wk at gnupg.org
Wed Feb 16 10:54:35 PST 2005
On Wed, 16 Feb 2005 11:57:36 -0500, David Shaw said:
> Yes it is. Assuming this is true, we must start migrating away from
> SHA-1. Actually, we should start this anyway - even the NIST
> recommends moving away from SHA-1 for long-term security.
The real problem with the breakthrough is, that it seems that they
have developed a new cryptoanalytical method and that might pave the
way for further improvements. Over the last 2 decades the art of
cryptoanalysis has changed dramatically in the area of symmetric
ciphers. This will probably also happen to hash algorithms now.
There is however a huge problem replace SHA-1 by something else from
now to tomorrow: Other algorithms are not as well anaylyzed and
compared against SHA-1 as for example AES to DES are; so there is no
immediate successor of SHA-1 of whom we can be sure to withstand the
possible new techniques. Second, SHA-1 is tightly integrated in many
protocols without a fallback algorithms (OpenPGP: fingerprints, MDC,
default signature algorithm and more).
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users at gnupg.org
--- end forwarded text
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
More information about the cypherpunks-legacy