Arafat's Swiss Bank Account

[R.A. Hettinga]

<http://www.meforum.org/article/645> ?
 - Middle East Quarterly - Fall 2004

FALL 2004 * VOLUME XI: NUMBER 4


Arafat's Swiss Bank Account
 by Issam Abu Issa


Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Authority are known internationally for
the violence between Israelis and Palestinians. As ruinous as that violence
has been, another cancer permeates Arafat's administration; its name is
corruption. From firsthand experience, I understand just how deep it is.
Here is what I know.

>From Optimism to Dismay

On July 1, 1994, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman,
Yasir Arafat, arrived triumphant in the Gaza Strip, watched by millions on
television across the world. I was already in Ramallah, having traveled
there from my family's exile in Qatar in the weeks after Arafat, Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and President Bill Clinton had signed the
Oslo accords in September 1993. Between 1994 and 1996, I and fellow
Palestinian businessmen and intellectuals spent many days brainstorming to
see what contributions we could make to a Palestinian state. My family was
originally from Haifa, and I hoped to witness an Israeli withdrawal of
forces and the birth of a democratic Palestinian state. It was a time of
optimism among Palestinians. I gathered with friends and business partners
around the television in Ramallah and watched Arafat's arrival in the Gaza
Strip.

In 1996, I founded the Palestine International Bank (PIB). Thousands of
Palestinians in the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the diaspora supported
me financially or morally. My investors and I hoped to build a thriving
economy in the newly autonomous PA areas. The PIB was truly Palestinian.
Headquartered in Ramallah, it used mostly Palestinian capital, although it
did receive support from other Arabs. All its reserves were kept inside
Palestinian areas, and our shares traded actively on the Palestinian stock
exchange. From nothing, we expanded our customer base to more than 15,500.
Among those licensed by the newly established Palestine Monetary Authority
(PMA), we were the largest bank in the Palestinian territories.

I first met Arafat in April 1995 while trying to secure a banking license
for the PIB. This meeting at his Gaza office, though brief, was cordial and
encouraging. I thought things would go smoothly. But, as the PIB grew more
popular, Arafat's inner circle and, specifically, Muhammad Rashid, a PA
official, also known as Khalid Salam and often described as an economic
advisor to Arafat and manager of a small percentage of PIB stocks, made it
difficult for us to branch out and move forward.[1] The PA, which strictly
controls Palestinian media, launched a negative media blitz against us in a
bid to suppress our growth. The systematic effort to undermine PIB came
after I refused to cede power to Muhammad Rashid.[2]

Over the course of fifteen meetings, I became better acquainted with Arafat
and grew increasingly concerned with his leadership style. Arafat and top
PA officials did not respect the rule of law; many were corrupt. Arafat
believed neither in separation of powers nor in checks and balances. His
animosity toward accountability thwarted efforts to establish a responsible
leadership. By 1996, Palestinians in the PA were saying they had traded one
occupation for two, the one by Israel and the one by Arafat and his cronies.

Rather than use donor funds for their intended purposes, Arafat regularly
diverted money to his own accounts. It is amazing that some U.S. officials
still see the Palestinian Authority as a partner even after U.S.
congressional records revealed authenticated PLO papers signed by Arafat in
which he instructed his staff to divert donors' money to projects
benefiting himself, his family, and his associates.[3]

How did Arafat's inner circle benefit? In 1994, he instructed the
Palestinian Authority official in charge of finances, Muhammad Nashashibi,
to fund secretly-to the tune of $50,000 per month-a Jerusalem publicity
center for Raymonda Tawil, Arafat's mother-in-law, and Ibrahim Qar'in, an
associate of Arafat's family.[4] He also ordered the investment in the
computer companies of 'Ali and Mazzan Sha'ath, sons of Nabil Sha'ath, the
PA's key negotiator in talks with Israel. Amin Haddad, Arafat's designated
governor of the Palestine Monetary Authority, established several
import-export companies acting as the front man for Arafat. The Palestinian
Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction financed these
activities.[5] Thus, an organization meant to channel funds from donor
countries like France and Germany became a mechanism by which to enrich
Arafat.

