Spotting Trouble Identifying Faltering and Failing States (1997)

[R.A. Hettinga]

Click the link for the couple of tables referenced in the text.

Cheers,
RAH
--------

<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1997/spring/art4sp97.htm>

Naval War College

Spotting Trouble Identifying Faltering and Failing States

 Richard J. Norton  and
 James F. Miskel

 In the past several years, images of American servicemembers hurriedly
deploying to various parts of the developing world in response to collapses
of state governments have become relatively common. For example, in 1995
U.S. troops kept uneasy watch on the borders of the disintegrating Former
Republic of Yugoslavia, patrolled the streets of Haiti, dealt with streams
of refugees pouring out of Rwanda, and withdrew from Somalia after four
years of humanitarian operations. These operations have not been
inexpensive; they have cost billions of dollars and dozens of American
lives.

 U.S. military involvement with faltering and failing states takes many
forms. 1 Actual combat may be involved, against opponents ranging from
criminal gangs possessing little more than light infantry weapons to
semiprofessional armies boasting artillery and armor. 2 In other
circumstances, "nation building" activities, such as road building, water
purification, and power restoration, make up the bulk of the efforts.
Additional tasks have included advising on clearing land mines, providing
security escorts to representatives of humanitarian organizations, serving
as an interim police force, evacuating foreign nationals, or simply
maintaining an offshore military presence.

 As 1995 demonstrated, states can fail in any portion of the populated
globe. The preparation time given U.S. military planners to respond to
these missions can range from months to only days; actual involvement may
last from weeks to years, with a proportionate range of costs.
Additionally, in an era of shrinking resources and limited force structure,
it is all the more significant that units committed to these missions are
likely to be unavailable for other operations.

 Therefore, military leaders are among the decision makers who have a
vested interest in being able to predict more accurately which states are
likely to fail. Others with this interest would include the president,
senior diplomats in the State Department, and the directors of humanitarian
nongovernmental organizations. Early identification of candidates for
failure would allow time to list required assets and prepare detailed
contingency plans. If, as we shall argue, traditional economic aid does not
significantly help states that are at high risk of failure, early
identification could also aid in forestalling the authorization of costly
and unproductive civil affairs or nation-building missions. In fact, early
warning can provide time to debate usefully whether the military should be
involved at all, and if it should, what shape the participation should take.

 Despite the frequent and prominent involvement of the U.S. military,
dealing with faltering and failed states is primarily a diplomatic issue.
Traditionally, development aid has been viewed as an essential element in
preventing states from failing. Development aid has included military
nation building and civil affairs projects, not only as routine peacetime
operations but also as part of disaster response packages and postconflict
assistance. These projects are often funded solely by the regional
commanders in chief or the military services. Attempts to apply this aid
have frequently been lengthy and quite costly. 3

 Yet notwithstanding the costs that were borne, these efforts have restored
very few failing states to health. Debates regarding the efficient and
effective application of current fiscally constrained military budgets have
become commonplace, both within and outside the military services. A factor
in this debate may be a dawning anxiety about the wisdom of "high risk, low
return" investments in failing states, investments that may yield little or
no positive return. For these reasons it seems to us that military planners
and decision makers should be interested in considering new approaches
toward aiding failing and faltering states. 4

 One such approach would recognize that the economic, social, and political
conditions in failing states are so adverse that they merit qualitatively
different treatment by the United States. Too often, U.S. foreign aid and
military assistance policies have dealt with failing states as if they were
no different from other underdeveloped and poor nations. Traditional
programs were designed for less dire situations and can, at best, only
moderate the symptoms, not cure such diseases. Thus, continued spending on
traditional forms of foreign aid for these states is not the most
cost-effective strategy in an era of scarce resources. A better
approach--akin to "triage" for battlefield wounds--would limit aid in these
cases to short-term humanitarian assistance, like disaster relief. These
states do not offer fertile soil for economic development assistance
undertakings that are long-term or require sustained maintenance by the
host country. Thus, environmental, education, and family planning projects
funded by the Agency for International Development, or military "civic
action" support for school reconstruction and public health system
development, would be recognized as essentially futile. Examples of nations
in such dire straits would have included Rwanda and Somalia: years of aid
were not successful in promoting self-sustaining economic growth and
stability--if they had been, operations RESTORE HOPE and SUPPORT HOPE would
not have been necessary.

