From sunder at sunder.net  Mon Mar  1 05:48:55 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (sunder)
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 08:48:55 -0500
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II
In-Reply-To: <1078107412.2761.1.camel@daft>
References: <40426560.8B3D9993@cdc.gov> <1078107412.2761.1.camel@daft>
Message-ID: <40433F47.5020205@sunder.net>

Steve Furlong wrote:

> On Sun, 2004-02-29 at 17:19, Major Variola (ret.) forwarded:
> 
>>Blix says US spied on him over Iraq
>>...
>>It feels like an intrusion into
>>your integrity in a situation when you are actually on the same side.
> 
> 
> Begging the question of whether Blix was actually on the same side as
> the Brits or the US.

Indeed, he was supposed to represent the UN, not the USA, nor the UK.  It 
says quite a whole lot when someone who should have been "fair and 
balanced" (ribbing Fox) to all sides involved thought himself to be on the 
same side of only one part of the equation, then found himself bugged by 
that side.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Mon Mar  1 06:46:21 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 09:46:21 -0500
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II
Message-ID: <BAY7-F115ueolj8Jecd0002707e@hotmail.com>

Interesting.
I guess my basic question is, is there a subset of counter-surveillance 
actions that can be taken that, while not ensuring secure communications, 
forces eavesdropping parties to take 'radical' measures in order to obtain 
the desired information? In other words, if they have to deploy a black-bag 
operation every few weeks, then that makes the odds of them being 'outed' 
sooner rather than later much greater. It might even deter survelliance 
except "when it really counts".

But then again, if the walls really have ears, then there's not much that 
can be done. Perhaps Koffi Annan was completely aware of this but counted on 
normal diplomatic protocol to prevent embarrasing and public 
exposures...(and that may be all that's really needed at the UN after 
all...)

-TD


>From: "Major Variola (ret.)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>Reply-To: cypherpunks at lne.com
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II
>Date: Sun, 29 Feb 2004 14:19:13 -0800
>
>Blix says US spied on him over Iraq
>
>Reuters London Feb 28: Former chief United Nations weapons inspector Mr
>Hans Blix said today he suspected the United States bugged his office
>and home in the run-up to the Iraq war, but had no hard evidence.
>
>Describing such behaviour as disgusting, Mr Blix told Britains
>Guardian newspaper in an interview: It feels like an intrusion into
>your integrity in a situation when you are actually on the same side.
>
>His allegation came on top of a diplomatic row sparked this week when
>former British minister Ms Clare Short said Britain bugged UN Secretary
>General Mr Kofi Annans office as London and Washington tried but failed
>to win UN backing to invade Iraq.
>
>Mr Blix said his suspicions were raised when he had trouble with a
>telephone connection at home.
>
>It might have been something trivial or it might have been something
>installed somewhere, I dont know, he said.
>
>The Swede said he asked UN counter-surveillance teams to check his
>office and home for listening devices.
>
>If you had something sensitive to talk about you would go out into the
>restaurant or out into the streets, said Mr Blix.
>
>He said US state department envoy Mr John Wolf visited him two weeks
>before the Iraq war with pictures of an Iraqi drone and a cluster bomb
>that the former inspector believed could have been secured only from
>within the UN weapons office.
>
>He should not have had them. I asked him how he got them and he would
>not tell me, Mr Blix said.
>
>It could have been some staff belonging to us that handed them to the
>Americans... It could also be that they managed to break into the secure
>fax and got it that way, he said.
>
>Ms Short, in government before and during the Iraq war, said on Thursday
>she had seen transcripts of what she said were bugged accounts of Mr
>Annans conversations. She resigned after the war.
>
>The British Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair accused her of being
>irresponsible and of undermining intelligence services at a time when
>Britain faced a threat of attack from Islamic militants.
>
>Blair said British security services acted within domestic and
>international law.
>
>But UN spokesman Mr Fred Eckhard said Mr Annan would seek a fuller
>explanation from Britain on the allegations, saying any attempt to
>eavesdrop on the Secretary General was illegal and should stop as it
>would violate three international treaties.
>
>Mr Blair warned critics like Ms Short that unless they buried
>differences they risked ousting his Labour Party from power as it
>prepares to fight a general election expected in 2005.
>
>Former UN secretary-general Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali and another former
>chief UN weapons inspector, Mr Richard Butler, said yesterday they
>believed they had been spied on.
>
>From the first day I entered my office they told me: beware, your
>office is bugged, your residence is bugged, Mr Boutros-Ghali told the
>BBC.
>
>It is a tradition that member states that have the technical capacity
>to bug will do it without hesitation, he said.
>
>http://www.navhindtimes.com/stories.php?part=news&Story_ID=022910
>

_________________________________________________________________
Stay informed on Election 2004 and the race to Super Tuesday. 
http://special.msn.com/msn/election2004.armx




From mv at cdc.gov  Mon Mar  1 10:01:59 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 10:01:59 -0800
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II (opsec review)
Message-ID: <40437A97.A6B7F324@cdc.gov>

At 09:46 AM 3/1/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>I guess my basic question is, is there a subset of counter-surveillance

>actions that can be taken that, while not ensuring secure
communications,
>forces eavesdropping parties to take 'radical' measures in order to
obtain
>the desired information?

Sunder's suggestion of introducing information and watching for their
response is good, though the Adversary will not respond if they're
smart and they're watching you for something more important.

(What was that Brit town sacrificed so the Germans wouldn't know
the codes were broken?  Starts with "C"...)

In order to avoid places with ears (and "homeless" people with
directional
mics, see _Enemy of the State_) go to a park that you haven't been to
before.  And perform the usual CI driving maneuvres (see that Tomlinson
book _The Big Breach_ for a description.. lets just say that a few
sudden right turns can be useful) on the way.

Or perhaps given GPS gizmos, take a bus.  Leave your cell phone at home,

or better, send it through the mail (left on) to yourself :-)

------
Only amateurs attack machines; professionals target people.
Bruce Schneier

The ultimate in paranoia is not when everyone is against you but
when everything is against you.  P.K.Dick




From sunder at sunder.net  Mon Mar  1 07:42:03 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (sunder)
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 10:42:03 -0500
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II
In-Reply-To: <BAY7-F115ueolj8Jecd0002707e@hotmail.com>
References: <BAY7-F115ueolj8Jecd0002707e@hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <404359CB.3080509@sunder.net>

Tyler Durden wrote:

> Interesting.
> I guess my basic question is, is there a subset of counter-surveillance 
> actions that can be taken that, while not ensuring secure 
> communications, forces eavesdropping parties to take 'radical' measures 
> in order to obtain the desired information? In other words, if they have 
> to deploy a black-bag operation every few weeks, then that makes the 
> odds of them being 'outed' sooner rather than later much greater. It 
> might even deter survelliance except "when it really counts".
> 
> But then again, if the walls really have ears, then there's not much 
> that can be done. Perhaps Koffi Annan was completely aware of this but 
> counted on normal diplomatic protocol to prevent embarrasing and public 
> exposures...(and that may be all that's really needed at the UN after 
> all...)

Sure there is.  Plenty.  You feed'em barium and see how they react - or if 
they somehow tip their hand by acting on the information fed to them.  In 
this case, that would have been unlikely useful as these are pros.

For example, one way to piss them off is to attempt to sing when you have 
zero singing skills, and do it for hours on end, purposely off key, abusing 
whatever instrument is available...  Or playing something very 
annoying/disturbing over and over again...

Large doses of Aphex Twin or Beavis and Butthead, dogs barking, etc.  Ditto 
on unimportant phone and cell conversations, especially while driving in 
your car, or for even more phone fun, call yourself from the cell phone and 
let the minutes add up and playing some of the above, or better yet, put 
the cell phone and phone handset together and let the sweet digital 
feedback built up.  Whatever you're paying in cellphone minutes is far less 
than what they're wasting on surveillance, that's for sure.

Or, instead of having fun with them, you go about your business pretending 
to be on the side of those bugging you, then do whatever it is you need to 
do anyway and surprise them at the last moment.  This involves typing one 
memo on your desk computer in the office, and delivering a totally 
different - perhaps handwritten at the last moment before it's actually 
needed, then make lots of public noise loudly about being hampered, etc.

(This is likely what he did to avoid being found in the woods with his 
wrists slashed...)


[Hmmm, I really should have substituted that "you" with the more English 
"one" in order to clarify that I don't mean the nym known as Tyler Durden, 
of course...  but that would be a bit too British for my taste.]  :)




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar  1 10:09:09 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 2004 13:09:09 -0500
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II (opsec review)
In-Reply-To: <40437A97.A6B7F324@cdc.gov>
References: <40437A97.A6B7F324@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <p0610023bbc692cb3d930@[66.149.49.5]>

At 10:01 AM -0800 3/1/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>(What was that Brit town sacrificed so the Germans wouldn't know
>the codes were broken?  Starts with "C"...)

Coventry...

Ancient cathedral, etc...

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From claudia at coldstream.ca  Mon Mar  1 11:05:21 2004
From: claudia at coldstream.ca (Claudia Schmeing)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 2004 14:05:21 -0500
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
Message-ID: <mailman.836.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

<users at lists.freeswan.org>
List-Archive: <https://mj2.freeswan.org/archives>
Sender: users-owner at mj2.freeswan.org

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Dear FreeS/WAN community,


After more than five years of active development, the FreeS/WAN project will be
coming to an end.

The initial goal of the project was ambitious -- to secure the Internet
using opportunisitically negotiated encryption, invisible and convenient
to the user. (for more, see http://www.freeswan.org/history.html).
A secondary goal was to challenge then-current US export regulations,
which prohibited the export of strong cryptography (such as triple DES
encryption) of US origin or authorship.

Since the project's inception, there has been limited success on the
political front. After the watershed Bernstein case (see
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto_export/Bernstein_case/ )
US export regulations were relaxed. Since then, many US companies have exported
strong cryptography, without seeming restriction other than having to notify
the Bureau of Export Administration for tracking purposes.

This comfortable situation has perhaps created a false sense of security.
The catch? Export regulations are not laws. The US government still
reserves the right to change its export regulations on short notice, and
there is no facility to challenge them directly in a court of law. This leaves
the US crypto community and US Linux distributions in a position which seems
safe, but is not legally protected -- where the US government might at any time
*retroactively* regulate previously released code, by prohibiting its future
export. This is why FreeS/WAN has always been developed outside the US (in
Canada and in Greece), and why it has never (to the best of our knowledge)
accepted US patches.

If FreeS/WAN has neither secured the Internet, nor secured the right of US
citizens to export software that could do so, it has still had positive
benefit.

With version 1.x, the FreeS/WAN team created a mature, well-tested IPsec VPN
(Virtual Private Network) product for Linux. The Linux community has relied
on it for some time, and it (or a patched variant) has shipped with several
Linux distributions.

With version 2.x, FreeS/WAN development efforts focussed on increasing the
usability of Opportunistic Encryption (OE), IPSec encryption without
prearrangement. Configuration was simplified, FreeS/WAN's cryptographic
offerings were streamlined, and the team promoted OE through talks and
outreach.

However, nine months after the release of FreeS/WAN 2.00, OE has not caught
on as we'd hoped. The Linux user community demands feature-rich VPNs for
corporate clients, and while folks genuinely enjoy FreeS/WAN and its
derivatives, the ways they use FreeS/WAN don't seem to be getting us any
closer to the project's goal: widespread deployment of OE. For its part, OE
requires more testing and community feedback before it is ready to be used
without second thought. The project's funders have therefore chosen to
withdraw their funding.

Anywhere you stop, a little of the road ahead is visible. FreeS/WAN 2.x
might have developed further, for example to include ipv6 support.

Before the project stops, the team plans to do at least one more release.
Release 2.06 will see FreeS/WAN making a late step toward its goal of being
a simple, secure OE product with the removal of Transport Mode. This in
keeping with one of Neils Fergusson's and Bruce Schneier's security
recommendations, in _A Cryptographic Evaluation of IPsec_
(http://www.counterpane.com/ipsec.pdf). 2.06 will also feature KLIPS
(FreeS/WAN's Kernel Layer IPsec machinery) changes to faciliate use with the
2.6 kernel series.

After Release 2.06, FreeS/WAN code will continue to be available for public use
and tinkering.  Our website will stay up, and our mailing lists at
lists.freeswan.org will continue to provide a forum for users to support one
another. We expect that FreeS/WAN and its derivatives will be widely deployed
for some time to come.

It is our hope that the public will one day be ready for, and demand,
transparent, opportunistic encryption. Perhaps then some adventurous folks
pick up FreeS/WAN 2.x and continue its development, making the project's
original goal a reality.

Many thanks to the wonderful folks who've been part of the lists.freeswan.org
community over the last few years. Thanks to the developers who've created
patches and written HOWTOs. Thanks to the volunteers who've donated Web space
and time as system administrators. Thanks to the distributors who've puzzled
out the fine points of integrating our software with others'. Finally, thanks
to the users who've tested our software, shared interoperation success stories,
and given others a helping hand. We couldn't have done it without you.


Best Regards,

Claudia Schmeing
for the Linux FreeS/WAN Project

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_______________________________________________
FreeS/WAN Users mailing list
users at lists.freeswan.org
https://mj2.freeswan.org/cgi-bin/mj_wwwusr

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Mon Mar  1 11:32:55 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 14:32:55 -0500
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II (opsec review)
Message-ID: <BAY7-F75I8meDiecVbs00029bf9@hotmail.com>

Actually, I believe there was also a town in Poland with lots of odd letter 
combinations so that the Allies could help break German codes! (ie, by 
listening to Encrypted German communications about the bombing and it's 
location...)

That's some interesting crap about playing Beavis and Butthead...at the very 
least, leaving the CD player in 'perpetual' mode can force some heavy human 
investment in time and energy.

-TD


>From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>,        "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" 
><cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Re: Gentlemen reading mail part II (opsec review)
>Date: Mon, 1 Mar 2004 13:09:09 -0500
>
>At 10:01 AM -0800 3/1/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> >(What was that Brit town sacrificed so the Germans wouldn't know
> >the codes were broken?  Starts with "C"...)
>
>Coventry...
>
>Ancient cathedral, etc...
>
>Cheers,
>RAH
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>

_________________________________________________________________
Take off on a romantic weekend or a family adventure to these great U.S. 
locations. http://special.msn.com/local/hotdestinations.armx




From mv at cdc.gov  Mon Mar  1 15:49:15 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 15:49:15 -0800
Subject: Brinworld: cellphone as cuecat [privacy, orwell]
Message-ID: <4043CBF8.BD8DE8CF@cdc.gov>

A benign use of G3 cell-cams: as UPC scanners + Priceline.

A bit of a privacy concern unless you use prepaid phones.

How many years until folks can snap pictures of kids, or arabs,
and send them to some Kidnap / FatherlandSecurity site for review?
The location of the cellphone camera, of course, will be
automatically sent.

........

New camera phone software is mobile shopping guide

Comparison shopping online has become a consumer pastime. And people
love taking pictures with camera phones. Charles Fritz wants to combine
the activities.

His idea: Let people use their camera phones to scan bar codes and
immediately get price or other product information wherever they are.

http://www.sptimes.com/2004/03/01/Technology/New_camera_phone_soft.shtml




From mv at cdc.gov  Mon Mar  1 16:25:54 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 16:25:54 -0800
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II (opsec review)
Message-ID: <4043D492.9AB0A43B@cdc.gov>

At 09:19 PM 3/1/04 +0000, Justin wrote:
>Major Variola (ret) (2004-03-01 18:01Z) wrote:
>
>> In order to avoid places with ears (and "homeless" people with
>> directional mics, see _Enemy of the State_) go to a park that you
>> haven't been to before.  And perform the usual CI driving maneuvres
>> (see that Tomlinson book _The Big Breach_ for a description.. lets
>> just say that a few sudden right turns can be useful) on the way.
>>
>> Or perhaps given GPS gizmos, take a bus.  Leave your cell phone at
>> home,
>>
>> or better, send it through the mail (left on) to yourself :-)
>
>If they know you're trying to shake them, that alerts them and
>eliminates any opportunity you might have otherwise had to feed them
>misinformation in the future.

Excellent point.

My advice re parks and CI driving is for Annan.  Who knows he's
watched and doesn't worry about the Hole.

Its not for someone who is wondering whether they're watched, and
has reason to, and doesn't want to tip their suspicions yet.




From mv at cdc.gov  Mon Mar  1 16:30:14 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 16:30:14 -0800
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II (opsec review)
Message-ID: <4043D596.885F3583@cdc.gov>

At 12:10 AM 3/2/04 +0100, Nomen Nescio wrote:
>  That's when you strap on the C-4 vest.

Or implement other dead-man switch type plans.

Gonna fly the week the feds announce they've caught Osama?
:-)




From sfurlong at acmenet.net  Mon Mar  1 14:10:51 2004
From: sfurlong at acmenet.net (Steve Furlong)
Date: 01 Mar 2004 17:10:51 -0500
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II
In-Reply-To: <404359CB.3080509@sunder.net>
References: <BAY7-F115ueolj8Jecd0002707e@hotmail.com> 	
  <404359CB.3080509@sunder.net>
Message-ID: <1078179051.3815.15.camel@daft>

On Mon, 2004-03-01 at 10:42, sunder wrote:
> For example, one way to piss them off is to attempt to sing when you have 
> zero singing skills, and do it for hours on end, purposely off key, abusing 
> whatever instrument is available...

Ugh. I did _not_ want to think about Kofi Annan yodeling for hours while
abusing his skin flute.




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar  1 15:09:10 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 2004 18:09:10 -0500
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
Message-ID: <p061002a4bc697309559c@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Mon Mar  1 13:19:53 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 2004 21:19:53 +0000
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II (opsec review)
In-Reply-To: <40437A97.A6B7F324@cdc.gov>
References: <40437A97.A6B7F324@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20040301211953.GA11587@dreams.soze.net>

Major Variola (ret) (2004-03-01 18:01Z) wrote:

> In order to avoid places with ears (and "homeless" people with
> directional mics, see _Enemy of the State_) go to a park that you
> haven't been to before.  And perform the usual CI driving maneuvres
> (see that Tomlinson book _The Big Breach_ for a description.. lets
> just say that a few sudden right turns can be useful) on the way.
> 
> Or perhaps given GPS gizmos, take a bus.  Leave your cell phone at
> home,
> 
> or better, send it through the mail (left on) to yourself :-)

If they know you're trying to shake them, that alerts them and
eliminates any opportunity you might have otherwise had to feed them
misinformation in the future.

Or, depending on the potential threat you represent, they might just
arrest you and put you in a dark hole since you're obviously no longer a
useful source of intel.

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge, and... we deserve to die.  -Budd, Kill Bill




From sunder at sunder.net  Mon Mar  1 18:58:54 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (sunder)
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 21:58:54 -0500
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II (opsec review)
In-Reply-To: <40437A97.A6B7F324@cdc.gov>
References: <40437A97.A6B7F324@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <4043F86E.1020308@sunder.net>

Major Variola (ret) wrote:

> Sunder's suggestion of introducing information and watching for their
> response is good, though the Adversary will not respond if they're
> smart and they're watching you for something more important.
> 
> (What was that Brit town sacrificed so the Germans wouldn't know
> the codes were broken?  Starts with "C"...)

Coventry.  Story goes Churchill had info from Bletchley Enigma intercepts 
that Coventry was next to be bombed, but if he evacuated it, the Germans 
would have suspected that Enigma was cracked.  I've also heard references 
that this was an urban legend, not sure.

However, they did sink quite a lot of subs based on triangulation + Enigma 
decrypts by fortuitously sending an airplane in the area they knew the subs 
would be before hunting them down - as cover to say that the subs were 
spotted...  This way they could sink the subs and still let the Germans 
think that Enigma was safe.




From s.schear at comcast.net  Mon Mar  1 22:11:42 2004
From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear)
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 22:11:42 -0800
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II
In-Reply-To: <404359CB.3080509@sunder.net>
References: <BAY7-F115ueolj8Jecd0002707e@hotmail.com> 
  <404359CB.3080509@sunder.net>
Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20040301170502.050fae60@mail.comcast.net>

At 07:42 AM 3/1/2004, sunder wrote: >>Interesting. >>I guess my basic
question is, is there a subset of counter-surveillance >>actions that can
be taken that, while not ensuring secure communications, >>forces
eavesdropping parties to take 'radical' measures in order to >>obtain the
desired information? In other words, if they have to deploy a >>black-bag
operation every few weeks, then that makes the odds of them >>being
'outed' sooner rather than later much greater. It might even deter
>>survelliance except "when it really counts". >>But then again, if the
walls really have ears, then there's not much that >>can be done. Perhaps
Koffi Annan was completely aware of this but counted >>on normal
diplomatic protocol to prevent embarrasing and public >>exposures...(and
that may be all that's really needed at the UN after all...) How about a
pseudo random "conversation" generator appliance for the person trying to
mask their speech. If it closely models the vocal tract, language and
language characteristics of the speaker it might be extremely difficult
to remove as background noise. steve
 --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus
system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.605 / Virus Database: 385 -
Release Date: 3/1/2004




From nobody at dizum.com  Mon Mar  1 15:10:01 2004
From: nobody at dizum.com (Nomen Nescio)
Date: Tue,  2 Mar 2004 00:10:01 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II (opsec review)
Message-ID: <a71403e29e1aeceb1c1607b05a0b3a7a@dizum.com>

Justin says:

> If they know you're trying to shake them, that alerts them and
> eliminates any opportunity you might have otherwise had to feed them
> misinformation in the future.


  That's when you strap on the C-4 vest.

Zombie Monger




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Mon Mar  1 18:31:29 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 02:31:29 +0000
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
In-Reply-To: <p061002a4bc697309559c@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p061002a4bc697309559c@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20040302023129.GA12669@dreams.soze.net>

> From: Claudia Schmeing <claudia at coldstream.ca>
> Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
> 
> Dear FreeS/WAN community,
> 
> After more than five years of active development, the FreeS/WAN
> project will be coming to an end.

Is anyone disappointed?  Is anyone surprised?

FreeS/WAN garroted itself by refusing to take code contributions from
people inside the U.S., out of fear that the BXA would retroactively
change export policy and render those contributions poisonous.

FreeS/WAN made no serious attempt to integrate with the linux kernel's
routing infrastructure, no doubt due in part to the first issue above.

FreeS/WAN configuration was, and probably still is, not very intuitive;
diagnostics were and probably are similarly poor.

Corporations, the major users of VPNs, usually use dedicated vpn boxes
with support from a commercial VPN provider.  If any such providers base
their VPN products on FreeS/WAN, it's probably heavily modified.

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge, and... we deserve to die.  -Budd, Kill Bill




From shaddack at ns.arachne.cz  Mon Mar  1 18:49:47 2004
From: shaddack at ns.arachne.cz (Thomas Shaddack)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 03:49:47 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
In-Reply-To: <20040302023129.GA12669@dreams.soze.net>
References: <p061002a4bc697309559c@[66.149.49.5]>
  <20040302023129.GA12669@dreams.soze.net>
Message-ID: <0403020343050.0@somehost.domainz.com>

On Tue, 2 Mar 2004, Justin wrote:
> > From: Claudia Schmeing <claudia at coldstream.ca>
> > Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
> >
> > Dear FreeS/WAN community,
> >
> > After more than five years of active development, the FreeS/WAN
> > project will be coming to an end.
>
> Is anyone disappointed?

Yes.

> Is anyone surprised?

Mildly.

> FreeS/WAN garroted itself by refusing to take code contributions from
> people inside the U.S., out of fear that the BXA would retroactively
> change export policy and render those contributions poisonous.

Is there anybody with enough organizational/leadership skills to take over
the project, preferably located further away of the US influence than
Canada is? Export policies are relevant only when enforceable.

> FreeS/WAN made no serious attempt to integrate with the linux kernel's
> routing infrastructure, no doubt due in part to the first issue above.

That could be relieved, given developers and skilled leadership.

> FreeS/WAN configuration was, and probably still is, not very intuitive;
> diagnostics were and probably are similarly poor.

Again, this can be relieved, given the developers.

> Corporations, the major users of VPNs, usually use dedicated vpn boxes
> with support from a commercial VPN provider.  If any such providers base
> their VPN products on FreeS/WAN, it's probably heavily modified.

I maintain a small conglomerate of private and corporate networks. We use
FreeS/WAN quite extensively, with great success - in last 2 years we had
no drop-out caused by the crypto infrastructure fault. No attempt for
opportunistic crypto on the IP level, though, at least not yet.

It was a good project. Hope somebody picks up the torch and keeps it
burning, possibly even brighter.




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Mon Mar  1 20:04:04 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 04:04:04 +0000
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
In-Reply-To: <0403020343050.0@somehost.domainz.com>
References: <p061002a4bc697309559c@[66.149.49.5]>
  <20040302023129.GA12669@dreams.soze.net>
  <0403020343050.0@somehost.domainz.com>
Message-ID: <20040302040404.GB12669@dreams.soze.net>

Thomas Shaddack (2004-03-02 02:49Z) wrote:

> Is there anybody with enough organizational/leadership skills to take over
> the project, preferably located further away of the US influence than
> Canada is? Export policies are relevant only when enforceable.

> > Corporations, the major users of VPNs, usually use dedicated vpn boxes
> > with support from a commercial VPN provider.  If any such providers base
> > their VPN products on FreeS/WAN, it's probably heavily modified.
> 
> I maintain a small conglomerate of private and corporate networks. We use
> FreeS/WAN quite extensively, with great success - in last 2 years we had
> no drop-out caused by the crypto infrastructure fault. No attempt for
> opportunistic crypto on the IP level, though, at least not yet.
>
> It was a good project. Hope somebody picks up the torch and keeps it
> burning, possibly even brighter.

1.9 was forked and is part of USAGI's IPv6 project, which was (mostly)
integrated into the 2.6 kernel.

I think at this point, small portions of 1.9->2.06 diff may be
integrated, but the rest, and FreeS/WAN in general, is dead as a project
distinct from the kernel.  The USAGI version uses cryptoapi which is
much more intelligent than using gmp.  I haven't looked, but I think the
USAGI/2.6 implementations are much better integrated with the linux
routing infrastructure.  DaveM and Alexey were griping about the
miserable state of FreeS/WAN in that department back when ipsec in 2.6
was being discussed.

In particular, OE may not be part of 2.6 yet (I haven't used 2.6 ipsec
or USAGI ipsec, so I don't know), but that's the only major thing from
FreeS/WAN 2.0 I can see being integrated.

And sure, you use FreeS/WAN, and a company I used to work for used it
too.  There are employees of many other companies who post to the
FreeS/WAN lists.  But that's hardly representative of the majority of
companies.

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge, and... we deserve to die.  -Budd, Kill Bill




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Mon Mar  1 21:59:26 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 05:59:26 +0000
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
In-Reply-To: <0403020343050.0@somehost.domainz.com>
References: <p061002a4bc697309559c@[66.149.49.5]>
  <20040302023129.GA12669@dreams.soze.net>
  <0403020343050.0@somehost.domainz.com>
Message-ID: <20040302055926.GA14183@dreams.soze.net>

Thomas Shaddack (2004-03-02 02:49Z) wrote:

> It was a good project. Hope somebody picks up the torch and keeps it
> burning, possibly even brighter.

And for anyone unhappy with the linux 2.6 implementation, this forked
just a few months ago:

http://www.openswan.org/

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge, and... we deserve to die.  -Budd, Kill Bill




From shaddack at ns.arachne.cz  Mon Mar  1 22:09:37 2004
From: shaddack at ns.arachne.cz (Thomas Shaddack)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 07:09:37 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
In-Reply-To: <20040302040404.GB12669@dreams.soze.net>
References: <p061002a4bc697309559c@[66.149.49.5]>
  <20040302023129.GA12669@dreams.soze.net> 
  <0403020343050.0@somehost.domainz.com>
  <20040302040404.GB12669@dreams.soze.net>
Message-ID: <0403020707260.0@somehost.domainz.com>

<good news snipped>
:)

> And sure, you use FreeS/WAN, and a company I used to work for used it
> too.  There are employees of many other companies who post to the
> FreeS/WAN lists.  But that's hardly representative of the majority of
> companies.

"Majority" as in number of employees, or as in count? Do mom-and-pop shops
count as companies? Do we count majority as a share of all companies, or
only as a share of some-kind-of-a-VPN users?




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Mon Mar  1 23:11:27 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 07:11:27 +0000
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
In-Reply-To: <0403020707260.0@somehost.domainz.com>
References: <p061002a4bc697309559c@[66.149.49.5]>
  <20040302023129.GA12669@dreams.soze.net>
  <0403020343050.0@somehost.domainz.com>
  <20040302040404.GB12669@dreams.soze.net>
  <0403020707260.0@somehost.domainz.com>
Message-ID: <20040302071127.GB14183@dreams.soze.net>

Thomas Shaddack (2004-03-02 06:09Z) wrote:

> > And sure, you use FreeS/WAN, and a company I used to work for used it
> > too.  There are employees of many other companies who post to the
> > FreeS/WAN lists.  But that's hardly representative of the majority of
> > companies.
> 
> "Majority" as in number of employees, or as in count? Do mom-and-pop shops
> count as companies? Do we count majority as a share of all companies, or
> only as a share of some-kind-of-a-VPN users?

Lots of suits use ipsec, and those suits run windows with pgpnet or some
commercial ipsec roadwarrior "solution".  Those seem to be the likely
majority of ipsec endpoints.

As for static ipsec links, where neither side is serving only one
person, you may be right that the majority of companies have at least
one using frees/wan.

Maybe I'm underestimating the number of corporate inter-office VPNs or
developer-to-employer tunnels, and maybe most of them use frees/wan.  I
really have no way to know.  But my impression is that developer tunnels
are quite rare, and that inter-office VPNs are outnumbered by
roadwarriors who don't run linux.

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge, and... we deserve to die.  -Budd, Kill Bill




From s.schear at comcast.net  Tue Mar  2 07:38:09 2004
From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear)
Date: Tue, 02 Mar 2004 07:38:09 -0800
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II
In-Reply-To: <BAY7-F26rsAobpLiPJ9000352ce@hotmail.com>
References: <BAY7-F26rsAobpLiPJ9000352ce@hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20040302073323.05484a48@mail.comcast.net>

At 06:50 AM 3/2/2004, Tyler Durden wrote: >"How about a pseudo random
"conversation" generator appliance for the >person trying to mask their
speech. If it closely models the vocal tract, >language and language
characteristics of the speaker it might be extremely >difficult to remove
as background noise." > >There are plenty of CDs of conversations out
there. Moreover, it would be >easy to simply record a fairly banal
conversation oneself was having. Then >put it on a CD player that has
repeat mode. That would require too much work on the part of the person
and could only be used safely as a "one-time pad". Reuse would expose it
to more simplified removal. >Of course, I'm willing to believe this can
still be chopped through with >the appropriate eavesdropping gear. I'm
not so sure. If the appliance can create the ambience of a noisy party
and all its reflected sound qualities, with one or more of the voices
very close to your own, it may be beyond current signal processing
techniques to extract your real voice. >But the point is that with about
$10 bucks of investment, you now force >eavesdroppers to deploy $1000s
(or more) of gear and people. Adds a kind >of reverse DC-bias to the
situation, no? Now, only the determined will be >going after you, not
someone merely fishing for levers to be used against >you. Now, they have
to send a truck....' Indeed. steve
 --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus
system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.605 / Virus Database: 385 -
Release Date: 3/1/2004




From shaddack at ns.arachne.cz  Tue Mar  2 00:26:52 2004
From: shaddack at ns.arachne.cz (Thomas Shaddack)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 09:26:52 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Idea: opportunistic TCP-level crypto
Message-ID: <0403020910530.-1277394524@somehost.domainz.com>

There is plenty of space available in the form of (normally unused)
payload of TCP SYN, SYN/ACK, and ACK packets. Could they be used to
announce the intention/capabilities for an encrypted connection,
eventually serve for authenticating the connection?

This way there would be virtually no overheads in the connection in the
case one of the sides doesn't offer opportunistic crypto; the packet
payload data would get ignored in that case.


For UDP connections, handshake using ICMP packets in a ping-like scenario
could be possible; send ICMP_ECHO_REQUEST to the server with the payload
containing a handshake request. If the ICMP_ECHO_REPLY returned contains
the handshake acknowledge, proceed, otherwise assume the server doesn't
speak our dialect of OE.


Opinions, comments? Why this wouldn't work?




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Tue Mar  2 06:50:20 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Tue, 02 Mar 2004 09:50:20 -0500
Subject: Gentlemen reading mail part II
Message-ID: <BAY7-F26rsAobpLiPJ9000352ce@hotmail.com>

"How about a pseudo random "conversation" generator appliance for the person 
trying to mask their speech.  If it closely models the vocal tract, language 
and language characteristics of the speaker it might be extremely difficult 
to remove as background noise."

There are plenty of CDs of conversations out there. Moreover, it would be 
easy to simply record a fairly banal conversation oneself was having. Then 
put it on a CD player that has repeat mode.

Of course, I'm willing to believe this can still be chopped through with the 
appropriate eavesdropping gear. But the point is that with about $10 bucks 
of investment, you now force eavesdroppers to deploy $1000s (or more) of 
gear and people. Adds a kind of reverse DC-bias to the situation, no? Now, 
only the determined will be going after you, not someone merely fishing for 
levers to be used against you. Now, they have to send a truck....'

-TD





>From: Steve Schear <s.schear at comcast.net>
>To: sunder <sunder at sunder.net>
>CC: cypherpunks at minder.net
>Subject: Re: Gentlemen reading mail part II
>Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 22:11:42 -0800
>
>At 07:42 AM 3/1/2004, sunder wrote:
>>>Interesting.
>>>I guess my basic question is, is there a subset of counter-surveillance 
>>>actions that can be taken that, while not ensuring secure communications, 
>>>forces eavesdropping parties to take 'radical' measures in order to 
>>>obtain the desired information? In other words, if they have to deploy a 
>>>black-bag operation every few weeks, then that makes the odds of them 
>>>being 'outed' sooner rather than later much greater. It might even deter 
>>>survelliance except "when it really counts".
>>>But then again, if the walls really have ears, then there's not much that 
>>>can be done. Perhaps Koffi Annan was completely aware of this but counted 
>>>on normal diplomatic protocol to prevent embarrasing and public 
>>>exposures...(and that may be all that's really needed at the UN after 
>>>all...)
>
>How about a pseudo random "conversation" generator appliance for the person 
>trying to mask their speech.  If it closely models the vocal tract, 
>language and language characteristics of the speaker it might be extremely 
>difficult to remove as background noise.
>
>steve
>
>---
>Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
>Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
>Version: 6.0.605 / Virus Database: 385 - Release Date: 3/1/2004

_________________________________________________________________
Find things fast with the new MSN Toolbar  includes FREE pop-up blocking! 
http://clk.atdmt.com/AVE/go/onm00200414ave/direct/01/




From rsw at jfet.org  Tue Mar  2 08:28:53 2004
From: rsw at jfet.org (Riad S. Wahby)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 11:28:53 -0500
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending (fwd from
  eugen@leitl.org)
In-Reply-To: <20040302154222.GA17987@leitl.org>
References: <20040302154222.GA17987@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <20040302162853.GB20211@positron.mit.edu>

Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> Can we demime the mails on this node?

It's already being done.

It seems, however, that the formatting of some messages is getting
screwed up.  I haven't found the problem yet, but your other recent
mail is an example of this.  Do you have a copy of the original
message so I can look into what's going wrong?  If so, please send it
to me personally.

Thanks.

-- 
Riad Wahby
rsw at jfet.org
MIT VI-2 M.Eng




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Mar  2 07:40:21 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 16:40:21 +0100
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
In-Reply-To: <0403020343050.0@somehost.domainz.com>
References: <p061002a4bc697309559c@[66.149.49.5]>
  <20040302023129.GA12669@dreams.soze.net>
  <0403020343050.0@somehost.domainz.com>
Message-ID: <20040302154021.GQ17144@leitl.org>

On Tue, Mar 02, 2004 at 03:49:47AM +0100, Thomas Shaddack wrote: > I
maintain a small conglomerate of private and corporate networks. We use >
FreeS/WAN quite extensively, with great success - in last 2 years we had
> no drop-out caused by the crypto infrastructure fault. No attempt for >
opportunistic crypto on the IP level, though, at least not yet. What sank
FreeS/WAN for me (as compared to StarTLS for opportunistic email
encryption) is requirement to publish DNS records and KLIPS always
failing on next kernel upgrades. Opportunistic encryption suffers from
fax effect; FreeS/WAN made things unnecessarilly difficult. We have
KAME/Racoon support in OS X, and IPsec seem to have been present in
Windows since NT, OpenBSD has support, and now we see 2.6 kernels
becoming available (Knoppix, Fedora Core 2 test1 and Mandrake seem to
have it). What's needed is a good OE patch for 2.6.x which is activated
and shipped in mainstream Linux distros as default (fallback to plain
will probably produce visible delays). Until that happens, OE in IPsec
will remind largely a pipe dream, and only grow very slowly among the
early adopters. > It was a good project. Hope somebody picks up the torch
and keeps it > burning, possibly even brighter. Is there a protocol flaw
in IPsec which prevents it from going OE as StartTLS does? -- Eugen*
Leitl leitl
______________________________________________________________ ICBM:
48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014
B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org
http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Mar  2 07:40:21 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 16:40:21 +0100
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending
Message-ID: <mailman.837.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Tue, Mar 02, 2004 at 03:49:47AM +0100, Thomas Shaddack wrote:

> I maintain a small conglomerate of private and corporate networks. We use
> FreeS/WAN quite extensively, with great success - in last 2 years we had
> no drop-out caused by the crypto infrastructure fault. No attempt for
> opportunistic crypto on the IP level, though, at least not yet.

What sank FreeS/WAN for me (as compared to StarTLS for opportunistic email
encryption) is requirement to publish DNS records and KLIPS always failing on
next kernel upgrades. 

Opportunistic encryption suffers from fax effect; FreeS/WAN made things unnecessarilly difficult.
We have KAME/Racoon support in OS X, and IPsec seem to have been present in
Windows since NT, OpenBSD has support, and now we see 2.6 kernels becoming
available (Knoppix, Fedora Core 2 test1 and Mandrake seem to have it).

What's needed is a good OE patch for 2.6.x which is activated and shipped in
mainstream Linux distros as default (fallback to plain will probably produce
visible delays). Until that happens, OE in IPsec will
remind largely a pipe dream, and only grow very slowly among the early
adopters.
 
> It was a good project. Hope somebody picks up the torch and keeps it
> burning, possibly even brighter.

Is there a protocol flaw in IPsec which prevents it from going OE as StartTLS
does?

-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net



----- End forwarded message -----
-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Mar  2 07:42:22 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 16:42:22 +0100
Subject: [Users] Announce: FreeS/WAN Project Ending (fwd from
  eugen@leitl.org)
Message-ID: <20040302154222.GA17987@leitl.org>

Can we demime the mails on this node?

----- Forwarded message from Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar  2 17:28:41 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 20:28:41 -0500
Subject: Teachers Union declared a "Terrorist Organization"
Message-ID: <p06100205bc6ae4a3ee49@[66.149.49.5]>

NNTP-Posting-Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2004 20:32:07 -0600
Subject: Teachers Union declared a "Terrorist Organization"
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2004 18:32:08 -0800
From: Tim May <timcmay at removethis.got.net>
Newsgroups:
alt.teachers,misc.education,misc.survivalism,scruz.general,la.general,
Lines: 27
NNTP-Posting-Host: 69.19.240.173

WASHINGTON (Routers) -  Education Secretary Rod Paige called the
nation's largest teachers' union a "terrorist organization" during a
meeting on Monday with U.S. governors. "It is important that terrorists
and the groups which harbor them not be given the rights intended by
the Constitution," he added.
Administration officials declined to state how many of the so-called
"teachers" have been apprehended, but confirmed that they are being
held without bail, without access to lawyers, and without their First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Fourteenth, and other Bill of
Rights rights.

"As terrorists, they have no rights."

Citizens are urged to make citizen's arrests of any members of the
National Teachers Union or similar terrorist cells they may run across.
EdSec Paige acknowledged that some terrorists may be killed in
firefights with citizens, but he said this is the price which must be
paid.
"We encourage citizen-units to "bag" these terrorists. Kill them. Shoot
them in their homes, shoot them in their cars, kill them as they enter
their terrorist training camps, the so-called "schools," he added.

"We took away the rights of those who protested our actions in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, and Jordan, so why should we give more
pribleges to, like, some teachers?"

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar  2 17:31:17 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 20:31:17 -0500
Subject: Negroes in Haiti want "Billions" in Aid--FUCK THAT
Message-ID: <p06100206bc6ae580226c@[66.149.49.5]>

NNTP-Posting-Date: Sun, 29 Feb 2004 14:00:49 -0600
Subject: Negroes in Haiti want "Billions" in Aid--FUCK THAT
Date: Sun, 29 Feb 2004 12:00:53 -0800
From: Tim May <timcmay at removethis.got.net>
Newsgroups: misc.survivalism,la.general,scruz.general
Message-ID: <290220041200537144%timcmay at removethis.got.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: 8bit
Mail-Copies-To: nobody
User-Agent: Thoth/1.6.0 (Carbon/OS X)
Lines: 63
NNTP-Posting-Host: 69.19.185.221


The negro mobs and hooligans, led by the usual corrupt drug barons, are
seeking Uncle Sugar's handouts. Billions in aid for Haiti. Fuck that.

Money stolen from U.S. taxpayers should not be sent to Haiti...or to
Egypt, Iraq, Sudan, Taiwan, Israel, Russia, India, or any of the other
hundred satrapies we "bail out" (translation: most of the stolen money
the U.S. government gives them in "grants" and "development loans" is
sent into Swiss and Cayman Island bank accounts).

Let the Bloods and Crips of Haiti battle it out for the scraps of food
looted from the few remaining stores. Let the cannibals swing their
machetes, necklace their opponents, burn down their neighborhoods in
the same way the negro ghetto mutants burned down their neighborhoods
in South-Central LA, in Oakland, in Liberty City (lots of Haitians
there, not surprisingly), Watts, and Detroit.

The U.S. has a _stated_ national debt of $7 trillion
($7,000,000,000,000), and an _actual_ national debt of approximately
$35 trillion, counting "unfunded liabilities," loans which are are not
carried as debt but which stand a nil chance of ever being repaid, the
Socialist InSecurity black hole, and various other "suicide with a
fountain pen" co-signing agreements on loans which are worthless.

This $35 trillion national debt represents an amortized personal debt
of about $125,000 for each of America's roughly 275 million
citizens/residents (no longer the same thing, but I digress).

However, not all of those 275 million are taxpayers. Many are children,
many are prisoners, many are spouses or other non-filing family
members. And many simply don't file tax returns.

Approximately 100 million taxpayers are visible, meaning the above
$125,000 number is actually about $350,000 for each actual taxpayer.
(Further, most taxpayers pay very little--60% of all taxes are paid by
the wealthiest 3%. The debt load is thus enormous on our most
productive members.)

Uncle Sam has been Uncle Sugar for too many of the nations of the
world. And he has been Uncle Sugar for too many bums and layabouts and
welfare breeders who think money miraculously is owed to them so they
can sit at home, in subsidized apartments, collecting welfare checks
and listening to Oprah Winfrey and Jesse Jackson tell them that have an
"entitlement" to their handouts.

Meanwhile, a $7 trillion official national debt, and a looming $35
trillion _actual_ national debt.
Corporations are moving jobs out of this collapsing house of cards as
fast as they can. This will make the coming generation of burger
flippers and Starbucks latte slingers carry the full burden of paying
for the retirement of the Baby Boomers...and paying 80% taxes on their
meager service economy salaries to pay off the ever-mounting national
debt.
And to send more billions in aid dollars to Haiti, Egypt, Israel,
Poland, Sudan, Georgia, Kazhakstan, Baluchistan, India, Thailand,
Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, and a hundred other countries.

It's not a sustainable situation. The chickens are coming home to roost.

--Tim May

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar  2 18:01:45 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 21:01:45 -0500
Subject: Fwd: Re: Don't Panic - Not All Jobs Are Headed Overseas
Message-ID: <p06100209bc6aec84c75a@[66.149.49.5]>

NNTP-Posting-Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2004 17:29:41 -0600
Subject: Re: Don't Panic - Not All Jobs Are Headed Overseas
Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2004 15:29:41 -0800
From: Tim May <timcmay at removethis.got.net>
Newsgroups: misc.survivalism
Message-ID: <210220041529416788%timcmay at removethis.got.net>
References: <20040219051351.19387.00001980 at mb-m26.aol.com>
<1e4e3692.0402211504.1db2b7ea at posting.google.com>
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In article <1e4e3692.0402211504.1db2b7ea at posting.google.com>, William
<billybeeper at juno.com> wrote:

halcitron at aol.comhatespam (Halcitron) wrote in message
news:<20040219051351.19387.00001980 at mb-m26.aol.com>...
Don't Panic - Not All Jobs Are Headed Overseas

Any keyboard job can be shipped overseas, including engineering (CAD),
XRAY and MRI analysis/interpretation.

Unless they have robotic heavy equipment, bulldozer and crane
operators may still have a future.

The rest will be burger flippers and Walmart greeters.

Here's an article I sent off this morning to a mailing list made up of
some of the brightest programmers I know. A few names have been
replaced with pseudonyms, for their protection:

--begin forwarded article--


Most of these comments all support the basic point: programming is not
an easy, or "blue collar," job, and attempts to teach programming to
folks who really are better-suited to be welders or auto mechanics or
seamstresses (for the PC, "sewpersons") are probably doomed. Just
yesterday there was a news item (Yahoo) about the financial collapse of
a bunch of "technical schools" which purported to teach their students
how to get high-paying jobs in the burgeoning field of Web page
development!! (Not too surprisingly, most of the students didn't get
interesting or well-paying jobs, and this was only partly because of
the dot bombs.)

Larry's point: "Before you get them to university, stuff them with
years of doing
geometric proofs.  Works wonders." goes to the heart of the issue. (I
loved geometry, did very well in it, and the lessons I learned from it
I use every day. One of my earliest exposures to programming was c.
1967 when my _excellent_ 10th grade geometry teacher told us about how
a computer had discovered a brand-new proof of triangle similarity,
using a truly "out of the box" approach...I didn't catch the name then,
but I later surmised he was talking about one of David Gelernter's
geometry theorem-provers, which were developed in the early 1960s.)

My strong belief is that poor students make poor programmers. (Poor
students in the sense of ability to learn, not the grades they get...I
know a bunch of very smart programmers, many of them presenting code
this weekend at CodeCon in San Francisco, who never went to college.
Some dropped out of high school. But they were still quick learners,
i.e., good students.)

Good programmers really are mathematicians of a sort. Understanding
logic and how to think are crucial stages (the point John Stenhart made
about "I've been volunteering to teach "computer science" in my local
high school. The course that I've designed is along the lines of
"Learning to think using computers as an excuse."  It's been a real
adventure because, at least where I live, kids don't learn how to think
in school.")

If students don't know even how to frame a simple argument, how to
consider alternatives, how to refute or falsify assumptions, it's
pretty hopeless to try to train them to be Java or PHP programmers.
Maybe doing cookie-cutter Web pages, but nothing very substantial and
nothing with much of a future. (As the many "Webmasters" at companies
discovered in the late 90s, when Web page creation tools got more
sophisticated; turned out that memorizing a bunch of HTML wasn't
needed.)

Overheard many times at the local malls:

"Like, you know, and then she goes "Huh?", and then I go "Way!", and it
was, like, weird!. And then I was like _so_..."

This doesn't translate well into computerese. Not the words, and
especially not the stream-of-consciousness mental process. (I read an
analysis of this kind of valspeak, and its isomorphic ghettospeak
versions, with the conclusion that many of today's kids are "replaying
movies in their head," hence the blow-by-blow recitation of what people
said, in fragmentary form. Logic, summaries, induction, deduction, and
analysis are mostly absent from their speech.

I have virtually no hope for 95% of today's high school graduates in
terms of their involvement in technology. And while exporting
programming to India isn't the full solution, it's a start: at least
their high school graduates are for the most part solidly trained in
the things a programmer needs--and not just math and logic: also
rhetoric, grammar, understanding the parts of speech, etc., are all
variants of the formalist, logical approach.

(I've talked to a lot of those at Intel who are rapidly moving software
and even design jobs to India and China. My old boss, Craig Barrett,
has been warning of these problems for _years_. Many high schools would
rather be babysitters for gang bangers and teach fluffy stuff about
lesbian sex  and "tolerance" than teach the "logic and rhetoric" core.
Which means a lot of programming and design jobs are going to be moving
out of the U.S.)

For the truly gifted, which I think nearly all Programmer's Conference
attendees are, things should be bright, especially with powerful tool,
languages, and machines leveraging the innate capabilities. But for
"Joe Average programmer," things don't look so bright. And the
prospects for teaching those who can't think, in Jon's analysis, the
prospects are grim.

(The community colleges are mostly a total joke. I see the syllabi (in
plain speak, the courses) from my local JCs, notably Cabrillo College
and UFO (University of Fort Ord, aka Cal State Monterey Bay) and they
are travesties. The computer courses are crammed with the "trade
school" junk about learning to be a Certified Microsoft Windows
Technician. Some of these students may in fact get jobs helping local
businesses figure out how to insert the CD-ROM into their PCs, but
mostly the training is scut work, almost guaranteed to be obsolete in a
few years when the Next Big Thing appears...then I guess they go back
for night school retraining in "How to be a Certified Microsoft
Longhorn Security Installer.")

As a welfare state nation, we are reaping what we have sown. The
dumbing-down of education has been successful.

It's going to be interesting to see where we are in 20 years, when
today's illiterates are the tax-paying core earners who are expected to
pay for the retirement of the largest generation in American history,
the Boomers.

--Tim May

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar  2 18:54:27 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2004 21:54:27 -0500
Subject: Fwd: Re: The Neocon Case for Imprisoning War Opponents
Message-ID: <p0610020abc6af912b8a8@[66.149.49.5]>

NNTP-Posting-Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2004 15:17:31 -0600
Subject: Re: The Neocon Case for Imprisoning War Opponents
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2004 13:17:27 -0800
From: Tim May <timcmay at removethis.got.net>
Newsgroups:
alt.conspiracy,alt.politics.bush,alt.politics.democrats,talk.politics.guns,misc.survivalism
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NNTP-Posting-Host: 204.31.188.217

In article <burtcj08k0 at enews1.newsguy.com>, mellstrr
<mellster at nospam.com> wrote:

The founding principles are in ruins, unless we can verify our elections
this November. I've had it with talk about touch-screen voting. It's time
for non-violent protest at the polls...


Carry a fancy metal briefcase with some stenciled lettering: "E-Vote
Compliance Monitoring Station." Or park a van across the street with an
antenna on the roof (easily faked-up out of old satellite dish junk and
t.v. yagis). Do this near some minority voting polls and watch them
scatter...could help suppress the welfare monkey vote a bit, and sow
unrest and paranoia.

Or enter a voting place with a "gizmo" and aim it at the electronic
polling stations. Turn to the little old biddies who run our polling
places and smile. If they ask what you just did, tell them "I just
changed the votes. Have a nice day!" Leave before they can call the
cops.

Launch a fake virus (be careful it's not a real replicator!) and send
it to some journalists. Give it some catchy title which suggests it's a
virus being spread to disrupt, change, or stuff the e-vote system. With
luck, some journalists will write about the "Grabber" virus and how
e-voting is clearly not safe.


--Tim May

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar  3 06:44:46 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2004 09:44:46 -0500
Subject: Fwd: Re: The Neocon Case for Imprisoning War Opponents
In-Reply-To: <200403031027.17896.lists@crimbles.demon.co.uk>
References: <p0610020abc6af912b8a8@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <200403031027.17896.lists@crimbles.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <p06100264bc6b9f89bd5b@[66.149.49.5]>

At 10:27 AM +0000 3/3/04, David Crookes wrote:
>Heh. Missing Tim are we?

"When I was your age we didn't have Tim May! We had to be paranoid
on our own! And we were grateful!" --Alan Olsen

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"When the hares made speeches in the assembly and demanded that all should
have equality, the lions replied, "Where are your claws and teeth?"  --
attributed to Antisthenes in Aristotle, 'Politics', 3.7.2




From lists at crimbles.demon.co.uk  Wed Mar  3 02:27:17 2004
From: lists at crimbles.demon.co.uk (David Crookes)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2004 10:27:17 +0000
Subject: Fwd: Re: The Neocon Case for Imprisoning War Opponents
In-Reply-To: <p0610020abc6af912b8a8@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p0610020abc6af912b8a8@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <200403031027.17896.lists@crimbles.demon.co.uk>

On Wednesday 03 March 2004 02:54, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
> NNTP-Posting-Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2004 15:17:31 -0600
> Subject: Re: The Neocon Case for Imprisoning War Opponents
> Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2004 13:17:27 -0800
> From: Tim May <timcmay at removethis.got.net>

Heh. Missing Tim are we?




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar  3 10:32:28 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 10:32:28 -0800
Subject: Vote changing gizmos (paid for by feds) 
Message-ID: <404624BC.F5062F00@cdc.gov>

At 09:54 PM 3/2/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:

>From: Tim May <timcmay at removethis.got.net>

>Or enter a voting place with a "gizmo" and aim it at the electronic
>polling stations. Turn to the little old biddies who run our polling
>places and smile. If they ask what you just did, tell them "I just
>changed the votes. Have a nice day!" Leave before they can call the
>cops.

..slow exhale.. thanks for the hit, Bob, that's the good shit.. I miss
it.

Of course, the e-election rubes contribute to the vote changing too:

Glitches Hinder Casting of Votes
Problems with new electronic systems in Orange and San Diego counties
frustrate voters. Officials call the harm minimal.

Problems with new electronic voting systems caused some Orange County
residents to vote in the wrong district elections Tuesday and prevented
some
San Diego County voters from casting any ballot at all.

http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-machines3mar03,1,3468893.story?coll=la-headlines-california




From sunder at sunder.net  Wed Mar  3 10:12:08 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (sunder)
Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 13:12:08 -0500
Subject: Virus with encrypted zip file - Important notify about your
  e-mail  account.
In-Reply-To: <vbjvdxmlonckiyfxulj@minder.net>
References: <vbjvdxmlonckiyfxulj@minder.net>
Message-ID: <40461FF8.6090601@sunder.net>

Interesting virus - anyone know what this one is called and what it's 
payload does?  Haven't seen this one before today...

It attaches a zip file with a password containing an executable.  (No 
worries, I've not run it, and only extracted it on a SPARC machine, so it 
can't use buffer overflows designed for intel in unzip -- if any exist.)


I've seen several of these from various cypherpunk nodes, and initially 
thought someone was attacking cypherpunks nodes again...

So what it is likely grabbing the domian name and capitalizing the first 
letter and inserting "The" and "team." around it to make it look like it's 
from the ISP...  It's also using various random reasons (mailbox is full, 
spamming, account about to expire, account abuse, can't go out with you 
tonight, have to wash hamster's hair, etc.)


Interesting that a virus would use an encrypted ZIP file.  Of course it 
does a dumb thing in terms of "security purposes" of sending the password 
with the attachment.  Certainly that isn't something a security wise person 
would do, *BUT* the true purpose of this ploy is likely an attempt for it 
to get past virus scanners which demime/unzip files through multiple 
layers, and would be able to detect the attachment is malware.

So this thing is probably carrying code to ZIP+encrypt files as well as 
MIME and possibly it's own SMTP client...  Pretty amazing for a 12K 
binary...  Well, not really. :)  I guess I'm used to seeing bloatware like 
Office 2000 - oh, yeah, forgot, MSFT products are virii..  :-D


Many, many, years ago, I recall there were polymorphic virii which 
encrypted their main body, but used various methods to build the extractor 
such that you (as an antivirus writer) couldn't easily get signatures from 
the extractor portion.  I believe they used permutations of opcodes which 
did the same thing under x86, but enough random combinations to prevent 
getting a useful virus signature.

It probably won't be long before we'll start seeing those again in modern 
virii...

Certainly email virus scanners shouldn't allow .EXE - even if inside of 
.ZIP archives anyway, but it's still interesting to see how the evil virus 
writers find new ways to push their crud on the  "If it's got dancing nude 
hippos, I'll click on it gladly, safety be damned" sheeple.  Now it's just 
exploiting the "I'll obey any instruction from any so called authority if 
you throw in the magic word 'reasons of security' in it."

What's really funny to me personally is that at my last job we were asked 
to send self decrypting PGP EXE's that contained the actual data to clients 
who didn't have PGP, and wouldn't know it from a hole in a wall.  We'd then 
tell them the (usually lame) password over the phone.  If any of those 
clients receive one of these, I can absolutely guarantee that they'll open 
it and spread this evil crap.


A virus pretending to be administration at minder.net wrote:

> For security reasons attached file is password  protected. The password is "10361".
>
> Kind regards,
>     The Minder.net  team                                http://www.minder.net




From sunder at sunder.net  Wed Mar  3 10:24:14 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (sunder)
Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 13:24:14 -0500
Subject: Fwd: Re: Don't Panic - Not All Jobs Are Headed Overseas
In-Reply-To: <p06100209bc6aec84c75a@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p06100209bc6aec84c75a@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <404622CE.6000307@sunder.net>

R. A. Hettinga wrote:

> Any keyboard job can be shipped overseas, including engineering (CAD),
> XRAY and MRI analysis/interpretation.

If you really think about CEO, CFO, CIO jobs can >ALL< be exported to India 
, and there won't be anything to stop the boards of major companies from 
doing that.

India's not even the end all of outsourcing - there's nothing special about 
India that some other third-world country couldn't do at lower prices once 
enough of their populous is trained to speak almost accent free English and 
to pretend their names are "Joan Sanchez from Ohio"...  Once there is cheap 
labor, cheap telepresence with enough bandwidth to do the job, even a boat 
parked 30 miles off the muddy shores of East Elbonia would work.  The 
occasional air trip would be needed to slap skin with a few people here and 
there, but  it's not always required...

After all, the CEO usually reports to the board and is working for the 
board's best interests, not necessarily for the company's best interests.

Most of the .com's I've worked at, the CEO was hired to do one single 
thing: pump up the image of the company to make it look like a big jucy 
steak when it was all crap internally, then sell the turd off to a sucker. 
  This of course results in the immediate job loss of 90% of the employees, 
etc.

(That of course isn't the case where the CEO is a founder and has reasons 
other than stock price to run the company.)

Ok, that's a wet dream I suppose... but there's very little reason why 
those jobs can't be outsourced.  Toward the end of the dot bomb era, there 
were a few companies offering part time temporary Cxx's for a fee because 
it was hard for the .com's to find brand name well known CEO's, etc.  So if 
they can be bought by the hour part time, (cultural, accent issues aside) 
no reason that they have to be physically in the US.