Arafat's men flagrantly displayed corruption. Arriving penniless in Gaza
and the West Bank from exile in Tunisia, many PLO members amassed wealth,
built villas in Gaza, Ramallah, Amman, and other places, and sent their
children to the best schools in the United Kingdom and the United States.
Hisham Makki, former head of the Palestine Broadcasting Services,
assassinated in January 2001, earned a monthly salary of $1,500 but became
a millionaire within a few years. Immediately after his assassination,
Arafat froze Makki's personal bank accounts, estimated at $17 million.
Makki was alleged to have taken bribes and sold government-owned equipment.
However, it was rumored that he had a dispute with another PA official over
the sharing of profits gained on illegal business transactions. His
assailants, believed to be members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, a
shady group affiliated with Fatah, have never been caught.[6]

Palestinians complained. The corruption of Arafat and the Palestinian
Authority were blatant, but it appeared as if their status quo policies
caused Israel and the United States to turn a blind eye. Diplomats
downplayed flagrant corruption. In August 2001, Israel seized close to a
half million documents from Palestinian offices in Jerusalem and elsewhere.
Subsequent State Department reports on Palestinian governance and terrorism
made little use or even mention of these documents.[7] European and U.S.
policymakers assumed Arafat's critics to be against the Oslo accord. That
may have been the case with members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
but it was not the case among more liberal-minded Palestinians and
investors like me.

Arafat's corruption reached its peak in 1999 via the monster of "twelve
security forces that nobody could control,"[8] in addition to the
disorganized Tanzim (Fatah's militia). He played these services off each
other, never allowing a subordinate to gain power. Between 1995 and 2000,
Arafat's thugs beat up at least eleven elected members of the 88-member
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) because they voiced views in private
and in public that were opposed to Arafat's on how the PA is run. The
victims included PLC Human Rights Committee head Qaddoura Fares, Azmi
ash-Shoaibi, Abdul Jawad Saleh, Hatem Abdul Kader, among others. Arafat
wanted to terrorize and silence his critics. Indeed, one of his favorite
slogans was Dimuqratiyat al-Banadiq (Democracy of the Guns). Arafat
believes true power lies in force, whether directed against Israelis or
against his own people.

How popular is Arafat among Palestinians? At times of crisis, television
crews show cheering Palestinians demonstrating and greeting their leader
outside his Ramallah headquarters. In better days, Palestinian television
regularly broadcasts pro-Arafat rallies across the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. But rallies aren't always what they seem. PA funds are used to buy
loyalty and drum up support.[9] The PA hires crowds, stages promotional
media campaigns, and distributes Arafat's pictures in the streets and
alleys of the Palestinian territories. Rather than build a viable state,
Arafat sought only to amass wealth and power. I myself heard his entourage
and close associates refer to him as al-Arrab, meaning "the Godfather."

At the end of 1997, when the PA Auditor's Office released its end of the
year financial report, $326 million-43 percent of the annual budget-was
"missing."[10] Only 57 percent of the budget was accounted for, spent on
security forces (35 percent), office of the president (12.5 percent), and
public allocation (9.5 percent). A special committee appointed by the PLC
conducted an investigation and released a report accusing the PA of
financial mismanagement. The findings of this panel exposed many official
misgivings and abuses such as the use of government money for personal
purposes by ministers Nabil Sha'ath, Talal Sidr, and Yasir Abd Rabboh;
excessive expenditure on rent, salaries, and cost of travel in various
ministries; receipt of bribes by ministry officials in the Ministry of
Civil Affairs; illegal and unreported collection of taxes by the Ministry
of Postal Services; granting illegal customs exemptions on cars, furniture,
and material donations entering the PA, etc. It concluded that anyone
involved in corruption should be taken to court, regardless of his position
as minister, undersecretary, or director-general. The report demanded the
ouster of at least two ministers: civil affairs minister Jamil at-Tarifi,
and planning and international cooperation minister Nabil Sha'ath.[11]

The PLC voted 51-1 in favor of dissolving Arafat's appointed 18-member
limited self-rule cabinet. Sixteen ministers gave letters to Arafat
signaling readiness to resign if asked. But Arafat confirmed the corrupt
ministers in their positions rather than firing them. Additionally, PLC
member Haider Abdel Shafi resigned due to "frustration with the performance
of the PLC and with the executive's total lack of concern for its
recommendations," and added, "The PLC is a marginal body and not a true
parliament."[12]

Even as the PLC committee was conducting its investigation, Arafat
appointed Tayeb Abd al-Rahim, general secretary of the Presidential Office,
to make a detailed inquiry into acts of corruption. His report remains
secret.