 A prerequisite to formulating any new approach to these states is to be
able to distinguish accurately states that are failing or faltering from
the larger group of underdeveloped states that, while poor, are not so near
extremis. Making this type of distinction between poor and failing states
may be even more important for military leaders today than in the past,
because decisions about aid and military "humanitarian" operations are
often heavily influenced by the emotions of the public and their elected
representatives. This emotional response is triggered by the world media,
when they telecast gripping visual images of suffering from wherever on the
globe their attention is focused. To a large extent, this is as it should
be; in a democracy, the people ought to decide how much money should be
spent on foreign aid and to which states the resources should be dedicated.
On one hand, the public will find if difficult to make these judgments
without at least some information from the media; on the other hand,
however, the media's focus is normally only short-term. Appreciating the
complex problems in faltering and failing states requires a more
significant investment in time than the media are ordinarily willing to
invest. Objectively distinguishing states that are faltering and failing
from those that are "only" poor may enable military and political leaders
the better to explain policies and decisions.

 A logical first step, then, toward a systematic approach is to develop a
reliable method to identify faltering and failing states before they fail.
Ideally, such a methodology would also be useful for evaluating apparent
improvements made by a failing state--to distinguish the signals of
genuine, sustainable progress from the noise of false starts and empty
promises. In other words, policy makers could thereby determine when the
conditions in a failing state had stabilized or had begun so to improve
that development aid, including nation-building and civil affairs
operations performed by military units, could be fruitfully resumed.

 The purpose of this article is to stimulate discussion about a methodology
that could be used for identifying the failing states of today and
tomorrow. What this article will not do is attempt to determine exactly how
much money the United States should spend on foreign aid, or how much of
the Defense Department's budget should be reserved for dealing with
faltering and failing states. Nor will it attempt to determine how
individual foreign aid projects should be evaluated or which specific
programs are the most effective. These important issues deserve separate
consideration.

 We are, of course, not the first to observe or comment upon "failing
states." Others have preceded us in documenting the phenomenon and have
framed the borders of the debate. They remind us that the current policy
debates should focus more on the problems of failed and faltering states
and less on such issues as the potential merits of consolidating
Washington's foreign policy bureaucracies.

 One scholar, Robert Kaplan, has provided a disturbing and pessimistic
analysis of failing states. 5 According to Kaplan, most of the
nation-states in West Africa have virtually ceased to govern in any
meaningful way. All along a coastal crescent from Nigeria west to Liberia,
national governments have been overwhelmed by extreme poverty, disease,
crime, and anarchic violence. Endemic civil wars and clan violence will
almost inevitably make necessary some form of military protection and
involvement in aid efforts if these nations are to have any hope of
achieving even limited success. Worse, Kaplan sees no real cure for the
sociopathology of several West African states. Foreign aid, even if
administered under military protection, will have no lasting effect other
than to reduce the fiscal and other resources of the contributing
countries. Any aid that the United States provides to the failed states of
West Africa, he argues, will be no more than a sop to American domestic
interest groups.

 If ailing and fallen trees may be used as an analogy for faltering and
failed states, Kaplan might characterize the cause of failure as poor soil.
By contrast, Gerald B. Helman and Steven B. Ratner would instead blame
shallow roots. 6 In their view, many of the states that were created or
that gained independence after World War II were simply not well prepared
to face the daunting challenges of the 1980s and 1990s. Helman and Ratner
perceive the situation for these states as serious but not entirely
hopeless. The cure they propose is "conservatorship," under which the
United Nations would directly supervise or actually take over the
government of a failed state until it became fully capable of administering
its own affairs. 7 U.S. military and political leaders should immediately
understand, these authors warn, that such a conservatorship would
inevitably involve American military participation in some form or another.

 Taking the ailing-tree analogy a step further, Paul Kennedy would identify
neither shallow roots nor poor soil as the cause of failure; he would
ascribe the blame to gypsy moths and insufficient rain. Every state in the
world faces figurative gypsy moth swarms, e.g., transnational problems like
environmental degradation and AIDS. The least advanced states are too poor
to buy their way out of these problems, and they do not get enough rain (in
the form of investment or foreign aid) to save themselves. As a result,
they may be doomed to the chaos that Kaplan saw in West Africa. Conversely,
the most advanced states possess, or can afford, pest control, irrigation,
and well-drilling equipment; that is, their educated populations and
research and technology infrastructures give them the wherewithal to meet
or adjust to transnational challenges. Kennedy's solution to the problem of
faltering and failing states would be to launch international crusades
against these transnational problems and to invest more heavily in the
economic development of states that are falling behind. 8 Participation of
the U.S. military in this solution would not be surprising.