From rsw at jfet.org  Wed Mar  3 13:01:58 2004
From: rsw at jfet.org (Riad S. Wahby)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2004 16:01:58 -0500
Subject: Virus with encrypted zip file - Important notify about your
  e-mail  account.
In-Reply-To: <40461FF8.6090601@sunder.net>
References: <vbjvdxmlonckiyfxulj@minder.net>
  <40461FF8.6090601@sunder.net>
Message-ID: <20040303210158.GB9688@positron.mit.edu>

sunder <sunder at sunder.net> wrote:
> It attaches a zip file with a password containing an executable.  (No 
> worries, I've not run it, and only extracted it on a SPARC machine, so it 
> can't use buffer overflows designed for intel in unzip -- if any exist.)

I believe it's called Bagle.J.

Lots of people allow .zip files through their virus scanners if
they're encrypted, since until now it was thought that no virus would
encrypt the .zip file.  In fact, one popular way of sending
viruses/trojan horses/other malware to forensic mailing lists for
analysis and discussion is by putting it inside an encrypted .zip
file, preventing it from opening automatically or being identified by
virus scanners and bounced.

Clever clever.

-- 
Riad Wahby
rsw at jfet.org
MIT VI-2 M.Eng




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar  3 19:30:21 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2004 22:30:21 -0500
Subject: How Tiny Swiss Cellphone Chips Helped Track Global Terror Web
Message-ID: <p061002cfbc6c52efca4f@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://nytimes.com/2004/03/04/international/europe/04PHON.html?hp=&pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

March 4, 2004

How Tiny Swiss Cellphone Chips Helped Track Global Terror Web
By DON VAN NATTA Jr. and DESMOND BUTLER

ONDON, March 2 - The terrorism investigation code-named Mont Blanc began
almost by accident in April 2002, when authorities intercepted a cellphone
call that lasted less than a minute and involved not a single word of
conversation.

 Investigators, suspicious that the call was a signal between terrorists,
followed the trail first to one terror suspect, then to others, and
eventually to terror cells on three continents.

What tied them together was a computer chip smaller than a fingernail. But
before the investigation wound down in recent weeks, its global net caught
dozens of suspected Qaeda members and disrupted at least three planned
attacks in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, according to counterterrorism and
intelligence officials in Europe and the United States.

The investigation helped narrow the search for one of the most wanted men
in the world, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who is accused of being the
mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks, according to three intelligence
officials based in Europe. American authorities arrested Mr. Mohammed in
Pakistan last March.

For two years, investigators now say, they were able to track the
conversations and movements of several Qaeda leaders and dozens of
operatives after determining that the suspects favored a particular brand
of cellphone chip. The chips carry prepaid minutes and allow phone use
around the world.

Investigators said they believed that the chips, made by Swisscom of
Switzerland, were popular with terrorists because they could buy the chips
without giving their names.

"They thought these phones protected their anonymity, but they didn't,"
said a senior intelligence official based in Europe. Even without personal
information, the authorities were able to conduct routine monitoring of
phone conversations.

A half dozen senior officials in the United States and Europe agreed to
talk in detail about the previously undisclosed investigation because, they
said, it was completed. They also said they had strong indications that
terror suspects, alert to the phones' vulnerability, had largely abandoned
them for important communications and instead were using e-mail, Internet
phone calls and hand-delivered messages.

"This was one of the most effective tools we had to locate Al Qaeda," said
a senior counterterrorism official in Europe. "The perception of anonymity
may have lulled them into a false sense of security. We now believe that Al
Qaeda has figured out that we were monitoring them through these phones."

The officials called the operation one of the most successful
investigations since Sept. 11, 2001, and an example of unusual cooperation
between agencies in different countries. Led by the Swiss, the
investigation involved agents from more than a dozen countries, including
the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Britain and Italy.

Cellphones have played a major role in the constant jousting between
terrorists and intelligence agencies. In their requests for more
investigative powers, Attorney General John Ashcroft and other officials
have repeatedly cited the importance of monitoring portable phones. Each
success by investigators seems to drive terrorists either to more advanced
- or to more primitive - communications.

During the American bombing of Tora Bora in Afghanistan in December 2001,
American authorities reported hearing Osama bin Laden speaking to his
associates on a satellite phone. Since then, Mr. bin Laden has communicated
with handwritten messages delivered by trusted couriers, officials said.

In 2002 the German authorities broke up a cell after monitoring calls by
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who has been linked by some top American officials to
Al Qaeda, in which he could be heard ordering attacks on Jewish targets in
Germany. Since then, investigators say, Mr. Zarqawi has been more cautious.

"If you beat terrorists over the head enough, they learn," said Col. Nick
Pratt, a counterterrorism expert and professor at the George C. Marshall
European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.
"They are smart."

Officials say that on the rare occasion when operatives still use mobile
phones, they keep the calls brief and use code words.

 "They know we are on to them and they keep evolving and using new methods,
and we keep finding ways to make life miserable for them," said a senior
Saudi official. "In many ways, it's like a cat-and-mouse game."

Some Qaeda lieutenants used cellphones only to arrange a conversation on a
more secure telephone. It was one such brief cellphone call that set off
the Mont Blanc investigation.

The call was placed on April 11, 2002, by Christian Ganczarski, a
36-year-old Polish-born German Muslim whom the German authorities suspected
was a member of Al Qaeda. From Germany, Mr. Ganczarski called Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, said to be Al Qaeda's military commander, who was running
operations at the time from a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, according to
two officials involved in the investigation.

The two men did not speak during the call, counterterrorism officials said.
Instead, the call was intended to alert Mr. Mohammed of a Qaeda suicide
bombing mission at a synagogue in Tunisia, which took place that day,
according to two senior officials. The attack killed 21 people, mostly
German tourists.

Through electronic surveillance, the German authorities traced the call to
Mr. Mohammed's Swisscom cellphone, but at first they did not know it
belonged to him. Two weeks after the Tunisian bombing, the German police
searched Mr. Ganczarski's house and found a log of his many numbers,
including one in Pakistan that was eventually traced to Mr. Mohammed. The
German police had been monitoring Mr. Ganczarski because he had been seen
in the company of militants at a mosque in Duisburg, and last June the
French police arrested him in Paris.

Mr. Mohammed's cellphone number, and many others, were given to the Swiss
authorities for further investigation. By checking Swisscom's records,
Swiss officials discovered that many other Qaeda suspects used the Swisscom
chips, known as Subscriber Identity Module cards, which allow phones to
connect to cellular networks.

For months the Swiss, working closely with counterparts in the United
States and Pakistan, used this information in an effort to track Mr.
Mohammed's movements inside Pakistan. By monitoring the cellphone traffic,
they were able to get a fix on Mr. Mohammed, but the investigators did not
know his specific location, officials said.

Once Swiss agents had established that Mr. Mohammed was in Karachi, the
American and Pakistani security services took over the hunt with the aid of
technology at the United States National Security Agency, said two senior
European intelligence officials. But it took months for them to actually
find Mr. Mohammed "because he wasn't always using that phone," an official
said. "He had many, many other phones."

 Mr. Mohammed was a victim of his own sloppiness, said a senior European
intelligence official. He was meticulous about changing cellphones, but
apparently he kept using the same SIM card.

In the end, the authorities were led directly to Mr. Mohammed by a C.I.A.
spy, the director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet, said in a
speech last month. A senior American intelligence official said this week
that the capture of Mr. Mohammed "was entirely the result of excellent
human operations."

When Swiss and other European officials heard that American agents had
captured Mr. Mohammed last March, "we opened a big bottle of Champagne," a
senior intelligence official said.

Among Mr. Mohammed's belongings, the authorities seized computers,
cellphones and a personal phone book that contained hundreds of numbers.
Tracing those numbers led investigators to as many as 6,000 phone numbers,
which amounted to a virtual road map of Al Qaeda's operations, officials
said.

The authorities noticed that many of Mr. Mohammed's communications were
with operatives in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Last April, using the phone
numbers, officials in Jakarta broke up a terror cell connected to Mr.
Mohammed, officials said.

After the suicide bombings of three housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, on May 12, the Saudi authorities used the phone numbers to track
down two "live sleeper cells." Some members were killed in shootouts with
the authorities; others were arrested.

Meanwhile, the Swiss had used Mr. Mohammed's phone list to begin monitoring
the communications and activities of nearly two dozen of his associates.
"Huge resources were devoted to this," a senior official said. "Many
countries were constantly doing surveillance, monitoring the chatter."

Investigators were particularly alarmed by one call they overheard last
June. The message: "The big guy is coming. He will be here soon."

An official familiar with the calls said, "We did not know who he was, but
there was a lot of chatter." Whoever "the big guy" was, the authorities had
his number. A Swisscom chip was in the phone.

"Then we waited and waited, and we were increasingly anxious and worried
because we didn't know who it was or what he had intended to do," an
official said.

But in July, the man believed to be "the big guy," Abdullah Oweis, who was
born in Saudi Arabia, was arrested in Qatar. "He is one of those people
able to move within Western societies and to help the mujahedeen, who have
lesser experience," an official said. "He was at the very center of the Al
Qaeda hierarchy. He was a major facilitator."

In January, the operation led to the arrests of eight people accused of
being members of a Qaeda logistical cell in Switzerland. Some are suspected
of helping with the suicide bombings of the housing compounds in Riyadh,
which killed 35 people, including 8 Americans.

Later, European authorities discovered that Mr. Mohammed had contacted a
company in Geneva that sells Swisscom phone cards. Investigators said he
ordered the cards in bulk.

The Mont Blanc inquiry has wound down, although investigators are still
monitoring the communications of a few people. Christian Neuhaus, a
spokesman for Swisscom, confirmed that the company had cooperated with the
inquiry, but declined to comment.

Last year, Switzerland's legislature passed a law making it illegal to
purchase cellphone chips without providing personal information, following
testimony from a Swiss federal prosecutor, Claude Nicati, that the Swisscom
cards had become popular with Qaeda operatives. The law goes into effect on
July 1.

One senior official said the authorities were grateful that Qaeda members
were so loyal to Swisscom.

Another official agreed: "They'd switch phones but use the same cards. The
people were stupid enough to use the same cards all of the time. It was a
very good thing for us."


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Wed Mar  3 20:47:55 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2004 04:47:55 +0000
Subject: research paper
In-Reply-To: <40468B01.6010107@storm.ca>
References: <E1AyNRQ-0002Of-U1@platypus.lewismedia.com>
  <40468B01.6010107@storm.ca>
Message-ID: <20040304044755.GA21677@dreams.soze.net>

Sandy Harris (2004-03-04 01:48Z) wrote:

> someone wrote:
> 
> >I'm currently doing a research paper, with the topic of cryptography
> >being essiantial for society, ...
> >
> >I was wondering if there where any particular books, websites, ...
> 
> One web page with a lot of links:
> http://www.freeswan.org/freeswan_trees/freeswan-2.05/doc/politics.html

The cypherpunks FAQ link referenced on the
online.offshore.com.ai/security/ page (linked from the above page) is
broken (the oberlin copy has vanished, apparently).  Here are good ones:

 http://www2.pro-ns.net/~crypto/cyphernomicon.html
 http://www.cyphernet.org/cyphernomicon/cyphernomicon.contents.html
 http://www.spinnaker.com/crypt/cyphernomicon/
 http://koeln.ccc.de/archiv/cyphernomicon/
 http://www.koot.biz/docs/cyphernomicon/cyphernomicon.html
 http://swiss.csail.mit.edu/6805/articles/crypto/cypherpunks/cyphernomicon/

On another note...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cypherpunk
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy_C._May

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge, and... we deserve to die.  -Budd, Kill Bill




From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com  Thu Mar  4 07:46:32 2004
From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV)
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2004 07:46:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Fwd: Re: Don't Panic - Not All Jobs Are Headed Overseas
In-Reply-To: <404622CE.6000307@sunder.net>
Message-ID: <20040304154632.93040.qmail@web21207.mail.yahoo.com>

> Most of the .com's I've worked at, the CEO was hired
> to do one single 
> thing: pump up the image of the company to make it
> look like a big jucy 
> steak when it was all crap internally, then sell the
> turd off to a sucker. 
>   This of course results in the immediate job loss
> of 90% of the employees, 
> etc.
> 

Very true :)

Its election year in U.S. Once they are over,they
would pass another bill that would again allow
outsourcing. 

Who wouldn't want to get their works at cheaper rates.
Now a days,in Indian call centers,people with Mother
Tongue Influence are not taken for the job.They are
also asked to keep their normal accent and not to
mimick the british or american way of speech,most of
them here try the british accent.

May be in one or two years,speech should appear
neutral and no signs of culture would be
detected.Except for the Slangs,communication should be
clear.

Sarath.


__________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Search - Find what youre looking for faster
http://search.yahoo.com




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar  4 08:41:03 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2004 08:41:03 -0800
Subject: Medical insurers checking terrorist list
Message-ID: <40475C1E.5F1F6B70@cdc.gov>

Some Insurers Checking Provider Lists for Terrorists

     Joyce Frieden
     Associate Editor, Practice Trends


Insurance plans say they now must cross-reference lists of business
partnersincluding providersagainst a federal list of known or
suspected terrorists.

As a result of an executive order issued shortly after Sept. 11, 2001,
many health plans say that they are now required to compare their
provider, member, and applicant lists with a list of potential
terrorists maintained by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets
Control (OFAC).

If we didn't have to do it, we probably wouldn't, said Helen Stojic,
spokeswoman for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, which is matching
the names on the OFAC list against its database of 4.8 million members
and 20,000 providers. [But] we did not see it as something that was
voluntary.

Other plans that are checking member and provider databases with the
OFAC list include Cigna and Aetna US Healthcare. So far, none of
those three plans has found any matches to the list.

The executive order states that any transaction or dealing by United
States persons or within the United States in property  blocked
pursuant to this order is prohibited, including but not limited to the
making or receiving  of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit
of
those persons listed by the government. Because there was some
confusion about whether the order applied to health insurers, the
American
Association of Health Plans-Health Insurance Association of America
sought more information from the Treasury Department.

The Treasury Department sent back an informal guidance document
explaining that the executive order applies to government agencies and
private companies including health plans and insurers and that one
method for health plans and insurers to comply is to search their
records
to see if there are any individuals or businesses that match the names
on the OFAC list.

If a plan does receive an insurance application from someone on the
list, it is obligated not to issue the policy, and if it has
inadvertently
already issued a policy to a person on the list, plan officials are
supposed to contact the Treasury Department.

Although the document did not say that comparing lists was the only way
to find out if an insurer is doing business with a suspected terrorist,
I haven't heard of any other method, Ms. Stojic said.

The federal government is not alone in requiring health insurers to
comply with the executive order, noted Fred Laberge, spokesman for Aetna

US Healthcare, in Hartford, Conn. We've seen similar requests from
state departments of insurance saying, We've seen this executive order;

demonstrate that you're complying with it. Florida and New York are
among the states that have made these requests, he said.

Since member and provider lists change constantly, the cross-referencing
will be ongoing, plans say. It includes scanning of our databases
on a periodic basis to screen new customers and transactions on the OFAC
list, said Cigna spokeswoman Amy Turkington.

Plans say these checks do not compromise any personal health information
or raise any privacy concerns under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).

We're not sharing any information about our members beyond checking the
list of names, said Aetna's Mr. Laberge. Private medical
information is not even being looked at or asked about.

Still, civil libertarians are not happy with the order. We know that
databases are filled with errors, said Virginia Rezmierski, Ph.D., of
the
school of public policy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. If a
patient's account is mistakenly frozen because he or she is thought to
be
on the OFAC list, what does that do to someone getting ready to have a
procedure?

Checking names against the OFAC list is not as bad as using claims data
to do the same thing, Dr. Rezmierski said. However, by
approaching terrorism and deterrence of it in this way, we've
effectively thrown out the entire notion of innocent till proven guilty.
We are now
guilty until there's no match. Instead of going from knowledge about the
behavior of an individual and having cause to do this violation, we're
violating everyone.

Jay Stanley, communications director for the technology and liberty
program at the American Civil Liberties Union, said he was concerned
that
this is part of an overall trend of the government enlisting private
individuals and companies into its information-gathering and enforcement

proceedings.

Obviously, it's a good thing if no one does business with true
terrorists, Mr. Stanley said. But the problem is that there are no
established
guidelines for due process in how one gets placed on these lists.
Mistakes have been rife, especially when you are talking about Arab
names
 which have to be translated into a different alphabet.

Mr. Stanley noted that such lists are set up primarily to prevent
terrorists from laundering money through unsuspecting American
corporations.
As far as I can tell, nobody uses health insurance to launder money.
There are basic questions that need to be asked about the cost and
benefit of targeting here.

February 2004  Volume 32  Number 2
http://www2.eClinicalPsychiatryNews.com/scripts/om.dll/serve
login: cypherpunks/writecode




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar  4 08:49:43 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2004 08:49:43 -0800
Subject: How Tiny Swiss Cellphone Chips Helped Track Global Terror
  Web
Message-ID: <40475E27.E3D014A0@cdc.gov>

At 10:30 PM 3/3/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
><http://nytimes.com/2004/03/04/international/europe/04PHON.html?hp=&pagewanted=print&position=>

>
>The New York Times
>
>March 4, 2004
>
>How Tiny Swiss Cellphone Chips Helped Track Global Terror Web

And that, boys and girls, is what traffic analysis is about.  You don't
need to know the surname of the endpoint of a communication to
know that said endpoint is interesting.

Also, of course, Al's mistake of thinking that the handset is the
endpoint, instead of the SIM.

Internet-broadcast stego is best if you don't have a courier and a
donkey.

----
See you in Athens




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar  4 08:51:20 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2004 08:51:20 -0800
Subject: FLA to use fingerprint scanners on schoolbusses
Message-ID: <40475E88.4FA081BB@cdc.gov>

The Pinellas school system is ready to approve a new technology that
uses student fingerprints to keep track of who is riding school buses.

Beginning in the fall, the fingerprint system would identify students as
they board and leave. The goal is to ensure they are getting on the
right bus and getting off at the right stop.

School officials say the $2-million project will save money and
dramatically improve safety for students, whose fingerprints will serve
as authorization to board and disembark.

If the School Board approves the proposal March 9, Pinellas will become
one of four Florida school districts in the process of implementing
Global Positioning Systems with a student-tracking system.

"This is Management 101 in transportation. Now we will have good,
factual information that we can use in a very timely manner to make our
services as good as humanly possible," said Terry Palmer, the district's
transportation director.

But some parents and national organizations are concerned about the
implications of fingerprinting 45,000 bus riders, some as young as 5.

"This is probably a really good idea, but in my mind it was just this
terrible feeling, like they're watching my kids wherever they go," said
Nancy McKibben, mother of three teenagers at Palm Harbor University High
School and president of the school's PTSA.

Critics say programs of this nature raise significant privacy concerns
and teach students at a young age to accept what amounts to a "Big
Brother" surveillance society.

"We are conditioning these children to understand that they have no
personal space, no personal privacy," said Barry Steinhardt, director of
the American Civil Liberties Union's Program on Technology and Liberty.

<snip>
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/02/28/Tampabay/Have_your_thumb_ready.shtml




From sandy at storm.ca  Wed Mar  3 17:48:49 2004
From: sandy at storm.ca (Sandy Harris)
Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2004 09:48:49 +0800
Subject: research paper
In-Reply-To: <E1AyNRQ-0002Of-U1@platypus.lewismedia.com>
References: <E1AyNRQ-0002Of-U1@platypus.lewismedia.com>
Message-ID: <40468B01.6010107@storm.ca>

someone wrote:

> I'm currently doing a research paper, with the topic of cryptography
> being essiantial for society, ...
> 
> I was wondering if there where any particular books, websites, ...

One web page with a lot of links:
http://www.freeswan.org/freeswan_trees/freeswan-2.05/doc/politics.html




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Mar  4 09:59:02 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2004 12:59:02 -0500
Subject: Vote changing gizmos (paid for by feds)
Message-ID: <BAY7-F579VjeRoXaXgB00040224@hotmail.com>

"..slow exhale.. thanks for the hit, Bob, that's the good shit.. I miss
it."

Yeah...I admit it. I snuck down to the cellar and took a few tokes as well.

I don't dig all the calls for "needs killing", but every now and then the 
dude delivers.

-TD



>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Vote changing gizmos (paid for by feds) Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 
>10:32:28 -0800
>
>At 09:54 PM 3/2/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>
> >From: Tim May <timcmay at removethis.got.net>
>
> >Or enter a voting place with a "gizmo" and aim it at the electronic
> >polling stations. Turn to the little old biddies who run our polling
> >places and smile. If they ask what you just did, tell them "I just
> >changed the votes. Have a nice day!" Leave before they can call the
> >cops.
>
>..slow exhale.. thanks for the hit, Bob, that's the good shit.. I miss
>it.
>
>Of course, the e-election rubes contribute to the vote changing too:
>
>Glitches Hinder Casting of Votes
>Problems with new electronic systems in Orange and San Diego counties
>frustrate voters. Officials call the harm minimal.
>
>Problems with new electronic voting systems caused some Orange County
>residents to vote in the wrong district elections Tuesday and prevented
>some
>San Diego County voters from casting any ballot at all.
>
>http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-machines3mar03,1,3468893.story?coll=la-headlines-california
>
>
>

_________________________________________________________________
Frustrated with dial-up? Lightning-fast Internet access for as low as 
$29.95/month. http://click.atdmt.com/AVE/go/onm00200360ave/direct/01/




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar  5 07:56:42 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 10:56:42 -0500
Subject: Happy Reichstag Day...
Message-ID: <p061002f2bc6e533bde64@[66.149.49.5]>

>From Writer's Almanac 5 March



Literary and Historical Notes:

It was on this day in 1933 that the Nazi Party won the majority of the
seats in the German parliament, known as the Reichstag, effectively taking
control of the country. It was the last free election in Germany the end of
World War II. Adolf Hitler had secured the chancellorship after the
November 1932 elections, but he still didn't have a majority in the
Reichstag, so he set March 5, 1933 as the date for new elections. Six days
before the election, the Reichstag building caught fire, and the Nazis used
the fire as a symbol of the chaos that they would help correct, though some
historians believe that the Nazis set the fire themselves. After the
election, Hitler passed a law that gave him absolute power over the country.

Just five days after the election, Victor Klemperer, a Jewish professor of
romantic languages living in Germany, wrote in his diary: "What, up to
election Sunday on March 5, I called terror, was a mild prelude. . . . It's
astounding how easily everything collapses. . . . Since [the election,] day
after day commissioners appointed, provincial governments trampled
underfoot, flags raised, buildings taken over, people shot, newspapers
banned, etc., etc. . . . A complete revolution and party dictatorship. And
all opposing forces as if vanished from the earth. . . . No one dares say
anything anymore, everyone is afraid."

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar  5 08:04:17 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 11:04:17 -0500
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
Message-ID: <p061002f3bc6e53cc006d@[66.149.49.5]>

The "whitelist for my friends" part of "a whitelist for my friends, all
others pay cash" seems to be underway...

If we really do get cryptographic signatures on email in a way that works,
expect 80% of all spam to be blown away as a matter of course.

Cheers,
RAH
-------

<http://www.pcworld.com/resource/printable/article/0,aid,115094,00.asp>  
  

PCWorld.com

 Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
 
New systems could fight spam and Internet scams, company says.

Paul Roberts, IDG News Service
Friday, March 05, 2004

ISP Earthlink will soon begin testing new e-mail security technology,
including Microsoft's recently released Caller ID technology, a company
executive says.
AdvertisementEarthlink will be experimenting "very soon," with "sender
authentication" technology including Caller ID and a similar plan called
Sender Policy Framework (SPF). The Atlanta-based ISP will be evaluating
other e-mail security proposals as well, but is not backing any specific
technology, says Robert Sanders, chief architect at Earthlink.

Plans to secure e-mail by verifying the source of e-mail messages have
garnered much attention in recent months, as the volume of spam has swelled
and the number of Internet scams has increased.

Spammers and Internet-based criminals often fake, or "spoof," the origin of
e-mail messages to trick recipients into opening them and trusting their
content. Sender authentication technologies attempt to stop spoofing by
matching the source of e-mail messages with a specific user or an approved
e-mail server for the Internet domain that the message purports to come
from.

Different Strategies

So far, Earthlink has stayed out of the sender authentication fray while
Web-based e-mail services, including Yahoo and Hotmail, and major ISP
America Online, have all backed slightly different sender authentication
proposals.

Yahoo is promoting an internally developed technology called DomainKeys,
that uses public key cryptography to "sign" e-mail messages.

AOL said in January that it is testing SPF for outgoing mail, publishing
the IP (Internet protocol) addresses of its e-mail servers in an SPF record
in the DNS (Domain Name System).

Finally, Microsoft-owned Hotmail is publishing the addresses of its e-mail
servers using that company's recently announced Caller ID standard.

Earthlink believes that sender authentication is necessary, and is prepared
to support multiple sender authentication standards if necessary. However,
the company hopes that one clear winner emerges from the field of competing
proposals, Sanders says.

"I don't think it's unlikely that we'll see two or three coexisting
proposals go into production. We had hopes that they would be able to
merge, but I think at this point each standard adds a different function,
and we're unlikely to see a merger," he says.

Coming Soon?

For now, Caller ID and SPF will probably make it into production first,
because neither require companies to deploy new software to participate in
the sender authentication system, he says.

Earthlink is also interested in proposals like Yahoo's DomainKeys, which
allows e-mail authors to cryptographically sign messages, enabling
recipients to verify both the content of a message and its author. However,
DomainKeys is more complicated to deploy than either Caller ID or SPF and
requires software changes that will slow implementation, he says.

Earthlink is not backing any proposal but is interested in looking at the
results of its trial deployments, and those of other organizations.

"We have to get real world data from people who have deployed SPF or Caller
ID," he says.

The company is also a member of the Anti-Spam Technical Alliance, an
industry group that includes Microsoft, AOL, Yahoo, Comcast, and British
Telecommunications, and continues to participate in meetings and
initiatives through that organization, he says.

Microsoft's backing of Caller ID and its plans to use that technology for
Hotmail tips the scales in favor of that technology, he says.

"One factor that determines what you, as an e-mail sender, deploy is the
important question of 'Who am I sending mail to?' What the larger [e-mail]
receivers deploy is what you're going to support," he says.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar  5 15:03:09 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2004 18:03:09 -0500
Subject: Autobrinification: Microsoft Gadget Keeps Record of Your Life
Message-ID: <p06100322bc6eb766590e@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/040304/microsoft_visual_diary_3.html>

Yahoo!


Associated Press
Microsoft Gadget Keeps Record of Your Life
Thursday March 4, 8:51 pm ET
By Allison Linn, AP Business Writer

Microsoft's SenseCam Can Be Worn Around Your Neck and Take 2,000 Images

REDMOND, Wash. (AP) -- SenseCam, touted as a visual diary of sorts by
Microsoft Corp., is designed to be worn around the neck and take up to
2,000 images a 12-hour day automatically.

The prototype responds to changes such as bright lights and sudden
movements and might one day even respond to other stimuli such as heart
rate or skin temperature -- to track medical problems as easily as to
record a Hawaiian vacation. And it could eventually link with other
technology, such as face recognition to remind wearers when they've seen
someone before.

As Lyndsay Williams trudged along snow-covered paths and passed by shop
windows one recent day in Cambridge, England, so too did her SenseCam --
automatically snapping hundreds of photos along the way.

Later that day, Williams could have used those pictures to figure out where
she'd left her car keys, or to show a friend the sweater she saw in a
window.

Perhaps weeks or months later, she might have zipped through them to figure
out when she last saw a particular colleague or what bottle of wine she had
been drinking that night.

Williams and other Microsoft researchers are showcasing dozens of
futuristic gadgets and projects to company employees and journalists. The
annual TechFest is hosted by Microsoft Research, a unit that delves into
everything from super-technical programming applications to tools for
developing HIV vaccines.

Though Microsoft Research works on security and other issues deemed
important today, its head, Rick Rashid, said researchers also try to
anticipate what Microsoft developers will want in several years. Some
projects never make it into a for-profit product.

But many do, including the TabletPC and a smart watch that gets news and
other information from a service called MSN Direct.

Other technologies could soon be available to the public.

Microsoft is looking to license technology for identification cards touted
as forge-proof because they combine a regular picture ID with a box that
includes a compressed facial image.

Another project converts a regular webcam image into low-resolution
animation -- stripped of everything but the eyes, lips, nose and eyebrows.
It's easier to transmit than full video and can be used with instant
messaging to convey emotion and nuance.

Rashid, a computer scientist at Carnegie Mellon University before joining
Microsoft, is already thinking ahead. One item he has in mind: an alarm
clock that figures out when to wake you based on current traffic conditions.

http://research.microsoft.com



-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Mar  6 07:31:08 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 2004 10:31:08 -0500
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
In-Reply-To: <20040306121426.GT18046@leitl.org>
References: <p061002f3bc6e53cc006d@[66.149.49.5]>  
  <E1AzWAL-0007Ok-Ft@medusa01> <20040306121426.GT18046@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <p061003c1bc6f9f0da539@[66.149.49.5]>

At 1:14 PM +0100 3/6/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>Filtering for signed/vs. unsigned mail doesn't make sense, authenticating
>and whitelisting known senders by digital signature makes very good sense.

Right. A whitelist for my friends.

>Of course, this doesn't help with people you don't yet know.

All others pay cash.

Cheers,
RAH


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Mar  6 07:32:40 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 2004 10:32:40 -0500
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
In-Reply-To: <20040306132118.GU18046@leitl.org>
References: <20040306121426.GT18046@leitl.org>  
  <E1AzatD-0007dZ-Dd@medusa01> <20040306132118.GU18046@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <p061003c2bc6f9f7bbf26@[66.149.49.5]>

At 2:21 PM +0100 3/6/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>Facultative strong authentication doesn't nuke anonynimity.

Perfect pseudonymity is functional anonymity, in my book...

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From sfurlong at acmenet.net  Sat Mar  6 07:56:28 2004
From: sfurlong at acmenet.net (Steve Furlong)
Date: 06 Mar 2004 10:56:28 -0500
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
In-Reply-To: <p061003c2bc6f9f7bbf26@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <20040306121426.GT18046@leitl.org> 
  <E1AzatD-0007dZ-Dd@medusa01> 	 <20040306132118.GU18046@leitl.org> 
  <p061003c2bc6f9f7bbf26@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <1078588587.12194.11.camel@daft>

On Sat, 2004-03-06 at 10:32, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
> At 2:21 PM +0100 3/6/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> >Facultative strong authentication doesn't nuke anonynimity.
> 
> Perfect pseudonymity is functional anonymity, in my book...

No, pseudonymity lets others identify messages on, say c-punks, as
coming from a particular sender. Reputation can work here, even with no
meat-space identity attached. Anonymity means reputation can't work, so
each message has to be taken on its own, with no history to give clues
as to bias or reliability. I certainly wouldn't want to have to wade
through all the traffic, wondering which from Eugen and which from the
Australian-shithead-who-shall-not-be-named. Yah, it's easy enough to
tell once you've read the message, but I'd rather filter it out on the
"From:" level.

I realize that your, RAH's, "book" mostly deals with financial
transactions. In the very narrow domain of transactions which don't
require any trust, anonymity should be as useful as pseudonymity. In the
more general case, I'd think true anonymity would be a handicap. eg, I'm
certainly not going to send my hard-earned e-money to the account of
some untraceable joker in exchange for his promise to deliver me a
week's worth of groceries.




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Mar  6 04:14:26 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 2004 13:14:26 +0100
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
In-Reply-To: <E1AzWAL-0007Ok-Ft@medusa01>
References: <p061002f3bc6e53cc006d@[66.149.49.5]>
  <E1AzWAL-0007Ok-Ft@medusa01>
Message-ID: <20040306121426.GT18046@leitl.org>

On Sat, Mar 06, 2004 at 08:24:09PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> writes:
>
> >If we really do get cryptographic signatures on email in a way that works,
> >expect 80% of all spam to be blown away as a matter of course.
>
> I think you mean:
>
>   If we really do get cryptographic signatures on email in a way that
works,
>   expect 80% of all spam to contain legit signatures from hacked PCs.

"A way that works" would involve passphrase-locked keyrings, and forgetful
MUAs (this mutt only caches the passphrase for a preset time).

Filtering for signed/vs. unsigned mail doesn't make sense, authenticating
and whitelisting known senders by digital signature makes very good sense.

Of course, this doesn't help with people you don't yet know. Would work well
with prioritizing mail if taken together with other modes of filtering,
though.

> This is just another variation of the "To secure the Internet, build a big
> wall around it and only let the good guys in" idea.

-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Mar  6 05:21:18 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 2004 14:21:18 +0100
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
In-Reply-To: <E1AzatD-0007dZ-Dd@medusa01>
References: <20040306121426.GT18046@leitl.org>
  <E1AzatD-0007dZ-Dd@medusa01>
Message-ID: <20040306132118.GU18046@leitl.org>

On Sun, Mar 07, 2004 at 01:26:47AM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> writes:
>
> >"A way that works" would involve passphrase-locked keyrings, and forgetful
> >MUAs (this mutt only caches the passphrase for a preset time).
>
> "A way that works *in theory* would involve ...".  The chances of any
vendor

No, that was a definition. I made no statement about how users take to
passphrases, and vendors implementing this unwelcome feature.

Works well for me, though.

> of mass-market software shipping an MUA where the user has to enter a
password
> just to send mail are approximately... zero.

I agree. It doesn't mean signing (whether in MUA or MTA level) is useless.
Only a tiny fraction of all systems is compromised, and if those systems use
signed mail blocking them is actually easier (generating new keys on an 0wn3d
machine introduces extra degrees of complication, and limits the rate of
mail sent). If this is adopted on a large scale, nonsigned mail would
automatically increase the spam scoring function, further speeding adoption.

> >Filtering for signed/vs. unsigned mail doesn't make sense, authenticating
and
> >whitelisting known senders by digital signature makes very good sense.
>
> In that case you can just filter by sender IP address or something
(anything)
> that's simpler than requiring a PKI.  Again though, that's just another

Parsing headers is problematic, and signatures work at user, not at IP level
(there are public mail services which serve millions of users with just a few
IPs). You can as well sign at MTA level, if users are authenticated, and each
of
them has a signature.

> variant of the "Build a big wall" dream.  In order to have perimeter
security

Every exploitable system will be exploited, if a sufficient incentive is
present. You can't get around the fact that we need to modify the
infrastructure. Specifically for spam, facultative strong authentication is a
part of a solution (there is no single solution, because it's a complex,
adaptive problem).

> you first need a perimeter.  If the spammer you're trying to defend against
is
> your own mother (because she clicked on an attachment you sent her, it says
so
> in the From: address, that's actually a spam-bot), you don't have a
perimeter.
> All you have is a big pile of Manchurian candidates waiting to bite you.

When I get virus mail from someone who has my email in my address book, it
would be nice if that mail was signed, so I could contact her, and tell her
she has a problem.

Facultative strong authentication doesn't nuke anonynimity. It does shift it
into darker, seedier corners of communication, though. Which is only natural:
trolls thrive on anonymity, giving it a bad rap. Which is why we need a nym
supporting infrastructure.

-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Fri Mar  5 23:24:09 2004
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Sat, 06 Mar 2004 20:24:09 +1300
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
In-Reply-To: <p061002f3bc6e53cc006d@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <E1AzWAL-0007Ok-Ft@medusa01>

"R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> writes:

>If we really do get cryptographic signatures on email in a way that works,
>expect 80% of all spam to be blown away as a matter of course.

I think you mean:

  If we really do get cryptographic signatures on email in a way that works,
  expect 80% of all spam to contain legit signatures from hacked PCs.

This is just another variation of the "To secure the Internet, build a big
wall around it and only let the good guys in" idea.

Peter.




From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Sat Mar  6 04:26:47 2004
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Sun, 07 Mar 2004 01:26:47 +1300
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
In-Reply-To: <20040306121426.GT18046@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <E1AzatD-0007dZ-Dd@medusa01>

Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> writes:

>"A way that works" would involve passphrase-locked keyrings, and forgetful
>MUAs (this mutt only caches the passphrase for a preset time).

"A way that works *in theory* would involve ...".  The chances of any vendor
of mass-market software shipping an MUA where the user has to enter a password
just to send mail are approximately... zero.

>Filtering for signed/vs. unsigned mail doesn't make sense, authenticating and
>whitelisting known senders by digital signature makes very good sense.

In that case you can just filter by sender IP address or something (anything)
that's simpler than requiring a PKI.  Again though, that's just another
variant of the "Build a big wall" dream.  In order to have perimeter security
you first need a perimeter.  If the spammer you're trying to defend against is
your own mother (because she clicked on an attachment you sent her, it says so
in the From: address, that's actually a spam-bot), you don't have a perimeter.
All you have is a big pile of Manchurian candidates waiting to bite you.

Peter.




From mv at cdc.gov  Sun Mar  7 08:56:52 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sun, 07 Mar 2004 08:56:52 -0800
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
Message-ID: <404B5454.D9134BC9@cdc.gov>

At 10:56 AM 3/6/04 -0500, Steve Furlong wrote:
>No, pseudonymity lets others identify messages on, say c-punks, as
>coming from a particular sender. Reputation can work here, even with no

>meat-space identity attached. Anonymity means reputation can't work, so

>each message has to be taken on its own, with no history to give clues
>as to bias or reliability.

Correct.  Think of pseudonymity as a persistant endpoint of a
communication,
which thanks to (PK-verifiable) persistance can accrue reputation.

An anonymous endpoint is necessarily ephemeral.

>I realize that your, RAH's, "book" mostly deals with financial
>transactions. In the very narrow domain of transactions which don't
>require any trust, anonymity should be as useful as pseudonymity. In
the
>more general case, I'd think true anonymity would be a handicap. eg,
I'm
>certainly not going to send my hard-earned e-money to the account of
>some untraceable joker in exchange for his promise to deliver me a
>week's worth of groceries.

Sure you will, if the groceries are in front of you, and the purchase or

possession of some of them you don't want associated with anything.
In this case the reputation of the grocer and/or your ability to assay
the
groceries (in meatspace) suffice.




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar  7 09:11:20 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2004 12:11:20 -0500
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
In-Reply-To: <404B5454.D9134BC9@cdc.gov>
References: <404B5454.D9134BC9@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <p0610034cbc7107f83e40@[66.149.49.5]>

At 8:56 AM -0800 3/7/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>Sure you will, if the groceries are in front of you, and the purchase or
>
>possession of some of them you don't want associated with anything.
>In this case the reputation of the grocer and/or your ability to assay
>the
>groceries (in meatspace) suffice.

Right.

More to the point, the only person you trust in a bearer transaction is the
underwriter, who, of course, can be a persistent pseudonym.

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar  7 09:21:07 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2004 12:21:07 -0500
Subject: Chameleon Card Changes Stripes
Message-ID: <p06100354bc710a3ac5af@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62545,00.html>

Wired News

Chameleon Card Changes Stripes 
By Mark Baard?

Story location: http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,62545,00.html

02:00 AM Mar. 05, 2004 PT

Your next wallet may be 8 mm thick and contain the only card you'll ever need.

 Chameleon Network, in Concord, Massachusetts, plans to replace the stacks
of credit, bank and customer-loyalty cards burdening modern consumers with
a single, rewritable Chameleon Card, which works just like an ordinary card
with a magnetic strip.


 The Chameleon Card's black strip covers a programmable transducer that
mimics the information on the magnetic strips of the cards it is replacing.
A new handheld device from Chameleon, the Pocket Vault, programs the
Chameleon Card to take the place of any credit card the consumer chooses
for a transaction.

 Shoppers will be able to swipe their Chameleon Cards through the same
magnetic readers used in stores and banks today. And instead of reading bar
codes off the back of customer-loyalty cards, retail bar-code readers will
scan the bar code displayed on the Pocket Vault itself.

 The Pocket Vault has a slot for the Chameleon Card, but has no buttons or
stylus. The device, which will be about half the size of an iPaq pocket PC,
will be on sale in stores such as Best Buy and Circuit City as early as
January 2005, according to Chameleon CEO Todd Burger.

 First-time users of the Pocket Vault will read their old credit cards with
the device, which stores their information internally and backs it up to an
online or local database in case the Pocket Vault is lost or stolen. Each
credit card stored on the Pocket Vault is then represented by an icon on
the device's touch-screen display.

 The Pocket Vault also prompts its owners to place their fingerprints on
the device's reader pad to create a biometric profile.

 To use the Chameleon Card for a credit card transaction, a shopper taps
the logo on the Pocket Vault's display representing the credit card account
he wants to use. Seconds later, the Pocket Vault spits out the shopper's
Chameleon Card, with the selected credit card account number, expiration
date and logo imprinted on its flexible display, and its transducer
reconfigured to work in the store's or bank's magnetic card reader.

 The Pocket Vault, which Burger expects to sell for less than $200, will
also replace ExxonMobil's Speedpass and similar radio-frequency
identification applications with its own, built-in RFID chips.

 But the Pocket Vault promises to do more than prevent slipped discs caused
by overstuffed wallets. Its security features should also help safeguard
shoppers from the devastation of credit card fraud and identity theft, said
Burger.

 The Pocket Vault will only power up when it detects its owner's
fingerprint. And unlike an ordinary credit card, the information stored on
a Chameleon Card becomes unreadable (and the transducer inoperable) within
10 minutes.

 The Pocket Vault also switches off shortly after ejecting a Chameleon Card.

 That's plenty of time for a shopper to swipe his Chameleon Card through a
magnetic reader at the grocery store, but hardly enough for a thief to do
much damage to the shopper's credit.

 "Your worst possible exposure," said Burger, "is that a thief may be able
to get in one illegal purchase in the 10 minutes after the card is ejected
from the (Pocket Vault)."

 Major credit companies, banks and other financial institutions are just
weeks away from signing an agreement with Chameleon, said Burger.

 Chameleon has built most of the components of the Pocket Vault system, and
it has successfully tested its replacement for the Speedpass.

 But an analyst warned that, although the Pocket Vault and Chameleon Card
may be easy to use, consumers are typically reluctant to change their
buying behaviors.

 They may also balk at the Pocket Vault's strongest security feature, its
use of fingerprint authentication.

 "Consumers still associate biometrics with an invasion of their privacy,"
said Forrester Research analyst Penny Gillespie. "For better or worse, they
see it as intrusive."


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From jbone at place.org  Sun Mar  7 20:42:43 2004
From: jbone at place.org (jbone at place.org)
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 2004 22:42:43 -0600
Subject: [FoRK] Outlawing dissent:  COINTELPRO resurgence
Message-ID: <mailman.838.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


There was a recent NOW bit re: trends in domestic spying... prompted me
to hunt around a bit, found this --- essentially the same gist.

I love it:  the Quakers (American Friends Service Committee) --- a
"criminal extremist" group.  Well, hell yeah, that damned philosophy of
"perfect silence" is criminally annoying. ;-)


--

	http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/printer_5102.shtml

 From AxisofLogic.com

Civil Rights/Human Rights
Outlawing dissent: Spying on peace meetings, cracking down on
protesters, keeping secret files on innocent people -- how Bush's war
on terror has become a war on freedom

By Michelle Goldberg
Feb 12, 2004, 10:07

News
A sting-ball grenade thrown by Oakland police, foreground, explodes
over running protesters during an antiwar protest in Oakland, Calif.,
April 7, 2003.

February 11, 2004-The undercover cop introduced herself to the
activists from the Colorado Coalition Against the War in Iraq as Chris
Hoffman, but her real name was Chris Hurley. Last March, she arrived at
a nonviolence training session in Denver, along with another undercover
officer, Brad Wanchisen, whom she introduced as her boyfriend. The
session, held at the Escuela Tlatelolco, a Denver private school, was
organized to prepare activists for a sit-in at the Buckley Air National
Guard Base the next day, March 15. Hurley said she wanted to
participate. She said she was willing to get arrested for the cause of
peace. In fact, she did get arrested. She was just never charged. The
activists she protested with wouldn't find out why for months.

Chris Hurley was just one of many cops all over the country who went
undercover to spy on antiwar protesters last year. Nonviolent antiwar
groups in Fresno, Calif., Grand Rapids, Mich., and Albuquerque, N.M.,
have all been infiltrated or surveilled by undercover police officers.
Shortly after the Buckley protest, the Boulder group was infiltrated a
second time, by another pair of police posing as an activist couple.

Meanwhile, protesters arrested at antiwar demonstrations in New York
last spring were extensively questioned about their political
associations, and their answers were entered into databases. And last
week, a federal prosecutor in Des Moines, Iowa, obtained a subpoena
demanding that Drake University turn over records from an antiwar
conference called "Stop the Occupation! Bring the Iowa Guard Home!"
that the school's chapter of the National Lawyers Guild, a civil
libertarian legal group, hosted on Nov. 15 of last year, the day before
a protest at the Iowa National Guard headquarters. Among the
information the government sought was the names of the leaders of the
Drake University Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild, its records
dating back to January of 2002, and the names of everyone who attended
the "Stop the Occupation!" conference. Four antiwar activists also
received subpoenas in the investigation.

On Tuesday, after a national outcry, the U.S. Attorney's Office
canceled the subpoenas. Still, says Bruce Nestor, a former president of
the National Lawyers Guild who is serving as the Drake chapter's
attorney, "We're concerned that some type of investigation is ongoing."

In the early 1970s, after the exposure of COINTELPRO, a program of
widespread FBI surveillance and sabotage of political dissidents,
reforms were put in place to prevent the government from spying on
political groups when there was no suspicion of criminal activity. But
once again, protesters throughout America are being watched, often by
police who are supposed to be investigating terrorism. Civil
disobedience, seen during peaceful times as the honorable legacy of
heroes like Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., is being treated as
terrorism's cousin, and the government claims to be justified in
infiltrating any meeting where it's even discussed. It's too early to
tell if America is entering a repeat of the COINTELPRO era. But Jeffrey
Fogel, legal director of the Center for Constitutional Law in
Manhattan, says, "There are certainly enough warning signs out there
that we may be."

As a new round of protests approaches -- including worldwide antiwar
demonstrations on March 20 and massive anti-Bush actions during the
Republican National Convention in August and September -- experts say
the surveillance is likely to increase. "The government is taking an
increasingly hostile stance toward protesters," says Michael Avery,
president of the National Lawyers Guild and a professor of
constitutional law at Suffolk University. In the run-up to the
Republican Convention, he says, "I'm sure the government will be
attempting to infiltrate political groups. They may send agent
provocateurs into political groups. They're no doubt compiling reports
on people. We have to stand up against that."

No one knows the extent of the political spying and profiling currently
being carried out against critics of the Bush administration and
American foreign policy -- which may be the most disturbing thing about
the entire phenomenon. "Presumably if they're doing their jobs well,
we'll never know," says Fogel. Activists have also been unsuccessful at
finding out why they're being watched, and under whose authority.

What we do know, though, is that several of the police departments that
have been accused of spying on protesters -- including the Aurora,
Colo., Police Department, where Hurley works -- are part of Joint
Terrorism Task Forces. These are programs in which local police are
assigned to work full-time with FBI agents and other federal agents "to
investigate and prevent acts of terrorism," as the FBI's Web site says.
According to the FBI, such JTTFs have been around since 1980, but the
total number has almost doubled since Sept. 11, 2001, to 66.

A Polk County deputy sheriff assigned to a Joint Terrorism Task Force
served the subpoenas in Iowa. According to Nestor, the deputy sheriff
even handed out business cards that identified him as part of the JTTF.
On Monday, though, after what Nestor describes as a "tremendous public
reaction" following news reports of the JTTF's involvement, the U.S.
Attorney's Office in Des Moines issued a written statement denying that
the investigation was being conducted by the task force.

The U.S. Attorney's Office confirms that the investigation is a
collaboration between the FBI, the Polk County Sheriff's Department and
the U.S. Attorney's Office -- all of whom, Nestor notes, serve on the
JTTF. It focuses on a case of misdemeanor trespassing on government
property that took place on Nov. 16, near the antiwar protest.
According to Nestor, the case involves someone who "walked up to a
closed gate" outside the National Guard's armory, "had a conversation
with the guards and got charged with trespassing." The police and FBI
are now investigating whether people at the antiwar conference entered
into some kind of conspiracy to break the law -- in other words,
whether they planned acts of civil disobedience.

"They appear to be taking the stance that if any individual, as part of
or in relation to a protest, commits an act that might be a violation
of federal law, that they can subpoena and investigate any records of
any meeting that person may have gone to in the days or even months
proceeding," says Nestor.

Avery suggests that such investigations will have a chilling effect on
the planning for future protests. "The risk is that if there's some
kind of demonstration or protest activity that involves trespassing,
[the JTTF] is saying they can ask people what political meetings have
you been to lately, who was there, what did you talk about," says
Avery. "People are allowed to meet and talk and debate political issues
without being spied on by the government." At least, they used to be.

Whether or not a Joint Terrorism Task Force was behind the Iowa
investigation, JTTFs have already been implicated in political spying.
In a three-ring binder from the Denver Police Department Intelligence
Unit obtained by the Colorado ACLU, a section labeled "Colorado and
Local Links: JTTF Active Case List" contained printouts made in April
2002 from the Web sites of the Colorado Campaign for Middle East Peace,
American Friends Service Committee, Denver Justice and Peace Committee
and the Rocky Mountain Independent Media Center. One of the printouts,
a copy of which is available on the ACLU's Web site, is the American
Friends Service Committee's calendar of upcoming antiwar events.

Last November, the New York Times revealed a leaked FBI memo asking
local police to report protest activity to their local Joint Terrorism
Task Force. The bulletin, sent to law enforcement agencies on Oct. 15,
2003, warned about antiwar protests planned for Oct. 25, saying, "While
the FBI possesses no information indicating that violent or terrorist
activities are being planned as part of these protests, the possibility
exists that elements of the activist community may attempt to engage in
violent, destructive, or dangerous acts."

The bulletin went on to list common protest methods including marches
and sit-ins, as well as "aggressive tactics" used by "extremist
elements," including vandalism, trespassing, physical harassment,
formation of human chains and the use of weapons.

"Even the more peaceful techniques can create a climate of disorder,
block access to a site, draw large numbers of police officers to a
specific location in order to weaken security at other locations,
obstruct traffic, and possibly intimidate people from attending the
events being protested," it warned.

It ended by saying, "Law enforcement agencies should be alert to these
possible indications of protest activity and report any potentially
illegal acts to the nearest FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force."

The Colorado activists who attended nonviolence training with Chris
Hurley remember her as shy and timid. She didn't arouse suspicion at
either the training session, where people practiced staying calm even
when confronted by aggressive police, or the next day, when she showed
up at the demonstration.

On March 15, around 300 people protested near the Buckley base, but
only 18 (not including Hurley) engaged in civil disobedience by sitting
in the road and blocking the base's entrance. The action was no secret
-- the Colorado Coalition Against the War had informed police of what
it intended to do in advance. "We always have a police liaison when we
have a civil disobedience," says participant Terry Leichner, a
54-year-old psychiatric social worker and veteran activist. "We always
work with police so there's no violence."

The Aurora Police Department doesn't deny that the activists told them
exactly what they planned to do. Indeed, they use that fact as a
rationale for infiltrating the group. "Prior to the actual protest,
this group came to the police department and told us they were going to
conduct criminal acts in our city," says Kathleen Walsh, the Aurora
Police Department's public information officer. "We have a
responsibility to the citizens of Aurora to investigate." Walsh insists
that the activists' willingness to tell the police their plans didn't
mitigate the need to spy on the group. "Can you guarantee me that
people don't lie to police?" she said. Walsh asked that further
questions -- including those about Hurley's connection to
counterterrorism investigations -- be submitted in writing. She has yet
to answer them.

Having been warned in advance, the police arrived quickly to remove the
Buckley demonstrators. They wore riot gear, but didn't need it -- the
protesters, including Hurley, were arrested without incident, and the
whole thing was over in an hour. All 19 arrestees were taken to a
holding cell, where the activists say Hurley seemed nervous. Nancy
Peters, a 56-year-old protest organizer, recalls trying to comfort her,
but Hurley didn't say much. While the rest of the group exchanged
stories, Leichner says, Hurley was "noncommittal." When they were
released, she didn't attend a meeting the activists had to plan legal
strategy, but according to Peters, she asked to be kept informed.

None of the activists found out that Hurley was an Aurora police
officer until the discovery phase of their trials last spring.

By then, though, their lawyers had reason to be suspicious. A month
after the Buckley protest, the Colorado Coalition was infiltrated
again, by an undercover officer from the Arapahoe County Sheriff's
Office, which is also part of a Joint Terrorism Task Force. This time,
the group realized something was up.

On April 14, the activists planned to meet with Republican Sen. Wayne
Allard, a supporter of the war, and ask him to present a "peace
resolution" to Congress. Several of the activists planned to refuse to
leave his office unless he acceded to their demands, which no one
expected him to do.

Peters, who was arrested at Buckley, was one of the organizers of the
Allard action and was going to be on hand to bail out activists taken
to jail. Again, the Colorado Coalition held a nonviolence training
session the day before for those planning to be arrested.

Peters remembers unloading her car outside the church where the
training was held when she saw a couple walking by, looking like they
were "killing time" before finally going inside. The man, a muscular
guy who looked to be in his 30s, introduced himself as Chris Taylor and
said the woman with him was his girlfriend. In fact, his name was
Darren Christensen and he was an undercover officer, as was Liesl
McArthur, the woman he was with. As the Rocky Mountain News reported in
December, much of his usual undercover work involved "being solicited
on line for deviant sex."

Unlike Hurley, Christensen immediately made the activists nervous. "A
couple of people from the group came up and said, 'Who are they? Do you
know them from any other events?'" says Peters. "He was pumping for
information, asking questions about whether there was a group that was
more radical and had a different focus, more like the black bloc or the
anarchists."

At the time, though, it didn't occur to anyone that the police would be
interested in spying on them. So they let Christensen participate, even
after he made what Peters thought was an outlandish suggestion.

"It was in the evening when we were trying to figure out our general
plan," she says. "We didn't know whether the police would be blocking
the entrance to Allard's office." They were discussing whether the six
people planning the sit-in should go in as a group, or one by one, in
order to evade attention. "[Christensen] said, 'Look, why don't we just
walk right through their line?' We were like, whoa, nobody wants to get
their heads blown off," says Peters. "We are peaceful, nonviolent
group. We're not trying to storm a building."

The next day, the group met beforehand to coordinate. Everyone who
planned to get arrested gave Peters bond money, except for Christensen,
who said his girlfriend would bail him out. The six entered Allard's
office at 1 p.m., and by 5 p.m. they'd all been arrested.

"I raced over to the jail," says Peters. "There were several people
there, including his 'girlfriend.' I was trying to find out who'd been
booked and what their bail was, but none had been put into the system
yet."

Peters was standing in the jailhouse lobby and talking on a pay phone
when, out of the corner of her eye, she saw Christensen walking out the
door. "He had a phony story about how his girlfriend got him out," she
says. "I asked, 'Can I see your summons?' He didn't have one."

Peters passed her concerns on to her group's pro bono defense
attorneys, who soon found that although six people had been arrested,
only five had been charged. Then, while reviewing the Buckley case,
they noticed that while 19 people had been arrested there, only 18 were
charged. Eventually, by subpoenaing police records, the attorneys
figured out that police had sent the undercover agents to infiltrate
the group.

Once exposed, Hurley turned up in court to watch the protesters' trials.

"When she came to court, she just seemed so arrogant," says Ellen
Stark, a 57-year-old preschool teacher who is part of the group
arrested at Buckely. "She was not at all apologetic about her
activities and the fact that she had lied to us. She just looked at us
with disdain." None of the activists have been able to get any answers
from officials about why they were being watched. "I couldn't interest
anybody on the Aurora City council to even meet with me," says Stark.
"Nobody would talk to me."

America has seen this kind of thing before. Between 1956 and 1971, the
FBI under J. Edgar Hoover ran COINTELPRO, a program of surveillance and
sabotage against political dissidents. COINTELPRO watched violent
groups like the Ku Klux Klan and, later, the Weather Underground and
the Black Panthers, but it also spied on and harassed thousands of
innocent people, including Martin Luther King Jr.

COINTELPRO's abuses came to light in 1971, when a group of activists
calling themselves the Citizens Commission to Investigate the FBI broke
into an FBI office in Media, Penn., and stole several hundred pages of
files.

In his recent history of COINTELPRO, "There's Something Happening Here:
The New Left, the Klan and FBI Counterintelligence," David Cunningham
writes, "These files provided the first public disclosure of a range of
Bureau activities against targets such as the Black Panther Party, the
Venceremos Brigade, the Philadelphia Labor Committee, Students for a
Democratic Society, and college students with 'revolutionary'
leanings."

Eventually, damaging revelations about COINTELPRO led the FBI to adopt
reforms designed to prevent a repeat of Hoover's excesses. Attorney
General Edward Levi laid out a set of standards for FBI domestic
surveillance. "These so-called Levi Guidelines clearly laid out the
criteria required for initiated investigations, establishing a standard
of suspected criminal conduct, meaning activity (rather than merely
ideas or writings, which had been adequate cause for targeting groups
and individuals as subversive during the COINTELPRO era)," Cunningham
writes. "The guidelines also stipulated as acceptable only particular
investigative techniques, making it considerably more difficult to
initiate intrusive forms of surveillance."

The Levi guidelines didn't end all political spying -- in the 1980s,
the FBI targeted the Committee in Solidarity With the People of El
Salvador, or CISPES. As the ACLU reports, "Strong evidence suggests
that CISPES was targeted for investigation because of its ideological
opposition to then-President Reagan's already controversial foreign
policy in Latin America. The FBI persisted in an intensive six-month
investigation of CISPES in which it often reported the group's
activities to the Department of Justice in a prejudicial and biased
manner." Yet most civil libertarians believe that even if the rules
were occasionally broken, they still worked to protect First Amendment
rights.

Contrary to the claims made by defenders of Bush administration
policies, the Levi guidelines would not have impeded an investigation
of al-Qaida. As Cunningham points out, cases "with suspected ties to
'foreign powers' were not subject to this criminal standard."
Nevertheless, after Sept. 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued new
rules gutting the Levi guidelines. Thanks to Ashcroft, FBI agents are
now allowed to monitor public meetings even if they don't have any
reason to suspect that there's any criminal activity being committed or
planned.

"Now, that means if there is a rally of people who are criticizing the
United States and its policies and saying that the United States will
someday perhaps be destroyed because of that, the FBI agent can go and
listen to what's being said," Ashcroft told CNN's Larry King in May of
2002. In other words, merely arguing that U.S. policies may result in
the country's destruction justifies FBI snooping. This gives the FBI
investigative license far beyond even that it enjoyed during the
COINTELPRO period, let alone under the Levi Guidelines.