In practice the reports were meaningless. Since Arafat does not honor rule
of law, decisions by auditors or the Palestinian Legislative Council fall
by the wayside. Corruption continues. More than six years after the
report's issuance, Tarifi remains in the cabinet. Rather than face charges,
Sha'ath has won promotion.

In another case, Salam Fayyad, the official in charge of finance, again
said in August 2003 that there were many "irregularities" in the work of
the Petroleum Authority, which has been siphoning money to secret bank
accounts for years.[13] When Nablus legislator Mu'awyah al-Masri asked for
details and figures about the revenues from oil products, Fayyad shocked
the lawmakers by declaring, "Unfortunately, the documents related to the
revenues from oil products-or how the money was used-can't be found. They
have disappeared from the ministry."[14]

The bank accounts of Harbi Sarsour, head of the Petroleum Authority, were
frozen by the PA pending investigation into the scandal. But an initial
investigation by Fayyad's office and the PLC showed that much of the oil
profits had been deposited into a bank account under Arafat's name.[15]

For sheer scale, few allegations match up to a deal allegedly struck
between Muhammad Rashid, one of Arafat's economic advisors, and the late
Yossi Ginosar, a former Israeli security officer. Ginosar's company, ARC,
helped open Swiss bank accounts and deposit funds into them derived from
both PA-financed companies and Israeli tax rebates to the Palestinian
Authority.[16] Over a period of five years, approximately US$900 million
was diverted to these accounts.[17]

In early 2002, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
conducted a poll in which they surveyed 1,320 Palestinians. Eighty-five
percent believed that there was corruption in PA institutions; only 16
percent gave a positive evaluation to democracy under the Palestinian
Authority. Eighty-four percent expressed support for fundamental reforms in
the PA.[18]

Arafat Robs the Palestine International Bank

On November 28, 1999, I became a victim of Arafat's abuse of power and
flagrant disregard for the law. That's when, in direct breach of the law,
Arafat issued a decree dissolving the Palestine International Bank's board
of directors. The state-controlled Palestine Monetary Authority took over
the bank, and with Arafat's blessing and written approval,[19] formed a new
supervisory board of directors, including at least one convicted and
Interpol-wanted felon. The unlawful takeover was a confiscation of my own,
my shareholders', and my clients' private assets for Arafat's personal use.
At the date of seizure, PIB total assets amounted to $105 million. Since
the takeover, they have neither called for a shareholders' meeting nor
disclosed the bank's balance sheet.

The PLC investigated the seizure of the bank after I lodged a complaint in
2000 about the PIB's unlawful takeover. The PMA governor then threatened
the bank's auditing firm, Talal Abu Ghazaleh International (TAGI), for
revealing facts and figures that implicated the Palestinian leadership. The
PMA governor took punitive measures against them but was unanimously
condemned by the PLC.[20] Meanwhile, the PMA altered, hid, or destroyed
bank records in their campaign to demonstrate malfeasance on my part
retroactively. They supplied false information to the
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) group leading to a faulty audit. PWC seems to
have taken for granted the accuracy of material that PMA governor Amin
Haddad supplied, but he both provided some fraudulent documents and omitted
others. The Qatari government, which has remained interested in the case
because of my Qatari citizenship, rejected the PWC Report.[21]

As they seized the bank, Arafat's security services harassed me. I fled to
the Qatari mission in Gaza. Arafat's staff confiscated my private
belongings, including my car, which Arafat took for himself.[22] My brother
Issa accompanied a Qatari Foreign Ministry delegation to Gaza in order to
resolve the stalemate. But, upon his arrival, Palestinian police acting on
orders from Arafat arrested him. The PA said they would trade his freedom
for mine. Only after the State of Qatar threatened Arafat with financial
sanctions and severing of diplomatic ties did the PA give us free passage
to leave Gaza for Qatar.