 Each of these solutions raises some very thorny questions. Which states
outside West Africa would people write off? Are all of the West African
states lost causes? Will these states be lost causes forever? Which states
would others put under conservatorship? Practically everyone concedes that
conservatorship is so expensive that the international community could
afford to handle very few cases at any given time. That being so, which
failed nations would be placed on a "waiting list," condemned to anarchy
until their turn for conservatorship came up? Or would an international
crusade attempt to rescue all poor states simultaneously? If their number
is too great, which states would be rescued first? What might be done for
the others while they collapse?

 Answering these questions requires a methodology--a taxonomy for
identifying failing and faltering states. We will offer such a taxonomy and
suggest how it could be applied in practice.

 Our taxonomy comprises nine sets of measurements, grouped into three main
categories. The first category assesses the trends in the living conditions
of a state's population, with emphasis on whether factors that might favor
economic development are better or worse than in other developing states.
The measurements of the second category appraise the capacity of the
private-sector economy to improve living conditions, over both the long and
short terms. The third category evaluates the capacity of the governmental
structure to maintain or improve the economic infrastructure, the
foundation on which the economy would begin improving living conditions.

 In order to apply these measurements, it is necessary to devise certain
criteria by which to evaluate a state's performance. We have color-coded
the basic assessments that might be assigned each criterion. Red "tiles"
represent conditions that are substantially worse than the average for all
developing nations, yellow tiles indicate a status near that average, and
green denotes conditions substantially above it. When the results in each
of the three categories are combined, a "mosaic" emerges, a picture of a
state's health. Although an infinite number of gradations are possible, we
place states, like the criteria, into one of three lists--also coded green,
yellow, and red. Green states appear to be in no danger of failure; red
marks those that are already failing or have a strong possibility of doing
so; whereas states in the yellow list are faltering--they stand at a
crossroads and could go either way. These are very broad categories, and
the boundaries tend to blur. Like all mosaics, the overall "picture" for
any given state is likely to contain tiles of different colors; the final
determination would be based on the predominate one. Thus a state might
have widespread poverty, and receive a red tile for that, but nevertheless
be coded yellow or even green overall, depending upon how this single
criterion stacked up against others.

 The mosaic analogy is not perfect, inasmuch as it calls to mind a static
image, a snapshot. A single data point simply cannot give an accurate
depiction of a state's potential for failure. In Figure 1 we indicate an
improving trend by an upward-pointing arrow; a negative trend would be
represented by a downward one, whereas the absence of an arrow would
indicate stagnation (unless the tile was green, when absence of an arrow
would reflect stability). Analysis of trend data is crucial if one is to
distinguish between a state heading toward failure and a poor but viable
nation. For example, data demonstrating improving trends would suggest that
a state is likely to survive; negative trends or stagnation in a "red" or
"yellow" state could represent the opposite.
 It is also important to note that this methodology does not provide a date
by which a certain country will fail, or even a guarantee of failure. Its
value, as stated earlier, lies in identifying those states that warrant a
different foreign-aid approach--not the reverse, i.e., those for which
maintenance of traditional foreign aid schemes is appropriate. It may also
be helpful to remember that this evaluation system makes no value judgment
about the nature of a state's government. Neither does it measure the
intentions of its political leadership; responding to intent is the
province of foreign policy, not aid policy. For example, though a state
ruled by a corrupt but effective dictator might not be considered "failing"
by our methodology, the United States might decide, for policy reasons, to
suspend aid until democratic reforms were implemented.

Social Conditions
 Category One primarily addresses the social conditions of a state. We have
selected three measurements to represent this category--poverty, literacy,
and also mortality (the death rate) and morbidity (incidence of
disease)--because they are related to basic building blocks of economic
growth and prosperity.

Poverty. Many organizations regularly examine the fiscal health of states,
and there are numerous definitions of poverty. Our definition is based on
what most experts would agree is the absolute minimum requirement to
support one of the most basic of human needs--getting enough food to stay
alive. We thus use the methodology of the Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations, which tracks the per capita calories
available (as percentage of need). It should be noted that this measure is
relatively unconcerned with unequal distribution of resources; many
nations, including the United States, have unequal distribution patterns.

