An Essential War

[R. A. Hettinga]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Figuring out what happens after the state is probably the most
important thing to work on in the coming century, I figure. Sooner or
later, the state, that is, politically controlled transfer-priced
geographic force-monopoly, isn't going to work anymore.

Given Moore's Law and its effects on communications networks and
resultant social structures, the first step, which is already
happening, will be more, and not fewer, states.

As price discovery costs fall, this will probably result in
non-geographic control of force, and, most likely, non-monopolistic
markets for same. With sufficiently lowered transaction costs, the
end-state, if you will :-), will probably be the complete
commercialization of force. Not in monopolistic competition using
laws for control and organization, using incorporation, patents and
brands (Ford vs. Diamler-Chrysler) but in perfectly competitive
auction markets, like those for graded fungible commodities, using
network and financial cryptography protocols for transaction
execution and proof of performance, and much more focused
applications of force than modern warfare entails.

We live in interesting times, with interesting problems to solve.

In the meantime, the ability to fight distributed violence rests with
nation-states, who are finally getting the idea that it is, in fact,
a military problem, and not something to leave to lawyers. The threat
of terrorism and other geodesic forms of warfare is just that, a
permutation of war, and, though now can and should be fought at the
level of the state, ultimately, it must be fought at a scale much
smaller than that.

Ultimately, terrorism is a form of individual violence, and will be
fought individually.

Think of it as a form of responsible anarchy, informed more by
markets at the device layer of a society's architecture than by
ideology at the human.

Cheers,
RAH
- --------

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB108052892146167601,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal

      March 29, 2004

 COMMENTARY



An Essential War

By GEORGE P. SHULTZ
March 29, 2004; Page A18


We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan
administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a
big problem, a different problem, and we have to take forceful action
against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me, but not many
others did. (Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception.)

In those days we focused on how to defend against terrorism. We
reinforced our embassies and increased our intelligence effort. We
thought we made some progress. We established the legal basis for
holding states responsible for using terrorists to attack Americans
anywhere. Through intelligence, we did abort many potential terrorist
acts. But we didn't really understand what motivated the terrorists
or what they were out to do.

In the 1990s, the problem began to appear even more menacing. Osama
bin Laden and al Qaeda were well known, but the nature of the
terrorist threat was not yet comprehended and our efforts to combat
it were ineffective. Diplomacy without much force was tried.
Terrorism was regarded as a law enforcement problem and terrorists as
criminals. Some were arrested and put on trial. Early last year, a
judge finally allowed the verdict to stand for one of those convicted
in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ten years! Terrorism is not a
matter that can be left to law enforcement, with its deliberative
process, built-in delays, and safeguards that may let the prisoner go
free on procedural grounds.

Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can
see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally
connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our
international system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the
1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the
bombs on the trains in Madrid, and scores of other terrorist attacks
in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or
another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states
that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise,
for sale.

What should we do? First and foremost, shore up the state system.

The world has worked for three centuries with the sovereign state as
the basic operating entity, presumably accountable to its citizens
and responsible for their well-being. In this system, states also
interact with each other -- bilaterally or multilaterally -- to
accomplish ends that transcend their borders. They create
international organizations to serve their ends, not govern them.

Increasingly, the state system has been eroding. Terrorists have
exploited this weakness by burrowing into the state system in order
to attack it. While the state system weakens, no replacement is in
sight that can perform the essential functions of establishing an
orderly and lawful society, protecting essential freedoms, providing
a framework for fruitful economic activity, contributing to effective
international cooperation, and providing for the common defense.

* * *

I see our great task as restoring the vitality of the state system
within the framework of a world of opportunity, and with aspirations
for a world of states that recognize accountability for human freedom
and dignity.

All established states should stand up to their responsibilities in
the fight against our common enemy, terror; be a helpful partner in
economic and political development; and take care that international
organizations work for their member states, not the other way around.
When they do, they deserve respect and help to make them work
successfully.

The civilized world has a common stake in defeating the terrorists.
We now call this what it is: a War on Terrorism. In war, you have to
act on both offense and defense. You have to hit the enemy before the
enemy hits you. The diplomacy of incentives, containment, deterrence
and prevention are all made more effective by the demonstrated
possibility of forceful pre-emption. Strength and diplomacy go
together. They are not alternatives; they are complements. You work
diplomacy and strength together on a grand and strategic scale and on
an operational and tactical level. But if you deny yourself the
option of forceful pre-emption, you diminish the effectiveness of
your diplomatic moves. And, with the consequences of a terrorist
attack as hideous as they are -- witness what just happened in Madrid
- -- the U.S. must be ready to pre-empt identified threats. And not at
the last moment, when an attack is imminent and more difficult to
stop, but before the terrorist gets in position to do irreparable
harm.