In recent months, there has been some movement on my case. After months of
investigation and deliberation, the Palestinian Legislative Council ruled
all decisions taken by the PMA on the matter of PIB to be illegal, and
hence subsequent actions to be illegitimate.[23] Chiefly because of his
mismanagement of the PIB case and citing corruption, in May 2004, the PLC
fired Amin Haddad from his position in the Palestinian Monetary
Authority.[24] Hassan Khreisheh, Palestinian deputy parliament speaker,
said, "This is part of the parliament's war against corruption in the
PA."[25] He pointed out that Haddad had been pocketing unauthorized bonuses
and profiting illegally from his management of the PIB. In spite of this,
Arafat continues to back Haddad. As Khreisheh says, "Arafat resists any
change, but pressure is building against him."[26] Arafat's support for
Haddad is magnified in his August 5, 2004 letter to the PLC Reform
Committee. He stated, "Firing the governor of the PMA would serve our
enemies."[27] By "enemies," he was referring to, among others, myself and
the deputy prime minister of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabor
ath-Thani, whom he mentioned more than three times before several PLC
members.

The PLC also indicted Arafat's relative, Jarrar al-Kudwa, who headed the
General Monitoring Board that functions as the PA's Controller's Office,
for corruption and misleading the investigation into the seizure of the
PIB.[28]

On June 18, 2004, the evening after the Jordanian daily Ad-Dustur published
the Khreisheh interview cited above, Arafat ordered his Special Security
Apparatus to arrest one of my sympathizers in Ramallah. Thus does Arafat
continue to use the Palestinian security forces to harass and intimidate
anyone who questions his pocketbook. It is no surprise then that he issued
clear instructions to PA officials not to discuss openly the PIB issue. To
him, the matter is an extremely important issue.[29]

I have very little faith in the Palestinian judicial system, which is fully
under Arafat's thumb. The PA disregards many court decisions unless they
serve Arafat's purposes. Chief Justice Zuhair as-Sourani usually acts on
Arafat's orders.[30] Arafat and Sourani handpicked Judge Talaat Taweel in
order to pass the civil judgment against me in absentia. Taweel has been
implicated in criminal cases.[31] Likewise, the PLC's Human Rights
Committee condemned Sourani's illegal actions. Earlier, while an attorney
general, Sourani issued an arrest warrant against me but failed to produce
any legal basis before the PLC; he merely acted on Arafat's verbal
instruction.[32] Arafat subsequently promoted him to chief justice.

The continuing decay of the judicial system prompted the Union of
Palestinian Lawyers to launch a short boycott of the Palestinian court
system on June 28, 2004.[33] Union leader Hatem Abbas remains a vocal
critical of judicial corruption. On September 26, 2004, he sent a strongly
worded letter regarding Sourani's malpractice.

And just recently, the PLC decided to suspend all sessions from September 7
to October 7, 2004, in an attempt to pressure Arafat to accelerate the
approval of a reform package that he publicly adopted on August 18, 2004,
and in protest against the Palestinian cabinet for not implementing the
decisions and bills approved by the PLC.[34] The PLC wants to stress that
the council's decisions have to be taken seriously.

The Cement Scandal

Abuse of power among Arafat's associates and Palestinian ministers is not
the exception but rather the rule, as shown by the cement scandal: PA
officials were accused of selling cement to Israel for use in constructing
the West Bank wall and for Israeli construction in the disputed
territories, then pocketing the money.

On February 11, 2004, Israel's Channel 10 television reported that the
Al-Quds Cement Factory supplied the cement for these purposes. Television
footage showed cement mixers leaving company headquarters and driving to
Maale Adumim, an Israeli settlement a few kilometers away. The family of
Prime Minister Ahmad Qureia co-owns the Al-Quds company. When confronted by
the allegations at a June 2004 press conference in Rome, Qureia denied
personal involvement.[35]

On June 9, 2004, the PLC held a debate in which some legislators accused
Maher Masri, who held the Palestinian Authority's economy portfolio, of
negligence and fraud. Council members called for an investigation on
"corruption and tax evasion" charges.[36] Despite the charges, the debate
itself was stilted. Palestinian security ejected PLC deputy and
anti-corruption campaigner Jawad Saleh from the debate after the PLC
speaker prevented nine deputies who had conducted the investigation from
participating in the debate.[37]