Literacy. Literacy, the proportion of adults that can read, is widely
recognized as an indicator of human development. Statistics on this
measurement are collected and used by many international organizations.
Obviously, low rates of literacy reflect poor prospects for economic growth
and must discourage private-sector investments. A trend indicating a lack
of improvement in the literacy rate is also an indicator that the
governmental and private-sector infrastructures lack the capability to
administer basic social programs that are preconditions for economic
development.

 Because the focus of this taxonomy is on identifying states that may not
be suited for traditional forms of aid, this measurement deals with the
overall rate of literacy. In many states there are significant differences
between the education offered to men and women; in such states the adult
male population has a higher literacy rate than the adult female group. In
other countries there are significant disparities in the literacy rates of
different ethnic groups. These are important issues, but they do not
necessarily indicate that a state is failing or faltering. For example,
women have a much lower literacy rate than men in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and
Syria--three nations that are relatively advanced economically. 9

Mortality and morbidity. This measurement seeks out nations that are
substantially worse off than other developing states in these two related
areas and have been unable to register improvements in recent years. It is
not intended simply to identify states where disease is more prevalent than
in Western Europe or North America.

 Statistics on life expectancy and infant mortality are the two most widely
compiled measurements of mortality and morbidity. In conjunction with data
on the government's expenditures on health, these statistics provide
meaningful insight into a state's capacity for economic growth.
Unfortunately, figures on central government expenditures for health are
not available for many developing countries; also, World Bank and World
Health Organization reports do not include data on public health budgets
from any of the nations that have high mortality or morbidity rates. 10

 As with low literacy rates, high mortality and morbidity is likely to
discourage private investment from abroad. Further, if mortality and
morbidity rates are higher than the average for all developing countries
and are not improving, the likelihood exists that there are serious
deficiencies in the governmental and private-sector infrastructures.

Private Sector
 Category Two deals with the capacity of the private sector to improve
living conditions. To represent this category we have chosen three
measurements--inflation, emigration, and infrastructure--that, taken
together, give an indication of a state's capacity to survive economically
in the global economy.

Inflation. Every state, at one time or another, suffers peak levels of
inflation. Many have also experienced episodes of hyperinflation. Sustained
hyperinflation is an important indicator that a state may be headed for
failure. However, inflation figures may be highly volatile. On one hand, a
long-term trend of rising inflation does not bode well; consistent
inflation indicates underlying governmental difficulties, and also that
more than short-term improvement will be required to dampen consumer,
domestic, and foreign-investor expectations about inflation. On the other
hand, even a brief period of hyperinflation may be enough to damage
severely a state's chances of avoiding failure. For this and other
measurements, then, though the trend is important, it is also necessary to
note the impact of current conditions.

Emigration. As with inflation, most states have been "sending" countries at
one time or another. In most cases, voluntary emigration has benefited both
sender and receiver. Dividends have included increased foreign exchange in
the form of remittances; relief of unemployment and population pressures;
and the opportunity to improve the living condition of the migrant.
However, excessive levels of migration may add to difficulties imposed by
high morbidity and mortality rates. Another potential negative effect is
"brain-drain," the emigration of technical and professional personnel
essential to the maintenance of industry, services, and government
administration. Very general data regarding outward migration flows are
collected by the UN and the World Bank. The U.S. State Department and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees provide data for worldwide
refugee flows and the internal movements of displaced persons. (These data,
incidentally, are often in conflict with those reported by sending and
receiving countries.) Taken together, despite their shortcomings these
figures can be used to derive some useful trend data.

Infrastructure. "Infrastructure" is often taken to refer to public goods,
such as highways and airports, or private assets like telephones. Such
measures as telephones per capita are significant. If the trend is
positive, it is an indication that a platform for economic growth is being
erected and that the state involved is neither faltering nor failing. An
important, if less concrete, example of a private infrastructure good is a
state banking system, and further, the amounts entrusted to it by private
citizens. If a state suffers from severe economic problems and has no
mechanisms for encouraging savings, its platform for economic growth is
probably even weaker than more tangible public goods might indicate alone.
It may seem counterintuitive to discuss savings in poor states, but the
evidence indicates that they do exist. The strength of these savings and
their related programs are important to foreign investors, who view their
absence as a sign of serious problems. Such shortcomings usually stem from
manipulations by vested interests of a state's economy for their own gain,
implying that there are insufficient incentives for free enterprise.