There's no way to know how often the FBI is actually monitoring
protesters. The cases that have come to light so far have involved
local police officers, not federal agents, and in most instances it's
unclear whether they've been working in concert with the FBI. For
example, last year in Fresno, the antiwar group Peace Fresno discovered
they'd been infiltrated when an undercover cop who'd been attending
their meetings was killed in a motorcycle accident. When his obituary
was published, members of Peace Fresno realized that the man they knew
as Aaron Stokes was really Aaron Kilner, a member of the Fresno County
Sheriff's Department's anti-terrorism unit.

There is a Joint Terrorism Task Force in Fresno, but members of Peace
Fresno and their lawyers have not yet been able to find out whether
Kilner was spying on them for the FBI, and whether he gave the FBI any
information about their activities.

Not that there's much information to give. "This is a group that passes
petitions and goes to city council meetings," says Nicholas DeGraff, a
Peace Fresno organizer. "When we have a demonstration, we call the
police ahead of time." The group, he says, is made up of "retirees,
grandparents, schoolteachers and community workers. Your model citizens
just participating in democracy."

The group has around 200 people on its membership roster, says DeGraff,
with an active core of about 25 people. In early 2003, Kilner paid a
$12 membership fee and joined them. He told the group that he didn't
work and lived off an inheritance. In the weeks before the war in Iraq,
he came to meetings and participated in the weekly demonstrations Peace
Fresno held at a local intersection.

He said little, DeGraff recalls, and never volunteered to do anything
beyond passing out flyers. Most of the time, says DeGraff, he sat in a
corner and took notes. Even after the war, he kept coming, showing up
at meetings every few weeks. When the group went to Sacramento to
protest at a WTO ministerial meeting in June, he went with them. He
died in August.

Peace Fresno has since been assured by the Fresno Sheriff's Department
that it is not under investigation and has never been under
investigation. That may be true in some bureaucratic sense, but the
fact remains that an anti-terrorism agent spent half a year surveilling
them. "It's equating dissent with terrorism," says DeGraff. "It's
saying if you dissent, you're a terrorist."

In fact, that's exactly what some law enforcement officers have said.

On April 2 of last year, the California Anti-Terrorism Information
Center, which is under the auspices of the state Justice Department but
whose regional task forces include FBI agents, issued a bulletin
warning to police about potential violence at an antiwar protest
scheduled for the Port of Oakland. An Oakland Tribune investigation
found that the Anti-Terrorism Information Center had little substantive
information regarding possible violence. "Intelligence records released
under open-government laws reveal the thinking of CATIC and Oakland
intelligence officials in the days leading up to the protest," said a
June 1 story by Ian Hoffman, Sean Holstege and Josh Richman. The
agencies, they wrote, "blended solid facts, innuendo and inaccurate
information about anti-war protesters expected at the port."

The protest did in fact turn violent, but according to documentary
evidence the violence was precipitated by the police, who fired on
demonstrators with wooden bullets and beanbags. The Tribune reported
that, according to videotapes and transcripts of radio transmissions of
the event, there's no evidence of "protesters throwing objects at
police or engaging in civil disobedience until 20 minutes after police
opened fire."

So why was the warning issued in the first place? In an interview with
the Tribune, Mike Van Winkle, spokesman for the California
Anti-Terrorism Information Center, issued a remarkably broad definition
of terrorism. "You can make an easy kind of link that, if you have a
protest group protesting a war where the cause that's being fought
against is international terrorism, you might have terrorism at that
protest," he said. "You can almost argue that a protest against that is
a terrorist act."

This egregious statement, in which a law enforcement representative
takes it upon himself to judge the legitimacy of democratic protest,
seems to confirm the worst fears of civil libertarians that Bush's "war
against terror" is actually a war against dissent. Of course, whether
Van Winkle actually believes that antiwar protesters are as dangerous
to the citizens of California as al-Qaida is impossible to say. But
it's not just rhetorical excess or fascistic impulses that lead
officials to speak of demonstrators as terrorists. They may actually
have a bureaucratic and financial incentive to do so.

"This is a good way for police officers to get terrorism points," says
Timothy Edgar, legislative counsel for the ACLU . "They have to justify
the dollars they're receiving from the federal government for homeland
security. We've seen a massive inflation of terrorism statistics on the
federal level. Every Arab who has a phony drivers license is now called
a terrorist by the Justice Department, so they can say, 'We've arrested
thousands of terrorists.'

"This is the perfect example of not learning the lessons of 9/11," he
continues. "The FBI was not sufficiently focused on the possibility
that a group like al-Qaida would commit a serious terrorist attack. One
real failure since 9/11 is that, when they call everything a
'terrorist,' they're still not sufficiently focused on actual
terrorists. There's an overbroad definition of domestic terrorism in
the PATRIOT Act, and it's had a spillover effect into state and local
governments who want to justify their antiterrorism funding and
mission."

In a Nation article from May 2002, Robert Dreyfuss wrote of that
spillover effect. The Justice Department, he reported, had offered
billions of dollars in anti-terror subsidies to local governments, but
first they had to show that there were "potential threat elements" in
their area.

"Under the Justice Department program each state was asked to conduct a
county-by-county assessment of potential terrorist threats in order to
qualify for the federal largesse," Dreyfuss wrote. "In each city and
county local police were required to identify up to fifteen groups or
individuals called potential threat elements (PTEs). The Justice
Department helpfully points out that the motivations of the PTEs could
be 'political, religious, racial, environmental [or] special interest.'
At a stroke, the Justice Department prompted 17,000 state and local
police departments to begin monitoring radicals."

Thus even if the FBI isn't working directly with local police to spy on
protesters, the messages coming from the Justice Department influence
the agencies below, says Edgar. "The Ashcroft Justice Department has
set a terrible example," he says. "They're sending the wrong message
around the country to the state and local police. Local and state
police will follow the FBI's example on a lot of things. On top of
that, add big grants for homeland security and you've got a recipe for
a lot more political spying."

This is the first of two parts.

Michelle Goldberg is a staff writer for Salon based in New York.

http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/02/11/cointelpro/




) Copyright 2003 by YourSITE.com
_______________________________________________
FoRK mailing list
http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork

----- End forwarded message -----
-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From ben at algroup.co.uk  Mon Mar  8 01:19:23 2004
From: ben at algroup.co.uk (Ben Laurie)
Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2004 09:19:23 +0000
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
In-Reply-To: <E1AzatD-0007dZ-Dd@medusa01>
References: <E1AzatD-0007dZ-Dd@medusa01>
Message-ID: <404C3A9B.90502@algroup.co.uk>

Peter Gutmann wrote:

> Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> writes:
> 
> 
>>"A way that works" would involve passphrase-locked keyrings, and forgetful
>>MUAs (this mutt only caches the passphrase for a preset time).
> 
> 
> "A way that works *in theory* would involve ...".  The chances of any vendor
> of mass-market software shipping an MUA where the user has to enter a password
> just to send mail are approximately... zero.

And it doesn't even work in theory - once your PC is hacked, the 
passphrase would be known the first time you used it.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html       http://www.thebunker.net/

"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Mar  8 02:44:00 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2004 11:44:00 +0100
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
In-Reply-To: <404C3A9B.90502@algroup.co.uk>
References: <E1AzatD-0007dZ-Dd@medusa01> <404C3A9B.90502@algroup.co.uk>
Message-ID: <20040308104400.GR18046@leitl.org>

On Mon, Mar 08, 2004 at 09:19:23AM +0000, Ben Laurie wrote:

> And it doesn't even work in theory - once your PC is hacked, the
> passphrase would be known the first time you used it.

True, but in the current threat model passphrase snarfing is yet negligible
(keyloggers look for credit card info, etc.). Also, the fraction of 0wn3d
to pristine machines is low, and likely go become lower in future. So the
egress points of spam remain few, and if they come with signatures, so much
better for us. If they don't come with signatures, or use variable signatures
(if you disregard entropy pool issues, how many signatures/min can you churn
out on a desktop PC?), ditto (if you compute spam score by signed, and know
signed vs unsigned).

*BSD and Linux penetration rate (desktop, not server) is low, Redmondware is
about to become similiarly hardened at the network layer. Things are still a
bit dismal at the userland executable level, but security has become a
selling argument. So, sooner or later, they will have to start selling
something palpably more secure, instead of just waffling about it.

The passphrase locking idear won't fly, but a biometrics-lockable wallet
could. Isn't
part of Pd envelope goal establishing a tamper-proof compartment? We know Pd
is evil, but once hardware support is everywhere, one can as well use it for
something positive, for a change.

-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Mar  8 04:31:02 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2004 13:31:02 +0100
Subject: [FoRK] Outlawing dissent:  COINTELPRO resurgence (fwd from
  jbone@place.org)
Message-ID: <20040308123102.GI18046@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from "jbone @ place. org" <jbone at place.org> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar  8 16:44:24 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2004 19:44:24 -0500
Subject: Evidence is clear: Videos convict
Message-ID: <p06100316bc72bf01264c@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www2.ocregister.com/ocrweb/ocr/article.do?id=84540>

The Orange County Register

Monday, March 8, 2004

 Evidence is clear: Videos convict
  And sometimes it's the accused themselves who provide the taped version
of the smoking gun.


 By LARRY WELBORN
 The Orange County Register


 Twelve jurors and two alternates sat almost unblinkingly in a 10th-floor
courtroom and watched a 21-minute videotape on two television monitors.

Some squirmed in the swivel seats in the jury box but their eyes remained
riveted on the screens, watching images of two men having sex with an
apparently unconscious woman in a Newport Beach apartment as techno music
droned in the background.

The trial of Allen Ward Crocker provided jurors with a rare chance to see
exactly what happened in a case of alleged sexual assault.

 Most of the time, jurors must decide guilt or innocence based on witness
memories, documents or expert testimony. But with the inexpensive but
still-sharp video cameras in existence these days, videotaped evidence is
becoming more and more common in criminal courtrooms, veteran lawyers say.

The Crocker case has similarities to the pending prosecution of Gregory
Haidl, the son of an assistant sheriff, and two of his teenage friends.

 They face trial next month in the alleged rape of an unconscious
16-year-old girl in July 2002.

 Haidl, 18, videotaped the encounter in Newport Beach, and now prosecutors
are using those images against him.

 The accused aren't the only ones providing police with videotape to show
jurors.

 In Los Angeles, an amateur photographer recorded the notorious videotape
of Rodney King being beaten by Los Angeles police officers. And in Orange
County, a surveillance camera at a convenience store captured images of a
former mental patient murdering sheriff's Deputy Brad Riches.

 "I call it the proliferation of Little Brother," said Costa Mesa defense
attorney Paul S. Meyer, who has prosecuted and defended in criminal cases
in Orange County for more than 30 years. "You know, just about everyone has
a video camera these days. It's only common sense that these videotapes are
showing up in trials."

In the Crocker case, it took the eight-man, four-woman jury just 90 minutes
to reach a verdict: guilty of rape.

Deputy District Attorney Steve McGreevy argued that the videotape clearly
depicted a crime-in-progress: The woman was unconscious after an evening of
bar-hopping in Newport Beach and unable to give consent.

 Defense attorney Robert Chatterton insisted that the videotape showed that
if the woman was unconscious, then Crocker, 36, of Tustin, was unaware of
it. Crocker had a good-faith belief that the woman consented to sex,
Chatterton argued.

 "We were able to witness it ourselves," said juror Kristina Durbin, 27, a
health-care worker who lives in Mission Viejo. "Without the videotape, I
wouldn't have been able to reach the decision because he would have been
able to put doubt in my mind. But with the videotape, the crime he was
charged with was right in front of me."

 The rape was caught on tape because Crocker's friend and alleged
accomplice, Tim Marino, 41, started his video camera rolling after the
victim passed out.

 The victim testified that she didn't know what was happening to her and
didn't know that the episode had been videotaped.

A $500,000 arrest warrant has been issued for Marino, who never kept an
appointment with a Newport Beach police detective after an investigation of
the Sept. 14, 2003, encounter was launched.

 Prominent Orange County defense attorney Jennifer Keller, a former deputy
public defender and a former president of the Orange County Bar
Association, said videotaped crimes won't be so rare in the future.

"It seems everything we do now is recorded or videotaped," Keller said. "To
our children, video cameras are second nature."

Assistant District Attorney Roseanne Froeberg, head of the office's
sex-crimes unit, said there have been sporadic cases in the past in which
rapes or other sex crimes were memorialized on videotape. But she said she
is seeing more of them lately.

"It does make it easier for us to prosecute when criminals videotape
themselves in the act," she said. "But to me, it is a sad commentary on our
society. Videotaping their perversions for sport takes things to different
level. An incredibly ugly level, in my opinion."

Said Meyer: "I call these ego crimes, where the criminals memorialize their
deeds on videotape." And yes, he added, "we will be seeing more and more of
these."

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From anmetet at freedom.gmsociety.org  Mon Mar  8 21:01:54 2004
From: anmetet at freedom.gmsociety.org (An Metet)
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2004 00:01:54 -0500
Subject: Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
Message-ID: <dd1cec9d27a5cea343eda6a092a07357@anonymous>

Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> writes:

> The passphrase locking idear won't fly, but a biometrics-lockable
> wallet could. Isn't part of Pd envelope goal establishing a tamper-proof
> compartment? We know Pd is evil, but once hardware support is everywhere,
> one can as well use it for something positive, for a change.

Well, you're preaching to the choir now, son.  Of course, it's a choir
of one, but c'est la vie.  The idea of finding good uses for Trusted
Computing has not exactly been gushingly popular around here.  In fact,
you yourself have been one of the harshest critics of its pseudonymous
proponent ("intelligent idiot" sound familiar?).

The problem with Palladium as a solution to spam is first, that it is
many years away, being part of the Longhorn OS release.  The latest
official estimates are 2006, rumors are that 2007 is the internal date,
and whispers of 2008 exist.  Then, it will take years before such systems
become widely enough used that spammers can no longer find pre-Palladium
systems to serve as a basis for attacks.  We're probably talking 2011
at the earliest.  We'll need adequate solutions to spam long before then.

Secondly, you could use Palladium to arrange that it was impossible
to send mail from your computer except via human interaction with your
authorized email program.  You'd have to set your outgoing mail server
to require a password (such auth systems are already in widespread use)
and you'd use Pd to lock up the password so that only the mail client
could get at it (using the application-specific sealed storage feature).
The user wouldn't have to type the password, in fact he wouldn't even
have to know there was a password, but he'd have to click the send
button himself.  (Secure user I/O paths are a Palladium feature.)

However, in doing this you give up the ability for ANY other program to
send email, at least without the user jumping through a lot of hoops
to authorize it.  Maybe that's an inherently necessary feature, but
there are arguably some "good" programs which can usefully send email,
and you'll be tossing out those babies with the spam bathwater.  Bye
bye MAPI.

Further, there's always the risk that the email program itself will be
buggy and be able to be tricked into sending something without user
authorization.  Fortunately, the number of such bugs is likely to be
few and confined to just one program, so those can probably be fixed
relatively quickly.

In short, Trusted Computing could in theory make a computer much more
resistant to being used to send spam.  It could still be taken over,
but the malware wouldn't be able to get to the password necessary for
sending mail.  You'd need some help from the ISP to require the password
and possibly block attempts to use remote mail servers.  Of course,
if the ISP is this clueful and cooperative, you'd think maybe it could
stop you from sending a zillion messages per hour in the first place.

The big problem is that TC is many years away.  But now that you know how
good it will be, I hope you will join me in my never ending battle to
bring some perspective to the one-sided "debate" over this technology.
There are good uses of TC, and maybe if people weren't so determined to
oppose it with their last breath, we might see the technology becoming
available a little sooner.




From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com  Tue Mar  9 06:34:04 2004
From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV)
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2004 06:34:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Evidence is clear: Videos convict
In-Reply-To: <p06100316bc72bf01264c@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20040309143404.41239.qmail@web21205.mail.yahoo.com>

doesn't sound good,hope all the court rooms will be
able to authenticate the tape,I mean a very good
editing tool and a CG expert working on it may come
out with real frightening stuff.
Who would say that the dinasours of jurrasic park
didn't look real :)

Sarath.


--- "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote:
>
<http://www2.ocregister.com/ocrweb/ocr/article.do?id=84540>
> 
> The Orange County Register
> 
> Monday, March 8, 2004
> 
>  Evidence is clear: Videos convict
>   And sometimes it's the accused themselves who
> provide the taped version
> of the smoking gun.
> 
> 
>  By LARRY WELBORN
>  The Orange County Register
> 
> 
>  Twelve jurors and two alternates sat almost
> unblinkingly in a 10th-floor
> courtroom and watched a 21-minute videotape on two
> television monitors.
> 
> Some squirmed in the swivel seats in the jury box
> but their eyes remained
> riveted on the screens, watching images of two men
> having sex with an
> apparently unconscious woman in a Newport Beach
> apartment as techno music
> droned in the background.
> 
> The trial of Allen Ward Crocker provided jurors with
> a rare chance to see
> exactly what happened in a case of alleged sexual
> assault.
> 
>  Most of the time, jurors must decide guilt or
> innocence based on witness
> memories, documents or expert testimony. But with
> the inexpensive but
> still-sharp video cameras in existence these days,
> videotaped evidence is
> becoming more and more common in criminal
> courtrooms, veteran lawyers say.
> 
> The Crocker case has similarities to the pending
> prosecution of Gregory
> Haidl, the son of an assistant sheriff, and two of
> his teenage friends.
> 
>  They face trial next month in the alleged rape of
> an unconscious
> 16-year-old girl in July 2002.
> 
>  Haidl, 18, videotaped the encounter in Newport
> Beach, and now prosecutors
> are using those images against him.
> 
>  The accused aren't the only ones providing police
> with videotape to show
> jurors.
> 
>  In Los Angeles, an amateur photographer recorded
> the notorious videotape
> of Rodney King being beaten by Los Angeles police
> officers. And in Orange
> County, a surveillance camera at a convenience store
> captured images of a
> former mental patient murdering sheriff's Deputy
> Brad Riches.
> 
>  "I call it the proliferation of Little Brother,"
> said Costa Mesa defense
> attorney Paul S. Meyer, who has prosecuted and
> defended in criminal cases
> in Orange County for more than 30 years. "You know,
> just about everyone has
> a video camera these days. It's only common sense
> that these videotapes are
> showing up in trials."
> 
> In the Crocker case, it took the eight-man,
> four-woman jury just 90 minutes
> to reach a verdict: guilty of rape.
> 
> Deputy District Attorney Steve McGreevy argued that
> the videotape clearly
> depicted a crime-in-progress: The woman was
> unconscious after an evening of
> bar-hopping in Newport Beach and unable to give
> consent.
> 
>  Defense attorney Robert Chatterton insisted that
> the videotape showed that
> if the woman was unconscious, then Crocker, 36, of
> Tustin, was unaware of
> it. Crocker had a good-faith belief that the woman
> consented to sex,
> Chatterton argued.
> 
>  "We were able to witness it ourselves," said juror
> Kristina Durbin, 27, a
> health-care worker who lives in Mission Viejo.
> "Without the videotape, I
> wouldn't have been able to reach the decision
> because he would have been
> able to put doubt in my mind. But with the
> videotape, the crime he was
> charged with was right in front of me."
> 
>  The rape was caught on tape because Crocker's
> friend and alleged
> accomplice, Tim Marino, 41, started his video camera
> rolling after the
> victim passed out.
> 
>  The victim testified that she didn't know what was
> happening to her and
> didn't know that the episode had been videotaped.
> 
> A $500,000 arrest warrant has been issued for
> Marino, who never kept an
> appointment with a Newport Beach police detective
> after an investigation of
> the Sept. 14, 2003, encounter was launched.
> 
>  Prominent Orange County defense attorney Jennifer
> Keller, a former deputy
> public defender and a former president of the Orange
> County Bar
> Association, said videotaped crimes won't be so rare
> in the future.
> 
> "It seems everything we do now is recorded or
> videotaped," Keller said. "To
> our children, video cameras are second nature."
> 
> Assistant District Attorney Roseanne Froeberg, head
> of the office's
> sex-crimes unit, said there have been sporadic cases
> in the past in which
> rapes or other sex crimes were memorialized on
> videotape. But she said she
> is seeing more of them lately.
> 
> "It does make it easier for us to prosecute when
> criminals videotape
> themselves in the act," she said. "But to me, it is
> a sad commentary on our
> society. Videotaping their perversions for sport
> takes things to different
> level. An incredibly ugly level, in my opinion."
> 
> Said Meyer: "I call these ego crimes, where the
> criminals memorialize their
> deeds on videotape." And yes, he added, "we will be
> seeing more and more of
> these."
> 
> -- 
> -----------------
> R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation
> <http://www.ibuc.com/>
> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
> "... however it may deserve respect for its
> usefulness and antiquity,
> [predicting the end of the world] has not been found
> agreeable to
> experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of
> the Roman Empire'
> 


__________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Search - Find what youre looking for faster
http://search.yahoo.com




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Mar  9 07:01:17 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 09 Mar 2004 07:01:17 -0800
Subject: Coin flip nonrandom
Message-ID: <404DDC3D.7BA84E32@cdc.gov>

Science News Online

Week of Feb. 28, 2004; Vol. 165, No. 9
Toss Out the Toss-Up: Bias in heads-or-tails

Erica Klarreich

If you want to decide which football team takes the ball first or who
gets the larger piece of
cake, the fairest thing is to toss a coin, right? Not necessarily.

A new mathematical analysis suggests that coin tossing is inherently
biased: A coin is more likely
to land on the same face it started out on.

"I don't care how vigorously you throw it, you can't toss a coin
fairly," says Persi Diaconis, a
statistician at Stanford University who performed the study with Susan
Holmes of Stanford and
Richard Montgomery of the University of California, Santa Cruz.

In 1986, mathematician Joseph Keller, now an emeritus professor at
Stanford, proved that one
fair way to toss a coin is to throw it so that it spins perfectly around
a horizontal axis through the
coin's center.

Such a perfect toss would require superhuman precision. Every other
possible toss is biased,
according to an analysis described on Feb. 14 in Seattle at the annual
meeting of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science.

The researchers' logic goes like this. At the opposite extreme from
Keller's perfect toss is a
completely biased toss, in which the coin stays flat while in the air.
Since the coin never actually
flips, it is guaranteed to land on the same face that it started out on.

Between the perfectly spinning toss and the flat toss lies a continuum
of other possibilities, in
which the coin spins around a tilted axis, precessing like an
old-fashioned children's top. Each of
these possibilities is biased, the team found. The bias is most
pronounced when the flip is close
to being a flat toss. For a wide range of possible spins, the coin never
flips at all, the team
proved.

In experiments, the researchers were surprised to find that it's
difficult to tell from watching a
coin whether it has flipped. A coin toss typically takes just half a
second, with the circumference
of the coin whizzing around at 3 meters per second. What's more, the
coin's spin makes it
wobble, often creating the illusion that the coin has flipped.

"Sometimes we had the complete impression that the coin had turned over
when it really hadn't,"
Holmes says.

Magicians and charlatans may take advantage of this illusion. Keller
observes, "Some people
can throw the coin up so that it just wobbles but looks to the observer
as if it is turning over." To
see whether the predicted bias shows up in actual coin tosses, the team
made movies of tossed
coins and then calculated the axes of spin.

Their preliminary data suggest that a coin will land the same way it
started about 51 percent of
the time. It would take about 10,000 tosses before a casual observer
would become aware of
such a small bias, Diaconis says. "Maybe that's why society hasn't
noticed this before," he says.

This slight bias pales when compared with that of spinning a coin on its
edge. A spinning penny
will land as tails about

80 percent of the time, Diaconis says, because the extra material on the
head side shifts the
center of mass slightly.

During World War II, South African mathematician John Kerrich carried
out 10,000 coin tosses
while interned in a German prison camp. However, he didn't record which
side the coin started
on, so he couldn't have discovered the kind of bias the new analysis
brings out.

Says David Aldous, a statistician at the University of California,
Berkeley, "This is a good lesson
that even in simple things that people take for granted, there may be
unexpected subtleties."


          If you have a comment on this article that you would like
considered for
          publication in Science News, send it to
editors at sciencenews.org. Please
          include your name and location.



To subscribe to Science News (print), go to
https://www.kable.com/pub/scnw/ subServices.asp.

To sign up for the free weekly e-LETTER from Science News, go to
http://www.sciencenews.org/pages/subscribe_form.asp.

References:

Diaconis, P. 2004. The search for randomness. American Association for
the Advancement of
Science annual meeting. Feb. 14. Seattle.

Further Readings:

Keller, J.B. 1986. The probability of heads. American Mathematical
Monthly
93(March):191-197.

Peterson, I. 2004. Heads or tails? Science News Online (Feb. 28).
Available at
http://www.sciencenews.org/articles/20040228/mathtrek.asp.

Sources:

David Aldous
Department of Statistics
University of California, Berkeley
367 Evans Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-3860

Persi Diaconis
Department of Statistics
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-4065

Susan P. Holmes
Department of Statistics
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-4065

Joseph B. Keller
Stanford University
Department of Mathematics
Stanford, CA 94305-2125

Richard Mongomery
Department of Mathematics
University of California , Santa Cruz
1156 High Street
Santa Cruz, CA 95064



http://63.240.200.111/articles/20040228/fob2.asp
>From Science News, Vol. 165, No. 9, Feb. 28, 2004, p. 131.
Copyright (c) 2004 Science Service. All rights reserved.




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Mar  9 07:06:22 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Tue, 09 Mar 2004 07:06:22 -0800
Subject: Posse What?  -the neofascists
Message-ID: <404DDD6E.E3F0629F@cdc.gov>

9 Mar 2004 04:00 GMT WSJ(3/9)Is Military Creeping Into Domestic Law
Enforcement?


Copyright ) 2004, Dow Jones Newswires

   (From THE WALL STREET JOURNAL)
   By Robert Block and Gary Fields
IN A LITTLE-NOTICED side effect of the war on terrorism, the military is
edging toward a sensitive area that has been off-limits to it
historically: domestic intelligence gathering and law enforcement.

Several recent incidents involving the military have raised concern
among student and civil-rights groups. One was a visit last month by an
Army intelligence agent to an official at the University of Texas law
school in Austin. The agent demanded a videotape of a recent academic
conference at the school so that he could identify what he described as
"three Middle Eastern men" who had made "suspicious" remarks to Army
lawyers at the seminar, according to the official, Susana Aleman, the
dean of student affairs.

The Army, while not disputing that the visit took place, declined to
comment, saying the incident is under investigation.

Last year, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the nation's primary source
of global maritime intelligence, demanded access to the U.S. Customs
Service's database on maritime trade, saying it needed information to
thwart potential terrorist activity. Customs officials initially
resisted the Navy's demands but eventually agreed to give naval
intelligence much of what it wanted.

In an interview earlier this month, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
chief Robert C. Bonner said he shares data only after getting Navy
assurances that the information won't be abused. Navy spokesman Jon
Spiers says the Office of Naval Intelligence first approached customs
about sharing inbound foreign cargo information in December 2002, and he
denies there is anything improper about the request. The agency "has not
overstepped any authority or crossed the line dividing law enforcement
from military operations," he says.

Lt. Spiers adds that when the Navy's top spy agency gains access to data
about American companies and individuals, the information will be
"subjected to a meticulous legal review" and will be retained only if it
is directly related to the agency's mission to identify potential
foreign threats.

In another sign of military interest in domestic information-gathering,
the Defense Intelligence Agency's new antiterrorism task force is
looking to share information with law-enforcement officials in
California and New York City, according to an August 2003 General
Accounting Office report.

Historically, Americans haven't trusted the military to do domestic
police work. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, passed in response to abuses
by federal troops in the South after the Civil War, prohibits the use of
the military "to execute the laws" of the U.S. That's been widely
interpreted as a ban on searching, arresting or spying on U.S. civilians
by federal troops.

But the law has been violated, notably during the Vietnam War, when Army
operatives spied on antiwar activists on campuses. Meanwhile, Congress
has eased the law's limits to allow the military to help prosecute the
war on drugs.

After the Sept. 11 attacks, the White House sought to further loosen
restrictions to allow the military to take on a new domestic-security
role. It has mostly been rebuffed. In May the House refused to approve a
White House-backed proposal to give the Central Intelligence Agency and
the military authority to scrutinize personal and business records of
U.S. citizens. And the Senate last year blocked funding for a Pentagon
project known as the Total Information Awareness program, which was
supposed to collect a vast array of information on individuals,
including medical, employment and credit-card histories.

The issue of an expanding military role in domestic affairs also
surfaced last year with the Pentagon's creation of the Northern Command,
or Northcom, based in Colorado Springs, Colo. The new command, the first
such military command designed to protect the U.S. homeland from a
terrorist attack, has responsibility for the U.S, Canada, Mexico,
portions of the Caribbean and U.S. coastal waters. Northcom's commander,
Gen. Ralph "Ed" Eberhart, is the first general since the Civil War with
operational authority exclusively over military forces within the U.S.

Gen. Eberhart has stoked concern among civil-liberties advocates by
saying that the military and civilians should be involved in developing
"actionable intelligence" for the government. In September 2002, he told
a group of National Guardsmen that the military and the National Guard
should "change our radar scopes" to prevent terrorism. It is important
to "not just look out, but we're also going to have to look in," he
said, adding, "we can't let culture and the way we've always done it
stand in the way."

Northcom officials and other military leaders play down his remarks. "No
one ran out after that speech and started snooping," one official says.
Gen. Eberhart echoed that last September on PBS's "News Hour": "We are
not going to be out there spying on people, " he said, though he added,
"we get information from people who do."

Further evidence of the blurring of the lines between the civilian and
military worlds comes in a job-vacancy notice for a senior
counterintelligence advisor to Northcom. The duties, according to the
notice, include providing advice that goes beyond potential terrorism to
include "other major criminal activity, such as drug cartels and
large-scale money laundering" -- work usually under the purview of the
Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Secret Service.

Another little-known Pentagon group, the Counterintelligence Field
Activity, was set up two years ago. With 400 service members and
civilians stationed around the globe, the CIFA was originally charged
with protecting the military and critical infrastructure from spying by
terrorists and foreign intelligence services. But in August, Paul
Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, issued a directive ordering the
unit to maintain a "domestic law-enforcement database that includes
information related to potential terrorist threats directed against the
Department of Defense."

The CIFA also works closely with the FBI and is conducting some duties
for civilian agencies. For example, according to Department of
Agriculture documents, the CIFA is in charge of doing background checks
on foreign workers and scientists employed by the department's
agricultural-research service. The group also provides information to
the Information and Security Command, or Inscom, the Army's main
intelligence organization, based at Fort Belvoir, Md.

The Army intelligence agent who investigated the law-school conference
was assigned to Inscom. Army officials reviewing the Texas incident
concede that the agent may have overstepped his boundaries and should
have tried to win the voluntary cooperation of the faculty and students.
But they say that he was reacting to a possible counterintelligence
threat to the military. It isn't clear why there were Army lawyers at
the conference in the first place, though some officials say the
attorneys wanted to learn more about Muslim traditions and Islamic law.

Civil-rights advocates are skeptical. Robert Pugsley, professor of law
at the Southwestern University School of Law in Los Angeles, says the
Texas incident is "a chilling example" of the military's overreaching.
"It'll multiply like fleas on a dog" if left unchecked, he says.

"What we are starting to see is 50 years of legal refinement and
revisions for oversight being quietly jettisoned," adds Steven
Aftergood, an intelligence policy specialist at the Federation of
American Scientists, a nonprofit, left-leaning think tank in Washington.

But James Carafano, a policy analyst with the Heritage Foundation in
Washington, says he believes the military has honored posse comitatus.
His concern is that hard distinctions have been created between who has
jurisdiction in homeland defense versus homeland security. It's
distinctions terrorists might exploit, he says. "We may potentially be
creating vulnerabilities."
(END) Dow Jones Newswires

March 08, 2004 23:00 ET (04:00 GMT)

http://www.dowjonesnews.com/sample/samplestory.asp?StoryID=2004030904000010&Take=1




From s.schear at comcast.net  Tue Mar  9 07:46:11 2004
From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear)
Date: Tue, 09 Mar 2004 07:46:11 -0800
Subject: Evidence is clear: Videos convict
In-Reply-To: <p06100316bc72bf01264c@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p06100316bc72bf01264c@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20040309073103.04e43968@mail.comcast.net>

Transferring home videos from tape to PC is a common and inexpensive 
consumer practice today.  Tapes are cheap and trashing them after use for 
recording of incriminating evidence is an effective way to get rid of that 
copy.  Once transferred to PC users can also now easily encrypt the 
videos.  Eventually only the ignorant criminals that record their crimes 
will be in such embarrassing situations.

steve

At 04:44 PM 3/8/2004, R. A. Hettinga wrote:


><http://www2.ocregister.com/ocrweb/ocr/article.do?id=84540>



>  Twelve jurors and two alternates sat almost unblinkingly in a 10th-floor
>courtroom and watched a 21-minute videotape on two television monitors.
>
>Some squirmed in the swivel seats in the jury box but their eyes remained
>riveted on the screens, watching images of two men having sex with an
>apparently unconscious woman in a Newport Beach apartment as techno music
>droned in the background.
>
>The trial of Allen Ward Crocker provided jurors with a rare chance to see
>exactly what happened in a case of alleged sexual assault.


>  They face trial next month in the alleged rape of an unconscious
>16-year-old girl in July 2002.
>
>  Haidl, 18, videotaped the encounter in Newport Beach, and now prosecutors
>are using those images against him.
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.605 / Virus Database: 385 - Release Date: 3/1/2004




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Mar  9 07:57:14 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 09 Mar 2004 07:57:14 -0800
Subject: Evidence is clear: Videos convict
Message-ID: <404DE95A.FDB60BFA@cdc.gov>

At 06:34 AM 3/9/04 -0800, Sarad AV wrote:
>,I mean a very good
>editing tool and a CG expert working on it may come
>out with real frightening stuff.
>Who would say that the dinasours of jurrasic park
>didn't look real :)

A movie has been made about this. I think it took place in the
white house, and a prostitute was killed.  (spoiler next)
in the movie the cg boys missed a reflection.  Details, details.




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar  9 08:33:25 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2004 11:33:25 -0500
Subject: Filming the Hand That's Stealing His Wallet
Message-ID: <p06100326bc73a08d044c@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/09/business/09flier.html?th=&pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

March 9, 2004
FREQUENT FLIER

Filming the Hand That's Stealing His Wallet
With FRANCINE PARNES

f you want my title, it's professor of pickpocketry. My wife, Bambi
Vincent, and I spend seven months each year traveling the world to film
pickpockets and other street thieves who prey on unsuspecting tourists. As
a security consultant to business travelers, law enforcement and
corporations, I live to expose the latest tricks of scoundrels.

 After we observe a thief in action, we usually try to lure him into
conversation and pick his brain the way he picks the pockets of his
victims. Most thieves love to brag, though on other occasions we've had
rocks thrown at us and knives pulled on us, and we've been hit and spat
upon.

I keep my money tucked inside my trousers, in a thin leather pouch that
hangs from my belt. I also have a wallet stuffed only with newspaper, which
I use as bait. It has been stolen from my hip pocket more than 100 times.
Sometimes I confront the thieves and it magically appears on the ground.
But other times I steal it back; that's the quickest way to establish
rapport with pickpockets. When I invite them for coffee, I think they are
in awe, and that is why they reveal their secrets and give me their
cellphone numbers. Granted, the phones are usually stolen.

Our cameras are no bigger than a dime, hidden inside items like buttons on
shirt collars. In London, I was tracking some pickpockets for a news
program and had to go to the men's room. The camera was in my eyeglasses,
and when I stood at the urinal, I forgot to turn my head. The editors had
to do some cutting.

I probably have more insight into the subculture of global pickpocketing
than any other person in the world, on either side of the law. But that
doesn't mean that pickpockets can't outsmart me. Last summer in Rome, my
wife and I were packed like sardines in a metro at rush hour near the
crowded Spanish Steps. There were 20 people near the door, and 14 were
probably pickpockets. A woman was working my hip pocket, gently moving out
my wallet. I had a small wireless video camera hidden in a cellphone in my
right hand, high up filming the action. Bambi was to my left, with two guys
trying for her handbag, which she was keeping an eye on. Another team of
three guys was trying to go for a tall American man standing close beside
me. I pretended not to notice anything.

 Unbeknownst to me, they succeeded in removing a small video recorder from
a bag I was holding at knee level while I was watching everyone's faces.
Embarrassing, yes, but I have to acknowledge the finesse of high-end
pickpockets because of the perfection in their combination of stealth and
precise choreography.

I have seen a person steal from someone in a wheelchair. I have seen women
bare their breasts and drop their pants to shock and distract their victims
if they are accused. Nothing has come close what I documented in Calcutta
more than 40 years. Pickpockets with leprosy approached British expatriates
coming out of church and reached out to them with ravaged hands missing
fingers. The victim's reaction of shock and revulsion provided the
distraction needed for the pickpocket's partner to extract his wallet. It
was the most eye-opening incident in pickpocketing I have ever witnessed.

As told to Francine Parnes.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar  9 15:13:40 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2004 18:13:40 -0500
Subject: J.P. Morgan Is Facing Heat Of Patriot Act
Message-ID: <p06100366bc73ff4a3931@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB107878833057749707,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal

      March 9, 2004



J.P. Morgan
 Is Facing Heat
 Of Patriot Act

By RANDALL SMITH
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL



NEW YORK -- Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau has asked banking
regulators to examine documents from the recent criminal conviction of an
unlicensed money-transfer operation to determine whether J.P. Morgan Chase
& Co. or its predecessor banks violated "know your customer" rules.

Staffers in Mr. Morgenthau's office last year turned over to regulators
court papers from its investigation of Beacon Hill Service Corp., which was
convicted Feb. 23 in state criminal court in Manhattan of four felony
counts of operating as an unlicensed money transmitter, Mr. Morgenthau said.

The regulators include the New York State Banking Department and the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Mr. Morgenthau added. Neither agency
would comment on the action. However, the state agency has been reviewing
the case, according to one person familiar with the matter.

J.P. Morgan Chase, which declined to comment on any possible rule
violations, said it has been working with regulators to tighten its
standards. "We agree with regulators that financial institutions should
continually raise standards on know-your-customer policies, and have worked
with them to ensure that we tighten ours and strive to exceed the law," a
bank spokeswoman said.

The USA Patriot Act, adopted in October 2001, expanded the scope of U.S.
money-laundering rules in order to make it harder for terrorists to move
money without attracting attention. It includes beefed-up
know-your-customer requirements for some financial institutions, according
to some legal experts.

Beacon Hill took deposits and transmitted money on behalf of clients in
Central and South America, including wealthy individuals and money-exchange
houses, according to a filing by prosecutors in the criminal case. J.P.
Morgan Chase was Beacon Hill's bank and accepted deposits from Beacon until
Beacon's office was searched by Mr. Morgenthau's agents on Feb. 4, 2003,
according to an affidavit by a lawyer for Beacon Hill.

Beacon Hill, which began operating in 1994, originally had an account with
Chemical Bank, which later merged with Chase Manhattan Corp., which in turn
merged with J.P. Morgan & Co. in 2000 to become J.P. Morgan Chase. Beacon
had 49 customers as of mid-2002, 36 of them in a "pooled" account that
shielded their identities from the bank, according to a report by a
consultant to Beacon Hill that is part of the court record.

At Beacon Hill, $5.5 billion "went in and out between 1997 and 2002," Mr.
Morgenthau said. Yet, such pooled arrangements meant J.P. Morgan, its
predecessor banks and other banks who have dealt with money-transfer
businesses in similar fashion have transferred large sums -- a lot of it
"to secrecy jurisdictions" -- without knowing whose money it really was, he
said. Such banks "were not observing the know-your-customer rule."

He said that there isn't an accusation that J.P. Morgan was dealing with
illegal money. The question, he said, is this: "Should they have taken
money from an unlicensed money transmitter? That's a matter for State
Banking and the Federal Reserve to be concerned about." He asserted, "They
just weren't asking the questions under know-your-customer [that] they were
required to ask."

The New York licensing requirement for money transmitters, originally
adopted as a consumer-protection measure in 1963 to guard against fraud or
insolvency, was amended in 1990 to combat money laundering, according to
the banking department. The licensing process requires money transmitters
to have antimoney-laundering programs and to file suspicious activity
reports about large cash transactions, according to Betty Santangelo, a
money-laundering expert at law firm Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

Although an official at J.P. Morgan Chase asked Beacon Hill as early as
1998 if it needed a license to operate as a money transmitter, lawyers for
Beacon Hill said they weren't able to get an answer from the state Banking
Department, according to court filings. One reason the Banking Department
didn't answer faster, prosecutors said in court, was that Beacon Hill's
lawyer asked the question in October 2000 about a client identified only as
"XYZ Corp.," without disclosing that it already was engaging in the
activities described.

At one point, prosecutors contended that a senior Chase official lied to a
state regulator to cover for Beacon Hill. After Beacon Hill's lawyer told
state banking officials at a meeting in January 2001 that XYZ planned to
bank at Chase, a Banking Department lawyer, Sara Kelsey, followed up with
Chase's compliance chief, Greg Meredith. Mr. Meredith "deceitfully
confirmed that the business was not yet in operation," according to
grand-jury minutes described in a memorandum of law submitted by Mr.
Morgenthau on Oct. 21, 2003, as part of the Beacon Hill case. Mr. Meredith
told Beacon Hill it would have to hire an outside consultant to review its
regulatory compliance, according to a filing by prosecutors. Although Chase
wanted an audit of Beacon Hill, its owner, Anibal Contreras, restricted the
outside consultant to a review of its policies and procedures, the filing
said.

Mr. Meredith didn't return a call, and a J.P. Morgan Chase spokeswoman said
he wouldn't have any comment. Mr. Meredith no longer serves as the bank's
head of compliance, according to one person familiar with the bank, in part
owing to his failure to take more aggressive action in dealing with Beacon
Hill.

The J.P. Morgan Chase spokeswoman said the bank first asked Beacon Hill to
obtain "an outside compliance review," which showed "no indication of money
laundering." The bank then asked for an outside legal opinion about whether
Beacon Hill "needed a license, and the opinion said they didn't," she
added. Eventually, the bank asked Beacon Hill to seek an opinion from
regulators. "Our steps were directionally correct but too slow and not
forceful enough," she said.

J.P. Morgan Chase since has exited the business of dealing with wholesale
money remitters, she added. The bank also has tightened its
money-laundering controls, put in new monitoring systems, and "made
organizational changes in an effort to meet the higher standards financial
institutions are being held to," she said.

Mr. Morgenthau said that the issue of identifying customers of
money-transmitting businesses is "a very serious problem," but "I'm having
trouble convincing people of that: the regulators and the banks
themselves." One problem, he said, is what he called the "patchwork system
of regulation," with some bank units also regulated by the U.S. Comptroller
of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and other entities.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk  Tue Mar  9 14:38:24 2004
From: zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk (Peter Fairbrother)
Date: Tue, 09 Mar 2004 22:38:24 +0000
Subject: Evidence is clear: Videos convict
In-Reply-To: <404DE95A.FDB60BFA@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <BC73F7DF.48FB0%zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk>

Major Variola (ret) wrote:

> At 06:34 AM 3/9/04 -0800, Sarad AV wrote:
>> ,I mean a very good
>> editing tool and a CG expert working on it may come
>> out with real frightening stuff.
>> Who would say that the dinasours of jurrasic park
>> didn't look real :)
> 
> A movie has been made about this. I think it took place in the
> white house, and a prostitute was killed.  (spoiler next)
> in the movie the cg boys missed a reflection.  Details, details.

With The-Man-With-No-Name in it. I remember. She wasn't killed in a white
house though, but in a rich man's apartment. It could have been white.

There was a reflection in Blade Runner too, with Indiana Jones.

(dons Conspiracy-Finder uniform and  ...

-- 
Peter Fairbrother




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar  9 21:52:34 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2004 00:52:34 -0500
Subject: I'd recognise that ear, anywhere
Message-ID: <p061003f4bc745d6848a0@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/55/36106.html>

The Register


I'd recognise that ear, anywhere
By Lucy Sherriff
Posted: 09/03/2004 at 10:11 GMT

 
 Never mind retinal scans, finger printing or facial recognition: we'll
have our ears on a national database, soon.

 Boffins at the University of Leicester, working with K9 Forensic Services,
have developed a computerised ear image and ear print identification
system. Their technology is capable of recognising partial earprints and
images

Professor Guy Rutty, head of the forensic pathology unit at the university,
said the technology "may ultimately allow the development of a system
similar to that of the national finger print system which is used for the
identification of individuals by police forces across the world".

The human ear is a particularly difficult biometric to track, because it is
flexible and deforms under pressure. Several organisations are researching
the field, and in 2003 the EU launched a three-year investigation into the
feasibility of using ear prints for criminal identification. reg;


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Mar 10 07:11:34 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2004 10:11:34 -0500
Subject: J.P. Morgan Is Facing Heat Of Patriot Act
Message-ID: <BAY7-F54eJaqWX3hlWF00056c93@hotmail.com>

Holy Crap this seems bizarre. This isn't even really a case of "know your 
customers", but "know your customers' customers", isn't it?

Is this some kind of "snipe hunt" or mere "Brazil"-like government 
incompetence and mindless application of half-baked laws?

-TD


>From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net, e$@vmeng.com
>Subject: J.P. Morgan Is Facing Heat Of Patriot Act
>Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2004 18:13:40 -0500
>
><http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB107878833057749707,00.html>
>
>The Wall Street Journal
>
>       March 9, 2004
>
>
>
>J.P. Morgan
>  Is Facing Heat
>  Of Patriot Act
>
>By RANDALL SMITH
>Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
>
>
>
>NEW YORK -- Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau has asked banking
>regulators to examine documents from the recent criminal conviction of an
>unlicensed money-transfer operation to determine whether J.P. Morgan Chase
>& Co. or its predecessor banks violated "know your customer" rules.
>
>Staffers in Mr. Morgenthau's office last year turned over to regulators
>court papers from its investigation of Beacon Hill Service Corp., which was
>convicted Feb. 23 in state criminal court in Manhattan of four felony
>counts of operating as an unlicensed money transmitter, Mr. Morgenthau 
>said.
>
>The regulators include the New York State Banking Department and the
>Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Mr. Morgenthau added. Neither agency
>would comment on the action. However, the state agency has been reviewing
>the case, according to one person familiar with the matter.
>
>J.P. Morgan Chase, which declined to comment on any possible rule
>violations, said it has been working with regulators to tighten its
>standards. "We agree with regulators that financial institutions should
>continually raise standards on know-your-customer policies, and have worked
>with them to ensure that we tighten ours and strive to exceed the law," a
>bank spokeswoman said.
>
>The USA Patriot Act, adopted in October 2001, expanded the scope of U.S.
>money-laundering rules in order to make it harder for terrorists to move
>money without attracting attention. It includes beefed-up
>know-your-customer requirements for some financial institutions, according
>to some legal experts.
>
>Beacon Hill took deposits and transmitted money on behalf of clients in
>Central and South America, including wealthy individuals and money-exchange
>houses, according to a filing by prosecutors in the criminal case. J.P.
>Morgan Chase was Beacon Hill's bank and accepted deposits from Beacon until
>Beacon's office was searched by Mr. Morgenthau's agents on Feb. 4, 2003,
>according to an affidavit by a lawyer for Beacon Hill.
>
>Beacon Hill, which began operating in 1994, originally had an account with
>Chemical Bank, which later merged with Chase Manhattan Corp., which in turn
>merged with J.P. Morgan & Co. in 2000 to become J.P. Morgan Chase. Beacon
>had 49 customers as of mid-2002, 36 of them in a "pooled" account that
>shielded their identities from the bank, according to a report by a
>consultant to Beacon Hill that is part of the court record.
>
>At Beacon Hill, $5.5 billion "went in and out between 1997 and 2002," Mr.
>Morgenthau said. Yet, such pooled arrangements meant J.P. Morgan, its
>predecessor banks and other banks who have dealt with money-transfer
>businesses in similar fashion have transferred large sums -- a lot of it
>"to secrecy jurisdictions" -- without knowing whose money it really was, he
>said. Such banks "were not observing the know-your-customer rule."
>
>He said that there isn't an accusation that J.P. Morgan was dealing with
>illegal money. The question, he said, is this: "Should they have taken
>money from an unlicensed money transmitter? That's a matter for State
>Banking and the Federal Reserve to be concerned about." He asserted, "They
>just weren't asking the questions under know-your-customer [that] they were
>required to ask."
>
>The New York licensing requirement for money transmitters, originally
>adopted as a consumer-protection measure in 1963 to guard against fraud or
>insolvency, was amended in 1990 to combat money laundering, according to
>the banking department. The licensing process requires money transmitters
>to have antimoney-laundering programs and to file suspicious activity
>reports about large cash transactions, according to Betty Santangelo, a
>money-laundering expert at law firm Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
>
>Although an official at J.P. Morgan Chase asked Beacon Hill as early as
>1998 if it needed a license to operate as a money transmitter, lawyers for
>Beacon Hill said they weren't able to get an answer from the state Banking
>Department, according to court filings. One reason the Banking Department
>didn't answer faster, prosecutors said in court, was that Beacon Hill's
>lawyer asked the question in October 2000 about a client identified only as
>"XYZ Corp.," without disclosing that it already was engaging in the
>activities described.
>
>At one point, prosecutors contended that a senior Chase official lied to a
>state regulator to cover for Beacon Hill. After Beacon Hill's lawyer told
>state banking officials at a meeting in January 2001 that XYZ planned to
>bank at Chase, a Banking Department lawyer, Sara Kelsey, followed up with
>Chase's compliance chief, Greg Meredith. Mr. Meredith "deceitfully
>confirmed that the business was not yet in operation," according to
>grand-jury minutes described in a memorandum of law submitted by Mr.
>Morgenthau on Oct. 21, 2003, as part of the Beacon Hill case. Mr. Meredith
>told Beacon Hill it would have to hire an outside consultant to review its
>regulatory compliance, according to a filing by prosecutors. Although Chase
>wanted an audit of Beacon Hill, its owner, Anibal Contreras, restricted the
>outside consultant to a review of its policies and procedures, the filing
>said.
>
>Mr. Meredith didn't return a call, and a J.P. Morgan Chase spokeswoman said
>he wouldn't have any comment. Mr. Meredith no longer serves as the bank's
>head of compliance, according to one person familiar with the bank, in part
>owing to his failure to take more aggressive action in dealing with Beacon
>Hill.
>
>The J.P. Morgan Chase spokeswoman said the bank first asked Beacon Hill to
>obtain "an outside compliance review," which showed "no indication of money
>laundering." The bank then asked for an outside legal opinion about whether
>Beacon Hill "needed a license, and the opinion said they didn't," she
>added. Eventually, the bank asked Beacon Hill to seek an opinion from
>regulators. "Our steps were directionally correct but too slow and not
>forceful enough," she said.
>
>J.P. Morgan Chase since has exited the business of dealing with wholesale
>money remitters, she added. The bank also has tightened its
>money-laundering controls, put in new monitoring systems, and "made
>organizational changes in an effort to meet the higher standards financial
>institutions are being held to," she said.
>
>Mr. Morgenthau said that the issue of identifying customers of
>money-transmitting businesses is "a very serious problem," but "I'm having
>trouble convincing people of that: the regulators and the banks
>themselves." One problem, he said, is what he called the "patchwork system
>of regulation," with some bank units also regulated by the U.S. Comptroller
>of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and other entities.
>
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>

_________________________________________________________________
Create a Job Alert on MSN Careers and enter for a chance to win $1000! 
http://msn.careerbuilder.com/promo/kaday.htm?siteid=CBMSN_1K&sc_extcmp=JS_JASweep_MSNHotm2




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar 10 11:49:47 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2004 11:49:47 -0800
Subject: J.P. Morgan Is Facing Heat Of Patriot Act
Message-ID: <404F715B.64D111D@cdc.gov>

At 10:11 AM 3/10/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>Holy Crap this seems bizarre. This isn't even really a case of "know
your
>customers", but "know your customers' customers", isn't it?
>
>Is this some kind of "snipe hunt" or mere "Brazil"-like government
>incompetence and mindless application of half-baked laws?

Optimist.

This is how the US intimidates such that the USG can monitor
all transactions.  A serious practical problem for e$ when it
needs to interface to atoms.

....
The python says to the goat in its coils: relax, exhale...
A tentacle grows another sucker.




From s.schear at comcast.net  Wed Mar 10 14:27:38 2004
From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2004 14:27:38 -0800
Subject: J.P. Morgan Is Facing Heat Of Patriot Act
In-Reply-To: <404F715B.64D111D@cdc.gov>
References: <404F715B.64D111D@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20040310142348.04ff4880@mail.comcast.net>

At 11:49 AM 3/10/2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:


>At 10:11 AM 3/10/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> >Holy Crap this seems bizarre. This isn't even really a case of "know
>your
> >customers", but "know your customers' customers", isn't it?
> >
> >Is this some kind of "snipe hunt" or mere "Brazil"-like government
> >incompetence and mindless application of half-baked laws?
>
>Optimist.
>
>This is how the US intimidates such that the USG can monitor
>all transactions.  A serious practical problem for e$ when it
>needs to interface to atoms.

not really.  it means there is a need for a more P2P approach, like 
Kawalah, where trusted individuals act as entry and exit points using their 
own banking accounts in exchange for the lion's share of the service 
fees.  this is not uncommon now in e-gold where secondary players offer 
such transactions.

steve 
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.605 / Virus Database: 385 - Release Date: 3/1/2004




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar 11 09:14:39 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 09:14:39 -0800
Subject: J.P. Morgan Is Facing Heat Of Patriot Act
Message-ID: <40509E7E.79CEFE18@cdc.gov>

At 02:27 PM 3/10/04 -0800, Steve Schear wrote:
>At 11:49 AM 3/10/2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>>This is how the US intimidates such that the USG can monitor
>>all transactions.  A serious practical problem for e$ when it
>>needs to interface to atoms.
>
>not really.  it means there is a need for a more P2P approach, like
>Kawalah, where trusted individuals act as entry and exit points using
their
>own banking accounts in exchange for the lion's share of the service
>fees.

Kawalah, isn't that a terrorist tool? ;-)

If it isn't already, it will be declared one.  Unlicenced transfers over
N$
get you a discrete military tribunal, after detention incommunicado,
sans
charges, of course.  Cuba really is nice this time of year.

Moving money between people will require government-licensed
(ie 0wn3d) intermediary, much like moving handguns (or pharmaceuticals)
inside various States.


>this is not uncommon now in e-gold where secondary players offer
>such transactions.

The next time Ashcroft [1] gets a hard-on for gambling | drugs |  porn |

arabs, e-gold systems will see major hasslement ranging from frozen
or confiscated subscribers assets to the latest in Raytheon's precision
versions
of the V-2 delivered to their doorstep.  No extra charge for nighttime
delivery.

[1] Hey, at least that bastard Bennett would have been soft on gambling,

given his addiction, not that such innumeracy redeems the slow painful
death he earned.

------

 "They keep talking about drafting a Constitution for Iraq. Why don't we
just
give them ours? It was written by a lot of really smart guys, it's
worked for
over 200 years, and Hell, we're not using it anymore."
-Jay Leno




From sunder at sunder.net  Thu Mar 11 06:57:55 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (sunder)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 09:57:55 -0500
Subject: I'd recognise that ear, anywhere
In-Reply-To: <p061003f4bc745d6848a0@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p061003f4bc745d6848a0@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <40507E73.80606@sunder.net>

This is old news.

No, really, I'm not channeling Mr. May and telling you to hit the 
archives...  A few years ago, this was a topic here, and the outcome was 
that cypherpunks should wear their hair long so as to cover their ears. 
Kinda goes with the long hair - 10 gallon hat kinda look. :)

I believe the INS requires pictures at 45 degrees for green cards, but not 
passports(???), so that they can see one ear (or enough of it to use as ID) 
so it's quite likely that somewhere some black budget project likely 
already made leaps into this technology, and that this is possibly just 
another example of a university doing stuff that the spooks have already 
done 10 years ago - or whenever...



R. A. Hettinga wrote:

> <http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/55/36106.html>
> 
> The Register
> 
> 
> I'd recognise that ear, anywhere
> By Lucy Sherriff
> Posted: 09/03/2004 at 10:11 GMT
> 
>  
>  Never mind retinal scans, finger printing or facial recognition: we'll
> have our ears on a national database, soon.




From s.schear at comcast.net  Thu Mar 11 10:30:53 2004
From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 10:30:53 -0800
Subject: J.P. Morgan Is Facing Heat Of Patriot Act
In-Reply-To: <40509E7E.79CEFE18@cdc.gov>
References: <40509E7E.79CEFE18@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20040311102704.05448210@mail.comcast.net>

At 09:14 AM 3/11/2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:


>At 02:27 PM 3/10/04 -0800, Steve Schear wrote:
> >At 11:49 AM 3/10/2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> >>This is how the US intimidates such that the USG can monitor
> >>all transactions.  A serious practical problem for e$ when it
> >>needs to interface to atoms.
> >
> >not really.  it means there is a need for a more P2P approach, like
> >Kawalah, where trusted individuals act as entry and exit points using
>their
> >own banking accounts in exchange for the lion's share of the service
> >fees.
>
>Kawalah, isn't that a terrorist tool? ;-)
>
>If it isn't already, it will be declared one.

The money order and small payment industry sought and got exemptions 
covering smaller operators (I think the upper limit is $10,000 per 
day).  E-gold secondaries easily fit within that umbrella.  Its unlikely 
that federal laws will effectively be tightened to keep such ad hoc small 
transfer businesses from operating legally.

steve
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.605 / Virus Database: 385 - Release Date: 3/1/2004




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Mar 11 08:59:20 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 11:59:20 -0500
Subject: J.P. Morgan Is Facing Heat Of Patriot Act
Message-ID: <BAY7-F104OImdkSNZaa00055769@hotmail.com>

"This is how the US intimidates such that the USG can monitor
all transactions.  A serious practical problem for e$ when it
needs to interface to atoms."

I'm also tempted to think that the USG needs to retain illicit drug-price 
differentials in order to fund backdoor opps.

Hum. Perhaps on a larger scale, they don't want currency differences to be 
beyond their control. The "American Century" indeed.