The scandal reportedly started with an Israeli-German businessman named
Zeev Blenski. Blenski sought to import 120,000 tons of Egyptian concrete
but, the Egyptian firms, under pressure from Egypt's anti-Israel lobby,
refused to provide it. Blenski then turned to the Tarifi Ready Mix Cement
Company, owned by Civil Affairs Minister Jamil Tarifi and his brother Jamal
and two other Palestinian cement companies, Intisar Barakeh Company for
General Trade and the Yusef Barakeh Company for General Trade.[38]

Tarifi got Masri to sign an import permit. In fact, "senior PA officials
had received bribes to issue import licenses to several importers and
businessmen working on behalf of Israelis."[39] The permits directed the
cement to be used to rebuild homes in the Rafah refugee camp, which had
been razed by Israeli troops.[40] Instead, Blenski sold the cement to build
parts of the separation fence, as well as new houses in Jewish communities
in the West Bank and Gaza.[41]

The PLC report concluded that the cement scandal went against PA objectives
by indirectly contributing to the separation barrier but also by
undermining the Palestinian treasury through the failure to collect tax on
the imported cement. Lastly, because the Palestinians still operate under
annual cement importation quotas, PA officials' greed undercut the
Palestinian construction sector.[42] The PLC passed the report to the
district attorney, but no action has yet been taken. Few Palestinians
expect that action will be taken.

Surprise in New York

Pressure for reform is waning, and Palestinian democrats are caught in the
middle. On February 13, 2004, I arrived at JFK International Airport in New
York on my way to testify about PA corruption before the U.S. House
Financial Services Committee. It was not my first trip to Washington; I
have been there a half dozen times and have never faced any difficulties.
My most recent visit had been a year before when I addressed both the
Hudson Institute and The Foundation for the Defense of Democracy on
democracy and Palestinian reform.[43]

But, this trip was different. Instead of breezing through customs as I had
in the past, agents from the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement kept me in custody for seventeen hours.
At some point, I was cuffed at the wrists and ankles and repeatedly
interrogated by agents who accused me of laundering $6 million from the PIB
on behalf of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They let me go, but I now
cannot gain entry to the United States. While dozens of academics signed
petitions in support of a visa for Tariq Ramadan, the grandson of the
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, my case generated only silence in
American universities.[44]

Why the change? PA officials passed the charge to the State Department,
which forwarded the information uncritically to Homeland Security.[45] This
is ironic since the PIB leadership installed after my ouster was implicated
in money laundering for Saddam Hussein.[46] The U.S. embassy in Doha has
sought to rectify the matter, and I was allowed to reapply for a new visa;
the case is still pending. But splashed across the Arabic press, the
message was clear: Foggy Bottom supports Arafat and will turn a blind eye
toward the concerns of dissidents.[47] It is counterproductive for
Washington to indulge Arafat to the extent that they pull the rug out from
anyone trying to make a change. Recent chaos in Gaza reinforces that
Washington should not put all its eggs in one basket. But, how can
Palestinian administration improve if the U.S. government allows Arafat to
use its bureaucracy to do his dirty work? Accountability is key.

Conclusion

For four years, there has been violence and unmasked hostility between
Israeli and Palestinians. Palestinian security forces and Israeli soldiers,
who once jointly patrolled the streets of West Bank and Gaza towns, now
fight each other. The conflict has taken a heavy toll on human life and on
resources, both among Palestinians and Israelis. Israeli authorities and
Palestinian organizations estimate the total dead at almost 4,000 and the
wounded at more than 32,000.[48] The ailing Palestinian economy has
declined 25 percent in 2003[49] while Israel has lost billions of dollars
due to recession in the tourism sector and declining investor confidence.
When I see cars blown apart by missiles, buses and cafes on the streets of
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv destroyed, as well as destruction and death in Gaza
and the West Bank, or pictures of grieving mothers and daughters, it is
hard to believe that it has been only eleven years since the world
celebrated the promise of the Oslo accords. I have problems with Israeli
policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but Arafat's leadership for too
long has used Israel as an excuse for failure to clean our own house.