Government Strength
 Category Three addresses a government's ability and willingness to invest
in the improvements to state infrastructure required to support economic
growth. As with Categories One and Two, we have chosen three measurements
to represent this category--border control, law and order, and government
action.

 Efforts to improve infrastructure and promote growth are long-term ones
and require significant investments at least of organized sweat equity
(e.g., equity resulting from labor invested) in operations and maintenance.
A certain amount of security is necessary for both the state's exposure and
that of donors of foreign aid and sponsors of military civil affairs
projects. What is important here is to measure not a state's ability to
provide security for individual projects or locations but rather its
overall capacity and willingness to provide it. Although a certain amount
of data regarding the following three measurements is available from a
variety of sources, the final rating of a given state in this category must
be a subjective one.

Border control. Although the state-centric model of the international
political system may no longer be as powerful as it once was, states are
likely to remain the most important actors in the international arena for
the foreseeable future. One of the primary functions of any state is to
control its borders, in order to regulate commerce, maintain security,
exercise its legal system, and so forth. Its capacity to do so is a
valuable litmus test of the viability of a state's central government. An
inability to perform this function also suggests significant problems in
other areas.

Law and order. Maintaining internal order is a second key measure of a
government's--and state's--prospects. In extreme cases the ability of the
central government to guarantee the safety of its citizens stops at the
doorways of a few federal buildings in the capital. The presence of
criminal-controlled enclaves, rampant criminal activity, the failure or
incompetence of government police forces, and a lack of public belief in
the efficacy of government law enforcement all point to potentially
serious, even fatal, flaws. Other indicators in this category would be
civil wars or armed and effective resistance groups. Where the latter are
present, there is almost always an obvious and direct tie-in with control
of borders.

Government action. The final criterion in Category Three, government
ability and willingness to act, cuts directly to the capability of a
central government. In some cases, it is so weak that it is unable to
perform. (Robert Kaplan would say that all West African states, for
instance, would receive a red tile for this measurement.) In other cases,
the government does have the means to act but fails to do so because of
corruption, ineptitude, or misplaced priorities. Such a state may have
significant natural resources, financial assets, or a public-sector and
economic infrastructure but be led by an individual or group that has
abrogated the responsibilities of government. Such regimes, in effect,
cause their state to fail in order to advance their own interests, e.g.,
Idi Amin in Uganda. Sometimes their attitude leads only to insurrection and
revolution, but the result may be the failure of the state itself.

A Special Challenge
 For the purposes of illustration we have chosen to apply this methodology
(retroactively) to Somalia for the 1980-1990 time frame. 11 The results are
indicated in Figure 2. Insufficient information is available to assess the
color of certain tiles, but we would argue that the preponderance of red
tiles and downward-pointing arrows for the period would have indicated
Somalia's potential failure to such U.S. policy makers as joint commanders
in chief in the years preceding its collapse. For brevity we present only
one example in this article; however, our work with other cases suggests
that this methodology warrants continued and deeper investigation.
 It should be reemphasized that the final determination of a state's
potential for failure rests on no single area. For example, in the United
States (a nation that is not deemed in danger of failure) one could cite
failure to control borders and high crime rates as potentially serious
problems. It is the combination of data and trends across all three
categories that allows one to assign a color code to an individual state.

 There are difficulties inherent in this taxonomy. Currently, there is no
single, central location where the required information can be obtained.
The Central Intelligence Agency does not now maintain a central database.
Some elements of the data reside at the Department of State, others at the
UN, and still others at private organizations. In some areas the figures
are unreliable or nonexistent. We would therefore recommend as a starting
point the establishment of a central repository for the required
information, one that is unclassified and accessible to all. The material
should be gathered overtly, either by the countries themselves or by
reputable research teams. Although the CIA might be the most logical
custodian (already possessing, as it does, the tools of data collection and
assimilation), its national intelligence function may make it politically
unsuited to this role. The UN, despite its significant inefficiencies and
multilayered bureaucracies, would seem the best home for this global
database, despite the enormous political pressures sometimes applied to
portray a "rosy picture."

 Data now obtainable is sketchy, unreliable, or nonexistent for some
countries and regions, and for significant historical periods of time. The
reason may be an inability on the part of the state to collect such data
(perhaps in itself an indicator of a problem) or reluctance to publicize
poor performance. Data can be falsified to make a state look better (or
worse, in an effort to attract aid) than it actually is. To begin to
correct these potential flaws, states might be required to submit data as
part of the price of admission to the United Nations, or as a prerequisite
for UN assistance and funding. Random verification could ascertain the
validity of reported figures, although we suspect that many nongovernmental
organizations would voluntarily serve, in effect, as watchdogs.