-TD



>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: RE: J.P. Morgan Is Facing Heat Of Patriot Act
>Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2004 11:49:47 -0800
>
>At 10:11 AM 3/10/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> >Holy Crap this seems bizarre. This isn't even really a case of "know
>your
> >customers", but "know your customers' customers", isn't it?
> >
> >Is this some kind of "snipe hunt" or mere "Brazil"-like government
> >incompetence and mindless application of half-baked laws?
>
>Optimist.
>
>This is how the US intimidates such that the USG can monitor
>all transactions.  A serious practical problem for e$ when it
>needs to interface to atoms.
>
>....
>The python says to the goat in its coils: relax, exhale...
>A tentacle grows another sucker.
>
>

_________________________________________________________________
One-click access to Hotmail from any Web page  download MSN Toolbar now! 
http://clk.atdmt.com/AVE/go/onm00200413ave/direct/01/




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Mar 11 09:13:06 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 12:13:06 -0500
Subject: I'd recognise that ear, anywhere
In-Reply-To: <40507E73.80606@sunder.net>
References: <p061003f4bc745d6848a0@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <40507E73.80606@sunder.net>
Message-ID: <p0610031bbc764e659c47@[66.149.49.5]>

At 9:57 AM -0500 3/11/04, sunder wrote:
>This is old news.

Hmmm... Actual progress on old news is new news, right?

:-)

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From njohnsn at njohnsn.com  Thu Mar 11 18:15:40 2004
From: njohnsn at njohnsn.com (Neil Johnson)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 20:15:40 -0600
Subject: Evidence is clear: Videos convict
In-Reply-To: <BC73F7DF.48FB0%zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk>
References: <BC73F7DF.48FB0%zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk>
Message-ID: <200403112015.40163.njohnsn@njohnsn.com>

On Tuesday 09 March 2004 04:38 pm, Peter Fairbrother wrote:

>
> With The-Man-With-No-Name in it. I remember. She wasn't killed in a white
> house though, but in a rich man's apartment. It could have been white.
>
> There was a reflection in Blade Runner too, with Indiana Jones.
>
> (dons Conspiracy-Finder uniform and  ...

Actually I think it was called "Rising Sun" 

http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/RisingSun-1044927/about.php

It starred Sean Connery and Wesley Snipes investigating the murder of a woman 
in the corporate offices of a Japanese controlled corporation in Los Angeles.

(Hmmm, Sean Connery was in an Indiana Jones film too......)

Turned out the "reflection" was a witness to the murder, and the real killer 
was an American politician trying to hide is indiscretion.

Basically, it was a kung-fu film within the background of the conflict between 
Japanese and American culture. (This was back during the "The Japanese are 
going to buy out America" mania in the 80's).

I think it was based on a Michael Crichton novel too. (Hey, wasn't "Jurassic" 
Park directed by Spielberg who supported Directory George Lucas with the 
"Indiana Jones" Films ....... what's that noise, hey someone's breaking down 
the  door. Oww11 als;kfjlaskjlt6ihaklhglk;ajs al ........ CARRIER TERMINATED 


-- 
Neil Johnson
http://www.njohnsn.com
PGP key available on request.




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 12 06:34:25 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2004 09:34:25 -0500
Subject: Quantum crypto reaches 150 km (March 2004)
Message-ID: <p06100398bc777ace0650@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://optics.org/articles/news/10/3/11/1>
optics.org - News -  

 Quantum crypto reaches 150 km
 12 March 2004

A single photon is sent over a 150 km optical link beating the previous
transmission record by 50 km.

Scientists at NEC in Japan claim to have smashed the transmission distance
record for quantum cryptography. The team says it successfully sent a
single photon over a 150-km-long optical fiber link. This significantly
extends the previous record of 100 km, which was announced in June 2003.

Quantum cryptography uses a stream of single photons to transfer a secret
key between a transmitter and a receiver. Each transmitted bit of the
cryptographic key is encoded upon a single photon. Any attempt to intercept
the key changes the quantum state of the photons, which reveals the
presence of a hacker.

NEC's record-breaking system relies on planar lightwave circuit (PLC)
technology and a low-noise photon receiver. The system containing was
developed by a collaboration of researchers from NEC, the
Telecommunications Advancement Organization of Japan and the Japan Science
and Technology Agency.

According to NEC, its system has two distinct benefits. Firstly, it offers
stable one-way photon transmission. This reduces the noise of backscattered
photons from the optical fiber to below one-tenth that of conventional
round-trip systems.

The system's second plus-point is an alleged ten-fold increase in
signal-to-noise ratio compared with current systems. This is largely thanks
to the receiver's increased sensitivity to photons that have been broadened
by dispersion in the long fiber-optic link.

"Due to wide-area coverage, this system can realize quantum cryptography
transmissions in optical network in metropolitan areas and is expected to
contribute to the realization of an optical fiber network system requiring
advanced safety levels to prevent code-breaking in the future," said NEC in
its press release announcing the breakthrough.

Author
 Jacqueline Hewett is technology editor on Optics.org and Opto & Laser
Europe magazine.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From sunder at sunder.net  Fri Mar 12 07:02:39 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (sunder)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2004 10:02:39 -0500
Subject: I'd recognise that ear, anywhere
In-Reply-To: <p0610031bbc764e659c47@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p061003f4bc745d6848a0@[66.149.49.5]>
  <40507E73.80606@sunder.net> <p0610031bbc764e659c47@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <4051D10F.9020706@sunder.net>

R. A. Hettinga wrote:

> Hmmm... Actual progress on old news is new news, right?

Not when it pretends to be a new and wonderful idea, and ignores its past.

Sort of like Apple announcing the world's first 64 bit desktop computer 
when many of us have had DEC Alpha's and UltraSPARC machines on our desks 
since the early/mid 90's -- for example.  (And then it turns out, they 
don't even have a 64 bit OS for it yet!)




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 12 07:33:24 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2004 10:33:24 -0500
Subject: I'd recognise that ear, anywhere
In-Reply-To: <4051D10F.9020706@sunder.net>
References: <p061003f4bc745d6848a0@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <40507E73.80606@sunder.net> <p0610031bbc764e659c47@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <4051D10F.9020706@sunder.net>
Message-ID: <p061003a0bc7788ba49b1@[66.149.49.5]>

At 10:02 AM -0500 3/12/04, sunder wrote:
>Not when it pretends to be a new and wonderful idea, and ignores its past.

Pedant.

;-)

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com  Fri Mar 12 21:42:54 2004
From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2004 21:42:54 -0800 (PST)
Subject: I'd recognise that ear, anywhere
In-Reply-To: <4051D10F.9020706@sunder.net>
Message-ID: <20040313054254.43176.qmail@web21203.mail.yahoo.com>

Perhaps,its because they need the funds. Have to pull
wool over their eyes,to get the money.

--- sunder <sunder at sunder.net> wrote:
> R. A. Hettinga wrote:
> 
> > Hmmm... Actual progress on old news is new news,
> right?
> 
> Not when it pretends to be a new and wonderful idea,
> and ignores its past.
> 
> Sort of like Apple announcing the world's first 64
> bit desktop computer 
> when many of us have had DEC Alpha's and UltraSPARC
> machines on our desks 
> since the early/mid 90's -- for example.  (And then
> it turns out, they 
> don't even have a 64 bit OS for it yet!)
> 


__________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Mail - More reliable, more storage, less spam
http://mail.yahoo.com




From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com  Fri Mar 12 21:55:54 2004
From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2004 21:55:54 -0800 (PST)
Subject: inverse finding
In-Reply-To: <p061003a0bc7788ba49b1@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20040313055554.23138.qmail@web21201.mail.yahoo.com>

hi,


if gcd(a,m)=1,
for a*a inverse==1 mod m
is it better to find
a invese=a^(m-2) mod m   by binary exponentiation
modulo m  or is it more time efficient by extended
euclids algorithm for large 'm'?

thanks.
Sarath.

__________________________________
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Yahoo! Mail - More reliable, more storage, less spam
http://mail.yahoo.com




From brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org  Sat Mar 13 03:26:02 2004
From: brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org (brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org)
Date: 13 Mar 2004 11:26:02 -0000
Subject: FBI Adds to Wiretap Wish List
Message-ID: <mailman.839.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/03/12/2318251
Posted by: michael, on 2004-03-13 09:08:00
Topic: us, 146 comments

   from the can-we-hear-you-now? dept.
   [1]WorkEmail writes "A [2]far-reaching proposal from the FBI, made
   public Friday, would require all broadband Internet providers,
   including cable modem and DSL companies, to rewire their networks to
   support easy [3]wiretapping by police. The FBI's request to the
   Federal Communications Commission aims to give police ready access to
   any form of Internet-based communications. If approved as drafted, the
   proposal could dramatically expand the scope of the agency's wiretap
   powers, raise costs for cable broadband companies and complicate
   Internet product development."

References

   1. http://www.tghclan.com/
   2. http://news.com.com/2100-1028-5172948.html
   3. http://news.com.com/2100-7352-5137344.html?tag=nl

----- End forwarded message -----
-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Mar 13 03:43:42 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2004 12:43:42 +0100
Subject: FBI Adds to Wiretap Wish List (fwd from
  brian-slashdotnews@hyperreal.org)
Message-ID: <20040313114342.GL18046@leitl.org>

Now here's a good reason to figure out how to patch IPsec to go OE on all
major platforms.

----- Forwarded message from brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Mar 13 03:45:17 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2004 12:45:17 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Ideas for an opensource Skype lookalike (fwd from
  em@em.no-ip.com)
Message-ID: <20040313114517.GM18046@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Enzo Michelangeli <em at em.no-ip.com> -----


From em at em.no-ip.com  Sat Mar 13 03:03:17 2004
From: em at em.no-ip.com (Enzo Michelangeli)
Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2004 19:03:17 +0800
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Ideas for an opensource Skype lookalike
Message-ID: <mailman.840.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Hello everybody,

I just joined this list after lurking for a while on its archive at
http://zgp.org/pipermail/p2p-hackers/.

I'd like to gather opinions about using P2P techniques to support a type
of application that never managed to become really popular: a secure
internet phone. I have recently begun to monitor the development of
Speakfreely on Sourceforge (http://speak-freely.sourceforge.net/ ) after
its creator John Walker decided that the future of Internet was an
inhospitable environment for it and abandoned further development
(http://www.fourmilab.ch/speakfree/ ). I think that John overlooked the
possibilities offered by P2P architectures, in two critical areas:

- Directories for location and presence. Nothing fancy here, already done
before for P2P chat systems.
- Working around NAT routers. John says of implementing third-party
reflectors:

    "[...] no non-commercial site like mine could possibly
    afford the unlimited demands on bandwidth that would
    require. It's one thing to provide a central meeting
    point like a Look Who's Listening server, which handles
    a packet every five minutes or so from connected sites,
    but a server that's required to forward audio in
    real-time between potentially any number of
    simultaneously connected users is a bandwidth killer."

However, what a centralized system can't do, is a piece of cake for a
distributed system ("_One_ can't, perhaps," said Humpty Dumpty, "but two
can.[...]"). The fact that something like Skype does exist, works, and may
claim an average of more than 150,000 users online at any given time,
looks like a proof of feasibility to me!

Unfortunately, Skype is closed-source (which is a showstopper for a crypto
application), and Windows-only to boot. However, nothing prevents
borrowing some ideas at http://www.skype.com/skype_p2pexplained.html for
an opensource alternative.

Speakfreely might not represent the best starting point, but it usually
works out of the box (which is more than can be said for most other
Internet phones), it's multi-platform, and already contains an RTP stack
and bulk encryption code.  As an alternative to Speakfreely's code, one
could assemble together an RTP stack such as oRTP
(http://www.linphone.org/ortp/), a bulk encryption and authentication
layer such as SRTP (http://srtp.sourceforge.net/srtp.html), a portable
audio abstraction layer such as Portaudio (www.portaudio.com) and an
unencumbered codec such as Speex (www.speex.org). It would be nice if all
the components were or could be ported to WinCE, for use on wireless
PDA's.

What Speakfreely sorely lacks is a sensible session initiation protocol,
and access to non-NATted reflectors to help NATted peers to find each
other and exchange UDP traffic. That's where a P2P network (especially one
supporting the concept of non-NATted "ultrapeers") can save the day.

In my opinion, traditional server-based (i.e., non-P2P) session initiation
protocols like SIP -not to mention H.323- represent a poor choice for a
consumer-friendly application: they require an arsenal of infrastructural
applications (directories, proxies, gatekeepers etc.) which make them
attractive only to telcos and hardware vendors (hence Cisco's support for
SIP, and the venom liberally spilled on Skype at
http://www.voxilla.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=18&m
ode=thread).
Besides, as I wrote on speak-freely-devel at lists.sourceforge.net, "the
mechanisms that SIP/SDP use for session key negotiation range from the
pathetic (key sent in cleartext!!) to the impractical (S/MIME CMS, which
is a monster built on the clay feet of a PKI that isn't quite there)".
Skype claims to use RSA-based key exchange, which is good for multi-party
conferencing but does not preserve forward secrecy. Maybe some variant of
ephemeral D-H authenticated by RSA signatures, with transparent
renegotiation every time someone joins the conference, could do the job
better.

But the thing I particularly would like to discuss here is if, and how, to
leverage on existing P2P networks. One could always implement a brand new
network, using Distributed Hash Table algorithms such as Chord or
Kademlia, but it would be much easier to rely from the very beginning upon
a large number of nodes (at least for directory and presence
functionality, if not for the reflectors which require specific UDP code).
That would somehow repeat the approach initially adopted by Vocaltec when,
in 1995, they launched their Iphone making use of IRC servers to publish
dynamic IP addresses. Incidentally, the IRC users community didn't
particularly appreciate ;-), triggering the Great Iphone War, which
quickly led Vocaltec to set up its own dedicated IRC servers.

>From what I see, Gnutella is pretty hopeless for that purpose because
searches are only based on flooding, and therefore full-network searches
are nearly impossible; on the other hand, Overnet (which relies upon the
Kademlia algorithm) could perhaps be used as a sort of distributed
presence/location "server", and also key server (perhaps it would be wise
to use an OpenPGP key format to enjoy WoT features from day one). The
Overnet protocol is unpublished, but it's been reverse-engineered at least
in part by the mldonkey team.  Alternatively, Freenet or Entropy could
perhaps provide similar services, but with a large code overhead (I'd like
to keep the code small enough to be ported, one day, to a PDA) and perhaps
slower propagation (?).

Comments, as I said, are much welcome.

Enzo

_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From mv at cdc.gov  Sun Mar 14 04:36:51 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 04:36:51 -0800
Subject: inverse finding
Message-ID: <405451E3.9F6C72C4@cdc.gov>

At 09:55 PM 3/12/04 -0800, Sarad AV wrote:
>if gcd(a,m)=1,
>for a*a inverse==1 mod m
>is it better to find
>a invese=a^(m-2) mod m   by binary exponentiation
>modulo m  or is it more time efficient by extended
>euclids algorithm for large 'm'?

I dunno, why don't you think about it some?

How are you going to land a sweet outsourced job
if you ask others to do your homework?




From mv at cdc.gov  Sun Mar 14 04:56:15 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 04:56:15 -0800
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Ideas for an opensource Skype lookalike (fwd from
Message-ID: <4054566F.A9046EF6@cdc.gov>

At 12:45 PM 3/13/04 +0100, Eugen Leitl FORWARDED:
>----- Forwarded message from Enzo Michelangeli <em at em.no-ip.com> -----
>
>Skype claims to use RSA-based key exchange, which is good for
multi-party
>conferencing but does not preserve forward secrecy. Maybe some variant
of
>ephemeral D-H authenticated by RSA signatures, with transparent
>renegotiation every time someone joins the conference, could do the job

>better.

RSA (ie persistant keys) may be an option but MUST NOT be
required, for secrecy reasons as mentioned.  (At worst RSA keys
can be used once, then discarded.  Lots of primes out there :-)

Also, this is *voice*, ie biometric auth,
so public-key-web-o-trust verislime scam is
unnecessary at best.  (Although for ringing up a business it
might be a useful redundancy in case you misdial, and if there
are introducers more trusted and perhaps liable than verislime)

>But the thing I particularly would like to discuss here is if, and how,
to
>leverage on existing P2P networks.

Get Real Networks or AOL or M$ to bundle a free, open secphone with
their regular
products.  In AOL case you can exploit their "buddy" (aka traffic
analysis) system
for your directory services.

I bet its suggested monthly.  And shot down by managers who have been
shown photos of their personal indiscretions taken by spooks.

One could always implement a brand new
>network, using Distributed Hash Table algorithms such as Chord or
>Kademlia,

We don't give a flying fuck as to which shiny new algorithm you use,
although were we a graph theory wonk, we might care.

but it would be much easier to rely from the very beginning upon
>a large number of nodes (at least for directory and presence
>functionality, if not for the reflectors which require specific UDP
code).

What the NAT world (yawn) needs is free registry services exploitable by
any
protocol.  Those NAT-users with RSA-clue can sign their registry entry.

>That would somehow repeat the approach initially adopted by Vocaltec
when,
>in 1995, they launched their Iphone making use of IRC servers to
publish
>dynamic IP addresses. Incidentally, the IRC users community didn't
>particularly appreciate ;-), triggering the Great Iphone War, which
>quickly led Vocaltec to set up its own dedicated IRC servers.

Net was a smaller place in 95.  A '95 machine didn't have MIPS to burn.
Not so many broadband nodes.  Bush was just an airhead redneck governor,
not
a rabid Caesar.




From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com  Sun Mar 14 05:40:43 2004
From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV)
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 05:40:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: inverse finding
In-Reply-To: <405451E3.9F6C72C4@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20040314134043.79747.qmail@web21206.mail.yahoo.com>

I can't stop outsourcing.Don't blame me.Blame your own
govt.

Sarath.


--- "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov> wrote:
> At 09:55 PM 3/12/04 -0800, Sarad AV wrote:
> >if gcd(a,m)=1,
> >for a*a inverse==1 mod m
> >is it better to find
> >a invese=a^(m-2) mod m   by binary exponentiation
> >modulo m  or is it more time efficient by extended
> >euclids algorithm for large 'm'?
> 
> I dunno, why don't you think about it some?
> 
> How are you going to land a sweet outsourced job
> if you ask others to do your homework?
> 
> 
> 
> 


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Yahoo! Mail - More reliable, more storage, less spam
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From sfurlong at acmenet.net  Sun Mar 14 06:02:41 2004
From: sfurlong at acmenet.net (Steve Furlong)
Date: 14 Mar 2004 09:02:41 -0500
Subject: Career advise on entering the tech field
In-Reply-To: <405451E3.9F6C72C4@cdc.gov>
References: <405451E3.9F6C72C4@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <1079272961.17725.30.camel@daft>

On Sun, 2004-03-14 at 07:36, Major Variola (ret) wrote:

> How are you going to land a sweet outsourced job
> if you ask others to do your homework?

If Sarath is, in fact, a student who will soon be looking for work, he
may do just fine. Getting a tech job has little to do with how much you
know or how well you can do the work. Most of getting a job, at least in
the US, has to do with putting together a resume that will get you a
call-back, and with impressing the HR guys during the first interview.
Neither of these need have any bearing on actual qualifications.

Once he has a job in the tech field, someone with people skills
sufficient to get others to do his work for him will get farther ahead
than the techie who actually does the work. Of course, it's easier for a
woman to pull this off in the typical tech-heavy company -- a woman just
has to chat with the guys, whereas a man will have to actively
brown-nose the bosses or ask favors of his co-workers.




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 14 07:06:19 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:06:19 -0500
Subject: inverse finding
In-Reply-To: <20040314134043.79747.qmail@web21206.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20040314134043.79747.qmail@web21206.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <p06100304bc7a25318264@[66.149.49.5]>

At 5:40 AM -0800 3/14/04, Sarad AV wrote:
>I can't stop outsourcing.Don't blame me.Blame your own
>govt.

Bzzt. Right answer, wrong reason.

Government don't "cause" markets.

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 14 07:11:42 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:11:42 -0500
Subject: Return of the homebrew coder
Message-ID: <p06100305bc7a25f7b0a8@[66.149.49.5]>

Geodesic software, anyone? :-)

Cheers,
RAH
-------

<http://www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=2476892>

The Economist

MONITOR

Return of the homebrew coder

Mar 11th 2004
>From The Economist print edition


Software: Most modern software is written by huge teams of programmers. But
there is still room for homebrew coders, at least in some unusual niches


BEFORE Henry Ford unleashed the practice of mass production on the world,
every little town had a few dozen artisans who made the lives of citizens
easier. A cobbler made the shoes, a tailor sewed suits and a carpenter
built furniture. Mass production sounded the death knell for many
specialist craft jobs, and the rise of computerised supply chains finished
off most of the rest. But now, a century later, the trend is reversing
itself. The new craftsmen do not stitch leather, cut cloth or saw wood:
instead, they write software.

This is because, as digital gizmos proliferate, consumers are running into
some niggling problems. How can you synchronise a Sony Ericsson smartphone
with a Macintosh computer running Microsoft's Entourage software? How do
you send instant messages from your PocketPC or Palm handheld? How do you
maintain a weblog quickly and easily? Such difficulties are typically faced
by just a few thousand people with specific and unusual requirements-too
few to merit the attention of the big computer firms, but enough to provide
opportunities for a growing band of homebrew coders who set out to develop
niche products.

In many cases these programmers are making a decent living in the process,
thanks to the availability of high-speed internet connections, cheap
web-hosting services and online-payment systems such as PayPal and Kagi-all
of which make it quick and easy to distribute software and collect money
from customers. The trend is also a response to the sorry state of the
technology industry, following the bursting of the dotcom bubble. Where
they could once command salaries of $100,000, programmers now worry about
their jobs disappearing to India. So instead of waiting for things to
improve, some have decided to strike out on their own.

Brent Simmons is one such programmer. With the help of his wife, he runs
Ranchero Software from his garage in Seattle. They make a clever piece of
software called NetNewsWire, which runs on the Mac OS X operating system
and makes it easy to read news and then post comments on to a weblog. "I
like being able to design and implement software and have the final say,"
says Mr Simmons. "It's a higher level of creativity than working on someone
else's software. I get to refine and market my own ideas." At $40 each, Mr
Simmons needs to sell 2,000 copies of his program each year to earn what he
would be paid as an employee elsewhere.

Jonas Salling of Salling Software in Stockholm, meanwhile, has attracted a
loyal following for his handy software utilities. One allows data from
Microsoft's Entourage personal-information manager for Macintosh computers
to be transferred to Sony Ericsson smartphones. The other allows such
phones, and certain Palm handhelds, to be used as wireless remote-controls
via a Bluetooth link. So you can, for example, advance slides in a
presentation by clicking on your phone's keypad. The number of people who
actually want to do this is quite small, but they want to do it enough to
pay Mr Salling $10 for his software, which has won several awards.

Even more successful are Gaurav Banga and Saurabh Aggarwbi, based in
Sunnyvale, California. They sell VeriChat, a nifty piece of software that
allows people to send and receive instant messages on smartphones, or on
PocketPC and Palm handheld computers. VeriChat is sold on a subscription
basis, and brings in $20 per user per year, collected via PayPal. The
company's sales are expected to reach $1m this year.

 Another homebrew coder is Nick Bradbury, who lives in Franklin, Tennessee.
He wrote one of the first web-publishing tools, called HomeSite, and sold
it to Allaire, which is now part of Macromedia. Then he started Bradbury
Software, which sells a web-page editor called TopStyle and a news-reading
program called FeedDemon. Self-employment, he notes, has more than just
financial benefits. "I put in more hours, but those hours are very
flexible, which in my case means I can spend a great deal of time with my
two kids," he says. And he finds it very rewarding to know that his
software is making people's lives a little easier-"something I rarely, if
ever, experienced while working in the corporate world."

The phenomenon of the homebrew coder is not new, of course. For two
decades, programmers have distributed their wares as "shareware", initially
through dial-up bulletin boards or via disks given away with computer
magazines, and later via the internet. People can try a piece of software
free of charge, and then send a cheque to its creator if they want to
continue using it. This often entitles them to a registration code that
unlocks extra features. But online payment services such as PayPal and Kagi
have simplified and sped up the payment process, making the shareware model
far more attractive for programmers. "Software developers are essentially
cutting out the traditional distribution channels, which are not
efficient," says Kee Nethery, the founder of Kagi, who has noticed a
growing number of independent software developers collecting money using
his firm's service.

Mr Bradbury also points to improvements in development tools, which make it
easier for lone programmers to build complex software, and to a growing
number of niche markets, as programmable devices such as smartphones
proliferate. While new opportunities abound, however, this world of
independents is an unforgiving meritocracy. For homebrew coders, the fact
that their fortunes depend directly on the quality of their products is
both the risk and the reward.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Sun Mar 14 10:15:08 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:15:08 -0800
Subject: Return of the homebrew coder
Message-ID: <4054A12C.934725A3@cdc.gov>

At 10:11 AM 3/14/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>Return of the homebrew coder
>
>BEFORE Henry Ford unleashed the practice of mass production on the
world,
>every little town had a few dozen artisans who made the lives of
citizens
>easier.

Software is also still in the "craft" stage where the designers actually
do the
building, in some cases.  Know any architects that can handle an
automatic
nailer?

The article doesn't address the real reason that lone software artisans
(and small software businesses) can still exist: there are niches too
small for Microsoft,
not sexy enough for a squad of Open Source Gooncoders to replicate your
work for free.

Life in the 21st century feels like being a proto-mammal 65Mya, do not
get squashed by the monster lizards nor noticed by the hungry others.
Small, quick, furry, that's us.  Sometimes it gets cold, the lizards
can't move
fast enough, so we eat them.  Last two sentences sound like something Al
Q
could say :-)




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sun Mar 14 11:37:40 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 14:37:40 -0500
Subject: inverse finding
Message-ID: <BAY7-F69683JqzofU7D0000e5ae@hotmail.com>

>I can't stop outsourcing.Don't blame me.Blame your own
>govt.

Holy Shit, Sarath...what's that got to do with Variola's little quip?

And are you trying to suggest (On Cypherpunks, of all places) that the US 
government should somehow regulate outsourcing?

(Me, I work with outsourced experts all the time and for the most part it 
works out just fine. However, if the US government should do anything, it 
should be to level the playing field so that outsourced jobs don't go to 
countries which have no child labor laws, no pollution control or etc..., 
and even on this I'll probably get hammered on THIS list, which in general 
doesn't really trust ANY government to do much at all besides shore up its 
own power....)

-TD


>From: Sarad AV <jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: inverse finding
>Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 05:40:43 -0800 (PST)
>
>
>I can't stop outsourcing.Don't blame me.Blame your own
>govt.
>
>Sarath.
>
>
>--- "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov> wrote:
> > At 09:55 PM 3/12/04 -0800, Sarad AV wrote:
> > >if gcd(a,m)=1,
> > >for a*a inverse==1 mod m
> > >is it better to find
> > >a invese=a^(m-2) mod m   by binary exponentiation
> > >modulo m  or is it more time efficient by extended
> > >euclids algorithm for large 'm'?
> >
> > I dunno, why don't you think about it some?
> >
> > How are you going to land a sweet outsourced job
> > if you ask others to do your homework?
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>__________________________________
>Do you Yahoo!?
>Yahoo! Mail - More reliable, more storage, less spam
>http://mail.yahoo.com
>

_________________________________________________________________
Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee when you click here. 
http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 14 15:42:21 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 18:42:21 -0500
Subject: 'Special skills draft' on drawing board
Message-ID: <p06100364bc7a9dfbd22c@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/03/13/MNG905K1BC1.DTL&type=printable>
        

www.sfgate.com        


 'Special skills draft' on drawing board
 Computer experts, foreign language specialists lead list of military's needs
 Eric Rosenberg, Hearst Newspapers
 Saturday, March 13, 2004
)2004 San Francisco Chronicle | Feedback | FAQ



URL: sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/03/13/MNG905K1BC1.DTL

 Washington -- The government is taking the first steps toward a targeted
military draft of Americans with special skills in computers and foreign
languages.

 The Selective Service System has begun the process of creating the
procedures and policies to conduct such a targeted draft in case military
officials ask Congress to authorize it and the lawmakers agree to such a
request.

 Richard Flahavan, a spokesman for the Selective Service System, said
planning for a possible draft of linguists and computer experts had begun
last fall after Pentagon personnel officials said the military needed more
people with skills in those areas.

 "Talking to the manpower folks at the Department of Defense and others,
what came up was that nobody foresees a need for a large conventional draft
such as we had in Vietnam," Flahavan said. "But they thought that if we
have any kind of a draft, it will probably be a special skills draft."

 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has said he would not ask Congress to
authorize a draft, and officials at the Selective Service System, the
independent federal agency that would organize any conscription, stress
that the possibility of a so-called "special skills draft" is likely far
off.

 A targeted registration and draft is "is strictly in the planning stage,"
said Flahavan, adding that "the whole thing is driven by what appears to be
the more pressing and relevant need today" -- the deficit in language and
computer experts.

 "We want to gear up and make sure we are capable of providing (those types
of draftees) since that's the more likely need," the spokesman said, adding
that it could take about two years to "to have all the kinks worked out. "

 The agency already has in place a special system to register and draft
health care personnel ages 20 to 44 in more than 60 specialties if
necessary in a crisis. According to Flahavan, the agency will expand this
system to be able to rapidly register and draft computer specialists and
linguists, should the need ever arise. But he stressed that the agency had
received no request from the Pentagon to do so.

 The issue of a renewed draft has gained attention because of concerns that
U.S. military forces are over-extended. Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist
strikes, U.S. forces have fought two wars, established a major military
presence in Afghanistan and Iraq and are now taking on peacekeeping duties
in Haiti. But Congress, which would have to authorize a draft, has so far
shown no interest in renewing the draft.

 Legislation to reinstitute the draft, introduced by Rep. Charles Rangel,
D-N.Y., has minimal support with only 13 House lawmakers signing on as co-
sponsors. A corresponding bill in the Senate introduced by Sen. Fritz
Hollings, D-S.C., has no co-sponsors.

 The military draft ended in 1973 as the American commitment in Vietnam
waned, beginning the era of the all-volunteer force. Mandatory registration
for the draft was suspended in 1975 but resumed in 1980 by President Jimmy
Carter after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. About 13.5 million men, ages
18 to 25, are registered with the Selective Service.

 But the military has had particular difficulty attracting and retaining
language experts, especially people knowledgeable about Arabic and various
Afghan dialects.

 To address this need, the Army has a new pilot program underway to recruit
Arabic speakers into the service's Ready Reserves. The service has signed
up about 150 people into the training program.

 A Pentagon official familiar with personnel issues stressed that the armed
forces were against any form of conscription but acknowledged the
groundwork already underway at the Selective Service System.

 "We understand that Selective Service has been reviewing existing
organizational mission statements to confirm their relevance for the
future," the official said. "Some form of 'special skills' registration,
not draft, has been a part of its review."

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 14 16:59:57 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 19:59:57 -0500
Subject: Repeal every law enacted since 1912
Message-ID: <p06100374bc7aaec2c0fc@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://reviewjournal.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=reviewjournal.com+--+Opinion%3A+VIN+SUPRYNOWICZ%3A+Repeal+every+law+enacted+since+1...&expire=&urlID=9595693&fb=Y&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.reviewjournal.com%2Flvrj_home%2F2004%2FMar-14-Sun-2004%2Fopinion%2F23315601.html&partnerID=569>

 

Sunday, March 14, 2004
Las Vegas Review-Journal

 VIN SUPRYNOWICZ: Repeal every law enacted since 1912





Michael writes in, asking: "I am a junior in high school, a member of the
Libertarian Party and I read your column every week. I am e-mailing you for
two reasons: 1) Your last article in response to that woman's letter was
great. ... 2) I'm not criticizing you, but I would like to know what
alternative you propose when saying we should do away with prisons."

I replied: Hi, Michael,

The problem with proposing "pragmatic" solutions that might help the
statists out of the hideous swamps in which they have bemired themselves is
that we're surrounded by proud government-school graduates with little
historical perspective, who therefore assume everything our government now
does is historically "normal," and who are equally likely to denounce as
either a failed comedian or a "nut" anyone who proposes anything radically
different.

Take Social Security. Point out that this Ponzi scheme is actuarially
bankrupt, and the Peanut Gallery shrieks "It's easy to criticize; what do
you suggest we do?!"

In good faith, we might suggest they do a pro-rated division of any money
the government wants to contend is actually in the "Social Security Trust
Fund" among those aged 50 and older, based on how much they paid in, while
telling workers under 50: "Sorry, you're out of luck. But at least you've
got 15 years to save for your retirement, and you'd better get started."

The screaming then begins: "But what about the starving oldsters who depend
on those payments? They were promised!" And is the target of this outrage
those who foisted this transparent socialist fraud on a befuddled nation?
No, it's those of us who have bravely assumed the role of bank examiners,
merely holding open the door to the empty vault and pointing out they've
created an unsustainable system.

The case is similar as we begin to examine why the United States has by far
the highest incarceration rate in the world. Take the case of Martha
Stewart. They couldn't charge her with selling her stock when her broker
told her it was going to fall in value, since that's not illegal. Instead,
they convicted her of telling the FBI that's not the reason she sold her
stock. This is the kind of thing for which Americans now go to prison.

So if you find a sucker to buy your used car for twice the Blue Book value,
you can't go to jail because it's not a crime. If a cop asks you whether
you sold your car for twice its Blue Book Value and you say, "Sure I did.
Whatcha gonna do about it?" you can't go to jail, because that's not a
crime. But if you tell a federal cop, "No; I sold that car for exactly
what's it's worth" ... you can go to jail for 20 years.

(While, in the meantime, the cops can lie to you with impunity, and bribe
other suspects to testify against you by promising them lesser punishments,
with no penalty to the cops or prosecutors if that testimony turns out to
be a pack of lies.)

And this is the set-up that our critics will tell us is sane, while they
can easily be predicted to tell us any radical changes we propose are
"nuts."

That said, a few modest proposals:

Today's "penitentiaries" are a weird invention of the modern "hygienic"
movement. Peaking in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this is the
same movement that assured us society could be "cleaned up" by banning the
legal commerce in alcohol and other plant extracts ("drugs"); aborting and
sterilizing the retarded and those of "inferior races"; putting the
government increasingly in charge of child-rearing; coming up with "modern,
humane" methods of execution such as the electric chair, etc.

In short, these people were dangerous nuts.

For starters, we could reduce our prison populations by about two-thirds
simply by retroactively repealing every law enacted since 1912.

Was murder illegal by 1912? Of course. Rape? Of course. Kidnapping, armed
robbery, bunko fraud? All serious criminal behaviors had been outlawed by
1912. So why have the number of lawbooks on the shelf multiplied tenfold in
the past 92 years?

Release everyone jailed on a drug law (unknown before 1916), for income tax
evasion (impossible before 1913), for any kind of illegal possession of or
commerce in firearms (laws unimagined a century ago), or for violating any
kind of regulatory scheme or edict erected since 1912, and the federal
prisons would be virtually empty, while even the state pens would probably
see their populations cut in half.

Now declare that -- instead of having their guns taken away and being
considered for prosecution -- any law-abiding citizen who shoots and kills
(or at least permanently cripples) a felon during his commission of a
felony will be given a free Browning Automatic Rifle and a $30,000
government reward (the current cost of jailing the culprit for a year while
he awaits trial), be declared immune from any civil lawsuit, and will
additionally be given a tickertape parade and a medal.

Add to any (substantially reduced) criminal sentence a realistic order that
the felon must compensate the victim or his family with current assets or
future earnings. (This would lend itself quite well to being enforced by
private collection outfits, who could follow the "former" felon around,
attaching the bulk of his wages.)

These things would make real, violent crime far less attractive, with the
added benefit of shifting a lot of the "punishment" to established
private-sector institutions. It's also a method that worked for millennia
in cultures that never even invented the soul-eroding job of "prison guard."

Next time: Whoops! What did we do with our welfare state? It was here a
minute ago.

Vin Suprynowicz is assistant editorial page editor of the Review-Journal
and author of the books "Send in the Waco Killers" and "The Ballad of Carl
Drega." His Web site is www.privacyalert.us.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 14 18:07:32 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 21:07:32 -0500
Subject: If You Want to Protect A Security Secret, Make Sure It's Public
Message-ID: <p0610038abc7abfd3c126@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB107930573476054980,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal

      March 15, 2004

 PORTALS
 By LEE GOMES


If You Want to Protect
 A Security Secret,
 Make Sure It's Public

Here is some news that is shocking but true: The most sensitive, most
highly classified secrets of the U.S. government will soon be in the hands
of two foreigners, both of them self-described "Linux hackers."

It's nothing to be alarmed about, though. Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen,
two Belgian mathematicians, won a U.S.-sponsored global competition in 2000
to design the encryption system that will henceforth encode the secret
communications of the U.S. government. The contest was an entirely open
affair, and the winners selected after a lengthy public process. You can go
online yourself and test the Daemen-Rijmen Advanced Encryption Standard,
assuming you're handy with the likes of matrix multiplication.

It seems that the world's cryptographers, while dealing with keeping
secrets, do most of their work in public.

That's worth remembering as the country moves to electronic voting. The
connection between cryptography and voting may not be immediately apparent.
But in both fields, the integrity of something secret must be maintained,
often in very hostile circumstances.

After the Florida recount debacle, there is now a big push in the U.S.
toward electronic-voting systems; 50 million people are expected to be
using them this November. The problem is that most of the systems being
purchased by local election officials are proprietary, "black box"
solutions sold by companies who, citing trade secret issues, won't let
others look inside them.

It's not just conspiracy theorists who are worried about this, but leading
computer scientists. Proprietary balloting software leaked by corporate
insiders has been discovered by outside evaluators to be full of security
holes. Thus, the good folks working to guarantee secret ballots should
learn something from the people who work to guarantee secret messages. They
never trust anyone who says "trust us."

The basic approach in modern cryptography is to keep the pattern of your
specific key a secret, but not to worry if the overall design of your lock
gets out. It's called Kerckhoffs' Principle, after Auguste Kerckhoffs, a
19th-century cryptographer who, like Messrs. Daemen and Rijmen, was
Flemish. He listed six guidelines for a reliable encryption system. No. 2
was, "It must not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall
into the hands of the enemy without inconvenience."

The idea is counterintuitive, and for most of the long history of secret
codes, it was ignored. But with the rise of computer-assisted cryptography
in the past 50 years or so, there has been a sea change in the working
assumptions of cryptographers. Now, "you can't get good cryptography by
designing in secret," says Whitfield Diffie, co-inventor of the "public
key" encryption system that revolutionized the field, and currently chief
security officer at Sun Microsystems.

If you use the Internet, you are using an alphabet soup of different
encoding methods, all available for public inspection: RSA, SSL and more.
Many security problems exist on the Internet, but none involve these
algorithms.

Why make this stuff public? Because even the smartest people make mistakes.
David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers," says that hubris is something of
an occupational hazard among code makers. "One of the patterns in
cryptographic history is how people always believe the system they just
created is unbreakable," he says. "Someone very clever will create a
cipher, but then someone even cleverer will come along and find a flaw in
it."

Mr. Kahn notes that the German businessmen who began selling the famed
Enigma machine in the 1920s thought they had an unbreakable system. They
marketed the device by boasting that even if someone else had an Enigma, he
couldn't read your messages. Lucky for us, they were wrong. Polish, and
later British, cryptographers were able to defeat Enigma, in part because
at least in the early years, it gave away a clue by repeating the first
three characters of a transmission twice in a row.

These days, tens of thousands of cryptographers use the Internet as a kind
of global Bletchley Park, the famed World War II site where the British
cracked Enigma. Indeed, cryptographer Paul Kocher notes a pattern:
Cryptographic systems developed in public tend to stand up; those developed
in secret, like those for DVD systems or European-style GMS phones, often
get broken.

But if the entire world can see your encryption method, couldn't some smart
bad guy find a flaw in it and quietly use the information against you? In
theory, yes. But the real world doesn't work that way.

Think of all the graduate students eager to make a name for themselves by
pointing out someone else's mistake. Mr. Kocher, for instance, is a
cryptocelebrity because as a student, he found a subtle but serious
theoretical flaw in the widely used RSA encryption method. The system could
then be repaired.

You get the point by now. Cryptography is developed in public. If it's good
enough for eBay, isn't it good enough for the ballot box?

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From shaddack at ns.arachne.cz  Sun Mar 14 12:11:29 2004
From: shaddack at ns.arachne.cz (Thomas Shaddack)
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 21:11:29 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Ideas for an opensource Skype lookalike (fwd
  from  em@em.no-ip.com)
In-Reply-To: <20040313114517.GM18046@leitl.org>
References: <20040313114517.GM18046@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <0403142050550.-1123846336@somehost.domainz.com>

On Sat, 13 Mar 2004, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> ----- Forwarded message from Enzo Michelangeli <em at em.no-ip.com> -----
>
> - Directories for location and presence. Nothing fancy here, already done
> before for P2P chat systems.

I think I suggested it already somewhere. Use Jabber. Use Jabber ID
instead of the phone number.

This, if properly standardized, may open a way for small-scale third-party
services, PSTN-to-VOIP gateways. Pay a small sum, get a phone number
mapped to your Jabber ID, eg. in the scheme
[+country-prefix][local-number-with-PABX][extension], where [extension] is
mapped to the VoIP ID. That way, one person with one (or more) Jabber ID
could be reachable on multiple phone numbers in multiple countries, local
call in each of them.

Maybe could be done as an extension for Jabber protocol, or maybe as
"in-band" (so if you won't have a compatible Jabber client, you'd get the
connection request in plaintext on your screen, kind of like what you'd
get with "nc -l -p 80" instead of running a webserver); this would have
the advantage of being able to run as a proxy between a client of your
choice and the Jabber server.

<snip>
> What Speakfreely sorely lacks is a sensible session initiation protocol,
> and access to non-NATted reflectors to help NATted peers to find each
> other and exchange UDP traffic. That's where a P2P network (especially one
> supporting the concept of non-NATted "ultrapeers") can save the day.

I thought about a Jabber proxy that could launch SpeakFreely with
specified parameters if being asked to. Do the connection negotiations
over Jabber: request connection, be offered the capabilities (protocol to
use, codecs, encryption algorithms...), pick your choices, then the
proxies on both sides launch SpeakFreely (or other program of your
choice) with the required parameters (eg, direct connection, if to use a
reflector (and what one) when both are behind NAT, who initiates the
connection when only one is behind NAT, ...).

Other possibility is to not act as a proxy at all, but be just another
"Jabber resource" (as I think you can be connected from multiple places at
once with the same JID but different resource, but I don't really know
enough about it to be sure it's viable and how well it will play with the
clients already in the wild), and run as a separate client.




From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com  Sun Mar 14 22:00:28 2004
From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV)
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 22:00:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: inverse finding
In-Reply-To: <BAY7-F69683JqzofU7D0000e5ae@hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <20040315060028.36935.qmail@web21202.mail.yahoo.com>

--- Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote:

> And are you trying to suggest (On Cypherpunks, of
> all places) that the US 
> government should somehow regulate outsourcing?

It doesnot matter what i think.Neither can I help it
It already is
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3535893.stm

Any way,I am enlightened. :)

Sarath.

__________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Mail - More reliable, more storage, less spam
http://mail.yahoo.com




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Sun Mar 14 17:07:50 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 01:07:50 +0000
Subject: 'Special skills draft' on drawing board
In-Reply-To: <p06100364bc7a9dfbd22c@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p06100364bc7a9dfbd22c@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20040315010750.GA28120@dreams.soze.net>

R. A. Hettinga (2004-03-14 23:42Z) wrote:

> <http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/03/13/MNG905K1BC1.DTL&type=printable>
> 
>  Richard Flahavan, a spokesman for the Selective Service System, said
> planning for a possible draft of linguists and computer experts had begun
> last fall after Pentagon personnel officials said the military needed more
> people with skills in those areas.
> 
>  A targeted registration and draft is "is strictly in the planning stage,"
> said Flahavan, adding that "the whole thing is driven by what appears to be
> the more pressing and relevant need today" -- the deficit in language and
> computer experts.

Computer experts?  In-crip-shin?  Dig-a-tail?  I don't KNO3 nothin'.

Donald "Fauntleroy" Duckfeld ought to be planning a draft of
philosopher-ayatollahs.

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge... and... we deserve to die.
 -- Budd, "Kill Bill"




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Sun Mar 14 21:04:24 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 05:04:24 +0000
Subject: If You Want to Protect A Security Secret, Make Sure It's
  Public
In-Reply-To: <p0610038abc7abfd3c126@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p0610038abc7abfd3c126@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20040315050424.GA28514@dreams.soze.net>

R. A. Hettinga (2004-03-15 02:07Z) wrote:

> <http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB107930573476054980,00.html>
> 
> If You Want to Protect
>  A Security Secret,
>  Make Sure It's Public

What is "terrible article titles for $500, Alex"?

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge... and... we deserve to die.
 -- Budd, "Kill Bill"




From mv at cdc.gov  Mon Mar 15 09:11:40 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 09:11:40 -0800
Subject: If You Want to Protect A Security Secret...don't use slaves
  as   sysops
Message-ID: <4055E3CC.6F2164FF@cdc.gov>

At 05:04 AM 3/15/04 +0000, Justin wrote:
>> If You Want to Protect
>>  A Security Secret,
>>  Make Sure It's Public
>
>What is "terrible article titles for $500, Alex"?

Give the author a break, he actually cited K's principle in the friggin
WSJ.

Thanks for the forwards, RAH.  Some of us actually do appreciate the
editorial
service you're providing.  (A kindler, gentler cypherpunks.. ;-)

.....

Thoughts about the neo-con nazi enslavement of 3l33ts: What was up with
Schindler's
factories?  They produced such crap for the Fatherland... heh heh
And how 'bout that siberian gas explosion, eh?  Can't even steal good
code
these days...

---

At first, man was enslaved by the gods. But he broke their chains. Then
he was
enslaved by the kings. But he broke their chains. He was
enslaved by his birth, by his kin, by his race. But he broke
their chains. He declared to all his brothers that a man has
rights which neither god nor king nor other men can take away
from him, no matter what their number, for his is the right of
man, and there is no right on earth above this right.
Anthem, Ayn Rand




From mv at cdc.gov  Mon Mar 15 11:02:34 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 11:02:34 -0800
Subject: All your Ohioans are belong to us
Message-ID: <4055FDC8.355848B9@cdc.gov>

Report: Ohio Sold Records To Fla. Database Company For $50K

POSTED: 6:56 pm EST March 14, 2004

COLUMBUS, Ohio -- The state Bureau of Motor Vehicles sold driving
records of Ohioans for about $50,000 to a Florida company developing a
multistate crime database program, according to a report.

The program, called Matrix, lets states share information and
cross-reference the data with up to 20 billion records in databases held
by Seisint Inc., a private company based in Boca Raton, Fla.

Bureau of Motor Vehicles spokeswoman Julie Hinds told The Columbus
Dispatch that Seisint paid Ohio $50,073 between October 2002 and
December 2003.

Hinds said the company signed an agreement not to misuse the
information.

Twelve states that had expressed interest or were involved in the
program have pulled out. Connecticut, Michigan, Florida and Pennsylvania
are still participating.

A spokesman for state Attorney General Jim Petro, who supports the
system, said the information Ohio is sharing is already available to law
enforcement.

"There's nothing novel here. It's just the speed at which it's done,"
said James V. Canepa, chief deputy attorney general.

The records include details on property, boats and Internet domain names
that people own, their address history, utility connections,
bankruptcies, liens and business filings, according to an August report
by the Georgia state Office of Homeland Security.

The American Civil Liberties Union has complained that the system,
formally known as Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange, could
be used by state and federal investigators to compile dossiers on people
who have never been suspected of a crime.

Seisint officials have said safeguards are built into the system to
prevent such abuses.

Ohio and other states have been given releases stating they won't be
liable for mistakes if data from the system contain errors.

The ACLU has filed a number of public records requests in Ohio and other
states to get more details.

"Accuracy on this seems to be poor at best," said Carrie Davis, an
attorney with the ACLU of Ohio. "We have no idea what these records
are."

Gov. Bob Taft is reviewing to what extent Ohio should be involved.

"We are reviewing various legal issues and also long-term cost
implications," Taft spokesman Orest Holubec said.

http://www.local6.com/news/2921360/detail.html




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Mon Mar 15 09:33:00 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 12:33:00 -0500
Subject: If You Want to Protect A Security Secret...don't use slaves
  as sysops
Message-ID: <BAY7-F6Dw27nRIMxz3K0006807c@hotmail.com>

More on Fed's seeking to expand CALEA to VoIP.

http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,62659,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_8

You know, it occurs to me I need a little 'Bot.

What this Bot does is periodically make encrypted "calls" or send out 
meaningless encrypted messages on a regular basis. Then, it won't be as 
obvious when I really do need to do this.

In addition, let 'em spend themselves silly and tie up resources on my 
crapola. In fact, how 'bout a worm or something that does the same thing for 
everybody's machine?

-TD


>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Re: If You Want to Protect A Security Secret...don't use slaves as 
>  sysops
>Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 09:11:40 -0800
>
>At 05:04 AM 3/15/04 +0000, Justin wrote:
> >> If You Want to Protect
> >>  A Security Secret,
> >>  Make Sure It's Public
> >
> >What is "terrible article titles for $500, Alex"?
>
>Give the author a break, he actually cited K's principle in the friggin
>WSJ.
>
>Thanks for the forwards, RAH.  Some of us actually do appreciate the
>editorial
>service you're providing.  (A kindler, gentler cypherpunks.. ;-)
>
>.....
>
>Thoughts about the neo-con nazi enslavement of 3l33ts: What was up with
>Schindler's
>factories?  They produced such crap for the Fatherland... heh heh
>And how 'bout that siberian gas explosion, eh?  Can't even steal good
>code
>these days...
>
>---
>
>At first, man was enslaved by the gods. But he broke their chains. Then
>he was
>enslaved by the kings. But he broke their chains. He was
>enslaved by his birth, by his kin, by his race. But he broke
>their chains. He declared to all his brothers that a man has
>rights which neither god nor king nor other men can take away
>from him, no matter what their number, for his is the right of
>man, and there is no right on earth above this right.
>Anthem, Ayn Rand
>
>
>
>

_________________________________________________________________
Create a Job Alert on MSN Careers and enter for a chance to win $1000! 
http://msn.careerbuilder.com/promo/kaday.htm?siteid=CBMSN_1K&sc_extcmp=JS_JASweep_MSNHotm2




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Mon Mar 15 09:36:28 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 12:36:28 -0500
Subject: 'Special skills draft' on drawing board
Message-ID: <BAY7-F44DzpfuzGT2ik00067377@hotmail.com>

"A targeted registration and draft is "is strictly in the planning stage,"
said Flahavan, adding that "the whole thing is driven by what appears to be
the more pressing and relevant need today" -- the deficit in language and
computer experts."

Well, we could outsource 'em! I'd bet there's tons of Arabic-speakers 
willing to work on the cheap in countries such as Libya, Yemen, and 
Egypt...Bet there'd be a few Saudi nationals who'd be more than willing to 
ride alongside some of our boys in Iraq...

-TD



>From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: 'Special skills draft' on drawing board
>Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 18:42:21 -0500
>
><http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/03/13/MNG905K1BC1.DTL&type=printable>
>
>
>www.sfgate.com
>
>
>  'Special skills draft' on drawing board
>  Computer experts, foreign language specialists lead list of military's 
>needs
>  Eric Rosenberg, Hearst Newspapers
>  Saturday, March 13, 2004
>)2004 San Francisco Chronicle | Feedback | FAQ
>
>
>
>URL: sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/03/13/MNG905K1BC1.DTL
>
>  Washington -- The government is taking the first steps toward a targeted
>military draft of Americans with special skills in computers and foreign
>languages.
>
>  The Selective Service System has begun the process of creating the
>procedures and policies to conduct such a targeted draft in case military
>officials ask Congress to authorize it and the lawmakers agree to such a
>request.
>
>  Richard Flahavan, a spokesman for the Selective Service System, said
>planning for a possible draft of linguists and computer experts had begun
>last fall after Pentagon personnel officials said the military needed more
>people with skills in those areas.
>
>  "Talking to the manpower folks at the Department of Defense and others,
>what came up was that nobody foresees a need for a large conventional draft
>such as we had in Vietnam," Flahavan said. "But they thought that if we
>have any kind of a draft, it will probably be a special skills draft."
>
>  Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has said he would not ask Congress to
>authorize a draft, and officials at the Selective Service System, the
>independent federal agency that would organize any conscription, stress
>that the possibility of a so-called "special skills draft" is likely far
>off.
>
>  A targeted registration and draft is "is strictly in the planning stage,"
>said Flahavan, adding that "the whole thing is driven by what appears to be
>the more pressing and relevant need today" -- the deficit in language and
>computer experts.
>
>  "We want to gear up and make sure we are capable of providing (those 
>types
>of draftees) since that's the more likely need," the spokesman said, adding
>that it could take about two years to "to have all the kinks worked out. "
>
>  The agency already has in place a special system to register and draft
>health care personnel ages 20 to 44 in more than 60 specialties if
>necessary in a crisis. According to Flahavan, the agency will expand this
>system to be able to rapidly register and draft computer specialists and
>linguists, should the need ever arise. But he stressed that the agency had
>received no request from the Pentagon to do so.
>
>  The issue of a renewed draft has gained attention because of concerns 
>that
>U.S. military forces are over-extended. Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist
>strikes, U.S. forces have fought two wars, established a major military
>presence in Afghanistan and Iraq and are now taking on peacekeeping duties
>in Haiti. But Congress, which would have to authorize a draft, has so far
>shown no interest in renewing the draft.
>
>  Legislation to reinstitute the draft, introduced by Rep. Charles Rangel,
>D-N.Y., has minimal support with only 13 House lawmakers signing on as co-
>sponsors. A corresponding bill in the Senate introduced by Sen. Fritz
>Hollings, D-S.C., has no co-sponsors.
>
>  The military draft ended in 1973 as the American commitment in Vietnam
>waned, beginning the era of the all-volunteer force. Mandatory registration
>for the draft was suspended in 1975 but resumed in 1980 by President Jimmy
>Carter after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. About 13.5 million men, ages
>18 to 25, are registered with the Selective Service.
>
>  But the military has had particular difficulty attracting and retaining
>language experts, especially people knowledgeable about Arabic and various
>Afghan dialects.
>
>  To address this need, the Army has a new pilot program underway to 
>recruit
>Arabic speakers into the service's Ready Reserves. The service has signed
>up about 150 people into the training program.
>
>  A Pentagon official familiar with personnel issues stressed that the 
>armed
>forces were against any form of conscription but acknowledged the
>groundwork already underway at the Selective Service System.
>
>  "We understand that Selective Service has been reviewing existing
>organizational mission statements to confirm their relevance for the
>future," the official said. "Some form of 'special skills' registration,
>not draft, has been a part of its review."
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>

_________________________________________________________________
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http://clk.atdmt.com/AVE/go/onm00200413ave/direct/01/




From sunder at sunder.net  Mon Mar 15 10:08:22 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (sunder)
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 13:08:22 -0500
Subject: 'Special skills draft' on drawing board
In-Reply-To: <p06100364bc7a9dfbd22c@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p06100364bc7a9dfbd22c@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <4055F116.5040203@sunder.net>

So is this Uncle Sam's way of getting good workers for no pay?  You could 
expect the same kinds of skills to bring in several hundred dollars per 
hour in the .mil consulting sphere...

Huh... So working from January to April/May to pay one's tax burden isn't 
enough service to the republic anymore? (where tax burden = billions wasted 
on the Iraq/Afghanistani wars, overthrowing elections in Argentina, causing 
riots in Haiti and Africa, etc.)

Now they're resorting to what pretty much amounts to slavery?  How soon 
before .gov just absorbs Exxon, IBM, Sun, HP, Haliburton, Bechtel and all 
of interest directly? How soon before .gov comes out of the fascism closet 
already and announces itself for what it really is?

Bah! I may as well learn to flip burgers and ask if fries will be part of 
the order today...  being a sysadmin isn't getting me employed anymore 
anyway.  :(



R. A. Hettinga wrote:

> <http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/03/13/MNG905K1BC1.DTL&type=printable>
>         
> 
> www.sfgate.com        
> 
> 
>  'Special skills draft' on drawing board
>  Computer experts, foreign language specialists lead list of military's needs
>  Eric Rosenberg, Hearst Newspapers
>  Saturday, March 13, 2004
> )2004 San Francisco Chronicle | Feedback | FAQ
> 
> 
> 
> URL: sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/03/13/MNG905K1BC1.DTL
> 
>  Washington -- The government is taking the first steps toward a targeted
> military draft of Americans with special skills in computers and foreign
> languages.




From comesefosse at ntani.firenze.linux.it  Mon Mar 15 13:00:44 2004
From: comesefosse at ntani.firenze.linux.it (Tarapia Tapioco)
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 22:00:44 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Saving Opportunistic Encryption
Message-ID: <b25fbcdbdc17d83dd396e847fda3a074@firenze.linux.it>

We've recently seen FreeS/WAN die, not least due to the apparent
practical failure of Opportunistic Encryption. The largest blocking
point for deployment of OE always seemed to be the requirement for
publishing one's key in the reverse DNS space. While most tech-savvy
people are able to get access to forward domain space, reverse DNS space
is still more heavily centralized and thus inaccessible to the general
public.

So, the apparent solution for me seems to be the approach that the SPAM
blacklists used - publish information in a subspace of the forward DNS
space instead of using the authoritative in-addr.arpa area.

A possible implementation looks like this:

* Keys are kept in TEXT record like with old-style OE, as
  a.b.c.d.opportunistic.net.

  The format of the text record contains
  * IKE authentication RSA key
  * optional "secure" owner identity, as in x.509 or PGP sig.
  * server signature.

On the client side:

* Keys are published via a TCP client. This ensures there's a
  minimal level of authentication that the submitter of a key is
  also in control of the IP address. Additionally, when an overwrite
  is attempted, we could attempt to obtain an ICMP echo response over
  the old SA and only accept the update when the old SA is dead.

* J. Random libpcap application listens for traffic to different IP
  addresses and checks said DNS repository, manipulates security policy
  accordingly.

This is just a dirty hack since it necessarily misses packets when the
other node is first contacted, but it seems to be the easiest hack-me
route, and it requires little to no platform integration, just
 * a libpcap implemenation
 * a command line interface to IPSEC security policies

Check at least for Linux and Windows, probably *BSD too.

* Linux/KAME's IKE daemon racoon is patched to attempt retrieval of an
  RSA key from said DNS repository and generate appropriate security
  policies.

Cleaner solution, but more work probably.

Obvious weaknesses: As the SPAM blacklists showed impressively, running
an unpopular service on the net these days will get you DDoS'ed out of
existence. Distributing the keys over the whole DNS space like FreeS/WAN
OE did is the cleanest solution here, but I guess a cypherpunkly
approach would also be "good enough" to get this thing started: Just use
a configurable list of domains instead of just opportunistic.net, each
with a different key, and publish these lists like those for remailers
are currently published.