Over the last decade we have seen large areas of the world where
there is no longer any state authority at all, an ideal environment
for terrorists to plan and train. In the early 1990s we came to
realize the significance of a "failed state." Earlier, people allowed
themselves to think that, for example, an African colony could gain
its independence, be admitted to the U.N. as a member state, and
thereafter remain a sovereign state. Then came Somalia. All
government disappeared. No more sovereignty, no more state. The same
was true in Afghanistan. And who took over? Islamic extremists. They
soon made it clear that they regarded the concept of the state as an
abomination. To them, the very idea of "the state" was un-Islamic.
They talked about reviving traditional forms of pan-Islamic rule with
no place for the state. They were fundamentally, and violently,
opposed to the way the world works, to the international state
system.

The United States launched a military campaign to eliminate the
Taliban and al Qaeda's rule over Afghanistan. Now we and our allies
are trying to help Afghanistan become a real state again and a viable
member of the international state system. Yet there are many other
parts of the world where state authority has collapsed or, within
some states, large areas where the state's authority does not run.

That's one area of danger: places where the state has vanished. A
second area of danger is found in places where the state has been
taken over by criminals or warlords. Saddam Hussein was one example.
Kim Jong Il of North Korea is another.

They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their
wealth, consolidate their rule and develop their weaponry. As they do
this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the
international system, they at the same time claim its privileges and
immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the
internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these
thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world
have let them get away with it.

This is why the case of Saddam Hussein and Iraq is so significant.
After Saddam Hussein consolidated power, he started a war against one
of his neighbors, Iran, and in the course of that war he committed
war crimes including the use of chemical weapons, even against his
own people.

About 10 years later he started another war against another one of
his neighbors, Kuwait. In the course of doing so he committed war
crimes. He took hostages. He launched missiles against a third and
then a fourth country in the region.

That war was unique in modern times because Saddam totally eradicated
another state, and turned it into "Province 19" of Iraq. The
aggressors in wars might typically seize some territory, or occupy
the defeated country, or install a puppet regime; but Saddam sought
to wipe out the defeated state, to erase Kuwait from the map of the
world.

That got the world's attention. That's why, at the U.N., the votes
were wholly in favor of a U.S.-led military operation -- Desert Storm
- -- to throw Saddam out of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait to its place
as a legitimate state in the international system. There was
virtually universal recognition that those responsible for the
international system of states could not let a state simply be rubbed
out.

When Saddam was defeated, in 1991, a cease-fire was put in place.
Then the U.N. Security Council decided that, in order to prevent him
from continuing to start wars and commit crimes against his own
people, he must give up his arsenal of "weapons of mass destruction."

Recall the way it was to work. If Saddam cooperated with U.N.
inspectors and produced his weapons and facilitated their
destruction, then the cease-fire would be transformed into a peace
agreement ending the state of war between the international system
and Iraq. But if Saddam did not cooperate, and materially breached
his obligations regarding his weapons of mass destruction, then the
original U.N. Security Council authorization for the use of "all
necessary force" against Iraq -- an authorization that at the end of
Desert Storm had been suspended but not cancelled -- would be
reactivated and Saddam would face another round of the U.S.-led
military action against him. Saddam agreed to this arrangement.

In the early 1990s, U.N. inspectors found plenty of materials in the
category of weapons of mass destruction and they dismantled a lot of
it. They kept on finding such weapons, but as the presence of force
declined, Saddam's cooperation declined. He began to play games and
to obstruct the inspection effort.

By 1998 the situation was untenable. Saddam had made inspections
impossible. President Clinton, in February 1998, declared that Saddam
would have to comply with the U.N. resolutions or face American
military force. Kofi Annan flew to Baghdad and returned with a new
promise of cooperation from Saddam. But Saddam did not cooperate.
Congress then passed the Iraq Liberation Act by a vote of 360 to 38
in the House of Representatives; the Senate gave its unanimous
consent. Signed into law on October 31, it supported the renewed use
of force against Saddam with the objective of changing the regime. By
this time, he had openly and utterly rejected the inspections and the
U.N. resolutions.

In November 1998, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring
Saddam to be in "flagrant violation" of all resolutions going back to
1991. That meant that the cease-fire was terminated and the original
authorization for the use of force against Saddam was reactivated.
President Clinton ordered American forces into action in December
1998.

But the U.S. military operation was called off after only four days
- -- apparently because President Clinton did not feel able to lead the
country in war at a time when he was facing impeachment.

So inspections stopped. The U.S. ceased to take the lead. But the
inspectors reported that as of the end of 1998 Saddam possessed major
quantities of WMDs across a range of categories, and particularly in
chemical and biological weapons and the means of delivering them by
missiles. All the intelligence services of the world agreed on this.

- From that time until late last year, Saddam was left undisturbed to
do what he wished with this arsenal of weapons. The international
system had given up its ability to monitor and deal with this threat.
All through the years between 1998 and 2002 Saddam continued to act
and speak and to rule Iraq as a rogue state.

