Brands' private credentials
jason at lunkwill.org
Sun May 9 19:42:04 PDT 2004
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On Sun, 9 May 2004, Adam Back wrote:
> and seeing that it is a completely different proposal essentially
> being an application of IBE, and extension of the idea that one has
> multiple "identities" encoding attributes. (The usual attribute this
> approach is used for is time-period of receipt .. eg month of receipt
> so the sender knows which key to encrypt with).
Right, good summary.
> One claim is that the system should hide sensitive attributes from
> disclosure during a showing protocol. So the example given an AIDs
> patient could authenticate to an AIDS db server without revealing to
> an outside observer whether he is an AIDs patient or an authorised
> However can't one achieve the same thing with encryption: eg an SSL
> connection and conventional authentication?
How would you use SSL to prove fulfillment without revealing how? You could
get the CA to issue you a "patient or doctor" SSL cert, likewise for every
possible combination of things somebody might ask you for, but that's not very
practical. Presumably this is why the other systems also allow proof of
expressions without revealing all the attributes you used to do so.
> Outside of this, the usual approach to this is to authenticate the
> server first, then authenticate the client so the client's privacy is
If you can trust the server to do so. Firstly, hidden credentials limit what
the server learns, so you don't *have* to trust the server as much. But
secondly, they also solve the problem which shifts to the server when it goes
first: now the server has to reveal attributes to a complete stranger. For
sensitive systems, it's easy to get circular dependencies where neither side
wants to go first. Hidden credentials let you enforce the policy in the
ciphertext: "if you can read this, let's talk. if not, I didn't want to talk
to you anyway (and you won't learn why)". (Incidentally, two other similar
systems came out at about the same time as mine, both geared less toward
extreme policy/credential paranoia and more toward resolving such circular
dependencies: OSBE (Li, Du, Boneh) and Secret Handshakes (Balfanz et al)).
> Further more there seems to be no blinding at issue time. So to
> obtain a credential you would have to identify yourself to the CA /
> IBE identity server, show paper credentials, typically involving True
> Name credentials, and come away with a private key. So it is proposed
> in the paper the credential would be issued with a pseudonym. However
> the CA can maintain a mapping between True Name and pseudonym.
> However whenever you show the credential the event is traceable back
> to you by collision with the CA.
Right, that is a big consideration with my system; CAs can be nosy. Of
course, any CA will want you to show paper credentials or some other
real-world proof that they should give you a credential. But you're right
that the Chaum/Brands/L&C family do have a big advantage in limiting the risks
of big-brother CAs once they've issued it to you.
> I would not say your Hidden Credential system _is_ an anonymous
> credential system. There is no blinding in the system period. All is
> gated via a "trust-me" CA that in this case happens to be an IBE
> server, so providing the communication pattern advantages of an IBE
If your definition requires anonymity wrt the CA, then you're right. My
system lets folks:
* authenticate based on attributes rather than identity
* access resources without the server even knowing whether they fulfill the
* hide policies from people who don't fulfill them
So it's definitely in the realm of other privacy systems. We could define a
new term just to exclude my system from the others, but at this point I don't
think naming confusion is any worse for my system; they all have lots of
different nonorthogonal features. I have to write a survey paper for my Ph.D.
requirements, and I've been thinking I should write a big feature table as
part of it.
> In particular I don't see any way to implement an anonymous epayment
> system using Hidden Credentials. As I understand it is simply not
I've never really considered it as a payment system. It's geared more toward
systems which use extremely sensitive resources, and their corresponding
sensitive policies and credentials.
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