 Measurements requiring a subjective judgment pose a special challenge. The
U.S. ambassador to a state should obviously be consulted. However, this
does raise the issue of possible "clientism," and it could place an
ambassador who submitted a negative input in a potentially difficult
position. The regional commander in chief should also be brought in,
especially in regard to the capacity of the military branches of a
government, which are, in some cases, responsible for internal security.

 A better solution, in our opinion, would be for the Central Intelligence
Agency (or the United Nations) to be the central collection point. These
data could then be forwarded for review by a senior interagency working
group (IWG), which would submit recommendations to the National Security
Council for decision. There is no reason why private relief organizations
could not have representatives on this IWG. (Selecting an appropriately
experienced individual to represent this large and diverse community would
seem to be a challenge best solved by the "relief community" itself.) In
this manner, civil and military attempts to provide developmental aid could
be directed toward those areas where they would do the most long-term good;
advance planning could be undertaken for humanitarian responses to states
at high risk of collapse; and nations recovering from failure could be
channeled the right form of assistance. Over time, it appears, such a
consistent approach would both most wisely invest donor assets and provide
the most long-lasting benefit to those in need.

Notes
	1.  	States like the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia may be thought of
having failed in the same sense that the Holy Roman Empire failed--they are
now "extinct." Obviously, extinct states are not contenders for U.S. aid or
other forms of assistance; on the other hand, in the late 1980s and early
1990s Czechoslovakia and other states were in fact approaching political
failure. A foreign aid taxonomy must distinguish between political failures
that are "positive" (e.g., consistent with U.S. national interests or
reflective of the political consensus in, or economic self-interest of, the
affected country) and those that are negative, as in Somalia, where there
was widespread anarchy and starvation.

	2.  	This statement should not be taken as minimizing the difficulties
of any variety of combat but merely as pointing out the range of
capabilities possessed by potential opponents.

	3.  	The authors recognize that American foreign aid spending actually
constitutes less than 6 percent of the total U.S. budget and that the
majority of foreign aid is predisbursed to Israel, Egypt, Greece, and
Turkey. (The wisdom of that may be debated, but it is not the subject of
this article.) Nevertheless, development efforts are expensive in terms of
real dollars spent and even more so in proportion to the foreign aid budget
consumed.

	4.  	According to U.S. News & World Report (Tim Zimmerman, 12 February
1996, p. 42), Vice President Al Gore requested that the Central
Intelligence Agency study this problem. For the Agency response, see D.C.
Esty, J.A. Goldstone, T.R. Gurr, P.T. Surko, and A.N. Unger, "State Failure
Task Force Report," Working Paper for the Central Intelligence Committee
(Washington: November 1995).

	5.  	Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly,
February 1994, pp. 44-76.

	6.  	Gerald B. Helman and Steven B. Ratner, "Saving Failed States,"
Foreign Policy, Winter 1992-1993, pp. 3-21.

	7.  	Ibid., pp. 12-5.

	8.  	Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York:
Random House, 1993).

	9.  	World Bank, World Bank Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1995), p. 163.

	10.  	World Bank, pp. 180-1; World Health Organization, The World
Health Report 1995 (Geneva: 1995), pp. 105-8.

	11.  	Sources for this example include the World Bank's World
Development Reports (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994,
1995); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, World Population
Profile 1994 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994) and Demographic,
Economic, Social Statistics for the World (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1996); World Resources Institute, World Resources 1994-5: Guide to
the Global Environment; and World Health Organization.












Dr. Miskel is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War
College. During the Reagan and Bush administrations he served on the
National Security Council as Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control.
Dr. Miskel's doctorate is in modern European and Soviet history; he is the
author of Buying Trouble? National Security and Reliance on Foreign
Industry (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1993).

 Commander Norton recently retired from the U.S. Navy, after spending his
last three years of active duty as a faculty member of the National
Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College. He is
currently an adjunct professor of international relations at Florida
International University and a Ph.D candidate at The Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy. His most recent publication was National Security Decision
Making, vol. II, Case Studies in Contingency Operations, which he coedited
with Professor Miskel (Naval War College Press, 1994).  [Return to top]

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'