Thoughts?

(On a side note, minder.net has dropped a lot of my recent posts via remailers.
Is there a better node for this?) 




From jya at pipeline.com  Tue Mar 16 05:42:13 2004
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2004 05:42:13 -0800
Subject: If You Want to Protect A Security Secret, Make Sure It's  
  Public
In-Reply-To: <p0610038abc7abfd3c126@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <E1B3C3h-0000gp-00@smtp10.atl.mindspring.net>

Despite the long-lived argument that public review of crypto assures
its reliability, no national infosec agency -- in any country worldwide --
follows that practice for the most secure systems. NSA's support for 
AES notwithstanding, the agency does not disclose its military and
high level systems.

It is likely that these agencies are willing to go along with the notion
of public review to lull users into depending on the systems made
public. If any are breakable, the review will show that, and if the
agencies can break them they need not say squat, merely reap
the benefits of public ignorance and trust in seemingly unbreakable 
systems, as with Enigma, Crypto AG, and numerous other historical 
examples David Kahn describes.

Cryptome's FOI request for NSA documents on when and what it 
learned about public key (non-secret) crypto from the Brits is now 
3 1/2 years old. The agency has said it has relevants documents but 
has not yet released anything, though some $4,000 has been paid 
for the search. (Last response from NSA: May 23, 2003, a telephone
call from Pamela Philips, FOIA Chief, saying that the request was 
in the "easy queue," number 45 from the top.)

Whit Diffie has said he got hints of PK, or something like it, at
NSA. It is not clear from his account whether information on
PK was deliberately leaked to him, with or without a restriction
of disclosure, or if the breakthrough was truly a phenomenal 
private effort of Diffie-Hellman-Merkle.

Consider that intelligence agencies are known to run years-
even decades-long deception operations, especially about
top secret infosec operations, with the goal of deceiving about 
the strength of infosec systems so that they will be sufficiently
trusted to be widely used. Again, Kahn cites numerous 
examples of such deceptions.

The reputation of witting and unwitting participants and institutions
are often used to gain trust in these breakable systems. The

weakness of vaunted systems is considered to be more valuable
than their strengths.

It is imaginable that if AES did not exist it would have to be invented
for such a purposed. As with PK, PGP and the notion that public 
review of crypto is the hen's teeth of assurance.

Until national infosec agencies reveal what they know it does not
seem prudent to to believe conventional wisdom no matter
how often repeated, especially how often repeated. 

A 100% safe crypto system is never to be believed, isn't that what 
always accompanies cryptographers' assurances for they
now better than anyone that snake oil is their No. 1 tool.

Snake oil = crypto, which accounts for why the charge is so often 
hurled. And why snake oil is used to camouflage what is occurring
beneath its contemptible obviousness.




From rsw at jfet.org  Tue Mar 16 08:42:25 2004
From: rsw at jfet.org (Riad S. Wahby)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2004 11:42:25 -0500
Subject: If You Want to Protect A Security Secret, Make Sure It's Public
In-Reply-To: <E1B3C3h-0000gp-00@smtp10.atl.mindspring.net>
References: <p0610038abc7abfd3c126@[66.149.49.5]> <E1B3C3h-0000gp-00@smtp10.atl.mindspring.net>
Message-ID: <20040316164225.GB10530@positron.mit.edu>

John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote:
> Despite the long-lived argument that public review of crypto assures
> its reliability, no national infosec agency -- in any country worldwide --
> follows that practice for the most secure systems. NSA's support for 
> AES notwithstanding, the agency does not disclose its military and
> high level systems.

Nevertheless, given that the public has two options (disclosure or
non-), it seems public review is as good as it gets.

You're right, of course---don't put 100% trust in anything---but I
think it's still reasonable to trust a publicly reviewed system more
than a closed one.

-- 
Riad Wahby
rsw at jfet.org
MIT VI-2 M.Eng




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar 16 11:57:05 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2004 14:57:05 -0500
Subject: Cable taps into wiretap law
Message-ID: <p06100321bc7d0c5e1419@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://news.com.com/2102-1034_3-5173320.html?tag=st.util.print>

CNET News

 Cable taps into wiretap law

 By  Ben Charny
 Staff Writer, CNET News.com
 http://news.com.com/2100-1034-5173320.html

 Story last modified March 16, 2004, 11:00 AM PST

Cable operators are starting to comply with federal law that has long
required telecommunications carriers to help police conduct electronic
surveillance.

The cable companies are not required to do so yet, but they see the writing
on the wall. According to one source, Time Warner Cable is the first cable
operator to begin trying to comply with the federal wiretap law.

 Vernon Irvin, executive vice president at security vendor VeriSign, said
during a recent interview that his company had signed a deal with a "major
cable operator" in the United States to help it follow the Communications
Assistance For Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).


 Irvin, however, did assert that other cable companies are sure to follow.
That's because the FBI has made public a far-reaching proposal to require
all broadband Internet providers--including cable modem and digital
subscriber line (DSL) companies--to restructure their networks to support
easy wiretapping by police.

"The cable guys arenmt waiting," Irvin said.

The FBI's proposal would, for the first time, force cable providers that
sell broadband to come under the jurisdiction of 1994's CALEA, which
further defined the already-existing statutory obligations of telecom
carriers to help police conduct electronic surveillance. Telephone
companies that use their networks to sell broadband have already been
following CALEA rules.

Because the eavesdropping proposal has the support of the Bush
administration, the Federal Communications Commission is expected to take
it very seriously. Last month, FCC Chairman Michael Powell stressed that
"law enforcement access to IP-enabled communications is essential" and that
police must have "access to communications infrastructure they need to
protect our nation."

Irvin said that details of the VeriSign deal will be announced next week.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From sandy at storm.ca  Mon Mar 15 23:29:42 2004
From: sandy at storm.ca (Sandy Harris)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2004 15:29:42 +0800
Subject: Saving Opportunistic Encryption
In-Reply-To: <b25fbcdbdc17d83dd396e847fda3a074@firenze.linux.it>
References: <b25fbcdbdc17d83dd396e847fda3a074@firenze.linux.it>
Message-ID: <4056ACE6.2070006@storm.ca>

Tarapia Tapioco wrote:

> We've recently seen FreeS/WAN die, not least due to the apparent
> practical failure of Opportunistic Encryption. The largest blocking
> point for deployment of OE always seemed to be the requirement for
> publishing one's key in the reverse DNS space. ...

Yes.

> So, the apparent solution for me seems to be the approach that the SPAM
> blacklists used - publish information in a subspace of the forward DNS
> space instead of using the authoritative in-addr.arpa area.
>
Worth discussing at least.

> A possible implementation looks like this:
> ...
> 
> * Linux/KAME's IKE daemon racoon is patched to attempt retrieval of an
>   RSA key from said DNS repository and generate appropriate security
>   policies.
> 
> Cleaner solution, but more work probably.

Why would you use racoon? FreeS/WAN's Pluto is available, under GPL,
already does OE, and works with 2.6 kernel IPsec (though I'm not
certain if patches are needed for that). Wouldn't it be a better
starting point?




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar 16 13:36:31 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2004 16:36:31 -0500
Subject: Scarce objects -- bearer certificates for usage control
Message-ID: <p0610032cbc7d22d457d6@[66.149.49.5]>

Yup, certainly anyone who's thought about paying for, say, grid networks
time, or wireless access, has at least plinked around with the subject, but
it's nice that someone like *Nick* is thrashing some cycles on the problem.

:-)

In the interest of "telegraph, telephone, tell Hettinga", I'm just sending
this along and will read it myself later.

Cheers,
RAH
-------
--- begin forwarded text



From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Tue Mar 16 13:40:04 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2004 16:40:04 -0500
Subject: Chinese WiFi and Encryption
Message-ID: <BAY7-F84s8sw8kQtOTX000657a3@hotmail.com>

http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2004/tc20040315_6034_tc058.htm

What I don't see mentioned in this little article is that fact that WEP is 
largely useless in terms of security. So in a way the Chinese were 
attempting to jump into that hole.

Of course, Zhong Nan Hai will have a nice backdoor for themselves.

In In China things will play out like this if they successfully enact the 
standard:

t=0: Standard enacted
t= 6 months: Some concerns stated about the new standard's security. Jong 
Nan Hai issues statements in reply 'proving' that the concerns are 
unwarranted.
t=9 months: Standard is hacked wide open...a simple tool is posted on the 
Internet internationally, and by Chinese locally.
t=10 months: All links to the hack internationally are shut down, any locals 
still crowing about the security are arrested. Jong Nan Hai either ignores 
claims of a hack or else states that a simple patch has closed the hole, 
which was no big deal anyway.
t=14 months: WiFi routinely hacked in China. Jong Nan Hai continues to claim 
standard is secure, except for very rare cases. But states that anyone 
eavesdropping will be prosecuted and possibly executed.
t=18 months: Jong Nan hai claims standard is safe because of government 
control. Meanwhile, no Chinese use WiFi for anything critical.

-TD

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  FILETIME=[3197AE00:01C40B80]

http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2004/tc20040315_6034_tc058.htm

What I don't see mentioned in this little article is that fact that WEP is 
largely useless in terms of security. So in a way the Chinese were 
attempting to jump into that hole.

Of course, Zhong Nan Hai will have a nice backdoor for themselves.

In In China things will play out like this if they successfully enact the 
standard:

t=0: Standard enacted
t= 6 months: Some concerns stated about the new standard's security. Jong 
Nan Hai issues statements in reply 'proving' that the concerns are 
unwarranted.
t=9 months: Standard is hacked wide open...a simple tool is posted on the 
Internet internationally, and by Chinese locally.
t=10 months: All links to the hack internationally are shut down, any locals 
still crowing about the security are arrested. Jong Nan Hai either ignores 
claims of a hack or else states that a simple patch has closed the hole, 
which was no big deal anyway.
t=14 months: WiFi routinely hacked in China. Jong Nan Hai continues to claim 
standard is secure, except for very rare cases. But states that anyone 
eavesdropping will be prosecuted and possibly executed.
t=18 months: Jong Nan hai claims standard is safe because of government 
control. Meanwhile, no Chinese use WiFi for anything critical.

-TD

_________________________________________________________________
Find things fast with the new MSN Toolbar  includes FREE pop-up blocking! 
http://clk.atdmt.com/AVE/go/onm00200414ave/direct/01/




From DaveHowe at gmx.co.uk  Tue Mar 16 09:33:39 2004
From: DaveHowe at gmx.co.uk (Dave Howe)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2004 17:33:39 -0000
Subject: If You Want to Protect A Security Secret, Make Sure It's 
  Public
References: <p0610038abc7abfd3c126@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <E1B3C3h-0000gp-00@smtp10.atl.mindspring.net>
  <20040316164225.GB10530@positron.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <09e701c40b7c$d33172e0$c71121c2@exchange.sharpuk.co.uk>

Riad S. Wahby wrote:
> John Young <jya at pipeline.com> wrote:
>> Despite the long-lived argument that public review of crypto assures
>> its reliability, no national infosec agency -- in any country
>> worldwide -- follows that practice for the most secure systems.
>> NSA's support for
>> AES notwithstanding, the agency does not disclose its military and
>> high level systems.
> Nevertheless, given that the public has two options (disclosure or
> non-), it seems public review is as good as it gets.
  I also can't see an alternative; yes, we are giving military
organizations the "crown jewels" of our efforts for no cost (although at
least in theory they should pay for anything that is copyrighted or
patented :) but no large company can afford to spend a fraction of what
the NSA do every day on analysis - it is rely on the community or rely on
a handful of staff who may or may not be able to code their way out of a
paper bag (and if there is no community to give peer status to a
cryptographer, how can you tell good from bad when you hire one?)
  Almost always, closed source systems are either snakeoil, or based on
publically accepted algos with just a few extra valueless steps thrown in
so that they can claim it is different (VME for example can be very secure
indeed provided you combine it with something else - explicitly mentioned
as an option in the patent document - but the combined system is still
patented because their silly variant on a classic cypher is used at some
point)




From szabo at szabo.best.vwh.net  Tue Mar 16 13:22:38 2004
From: szabo at szabo.best.vwh.net (szabo at szabo.best.vwh.net)
Date: 16 Mar 2004 21:22:38 -0000
Subject: Scarce objects -- bearer certificates for usage control
Message-ID: <mailman.841.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


(Bob -- feel free to forward this to whatever list(s) you think might be
interes
ted -- Nick).

I desribe an architecture providing usage control (as opposed to access
control)
 for mutually suspicious objects (i.e., objects interacting across trust
boundar
ies), using bearer certificates:

http://szabo.best.vwh.net/scarce.html


Nick Szabo
http://szabo.best.vwh.net/

~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From thad at cc.gatech.edu  Tue Mar 16 22:29:53 2004
From: thad at cc.gatech.edu (Thad E. Starner)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 01:29:53 -0500 (EST)
Subject: [wearables] Wearable Computers and Body Privacy take 2
Message-ID: <mailman.842.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


Thanks to everyone for their comments so far.

Here is a second version of the article that sounds a little less,
uh, paranoid.  As usual, I'm trying to fit too much in too little
space, but this verison is a little cleaner.  See what y'all think.

			   Thad
------
Wearable Computers and Body Privacy

About 10 years ago, I made a bet with a colleague that the first large
wearable computing market would evolve from portable consumer
electronics like MP3 players instead of growing out of the mobile
phone market.  Apparently I am in the process of losing that bet.

Today's mobile phones are integrating wireless messaging, video and
audio recording, web browsing, e-mail, and many computing
applications.  Previously, these features could only be found on
prototype wearable computers.  With the addition of a high resolution
screen, such as MicroOptical's SV-6 head-up display, and a fast mobile
text entry method, such as Handykey's Twiddler one-handed keyboard,
these mobile phones will be very similar to our current research
prototypes, at least in hardware specifications.  With such additions,
much of Vernor Vinge's vision with respect to wearable computers in
his story ``Synthetic Serendipity'' will be possible for a large
consumer base.  In fact, many of wearable computing's early
demonstrations should be possible with this current generation of
mobile phones with embedded cameras: augmented realities where
computer graphics are overlaid on the physical world; sharing points
of view in real-time; ad hoc collaborations with remote colleagues;
and access to web search engines to provide assistance during a
conversation, for example.  However, I'd like to discuss a major
feature and challenge to these devices:  privacy.

Wearable computing may provide some privacy-protections for the field
of ubiquitous computing.  Many instantiations of ubiquitous computing
place cameras, microphones, and other sensors in the environment
around us.  Yet, who receives this information or provides controls
against logging it?  Who provides the money for installing and
maintaining the infrastructure and ensures that the infrastructure is
not perverted for improper use?

By concentrating sensing and data storage on the body, a wearable
computer allows its user to ``control his own bits.''  The user
determines when and where his data is released and how much to trust
the infrastructure around him.  For example, when a wearable user
enters work in the morning, he may instruct his wearable to inform his
office of his arrival so that his office unlocks his door or starts a
pot of coffee.  However, the user would probably tell his wearable not
to share his identity with billboards he walks past to avoid the sort
of targeted advertising portrayed in the film ``Minority Report.''  Of
course, some bargain hunters may choose to share their identity with
advertisers to obtain better deals, much like membership cards in
today's grocery stores.

While wearable computers provide the user a sense of physical security
and control over his private data, many people express concern over
potential violations of privacy for others who happen to be near the
wearable user.  In fact, wearable computers provide little new
recording capability.  Hidden cameras have been commonly available for
over two decades, and hidden body-worn microphones have been used for
over half a century.  In truth, much of the populace in developed
countries already carry a hidden microphone in their pockets - the
mobile phone.  While mobile phone users believe that their phones are
``off'' when not in use, most modern phones actually use a ``soft''
power switch which only turns off parts of the phone.  In theory, a
service provider, government agency, or technically savvy cracker
could reprogram a mobile phone to record or transmit the user's audio
without their knowledge!  Perhaps what we need is a legal concept of
``body privacy.''  Misuse of information sensed or stored on a user's
body should carry the same penalties as theft of personal items
carried on the body.  Similarly, the same burden of proving sufficient
cause should be required of law enforcement agencies when searching
body-worn devices as when searching the user's body.

Given today's technology, a mobile phone user might record all his
conversations himself.  While this possibility certainly exists, as a
society in general, we do not worry about our colleagues recording
confidential conversations and using the information against us.  Such
an action would be a violation of the implicit social contracts we
have already evolved for everyday life.  In some sense, our colleagues
are accountable in that, if the information is used inappropriately,
we know who to blame.  In my research group, we avoid even this
possibility by using noise canceling microphones with our wearable
computers.  While these microphones can hear the user's side of the
conversation, the microphone's physical characteristics are designed
to avoid capturing environmental noises such as the other person's
speech.  My conversational partner may choose to make his speech
available to my wearable through the use of his own noise-cancelling
microphone, but, again, he controls his own data.

By using a combination of physical sensor limitations, legal recourse,
and social conventions, I believe that wearable computers can improve
our lives while protecting our privacy.  However, in order to
determine the issues involved, we need communities of early adopters
to experiment with the use of these devices and encourage meaningful
discussion on the topic.

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From sunder at sunder.net  Wed Mar 17 06:02:17 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (sunder)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 09:02:17 -0500
Subject: Saving Opportunistic Encryption
In-Reply-To: <20040317091656.GE28136@leitl.org>
References: <20040317091656.GE28136@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <40585A69.1080206@sunder.net>

Eugen Leitl wrote:

> No, anything requiring publishing DNS records won't fly. OE is
> *opportunistic*. It doesn't care about what the true identity of the opposite
> party is. Any shmuck on dynamic IP should be able to use it instantly, with
> no observable performance degradation, using a simple patch.
> 
> If it doesn't fit these minimal requirements, it will die, just the same way
> FreeS/WAN did.

I absolutely agree.  While it's possible to do things like MIM attacks if 
you don't know who the other guy is, look at how successful SSH is over any 
other kind of solution.  Its biggest competitor at the time it was 
introduced was kerberized telnet/ftp.  How many networks do you know that 
use Kerberos instead of ssh these days?

Look at how many folks use PGP - those who really know it and want it, or 
those who know enough about it and have some easily automated 
implementation that plugs in to their mail client. (i.e. commercial pgp 
with Eudora/Outlook plug in.  As an aside, I'm still pissed off that the 
Mozilla mail client doesn't support PGP/GPG in addition to S/MIME or 
whatever the hell..)

Adding another infrastructure requirement that requires ISP layer changes 
will exponentially raise resistance to its adoption.  While I do run my own 
server for mail/web, 99.9% of the internet luser population doesn't - and 
even so, I chose not to run my own DNS server.  (Allowing register.com to 
do so makes it safer for me: it's one less service that might be 
compromised due to possible bugs.)

Making it optional to add that infrastructure layer - whether it's via DNS, 
LDAP, signed public keys, web o' trust / pgp keyserver, finger, or even 
something entirely new, is probably the safer way to go, BUT don't require it.

There do exist transparent web caching proxies out there (usually 
advertised as web accelerators.)  I ran across such a few months ago when 
our satellite office couldn't connect to one of our servers.  We were using 
private dns virtual host names to access management web pages on our 
servers.  However the proxy intercepted those requests, and tried to 
resolve DNS, but obviously couldn't, so everyone in the office got a DNS 
error.  It took some pretty strong words to get the ISP to even admit that 
they were using such a beast, much less disable it just for us.

It's certainly possible to create a proxy to do MitM interception that 
would foil even SSH.  This wouldn't work so well against mobile devices 
which might fortuitously use a different route, but would work very well 
one hop above the server if that's the only pipe the server has.

There are ways to protect against this such as publishing a line for the 
known-hosts entry by other means, but no one does this (yet?)  (i.e: 
sneakernet, finger, web page, pgp signed/encrypted email, over the 
telephone, etc.)   (Another useful thing is to use public keys for SSH 
instead of passwords: this way the attacker won't be able to reuse your 
password - but you're still compromised the second you login.)

There are some rare cases where you absolutely want to know who you are 
talking to.  For example an https server that allows control of financial 
data.  Even in that case the server doesn't fully know who the client is, 
and doesn't need to (in order to establish the secure link) -- until a 
login (or CC info) is presented.  In the case of using OE to talk to a 
server, the client already has some idea of the server's identity, and the 
server will eventually have some idea of who the client is.


As an aside: Just doing the above to encapsulate emails won't help at all 
against spamming: the spammers will just randomly generate throw away 
public keys, etc.  They've already written trojan spammers with their own 
SMTP servers built in, it's only a few more (thousand?) lines of code to 
incrementally bypass that layer as well.

I've already seen a few years ago spam sites that return "yahoo.com" and 
"msn.com" in reverse DNS, but doing traceroutes reveals that they're 
actually in Korea or China, etc.  So you can't fully rely on (spoofable) 
DNS info anyway.


If any of you remember the recent virii attacks where the attachment is a 
password protected zip file with the password in the body of the email, 
guess what: the evil ones kicked it up a notch once more.

Just yesterday, I saw a new form of this on cpunx: instead of a ZIP 
attachment, the new malware uses a RAR archive, and instead of the password 
being in clear text, it's inside an a randomly named attached .GIF file! 
They've not obscured it, so it's possible to add OCR to the anti-virus 
code, but it's now it's that much harder for the anti-virus to block.

Just as the virus authors evolve their code to adapt their offenses to the 
defenses of virus scanners, so will the spammers evolve their code to 
bypass spam filters, and we've already seen that spammers use virii/worms 
to spread their code...

Distributed computing is already here.  Shame that it's biggest use is 
currently for evil.  Ugh! :(




From mann at eecg.toronto.edu  Wed Mar 17 06:38:57 2004
From: mann at eecg.toronto.edu (Steve Mann)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 09:38:57 -0500 (EST)
Subject: [wearables] Wearable Computers and Privacy (surveillance and...)
Message-ID: <mailman.843.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

> By concentrating sensing and data storage on the body, a wearable
> computer allows its user to ``control his own bits.''  The user
> determines when and where his data is released and how much to trust
> the infrastructure around him.  For example, when a wearable user
> enters work in the morning, he may instruct his wearable to inform his
> office of his arrival so that his office unlocks his door or starts a
> pot of coffee.  However, the user would probably tell his wearable not
> to share his identity with billboards he walks past to avoid the sort
> of targeted advertising portrayed in the film ``Minority Report.''  Of
> course, some bargain hunters may choose to share their identity with
> advertisers to obtain better deals, much like membership cards in
> today's grocery stores.
..
> By using a combination of physical sensor limitations, legal recourse,


Some of the social, legal, ethical, moral, and policy issues you
raise are very relevant.  In thinking about our recent Special
Issue on cyborglaw, here is a comparison of architecture-based
recording (surveillance) and person-based recording (sousveillance).

You might find this comparison interesting and useful for your
article.

We'd also welcome thoughts from the whole group on this dichotomy:




Surveillance                           Sousveillance


God's eye view from above.             Human's eye view.
(Authority watching from on-high.)     ("Down-to-earth.")

Cameras usually mounted on high        Cameras down at ground-level,
poles, up on ceiling, etc..            e.g. at human eye-level.

Architecture-centered                  Human-centered
(e.g. cameras usually mounted on       (e.g. cameras carried or worn
or in structures).                     by, or on, people).

Recordings made by authorities,        Recordings of an activity
remote security staff, etc..           made by a participant in the
                                       activity.

Note that in most states it's          In most states it's legal to
illegal to record a phone              record a phone conversation of
conversation of which you are          which you are a party.  Perhaps
not a party.  Perhaps the same         the same would apply to an
would apply to an audiovisual          audiovisual recording of your own
recording of somebody else's           conversations, i.e. conversations
conversation.                          in which you are a party.

Recordings are usually kept in         Recordings are often made public
secret.                                e.g., on the World Wide Web.

Process usually shrouded in            Process, technology, etc., are
secrecy.                               usually public, open source, etc..

Panoptic origins, as described         Community-based origins, e.g.
by Foucault, originally in the         a personal electronic diary,
context of a prison in which           made public on the World Wide Web.
prisoners were isolated from           Sousveillance tends to bring
each other but visible at all          together individuals, e.g. it
times by guards.  Surveillance         tends to make a large city
tends to isolate individuals           function more like a small town,
from one another while setting         with the pitfalls of gossip, but
forth a one-way visibility to          also the benefits of a sense of
authority figures.                     community participation.

Privacy violation may go               Privacy violation is usually
un-noticed, or un-checked.             immediately evident.  Tends
Tends to not be self-correcting.       to be self-correcting.

It's hard to have a heart-to-heart     At least there's a chance you can
conversation with a lamp post,         talk to the person behind the
on top of which is mounted a           sousveillance camera.
surveillance camera.

When combined with computers, we       When combined with computers, we
get ubiquitous computing               get wearable computing.
("ubiqcomp") or pervasive              ("wearcomp").  Wearcomp usually
computing ("pervcomp").                doesn't require the cooperation
Ubiq./perv. comp. tend to rely on      of any infrastructure in the
cooperation of the infrastructure      environments around us.
in the environments around us.

With surveillant-computing, the        With sousveillant-computing, it
locus of control tends to be with      is possible for the locus of
the authorities.                       control to be more distributed.

Eventually, we will probably end up with a combination of
ubiq/pervcomp (surcomp/souscomp) and wearcomp (sousveillant-computing).
There will eventually be some kind of equilibrium ("equivellance")
between surveilance and sousveillance.  We will wear or carry some but
not all of the technology.  Obviously we don't wear big batteries to
run head-mounted lights, so there are some elements like shelter,
lighting, electrical wiring, and plumbing (except for diapers which
are wearable restrooms) that are best-served by the architecture.
But new emerging technologies of miniaturization will shift the
equiveillance (sur/sous equilibrium) a little more from architecture
of buildings to human-scale architecure.  I believe that the
"heavy currents" like the 600 Amp 3phase service that comes into
our building will stay in the architecture, whereas the
"light currents" (informatic electrical signals) will move more and
more onto and into the body.  Thus the shift in equiveillance will
be primarily informatic, encompassing also personal information
like lifelong video capture "cyborglog" personal diaries.

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 17 07:15:38 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 10:15:38 -0500
Subject: [wearables] Wearable Computers and Body Privacy take 2
Message-ID: <p06100379bc7e1c0d8c64@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Mar 17 01:16:58 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 10:16:58 +0100
Subject: Saving Opportunistic Encryption
Message-ID: <20040317091656.GE28136@leitl.org>

On Tue, Mar 16, 2004 at 03:29:42PM +0800, Sandy Harris wrote:

> >So, the apparent solution for me seems to be the approach that the SPAM
> >blacklists used - publish information in a subspace of the forward DNS
> >space instead of using the authoritative in-addr.arpa area.
> >
> Worth discussing at least.

No, anything requiring publishing DNS records won't fly. OE is
*opportunistic*. It doesn't care about what the true identity of the opposite
party is. Any shmuck on dynamic IP should be able to use it instantly, with
no observable performance degradation, using a simple patch.

If it doesn't fit these minimal requirements, it will die, just the same way
FreeS/WAN did.

-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar 17 11:02:27 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 11:02:27 -0800
Subject: uncomfortable suspicion: french fending off US PKI domination
Message-ID: <4058A0C3.98176625@cdc.gov>

COMPUTER SECURITY
French Move To Fend Off U.S. Domination
 With some help from Germany, the French are discreetly seeking an
alternative to U.S. domination of the field of computer authentication
systems and security (Public Key Infrastructure: [...]  [ 617 words
5,5USD ]
http://www.intelligenceonline.com/

The jist is that Infrasec will be replacing Verislime for the French,
Versign being the "object of uncomfortable suspicion"




From nobody at cypherpunks.to  Wed Mar 17 02:46:15 2004
From: nobody at cypherpunks.to (Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 11:46:15 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Saving Opportunistic Encryption
Message-ID: <21eb05fb48182426cd8c2da37d8758d1-cpunks-mod@cypherpunks.to>

Hi,
Sandy Harris wrote:
>Tarapia Tapioco wrote:
>>A possible implementation looks like this:
>>...
>>
>>* Linux/KAME's IKE daemon racoon is patched to attempt retrieval of an
>>  RSA key from said DNS repository and generate appropriate security
>>  policies.
>>
>>Cleaner solution, but more work probably.
>
>Why would you use racoon? FreeS/WAN's Pluto is available, under GPL,
>already does OE, and works with 2.6 kernel IPsec (though I'm not
>certain if patches are needed for that). Wouldn't it be a better
>starting point?

I have to take a look at this. Using racoon was my first idea because it
seems to be the "official" Linux thing these days and is portable to the
*BSDs, too. It's probably only the NIH syndrome at work.

Also, using pluto suffers from the general FreeS/WAN problem of not allowing
contributions from USAians. 

Anyway, thanks for the reminder - while the project is still at the 
"half-assed idea tossing" state, hacking FreeS/WAN should still be an 
option.




From petard at freeshell.org  Wed Mar 17 07:09:54 2004
From: petard at freeshell.org (petard)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 15:09:54 +0000
Subject: Saving Opportunistic Encryption
In-Reply-To: <40585A69.1080206@sunder.net>
References: <20040317091656.GE28136@leitl.org>  
  <40585A69.1080206@sunder.net>
Message-ID: <20040317150954.GA6138@SDF.LONESTAR.ORG>

a couple nitpicks on otherwise interesting points...

On Wed, Mar 17, 2004 at 09:02:17AM -0500, sunder wrote:
> Look at how many folks use PGP - those who really know it and want it, or 
> those who know enough about it and have some easily automated 
> implementation that plugs in to their mail client. (i.e. commercial pgp 
> with Eudora/Outlook plug in.  As an aside, I'm still pissed off that the 
> Mozilla mail client doesn't support PGP/GPG in addition to S/MIME or 
> whatever the hell..)
>
There's a well-supported extension for that: http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
Actually, plans are in the works to make S/MIME an extension as well, so
the two will soon be on equal footing.
 
> There are ways to protect against this such as publishing a line for the 
> known-hosts entry by other means, but no one does this (yet?)  (i.e: 
> sneakernet, finger, web page, pgp signed/encrypted email, over the 
> telephone, etc.)   (Another useful thing is to use public keys for SSH 
> instead of passwords: this way the attacker won't be able to reuse your 
> password - but you're still compromised the second you login.)
> 
Out-of-band transmission of known-hosts entries has been standard
operating procedure everywhere *I* have used ssh for the past 10 years.
I thought everyone did that.


regards,

petard




From shaddack at ns.arachne.cz  Wed Mar 17 07:20:55 2004
From: shaddack at ns.arachne.cz (Thomas Shaddack)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 16:20:55 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Saving Opportunistic Encryption
In-Reply-To: <20040317091656.GE28136@leitl.org>
References: <20040317091656.GE28136@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <0403171554090.-1196711344@somehost.domainz.com>

On Wed, 17 Mar 2004, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 16, 2004 at 03:29:42PM +0800, Sandy Harris wrote:
>
> > >So, the apparent solution for me seems to be the approach that the SPAM
> > >blacklists used - publish information in a subspace of the forward DNS
> > >space instead of using the authoritative in-addr.arpa area.
> > >
> > Worth discussing at least.
>
> No, anything requiring publishing DNS records won't fly. OE is
> *opportunistic*. It doesn't care about what the true identity of the opposite
> party is. Any shmuck on dynamic IP should be able to use it instantly, with
> no observable performance degradation, using a simple patch.
>
> If it doesn't fit these minimal requirements, it will die, just the same way
> FreeS/WAN did.

I discussed it with friends. There could be a way to advertise the OE
availability, at least for TCP connections; my original idea was to use
some magic number in the payload (which is normally zero) in the TCP/SYN
and TCP/SYNACK packets. I was advised against this, as these packets are
likely to be thrown away, and got suggested that there are various TCP
options in the header. Maybe we could hijack one of them, eg. use the MD5
checksum option otherwise used by BGP (RFC 2385) to advertise our support
for OE. The field is 128 bits of data we can use for a magic number and a
bitfield of options. It is defined in RFCs, so it should be valid. We
could put it into TCP/SYN packets when opening a connection, to advertise
we support OE; the server then can use the same mechanism to send back
confirmation of its OE support, and the method (if present) that can be
used for authenticating its identity.

The disadvantage is that we still have some risk that some routers will
throw such packets away; see the problems eg. ECN has. However, some RFC
offers a remedy for this, as it defines that if the first TCP/SYN with ECN
support set doesn't get a SYNACK, the retry is WITHOUT the ECN offer.
(This principle introduces the possibility of failure to use OE if the SYN
packet with the OE (or the corresponding ACK) offer gets dropped due to
congestion, but it should introduce no additional overheads (except the
need to retry TCP/SYN in case it gets dropped due to non-RFC-compliant
infrastructure on the link).

Another disadvantage is that we don't protect UDP, due to lack of the
header options.

The advantage could be the possibility to implement this transparently on
eg. the firmware of a NAT box; it has to track the connection states
anyway, so it should be capable of mangling the first TCP/SYN packet by
putting the OE offer in, and then strip it from the answers before
passing it back, and handle the encryption in transparent manner. This way
we got big savings in terms of effort needed to deploy OE between a
heterogenous LAN and the Net; just upgrade the router.

This scheme, as all OE are, is susceptible to an attack by stripping the
OE offers from the packets. It, however, is not the passive way anymore,
is more expensive, poses more difficulties, and a variant of eg.
"arpwatch" userspace daemon can alert us that something like that is
happening, that sites that used to use OE don't do so anymore, or that
their identities are suspiciously changed.

Told something like this to the crew of OpenSWAN developers. Got some
reaction, but it's too soon to know more.

Opinions, comments?




From noreply at adc.apple.com  Wed Mar 17 18:17:09 2004
From: noreply at adc.apple.com (Apple Developer Connection)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 18:17:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Mac OS X and the Power Mac G5 Tech Talk Invitation
Message-ID: <mailman.844.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

============================================================

             Mac OS X and the Power Mac G5

                 Tech Talk Invitation

                Tuesday: 20 March, 2004

                Cambridge, Massachusetts

<http://techtalk.apple.com/?Event=MacOSXCambridge042004TT>

============================================================
Dear Developer,

The Apple Developer Connection is pleased to invite you to a "Mac OS
X and the Power Mac G5" Tech Talk, Tuesday, April 20th at the
Harvard University Science Center.

This event is aimed at developers who want to better understand how
to port their code to Mac OS X and exploit the horsepower provided
by the Power Mac G5.

Don't miss this opportunity to learn more about the latest
technologies in Mac OS X and how to take advantage of them in your
application.

------------------------------
TECH TALK CONTENT
------------------------------

During the Tech Talk, Apple technology evangelists will explore the
powerful technologies designed to take the Macintosh platform
through the next decade.

Agenda topics will include:

  - Mac OS X Panther Technology Update:
    A walk-through of the modular system architecture of Mac OS X,
    explaining the latest developments in each of the major
    component layers in the OS. The focus of this presentation is on
    porting existing code to Mac OS X.

  - The Power Mac G5 in Depth:
    A discussion of the new Power Mac G5, focusing on technical
    specifications, the PowerPC G5 architecture, and optimization
    techniques for achieving maximum performance.

  - Xcode Tools Overview:
    A walk-through of the Xcode IDE and Apple's suite of robust
    performance tools that ship with every Power Mac G5.

------------------------------
DATE AND LOCATION
------------------------------
Mac OS X and the Power Mac G5 Tech Talk
Cambridge, MA

Tuesday, April 20, 2004
5:30pm Registration
6:00pm-9:00pm Presentations

Harvard University Science Center
Lecture Hall A, 1 Oxford Street
Cambridge, MA.

------------------------------
REGISTRATION INFORMATION
------------------------------
There is no enrollment fee required for participation in this
Tech Talk. You must assume your own travel and hotel expenses.

Seating is limited and registration is taken on a first-come,
first-served basis. We expect this Tech Talk to be very popular, so
we encourage you to reserve your space immediately by filling out
the registration information at
<http://techtalk.apple.com/?Event=MacOSXCambridge042004TT>

Upon receipt of your reservation, if space is available you will
receive a confirmation email with further details and lodging
options. You are not guaranteed a place without this confirmation.
If you have any questions, please contact us at <techtalk at apple.com>.

We look forward to seeing you at the Tech Talk!

Best regards,

Apple Developer Connection


____________________________________________________________________
You are receiving this invitation because you are an ADC Member who
has agreed to receive Technical or Marketing information from the
Apple Developer Connection. Your information has not been shared
with any third parties.

Questions about your ADC membership? Please contact us at
<developer.apple.com/contact/programs.html>.
____________________________________________________________________

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Mar 17 11:33:19 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 20:33:19 +0100
Subject: Saving Opportunistic Encryption
Message-ID: <20040317193319.GP28136@leitl.org>

On Wed, Mar 17, 2004 at 03:09:54PM +0000, petard wrote:

> There's a well-supported extension for that: http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
> Actually, plans are in the works to make S/MIME an extension as well, so
> the two will soon be on equal footing.

PGP/GPG has failed to protect the bulf of email for same reason as FreeS/WAN
failed to protect the bulk of TCP/IP traffic. In comparison, opportunistic
encryption via StartTLS has been a modest success, simply because it's so
easy to deploy at MTA level (it would be a lot more successfull, if
postfix/exim/qmail shipped with working StartTLS, or at least apt-get install
yourMTAhere-tls would set up the certs and config properly).

Purists would scoff that plaintext is default fallback, hence initial key
setup easily disruptable, and MITM, and whatnot. However, if keys are cached,
key changes and sudden reverts to plain for known hosts are logged, and key
fingerprints for hosts crosscorellated, potential meddling becomes far easier
to detect, and if only after the fact. Passive taps are easy, stealthy active
traffic manipulation, on a large scale? Could as well look out for fecal
precipitation from porcine aviation.

Should it happen, upgrading to a web of trust is always an option.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From decapita at dti.unimi.it  Wed Mar 17 12:42:51 2004
From: decapita at dti.unimi.it (Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 21:42:51 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [p2p-hackers] CFP: Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Message-ID: <mailman.845.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


      [Apologies if you receive multiple copies of this message]

                           CALL FOR PAPERS

          3rd WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC SOCIETY
                Washington, DC, USA - October 28, 2004
                        Sponsored by ACM SIGSAC
              Held in association with 11th ACM CCS 2004

                 http://seclab.dti.unimi.it/wpes2004

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Privacy issues have been the subject of public debates and the need
for privacy-aware policies, regulations, and techniques has been
widely recognized. Goal of this workshop is to discuss the problems of
privacy in the global interconnected societies and possible solutions
to it. The 2004 Workshop is the third in what we hope will be a yearly
forum for papers on all the different aspects of privacy in today's
electronic society. The first two workshops in the series were held in
Washington, in conjunction with the 9th ACM CCS conference and with
the 10th ACM CCS conference, respectively. The success of the first
two editions of the workshop and the increased interest of the
community in privacy issues, is the main reason for repeating the
event.

The workshop seeks submissions from academia and industry presenting
novel research on all theoretical and practical aspects of electronic
privacy, as well as experimental studies of fielded systems. We
encourage submissions from other communities such as law and business
that present these communities' perspectives on technological
issues. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:

- anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability
- business model with privacy requirements
- data protection from correlation and leakage attacks
- electronic communication privacy
- information dissemination control
- privacy-aware access control
- privacy in the digital business
- privacy enhancing technologies
- privacy policies and human rights
- privacy and anonymity in Web transactions
- privacy threats
- privacy and confidentiality management
- privacy in the electronic records
- privacy in health care and public administration
- public records and personal privacy
- privacy and virtual identity
- personally identifiable information
- privacy policy enforcement
- privacy and data mining
- relationships between privacy and security
- user profiling
- wireless privacy


PAPER SUBMISSIONS
Submitted papers must not substantially overlap papers that have been
published or that are simultaneously submitted to a journal or a
conference with proceedings. Papers should be at most 15 pages
excluding the bibliography and well-marked appendices (using 11-point
font and reasonable margins on letter-size paper), and at most 20
pages total. Committee members are not required to read the
appendices, and so the paper should be intelligible without
them. Papers should have a cover page with the title, authors,
abstract and contact information.


Authors are invited to submit their contributions electronically
through the web site
http://seclab.dti.unimi.it/wpes2004/submissions.html. Submission must
be in the form of a ps (Postscript), or pdf (Adobe) file. Do NOT
submit files formatted for word processing packages (e.g., Microsoft
Word or WordPerfect files).

Papers must be received by the deadline of June 11, 2004 in order to
be considered. Notification of acceptance or rejection will be sent to
authors by August 2, 2004. Authors of accepted papers must guarantee
that their paper will be presented at the workshop. Accepted papers
will be published by the ACM in a conference proceedings.



GENERAL CHAIR
Vijay Atluri
Rutgers University, USA
email: atluri at andromeda.rutgers.edu


PROGRAM CHAIRS
Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati   Paul Syverson
University of Milan                Naval Research Laboratory
email: samarati at dti.unimi.it       url: www.syverson.org


IMPORTANT DATES
Paper Submission due:    June 11, 2004
Acceptance notification: August 2, 2004
Final papers due:        August 30, 2004


PROGRAM COMMITTEE
JC Cannon, Microsoft, USA
Lorrie Cranor, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Ernesto Damiani, University of Milan, Italy
George Danezis, University of Cambridge, UK
Roger Dingledine, The Free Haven Project, USA
Wenliang Du, Syracuse University, USA
Philippe Golle, Stanford University, USA
Mike Gurski, Information & Privacy Commission/Ontario, Canada
Susan Landau, Sun Microsystems Laboratories, USA
Andreas Pfitzmann, Dresden University of Technology, Germany
Andrew Patrick, National Research Council, Ottawa, Canada
Marc Rennhard, ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Pierangela Samarati, University of Milan, Italy
Matthias Schunter, IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Switzerland
Tomas Sander, Hewlet Packard, USA
Marianne Winslett, U. of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, USA



_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Mar 17 12:57:21 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 2004 21:57:21 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] CFP: Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic
  Society (fwd from decapita@dti.unimi.it)
Message-ID: <20040317205720.GU28136@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati
<decapita at dti.unimi.it> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 17 21:33:45 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 00:33:45 -0500
Subject: Mac OS X and the Power Mac G5 Tech Talk Invitation
Message-ID: <p06100334bc7ee4fea5d6@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Thu Mar 18 01:46:44 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 01:46:44 -0800
Subject: Saving Opportunistic Encryption
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20040318005729.03785878@pop.idiom.com>

The simplest way to get half-safe opportunistic encryption is the "Open 
Secret" shared secret,
or equivalently, draft-ietf-ipsec-internet-key-00.txt's shared 
secret.  Everybody who wants to use it just adds it to their ipsec's list 
of known shared secrets, and uses it unless something better is 
available.  It doesn't pretend to be MITM-proof, but it's a start.  Doing 
the whole job correctly is much harder, which is why Gilmore's 
do-the-job-correctly-or-bust project didn't achieve the "encrypting X% of 
the net by Christmas", where X>1 and Christmas < 2010.  (This doesn't count 
the VPN market, which is what got the commercial support, even if many of 
the vendors used FreeS/WAN code, and it's a much easier problem even if 
ISAKMP/Oakley is a hard way to do something easy.)

Forward DNS support is widely available, because anybody out there who 
doesn't want to run their own DNS can find a friendly DNS provider who'll 
sell them a subdomain they can use, e.g. 
joecypherpunk.FriendlyDnsProvider.net, and they can even do DNSSEC support 
(though obviously you can't walk the whole tree unless the roots are 
signed.)  No ISP support needed.

Reverse DNS support was pretty much a non-starter, because most ISPs don't 
give the user control over their reverse DNS space even if they bother to 
implement it at all.   They're getting better, but you're still usually 
port123.box456.sfo.example.net, and forget getting DNSSEC support.  You 
*could* make it work by building a separate Reverse DNS tree, like 
D.B.C.A.opportunistic-encryption.org, instead of hanging it off 
D.B.C.A.in-addr.arpa.  You'd still have to get people to populate it, and 
make it scalable and DDOS-proof, but perhaps you could do it.

Reverse DNS also has the problem that it's _not_ a 1:1 matching - a given 
IP address may have many virtual hosts on it, and therefore many domain 
names, and the domain names can be different for email vs. web vs. other 
protocols.  So it can only work on a subset of the application space, even 
if you've got the control you need.

Of course, forward DNS isn't really what you want, and reverse DNS mostly 
is, because there isn't a user interface to your IPSEC interface or routing 
tables, especially if the IPSEC box is some security gateway that the end 
user doesn't even have access to, so unless you want to invent some other 
protocol (not ISAKMP/Oakley/etc.) to seed the IPSEC Security Associations, 
all you've got to work with   is the IP address of a destination, not a name.

It's possible to play hackish workarounds that have the DNS server 
opportunistically fetch DNSSEC information, with the assumption that most 
people only talk to IP addresses that they got from DNS lookups, and it 
even has the performance advantage that you can do the fetch before you 
send out any TCP or UDP packets to the destination instead of stalling and 
risking timeouts.  They're not hugely reliable, but they're a start, 
especially if you're going to fall back to "Open Secret".  They're mainly 
useful for machines that are doing their own IPSEC encryption, rather than 
using some IPSEC gateway/firewall box - otherwise you need to build dodgy 
configurations like running the DNS server on  the IPSEC gateway and making 
sure DNS caching and IPSEC SA caching times are compatible.   Also, working 
at this level means you're not just hacking the kernel, or the kernel plus 
some helper daemons - you're hacking BIND and its competitors, and suddenly 
you become responsible for maintaining them :-)

Another approach is to invent a whole new protocol, separate from 
ISAKMP/Oakley/SKIP/etc., which does a handshake to fetch keys.  It either 
has to hit a server at the destination's IP address, implying a need for 
firewall transparency and compatible address spaces (probably works better 
for transport mode than tunnel mode?), or else have some mechanism for 
finding a key+config server.  Hugh Daniel suggested rehabilitating Finger 
as the end-system protocol (after all, we've long since patched the 
security bugs that the Morris worm used back in 1988).  If you're building 
a non-end-to-end mechanism that uses IP addresses as its lookup, you're 
getting awfully close to reinventing Reverse DNS, or else building some 
other vast coordinated effort with half-vast goals.  On the other hand, if 
you're patching half of ISAKMP/Oakley anyway, might as well patch Photuris, 
which is much smaller, lighter, and more correct.


                 Bill Stewart



----
Bill Stewart  bill.stewart at pobox.com  




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Mar 18 05:53:58 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 08:53:58 -0500
Subject: Regulatory Malpractice
Message-ID: <p06100399bc7f58c0c803@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20040317-082622-7954r.htm>

The Washington Times

Regulatory malpractice

By Richard W. Rahn

Published March 18, 2004




In today's parlance, George Washington was a victim of medical malpractice.
When he became ill, he was bled by his doctors, which almost certainly
hastened his death. Like Washington, the financial industry and its
customers are now slowly being bled, which will be fatal for some.



The "doctors" in this case are a group of politicians, tax and law
enforcement officials, who are operating without the constraint of national
boundaries or economic sense.



People around the globe are justifiably concerned about terrorism and
ordinary criminality. A certain international political class has used this
anxiety to argue that since criminals and terrorists use money, all
monetary movements and holdings must be monitored. Yes, it is useful to be
able to trace the money trail of al Qaeda operatives. But does that mean
all citizens of every country should be subject to having all their
financial privacy destroyed? Furthermore, is it cost-effective to monitor
almost everyone, or would both public and private law enforcement dollars
be more wisely spent monitoring the activities of those individuals or
groups known or strongly suspected of engaging in terrorist or criminal
activities?



The problem is there are now literally dozens of organizations issuing
rules and regulations that apply not only to financial institutions but to
all "money service providers," including such activities as pawn shops,
used car dealers and real estate agents. The agencies within the U.S.
government issuing the new financial rules and regulations include the
Internal Revenue Service, the FBI, the Justice Department, the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) and the Federal Reserve.



In addition, U.S. financial institutions and other businesses engaged in
operations outside the U.S. or those involved in international transactions
are also faced with a barrage of new rules and regulations from many
foreign governments, plus the European Union, and from international
institutions such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the U.N.



Millions of businesses are subject to at least some of these rules and
regulations, and it is close to impossible to inform them of their
obligations. Even the largest international banks, with huge staffs of
lawyers and anticrime enforcement personnel, are unable to fully work
through this ever-expanding morass of regulation.



Smaller banks and businesses are at a competitive disadvantage because of
the disproportionate effect of these regulatory costs. Some of the
regulators are aiming at terrorists, others at ordinary criminals, and some
at tax avoiders or evaders. Most of the regulations are directed at "money
launderers," even though the term has a very elastic definition.



Many of these new rules and regulations are overlapping, some are
contradictory, some violate basic civil liberties and many are costly to
administer and do not meet reasonable cost-benefit tests. Yet the Bush
administration just announced a doubling in the budget for FinCen, as well
as budget increases for many of the other financial rulemaking bodies.



The reason we should care is that all of these extra, and in many cases
totally unnecessary, costs are passed along to consumers of financial
services as higher fees and more expensive and fewer choices in financial
products. This directly translates into job losses not only in financial
industries but in all businesses that rely on some outside financing.



In addition, it will make it more difficult for low-income people, the
young and recent immigrants to open bank accounts. We are now seeing, for
the first time in our nation's history, a rise in the portion of our
citizens without banking relationships. Costly regulations that force more
people into the cash economy not only make life more dangerous for those
who cannot open bank accounts, but also have the perverse effect of making
it more difficult for law enforcement to trace funds of criminals.



There is little evidence all the new rules and paperwork are having any
appreciable effect on crime or terrorism, because there is an almost
infinite number of ways to "launder" money, and organized terrorists and
criminals can almost always find ways around the regulations. On the other
hand, there is considerable evidence of damage to our pocketbooks and civil
liberties from these regulations.



The U.S. government should expand the jurisdiction of the "Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs" (OIRA) to include the IRS and the other
financial and law enforcement agencies that issue financial regulations,
and insist financial regulations meet strict cost-benefit and civil
liberties' tests.



In addition, an international organization is needed to apply the same
strict cost-benefit and civil liberties' tests to all proposed regulations
emanating from international bodies like the OECD, FATF, and the U.N., as
well as those from governments that affect nonresident institutions.



If financial institutions and their customers are weakened or bled to death
by regulatory malpractice, the war against real criminals and terrorists
will only be made more difficult.



Richard W. Rahn is a senior fellow of the Discovery Institute and an
adjunct scholar of the Cato Institute.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar 18 10:37:25 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 10:37:25 -0800
Subject: chatroom conversation turing computable
Message-ID: <4059EC65.EA6B9493@cdc.gov>

http://news.scotsman.com/scitech.cfm?id=312492004




From kat at the.whole.net  Thu Mar 18 10:50:34 2004
From: kat at the.whole.net (Kat)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 13:50:34 -0500 (EST)
Subject: chatroom conversation turing computable
In-Reply-To: <4059EC65.EA6B9493@cdc.gov>
References: <4059EC65.EA6B9493@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20040318134949.K81492@maine.haze.net>

On Thu, 18 Mar 2004, Major Variola (ret.) wrote:

> http://news.scotsman.com/scitech.cfm?id=312492004
>

Kinda raises teh question of, is grooming an underaged chatbot illegal?




From s.schear at comcast.net  Thu Mar 18 14:02:00 2004
From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 14:02:00 -0800
Subject: New remailer uses hashcash
In-Reply-To: <4058FF76.3010309@harvee.org>
References: <4058FF76.3010309@harvee.org>
Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20040318134948.05039aa0@mail.comcast.net>

"My remailer will only deliver postings which contain a valid hashcash token.
To get your posting through you must provide a Hashcash token."

http://www.panta-rhei.dyndns.org/hashcash/index.html

steve
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.605 / Virus Database: 385 - Release Date: 3/1/2004




From lloyd at randombit.net  Thu Mar 18 11:18:38 2004
From: lloyd at randombit.net (Jack Lloyd)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 14:18:38 -0500
Subject: chatroom conversation turing computable
In-Reply-To: <4059EC65.EA6B9493@cdc.gov>
References: <4059EC65.EA6B9493@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20040318191838.GA17578@acm.jhu.edu>

On Thu, Mar 18, 2004 at 10:37:25AM -0800, Major Variola (ret.) wrote:
> http://news.scotsman.com/scitech.cfm?id=312492004

"If a nanniebot detects signs of paedophile activity, such as an adult posing
as a child, it sends out an alert."

I can't wait for two of them to meet and each decide the other is a
(potential-)kiddie molester.

The obvious next step is writing a bot that poses as an adult posing as a
kid.

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar 18 15:29:23 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 15:29:23 -0800
Subject: chatroom conversation turing computable
Message-ID: <405A30D3.7DCFD87D@cdc.gov>

At 02:18 PM 3/18/04 -0500, Jack Lloyd wrote:
>
>The obvious next step is writing a bot that poses as an adult posing as
a
>kid.

I think its easily (if crudely) simulated thusly:

All you need is another kidbot which is 1. not controlled
by the adversary 2. eventually uses keywords that trigger the
adversary's
kidbot.  (Maybe the adversary waits for pictures before triggering?)

All in all, fine AI games one can contemplate.

One could also set up IRCs with kidbots and pedobots, in a
highly verbal and abstract game of Spot the Feds.
Robowars for counter-intel folks :-)

Sounds entertaining but we are busy getting ready the little boxes
that say "fear" in greek.




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Mar 18 11:17:26 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 20:17:26 +0100
Subject: chatroom conversation turing computable
In-Reply-To: <20040318134949.K81492@maine.haze.net>
References: <4059EC65.EA6B9493@cdc.gov>
  <20040318134949.K81492@maine.haze.net>
Message-ID: <20040318191726.GU28136@leitl.org>

On Thu, Mar 18, 2004 at 01:50:34PM -0500, Kat wrote:
> On Thu, 18 Mar 2004, Major Variola (ret.) wrote:
>
> > http://news.scotsman.com/scitech.cfm?id=312492004
> >
>
> Kinda raises teh question of, is grooming an underaged chatbot illegal?

Apparently, yes:

	http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2490497.stm

It's nice that war on drugs, fighting terrorists and pedophiles have become
great markers for rabid anti-freedom campaigns.

In other news, over two days 800 individual homes in Germany were searched for
the crime of
media and program "piracy", culminating 2-year criminal investigation, a
service publishing
just p2p links (no content hosted) to moviez was shut down in
Switzerland, the 25-year-old operator quite likely to be issued a stiff
criminal penalty, digital smartcard ID is about to be issued for 2006 to any
employed warm body (very likely with a RFID as well) in Germany, and
biometrics (EU-wide, but
quite likely to interoperate with NA and other usual suspects).

Business as usual, in other words, with zero awareness on the side of the
governed.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From andreas.steffen at strongsec.net  Thu Mar 18 12:59:14 2004
From: andreas.steffen at strongsec.net (Andreas Steffen)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 21:59:14 +0100
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <mailman.846.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Gecko/20040113
To: FreeS/WAN <users at mj2.freeswan.org>,
	users <users at lists.openswan.org>
Cc: Juergen Schmidt <ju at ct.heise.de>
Subject: [Users] ANNOUNCE:  strongswan-2.0.0 released
List-Subscribe:
<https://mj2.freeswan.org/cgi-bin/mj_wwwusr?user=&passw=&func=lists-long-full&extra=users>
List-Post: <users at lists.freeswan.org>
List-Id: Discussion on the day to day usage of FreeS/WAN IPsec
<users at lists.freeswan.org>
List-Archive: <https://mj2.freeswan.org/archives>
Sender: users-owner at mj2.freeswan.org

Dear FreeS/WAN users,

for three years in a row I've been releasing my X.509 patch, starting
out in the year 2000 with a very rudimentary X.509 support for freeswan-1.3
up to the feature-rich X.509-1.5.3 release for the latest and last
FreeS/WAN versions 2.04/2.05.

The official announcement of the discontinuation of the FreeS/WAN
project made me reflect on the future direction my X.509 project should
take. One alternative was to contribute directly to the Openswan project
and the second one to start a distribution of my own. My personal
experience with the freeswan-2.0x releases over the last year that
involved continuous and very tiresome adaptations of my patches against
an ever moving target convinced me to take the distribution into my
own hands.

Therefore I officially announce the strongSwan OpenSource project
hosted at

    http://www.strongswan.org

The objectives of strongSwan will be:

     * simplicity of configuration
     * strong encryption and authentication methods
     * powerful IPsec policies facilitating the management of
       large and complex VPN networks

The current release strongswan-2.0.0 is based on freeswan-2.04 and
the latest X.509 patch 1.5.3. In addition to that NAT traversal and
the additional encryption algorithms AES, Serpent, Blowfish and Twofish,
as well as SHA-2 authentication are supported. Dead Peer Detection (DPD)
will be added in one of the next releases.

strongswan-2.0.0 runs both on Linux 2.4 (with KLIPS) and Linux 2.6
(with the native IPsec stack).

The forthcoming release strongswan-2.1.0 will bring some powerful
tools for the management of Certification Authorities (CAs), allowing
e.g. to define CRL and OCSP URLs per CA in ipsec.conf.

The Openswan team is heartily invited to integrate all or parts of
my future X.509 extensions into their project since all code will be
put under the GPL licence. Also contributions to strongSwan are welcome
as long as they fit the three objectives listed above.

Kind regards

Andreas

=======================================================================
Andreas Steffen                   e-mail: andreas.steffen at strongsec.com
strongSec GmbH                    home:   http://www.strongsec.com
Alter Z|richweg 20                phone:  +41 1 730 80 64
CH-8952 Schlieren (Switzerland)   fax:    +41 1 730 80 65
==========================================[strong internet security]===
_______________________________________________
FreeS/WAN Users mailing list
users at lists.freeswan.org
https://mj2.freeswan.org/cgi-bin/mj_wwwusr

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From shaddack at ns.arachne.cz  Thu Mar 18 16:02:15 2004
From: shaddack at ns.arachne.cz (Thomas Shaddack)
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2004 01:02:15 +0100 (CET)
Subject: chatroom conversation turing computable
In-Reply-To: <4059EC65.EA6B9493@cdc.gov>
References: <4059EC65.EA6B9493@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <0403190059370.-1196711200@somehost.domainz.com>

On Thu, 18 Mar 2004, Major Variola (ret.) wrote:
> http://news.scotsman.com/scitech.cfm?id=312492004

Wondering how it will cope with phonetic English, so often used online.
Kids with 100% correct English are not exactly common these days.
Will its own perfection become its weakness?