Arafat's failed leadership is one factor responsible for the evolution of
Palestinian extremism and fundamentalism, as well as a culture of death and
despair among the Palestinians. While Clinton feted Arafat at the White
House as a peace partner, many of us who worked with or lived under Arafat
disagreed, seeing him instead as a man exclusively concerned with power,
money, and personal gratification. He heads a dictatorial regime staffed by
gangsters.[50] I and increasing numbers of Palestinians also blame U.S. and
Israeli officials who, in the wake of the Oslo accords, calculated that a
Palestinian dictatorship would make a better negotiating partner than a
Palestinian democracy.[51] They were very wrong. When growing pressure in
the Palestinian territories forced Arafat to find a scapegoat for his
political failure, mismanagement, and economic plunder, he turned his guns
toward the Israelis.

Reform and Arafat are like oil and water. Arafat instigates violence to
deflect blame for his own corruption. No amount of dialogue or diplomatic
dinners will change this fact.

On the positive side, there are still persons who can move the
peace-building process ahead. Many Palestinians seek change and welcome
democratization and good governance. The Palestinians have the wealth,
talent, and skills to carry out major functions for the needed
transformation. Young economic leaders could spearhead the process since
economic growth and development are fruits of peace. The Palestinian
private sector and civil society organizations can be mobilized and
empowered in order to foster the democratization process.

With the right support, the Palestinians are capable of leading a real
transformation towards a democratic state, one characterized by a
separation of powers, the rule of law, a free market economy, and a strong
civil society.

America should not be discouraged by what is going on in the Middle East
today. Signs of freedom and reform abound. But, Washington must look
forward and not revert to the formulas of the past. Palestinians want not
only to be freed from Israeli control but also, as importantly, to end the
occupation by Arafat and his cronies.

Issam Abu Issa, former chairman of the Palestine International Bank,
currently resides in Qatar. He is founder of the Palestinian National
Coalition for Democracy and Independence, a Palestinian democratic reform
movement.