President Bush made it clear by 2002, and against the background of
9/11, that Saddam must be brought into compliance. It was obvious
that the world could not leave this situation as it was. The U.S.
made the decision to continue to work within the scope of the
Security Council resolutions -- a long line of them -- to deal with
Saddam. After an extended and excruciating diplomatic effort, the
Security Council late in 2002 passed Resolution 1441, which gave
Saddam one final chance to comply or face military force. When on
December 8, 2002, Iraq produced its required report, it was clear
that Saddam was continuing to play games and to reject his
obligations under international law. His report, thousands of pages
long, did not in any way account for the remaining weapons of mass
destruction that the U.N. inspectors had reported to be in existence
as of the end of 1998. That assessment was widely agreed upon.

That should have been that. But the debate at the U.N. went on -- and
on. And as it went on it deteriorated. Instead of the focus being
kept on Iraq and Saddam, France induced others to regard the problem
as one of restraining the U.S. -- a position that seemed to emerge
from France's aspirations for greater influence in Europe and
elsewhere. By March of 2003 it was clear that French diplomacy had
resulted in splitting NATO, the European Union, and the Security
Council . . . and probably convincing Saddam that he would not face
the use of force. The French position, in effect, was to say that
Saddam had begun to show signs of cooperation with the U.N.
resolutions because more than 200,000 American troops were poised on
Iraq's borders ready to strike him; so the U.S. should just keep its
troops poised there for an indeterminate time to come, until
presumably France would instruct us that we could either withdraw or
go into action. This of course was impossible militarily,
politically, and financially.

Where do we stand now? These key points need to be understood:
* There has never been a clearer case of a rogue state using its
privileges of statehood to advance its dictator's interests in ways
that defy and endanger the international state system.
 
* The international legal case against Saddam -- 17 resolutions --
was unprecedented.
 
* The intelligence services of all involved nations and the U.N.
inspectors over more than a decade all agreed that Saddam possessed
weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to international
peace and security.
 
* Saddam had four undisturbed years to augment, conceal, disperse,
or otherwise deal with his arsenal.
 
* He used every means to avoid cooperating or explaining what he
has done with them. This refusal in itself was, under the U.N.
resolutions, adequate grounds for resuming the military operation
against him that had been put in abeyance in 1991 pending his
compliance.
 
* President Bush, in ordering U.S. forces into action, stated that
we were doing so under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687,
the original bases for military action against Saddam Hussein in
1991. Those who criticize the U.S. for unilateralism should recognize
that no nation in the history of the United Nations has ever engaged
in such a sustained and committed multilateral diplomatic effort to
adhere to the principles of international law and international
organization within the international system. In the end, it was the
U.S. that upheld and acted in accordance with the U.N. resolutions on
Iraq, not those on the Security Council who tried to stop us.
 


* * *

The question of weapons of mass destruction is just that: a question
that remains to be answered, a mystery that must be solved. Just as
we also must solve the mystery of how Libya and Iran developed
menacing nuclear capability without detection, of how we were caught
unaware of a large and flourishing black market in nuclear material
- -- and of how we discovered these developments before they got
completely out of hand and have put in place promising corrective
processes. The question of Iraq's presumed stockpile of weapons will
be answered, but that answer, however it comes out, will not affect
the fully justifiable and necessary action that the coalition has
undertaken to bring an end to Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq. As Dr.
David Kay put it in a Feb. 1 interview with Chris Wallace, "We know
there were terrorist groups in state still seeking WMD capability.
Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in
this area. A marketplace phenomena was about to occur, if it did not
occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been very
dangerous if the war had not intervened."

When asked by Mr. Wallace what the sellers could have sold if they
didn't have actual weapons, Mr. Kay said: "The knowledge of how to
make them, the knowledge of how to make small amounts, which is,
after all, mostly what terrorists want. They don't want battlefield
amounts of weapons. No, Iraq remained a very dangerous place in terms
of WMD capabilities, even though we found no large stockpiles of
weapons."

Above all, and in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq
war will be what it means for the integrity of the international
system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The
stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That
is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why,
for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is
that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to
sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in
the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their
depredations -- including the development of awesome weapons for
threats, use, or sale -- behind the shield of protection that
statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a
state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the
system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.

Sept. 11 forced us to comprehend the extent and danger of the
challenge. We began to act before our enemy was able to extend and
consolidate his network.

If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around
1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to
head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in
action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and
diplomacy, we can win this war.

Mr. Shultz, a former secretary of state, is a distinguished fellow at
the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. This is adapted from his
Kissinger Lecture, given recently at the Library of Congress.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.3

iQA/AwUBQGg2u8PxH8jf3ohaEQIhsACfeecKJ/jMS+uFyh13mJiwlw6Qs3AAoKU/
ElxEXBs3CRz6PwPGbCQnM6kU
=sVKK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'