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Mar 19 10:31:47 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2004 10:31:47 -0800
Subject: Al Qaeda backs Bush-Cheney 2004
Message-ID: <405B3C92.D566D051@cdc.gov>

http://wireservice.wired.com/wired/forms/printstory.asp?section=RelatedStories&pitem=INTERNATIONAL%2DSECURITY%2DSPAIN%2DTRUCE%2DDC&rev=20040319&pub_tag=REUTG&relatedTo=838081&from=relatedstory&rsNum=2

The statement
[sent to the Arabic language daily al-Hayat, the Abu Hafs al-Masri
Brigades, which claimed responsibility for the Madrid bombings that
killed 201 people,]
said it supported President Bush in his reelection campaign, and would
prefer him to win in November rather than the Democratic candidate John
Kerry, as it was not possible to find a leader "more foolish than you
(Bush), who deals with matters by force rather than with wisdom."

..........

Nice to see that someone understands psyops, and how supporting
other-than-Bush
would be abused by Bush.

.........

Explosives for a barracks-bomb in Lebanon, $30,000
SAMs for Somalia 144 x $12,000
Spanish bombs, 10 x $8,000
Watching Bush allies lose their elections: priceless.
Some things money can't buy.
For everything else there's Hawala




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 19 07:34:21 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2004 10:34:21 -0500
Subject: [Users] ANNOUNCE:  strongswan-2.0.0 released
Message-ID: <p06100402bc80c339be2b@[66.149.49.5]>

In English, even...

Cheers,
RAH

--- begin forwarded text



From jim.salters at fstc.org  Fri Mar 19 10:13:02 2004
From: jim.salters at fstc.org (Jim Salters)
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2004 13:13:02 -0500
Subject: FSTC Feb/March Project Update
Message-ID: <mailman.847.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Mar 19 04:33:15 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2004 13:33:15 +0100
Subject: FreeS/WAN-->StrongSwan
Message-ID: <20040319123315.GA28136@leitl.org>

FreeS/WAN is dead, long live StrongSwan...

<kraut>
------------------------------------------------------------------------

IPSec-Implementierung FreeS/WAN bekommt Verstdrkung

Andreas Steffen, langjdhriger Maintainer der X.509-Patches f|r
FreeS/WAN, hat angek|ndigt, ein eigenes Nachfolgeprojekt namens
StrongSwan zu starten. FreeS/WAN ist eine populdre
IPSec-Implementierung f|r Linux; mit Internet Protocol Security lassen
sich verschl|sselte und authentifizierte Verbindungen |ber das Internet
realisieren und damit Netze und Rechner kosteng|nstig und sicher
vernetzen. Das Entwicklerteam von FreeS/WAN hatte allerdings vor kurzem
ank|ndigt, die Weiterentwicklung von FreeS/WAN einzustellen[1].

StrongSwan[2] setzt nun auf das FreeS/WAN-Release 2.04 auf, lduft
wahlweise mit den FreeS/WAN-Kernel-Erweiterungen KLIPS	oder den
nativen IPSec-Funktionen des 2.6er-Kernels und enthdlt die aktuelle
Version der X.509-Patches f|r den Einsatz von X.509-Zertifikaten. Des
weiteren kommen NAT-Traversal und die Verschl|sselungsverfahren AES,
Serpent, Blowfish und Twofish hinzu.

Die X.509-Erweiterungen funktionierten seit Jahren stabil und wurden im
wesentlichen aus politischen Erwdgungen nicht in FreeS/WAN integriert.
So hat Steffen sie |ber Jahre hinweg weiterentwickelt und immer wieder
an den FreeS/WAN-Code angepasst. Nach dem Ende von FreeS/WAN[3] hat er
sich jetzt entschieden, ein eigenes Linux-IPSec-Projekt zu starten.
Dabei will er den Schwerpunkt auf die einfache Konfiguration und
Administration gerade in Bezug auf den Einsatz mit Zertifikaten und
PKIs legen. Von einer direkten Zusammenarbeit mit dem bereits
existierenden FreeS/WAN-Nachfolgeprojekt
OpenSwan[4] hat Steffen Abstand genommen. Das OpenSwan-Team hat zwar
die X.509-Patches integriert, den Code aber dabei so weit verdndert,
dass eine Synchronisierung mit seinen Weiterentwicklungen zu aufwendig
erschien.
 (ju[5]/c't)

URL dieses Artikels:
  http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/45769

Links in diesem Artikel:
  [1] http://www.heise.de/security/news/meldung/45176
  [2] http://www.strongswan.org
  [3] http://www.heise.de/security/news/meldung/45176
  [4] http://www.openswan.org
  [5] mailto:ju at ct.heise.de

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2004 Heise Zeitschriften Verlag

----- End forwarded message -----
</kraut>

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 19 11:51:01 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2004 14:51:01 -0500
Subject: FSTC Feb/March Project Update
Message-ID: <p06100453bc80ff8de229@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Sat Mar 20 00:13:31 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2004 00:13:31 -0800
Subject: Challenge-response port knocking for TCP
In-Reply-To: <0403200814060.-1196695644@somehost.domainz.com>
References: <0403200814060.-1196695644@somehost.domainz.com>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20040320000711.037f6938@pop.idiom.com>

At 11:21 PM 3/19/2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
>The idea of advertising opportunistic crypto presence in TCP/SYN inspired
>me to another one: authenticated connection handshake for TCP protocol.
>
>Scenario: Application listening on port P of server S, only for
>authenticated users.
>
>Unknown user sends TCP/SYN to S:P, gets back TCP/RST, with challenge in
>MD5 field of TCP options. The user doesn't support this scheme, so
>considers the port closed.
>
>Unknown-now known user sends TCP/SYN, gets back TCP/RST with the
>challenge, sends another TCP/SYN, this time with calculated response using
>a shared secret, again in TCP MD5 option field, gets back TCP/SYNACK.


Firewalls may munge the TCP headers, and if you're just protecting the 
session setup,
you still need to worry about eavesdroppers and session hijackers.
Also, this doesn't strike me as the right protocol layer to address the 
problem at.


If you want to be secure, either use IPSEC (in which case this isn't that 
necessary),
or else use SSL if you'd rather wrap things in Layer 4.
Alternatively, do the job at Layer 7.




From shaddack at ns.arachne.cz  Fri Mar 19 23:21:26 2004
From: shaddack at ns.arachne.cz (Thomas Shaddack)
Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2004 08:21:26 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Challenge-response port knocking for TCP
Message-ID: <0403200814060.-1196695644@somehost.domainz.com>

The idea of advertising opportunistic crypto presence in TCP/SYN inspired
me to another one: authenticated connection handshake for TCP protocol.

Scenario: Application listening on port P of server S, only for
authenticated users.

Unknown user sends TCP/SYN to S:P, gets back TCP/RST, with challenge in
MD5 field of TCP options. The user doesn't support this scheme, so
considers the port closed.

Unknown-now known user sends TCP/SYN, gets back TCP/RST with the
challenge, sends another TCP/SYN, this time with calculated response using
a shared secret, again in TCP MD5 option field, gets back TCP/SYNACK.

The random challenge should be sent back in all TCP/RST packets, otherwise
port scanning will still be possible.

Is it a good idea? Could it work? Why not?




From rabbi at abditum.com  Sat Mar 20 17:34:45 2004
From: rabbi at abditum.com (Len Sassaman)
Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2004 17:34:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Mixmaster 3.0b1 released
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0403201728390.1491@thetis.deor.org>

Mixmaster 3.0b1 has just been released. This release includes two year's
worth of development on the Mixmaster software, numerous stability
improvements, anonymity benefits, bug fixes, and feature enhancements. We
would like to agressively move this out of beta into final release as
quickly as possible, so we're highly encouraging users and remailer
operators to send us their feedback.

Mixmaster can be obtained from:

https://sourceforge.net/projects/mixmaster/

The change history for this release can be viewed here:

https://source.mixmaster.anonymizer.com/svn/mixmaster/branches/mixmaster_3_0b1/Mix/HISTORY


Thanks,

Len




From yyjimfp at hkgx.com  Sun Mar 21 07:34:03 2004
From: yyjimfp at hkgx.com (Verna Edmonds)
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2004 18:34:03 +0300
Subject: Promising stock Advice
Message-ID: <360455725108.UZZ13597@awake.x-networks.net>

Time sensitive information for Investors and traders:

ST0CK ALERT - 
 
Updated: 4/01/O5  07:51 AM EST

Biogenerics LTD (BIGN) Announces Commencement of Drilling 0perations in Gas-Rich Formation.
The company's recent |ucrative acquisition of Tyche Energy ,coup|ed with a joint venture with
Hydro S|otter Corp (a technology-driven company) has increased we|l production by up to 600%.

BIGN Stock Status - 
Last Sa|e:       O.83 
Share Vo|ume:    109OO 
 
 
Investment Considerations:
- 0i| prices are f|uctuating at over $5O a barrel - a|l time high
- 0PEC warns oi| rates wi|| continue to rise
- BIGN Stock continues to trend to new 52 week highs
- BIGN stock is positioned for growth due to recent Oil and gas aquisitions & ventures
- BIGN Focuses Completely on the Domestic Oil & Gas Arena (Market Exceeds $1O Billion)
- Domestic 0i| & Gas Sector Provide Immediate 0pportunity to Garner Value
- BIGN is pursuing strategies to create shareholder value
- Company�s growth strategy is driven by M&A

Brian Ke||ey, CE0 of Biogenerics,says:
"Dri|ling in such a rich area of gas reserves represents another milestone for Biogenerics.
The Company's new affi|iation with Tyche Energy cou|d garner significant short and long-term va|ue"

PRESS RELEASE--TOR0NTO--(BUSINESS WIRE)--March 4, 2OO5
Biogenerics Inc. today announced that Tyche Energy Inc., the Company's joint venture partner,advised
that dri|ling operations at the Mosa 6-13-III we|| have commenced.
The Mosa 6-13-III we|| is the first of an initial two (2) we|| exploration dri||ing programs targeting 
the Gas prone Si|urian Grimsby formation encountered at a depth of approximately 2,1OO feet.
Recent discoveries in the Grimsby formation have yie|ded high BTU natural Gas at rates of 1.2 to 4.2 mil|ion
cubic feet (MMCFD) per day.Individual pool reserves may be up to 10 billion cubic feet (1O BCF).
Tyche Inc. currently ho|ds over 4,OOO acres of petro|eum and natura| gas leases within the fairway of this
expanding natura| Gas play. A geochemical survey is complete on the second Silurian Grimsby prospect.
Analysis of this data wi|| assist the company in identifying prospective dril|ing targets on these lands.

Company Profi|e:
BI0GENERICS LTD is a domestic oil and gas provider, and through its joint ventures is a technology |eader 
in today�s Energy market. The company�s shares trade on the NQB (ticker BIGN).
Sourcing Domestic Oil and Gas is Bush�s #1 priority and, therefore, the Board of Biogenerics
deemed it prudent and appropriate to focus its principa| business in this hotbed of activity.
The Company, prior to its change of focus, held significant positions in biotechnology, fiber optics 
and other technology ventures that management believed could prope| shareho|der value.
The Board of Directors took in account the enormous shift to oi| & gas, and acquired Tyche Energy
and formed a joint venture with Hydro S|otter Corporation � an oil and gas techno|ogy |eader.
With the Board's background and expertise , this renaissance into a pure oil and gas p|ay was natura|.
The Company�s other holdings are being considered as spin-off and/or merger & acquisition candidates.
Management plans to fi|e a Form 1O in the immediate future.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Prove to yourself that the penny stocks system can be wild|y profitable:

1. Back in July 1999 Methane Corp.(MEOS) wou|d have fit my criteria perfectly. If you had bought at 1.66
   and sold at $5.63, an investment of $50O would have made you $1,195 in just one month.

2. Medix Resources stock more than doub|ed in 15 days. An investment of $5O0 in that company wou|d have made
   you $675 whi|e you were vacationing.

3. At one time, $1.63 bought one share of Idca Pharmaceuticals (IDPH). If you would have bought it at that
   price and sold it when it at $113 it hit recent|y - you wou|d have made a profit of $34,662 with a $5O0
   investment.

4. And my favorite story of all... Elantec Corp.(ELNT) was se|ling for $1.57 a share in Aug. of 1999.
   It was f|at...going nowhere...then out of the blue, it started climbing. Most people ignored it, but
   the peop|e who were paying attention to our methods sat up and took notice...
   to make a |ong story short, if you had bought $50O worth of shares in this company and sold it in 
   September 2O0O at $1O1 a share, you would have $31,662.OO in pure profits in less than 13 months.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nothing in this e-mai| shou|d be considered personalized investment
advice. Although our employees may answer your general customer
service questions, they are not |icensed under securities |aws to
address your particu|ar investment situation. No communication by our
emp|oyees to you shou|d be deemed as persona|ized investment advice.

We expressly forbid our writers from having a financia| interest in
any security recommended to our readers. Al| of our emp|oyees and
agents must wait 24 hours after on-|ine pub|ication or 72 hours after
the mai|ing of printed-only pub|ication prior to fo|lowing an initial
recommendation. Any investments recommended in this letter shou|d be
made on|y after consu|ting with your investment advisor and only after
reviewing the prospectus or financial statements of the company.

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We sent this e-mail because you subscribed to The Investment Newsletter E-Letter.

To cancel by mail or for any other subscription issues, reply please to: ioua9087 @  yahoo.com


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From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 22 05:47:45 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2004 08:47:45 -0500
Subject: MannWorld vs. BrinWorld
Message-ID: <p06100414bc849ddffb4f@[66.149.49.5]>

A little touchy-feeley and "communitarian" for J. Random Anarcho-capitalist
Cypherpunk :-), but Steve's got a point about geodesic *supervision* of
one's property and person in the defense of same, and not centralized
*surveillance* by citizens by the state for the oppression thereof...

Cheers,
RAH

--- begin forwarded text



From s.schear at comcast.net  Mon Mar 22 11:46:27 2004
From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear)
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2004 11:46:27 -0800
Subject: MR
In-Reply-To: <Sea1-DAV30XTEgBUQmW00004c2d@hotmail.com>
References: <Sea1-DAV30XTEgBUQmW00004c2d@hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20040322113836.054b6238@mail.comcast.net>

At 12:46 AM 3/22/2004, javve wrote:

>Mr.
>
>
>Are the  are anny  spy device can look  trough the wall too see  you?
>If the are with one?

IR systems capable of locating warm objects within structures have been 
available for a long time.  They are routinely used for search and rescue 
in collapsed building.  Resolution is low. they could not be used to see 
anything much beyond a warm blob through rubble.

There are purported to be devices using ultra wideband RF and microwave 
frequencies and millimeter wave active or passive devices to do 
this.  Resolution of the microwave devices should be even lower than the IR 
and perhaps suitable only for determining occupant location, for example 
prior to breaking down the door during a SWAT raid. Millimeter waves are 
emitted by warm bodies, such as own own, and can be used to passively see 
thorough clothing.  Not sure if passive devices would work through walls 
due to attenuation, but active devices probably could.

steve 
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.605 / Virus Database: 385 - Release Date: 3/1/2004




From btefft at orionsci.com  Mon Mar 22 11:32:37 2004
From: btefft at orionsci.com (Tefft, Bruce)
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2004 14:32:37 -0500
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
Message-ID: <mailman.848.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Thought everyone knew that.

Bruce


----- http://www.nwanews.com/times/story_Editorial.php?storyid=115586

Guest Commentary : Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
BY DONALD KAUL
Posted on Saturday, March 20, 2004

Here is the lesson to be learned from the fall of Martha

Stewart:

Don't ever, under any circumstances, answer questions put to you by the FBI
or any other federal agent unless you have a competent criminal lawyer at
your side. And it would be better if it were a very good criminal lawyer.
There are other lessons to be drawn from the fate of poor Martha, but that's
the main one. You see, there is a section in the federal code, referred to
as 1001 by legal eagles, that makes it a crime to lie to a federal agent.
The agent doesn't have to put you under oath. If you tell him or her a lie,
you're guilty. The federal officer doesn't even have to tape the
conversation. All he or she has to do is produce handwritten notes that
indicate that you made false statements. So, if you misspeak or the agent
mishears or there is an ambiguity that the agent chooses to interpret in an
unfortunate (for you) direction, you're on the hook. There's also the
possibility that you might be tempted to shade the truth a bit when an IRS
agent is quizzing you about that business deduction you took for the trip to
Vegas. My advice to you is: Don't do it. To be on the safe side, when
confronted by a federal agent, don't say anything at all unless your lawyer
says you have to.

It's a shame things have come to this. It used to be that people felt it
their duty as citizens to cooperate with federal authorities. That was
before Law 1001.

We now live in an era of Incredible Shrinking Civil Rights. You have to
protect yourself at all times.

Let's look more closely at the case of Poor Martha the Match Girl. What did
she do?

She was convicted of lying about the reason she sold her shares in a
biotechnology company two years ago. She said she sold them because they had
fallen to the price at which she and her broker had agreed to sell.

The government argued (and the jury believed) that she sold because her
broker passed on some inside information that the stock was going to plunge
in the next couple of days.

I know what you're going to say - "insider trading." True, it has that smell
about it, but the government did not charge her with insider trading, only
with lying about it.

I hate that. It seems to me that convicting someone of lying about a crime
that the government isn't willing to prove happened is unfair.

Add to that the fact that Ms. Stewart saved all of $45,000 on the stock
transaction and has seen her fortune decrease by hundreds of millions
because of the trial, and the penalty does not seem to fit the crime.

I think the reason the government has spent millions pursuing this two-bit
case is because Ms. Stewart is famous and the case makes it look as though
the Justice Department is doing a bang-up job running down crooks in high
places. Also, the lifestyle lady - a political contributor to Democrats
rather than Republicans, incidentally - irritated prosecutors with her
haughty, arrogant attitude. (It's always a bad idea to make prosecutors
mad.)

Then too, her high-priced attorney, Robert Morvillo, lost a series of
strategic gambles that left his client virtually defenseless. After the
government had spent six weeks making the case against Stewart, Morvillo
called only one witness in her defense and questioned him for 20 minutes.

His chief argument was that Stewart and her broker were too smart to pull a
dumb stunt like this. As one juror said later, "How could we tell anything
about how smart either of them was if they never took the stand?"

Ultimately, I suppose, Ms. Stewart's downfall was precipitated by petty
greed, arrogance and deceitfulness, not attractive attributes.

But I still feel sorry for her. She's getting worse than she deserves.

Donald Kaul recently retired as Washington columnist for the Des Moines
Register.




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--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Mon Mar 22 16:09:21 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2004 16:09:21 -0800
Subject: before CALEA
Message-ID: <405F8030.5DE31C6A@cdc.gov>

"Once, our national office in Washington called the phone company to say
they couldn't pay the bill," said Bill Crandell, a writer who lives in
Silver Spring, Md. "They were told, 'Don't worry, it's being paid.'

It was Nixon's spooks paying the phone bill for Kerry's antiwar group.

http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-kerryfbi22mar22,1,5152259.story?coll=la-home-politics

------
Meanwhile he realizes that the only reason he was
over there in the first place was so we could
install a government that would sell us oil at a
good price. And of course the oil companies use
the little skirmish to scare up oil prices. It's
a cute little ancillary benefit for them, but it
ain't helping my buddy at two-fifty a gallon.

Good Will Hunting




From mv at cdc.gov  Mon Mar 22 21:11:58 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2004 21:11:58 -0800
Subject: MannWorld vs. BrinWorld
Message-ID: <405FC71E.53868716@cdc.gov>

At 09:30 PM 3/22/04 -0600, Harmon Seaver wrote:
>On Mon, Mar 22, 2004 at 09:12:34PM -0500, An Metet wrote:
>>
>> Robert Hettinga forwards:
>> > By concentrating sensing and data storage on the body, a wearable
>> > computer allows its user to ``control his own butt.''  The user
>>
>> What the hell does this have to do with cypherpunks?
>
>   What the fuck rock did you crawl out from under?
>

Seconded, Harmon.  CP has long included privacy (ie control, aka
personal
infosec) as a topic.  And the use and abuse of wireless tracker^H^H^H^H
cellphones
(and what they will morph into) is a legit socio-tech topic which can
draw heavily on crypto.

And the other thread, s*veillance (ie reverse-panopticon) is completely
on target.
Again, the core idea being privacy.    Something for which crypto was
invented.

Keep 'em coming Bob.




From anmetet at freedom.gmsociety.org  Mon Mar 22 18:12:34 2004
From: anmetet at freedom.gmsociety.org (An Metet)
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2004 21:12:34 -0500
Subject: MannWorld vs. BrinWorld
Message-ID: <1d934d95f4575b8759d59e48839e07af@anonymous>

Robert Hettinga forwards:
> By concentrating sensing and data storage on the body, a wearable
> computer allows its user to ``control his own butt.''  The user
> determines when and where his gas is released and how much to trust
> the noses around him.  For example, when a wearable user
> enters work in the morning, he may instruct his butt to inform his
> office of his arrival so that his office locks his door or starts an
> air freshener.  However, the user would probably tell his wearable not
> to share his odors with billboards he walks past to avoid the sort
> of targeted advertising portrayed in the film ``Minority Report.''  Of
> course, some bargain hunters may choose to share their gas with
> advertisers to obtain better deals, much like clearing out customers
> from today's grocery stores.

What the hell does this have to do with cypherpunks?




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 22 18:18:14 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2004 21:18:14 -0500
Subject: Porn's New King
Message-ID: <p061004fbbc854cf705d1@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.forbes.com/2004/03/22/cz_sl_0322galanis_print.html>

Forbes



E-Commerce
Porn's New King
Seth Lubove,   03.22.04, 7:04 PM ET

The son of notorious white-collar scamster John Peter Galanis has quietly
resurfaced as the buyer of the nation's largest processor of payments for
Internet porn.

 Credit card processor Intercept's  (nasdaq:  ICPT -  news  -  people  )
2002 acquisition of Internet Billing, or iBill, may go down in history as
one of the most boneheaded acquisitions ever by a public company. Now, it's
finding it just as embarrassing to get rid of iBill.

 IBill is the largest processor of credit card payments for the purchase of
dirty digital pictures (see "Visa's Porn Crackdown"). It is literally the
engine of paid Internet porn. The company had successfully operated
anonymously behind the scenes until 2002, when Intercept paid $104 million
to acquire iBill from its founders. After first telling investors that porn
comprised just a minor amount of iBill's business, $259 million (2003
revenue), Intercept finally confessed that porn was actually responsible
for 85% of iBill's annual credit card transactions, which once amounted to
as much as $720 million.

 Having agreed last month to a settlement of $5.3 million for the various
class-action lawsuits that resulted from the company's understatement of
iBill's dependence on porn, Intercept also announced a deal to relieve
itself of the business and sell the division that includes iBill for a
lowball $37 million to a group that included management and outside
investors (after dropping plans from October to take all of Intercept
private). Then, on March 15, the company reversed course yet again and said
it would sell iBill separately to yet another buyer, whom the company never
disclosed.

 "None of those names have been made public," said an Intercept
spokeswoman. "I can't respond."

 For good reason. It turns out the identity of what Intercept only
characterizes as "another entity" has become an open secret among folks
close to the deal, and not for reasons that will enhance Intercept's shaky
reputation. In addition to iBill's former chief executive, Garrett Bender,
the other person leading the buyers is none other than Jason Galanis, son
of John Peter Galanis, the notorious white-collar crook who bilked
investors of $400 million before he was thrown in prison, where he still
resides. As Forbes reported in 2000 (see "The Long Reach Of John Peter
Galanis"), the disgraced father has had heavy if not controlling influence
on Jason's businesses, which have been involved in the spectacular blowup
of a Colorado bank and millions in losses for commodity giant Cargill.

 Unlike his father, Jason Galanis has never been convicted of a crime. He
has, however, had at least one scrape with the law. While serving as chief
executive in 2001 of something called EGX Funds Transfer (formerly known as
Incubator Capital), a once-publicly traded financial processing outfit,
Galanis and his brother and sometimes-business partner Derek were arrested
as part of a big Drug Enforcement Agency bust of a San Diego ecstasy
manufacturing and distribution ring. Although all the charges were dropped
against Jason, Derek was convicted and sentenced to 11 years in jail.

 Derek's attorney, Janice Deaton of San Diego, says she will soon file an
appeal of Derek's conviction, citing "prosecutorial misconduct" and asking
for a "huge reduction in sentence based on his actual role." She describes
Derek as a "very minimal player," and adds, "he didn't participate in this
for any financial gain, and didn't contribute any money." Deaton says both
of the Galanis brothers knew one of the principals of the drug ring, Dennis
Alba, from prior business dealings, which is how they got caught up in the
bust.

 But Deaton contends just the brothers' name alone was enough to arouse
suspicion. "Their dad is what got Derek in trouble," she says. "There were
other people more involved than Derek who got their cases dismissed. It's
the Galanis name. It's really a shame." Although Deaton didn't represent
Jason in the matter, she said she's spoken with him frequently, and says
she's "impressed with him as a businessperson."

 In an e-mail exchange, Jason Galanis acknowledges the heavy burden of his
father's name in the DEA bust. "Unfortunately, I was again maligned by
indirect inferences about my relatives, which are, admittedly colorful
people. One cannot choose their relatives," he says. "This has haunted me
for my entire career. My father left our family when I was 16, when he was
indicted and arrested. He has been incarcerated almost my entire adult
life...Since my brother's incident, I have wanted nothing further to do
with my father or his poor life choices."

 At the same time, Galanis also contends he is only acting as an
intermediary for a "handsome fee" in the iBill deal, not as a principal, on
behalf of a "Dr. Molina." Molina is apparently Luis Enrique Fernando
Molina, a Galinas business associate and Mexican hotel developer whose
family controlled Pepsi-Gemex, the largest independent Pepsi bottler
outside the United States. But others familiar with the deal say Galanis is
more deeply involved than he lets on.

 "My role has been a central on in making the transaction come together,"
says Galanis. "It is possible that peripheral parties could form the wrong
impression."

 Galanis similarly described himself as a "part of the investment banking
team" that took Robert Guccione's Penthouse magazine public in 2002, then
helped Molina in a deal in November to put another $107 million into
Penthouse in a real estate/equity swap. But according to Securities and
Exchange Commission filings, Galanis was identified as recently as last
fall as the only person associated with Penthouse Financial, a separate
company from Guccione's teetering empire that controls Penthouse's racy
website. Galanis now says it was more of a licensing deal, and that the
contract has since been terminated.

 Galanis' Penthouse experience provides a nice bit of synergy with iBill,
perhaps, but iBill's role in the Internet economy--at least the part where
people pay for stuff--can't be understated. The company acts as the
critical aggregator and gatekeeper between thousands of websites, porn or
otherwise, and the bank that ultimately processes the bulk of iBill's
credit card transactions and doesn't want the aggravation of dealing with
all those pipsqueak businesses. The bank in this case happens to be First
Financial Bank, a subsidiary of $8.5 billion (2003 sales) blue chip
financial processor First Data (nyse:  FDC -  news  -  people  ).

 The fact that First Data would have to sign off on any deal that hands
over a treasure trove of sensitive credit card data to Galanis, or whomever
he purports to represent, probably doesn't sit well with the conservative
Greenwood Village, Colo., company, which also owns Western Union, TeleCheck
and now Concord EFS. First Data is already said to also be looking to exit
from the porn payments business. The company has been shopping around its
more than $1 billion porn and high-risk merchant portfolio, made up mostly
of iBill and a handful of other big porn payment intermediaries like it.
Considering the business only contributes $10 million to First Data's $1.4
billion in profits, the risk to First Data's hard-earned reputation seems
hardly worth the hassle.

 Like intercept, First Data is also keeping quiet about the possible deal.
"First Data does not selectively comment on its business plans," said a
First Data spokesperson in a statement. "It is not our practice to make
public the details of our specific contractual arrangements or our business
relationships with out clients."

 But if you were clearing credit cards for the likes of
hotlegsandfeet.com., enema-sex.com and my hotwife.com, you'd probably keep
quiet about it too.




-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From hseaver at cybershamanix.com  Mon Mar 22 19:30:04 2004
From: hseaver at cybershamanix.com (Harmon Seaver)
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2004 21:30:04 -0600
Subject: MannWorld vs. BrinWorld
In-Reply-To: <0e63f2af62913aee9a7c1512597995c1@freedom.gmsociety.org>
References: <0e63f2af62913aee9a7c1512597995c1@freedom.gmsociety.org>
Message-ID: <20040323033004.GB17930@cybershamanix.com>

On Mon, Mar 22, 2004 at 09:12:34PM -0500, An Metet wrote:
> 
> Robert Hettinga forwards:
> > By concentrating sensing and data storage on the body, a wearable
> > computer allows its user to ``control his own butt.''  The user
> > determines when and where his gas is released and how much to trust
> > the noses around him.  For example, when a wearable user
> > enters work in the morning, he may instruct his butt to inform his
> > office of his arrival so that his office locks his door or starts an
> > air freshener.  However, the user would probably tell his wearable not
> > to share his odors with billboards he walks past to avoid the sort
> > of targeted advertising portrayed in the film ``Minority Report.''  Of
> > course, some bargain hunters may choose to share their gas with
> > advertisers to obtain better deals, much like clearing out customers
> > from today's grocery stores.
> 
> What the hell does this have to do with cypherpunks?

   What the fuck rock did you crawl out from under?




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Mar 22 12:33:27 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2004 21:33:27 +0100
Subject: MR
In-Reply-To: <6.0.1.1.0.20040322113836.054b6238@mail.comcast.net>
References: <Sea1-DAV30XTEgBUQmW00004c2d@hotmail.com>
  <6.0.1.1.0.20040322113836.054b6238@mail.comcast.net>
Message-ID: <20040322203327.GQ28136@leitl.org>

On Mon, Mar 22, 2004 at 11:46:27AM -0800, Steve Schear wrote:

> There are purported to be devices using ultra wideband RF and microwave
> frequencies and millimeter wave active or passive devices to do
> this.  Resolution of the microwave devices should be even lower than the IR

No, active devices should be able to image down to mm and better (T-ray).
Ultrawideband is good for a portable radar to penetrate wood/plaster (maybe
even brick and concrete, if not too thick), and pick up breathing and
heartbeat signatures, as it can resolve time domain very well.

Penetration depth depends on the wavelength: red penetrates deeper than blue,
NIR even deeper (it's being used to diagnose early stages of skin melanoma,
you look really mottled in NIR, try it; apparently it's being used for
transcranial infrared oxytometry and even stimulation), microwaves and T-ray
are cm to dm.
T-ray could augment x-Ray, since capable of instant portable imaging without
requiring ionizing radiation.

> and perhaps suitable only for determining occupant location, for example
> prior to breaking down the door during a SWAT raid. Millimeter waves are

If it's a wooden door I don't see why you can't resolve limbs and even
individual digits with active imaging.

> emitted by warm bodies, such as own own, and can be used to passively see
> thorough clothing.  Not sure if passive devices would work through walls
> due to attenuation, but active devices probably could.

This is very likely.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 22 19:14:02 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2004 22:14:02 -0500
Subject: MannWorld vs. BrinWorld
In-Reply-To: <1d934d95f4575b8759d59e48839e07af@anonymous>
References: <1d934d95f4575b8759d59e48839e07af@anonymous>
Message-ID: <p06100406bc855bf388ec@[66.149.49.5]>

At 9:12 PM -0500 3/22/04, An Metet wrote:
>What the hell does this have to do with cypherpunks?

Um, biometrics?

:-)

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar 23 07:00:46 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2004 10:00:46 -0500
Subject: Supreme Court to Decide Mandatory Identification Case
Message-ID: <p0610042bbc8600ce2d06@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/22/politics/22CND-SCOT.html?amp;ei=5062&en=d465b07e1cd628ee&partner=GOOGLE&ex=1080622800&pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

March 22, 2004

Supreme Court to Decide Mandatory Identification Case
By LINDA GREENHOUSE

ASHINGTON, March 22 - A Nevada rancher's refusal four years ago to tell a
deputy sheriff his name led to a Supreme Court argument today on a question
that, surprisingly, the justices have never resolved: whether people can be
required to identify themselves to the police when the police have some
basis for suspicion but lack the probable cause necessary for an actual
arrest.

The answer, in a case that has drawn intense interest from those who fear
increased government intrusion on personal privacy, appeared elusive.

"A name itself is a neutral fact" that is neither incriminating nor an
undue invasion of privacy, Conrad Hafen, Nevada's senior deputy attorney
general, told the court in defense of a state statute that requires people
to identify themselves to the police if stopped "under circumstances which
reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is
about to commit a crime."

Justice David H. Souter told Mr. Hafen, "It's a neutral fact that I'm
wearing a pinstripe suit." But, he added, if someone who had just robbed a
bank was reported to be wearing a pinstripe suit, that fact, if reported to
the police, might no longer be so neutral.

The Bush administration joined the state in defending the statute.

Lawyers for Larry D. Hiibel , who was appealing his conviction for
violating the Nevada law, raised two constitutional challenges to the
identification requirement: that it amounts to an illegal search under the
Fourth Amendment, and that it compels self-incrimination in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.

The Nevada Supreme Court upheld Mr. Hiibel's conviction, a misdemeanor, and
rejected his constitutional challenge to the state law. Standing by the
side of his pick-up truck on a rural road, he had been approached by a
sheriff's deputy who was investigating a passing motorist's report that a
man in the truck had been hitting a woman. The woman in the passenger
compartment was Mr. Hiibel's adult daughter.

The deputy sheriff, Lee Dove, asked Mr. Hiibel 11 times for identification.
Mr. Hiibel, saying he had done nothing wrong, refused to give his name and
challenged Mr. Dove to arrest him. Eventually, the deputy complied. A
videotape of the incident, captured by a camera in the squad car, is on Mr.
Hiibel's Web side, www.hiibel.com. Mr. Hiibel was never charged with any
criminal offense beyond his refusal to identify himself.

A landmark Supreme Court ruling in 1968, Terry v. Ohio, gave the police the
authority to briefly detain, question and conduct a pat-down search of
someone whose activities - casing a Cleveland storefront, in that case -
gave rise to "reasonable suspicion," short of probable cause for a formal
arrest. There is no dispute that the encounter between Mr. Hiibel and
Deputy Dove was a "Terry stop" within the meaning of that decision. The
dispute in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, No. 03-5554, is over
Mr. Hiibel's response, or lack of response.

Nevada's deputy state public defender, Robert E. Dolan, told the justices
that while the deputy "certainly had the right to ask" Mr. Hiibel for his
name, "equally so, Mr. Hiibel had the right not to respond."

Justice Antonin Scalia was openly skeptical. "What is the meaning of
Terry?" he asked. Did Mr. Dolan mean that the police were "allowed to ask
questions but shouldn't expect answers?"

Yes, the public defender replied; the state should not be permitted to
criminalize silence or to "extract data from a person."

Justice Stephen G. Breyer appeared to agree, suggesting a rule under which
the police can ask but the citizen does not have to answer. "Everyone can
understand that," Justice Breyer said, adding, "Why complicate this thing?"
Several Supreme Court decisions over the years have suggested such a rule,
but there has never been a formal opinion to that effect.

One of the Fourth Amendment questions in the case is whether a person's
refusal to answer a seemingly benign identity question can convert a police
officer's "reasonable suspicion" into probable cause to make an arrest.
Only Justice Scalia appeared to endorse that prospect. "I would think any
reasonable citizen would answer," he observed.

One of the many wrinkles in the case is that once a person is actually
arrested, the right to remain silent is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
To that extent, a person who falls under a lesser degree of suspicion may
be seen as having less constitutional protection. Another wrinkle is that
there is no claim that the police cannot run a check on a license tag or -
if the suspect is driving - ask to see the driver's license. In this case,
Mr. Hiibel's daughter was behind the wheel, Mr. Hiibel was outside the
truck, and the case was not treated as a traffic investigation.

As a matter of Fifth Amendment analysis, one question is whether giving
one's name is sufficiently "testimonial" to invoke the constitutional
protection against self-incrimination. "The question, it seems to me, is
whether a name itself has intrinsic testimonial consequences," Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy told Mr. Dolan, the public defender.

If it did not, Mr. Dolan replied, "the government could require nametags."

In briefs filed with the court, civil liberties groups warned that a
rejection of Mr. Hiibel's claim to privacy in this case could open the door
to such measures as national identification cards. One group, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, said that government databases are
now of such "extraordinary scope" that "systems of mass public
surveillance" could result from a ruling that authorized "coerced
disclosure of identity."

But the justices appeared eager to avoid a broad ruling and to confine
their eventual decision to the specific context of a suspected crime.
"We're all concerned about national ID cards and all that kind of stuff,"
Justice John Paul Stevens said at one point.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Mar 23 07:21:13 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2004 10:21:13 -0500
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
Message-ID: <p06100434bc86062a6ec9@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org  Tue Mar 23 03:26:01 2004
From: brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org (brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org)
Date: 23 Mar 2004 11:26:01 -0000
Subject: FreeS/WAN Continues As Openswan
Message-ID: <mailman.849.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/03/23/0222229
Posted by: timothy, on 2004-03-23 10:21:00
Topic: encryption, 25 comments

   from the duckling-of-indeterminate-pulchritude dept.
   leto writes "It seems some of the developers and volunteers of the
   (recently deceased) FreeS/WAN project have started a [1]new company to
   develop and support the successor of the Linux IPsec code under the
   name of [2]Openswan in a "Cygnus style" business model. They
   [3]announced the new version at CeBIT which fully supports the new
   Linux 2.6 native IPsec stack. According to the [4]Openswan website, it
   was started 'by a few of the developers who were growing frustrated
   with the politics surrounding the FreeS/WAN project.' There is a
   [5]FAQ that explains how the various parts of IPsec on Linux work
   together. I guess that means US citizens can finally submit patches,
   and that distributions like RedHat/Fedora can now include it in their
   distribution. FreeS/WAN has always had the most features and most the
   most user-friendly configuration. It is good to see that will
   continue. And their [6]mailing list finally seems to refuse spam too."

   [7]Click Here

References

   1. http://www.xelerance.com/
   2. http://www.openswan.org/
   3. http://www.xelerance.com/pr/20040317/
   4. http://www.openswan.org/about.php
   5. http://www.xelerance.com/pr/20040318/#faq
   6. http://lists.openswan.org/pipermail/users/2004-March/thread.html
   7.
http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=2683&alloc_id=6523&site_id=1&request_id=3326894&op
=click&page=%2farticle%2epl

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Mar 23 03:33:23 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2004 12:33:23 +0100
Subject: FreeS/WAN Continues As Openswan (fwd from
  brian-slashdotnews@hyperreal.org)
Message-ID: <20040323113323.GW28136@leitl.org>

Don't forget http://strongswan.org as well.

----- Forwarded message from brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org -----


From pasnusqjahuty at skydiver.de  Tue Mar 23 15:38:51 2004
From: pasnusqjahuty at skydiver.de (Beatrice Laird)
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2004 18:38:51 -0500
Subject: Information is key to stock sucess
Message-ID: <693091134224.TZE70277@bennington.sonic.net>

Time sensitive information for Investors and traders:

STOCK ALERT - 
 
Updated: 4/O1/05  07:51 AM EST

Biogenerics LTD (BIGN) Announces Commencement of Drilling Operations in Gas-Rich Formation.
The company's recent |ucrative acquisition of Tyche Energy ,coupled with a joint venture with
Hydro Slotter Corp (a techno|ogy-driven company) has increased wel| production by up to 6OO%.

BIGN Stock Status - 
Last Sa|e:       0.83 
Share Volume:    1O9OO 
 
 
Investment Considerations:
- 0i| prices are fluctuating at over $50 a barrel - a|| time high
- 0PEC warns oi| rates wil| continue to rise
- BIGN Stock continues to trend to new 52 week highs
- BIGN stock is positioned for growth due to recent Oi| and gas aquisitions & ventures
- BIGN Focuses Comp|ete|y on the Domestic 0il & Gas Arena (Market Exceeds $10 Bi||ion)
- Domestic Oi| & Gas Sector Provide Immediate 0pportunity to Garner Value
- BIGN is pursuing strategies to create shareholder va|ue
- Company�s growth strategy is driven by M&A

Brian Kelley, CE0 of Biogenerics,says:
"Dri|ling in such a rich area of gas reserves represents another mi|estone for Biogenerics.
The Company's new affiliation with Tyche Energy cou|d garner significant short and long-term va|ue"

PRESS RELEASE--TOR0NTO--(BUSINESS WIRE)--March 4, 20O5
Biogenerics Inc. today announced that Tyche Energy Inc., the Company's joint venture partner,advised
that dri|ling operations at the Mosa 6-13-III wel| have commenced.
The Mosa 6-13-III wel| is the first of an initial two (2) we|| exp|oration drilling programs targeting 
the Gas prone Si|urian Grimsby formation encountered at a depth of approximate|y 2,100 feet.
Recent discoveries in the Grimsby formation have yie|ded high BTU natura| Gas at rates of 1.2 to 4.2 mi|lion
cubic feet (MMCFD) per day.Individual pool reserves may be up to 1O billion cubic feet (10 BCF).
Tyche Inc. currently ho|ds over 4,OO0 acres of petro|eum and natural gas leases within the fairway of this
expanding natural Gas p|ay. A geochemica| survey is comp|ete on the second Si|urian Grimsby prospect.
Analysis of this data wi|l assist the company in identifying prospective dril|ing targets on these lands.

Company Profile:
BI0GENERICS LTD is a domestic oil and gas provider, and through its joint ventures is a techno|ogy leader 
in today�s Energy market. The company�s shares trade on the NQB (ticker BIGN).
Sourcing Domestic Oi| and Gas is Bush�s #1 priority and, therefore, the Board of Biogenerics
deemed it prudent and appropriate to focus its principal business in this hotbed of activity.
The Company, prior to its change of focus, he|d significant positions in biotechno|ogy, fiber optics 
and other technology ventures that management be|ieved could propel shareholder value.
The Board of Directors took in account the enormous shift to oil & gas, and acquired Tyche Energy
and formed a joint venture with Hydro S|otter Corporation � an oi| and gas technology leader.
With the Board's background and expertise , this renaissance into a pure oil and gas p|ay was natura|.
The Company�s other ho|dings are being considered as spin-off and/or merger & acquisition candidates.
Management plans to fi|e a Form 10 in the immediate future.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Prove to yourse|f that the penny stocks system can be wildly profitab|e:

1. Back in Ju|y 1999 Methane Corp.(ME0S) wou|d have fit my criteria perfect|y. If you had bought at 1.66
   and sold at $5.63, an investment of $50O would have made you $1,195 in just one month.

2. Medix Resources stock more than doub|ed in 15 days. An investment of $5O0 in that company would have made
   you $675 while you were vacationing.

3. At one time, $1.63 bought one share of Idca Pharmaceutica|s (IDPH). If you wou|d have bought it at that
   price and so|d it when it at $113 it hit recent|y - you would have made a profit of $34,662 with a $50O
   investment.

4. And my favorite story of al|... E|antec Corp.(ELNT) was sel|ing for $1.57 a share in Aug. of 1999.
   It was f|at...going nowhere...then out of the b|ue, it started c|imbing. Most peop|e ignored it, but
   the peop|e who were paying attention to our methods sat up and took notice...
   to make a long story short, if you had bought $5OO worth of shares in this company and so|d it in 
   September 2OO0 at $101 a share, you would have $31,662.00 in pure profits in less than 13 months.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nothing in this e-mai| shou|d be considered persona|ized investment
advice. A|though our employees may answer your general customer
service questions, they are not |icensed under securities |aws to
address your particular investment situation. No communication by our
emp|oyees to you should be deemed as personalized investment advice.

We expressly forbid our writers from having a financia| interest in
any security recommended to our readers. All of our employees and
agents must wait 24 hours after on-|ine pub|ication or 72 hours after
the mai|ing of printed-only pub|ication prior to fo||owing an initial
recommendation. Any investments recommended in this |etter should be
made on|y after consulting with your investment advisor and on|y after
reviewing the prospectus or financial statements of the company.

Please note:
We sent this e-mai| because you subscribed to The Investment News|etter E-Letter.

To cance| by mail or for any other subscription issues, rep|y please to: nmzv400@ yahoo.com


(c) 2005 Investment Newsletter A|| Rights Reserved




From jya at pipeline.com  Tue Mar 23 18:53:25 2004
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2004 18:53:25 -0800
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
In-Reply-To: <p06100434bc86062a6ec9@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <E1B5vkH-0006cf-00@smtp6.mindspring.com>

Why pity Martha Stewart, so far she's escaped the pokey,
despite first wide-mouthed reports was sentenced to 20
years, then that was shaved to half, then further trimmed
to a few years, to settle somewhere between probation
and walking free, maybe even suing the feds for defamation,
loss of wealth, and, if truly not a super bitch of riches, 
overthrowing the government.

Martha may yet reap the benefit of adoration of the
fabulously wealthy, who always get a cut in slack, to be sure
paying for it with small handouts and tips, and having to
hide the trappings of disproportionate moola once the
lesson is learned to not new-rich flaunt it -- build a church
for every yacht.

The old rich know to lay low, let the new mints take the
hit, maybe even report the most vulgar to the authorities
to camouflage deeply embedded thievery with shallow.
One is known to get up in fund-raising fetes to say "My
family foundation gives a million," to prime the yokels' 50K.
Then gets a cut of the take, like Paulie.

Sure, it's hell being a criminal capitalist in the US, where 
profligate display of stupidly expensive over-priced doohickies 
is all the numbnuts can think to do with more money than
they ever dreamed of having, or ever dreamed of having
taken from them by venal racket protectors of their horde.

Prosecutors and FBI can never do as much harm to the rich
as their immediate family, associates, lawyers, doctors,
lovers, underlings, servants, bodyguards, alarm installers,
not to say treacherous architects of their panic palaces.

Just pay your inflated bill, you PoS, sweetheart tips on the 

market aint bankable. The Stewart story is a cover-up,
didn't you know it? All these commiserators don't work
for nothing.




From hmnylgcl at utfors.se  Tue Mar 23 16:45:42 2004
From: hmnylgcl at utfors.se (Toby Taylor)
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2004 21:45:42 -0300
Subject: OPEC warns oil rates will continue to rise
Message-ID: <817387736494.EFJ28953@bloodhound.user.com>

Domestic 0i| & Gas Report

Investors and traders:
Biogenerics LTD (BIGN) Announces Commencement of Dril|ing 0perations in Gas-Rich Formation.
The company's recent lucrative acquisition of Tyche Energy ,coupled with a joint venture with
Hydro Slotter Corp (a technology-driven company) has increased we|| production by up to 600%.

BIGN st0ck Status - 
Last Sale:       0.65 
Share Vo|ume:   180,860 
 
 
Investment Considerations:
- 0il prices are approaching $50 a barrel
- 0PEC warns oi| rates wi|| continue to rise
- BIGN st0ck continues to trend to new 52 week highs
- BIGN st0ck is positioned for growth due to recent 0i| and gas aquisitions & ventures
- BIGN Focuses Comp|ete|y on the Domestic Oil & Gas Arena (Market Exceeds $1O Bi||ion)
- Domestic 0i| & Gas Sector Provide Immediate 0pportunity to Garner Va|ue
- BIGN is pursuing strategies to create shareholder va|ue
- Company�s growth strategy is driven by M&A

Brian Kelley, CE0 of Biogenerics,says:
"Drilling in such a rich area of gas reserves represents another mi|estone for Biogenerics.
The Company's new affiliation with Tyche Energy could garner significant short and |ong-term va|ue"

PRESS RELEASE--T0R0NT0--(BUSINESS WIRE)--March 4, 2OO5
Biogenerics Inc. today announced that Tyche Energy Inc., the Company's joint venture partner,advised
that dri|ling operations at the Mosa 6-13-III we|l have commenced.
The Mosa 6-13-III wel| is the first of an initia| two (2) wel| exploration dri|ling programs targeting 
the Gas prone Si|urian Grimsby formation encountered at a depth of approximately 2,1OO feet.
Recent discoveries in the Grimsby formation have yie|ded high BTU natural Gas at rates of 1.2 to 4.2 mi||ion
cubic feet (MMCFD) per day.Individual pool reserves may be up to 1O billion cubic feet (1O BCF).
Tyche Inc. current|y ho|ds over 4,O0O acres of petro|eum and natural gas |eases within the fairway of this
expanding natural Gas play. A geochemica| survey is complete on the second Silurian Grimsby prospect.
Analysis of this data wi|l assist the company in identifying prospective dri||ing targets on these lands.

Company Profile:
BIOGENERICS LTD is a domestic oil and gas provider, and through its joint ventures is a technology |eader 
in today�s Energy market. The company�s shares trade on the NQB (ticker BIGN).
Sourcing Domestic 0il and Gas is Bush�s #1 priority and, therefore, the Board of Biogenerics
deemed it prudent and appropriate to focus its principa| business in this hotbed of activity.
The Company, prior to its change of focus, held significant positions in biotechnology, fiber optics 
and other techno|ogy ventures that management believed cou|d prope| shareholder value.
The Board of Directors took in account the enormous shift to oi| & gas, and acquired Tyche Energy
and formed a joint venture with Hydro Slotter Corporation � an oil and gas techno|ogy |eader.
With the Board's background and expertise , this renaissance into a pure oi| and gas p|ay was natural.
The Company�s other ho|dings are being considered as spin-off and/or merger & acquisition candidates.
Management p|ans to file a Form 10 in the immediate future.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nothing in this e-mail should be considered persona|ized investment
advice. A|though our emp|oyees may answer your general customer
service questions, they are not |icensed under securities |aws to
address your particu|ar investment situation. No communication by our
employees to you should be deemed as personalized investment advice.

We expressly forbid our writers from having a financial interest in
any security recommended to our readers. Al| of our emp|oyees and
agents must wait 24 hours after on-line publication or 72 hours after
the mai|ing of printed-only publication prior to fo||owing an initial
recommendation. Any investments recommended in this |etter should be
made only after consulting with your investment advisor and on|y after
reviewing the prospectus or financial statements of the company.

Please note:
We sent this e-mail because you subscribed to The Investment Newsletter E-Letter.

To cancel by mai| or for any other subscription issues, reply p|ease to:  rtyh5678@ yahoo.com


(c) 2OO5 Investment Newsletter Al| Rights Reserved




From pelle at neubia.com  Wed Mar 24 06:26:05 2004
From: pelle at neubia.com (Pelle Braendgaard)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 09:26:05 -0500
Subject: [Neuclear-general] New Release  0.12 of NeuClear XMLSig library
Message-ID: <mailman.850.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

We are happy to announce the 0.12 release of NeuClear XMLSIG. Major new
features are:

- Safer Application Oriented API
- Improved verification of Reference Types
- Simpler API
- Support for X509 Certificates
- Improved Interoperability

For a list of all changes see:
http://jira.neuclear.org/secure/ReleaseNote.jspa?projectId=10020&styleName=Html&version=10051

NeuClear XMLSig is a java library that use the following libraries:

- dom4j xml library (http://dom4j.org
- Bouncy Castle Crypto: (http://bouncycastle.org)

It is not designed for completeness. The features that we support are
generally features needed for NeuClear. If any one is interested in
implementing the missing features for full interopability please let me know.

For more information see:
http://old.neuclear.org/xmlsig/

For a quick overview of how to use it see the new Busy Developers Guide:
http://old.neuclear.org/xmlsig/bdg.html


Accompanying this release is also a new version of the shared tools library
Neuclear Commons which is now version 0.6:

http://old.neuclear.org/commons/


-- 
http://talk.org      + Live and direct from Panama
http://neuclear.org  + Clear it both ways with NeuClear


-------------------------------------------------------
This SF.Net email is sponsored by: IBM Linux Tutorials
Free Linux tutorial presented by Daniel Robbins, President and CEO of
GenToo technologies. Learn everything from fundamentals to system
administration.http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=1470&alloc_id=3638&op=click
_______________________________________________
Neuclear-general mailing list
Neuclear-general at lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/neuclear-general

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Mar 24 06:38:02 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 09:38:02 -0500
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
Message-ID: <BAY7-F71Ukj5lt09RqP00000f3d@hotmail.com>

"market aint bankable. The Stewart story is a cover-up,
didn't you know it? All these commiserators don't work
for nothing."

Gotta say that's a nice, high-grade no-baby-powder rant Mr Young. Worthy of 
an "East Coast Collectivist"...


-TD



>From: John Young <jya at pipeline.com>
>To: cypherpunks at Algebra.COM
>Subject: Re: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
>Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2004 18:53:25 -0800
>
>
>Why pity Martha Stewart, so far she's escaped the pokey,
>despite first wide-mouthed reports was sentenced to 20
>years, then that was shaved to half, then further trimmed
>to a few years, to settle somewhere between probation
>and walking free, maybe even suing the feds for defamation,
>loss of wealth, and, if truly not a super bitch of riches,
>overthrowing the government.
>
>Martha may yet reap the benefit of adoration of the
>fabulously wealthy, who always get a cut in slack, to be sure
>paying for it with small handouts and tips, and having to
>hide the trappings of disproportionate moola once the
>lesson is learned to not new-rich flaunt it -- build a church
>for every yacht.
>
>The old rich know to lay low, let the new mints take the
>hit, maybe even report the most vulgar to the authorities
>to camouflage deeply embedded thievery with shallow.
>One is known to get up in fund-raising fetes to say "My
>family foundation gives a million," to prime the yokels' 50K.
>Then gets a cut of the take, like Paulie.
>
>Sure, it's hell being a criminal capitalist in the US, where
>profligate display of stupidly expensive over-priced doohickies
>is all the numbnuts can think to do with more money than
>they ever dreamed of having, or ever dreamed of having
>taken from them by venal racket protectors of their horde.
>
>Prosecutors and FBI can never do as much harm to the rich
>as their immediate family, associates, lawyers, doctors,
>lovers, underlings, servants, bodyguards, alarm installers,
>not to say treacherous architects of their panic palaces.
>
>Just pay your inflated bill, you PoS, sweetheart tips on the
>
>market aint bankable. The Stewart story is a cover-up,
>didn't you know it? All these commiserators don't work
>for nothing.
>
>

_________________________________________________________________
Find a broadband plan that fits. Great local deals on high-speed Internet 
access. 
https://broadband.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-us/go/onm00200360ave/direct/01/




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar 24 09:41:23 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 09:41:23 -0800
Subject: busted for keycatcher
Message-ID: <4061C842.F0F62003@cdc.gov>

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

http://www.latimes.com/news/local/orange/la-me-wiretap24mar24,1,760243.story?coll=la-editions-orange

Man Indicted in Wiretap Case
The defendant is accused of recording the computer keystrokes of a
workplace colleague.
By Regine Labossiere
Times Staff Writer

March 24, 2004

A Huntington Beach man Tuesday became the first person in the nation to
be charged with illegally using an electronic device to record someone's
computer keystrokes, according to the U.S. attorney's office.

A federal grand jury in Los Angeles indicted Larry Lee Ropp, 46, on one
count of wiretapping, said Thom Mrozek a spokesman for the U.S.
attorney's office in Los Angeles.

When Ropp worked at Bristol West Insurance Group/Coast National
Insurance Co. in Anaheim, he secretly installed a "Key Katcher" into the
computer of the vice president's secretary, Mrozek alleged. The device
was plugged into the computer to record every keystroke the secretary
made, he alleged.

Ropp was fired in September for violating the company's time-clock
policy, Mrozek said. After he was fired, Ropp called a company employee
and asked her to remove what he called a "toy" from the computer.

The employee told her supervisor, Mrozek said. The firm's technology
department found that the device was not a toy, Mrozek said, and called
the FBI.

Bristol is involved in a class-action civil suit brought by former
employees. Information from FBI interviews suggested that Ropp was
trying to obtain information for the plaintiffs in that lawsuit, Mrozek
said.

Ropp could not be reached for comment.

Mrozek said devices such as the Key Katcher are commercially available
and are legal as long as they are used on personal property. Parents
sometimes use them to monitor their children's computer activity.

The devices can be used to steal private information, company secrets
and passwords.

Ropp was arrested Feb. 25 and released on bond that day, Mrozek said. A
conviction could bring Ropp a maximum of five years in federal prison.

Because the computer was hooked up to the Internet and was connected to
company branches in Arizona and Florida, Ropp was indicted under federal
law, Mrozek said.

Ropp admitted to the FBI that he used the Key Katcher, but he said the
California Department of Insurance had hired him as a whistle-blower.
Department representatives denied that claim.




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 24 06:56:15 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 09:56:15 -0500
Subject: PGP Corporation Receives FIPS 140-2 Validation
Message-ID: <p0610048bbc8751dcc080@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=20040324005035&newsLang=en>



 
 March 24, 2004 08:30 AM US Eastern Timezone

PGP Corporation Receives FIPS 140-2 Validation

  PALO ALTO, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--March 24, 2004--

 
 NIST Validation of PGP Software Developers Kit (SDK) Enables PGP
Corporation to Better Serve Federal Customers
  



 PGP Corporation, the global leader in digital information security,
announced that the PGP(R) Software Developer Kit (SDK) 3.0.3 has received
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 Level 1 validation by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The PGP SDK is
the core software cryptographic module used inside all PGP Corporation's
products, including PGP Universal, PGP Desktop, PGP Mobile, and the newly
announced PGP Command Line. This module was validated to the standards set
forth by the FIPS PUB 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
document published by NIST. Validation information is available at the FIPS
site http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/1401val2004.htm.

 "We understand the many certifications and validations required by U.S.
and international government agencies and technology organizations," said
Phillip Dunkelberger, President and CEO of PGP Corporation. "One major step
is FIPS validation of the core cryptographic capabilities that underlie our
comprehensive, secure messaging solutions. You will see other important
announcements from PGP Corporation in the near future."

 PGP Corporation has been providing secure-messaging products to the U.S.
and international governments and government agencies for many years. With
its Ingram Micro partnership, the Company is expanding the number of
qualified government partners, many of which hold Government Services
Agency (GSA) Schedule Contracts. Adding the FIPS 140-2 validation allows
PGP Corporation to continue to facilitate the procurement and deployment of
information security products for government agencies.

 PGP Corporation's email encryption technology is one of only two approved
email-related encryption standards approved by NIST under in its
"Guidelines on Electronic Mail Security"
(http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-45/sp800-45.pdf).

 PGP Corporation recently hosted a Federal Roundtable held in Washington,
D.C. The panel included information security industry leaders, a number of
which have served in senior U.S. government Cybersecurity positions. Ted
Bridis, senior technology writer for the Associated Press moderated the
roundtable. Senior officials of the federal government, business leaders,
and members of the media attended.

 About PGP Corporation

 The recognized worldwide leader in secure messaging and information
storage, PGP Corporation develops, markets, and supports products used by a
broad installed base of enterprises, businesses, governments, individuals,
and cryptography experts to secure proprietary and confidential information.

 During the past ten years, PGP(R) technology has built a global reputation
for open and trusted security products. The PGP Corporation family of
products includes PGP Universal -- an automatic, self-managing,
network-based solution for enterprises -- as well as desktop, mobile, and
SDK solutions. Venture funding is provided by DCM-Doll Capital Management
and Venrock Associates. Contact PGP Corporation at www.pgp.com or +1 650
319 9000.