[1] Interview with Palestinian deputy speaker, Ad-Dustur (Amman), June 17,
2004.
[2] Lamis Andoni, "Palestine Banking Trouble," Middle East International,
Jan. 28, 2000, p. 10.
[3] "Scandalous PLO Letters Authenticated by Congressional Task Force,"
Manfred and Anne Lehmann Foundation (New York), at
http://www.manfredlehmann.com/sieg429.html.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Khaled Abu Toameh, "Corrupt Palestinian Officials Said Fleeing in Fear
for Their Lives," The Israel Report, Jan./Feb. 2001, at
http://www.christianactionforisrael.org/isreport.
[7] Matthew Levitt, "PLOCCA 2002: Empty Words," The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, Peacewatch #384, May 24, 2002, at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2002/384.htm.
[8] Mahmoud Abbas, ex-Palestinian prime minister, quoted in Newsweek, June
21, 2004.
[9] Nathan Vardi, "Auditing Arafat," Forbes.com, Mar. 17, 2003, at
http://www.forbes.com/global/2003/0317/014.html.
[10] The Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1998.
[11] PLC Special Committee Report (The Corruption Report,) May 1997, at
http://www.jmcc.org/politics/pna/plc/plccorup.htm; Stacey Lakind and Yigal
Carmon, "The PA Economy," The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI),
Inquiry and Analysis Series, no. 11, Jan. 8, 1999, at
http://www.memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=IA1199.
[12] Arjan El Fassed, "Cement and Corruption," The Electronic Intifada,
June 11, 2004, at http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article2813.shtml.
[13] Khaled Abu Aker, "Where Has All the Oil Money Gone?" Arabic Media
Internet Network, Aug. 11, 2003, at http://www.amin.org.
[14] The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 3, 2003.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), Dec. 2, 2002, Mar. 7, 2004.
[17] Press briefing, International Monetary Fund, Dubai, UAE, Sept. 20,
2003, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2003/tr030920.htm.
[18] The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion
Poll #5, Aug. 18-21, 2002, at
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p5a.html.
[19] Appointment letter signed by Arafat, May 24, 2003, Palestinian Court
of First Instance.
[20] PLC decision, no. 626/1/8, Oct. 25, 2003.
[21] Letter, signed by Muhammad Jeham al-Kuwari, then-director of the
Office of the Foreign Minister of Qatar, to the late Yassin Shareef,
Palestinian ambassador to the state, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar,
Aug. 30, 2000, at http://www.palestine77.net/kuwari.pdf.
[22] Focus Magazine (Munich), Dec. 16, 2002, p. 208.
[23] PLC decision, no. 642/1/8, Dec. 30, 2003.
[24] Associated Press, May 5, 2004.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Newsweek International, Aug. 30, 2004.
[27] "Report of the Special Reform Committee," PLC, Aug. 25, 2004, p. 6.
[28] The Jerusalem Post, Jan. 18, 2004.
[29] Tahseen Al Miqati, Palestinian ambassador to Qatar, quoted in Forbes
(Arabic edition), May 2004, p. 88.
[30] "Position Paper -Re: The Case of Palestine International Bank," Jan.
23, 2004, co-signed by four Palestine-based NGOs: the Mandela Institute for
Human Rights, Al-Haq, Al-Quds Human Rights Center, Al-Dustour, at
http://www.palestine77.net/ngoenglish.doc.
[31] Ad-Dustur, June 17, 2004.
[32] "Report of the Human Rights Committee," PLC, Dec. 2, 2003, p. 34.
[33] Al-Quds (Jerusalem), June 27, 2004.
[34] Palestine Media Center, Sept. 2, 2004, at
http://www.palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=1&id=1422.
[35] Arjan El Fassed, "Cement and Corruption," The Electronic Intifada,
June 11, 2004, at http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article2813.shtml.
[36] Rouhi Fatouh, PLC speaker, quoted in The Jerusalem Times, June 18, 2004.
[37] The Jerusalem Post, June 21, 2004.
[38] The Jewish Tribune (Toronto), June 17, 2004.
[39] The Jerusalem Post, June 10, 2004.
[40] The Jewish Week (New York), June 25, 2004.
[41] Israel National News, June 13, 2004, at
http://www.israelnn.com/news.php3?id=63989.
[42] The Jerusalem Times, June 17, 2004.
[43] Feb. 6, 2003.
[44] "Tariq Ramadan: American and European Scholars Respond,"
Campus-Watch.org, Sept. 23, 2004.
[45] Amber Pawlik, "Exporting Freedom," May 9, 2004, at
http://www.mensnewsdaily.com/archive/p/pawlik/2004/pawlik050904.htm.
[46] The Peninsula (Doha), Apr. 13, 2003.
[47] "A Critic of Arafat Is Turned away at the U.S. Border-Reformer
Detained at Kennedy Was Headed to Meet Congress," The New York Sun, Feb.
17, 2004; "Standing up to Arafat," The Fox News, Feb. 23, 2004; Adam
Daifallah, "Arabs Who Believe in Democracy," The New York Sun, Feb. 23,
2004; "New York Authorities Detain PIB Chairman for 17 Hours at JFK
Airport," Ar-Raya (Doha), Feb. 19, 2004; "Story of the Detention of PIB
Chairman at the JFK Airport on Allegations of Financing Hamas and Jihad,"
Al-Hayat (London), Feb. 16, 2004.
[48] Casualty updates from Palestinian Red Crescent Society, at
http://www.palestinercs.org/crisistables/table_of_figures.htm, and Magen
David Adom of Israel, at
http://www.magendavidadom.org/casualtyitem.asp?Update=41.
[49] Palestine Investment Promotion Agency, at
http://www.pipa.gov.ps/economic_indicators.asp.
[50] Rafiq an-Natsheh, former PLC speaker, quoted in Asharq (Doha), July
20, 2004.
[51] Natan Sharansky, "From Helsinki to Oslo," Journal of International
Security Affairs, Summer 2001, at
http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/1383/documentid/1690/history/3,2359,947,1383,1690;
"Yasser Arafat: An Asset or a Burden. A Confidential Israeli Document,"
summarized by Mohammed Salah al-Attar, Nida Younis, trans., Ma'ariv, July
6, 2001, at
http://www.aljazeerah.info/News%20archives/2004%20News%20archives/Jan/13n/Yasser%20Arafat%20an%20asset%20or%20a%20burden,%20a%20confidential%20Israeli%20document%20By%20Mohammed%20Salah%20Al-Attar%20and%20Nida%20Younis.htm.


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