMP heads off to a web site specified by the media file to acquire
and download (and often purchase) a license.
But guess what? WMP doesn't check to see where it's going, or even what
it's downloading, so individuals up to no good simply redirect it to sites
where users end up with spyware, viruses, and other nastiness on their
Windows machines. One researcher went ahead, pressed "Yes" to allow stuff
to install, and then measured the results:
"My computer quickly became contaminated with the most spyware programs I
have ever received in a single sitting ... all told, the infection added 58
folders, 786 files, and an incredible 11,915 registry entries to my
Amazing. Astounding. And another example of how some supposed "security"
actually makes things easier for the bad guys - and makes things far worse
for the good guys (and by "good guys," I mean users, not the companies
Feel safer, act riskier
Social scientists have noticed an interesting pattern in human behavior
over the years: it seems that the more safe and secure people feel, the
more likely they are to engage in risky behavior. For proof of this, look
no further than the Iroquois Theater in Chicago, opened for business in
November of 1903. Fires at this time were a serious threat in theaters, due
to the hot lights hung all around the stage in close proximity to backdrops
and sets decorated with oil paints. Not to worry, though: the managers of
the Iroquois advertised that they had put into place an asbestos curtain
that would drop in case of fire, protecting the audience from the flames.
Additional precautions common to theaters of the time that should have been
put into place - things like firemen near the stage, and readily avilable
fire hoses and extinguishers - were ignored because it was believed that
the asbestos curtain was the ultimate in fire safety.
On 30 December 1903, a velvet curtain caught on fire as 1900 men, women,
and children were packed in to see an afternoon performance of the musical
"Mr. Blue Beard, Jr." The asbestos curtain was lowered, but got caught on a
lamp and failed to close, exposing the crowd to flames and smoke. People
rushed the doors in a panic, but the doors open inwardly, making them
impossible to open. 603 people died in the fire - and the supposed asbestos
curtain turned out to be a fake, since it too burned in the fire. Chicago's
strict fire codes resulted from the fire, but it was a steep price to pay.
Computer viruses, worms, and spyware don't compare to death and
destruction, but we see the same sort of human behavior - feeling safer,
acting riskier - at work. For years, anti-virus software from third-party
vendors has been included with most new Windows machines, and now both AOL
and Microsoft are bundling A/V software with their products. Virtually all
of the A/V software included with new PCs is time limited: it's free for 3
months, or maybe 6 months, and then the user has to buy it. You and I both
know that few users actually go ahead and sign up ... but many users still
believe they're protected.
In fact, a recent study covered in The Register illustrates this tendency.
Researchers looked at the computers of 329 volunteers. Nearly all of the
machines were infected with viruses, spyware, and other garbage - one
fellow had 1,059 spyware and adware programs on his machine! - yet about
75% of those same users "reported believing that their PC is very secure or
moderately secure". I'm not surprised.
And now Microsoft is adding "free" anti-spyware to the mix. Is this a good
thing? On the one hand, sure - now people will have anti-spyware on their
machines, and as regular readers know, it is badly needed, given the
outrageous levels of spyware out there on the Net. On the other hand, how
effective is this software going to be? We've seen increasing attacks on
security software over the past year; on top of that, Microsoft's other
security software - like its firewall - is hardly a shining paragon in its
category. Further, it appears that history will repeat itself: Microsoft's
ultimate aim is to charge for its bundled anti-virus and anti-spyware as
part of a new A1 security subscription service.
What's the result? Users think they're protected - after all, their
computer comes with anti-virus software! it comes with anti-spyware
software! it's got a firewall! - but in reality they're still vulnerable.
Given that mindset, why not use Internet Explorer? Why not use Outlook
Express, or Outlook? Why not click on whatever appears in the web browser?
Or in email? Why worry about security? They're safe and secure!
It's enough to make a security pro want to take off from work and go see a
The law of unexpected consequences is one that we simply can't afford to
forget, and even though they're impossible to adequately plan for, we can
minimize their effects. We have to worry about it, and we have to always
ask the hard question: given this new thing foo, what are all the possible
results that could happen? Brainstorm. Think out of the box. Don't be
afraid to consider whatever crazy idea pops into your head. Trust me: it's
never crazy enough.
My British readers at least have one advantage over us Yanks: it appears
that so many people in the UK are taking Prozac that the drinking water now
contains traces of the drug. Wait a little longer, and security pros in the
UK won't be worrying about unintended consequences: thanks to one that I
would have never thought of, they'll be blissfully unconcerned about them.
And on it goes.
"Iroquois Theatre Fire of 1903". Chicago Historical Society (17 February
McNeil Jr., Donald G. "New C-Note Is Awaited In the Land Of Fake Bills".
The New York Times (3 December 1995): 9.
Scott Granneman is a senior consultant for Bryan Consulting Inc. in St.
Louis. He specializes in Internet Services and developing Web applications
for corporate, educational, and institutional clients.
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
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