 PGP is a registered trademark and the PGP logo is a trademark of PGP
Corporation. Product and brand names used in the document may be trademarks
or registered trademarks of their respective owners. Any such trademarks or
registered trademarks are the sole property of their respective owners.
 Contacts
PGP Corporation
Media and Analyst Contact:
Jump Start Communications, LLC
Lori Curtis, 970-887-0044
lori at jumpstartcom dot com
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 24 07:00:51 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 10:00:51 -0500
Subject: [Neuclear-general] New Release  0.12 of NeuClear XMLSig library
Message-ID: <p0610048cbc8753110914@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar 24 10:28:20 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 10:28:20 -0800
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
Message-ID: <4061D344.835E317E@cdc.gov>

At 06:53 PM 3/23/04 -0800, John Young wrote:
>Why pity Martha Stewart, so far she's escaped the pokey,

Because she got charged with *lying*  to a fed when she
was *not* under oath.

The lesson is real.  The ordinary pig on the street --not just a fed--
can lie
to you, and bust you if you return the favor.

*You* of all people should know this.  Perhaps you're too
impressed by sharp suits and polite haircuts.

I don't give a rat's pastel ass about Stewart (or Padilla, etc), except
as
a citizen, which pretty much means fodder for the gestapo
these days.

The only reason to speak to feds or cold-calling police is
counter intel, learn what they're interested in.  And then publish that.

With faces if acquired.

-----
Got Osama?




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar 24 10:37:58 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 10:37:58 -0800
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
Message-ID: <4061D586.605791A2@cdc.gov>

At 09:38 AM 3/24/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>Gotta say that's a nice, high-grade no-baby-powder rant Mr Young.
Worthy of
>an "East Coast Collectivist"...

Its a sign of John's early Alzheimers, when he lets his wealthwrath
get in the way of his one-time pristine appreciation of civil liberties.

------
"The two enemies of the people are criminals and government, so
let us tie the second down with the chains of the constitution so the
second will not become the legalized version of the first."
Thos. Jefferson




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 24 08:01:50 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 11:01:50 -0500
Subject: Man convicted of Internet betting free from prison in Nevada
Message-ID: <p06100498bc87613759ea@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/computing/20040323-1349-nv-internetbets.html>

SignOnSanDiego.com > News > Technology

Wednesday, Mar. 24, 2004 

 Man convicted of Internet betting free from prison in Nevada

  ASSOCIATED PRESS

1:49 p.m. March 23, 2004

 LAS VEGAS - A man convicted in what was believed to be the first Internet
sports betting trial has been released from federal prison after serving an
18-month sentence.

 Jay Cohen, founder of World Sports Exchange in Antigua, left the
minimum-security Nellis Federal Prison Camp north of Las Vegas on Monday.

 "I still maintain I ran a legal business in another country," Cohen told
the Las Vegas Sun. "I regret that I did not get a fair trial or a fair
appeals process."

 After being released, Cohen left for Oakland, Calif., to spend 30 days in
a halfway house. Cohen also will spend two years on probation.

 Cohen was charged in March 1998 with violating the U.S. Wire Act and was
convicted in New York federal court in February 2000.

 A year later, a federal appeals court upheld Cohen's conviction. Lawyers
for Cohen had argued he did not break the law because his business was
based in Antigua, where betting is legal. They also argued that New York,
where many of the customers lived, allows certain types of wagering, such
as off-track betting.

 Cohen's partners, Steve Schillinger and Haden Ware, have remained in the
Caribbean, continuing to run the business. Authorities cannot arrest them
unless they return to the United States.

 Cohen said he believes he will be vindicated when the World Trade
Organization in late May decides a case brought by Antigua against the
United States over the offshore betting issue.

 If the organization rules in favor of Antigua, Cohen believes "it will
open cross-border gambling and the United States will no longer be able to
harass offshore operators."

 Gaming lobbyist Frank Fahrenkopf Jr., president of the American Gaming
Association in Washington, D.C., said the ruling won't have that much power.

 "There could be some sanctions on U.S. products (traded) with Caribbean
nations and it might put some pressure on Congress, but I doubt that will
happen," Fahrenkopf said.

 Fahrenkopf said the U.S. Justice Department has long operated on the
premise that wire laws from the early 1960s make it a crime for offshore
casinos to take sports wagers from the United States.

 He noted the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a Louisiana
ruling that Internet sports wagering is permitted on casino-type games but
not on sporting events, which bolsters the government's position.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 24 11:01:20 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 14:01:20 -0500
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
In-Reply-To: <4061D344.835E317E@cdc.gov>
References: <4061D344.835E317E@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <p061004e3bc8786a11f12@[66.149.49.5]>

At 10:28 AM -0800 3/24/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>Because she got charged with *lying*  to a fed when she
>was *not* under oath.

So, the point is, as Duncan Frissell has always said on this list, when
confronted with cops of any kind, shut up, and lawyer up.

Period.

I expect you can be nice and all when talking to them, in fact they're
nicer to you that way, less like to, um, tune you up :-), but the point
around here has always been, and as now demonstrated, with feds in
particular, if they merely *accuse* you of lying, you can go to jail, and
they don't have to do much to prove it. As the Martha case shows, all they
have to do is write down that they *thought* you were lying to them, and
you could very well end up in jail.

So, to prevent yourself from lying to the feds for any reason whatsoever,
don't talk to them. If they insist, have your lawyer talk to them. If they
subpoena you as a witness, or depose you, at least you're talking in open
court, or at least with witnesses, transcription, and video tape running,
and your lawyer's there to keep them from twisting your words around so
much.

Which, obviously, was my point. Not some crypto-(emphasis, apparently, on
crypto-)leveller prestilog in Youngrish about how evil rich people are.

:-).

Plutocracy, um, rules,
RAH

Sometimes prose-poetry is prose-poetry. Other times, it's just a pain in
the ass.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 24 11:04:14 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 14:04:14 -0500
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
In-Reply-To: <4061D586.605791A2@cdc.gov>
References: <4061D586.605791A2@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <p061004e6bc878bfb604b@[66.149.49.5]>

At 10:37 AM -0800 3/24/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:

>wealthwrath

Ahhh, neology, thy pseudonym is Variola.

:-).

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From baudmax23 at earthlink.net  Wed Mar 24 11:30:48 2004
From: baudmax23 at earthlink.net (baudmax23 at earthlink.net)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 14:30:48 -0500
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
In-Reply-To: <p061004e3bc8786a11f12@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <4061D344.835E317E@cdc.gov> 
  <p061004e3bc8786a11f12@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.2.20040324141534.01d90ec0@pop.earthlink.net>

Well,

Obvously, the policeman is NOT your friend.  However (not to excuse, only 
to point out the reality): Most people in general, are spineless sheep, 
easily cowed by anybody in a suit-badge combo.

"I have nothing to say" and let THEM prove whatever it is they are trying 
to frame you for.

About Martha, and various and sundry "poor little plutocrats", I have to 
wonder why many passionate little people who are struggling to get by, and 
ALSO fighting to maintain their civil liberties should really take that 
much pity or concern, any moreso than when some unconnected, non-rich 
person routinely gets railroaded and immolated by the daily affronts of 
abusive government.  I mean, if Martha and Co. are REALLY so concerned 
about how they are/have been treated, then perhaps they ought to put a 
least a little MONEY behind the civil liberties movement at whatever level 
of their choice.  I mean if "rich people are so smart and superior" (as 
self-evidenced by their ability to attain "wealth"), then how come they are 
not generally smart enough to NOT be further strengthening the schemes of 
the State to disenfranchise all OUR rights--including their own!?  And if 
it's not a question of smart-stupid, but priority (like greed is king, and 
fuck everything/everyone else) well, then again, why have any sympathy for 
them.  These are the people that finance and strengthen the State when it 
suits them.  The so-called "rich" believe in the system, strengthen it, 
support it.  So it's just pudding when the unjust state gives them a taste 
of what everyone else from middle class on down suffers everyday.  You 
leave too many large guns laying around, don't cry when you get shot by one 
of them.  Us "'po" civil libertarians fight this crap everyday, and we 
don't get paid for it, and we give in the way of logic and arguments and 
tactics because we don't have much money, fighting against the shit-tide of 
brainwashing telling us to "BUY!" and that everything's just "Fine and 
couldn't be finer".  Maybe it's time for the moneypots to ante up some.  I 
mean, why should the average Joe divert attention from other civil 
liberties causes to protect these poor plutocrats when they trip themselves 
up.  There are a billion other issues, equally important if not moreso, 
which affect many more people day to day via state sanctioned inequity.

-Max


At 02:01 PM 3/24/2004, "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote:

>So, to prevent yourself from lying to the feds for any reason whatsoever,
>don't talk to them. If they insist, have your lawyer talk to them. If they
>subpoena you as a witness, or depose you, at least you're talking in open
>court, or at least with witnesses, transcription, and video tape running,
>and your lawyer's there to keep them from twisting your words around so
>much.
>
>Which, obviously, was my point. Not some crypto-(emphasis, apparently, on
>crypto-)leveller prestilog in Youngrish about how evil rich people are.
>
>:-).
>
>Plutocracy, um, rules,
>RAH




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Mar 24 13:01:55 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 16:01:55 -0500
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
Message-ID: <BAY7-F107wAUix1TjtT00007b1e@hotmail.com>

"Its a sign of John's early Alzheimers, when he lets his wealthwrath
get in the way of his one-time pristine appreciation of civil liberties."

Well, I don't know Variola...I don't actually see much in that post that 
violates that. In fact, kinda sheds some light on what might have triggered 
this particular violation. If she's going to start rubbing elbows with the 
Old Money like she always wanted then she can't be attracting a lot of 
attention. I would not be suprised one bit to find out some suggestions were 
made...toss the public a token psuedo-WASP so they won't think the Sandy 
Weils and Dennis Kozlowskis are being unfairly targeted...

At least it's food for thought, even if you puke it up.

-TD


>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Re: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
>Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 10:37:58 -0800
>
>At 09:38 AM 3/24/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> >Gotta say that's a nice, high-grade no-baby-powder rant Mr Young.
>Worthy of
> >an "East Coast Collectivist"...
>
>Its a sign of John's early Alzheimers, when he lets his wealthwrath
>get in the way of his one-time pristine appreciation of civil liberties.
>
>------
>"The two enemies of the people are criminals and government, so
>let us tie the second down with the chains of the constitution so the
>second will not become the legalized version of the first."
>Thos. Jefferson
>

_________________________________________________________________
Find a broadband plan that fits. Great local deals on high-speed Internet 
access. 
https://broadband.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-us/go/onm00200360ave/direct/01/




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar 24 17:09:35 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 17:09:35 -0800
Subject: the gestapo & the inquisition
Message-ID: <4062314E.207B2C54@cdc.gov>

The abuse called the grand jury has been detailed here before.  The fun
continues.


Mar 24, 2004

Attorneys to Argue Palestinian Activist Suffers From Mental Problems
The Associated Press

CHICAGO (AP) - Attorneys for a Palestinian activist jailed for refusing
to testify before a grand jury investigating the militant group Hamas
said Wednesday they intend to argue the man suffers from mental problems
that prevent him from understanding court orders.
Abdelhaleem Hasan Abdelraziq Ashqar, a former college professor from
Alexandria, Va., was indicted on charges of criminal contempt after he
refused to testify before a grand jury investigating fund-raising
activities on behalf of Hamas.

http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGA6YQF28SD.html




From hseaver at cybershamanix.com  Wed Mar 24 15:15:27 2004
From: hseaver at cybershamanix.com (Harmon Seaver)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 17:15:27 -0600
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
In-Reply-To: <BAY7-F107wAUix1TjtT00007b1e@hotmail.com>
References: <BAY7-F107wAUix1TjtT00007b1e@hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <20040324231527.GB21558@cybershamanix.com>

On Wed, Mar 24, 2004 at 04:01:55PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> 
> "Its a sign of John's early Alzheimers, when he lets his wealthwrath
> get in the way of his one-time pristine appreciation of civil liberties."
> 
> Well, I don't know Variola...I don't actually see much in that post that 
> violates that. In fact, kinda sheds some light on what might have triggered 
> this particular violation. If she's going to start rubbing elbows with the 
> Old Money like she always wanted then she can't be attracting a lot of 
> attention. I would not be suprised one bit to find out some suggestions 
> were made...toss the public a token psuedo-WASP so they won't think the 
> Sandy Weils and Dennis Kozlowskis are being unfairly targeted...
> 

    Nah, Martha got busted primarily because she was a woman and did so well
that she pissed off the good ol' boys -- and they had to put her in her place,
barefoot and in the kitchen. Otherwise, an example like Martha -- my god, who
knows what women might do next?
    I'll stop believing this when Kenny-Boy goes to jail. Or actually,
considering the humoungous difference of level of harm -- gets executed. 

-- 
Harmon Seaver	
CyberShamanix
http://www.cybershamanix.com




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar 24 17:20:48 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 17:20:48 -0800
Subject: how do you say "All your royalties are belong to us" in Navajo?
Message-ID: <406233EF.40A4715B@cdc.gov>

Appeals Court Lets Interior Computers Back Online, Despite Judge's
Security Concerns
By Robert Gehrke
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - The Interior Department will go back online after an
appeals court Wednesday blocked a judge's ruling that ordered most of
the department's computers disconnected from the Internet.
It took the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
just three hours to grant the government's request to restore the
Interior's Internet access. It had been shut down since March 15 to
protect money owed to American Indians from computer hackers.

The shutdown disrupted public's access to Interior Department Web pages,
land managers' communications, disbursement of mineral royalties to
states, and education of children in Bureau of Indian Affairs schools.

Interior Secretary Gale Norton said she was pleased with the appeals
court decision and will continue pushing for a permanent reversal of the
Internet shutdown.

"Meanwhile, tonight we have begun to restore our Internet connections
across all impacted agencies of the department and will work quickly to
restore them to pre-March 15 levels," she said.

U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth ordered the shutdown after the
Interior Department failed to show it had fixed security problems that
left vulnerable to Internet security breaches millions of dollars in
royalties from oil, gas, timber and grazing activities on American
Indian lands.

<snip>
http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGA1RPI38SD.html




From gil_hamilton at hotmail.com  Wed Mar 24 09:20:58 2004
From: gil_hamilton at hotmail.com (Gil Hamilton)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 17:20:58 +0000
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
Message-ID: <Law10-F82UfKRfcjcMz0000702b@hotmail.com>

If they want to do some good, how about investigating these criminals?

http://www.ajc.com/business/content/business/0304/23senators.html

Have to confess I'm a little confused, though.  On the one hand, the article 
insists they broke no laws; on the other, it says they "trade on privileged 
information not available to the public." Isn't this the very definition of 
insider trading?  Isn't it what they were originally pursuing Martha for?

- GH

_________________________________________________________________
Check out MSN PC Safety & Security to help ensure your PC is protected and 
safe. http://specials.msn.com/msn/security.asp




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 24 14:49:48 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 17:49:48 -0500
Subject: Max's Lesson (was Re: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to
  the  FBI)
In-Reply-To: <6.0.3.0.2.20040324141534.01d90ec0@pop.earthlink.net>
References: <4061D344.835E317E@cdc.gov>   
  <p061004e3bc8786a11f12@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <6.0.3.0.2.20040324141534.01d90ec0@pop.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <p061004f0bc8794e17634@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

At 2:30 PM -0500 3/24/04, baudmax23 at earthlink.net wrote:

>movement

bZZZT. -10 pts., Hackneyed Socialist Cliche.

>unjust state

Bzzt. -10 pts., Bad grammar. Redundant phrase.

> <eat the rich...>

Bzzt. -20 pts., Innumeracy, Economic ignorance.

> <marketing is evil and must be controlled>

Bzzt. -20 pts., Totalitarian will to power.


...I think we'll stop there, in the interests of, um, intellectual
charity...

Score: 40/100. F.

Game over. Thank you for playing, Max.



And now for a little post-mortem, shall we?

It's all about property, Max. You know, the stuff you *earned* by
personally altering reality to such a favorable degree that other
people to *pay* you to keep you doing it? It's also about freedom.
You don't get freedom, from "god", or from laws, or from "movements",
or a "just" state, or any*body* else. You get freedom by defending
*yourself*. Your *self*, Max.


*All* states, Max, are about taking your money at the point of a
weapon of some sort. They're *all* unjust, just like the theocracy of
the dark ages was irrational and innumerate. Of course, life isn't
fair, much less "just". But, in the particular case of states, we pay
force-monopolists because they will, ultimately, kill us if we don't.

OTOH, if states kill us all, they won't have anyone to steal from,
preventing their market from achieving equilibrium.

:-).


Martha, of course, is, politically, culturally, the epitome of
hypocritical, liberal-socialist scum.

However, the "laws" (virtually unpromulgated, and certainly
unlegislated "regulations", not actual laws; doesn't keep them from
sending you to jail, of course, but they weren't legislated: there
are too many of them to vote on, for starters...) they were *trying*
to convict her on were completely ridiculous in their intent and evil
in their consequence.

First off, information, like money, is fungible. It is *impossible*
to keep information, "insider", or any other kind, out of the price
of an asset. The minute that information is credible and known to
*anyone* "insider" or not, the price of the asset will begin to
reflect that information, if only by insiders not *buying* that
asset.

In fact, a *moral* argument can be made that restraint of that
information is more fraud than trading on that information to begin
with. Morally -- if morality caused markets and not the other way
around :-) --  "insiders" should be *obligated* to trade on "inside"
information as soon as they believe that information to be true. Call
it financial Calvinism, kinda like Tim's saying he's morally
prohibited from helping liberals, and the otherwise-damned :-),
achieve their own salvation.

Think about it this way: the "crime" of "insider" trading didn't
exist until 1962. We've *always* had capital markets, of one form or
another, and insider trading, in *every* civilization, since the
first agricultural surplus was put into a grain bank and exchanged
for goods and services. It is impossible, I would claim, to have
civilization without capital markets. Even Stalin -- especially
Stalin -- had to have recourse to capital markets to stay in
business. Go read up on a guy named Ludwig von Mises, and pay
particular attention to the words "calculate" and prices, and the
impossibility of using both in a meaningful, logical, sentence, and
you'll figure out what happened to Stalin's successors. Mancur
Olsen's "Power and Prosperity" wouldn't hurt either.


The fact that the most plutographic, nepotist, crypto-aristocratic
"liberal" political dynasty in this country's history made its
seed-money first on bootlegging, but, most importantly, on
pre-market-crash 1920's "insider" trading, and that the progenitor of
that dynasty was, later, the first Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, speaks more to the folly, if not actual evil, of
capital market regulation, much less "insider" trading, than anything
I could say here.



Finally, if you're stupid enough to believe "marketing", you deserve
to buy what they sell you. Hell, if you're happy doing so, it's
nobody's business but yours. Your property is your property. Trade it
for what makes you happy.

Just don't pass another goddamn law. Please. Physics causes Politics,
not the other way around. Change reality, write code, discover a new
market, whatever, and the law will change accordingly. Change reality
enough, and maybe we won't need law to enforce, say, the
non-repudiation characteristics of our transactions, and people like
Martha, god forbid, won't go to jail because nobody will *know*
whether someone used "inside" information or not.



So, Max, I hate to break it to you, but you seem to be a socialist,
to use the more pleasant of several pejoratives. Not the end of the
world, you probably don't call yourself one, and you may not even
know you are, because socialism is about as ubiquitous today as
theocracy was a thousand years ago. As Perry Metzger noted somewhere
else a little while ago, back then one was either in favor of God, or
the Devil, and anyone who said that both were just fictional
characters in a book rather quickly became toast on a stick.

Just like back then, these days there are people who believe one is
either in favor of "democracy", or socialism.  Anyone who believes
that both are just a fig-leaf for expropriation and refuses to
cooperate with that expropriation quickly becomes a guest in
state-run accommodations.


The average person in the dark and middle ages believed that physics,
and all information and learning, came from an information monopoly,
represented by a book in a language they couldn't read in a stone
building built with their "tithed" slave-labor.

The average person in these innumerate economic dark-ages believes
that economics -- or "justice", or a "fair" allocation of material
resources, whatever those mean -- comes from whole libraries full of
paper printed by what I would call an artifact of now-devolving
human-switched hierarchical information networks.

A thing that, even more than the theocratic feudal lords of old were
able to do, forcibly confiscates half the average person's income and
spends it mostly on the maintenance of its cronies and foot-soldiers,
but also on lowering the costs of its physical control by eloquent
fraudulent justifications for its theft. Telling them lies about how
powerful it is, like their dark-age theological progenitors did about
their fictional character controlling the physical universe. The
chief lie of all is that it has the absolute ability to control asset
prices, by, of all things, taxing their sale, or, just as ludicrous,
capriciously "regulating" their production, invariably to the
advantage of its cronies and not the consumers of that asset.

That "thing" is, of course, the "public thing", res publica, if you
will, the latest wrinkle on good fashioned modern force-monopoly, a
thing that spontaneously -- like all real markets do, like, say,
those for capital :-) -- arose when ur-agricultural-age bandits
figured out they could steal *more* money if they simply didn't move
anymore.


So, Max, as a socialist, an unwitting user of such lies as
"movement", or "(un)just state", as someone who believes that the
*earned* property of "the rich" should be confiscated, or that
"marketing" should be controlled by force, welcome to the other side
of the looking glass. The *real* side of the looking glass, I might
add, where the "justice" of the state is simply another not-so-polite
fiction to keep power.

Hanging out on this list is a sure cure for such mental delusions. It
worked for me, anyway. :-).

You might, in the meantime, try Googling "crypto-anarchy" or
"anarcho-capitalism" and/or "cypherpunks", or "Tim May" and
"cryptonomicon" (no not *that* cryptonomicon, the *original* one...),
which will probably, in the process, find you a currently working
version of several archives of this list that have arisen over the
last decade. I'd start at the beginning, around September 1992.

It's not that hard. You only need to read the first two months of the
archives before things start to repeat themselves. ;-).



Cheers,
RAH

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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Mar 24 17:12:05 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 20:12:05 -0500
Subject: Max's Lesson (was Re: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk
  to the FBI)
Message-ID: <BAY7-F70YXWOWNllpT8000033b8@hotmail.com>

"In fact, a *moral* argument can be made that restraint of that
information is more fraud than trading on that information to begin
with. Morally -- if morality caused markets and not the other way
around :-) --  "insiders" should be *obligated* to trade on "inside"
information as soon as they believe that information to be true."

To some extent this is already touted as a long-term issue here on Wall 
Street.

The biggest example is when one company is doing "due diligence" when 
contemplating a purchase of another. During that process that have a (legal) 
level of access to information that does not exist elsewhere. During that 
time, then, they have the info-advantage that can be directly exploited 
during the deal and that causes bizarre pricing.

As I've said before, if we had a true blacknet, where even options could be 
traded, then no deal would ever suffer from the advantage of hidden 
info...they'd all be priced far more fairly, and the little 401K retirees 
would actually benefit greatly.



As for the notion of a state being INHERENTLY "evil", I'm still not 
convinced. At least, if I WANT to be butt-humped by the state, then it's OK, 
right?

-TD


>From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Max's Lesson (was Re: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the 
>FBI)
>Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 17:49:48 -0500
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA1
>
>At 2:30 PM -0500 3/24/04, baudmax23 at earthlink.net wrote:
>
> >movement
>
>bZZZT. -10 pts., Hackneyed Socialist Cliche.
>
> >unjust state
>
>Bzzt. -10 pts., Bad grammar. Redundant phrase.
>
> > <eat the rich...>
>
>Bzzt. -20 pts., Innumeracy, Economic ignorance.
>
> > <marketing is evil and must be controlled>
>
>Bzzt. -20 pts., Totalitarian will to power.
>
>
>...I think we'll stop there, in the interests of, um, intellectual
>charity...
>
>Score: 40/100. F.
>
>Game over. Thank you for playing, Max.
>
>
>
>And now for a little post-mortem, shall we?
>
>It's all about property, Max. You know, the stuff you *earned* by
>personally altering reality to such a favorable degree that other
>people to *pay* you to keep you doing it? It's also about freedom.
>You don't get freedom, from "god", or from laws, or from "movements",
>or a "just" state, or any*body* else. You get freedom by defending
>*yourself*. Your *self*, Max.
>
>
>*All* states, Max, are about taking your money at the point of a
>weapon of some sort. They're *all* unjust, just like the theocracy of
>the dark ages was irrational and innumerate. Of course, life isn't
>fair, much less "just". But, in the particular case of states, we pay
>force-monopolists because they will, ultimately, kill us if we don't.
>
>OTOH, if states kill us all, they won't have anyone to steal from,
>preventing their market from achieving equilibrium.
>
>:-).
>
>
>Martha, of course, is, politically, culturally, the epitome of
>hypocritical, liberal-socialist scum.
>
>However, the "laws" (virtually unpromulgated, and certainly
>unlegislated "regulations", not actual laws; doesn't keep them from
>sending you to jail, of course, but they weren't legislated: there
>are too many of them to vote on, for starters...) they were *trying*
>to convict her on were completely ridiculous in their intent and evil
>in their consequence.
>
>First off, information, like money, is fungible. It is *impossible*
>to keep information, "insider", or any other kind, out of the price
>of an asset. The minute that information is credible and known to
>*anyone* "insider" or not, the price of the asset will begin to
>reflect that information, if only by insiders not *buying* that
>asset.
>
>In fact, a *moral* argument can be made that restraint of that
>information is more fraud than trading on that information to begin
>with. Morally -- if morality caused markets and not the other way
>around :-) --  "insiders" should be *obligated* to trade on "inside"
>information as soon as they believe that information to be true. Call
>it financial Calvinism, kinda like Tim's saying he's morally
>prohibited from helping liberals, and the otherwise-damned :-),
>achieve their own salvation.
>
>Think about it this way: the "crime" of "insider" trading didn't
>exist until 1962. We've *always* had capital markets, of one form or
>another, and insider trading, in *every* civilization, since the
>first agricultural surplus was put into a grain bank and exchanged
>for goods and services. It is impossible, I would claim, to have
>civilization without capital markets. Even Stalin -- especially
>Stalin -- had to have recourse to capital markets to stay in
>business. Go read up on a guy named Ludwig von Mises, and pay
>particular attention to the words "calculate" and prices, and the
>impossibility of using both in a meaningful, logical, sentence, and
>you'll figure out what happened to Stalin's successors. Mancur
>Olsen's "Power and Prosperity" wouldn't hurt either.
>
>
>The fact that the most plutographic, nepotist, crypto-aristocratic
>"liberal" political dynasty in this country's history made its
>seed-money first on bootlegging, but, most importantly, on
>pre-market-crash 1920's "insider" trading, and that the progenitor of
>that dynasty was, later, the first Chairman of the Securities and
>Exchange Commission, speaks more to the folly, if not actual evil, of
>capital market regulation, much less "insider" trading, than anything
>I could say here.
>
>
>
>Finally, if you're stupid enough to believe "marketing", you deserve
>to buy what they sell you. Hell, if you're happy doing so, it's
>nobody's business but yours. Your property is your property. Trade it
>for what makes you happy.
>
>Just don't pass another goddamn law. Please. Physics causes Politics,
>not the other way around. Change reality, write code, discover a new
>market, whatever, and the law will change accordingly. Change reality
>enough, and maybe we won't need law to enforce, say, the
>non-repudiation characteristics of our transactions, and people like
>Martha, god forbid, won't go to jail because nobody will *know*
>whether someone used "inside" information or not.
>
>
>
>So, Max, I hate to break it to you, but you seem to be a socialist,
>to use the more pleasant of several pejoratives. Not the end of the
>world, you probably don't call yourself one, and you may not even
>know you are, because socialism is about as ubiquitous today as
>theocracy was a thousand years ago. As Perry Metzger noted somewhere
>else a little while ago, back then one was either in favor of God, or
>the Devil, and anyone who said that both were just fictional
>characters in a book rather quickly became toast on a stick.
>
>Just like back then, these days there are people who believe one is
>either in favor of "democracy", or socialism.  Anyone who believes
>that both are just a fig-leaf for expropriation and refuses to
>cooperate with that expropriation quickly becomes a guest in
>state-run accommodations.
>
>
>The average person in the dark and middle ages believed that physics,
>and all information and learning, came from an information monopoly,
>represented by a book in a language they couldn't read in a stone
>building built with their "tithed" slave-labor.
>
>The average person in these innumerate economic dark-ages believes
>that economics -- or "justice", or a "fair" allocation of material
>resources, whatever those mean -- comes from whole libraries full of
>paper printed by what I would call an artifact of now-devolving
>human-switched hierarchical information networks.
>
>A thing that, even more than the theocratic feudal lords of old were
>able to do, forcibly confiscates half the average person's income and
>spends it mostly on the maintenance of its cronies and foot-soldiers,
>but also on lowering the costs of its physical control by eloquent
>fraudulent justifications for its theft. Telling them lies about how
>powerful it is, like their dark-age theological progenitors did about
>their fictional character controlling the physical universe. The
>chief lie of all is that it has the absolute ability to control asset
>prices, by, of all things, taxing their sale, or, just as ludicrous,
>capriciously "regulating" their production, invariably to the
>advantage of its cronies and not the consumers of that asset.
>
>That "thing" is, of course, the "public thing", res publica, if you
>will, the latest wrinkle on good fashioned modern force-monopoly, a
>thing that spontaneously -- like all real markets do, like, say,
>those for capital :-) -- arose when ur-agricultural-age bandits
>figured out they could steal *more* money if they simply didn't move
>anymore.
>
>
>So, Max, as a socialist, an unwitting user of such lies as
>"movement", or "(un)just state", as someone who believes that the
>*earned* property of "the rich" should be confiscated, or that
>"marketing" should be controlled by force, welcome to the other side
>of the looking glass. The *real* side of the looking glass, I might
>add, where the "justice" of the state is simply another not-so-polite
>fiction to keep power.
>
>Hanging out on this list is a sure cure for such mental delusions. It
>worked for me, anyway. :-).
>
>You might, in the meantime, try Googling "crypto-anarchy" or
>"anarcho-capitalism" and/or "cypherpunks", or "Tim May" and
>"cryptonomicon" (no not *that* cryptonomicon, the *original* one...),
>which will probably, in the process, find you a currently working
>version of several archives of this list that have arisen over the
>last decade. I'd start at the beginning, around September 1992.
>
>It's not that hard. You only need to read the first two months of the
>archives before things start to repeat themselves. ;-).
>
>
>
>Cheers,
>RAH
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>Version: PGP 8.0.3
>
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>3LUbroEIsFZJjB7popxeS30X
>=yQsM
>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>

_________________________________________________________________
Is your PC infected? Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee. 
Security. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963




From baudmax23 at earthlink.net  Wed Mar 24 18:30:17 2004
From: baudmax23 at earthlink.net (baudmax23 at earthlink.net)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 21:30:17 -0500
Subject: Max's Lesson (was Re: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk 
   to the  FBI)
In-Reply-To: <p061004f0bc8794e17634@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <4061D344.835E317E@cdc.gov> 
  <p061004e3bc8786a11f12@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <6.0.3.0.2.20040324141534.01d90ec0@pop.earthlink.net> 
  <p061004f0bc8794e17634@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.2.20040324182854.01dc2a08@pop.earthlink.net>

[snide preposterous presumptions deleted to save space]

In response to "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>:

I did not in any way or form, either explicitly much less implicitly, make 
any claim for the expropriation of money from wealthy persons in any form, 
much less by the state.  Much as you'd like to presume that I am just some 
"socialist" and rant on from there; Whatever you feel you must do to avoid 
the point.

The point was that there are a thousand other injustices, such as civil 
asset forfeiture, which effect and have been effecting people of all 
economic strata for over a decade now (and a lot of other governmental 
connivances, such as RICO anti-racketeering, and drug prohibition, from 
which it was spawned).  Things that routinely effect not just the Martha 
Stewarts, or the so-called investor class. Things from which spring forth 
the presumptive powers which now also threaten the investor class, who had 
not resisted earlier and deeper erosions of their civil liberties.  Things 
about which the wealthy (and politicians) don't give a rats ass about, 
because they are a privileged class, by and large, and the laws generally 
are not applied equally to them as to others.  So why should they 
care?  Until one of them has to take a fairly minor fall, and then it's 
crocodile tears, and poor Martha!  Oh the injustice of it all!  Screaming 
meamies, that oh God, how dare they apply the same laws against the wealthy 
they have been abusing the peasants and workers with all these years?!  The 
travesty of it!  You see, people like you only have a problem when you 
can't "buy your way out of trouble".  I mean, The Just-Us system's "only be 
for us peasants, right, massah?".

Martha is just a token sacrifice for appearances sake, to appease the 
masses and protect the status quo from any serious reform.  So Martha goes 
to Club Fed for a short stint, and business basically goes on as usual.  Is 
it Justice?  Nah, Just-Us.. maybe, especially if it maintains the privilege 
system intact and beyond serious scrutiny or reform.

It is rather telling that you have completely sidestepped anything I 
mentioned (aside from making false assumptions).

At 05:49 PM 3/24/2004, , "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote:

>So, Max, as a socialist, an unwitting user of such lies as
>"movement", or "(un)just state", as someone who believes that the
>*earned* property of "the rich" should be confiscated, or that

There we go with nonsensical presumptions and stereotyping again.  I could 
pull out my own label for you my friend, but that would be really 
pointless.  I believe that earned property of ANY strata of society should 
be safe from arbitrary seizure or confiscation.  It is rather amusing how 
you have put words in my mouth which are not there, and then spend all your 
time kicking down your own non-existant straw man.

You want to mock "justness" of the laws of the State...? Well then, what is 
your beef about Martha then?  If the state is inherently a manifestation of 
unjust cronyism (as you seem to claim), does that become an argument that 
somehow we should NOT strive to make the system MORE uniformly just and 
therefore abuse of power less common and arbitrary?  I mean, that's just 
the way it is... but then, you shouldn't be whining about poor 
Martha.  That's just the way States are, you know.  But I guess we come 
back to the double standard, and as long as the "wealth exemption" comes 
into play, then you really don't concern yourself with such an "inherently 
socialist" (as you might say) concept as JUSTICE?


>"marketing" should be controlled by force, welcome to the other side
>of the looking glass. The *real* side of the looking glass, I might
>add, where the "justice" of the state is simply another not-so-polite
>fiction to keep power.

Alas, you were so quick to falsely label me a socialist, that you did not 
read what I wrote.  Needless to say, I in no way called for any such 
"forceful" control of "marketing" as you inventively and deceptively 
implied.  Not to worry, I try to buy as little meaningless shit as possible 
from this disposable vacuous society.  But at the same time, I encourage 
people to see the emptiness for what it is.  The things you own end up 
owning you, and it can all blow away in a storm faster than you realize 
(therefore, governments and insurance).  Bread and circuses is a sure 
signpost on the way down, we've seen it before.  Avoid facing reality long 
enough, and the head kick of reality will be that much more forceful when 
it finally comes.  Like chickens coming home to roost.. kind of like what 
we are currently experiencing... but I digress...

>Hanging out on this list is a sure cure for such mental delusions. It
>worked for me, anyway. :-).

Worry not, that I have no delusions that this "System" in any way 
represents me, much less has the slightest concerns about civil liberties 
or any of the foundational concepts upon which this country was 
philosophically based, much less the most basic sense of honesty or simple 
humanitarianism.  And by humanitarianism, you don't have to feed, clothe, 
etc everybody at "taxpayer expense", however, a good start would be a much 
better discretion about how our nation haphazardly flings around bombs and 
destabilizes large swaths of the globe.  Our congress, etc are bought and 
paid for, and both (dictated-media-viable) sides at that.  Corporate Clown 
A (Bush) or Corporate Clown B (Kerry).  Corporations that, by their 
"perpetual" nature and concentrated wealth, have subverted our system by an 
inappropriate and unjustified percentage of "representation", that violates 
the conecpt of one man one vote, and perverts and distorts our government 
into sheerly absurd tyranny.

See, for all the hee-hawing of the investor thief classes about 
presumptions of "worth" and "value" which is oftentimes claimed as earned, 
but quite often is fraudulently swindled from the hard work of others, and 
the bland assurances that "this is all good for us", yet our senses tell us 
that things are in decline.  We as a nation are less stable, less secure, 
and most people are working much harder, for much less; courtesy 
WorldCom/Enron/Tyco/Parmalat thievery.  Outsourcing is an excellent example 
of just such a swindle -- a devaluation of labor for short-term profits, 
which will only lead to massive wage erosion, decline of the standard of 
living in the west, and a subsequent economic decline as working people can 
no longer afford housing and basic necessities.  All and well and fine that 
the corporates do not see the storm rising, from their outsourcing, and how 
it will cost them very dearly in the coming future.  The so-called "war on 
terror", beyond being a perpetual war-profiteers wet dream, is the 
smokescreen being used to raise up a militarist police state to suppress 
the coming domestic instability which will inevitably arise from a massive 
decline in the American standard of living.

>You might, in the meantime, try Googling "crypto-anarchy" or
>"anarcho-capitalism" and/or "cypherpunks", or "Tim May" and
>"cryptonomicon" (no not *that* cryptonomicon, the *original* one...),
>which will probably, in the process, find you a currently working
>version of several archives of this list that have arisen over the
>last decade. I'd start at the beginning, around September 1992.

Kind of busy reading more practical material, such as the intricacies of 
smashing stacks and bypassing filters, or timely and relevant, such as "The 
Sorrows of Empire" by Chalmers Johnson.

>It's not that hard. You only need to read the first two months of the
>archives before things start to repeat themselves. ;-).

If I want repetition, I can just watch CNN (or buy a parrot), thank you 
very much!



>Cheers,
>RAH


Max




From ufdzl at lancsmail.com  Wed Mar 24 16:31:35 2004
From: ufdzl at lancsmail.com (Charlene Short)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 22:31:35 -0200
Subject: S0aring micrOcap m0ving quickly
Message-ID: <484803677578.FVB40455@cadaver.cyberinbox.com>

Yap Internationa|, Inc.(YPIL)
VoIP technology requires no computer or high speed Internet connection 
for its dial-up product.
Current Price: $.15
Watch This Stock Wednesday Some of These Litt|e VOIP Stocks Have Been 
Real|y Moving Lately.

And When Some of them Move, They Rea||y Go...Gains of 100%, 2OO% or 
More Are
Not Unheard Of.

Break News!!

The past months have seen Yap International executing on its plan to 
become a |eading supplier of VoIP techno|ogy including the fo|lowing 
milestones:

On November 17, 20O4, Yap International revealed a unique and patent 
pending technology marketed as the Nomad, or the Yap International 
Persona| Gateway. The Yap International Persona| Gateway (the Nomad) 
is a patent-pending so|ution to a rea| problem that is inherent in 
all current and competing VoIP gateways.  The problem is the end user 
is |imited to the physica| |ocation of the Gateway in order to make 
a VoIP cal|. The Nomad��s unique and patent pending techno|ogy allows 
the customer to make VoIP-enab|ed calls from any telephone, not just 
one physical|y connected to the Gateway. For the first time a customer 
may ca|l their Persona| Gateway from any cel|u|ar or |and|ine push 
button phone in the wor|d, (or even through their laptop or PDA), 
connecting to the Internet for VoIP ca|| savings and other on|ine 
information services, bypassing either partia||y or entire|y the 
high cost of Internationa| Long Distance charges from incumbent 
te|ecommunication providers.

On December 17, 20O4, Yap Internationa| announced its first major 
contract invo|ving the use of its technology products. Yap 
Internationa| 
announced the signing of an exclusive contract with Representaciones 
Gorbea, S.A. as the company��s distributor for VoIP products and 
services 
in Central and South America. Representaciones Gorbea, S.A. (RGSA) has 
a major presence in the region. RGSA entered into an exclusive 
contractua| 
agreement with the second largest carrier in the region for 200,0O0 
VoIP 
units to be deployed throughout Guatemala in 2005. The contract 
represents 
in excess of $52 mi|liOn USD and Yap International expects that its 
products wi|| comprise the largest share of the order. RGSA is also the 
exc|usive representative for Leve| 3 (LVLT-Nasdaq) in Centra| America.

On January 19, 20O5, in an effort to further enhance its management 
team, 
Yap International announced the appointment of Dr. Vladimir Karpenkov, 
MS, Ph.D. as the Company's Chief Information Officer. Dr. Karpenkov 
earned 
his PHD at Ura| State University and has comp|eted 2 separate Master of 
Science degrees in genera| programming /data base management and the 
physics of e|ectro magnetic occurrences / optics of semi conductors 
respective|y. Dr. Karpenkov is diverse background a|so includes direct 
involvement in the development of proprietary techno|ogies and systems, 
many of which have been patented in the U.S. and Europe. One such 
system 
was the first ce||u|ar phone network for the city of Che|yabinsk, 
Russia 
which was deve|oped by Dr, Karpenkov in partnership with Mi|liken GMBH 
of 
Germany and Radio Telephone Inc. of Russia.

Our agreement with Securities Trading Services Inc. and the 
developments 
of the past months leaves us with tools necessary to commercia|ize and 
market our products on a globa| scale. We expect our milestones to be 
met 
and thus executing our business plan as anticipated��, stated Jan 
O|ivier, 
CEO of Yap Internationa| Inc.

About The Company:
Yap Internationa|, Inc. is a mu|ti-national Internet Communications 
Company 
deve|oping cost effective telecommunications through Voice over 
Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) techno|ogies. The Company holds the exclusive rights to 
a 
revo|utionary VoIP product |ine called NOMAD SYSTEMS that has Dial-up, 
Broadband, DSL, Cab|e, Sate|lite and Wire|ess capabilities. The Company 
plans on targeting: 1) Nationa| fixed |ine II & III Tier carriers which 
are 
interested in effectively competing with the dominant carrier in their 
marketp|ace, 2) Large multinationa| corporations which need to have US 
or 
European presence by having, (for example), a United States number 
ringing 
in their offices in Guatema|a or London- offering business partners a 
more 
economical way to communicate, and 3) Immigrants in North America, a 
means 
of significant|y |owering their communication expense with their 
re|atives 
in their country of origin. The Company is headquartered in Las Vegas 
with 
administrative offices in Vancouver and sa|es offices in Los Angeles, 
San Francisco and Newport Beach California. 

----------------------------------------

And P|ease Watch this One Trade Wednesday! Go Ypi|

-----------------------------------------

Information within this publication contains future looking statements 
within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
Section 21B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Any statements 
thatexpress or involve discussions with respect to 
predictions,expectations, beliefs, plans, projections, objectives, 
goa|s, assumptions or futureevents or performance are not statements of 
historical fact and may be future |ooking statements. Future |ooking 
statements are based on expectations, estimates and projections at the 
time the statements are made that involve a number of risks and 
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materia||y from those present|y anticipated. Future looking statements 
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and specifically, the Company's growth prospects with  sca|able 
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Company's 
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of |icensed 
technologies, risk of increased competition,the potentia| need for 
additional financing, the conditions and terms of any financing that is 
consummated, the |imited trading market for the Company's securities, 
the possible vo|ati|ity of the Company's stock price, the concentration 
of ownership, and the potential fluctuation in the Company's operating 
resu|ts. 
The pub|isher of this report does not represent that the information 
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The publisher of this news|etter advises all readers and subscribers to 
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From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Wed Mar 24 20:33:44 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 04:33:44 +0000
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
In-Reply-To: <4061D344.835E317E@cdc.gov>
References: <4061D344.835E317E@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20040325043344.GF24784@dreams.soze.net>

Major Variola (ret) (2004-03-24 18:28Z) wrote:

> The only reason to speak to feds or cold-calling police is
> counter intel, learn what they're interested in.  And then publish that.

That is a very dangerous game, but it may soon become the only option.

It's only a matter of time before remaining silent will constitute a
problem too.  What are the Vegas odds on Hiibel?

Anyone have a transcript of oral arguments yet? (03-5554)

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge... and... we deserve to die.
 -- Budd, "Kill Bill"




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar 25 09:16:40 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 09:16:40 -0800
Subject: corporate vs. state, TD's education
Message-ID: <406313F8.C76BCFA5@cdc.gov>

At 10:26 AM 3/25/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>I also think that some cypherpunks mistake the Corporate State for what
has
>been described as Crypto-Anarchy.

Get this through your head: a corporation can't initiate force against
you.
You may not like their product, practices, or price, but no one is
coercing you at gunpoint.

The state, on the other hand, is entirely based on coercion.

If you can't appreciate this, you'll be hopelessly inconsistant.

PS: you are a corporation, I am a corporation, together we could
be a corporation, with 100K others we could be too.  Doesn't
matter; all have the same rights to act, and be left alone.


>In fact, it's easy to argue that the
>current Oil Crusade in Iraq is precisely for the purpose of protecting
a set
>of dinosaur industries in the US. That's not the kind of capitalism I
think
>most Cypherpunks espouse.

The state can legitimately only use taxpayers' armies to defend citizens
in the
country, not other countries, not its perceived-by-some self-interest,
not
corporations.  All the oil colonialism is illegitimate for that reason,
as well
as illegal as Congress has not declared war.




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar 25 09:27:58 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 09:27:58 -0800
Subject: no photography, no questions, no rights
Message-ID: <4063169D.92158BE7@cdc.gov>

LOS ANGELES (AP) -- On the eve of grand jury proceedings in the Michael
Jackson molestation case, the presiding judge of the Santa Barbara
courts barred pictures or communication with any prospective or final
panelists, or grand jury witnesses.

Superior Court Judge Clifford R. Anderson III did not mention Jackson's
name in his order Wednesday, but acknowledged a grand jury summoned this
week "has created significant media and public interest."

The order threatens to hold in contempt anyone who communicates with a
juror, prospective grand juror or witness - or reveals secret testimony.
It also prohibits photography of jurors or prospective jurors entering
and exiting the courthouse and "any other facility or property utilized
by the grand jury."

Media lawyers immediately protested, calling the order "overbroad and
unconstitutional prohibition of activity protected under the First
Amendment and California law." They said the courthouse and its environs
have long been recognized as a public forum.

"I've not seen an order so broad and so sweeping," said attorney
Theodore J. Boutrous Jr., who represents several media organizations
including The Associated Press.

<snip>
http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/C/CA_MICHAEL_JACKSON_CAOL-?SITE=CAANR&SECTION=STATE

-----------

In the Brinworld of Phonecams this is a nice challenge for the
freelancer...
Fuck you, Anderson III




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Mar 25 07:26:45 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 10:26:45 -0500
Subject: Max's Lesson (was Re: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk
  to the FBI)
Message-ID: <BAY7-F1118MTbQpYtMI0000a6e3@hotmail.com>

Max wrote...

"I mean, The Just-Us system's "only be for us peasants, right, massah?"."

Nice little lick there.

I also think that some cypherpunks mistake the Corporate State for what has 
been described as Crypto-Anarchy. If large corporations in the US and the 
wealthy happen to ultimately drive the current roundup of civil rights, then 
they've effectively become the state that some Cypherpunks some vehemently 
despise. Pointing this out (or at least making the case that this is the 
state of affairs) should not by any means be equated with socialism (unless 
of course you actually believe the socialists who maintain this is an 
inherent byproduct of capitalism). In fact, it's easy to argue that the 
current Oil Crusade in Iraq is precisely for the purpose of protecting a set 
of dinosaur industries in the US. That's not the kind of capitalism I think 
most Cypherpunks espouse.


-TD



>From: baudmax23 at earthlink.net
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: Max's Lesson (was Re: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk  to 
>the  FBI)
>Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 21:30:17 -0500
>
>[snide preposterous presumptions deleted to save space]
>
>In response to "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>:
>
>I did not in any way or form, either explicitly much less implicitly, make 
>any claim for the expropriation of money from wealthy persons in any form, 
>much less by the state.  Much as you'd like to presume that I am just some 
>"socialist" and rant on from there; Whatever you feel you must do to avoid 
>the point.
>
>The point was that there are a thousand other injustices, such as civil 
>asset forfeiture, which effect and have been effecting people of all 
>economic strata for over a decade now (and a lot of other governmental 
>connivances, such as RICO anti-racketeering, and drug prohibition, from 
>which it was spawned).  Things that routinely effect not just the Martha 
>Stewarts, or the so-called investor class. Things from which spring forth 
>the presumptive powers which now also threaten the investor class, who had 
>not resisted earlier and deeper erosions of their civil liberties.  Things 
>about which the wealthy (and politicians) don't give a rats ass about, 
>because they are a privileged class, by and large, and the laws generally 
>are not applied equally to them as to others.  So why should they care?  
>Until one of them has to take a fairly minor fall, and then it's crocodile 
>tears, and poor Martha!  Oh the injustice of it all!  Screaming meamies, 
>that oh God, how dare they apply the same laws against the wealthy they 
>have been abusing the peasants and workers with all these years?!  The 
>travesty of it!  You see, people like you only have a problem when you 
>can't "buy your way out of trouble".  I mean, The Just-Us system's "only be 
>for us peasants, right, massah?".
>
>Martha is just a token sacrifice for appearances sake, to appease the 
>masses and protect the status quo from any serious reform.  So Martha goes 
>to Club Fed for a short stint, and business basically goes on as usual.  Is 
>it Justice?  Nah, Just-Us.. maybe, especially if it maintains the privilege 
>system intact and beyond serious scrutiny or reform.
>
>It is rather telling that you have completely sidestepped anything I 
>mentioned (aside from making false assumptions).
>
>At 05:49 PM 3/24/2004, , "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote:
>
>>So, Max, as a socialist, an unwitting user of such lies as
>>"movement", or "(un)just state", as someone who believes that the
>>*earned* property of "the rich" should be confiscated, or that
>
>There we go with nonsensical presumptions and stereotyping again.  I could 
>pull out my own label for you my friend, but that would be really 
>pointless.  I believe that earned property of ANY strata of society should 
>be safe from arbitrary seizure or confiscation.  It is rather amusing how 
>you have put words in my mouth which are not there, and then spend all your 
>time kicking down your own non-existant straw man.
>
>You want to mock "justness" of the laws of the State...? Well then, what is 
>your beef about Martha then?  If the state is inherently a manifestation of 
>unjust cronyism (as you seem to claim), does that become an argument that 
>somehow we should NOT strive to make the system MORE uniformly just and 
>therefore abuse of power less common and arbitrary?  I mean, that's just 
>the way it is... but then, you shouldn't be whining about poor Martha.  
>That's just the way States are, you know.  But I guess we come back to the 
>double standard, and as long as the "wealth exemption" comes into play, 
>then you really don't concern yourself with such an "inherently socialist" 
>(as you might say) concept as JUSTICE?
>
>
>>"marketing" should be controlled by force, welcome to the other side
>>of the looking glass. The *real* side of the looking glass, I might
>>add, where the "justice" of the state is simply another not-so-polite
>>fiction to keep power.
>
>Alas, you were so quick to falsely label me a socialist, that you did not 
>read what I wrote.  Needless to say, I in no way called for any such 
>"forceful" control of "marketing" as you inventively and deceptively 
>implied.  Not to worry, I try to buy as little meaningless shit as possible 
>from this disposable vacuous society.  But at the same time, I encourage 
>people to see the emptiness for what it is.  The things you own end up 
>owning you, and it can all blow away in a storm faster than you realize 
>(therefore, governments and insurance).  Bread and circuses is a sure 
>signpost on the way down, we've seen it before.  Avoid facing reality long 
>enough, and the head kick of reality will be that much more forceful when 
>it finally comes.  Like chickens coming home to roost.. kind of like what 
>we are currently experiencing... but I digress...
>
>>Hanging out on this list is a sure cure for such mental delusions. It
>>worked for me, anyway. :-).
>
>Worry not, that I have no delusions that this "System" in any way 
>represents me, much less has the slightest concerns about civil liberties 
>or any of the foundational concepts upon which this country was 
>philosophically based, much less the most basic sense of honesty or simple 
>humanitarianism.  And by humanitarianism, you don't have to feed, clothe, 
>etc everybody at "taxpayer expense", however, a good start would be a much 
>better discretion about how our nation haphazardly flings around bombs and 
>destabilizes large swaths of the globe.  Our congress, etc are bought and 
>paid for, and both (dictated-media-viable) sides at that.  Corporate Clown 
>A (Bush) or Corporate Clown B (Kerry).  Corporations that, by their 
>"perpetual" nature and concentrated wealth, have subverted our system by an 
>inappropriate and unjustified percentage of "representation", that violates 
>the conecpt of one man one vote, and perverts and distorts our government 
>into sheerly absurd tyranny.
>
>See, for all the hee-hawing of the investor thief classes about 
>presumptions of "worth" and "value" which is oftentimes claimed as earned, 
>but quite often is fraudulently swindled from the hard work of others, and 
>the bland assurances that "this is all good for us", yet our senses tell us 
>that things are in decline.  We as a nation are less stable, less secure, 
>and most people are working much harder, for much less; courtesy 
>WorldCom/Enron/Tyco/Parmalat thievery.  Outsourcing is an excellent example 
>of just such a swindle -- a devaluation of labor for short-term profits, 
>which will only lead to massive wage erosion, decline of the standard of 
>living in the west, and a subsequent economic decline as working people can 
>no longer afford housing and basic necessities.  All and well and fine that 
>the corporates do not see the storm rising, from their outsourcing, and how 
>it will cost them very dearly in the coming future.  The so-called "war on 
>terror", beyond being a perpetual war-profiteers wet dream, is the 
>smokescreen being used to raise up a militarist police state to suppress 
>the coming domestic instability which will inevitably arise from a massive 
>decline in the American standard of living.
>
>>You might, in the meantime, try Googling "crypto-anarchy" or
>>"anarcho-capitalism" and/or "cypherpunks", or "Tim May" and
>>"cryptonomicon" (no not *that* cryptonomicon, the *original* one...),
>>which will probably, in the process, find you a currently working
>>version of several archives of this list that have arisen over the
>>last decade. I'd start at the beginning, around September 1992.
>
>Kind of busy reading more practical material, such as the intricacies of 
>smashing stacks and bypassing filters, or timely and relevant, such as "The 
>Sorrows of Empire" by Chalmers Johnson.
>
>>It's not that hard. You only need to read the first two months of the
>>archives before things start to repeat themselves. ;-).
>
>If I want repetition, I can just watch CNN (or buy a parrot), thank you 
>very much!
>
>
>
>>Cheers,
>>RAH
>
>
>Max
>
>

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From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar 25 12:39:58 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 12:39:58 -0800
Subject: corporate vs. state
Message-ID: <4063439E.26ACFA79@cdc.gov>

At 02:02 PM 3/25/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>Think I'm gonna have to disagree with ya' hear partner.
>For one, in the old days Corporations regularly hired goons to mow down

>striking coalminers and whatnot.

You have no right to trespass simply because you once worked there.

Neither does anyone have a right to unreasonable force.

>OK, those days are all gone, right? Wrong. Halliburton and Bechtel have
both
>hired mercs for their Iraq operations.

Who gives a rat's ass about what someone does in a foreign land?
US law only applies in the US, despite the current US Regime's
behavior to the contrary.

And BTW, what is wrong with hired police ("mercs") esp. when the local
police don't work?   Do you have a problem with private security guards
in the US, as long as
they don't involve you in unconsensual transactions?  Do you have a
problem
with weaponsbearing citizens, again, if they don't involve you in
unconsensual transactions?

Note that if some company makes enemies overseas, its not the US as a
whole
that has earned the airplane-in-the-skyscraper feedback.   Its the
official US regime behavior that Gen. Washington warned about: Trade
with all, make treaties with none, and beware of foreign entanglements.


>However, a corporation doesn't actually have to hire the goons these
days in
>order to get the job done, not when it's much cheaper to call upon the
>publically-available pool of goons that function as a government in
some
>places.

Anyone who abuses the power of the (gullible) State to coerce others
deserves killing.

The fact that some corporations may leverage existing thuggery to
>get their job done doesn't make them any less complicit. But this is
all
>besides my main point...

Its not thuggery to protect your own property or freedoms.  If someone
is guilty of true thuggery --ie coercion-- then the State is obligated
to act to protect the thuggees.  The State only gets involved when a
transaction is not mutually consensual; if the State gets involved in
mutually consensual transactions the State deserves killing -er,
preemptive regime change.




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar 25 12:54:52 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 12:54:52 -0800
Subject: no photography, no questions, no rights
Message-ID: <4063471C.3A39CFB8@cdc.gov>

At 02:05 PM 3/25/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>"In the Brinworld of Phonecams this is a nice challenge for the
>freelancer...
>Fuck you, Anderson III"
>
>All he did was raise the prices of said photos, correct? Shit...I
should get
>on out there and make myself a fortune...

In practice, because markets are robust, and anonymity not so hard, yes.
:-)

However this is a classic case of the State using *violence* to
(wrongly) prohibit
behavior which is in fact protected.

You *don't* have a right to take pictures inside *my* walls if its
prohibited, since
its private property.   In my house or store, I can call for the State's
violence
against you if you do things I don't consent to.

But on public land, or from a private building in the area, no one
(incl.
the State's twerps like Anderson III) can prohibit such behavior,
as there is no right to privacy in public.

Excellent (and 'punkly) point about the market for information, though.

PS: I'd say the Streisand vs. Coastal Photographer lawsuit was a good
example of someone trying to abuse the State's violence by convincing
it that the Photog was somehow doing a wrong.  In that case the
Judge correctly decided that Streisand was full of shit.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Mar 25 11:02:25 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 14:02:25 -0500
Subject: corporate vs. state, TD's education
Message-ID: <BAY7-F62oajSGmAoNGf000062cd@hotmail.com>

Ah Variola...do I detect a wee bit of Knee-jerk in your otherwise 
consistently iconoclastic views? Let's take a looksee...

>Get this through your head: a corporation can't initiate force against
>you.
>You may not like their product, practices, or price, but no one is
>coercing you at gunpoint.

Think I'm gonna have to disagree with ya' hear partner.
For one, in the old days Corporations regularly hired goons to mow down 
striking coalminers and whatnot.

OK, those days are all gone, right? Wrong. Halliburton and Bechtel have both 
hired mercs for their Iraq operations. (In fact, I was on a call a couple of 
weeks ago where a Halliburton official was describing the casualties they 
take on a regular basis. These don't get reported much in the news, though, 
for obvious reason...)

However, a corporation doesn't actually have to hire the goons these days in 
order to get the job done, not when it's much cheaper to call upon the 
publically-available pool of goons that function as a government in some 
places. The fact that some corporations may leverage existing thuggery to 
get their job done doesn't make them any less complicit. But this is all 
besides my main point...


>PS: you are a corporation, I am a corporation, together we could
>be a corporation, with 100K others we could be too.  Doesn't
>matter; all have the same rights to act, and be left alone.

Well, this is where I suspect a little knee-jerk. I'm no socialist: in no 
way am I saying that "Corporations are inherently evil". (In fact, I'm 
hoping to continue profiting admirably as the result of my participation in 
the capitalist system.) What I think bares investigation is whether or not, 
here in the US, a subset of the big corporations are so tied in with the 
political engine as to be complicit in the violations we both agree are 
occurring.

As Max said so eloquently, this is not to imply that "we should make some 
laws and eliminate these big evil corporations". Or maybe it is (I 
dunno...I'm a stoopid Cypherpunk...). But I don't think it's inherently 
inconsistent to point out that there may be a direct correlation between the 
activities of our particular State and the interests of a subset of Large, 
Old-money-dominated US Coporations.

-TD





>
>
> >In fact, it's easy to argue that the
> >current Oil Crusade in Iraq is precisely for the purpose of protecting
>a set
> >of dinosaur industries in the US. That's not the kind of capitalism I
>think
> >most Cypherpunks espouse.
>
>The state can legitimately only use taxpayers' armies to defend citizens
>in the
>country, not other countries, not its perceived-by-some self-interest,
>not
>corporations.  All the oil colonialism is illegitimate for that reason,
>as well
>as illegal as Congress has not declared war.
>
>
>

_________________________________________________________________
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From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Mar 25 11:02:37 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 14:02:37 -0500
Subject: Mac OS X XGrid, anyone?
Message-ID: <p0610047abc88d9e9a599@[66.149.49.5]>

I downloaded XGrid yesterday, fired it up here, and noticed that, among
other grid computing demo projects, it does factoring. :-).

Anyone out there want to play around with this, just to see how it works?

Contact me directly.

MMMM, BreadPudding....

Cheers,
RAH

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Mar 25 11:05:36 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 14:05:36 -0500
Subject: no photography, no questions, no rights
Message-ID: <BAY7-F13rVjYKtWfN3v0000b5a8@hotmail.com>

"In the Brinworld of Phonecams this is a nice challenge for the
freelancer...
Fuck you, Anderson III"

All he did was raise the prices of said photos, correct? Shit...I should get 
on out there and make myself a fortune...

-TD



>From: "Major Variola (ret.)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>Reply-To: cypherpunks at lne.com
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: no photography, no questions, no rights
>Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 09:27:58 -0800
>
>LOS ANGELES (AP) -- On the eve of grand jury proceedings in the Michael
>Jackson molestation case, the presiding judge of the Santa Barbara
>courts barred pictures or communication with any prospective or final
>panelists, or grand jury witnesses.
>
>Superior Court Judge Clifford R. Anderson III did not mention Jackson's
>name in his order Wednesday, but acknowledged a grand jury summoned this
>week "has created significant media and public interest."
>
>The order threatens to hold in contempt anyone who communicates with a
>juror, prospective grand juror or witness - or reveals secret testimony.
>It also prohibits photography of jurors or prospective jurors entering
>and exiting the courthouse and "any other facility or property utilized
>by the grand jury."
>
>Media lawyers immediately protested, calling the order "overbroad and
>unconstitutional prohibition of activity protected under the First
>Amendment and California law." They said the courthouse and its environs
>have long been recognized as a public forum.
>
>"I've not seen an order so broad and so sweeping," said attorney
>Theodore J. Boutrous Jr., who represents several media organizations
>including The Associated Press.
>
><snip>
>http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/C/CA_MICHAEL_JACKSON_CAOL-?SITE=CAANR&SECTION=STATE
>
>-----------
>
>In the Brinworld of Phonecams this is a nice challenge for the
>freelancer...
>Fuck you, Anderson III
>

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From hseaver at cybershamanix.com  Thu Mar 25 12:24:36 2004
From: hseaver at cybershamanix.com (Harmon Seaver)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 14:24:36 -0600
Subject: corporate vs. state, TD's education
In-Reply-To: <BAY7-F62oajSGmAoNGf000062cd@hotmail.com>
References: <BAY7-F62oajSGmAoNGf000062cd@hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <20040325202436.GA24024@cybershamanix.com>

On Thu, Mar 25, 2004 at 02:02:25PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> 
> >Get this through your head: a corporation can't initiate force against
> >you.
> >You may not like their product, practices, or price, but no one is
> >coercing you at gunpoint.
> 
> Think I'm gonna have to disagree with ya' hear partner.
> For one, in the old days Corporations regularly hired goons to mow down 
> striking coalminers and whatnot.
> 
   That's for sure -- you should read the history of the strike back around the
early 1900's on Minnesota's Iron Range. The goons would surround a whole small
town, then go from house to house beating *everyone*, even children, with
axehandles. Killed a lot of people too. 


> OK, those days are all gone, right? Wrong. Halliburton and Bechtel have 
> both hired mercs for their Iraq operations. (In fact, I was on a call a 
> couple of weeks ago where a Halliburton official was describing the 
> casualties they take on a regular basis. These don't get reported much in 
> the news, though, for obvious reason...)
> 
   Not to mention all the goons they still hire all over the 3rd world to break
strikes, kill organizers and labor leaders, etc. 


> However, a corporation doesn't actually have to hire the goons these days 
> in order to get the job done, not when it's much cheaper to call upon the 
> publically-available pool of goons that function as a government in some 
> places. The fact that some corporations may leverage existing thuggery to 
> get their job done doesn't make them any less complicit. But this is all 
> besides my main point...
> 
> 
> >PS: you are a corporation, I am a corporation, together we could
> >be a corporation, with 100K others we could be too.  Doesn't
> >matter; all have the same rights to act, and be left alone.

   Nonsense -- corporations are not humans, they have zero rights. Together we
could be a partnership, with 100K others we could be a partnership as
well. Corporations where the owners (shareholders) and employees are not liable
for the crimes and debts of the corp should be illegal. And there's nothing at
all socialistic or statist about that -- in fact, it's more that corporations
require statism to even exiest. 
   

> 
> Well, this is where I suspect a little knee-jerk. I'm no socialist: in no 
> way am I saying that "Corporations are inherently evil". (In fact, I'm 
> hoping to continue profiting admirably as the result of my participation in 
> the capitalist system.) What I think bares investigation is whether or not, 
> here in the US, a subset of the big corporations are so tied in with the 
> political engine as to be complicit in the violations we both agree are 
> occurring.
> 
> As Max said so eloquently, this is not to imply that "we should make some 
> laws and eliminate these big evil corporations". Or maybe it is (I 

    Why not? If Thomas Jefferson and George Washington had their way,
corporations would be illegal in the US. 



-- 
Harmon Seaver	
CyberShamanix
http://www.cybershamanix.com




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar 25 14:42:13 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 14:42:13 -0800
Subject: corporate vs. state
Message-ID: <40636045.BB375286@cdc.gov>

At 05:27 PM 3/25/04 -0500, mfidelman at ntcorp.com wrote:
>On Thu, 25 Mar 2004, Harmon Seaver wrote:
>
>>    Nonsense -- corporations are not humans, they have zero rights.
>
>Unfortunately, there are a whole slew of Supreme Court decisions that
say
>otherwise - mostly applying the 14th amendment (you know, freeing the
>slaves) to grant free speech and other constitutional protections to
>corporations.

1. The 14th says that anything Congress is prohibited from doing, states

(and other local govs) are too.  Slavery is merely a historical aside.
(Were the 14th not there, California could ban speech, support
religions, deny the right to keep and bear arms..)

2. Humans don't lose their rights when they form voluntary associations.

That's all the corporate decisions are saying.

Unfortunately, the *opposite* is practiced.  I, as an individual, can
choose
not to hire <ethnic>, but a group of people together are threatened
with violence should they care to choose similarly.

Freedom isn't being able to do what you like, it's allowing someone else

to do or say something you hate and supporting their right to do so.
Marshall Clow




From hseaver at cybershamanix.com  Thu Mar 25 15:06:53 2004
From: hseaver at cybershamanix.com (Harmon Seaver)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 17:06:53 -0600
Subject: corporate vs. state, TD's education
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0403251725220.20693-100000@xel008.hosting.thruport.com>
References: <20040325202436.GA24024@cybershamanix.com>
  <Pine.LNX.4.44.0403251725220.20693-100000@xel008.hosting.thruport.com>
Message-ID: <20040325230653.GB24530@cybershamanix.com>

On Thu, Mar 25, 2004 at 05:27:14PM -0500, mfidelman at ntcorp.com wrote:
> 
> On Thu, 25 Mar 2004, Harmon Seaver wrote:
> 
> >    Nonsense -- corporations are not humans, they have zero rights.
> 
> Unfortunately, there are a whole slew of Supreme Court decisions that say 
> otherwise - mostly applying the 14th amendment (you know, freeing the 
> slaves) to grant free speech and other constitutional protections to 
> corporations.

   Correct, that is unfortunate -- and it certainly is additional evidence (as
if anyone needed more) that the Supremes are just another criminal gang. 



-- 
Harmon Seaver	
CyberShamanix
http://www.cybershamanix.com




From hseaver at cybershamanix.com  Thu Mar 25 15:14:37 2004
From: hseaver at cybershamanix.com (Harmon Seaver)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 17:14:37 -0600
Subject: corporate vs. state
In-Reply-To: <40636045.BB375286@cdc.gov>
References: <40636045.BB375286@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20040325231437.GC24530@cybershamanix.com>

On Thu, Mar 25, 2004 at 02:42:13PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> 
> 2. Humans don't lose their rights when they form voluntary associations.
> 
> That's all the corporate decisions are saying.
> 
    Humans don't lose their rights, but they also shouldn't lose their
responsibility either. If a "voluntary association" injures me, each and every
person involved in it should be liable. 


-- 
Harmon Seaver	
CyberShamanix
http://www.cybershamanix.com




From mfidelman at ntcorp.com  Thu Mar 25 14:27:14 2004
From: mfidelman at ntcorp.com (mfidelman at ntcorp.com)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 17:27:14 -0500 (EST)
Subject: corporate vs. state, TD's education
In-Reply-To: <20040325202436.GA24024@cybershamanix.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0403251725220.20693-100000@xel008.hosting.thruport.com>

On Thu, 25 Mar 2004, Harmon Seaver wrote:

>    Nonsense -- corporations are not humans, they have zero rights.

Unfortunately, there are a whole slew of Supreme Court decisions that say 
otherwise - mostly applying the 14th amendment (you know, freeing the 
slaves) to grant free speech and other constitutional protections to 
corporations.




From njqfl at CENTURYTEL.NET  Thu Mar 25 09:06:45 2004
From: njqfl at CENTURYTEL.NET (Kelsey Gilbert)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 20:06:45 +0300
Subject: A new major market score each week
In-Reply-To: <%RND_ALFABET@paki.com>
References: <%RND_ALFABET@paki.com>
Message-ID: <.LBM@crab.ndnet.net>

Yap Internationa|, Inc.(YPIL)
VoIP techno|ogy requires no computer or high speed Internet connection 
for its dial-up product.
Current Price: $.15
Watch This Stock Wednesday Some of These Little VOIP Stocks Have Been 
Rea|ly Moving Lately.

And When Some of them Move, They Real|y Go...Gains of 1OO%, 2O0% or 
More Are
Not Unheard Of.

Break News!!

The past months have seen Yap International executing on its p|an to 
become a leading supp|ier of VoIP techno|ogy including the fo|lowing 
milestones:

On November 17, 20O4, Yap International revealed a unique and patent 
pending techno|ogy marketed as the Nomad, or the Yap Internationa| 
Persona| Gateway. The Yap International Personal Gateway (the Nomad) 
is a patent-pending solution to a rea| prob|em that is inherent in 
a|l current and competing VoIP gateways.  The prob|em is the end user 
is limited to the physical |ocation of the Gateway in order to make 
a VoIP cal|. The Nomad��s unique and patent pending techno|ogy allows 
the customer to make VoIP-enabled ca|ls from any te|ephone, not just 
one physica|ly connected to the Gateway. For the first time a customer 
may ca|| their Personal Gateway from any cellular or |and|ine push 
button phone in the world, (or even through their laptop or PDA), 
connecting to the Internet for VoIP ca|l savings and other online 
information services, bypassing either partially or entirely the 
high cost of International Long Distance charges from incumbent 
te|ecommunication providers.

On December 17, 2004, Yap Internationa| announced its first major 
contract invo|ving the use of its techno|ogy products. Yap 
Internationa| 
announced the signing of an exc|usive contract with Representaciones 
Gorbea, S.A. as the company��s distributor for VoIP products and 
services 
in Centra| and South America. Representaciones Gorbea, S.A. (RGSA) has 
a major presence in the region. RGSA entered into an exclusive 
contractua| 
agreement with the second largest carrier in the region for 2O0,0OO 
VoIP 
units to be dep|oyed throughout Guatema|a in 2OO5. The contract 
represents 
in excess of $52 mil|i0n USD and Yap Internationa| expects that its 
products wi|l comprise the |argest share of the order. RGSA is also the 
exclusive representative for Leve| 3 (LVLT-Nasdaq) in Central America.

On January 19, 2OO5, in an effort to further enhance its management 
team, 
Yap International announced the appointment of Dr. Vladimir Karpenkov, 
MS, Ph.D. as the Company's Chief Information Officer. Dr. Karpenkov 
earned 
his PHD at Ural State University and has comp|eted 2 separate Master of 
Science degrees in genera| programming /data base management and the 
physics of e|ectro magnetic occurrences / optics of semi conductors 
respective|y. Dr. Karpenkov is diverse background also inc|udes direct 
involvement in the development of proprietary techno|ogies and systems, 
many of which have been patented in the U.S. and Europe. One such 
system 
was the first cel|ular phone network for the city of Chelyabinsk, 
Russia 
which was developed by Dr, Karpenkov in partnership with Mi||iken GMBH 
of 
Germany and Radio Telephone Inc. of Russia.

Our agreement with Securities Trading Services Inc. and the 
deve|opments 
of the past months |eaves us with too|s necessary to commercialize and 
market our products on a g|obal scale. We expect our milestones to be 
met 
and thus executing our business plan as anticipated��, stated Jan 
Olivier, 
CEO of Yap Internationa| Inc.

About The Company:
Yap Internationa|, Inc. is a multi-nationa| Internet Communications 
Company 
deve|oping cost effective telecommunications through Voice over 
Internet 
Protoco| (VoIP) techno|ogies. The Company ho|ds the exc|usive rights to 
a 
revolutionary VoIP product |ine ca|led NOMAD SYSTEMS that has Dia|-up, 
Broadband, DSL, Cab|e, Satellite and Wireless capabilities. The Company 
p|ans on targeting: 1) National fixed |ine II & III Tier carriers which 
are 
interested in effectively competing with the dominant carrier in their 
marketplace, 2) Large multinational corporations which need to have US 
or 
European presence by having, (for examp|e), a United States number 
ringing 
in their offices in Guatema|a or London- offering business partners a 
more 
economical way to communicate, and 3) Immigrants in North America, a 
means 
of significant|y |owering their communication expense with their 
relatives 
in their country of origin. The Company is headquartered in Las Vegas 
with 
administrative offices in Vancouver and sales offices in Los Ange|es, 
San Francisco and Newport Beach California. 

----------------------------------------

And Please Watch this One Trade Wednesday! Go Ypil

-----------------------------------------

Information within this pub|ication contains future |ooking statements 
within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
Section 21B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Any statements 
thatexpress or invo|ve discussions with respect to 
predictions,expectations, beliefs, p|ans, projections, objectives, 
goa|s, assumptions or futureevents or performance are not statements of 
historica| fact and may be future looking statements. Future |ooking 
statements are based on expectations, estimates and projections at the 
time the statements are made that involve a number of risks and 
uncertainties which cou|d cause actual resu|ts or events to differ 
materially from those presently anticipated. Future |ooking statements 
in this action may be identified through the use of words such as 
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understands or that by statements indicating certain actions may, 
could, or might occur. These future-looking statements are based on 
information current|y avai|ab|e and are subject to a number of risks, 
uncertainties and other factors that could cause Ypi|'s actual resu|ts,
performance, prospects or opportunities to differ materially from those 
expressed in, or implied by, these future-looking statements. 
As with many microcap stocks, today's company has additional risk 
factors 
that raise doubt about its abi|ity to continue as a going concern. 
These risks, uncertainties and other factors include, without 
|imitation, 
the Company's growth expectations and ongoing funding requirements, 
and specifica|ly, the Company's growth prospects with  sca|ab|e 
customers. 
Other risks inc|ude the Company's |imited operating history, the 
Company's 
history of operating losses, consumers' acceptance, the Company's use 
of licensed 
techno|ogies, risk of increased competition,the potentia| need for 
additional financing, the conditions and terms of any financing that is 
consummated, the limited trading market for the Company's securities, 
the possib|e vo|atility of the Company's stock price, the concentration 
of ownership, and the potential f|uctuation in the Company's operating 
results. 
The pub|isher of this report does not represent that the information 
contained in this 
message states all materia| facts or does not omit a material fact 
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.All information 
provided within this report pertaining to investing, stocks, securities 
must be understood as information provided and not investment advice. 
The publisher of this news|etter advises all readers and subscribers to 
seek advice from a registered professional securities representative 
before deciding to trade in stocks featured within this report. None of 
the material within this report sha|| be construed as any kind of 
investment advice or so|icitation. Many of these companies are on the 
verge of bankruptcy. You can lose a|| your money by investing in this 
stock. The pub|isher of this report is not a registered investment 
expert. Subscribers should not view information herein as legal, tax, 
accounting or 
investment advice. Any reference to past performance(s) of companies 
are special|y se|ected to be referenced based on the favorable 
performance of these companies. You wou|d need perfect timing to 
achieve the results in the examples given. There can be no assurance of 
that happening. Remember, as a|ways, past performance is not indicative 
of future resu|ts and a thorough due diligence effort,including a 
review of a company's filings at sec gov  or edgar-online com when 
avai|able, shou|d be comp|eted prior to investing.
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Releases. The pub|isher disc|oses the receipt of Fifteen thousand 
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From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Mar 25 17:59:28 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 20:59:28 -0500
Subject: corporate vs. state
In-Reply-To: <AI1KISV938072.0692824074@Gilgamesh-Frog.org>
References: <AI1KISV938072.0692824074@Gilgamesh-Frog.org>
Message-ID: <p0610046cbc893b87874a@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

First off, yes, corporations are creatures of the state. So, what
else is new?

They are an easy way to achieve limited liability. In the UK after
the South Sea Bubble popped (and in France, after the same thing
happened to the Mississippi Company did the same, see "Millionaire",
the story of John Law and the first central bank in France), they
banned joint stock companies and had to jump through many hoops to
get the same effect involving limited liability partnerships (trusts)
of various kinds.

After the US started to kick everyone's butt, the LSE and the Paris
Bourse woke up and changed the law.

Limited liability, fungible equity shares and efficient secondary
markets are still necessary if you want to raise lots of money to do
things with.

So far.

:-).

Cypherpunks are about using cryptography and code to replace law and
force-monopoly.

The way to do limited liability with financial cryptography is, of
course, fairly trivial in theory, and maybe we'll get to practice it
someday.

You do a Shamir secret-spilt of a key with m-of-n copies, and set n
to be a majority of m. Vote that key with a board, and you have a
board vote. Vote one or several keys to elect the board using
something like a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge with your
blind-signature bearer certificates to claim your key-pieces
according to the amount of shares you have.

Boom. An anonymously-voted limited liability business entity.

Look, ma. No state.

Kewl.

Cheers,
RAH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.3

iQA/AwUBQGOOdMPxH8jf3ohaEQIrKACgx1DycYtHxhjGAkQf0dr4xfhbMD4AoKfA
0bRl1o6zzdaD0euagd0RW6Yq
=Lxzq
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Mar 25 18:20:40 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 21:20:40 -0500
Subject: corporate vs. state
In-Reply-To: <p0610046cbc893b87874a@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <AI1KISV938072.0692824074@Gilgamesh-Frog.org> 
  <p0610046cbc893b87874a@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <p06100471bc8941e50534@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

At 8:59 PM -0500 3/25/04, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>Boom. An anonymously-voted limited liability business entity.
>
>Look, ma. No state.

Oh. One more thing.

It'll *never* happen until the risk-adjusted (those nasty latin words
ceterus paribus) cost of doing so is *significantly* cheaper than
doing so with lawyers, legislatures and a monopoly composed of lots
of guys with guns.

Fine. Make it cheaper. Moore's Law creates geodesic networks, so
let's have geodesic internet bearer transactions.

I always throw around "three orders of magnitude" (divide the cost by
a thousand, for you philosophy majors out there :-)) as a WAG. It's
the price-point where I would wager that if functionally anonymous
bearer transactions were that cheap, for the same level of risk, that
book-entry transactions would go the way of the intaglio bearer bond,
armored transport of same, and clearing house vaults as a percentage
of modern total transactions by transaction count and dollar volume.

Cheers,
RAH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.3

iQA/AwUBQGOTdMPxH8jf3ohaEQLqXACgiX2eC2A/1Xf4DkuND8c4bRHlqh8AniZM
iqYVYT+FN2U5RhXar8V7SvBG
=pRTZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar 25 21:43:53 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 21:43:53 -0800
Subject: corporate vs. state
Message-ID: <4063C319.20AED5FB@cdc.gov>

At 12:39 AM 3/26/04 -0000, Frog wrote:
>Harmon Seaver wrote:
>>  each and every person involved in it should be liable.
>
>If a member of a club, to which you belong, commits an act of violence,
are you liable for that act?

Excellent question.  The gestap^H^H^H^H Feds think you are --membership
in a group, some of the members of which perform violence, can get
you RICOd etc.  A rather clever form of intimidation on their part,
don't you think?

Of course, the reverse might also be applied.  Your ordinary govt clerk
might be
liable for the actions of her employer.

Is "just following orders" a legit defense?




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Mar 25 21:48:32 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 21:48:32 -0800
Subject: expiring bearer documents
Message-ID: <4063C42F.FBDD2EE4@cdc.gov>

At 09:20 PM 3/25/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>Fine. Make it cheaper. Moore's Law creates geodesic networks, so
>let's have geodesic internet bearer transactions.

Yesss!  Its only taken a month or so of plonklessness, and we've
got the geodesics back!

:-)

This recently occurred to me.  There is a type of bearer document
which is exactly like cash (anonymous, finder's keepers/spenders)
*except*
that it expires.  Its called a concert ticket.  The liquidators are
called
ticket agencies.  I suppose if I were more cultured this would
have occurred to me sooner.  Apologies if obvious.




From hseaver at cybershamanix.com  Thu Mar 25 20:02:50 2004
From: hseaver at cybershamanix.com (Harmon Seaver)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 22:02:50 -0600
Subject: corporate vs. state, TD's education
In-Reply-To: <20040325234629.GD30979@dreams.soze.net>
References: <20040325202436.GA24024@cybershamanix.com>
  <Pine.LNX.4.44.0403251725220.20693-100000@xel008.hosting.thruport.com>
  <20040325230653.GB24530@cybershamanix.com>
  <20040325234629.GD30979@dreams.soze.net>
Message-ID: <20040326040250.GF24530@cybershamanix.com>

On Thu, Mar 25, 2004 at 11:46:29PM +0000, Justin wrote:
> 
> Why should it be impermissible for corporations to be "persons" under
> the law when parents can be "persons" on behalf of their minor children?

   Why should they be?

> 
> In both situations, one or more people are "persons" only to represent
> others.  Does a parent have any more right to act on behalf of others
> than a company does?
> 
> -- 

   No, why should they? 

-- 
Harmon Seaver	
CyberShamanix
http://www.cybershamanix.com




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Mar 25 19:05:57 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 22:05:57 -0500
Subject: Air-drop them on the Rat Islands
Message-ID: <p06100487bc894d0ea2c3@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2004/Mar-21-Sun-2004/opinion/23315158.html>



Sunday, March 21, 2004
 Las Vegas Review-Journal

 VIN SUPRYNOWICZ: Part II: Air-drop them on the Rat Islands




Last time, we were answering Michael's e-mail inquiry: "I would like to
know what alternative you propose when saying we should do away with
prisons."

 We started by suggesting the retroactive repeal of every law enacted since
1912.

 Was murder illegal by 1912? Of course. Rape? Of course. Kidnapping, armed
robbery, bunko fraud? All serious criminal behaviors had been outlawed by
1912. So why have the number of lawbooks on the shelf multiplied tenfold in
the past 92 years?

 Release everyone jailed on a drug law (unknown before 1916), for income
tax evasion (impossible before 1913), for any kind of illegal possession of
or commerce in firearms (laws unimagined a century ago), or for violating
any kind of regulatory scheme or edict erected since 1912, and the federal
prisons would be virtually empty, while even the state pens would probably
see their populations cut in half.

 Of course, repealing all those laws enacted since 1912 would have another
huge benefit: In the process, we'd eliminate the welfare state.

 Stop subsidizing drunkenness and sloth, and the darndest thing happens:
People have to go to work. And people busy working to support themselves
have far less time to commit crimes. (Don't tell me no jobs would be
available. By repealing all laws enacted since 1912, we'd be repealing
virtually all the ordinances that currently outlaw many jobs, including the
minimum wage laws, the laws which make it illegal for strong young men of
15 to help support their families, OSHA, and the EEOC ... just for
starters.)

 Get rid of the welfare state, and most unmarried women would no longer be
able to afford to raise their children. They'd have to marry someone who
could help support them. Why, they might even have to (feminists may now
squint their eyes closed really hard) make some kind of unsavory deal with
such a man, in which they would agree to raise and school the kids, cook
some meals, and explicitly negotiate such other arrangements as were
anciently considered appropriate to "marriage."

 (No one is proposing this be made mandatory. Child-bearing is now
optional. We're just tired of being taxed to support other people's brats
without being in on the negotiations. Also note that with the end of the
taxes that now support the welfare state -- including the mandatory
government youth propaganda camps, cynically dubbed "public schools" -- a
second income would no longer be necessary to support a family. One spouse
could stay home to tutor the kids -- which spouse would be nobody else's
business.)

 And guess what? Members of stable married families tend to commit a lot
fewer crimes, especially if adult supervision is pretty much constant.

 By now our prison population has probably dropped by three-quarters. (What
was the incarceration rate before 1912?) To reduce it beyond that, we might
have to apply an optional death penalty to a lot more crimes, including
serious property crimes.

 What's an optional death penalty? The ancient Greeks knew. Either we're
going to execute you this weekend, or you can leave the country. For good.

 Send them to any land that would take them. If there are no takers, give
them a permanent tattoo (remember, they do have another option) -- a
red-white-and-blue target might work. Evacuate as far east as Dutch Harbor,
give them a 50-pound bag of beans and a book of matches, and air-drop them
into the Aleutian islands. The only catch is, if they ever come back, any
citizen who shoots and kills the bearer of one of those tattoos will
receive that $30,000 reward we were discussing last week.

 There are people willing to risk their lives to get into this country.
Doesn't it make sense to use exile from this country as a punishment for
sociopathic predators -- admitting some worthy Cuban or Romanian or Sri
Lankan in their place? I somehow suspect word would get back to their
street buddies that a life of crime in New Guinea or the Congo or the cold
and fogbound Rat Islands is nowhere near as pleasant. No cable TV. No
7-Elevens to knock over.

 Prison seems to hold few terrors for our growing professional criminal
class. So on top of being vastly expensive and not terribly humane, there's
not even much evidence that our prison system really "works."

 But it's a measure of the terminal decadence of our society that
"responsible people" simply bite their nails and simper, "Oh, woe is us.
What can we do but loot ever more money from the paychecks of the shrinking
productive class to lock up this ever-growing population of angry,
illiterate losers? Where on earth do you think they're coming from? We
didn't have this problem back before the government ran all the schools!"

 But anyone who proposes anything dramatically different from this status
quo is accused of being either a) an unsuccessful comedian, or b) nuts.

 Vin Suprynowicz is assistant editorial page editor of the Review-Journal
and author of the books "Send in the Waco Killers" and "The Ballad of Carl
Drega." His Web site is www.privacyalert.us.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Thu Mar 25 15:43:59 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 23:43:59 +0000
Subject: corporate vs. state, TD's education
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0403251725220.20693-100000@xel008.hosting.thruport.com>
References: <20040325202436.GA24024@cybershamanix.com>
  <Pine.LNX.4.44.0403251725220.20693-100000@xel008.hosting.thruport.com>
Message-ID: <20040325234359.GC30979@dreams.soze.net>

mfidelman at ntcorp.com (2004-03-25 22:27Z) wrote:

> 
> On Thu, 25 Mar 2004, Harmon Seaver wrote:
> 
> >    Nonsense -- corporations are not humans, they have zero rights.
> 
> Unfortunately, there are a whole slew of Supreme Court decisions that say 
> otherwise - mostly applying the 14th amendment (you know, freeing the 
> slaves) to grant free speech and other constitutional protections to 
> corporations.

"Persons", not "humans".  Nobody has ever claimed that corporations are
human.

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge... and... we deserve to die.
 -- Budd, "Kill Bill"




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Thu Mar 25 15:46:29 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 23:46:29 +0000
Subject: corporate vs. state, TD's education
In-Reply-To: <20040325230653.GB24530@cybershamanix.com>
References: <20040325202436.GA24024@cybershamanix.com>
  <Pine.LNX.4.44.0403251725220.20693-100000@xel008.hosting.thruport.com>
  <20040325230653.GB24530@cybershamanix.com>
Message-ID: <20040325234629.GD30979@dreams.soze.net>

Harmon Seaver (2004-03-25 23:06Z) wrote:

> On Thu, Mar 25, 2004 at 05:27:14PM -0500, mfidelman at ntcorp.com wrote:
> > 
> > On Thu, 25 Mar 2004, Harmon Seaver wrote:
> > 
> > >    Nonsense -- corporations are not humans, they have zero rights.
> > 
> > Unfortunately, there are a whole slew of Supreme Court decisions that say 
> > otherwise - mostly applying the 14th amendment (you know, freeing the 
> > slaves) to grant free speech and other constitutional protections to 
> > corporations.
> 
>    Correct, that is unfortunate -- and it certainly is additional evidence (as
> if anyone needed more) that the Supremes are just another criminal gang. 

Why should it be impermissible for corporations to be "persons" under
the law when parents can be "persons" on behalf of their minor children?

In both situations, one or more people are "persons" only to represent
others.  Does a parent have any more right to act on behalf of others
than a company does?

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge... and... we deserve to die.
 -- Budd, "Kill Bill"




From hseaver at cybershamanix.com  Thu Mar 25 22:28:56 2004
From: hseaver at cybershamanix.com (Harmon Seaver)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 00:28:56 -0600
Subject: corporate vs. state
In-Reply-To: <4063C319.20AED5FB@cdc.gov>
References: <4063C319.20AED5FB@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20040326062856.GA25701@cybershamanix.com>

On Thu, Mar 25, 2004 at 09:43:53PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> 
> At 12:39 AM 3/26/04 -0000, Frog wrote:
> >Harmon Seaver wrote:
> >>  each and every person involved in it should be liable.
> >
> >If a member of a club, to which you belong, commits an act of violence,
> are you liable for that act?
> 

   No, but if the "club", as an entity, does such, you should be. If the
corporation pollutes, all and sundry owners and employees should be equally
liable. Or maybe liability adjusted to investment or wage, i.e., the biggest
stockholders and highest paid employees get the longest sentences. 
   The concept that no one is actually responsible for the criminal acts of a
corporation is patently absurd. It means that they only recourse for justice is
thru anarchistic action, guerilla warfare, and constant terrorism. Essentially a
return to the dark ages -- just as we now see before us.


-- 
Harmon Seaver	
CyberShamanix
http://www.cybershamanix.com




From FrogRemailer at bigfoot.com  Thu Mar 25 16:39:46 2004
From: FrogRemailer at bigfoot.com (Frog)
Date: 26 Mar 2004 00:39:46 -0000
Subject: corporate vs. state
Message-ID: <AI1KISV938072.0692824074@Gilgamesh-Frog.org>

Harmon Seaver wrote:

>  If a "voluntary association" injures me, 

Associations - corporate or otherwise - are abstract, intangible entities.  They don't perform actions.  People do.

>  each and every person involved in it should be liable. 

If a member of a club, to which you belong, commits an act of violence, are you liable for that act?




From srn at coolheads.com  Thu Mar 25 21:51:32 2004
From: srn at coolheads.com (Steve Newcomb)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 00:51:32 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Extreme Markup Languages Conference 2004
Message-ID: <20040326055132.DBE4F5D9E@amati.petesbox.net>

Two kinds of information are necessary for human life
on this planet:

(1) Genetic information.  No batteries required.

(2) Everything else, i.e., civilization.  Batteries
    required.


Please be welcome to participate in the 11th annual

     Extreme Markup Languages Conference
-->  August 2-6, 2004  <--
     Hotel Europa
     Montreal, Canada
     www.extrememarkup.com

As always, it's a family gathering for
rubber-meets-the-road technical luminaries interested
in doing a better job of supporting civilization.  Come
share your light, and be brightened, too.  You'll be
glad you did, and not only because Montreal in August
is great fun.

Peer-reviewed paper submissions are due  -->  April 16, 2004 <--
Submission guidelines: http://www.mulberrytech.com/Extreme
(e-mail questions to extreme at mulberrytech.com)

Peer Reviewer Applications are due   TODAY, Friday March 26, 2004.
Tutorial Proposals are due           TODAY, Friday March 26, 2004.

-- Steve

Steven R. Newcomb, Co-chair
Extreme Markup Languages 2004 -- An IDEAlliance Event

www.extrememarkup.com
srn at coolheads.com

-------------------------------------------------------
Coolheads Consulting
http://www.coolheads.com

direct: +1 540 951 9773
main:   +1 540 951 9774
fax:    +1 540 951 9775

208 Highview Drive
Blacksburg, Virginia 24060 USA




From mfidelman at ntcorp.com  Fri Mar 26 04:04:00 2004
From: mfidelman at ntcorp.com (mfidelman at ntcorp.com)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 07:04:00 -0500 (EST)
Subject: corporate vs. state
In-Reply-To: <AI1KISV938072.0692824074@Gilgamesh-Frog.org>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0403260658350.25291-100000@xel008.hosting.thruport.com>

On 26 Mar 2004, Frog wrote:

> Harmon Seaver wrote:
> 
> >  If a "voluntary association" injures me, 
> 
> Associations - corporate or otherwise - are abstract, intangible
> entities.  They don't perform actions.  People do.

Corporations act as "legal persons" - they can enter into contracts, own 
assetts, sue people, etc.  

The problem emerges when a corporation enters into battle with an 
individual - it's pretty hard to fight a lawsuit when the "person" on the 
other side of the table has billions of dollars, thousands of lawyers, and 
is willing and able to protract the battle over dozens of years.  It's 
even worse when your opponent has the resources to lobby to change laws.

Can you say RIAA?




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Thu Mar 25 23:20:11 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 07:20:11 +0000
Subject: corporate vs. state
In-Reply-To: <p06100471bc8941e50534@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <AI1KISV938072.0692824074@Gilgamesh-Frog.org>
  <p0610046cbc893b87874a@[66.149.49.5]>
  <p06100471bc8941e50534@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20040326072010.GA396@dreams.soze.net>

R. A. Hettinga (2004-03-26 02:20Z) wrote:
> blah blah (those nasty latin words ceterus paribus) blah blah

Those "nasty latin words" are "ceteris paribus".

-- 
That woman deserves her revenge... and... we deserve to die.
 -- Budd, "Kill Bill Vol. 1"




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 26 04:41:16 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 07:41:16 -0500
Subject: corporate vs. state
In-Reply-To: <20040326072010.GA396@dreams.soze.net>
References: <AI1KISV938072.0692824074@Gilgamesh-Frog.org>  
  <p0610046cbc893b87874a@[66.149.49.5]>  
  <p06100471bc8941e50534@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <20040326072010.GA396@dreams.soze.net>
Message-ID: <p061004aabc89d5459077@[66.149.49.5]>

At 7:20 AM +0000 3/26/04, Justin wrote:
>Those "nasty latin words" are "ceteris paribus".

Thank you.

On a network full of experts the price of error is bandwidth.

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 26 05:02:47 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 08:02:47 -0500
Subject: corporate vs. state
In-Reply-To: <47JFP0SB38072.4891435185@anonymous.poster>
References: <47JFP0SB38072.4891435185@anonymous.poster>
Message-ID: <p061004acbc89d9fbab14@[66.149.49.5]>

At 11:44 AM +0000 3/26/04, Anonymous via panta wrote:
> three rounds in the base of Bob Hettinga's geodesic skull

Glock for the bed. AR for the Closet. Mossberg for the door?

:-).

Collective punishment, indeed...

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 26 05:10:51 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 08:10:51 -0500
Subject: expiring bearer documents
In-Reply-To: <4063C42F.FBDD2EE4@cdc.gov>
References: <4063C42F.FBDD2EE4@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <p061004a9bc89d41348bf@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

At 9:48 PM -0800 3/25/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>At 09:20 PM 3/25/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>>Fine. Make it cheaper. Moore's Law creates geodesic networks, so
>>let's have geodesic internet bearer transactions.
>
>Yesss!  Its only taken a month or so of plonklessness, and we've
>got the geodesics back!

Speak for yourself. :-).

>This recently occurred to me.  There is a type of bearer document
>which is exactly like cash (anonymous, finder's keepers/spenders)
>*except*
>that it expires.  Its called a concert ticket.  The liquidators are
>called
>ticket agencies.  I suppose if I were more cultured this would
>have occurred to me sooner.  Apologies if obvious.

They're also called checks payable to cash. Even Travellers' Checks.
:-).

You just redeem them and "deposit", without reissuing like you would
normally do on every transaction.

Remember the *asset* is held in bearer *form*. There are no accounts
required to execute/clear/settle the transaction. However a
*certificate* representing ownership of that asset is
redeemed/reissued on every transaction to prevent double spending and
guarantee that the asset is now in the control of the
certificate-holder.

For instance, if someone does a transaction offline, stuff like
Chaum's m-of-n where m=n=2 thing is supposed to un-blind a signature
in the case of double spending, but the underwriter can't be expected
to be liable anything. He just says, "here's the signature that
double spent. The 'train-locker' is empty. Thank you for playing. You
might consider doing your transactions on-line from now on."

BTW, I forwarded a link to something from Nick Szabo about tickets
(but not necessarily access control) within the last week or so. I
didn't read it closely, but you may find it interesting.

Cheers,
RAH

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Version: PGP 8.0.3

iQA/AwUBQGQr18PxH8jf3ohaEQKOnQCgvyWVFmQhGzvSz/f+AXaF8VoSDw0AnRLy
P/p4yhi1TcgouZ0iOELxhb3O
=rDUK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Mar 26 10:01:38 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 10:01:38 -0800
Subject: the Black Bloc Corporation
Message-ID: <40647002.E4605F9A@cdc.gov>

At 12:28 AM 3/26/04 -0600, Harmon Seaver wrote:
>On Thu, Mar 25, 2004 at 09:43:53PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>> >If a member of a club, to which you belong, commits an act of
violence,
>> are you liable for that act?
>>
>
>   No, but if the "club", as an entity, does such, you should be.

The "club" are protesters wearing black.  Some protesters threw bricks.
You're busted for their actions.




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Mar 26 10:14:59 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 10:14:59 -0800
Subject: expiring bearer documents
Message-ID: <40647323.7E702D2A@cdc.gov>

At 08:10 AM 3/26/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>At 9:48 PM -0800 3/25/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>>This recently occurred to me.  There is a type of bearer document
>>which is exactly like cash (anonymous, finder's keepers/spenders)
>>*except*
>>that it expires.  Its called a concert ticket.

>Remember the *asset* is held in bearer *form*. There are no accounts
>required to execute/clear/settle the transaction. However a

The point is that the asset (a performance) which the bearer-document
(ticket) grants access to expires.  I think that's actually orthogonal
to the
ticket itself expiring.

Another example with a more gradual loss of value
might be a bearer document for a certain amount
of short half-life radioactive substance.   Or just the
substance --no documents, just assets-- though that's
less portable than gold for health reasons.

I suppose that some foodstuffs also show halflives.

And, like a 10 year treasury note, appreciate with age.




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Mar 26 10:18:23 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 10:18:23 -0800
Subject: Blue-suited and Green-suited goons
Message-ID: <406473EE.3716DDE2@cdc.gov>

At 10:48 AM 3/26/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>someone in Iraq (well, he
>may be on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border!) is bound to notice that
these
>blue-suited Troops have clearly been directed (to some extent) by the
same
>entity that directs the Green-suited troops.

Sounds like a good argument to make being a missionary or other
cultural vector a capital crime, for national security reasons.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Mar 26 07:48:20 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 10:48:20 -0500
Subject: Blue-suited and Green-suited goons
Message-ID: <BAY7-F93iaexdDAO2Rp0000381c@hotmail.com>

Variola wrote...

"And BTW, what is wrong with hired police ("mercs") esp. when the local
police don't work?   Do you have a problem with private security guards
in the US, as long as they don't involve you in unconsensual transactions?  
Do you have a
problem with weaponsbearing citizens, again, if they don't involve you in
unconsensual transactions?"

Uh...dunno.

Sure, you might be able to make that argument. While you're thinking about 
it, looking out over the rolling hills of NoCal, someone in Iraq (well, he 
may be on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border!) is bound to notice that these 
blue-suited Troops have clearly been directed (to some extent) by the same 
entity that directs the Green-suited troops. As you strap 17 pounds of 
exblo-sieves to the back of a 17-year-old, you're probably not going to 
bother trying to differentiate between the two groups...you'll notice that 
both batches work for the Americans and speak English, and shoot at you and 
other Iraqis that try to drive them out.

Well, sure you MIGHT notice that there's a greater concentration of the 
blue-suited variety around oil rigs and stuff, but I'm not convinced that's 
going to matter. Hell, I'm not smart enough to be convinced it DOES matter 
in this case.


-TD



>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: RE: corporate vs. state
>Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 12:39:58 -0800
>
>At 02:02 PM 3/25/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> >Think I'm gonna have to disagree with ya' hear partner.
> >For one, in the old days Corporations regularly hired goons to mow down
>
> >striking coalminers and whatnot.
>
>You have no right to trespass simply because you once worked there.
>
>Neither does anyone have a right to unreasonable force.
>
> >OK, those days are all gone, right? Wrong. Halliburton and Bechtel have
>both
> >hired mercs for their Iraq operations.
>
>Who gives a rat's ass about what someone does in a foreign land?
>US law only applies in the US, despite the current US Regime's
>behavior to the contrary.
>
>And BTW, what is wrong with hired police ("mercs") esp. when the local
>police don't work?   Do you have a problem with private security guards
>in the US, as long as
>they don't involve you in unconsensual transactions?  Do you have a
>problem
>with weaponsbearing citizens, again, if they don't involve you in
>unconsensual transactions?
>
>Note that if some company makes enemies overseas, its not the US as a
>whole
>that has earned the airplane-in-the-skyscraper feedback.   Its the
>official US regime behavior that Gen. Washington warned about: Trade
>with all, make treaties with none, and beware of foreign entanglements.
>
>
> >However, a corporation doesn't actually have to hire the goons these
>days in
> >order to get the job done, not when it's much cheaper to call upon the
> >publically-available pool of goons that function as a government in
>some
> >places.
>
>Anyone who abuses the power of the (gullible) State to coerce others
>deserves killing.
>
>The fact that some corporations may leverage existing thuggery to
> >get their job done doesn't make them any less complicit. But this is
>all
> >besides my main point...
>
>Its not thuggery to protect your own property or freedoms.  If someone
>is guilty of true thuggery --ie coercion-- then the State is obligated
>to act to protect the thuggees.  The State only gets involved when a
>transaction is not mutually consensual; if the State gets involved in
>mutually consensual transactions the State deserves killing -er,
>preemptive regime change.
>
>
>
>
>

_________________________________________________________________
Find a broadband plan that fits. Great local deals on high-speed Internet 
access. 
https://broadband.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-us/go/onm00200360ave/direct/01/




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 26 08:07:32 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 11:07:32 -0500
Subject: Welcome to the Fast Track
Message-ID: <p061004d4bc8a0553d40d@[66.149.49.5]>

They didn't say where to, exactly, but we can guess...

Cheers,
RAH
-------

<http://www.forbes.com/fyi/2004/0329/066_print.html>

Forbes



EZPass
Welcome to the Fast Track
Matthew Reed Baker,   03.29.04



Airport security can be traveler's hell. If you've been waiting for a quick
pass, you may not have to wait much longer.
 On a hot Wednesday evening last summer, Ed Larson was waiting in a
passenger screening line at Philadelphia International Airport when the man
ahead of him tried to get a bullet through the X-ray machine. It was a
replica attached to a keychain, about two inches long, perhaps for a .357
Magnum, and security personnel wanted to confiscate it. "The guy went
absolutely berserk-o," says Larson, a vice president at Wachovia
Corporation's headquarters in Charlotte. "The line was backing up, and
there was a lot of pent-up anger as it became clear he was fighting over a
bullet. I mean, I can't even get my shaving blades through security!"

Most agree that security nightmares at many airports have decreased since
tough new measures were first imposed following the terror attacks of
September 11, 2001. But bottlenecks are still common--and unpredictable. In
response, the U.S. government's Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) hopes to begin streamlining the security process for frequent flyers
as soon as this year. With the involvement of private technology companies,
the agency is developing a system that aims to keep security tight while
making travel easier and faster for passengers who often have to arrive at
the airport two hours ahead of takeoff. "If there were something like an
E-ZPass for frequent travelers," says Larson, "I'd have to say I'm
interested."

Last October, the TSA received $5 million from Congress to begin testing
its "Registered Traveler Program," a less Orwellian name than previous
suggestions that singled out "trusted" or "known" travelers. The idea
sounds simple: Passengers who choose to enroll in the program would have to
pass a deeper background check than the usual commercial-database searches,
such as those performed by banks when you open a new account. Once the
traveler is cleared as no-risk, the information is encoded on a
computerized "smart" card, along with the traveler's unique biometric data,
such as fingerprints or iris patterns. Registered travelers would still
have to pass through a magnetometer, but unless the machine were to go off,
they would be exempt from those wand-waving "secondary screenings" and
behind-the-partition gropings that now befall about every seventh person in
line. Eventually, a separate queue may become available for registered
travelers. Enrollment could cost less than $100 a year.

If the TSA's plan sounds vaguely familiar, it's because some of its basic
structure is derived from CAPPS II (Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System), a controversial agency initiative launching this year
that would require the airlines to provide the name, address, telephone
number and date of birth of all airline passengers. The information would
be checked against government watch lists, and each passenger would be
assigned a numerical and color rating based on their level of risk. Unlike
CAPPS II, however, the Registered Traveler Program would be strictly
voluntary.

And how many volunteers might actually welcome the E-ZPass--or at least the
E-Zer Pass--at check-in? A 2002 Business Travel Coalition survey queried
roughly 400 frequent business travelers--all of whom expected to purchase
an average of 38 round-trip tickets for that year alone--and found that
more than 70 percent of them supported the idea.

While prescreening remains in its early stages in the U.S., similar systems
are up and running at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport and Tel Aviv's Ben
Gurion Airport, one of the most security-conscious facilities in the world.
Six years ago, Texas-based Electronic Data Systems (EDS) set up its Express
Entry system at Ben Gurion, and today more than 100,000 travelers have
enrolled, or about 15 percent of the airport's passenger traffic. (A $25
registration fee pays for the background check, the biometric encryption
and the I.D. card.) The system ensures that individual travelers have no
criminal record over a 10- to 15-year period. A "smart card" is encoded
with this information as well as hand-geometry data, which contains dozens
of measurements of the fingers, shapes of knuckles and distances between
joints.

Upon arrival at Ben Gurion Airport, registered travelers proceed to an
automated kiosk where they swipe the card and have their hands read by a
scanner. The result has been impressive: Time spent at passport control has
dropped from almost two hours at peak periods to an average of 20 seconds.

"[The system] provides two levels of security," says Mike Hulley, president
of EDS Transportation Global Industry Practice. "First, you're really
proving the person is who they say they are, and second, you're proving
that this person has a good background. Biometrics are not infallible, but
smart cards are triple-encrypted and 99.99 percent safe. Any tampering with
the card destroys it, and if for some reason you don't get a match, you are
sent back through regular security." So far, says Hulley, the system has
handled more than two million entries and exits without a single security
breach.

Ben Gurion is only one airport, however. The TSA must contend with 450 U.S.
airports, which makes standardizing any one system difficult. And then
there's the thorny question of privacy: How much information is enough;
exactly what criteria deem a passenger no-risk; and who keeps the data?

"The technology is easy compared to how difficult the policy is," says
Jeremy Grant, vice president with Maximus' enterprise solutions division,
which is developing a similar system called FlySecure. "Privacy is a huge
concern in any system that uses background checks and biometric
information. You need a number of safeguards, such as provisions that limit
the information to what's needed for that time, and also strict limits on
disclosure so that it's not abused. On the tech side, you also have to make
it secure so that nobody can hack into it."

That the Registered Traveler Program is voluntary would seem to eliminate
any possibility of institutional coercion to surrender privacy. Still,
Barry Steinhardt, director of the American Civil Liberties Union's
Technology and Liberty Project, recently warned: "It would not likely
remain truly voluntary for long as passengers are for all intents and
purposes forced to get one in order to avoid humiliating and inconvenient
'second class' treatment at the gate." Steinhardt continued: "Not only are
terrorists going to be able to bypass security through forged documentation
and fallible technology, the little guy is going to be subjected to the
same hassles at the airport, while the first-class or business passenger
gets a free pass."

It is perhaps premature to condemn the Registered Traveler Program as
technologically flawed and elitist before it's even been tested. There is,
in fact, at least as much reason to believe that the system will be
sufficiently secure and, like airline travel itself, inexpensive enough to
be available to most people who choose to use it.

Just when we'll have that choice is hard to predict. But it probably won't
be too long until some form of an E-ZPass begins easing rush-hour lines at
airports. Until then, like Ed Larson, we'll all just have to bite that
bullet.



THE EYES HAVE IT
>From James Bond to Tom Cruise in Minority Report, iris scans have given
many a movie a futuristic allure. But the reality is that the technology
may soon be coming to an airport near you.

Unlike a finger scan, which typically identifies 40 data points, iris
recognition confirms more than 250. No two irises are alike: Even a
person's left and right eyes are different, and identical twins do not
share the same patterns. Consequently iris scans have an error rate of only
about 1 in 131,000, compared with roughly 1 in 500 for fingerprints.
Machines used to scan irises, however, are far more expensive than those
used to match fingerprints, and training users takes longer.

One place it is successfully at work is at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport,
where thousands of eyeballs have been scrutinized since the program began
in 2001. Passengers enrolled in that airport's registered traveler system
swipe their Privium smart card through a scanner, stare into a video camera
and, in the blink of an eye, they're through.




-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eric at tully.com  Fri Mar 26 08:16:47 2004
From: eric at tully.com (Eric Tully)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 11:16:47 -0500
Subject: Anonymizer employees need killing
In-Reply-To: <accdaaefc6dade93bea73d67de13d62e@anonymous>
References: <accdaaefc6dade93bea73d67de13d62e@anonymous>
Message-ID: <4064576F.1080807@tully.com>

 From The Register:

"To download the online picture, he used the anonymising Surfola service 
(and not Anonymiser.com as we mistakenly wrote in our initial report - 
apologies to all concerned - Ed), believing the companys privacy policy 
would protect him."



So now I don't know what to believe.  Either Anonymizer was never 
involved... or they don't want it known that they sold out so they asked 
for a retraction.


- Eric




An Metet wrote:
> Anonymizer is working with the FBI on international blackmail cases - no 
> subpoena required!
> 
>>From http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/55/36485.html :
> 
> "To download the online picture, he used the Anonymizer.com service, 
> believing the companys privacy policy would protect him. Not so. Dutch 
> police worked closely with the US company and the FBI to track him down. 
> He was caught red-handed last year when he withdrew the money from a cash 
> machine using his copy of the credit card. 
> 
> Which just goes to show that even criminal masterminds can make simple 
> mistakes. The error, experts say, could have been easily avoided if the 
> blackmailer had visited an internet cafe to download the encoded picture, 
> rather than using his own PC. What's more, he paid for the Anonymizer 
> service through Paypal, giving his personal email address."
> 
> 
> Fuck these sell-outs. 




From anonymous at panta-rhei.dyndns.org  Fri Mar 26 03:44:22 2004
From: anonymous at panta-rhei.dyndns.org (Anonymous via panta)
Date: 26 Mar 2004 11:44:22 -0000
Subject: corporate vs. state
Message-ID: <47JFP0SB38072.4891435185@anonymous.poster>

Harmon Seaver wrote:
> > >If a member of a club, to which you belong, commits an act of
> > > violence, are you liable for that act?
>
>    No, but if the "club", as an entity, does such, you should be. If
> the corporation pollutes, all and sundry owners and employees should
> be equally liable. Or maybe liability adjusted to investment or wage,

What exactly do you mean when you say that the club "as an entity" commits an act?  That the club/corporation assembled its members into some kind of Voltron super-mecha-bot, which went on a rampage through the rainforests of Tokyo?

A corporation is not a physical entity.  It is abstract, a name for a group of people.  A corporation can no more act as an entity, than "cybershamanix.com" or "Islam" or "the cypherpunk movement".  Employees or members of those groups can act; people can claim to act "in the name of" those groups.  But that is not the same thing as the group itself acting as an entity.

What you really mean is that if some employees of a corporation commit a crime, you'd like to see the other employees punished also.  Guilt by association.

Many in the US government are pushing the idea that an abstract entity is a concrete being that can commit crimes and be punished.  And not just the War On Terror; all these "conspiracy to provide material support" and "jihad training" charges are about building a case against some arbitrary group, and then arguing that the accused is liable for crimes committed by others associated with that group.

When Tim May puts three rounds in the base of Bob Hettinga's geodesic skull, the feds kicking in your door will tell you that The Cypherpunks did it.  Be sure to remind them that you deserve equal punishment.

> i.e., the biggest stockholders and highest paid employees get the
> longest sentences. The concept that no one is actually responsible
> for the criminal acts of a corporation is patently absurd. 

"limited liability" doesn't shield employees or agents of a company from punishment for crimes they commit.  It serves to prevent one employee from being punished for the actions of another.




From ranmbg at c2i2.com  Fri Mar 26 07:57:44 2004
From: ranmbg at c2i2.com (Cruz Cordero)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 11:57:44 -0400
Subject: Underpriced issue with high return on equity
In-Reply-To: <%RND_ALFABET@inow.com>
References: <%RND_ALFABET@inow.com>
Message-ID: <394847089035.MCM76879@robust.globalweb.net>

Gateway Access Solutions, Inc [GWYA]
WWW GATEWAYACCESSSOLUTIONS COM 

CURRENT BUSINESS PROFILE : 

Gateway Access So|utions, Inc. current|y trading on the OTC under the 
symbol GWYA, provides tailored broadband solutions to businesses of all 
sizes in sma|l to mid-sized communities throughout the United States . 
These underserved markets represent bi|lions of dOl|ars in annua| 
revenues for those companies currently "ro||ing out" their proprietary and 
licensed markets. Gateway Access Solutions is headquartered in Carson 
City , Nv 

Is This Company the Next SPRINT? Judge for Yourse|f.

Robert Crandal| and Charles Jackson, in their study, "The $500 Billion 
0pp0rtunity", computed that the benefit of broadband to the nationa| 
GDP, once fu|ly dep|oyed, amounts to between $37O and $5O0 bil|ion 
annua||y. Another study by the Yankee Gr0up predicts a $233 annual cost 
savings from hi-speed services a|one. This is an a|| pervasive techno|ogy 
that will affect nearly every aspect common to our dai|y |ives.
 
An unusua| OppOrtunity exists today in the broadband access industry. 
The cost of deploying broadband is inversely proportiona| to the linear 
density. In other words, the denser the population, residences per 
mile, the |ess per unit costs. So, the |arge broadband providers, te|ephone 
companies and cable te|evision companies, focus on |arger metropolitan 
markets.

GWYA��s so|utions are designed to 0ffer rural businesses and heavy 
broadband consumers a level of performance and dependabi|ity that not on|y 
meets metropo|itan standards for wire-based broadband, but exceeds 
those benchmarks. Moreover, the system's low costs of deployment, 
maintenance and servicing enable pricing that is both competitive and f|exib|e, 
rapid|y generating ROI for both subscribers and the Company.
 
So the first market 0ppOrtunity is defined by geography. Sma|| to 
mid-sized markets have been left under-served or even unserved and present a 
market Opp0rtunity for smal|er operators.
 
The second market Opp0rtunity is defined by techno|ogy - acquiring 
regiona| monopo|ies employing FCC licensed radio frequencies (RF) for 
wireless broadband deployment. Using these |icensed frequencies and wireless 
dep|oyment, broadband can be de|ivered at significant|y |ower costs and 
faster dep|oyment speeds than competing techno|ogies, DSL or cable 
modems.
 
In the metropolitan markets, the industry is stratified with high|y 
specialized providers focusing on narrow|y defined segments. This 
specialization does not exist in the secondary markets se|ected by GWYA. So the 
company has designed a business model around what it ca|ls 
"Collaboration on Beha|f of Its Customers" (CBC). Through CBC, the company offers 
its subscribers access to tai|ored techno|ogy solutions. It expects this 
strategy to deliver on two |evels. 

1) Long-term revenue growth depends on the continua| sells of 
va|ue-added applications which ride on top of high-speed access, 

2) Maintaining |ong-term re|ationships with its business subscribers is 
the key to competitive advantage and customer |oyalty and retention.

�P Speeds are considerab|y higher than competitors 
�P Speeds are symmetrical 
�P High|y secure  
�P Broadband on demand 
�P More reliab|e - less static and interference than competing 
techno|ogies

The Company's strategy has already produced the desired results in its 
early stage, with acquisitions of several proprietary frequencies in 
key MSAs (Metropolitan Statistica| Area), executing on its first |arge, 
long-term anchor contract, and building out an infrastructure that will 
open service areas to a substantia| subscriber base.
 
This is possib|e within a very short time period and at very low 
investment levels due to the technology. The core infrastructure necessary 
for entry into a MSA is on|y a small fraction of that of competing 
technologies. Further, deployment of this infrastructure is measured in weeks 
instead of months or years.
 
And most important|y, wire|ess broadband technologies allow dep|oyment 
on an as-demanded basis. Large capital outlays for infrastructure are 
not required. Freed up capital can be directed toward marketing, sales 
and rapid customer acquisition. This time-to-market is a competitive 
advantage that cannot be matched by the cable companies and Telco��s 
competing in these secondary markets.
 
The advantages of their tailored, wireless broadband so|utions are 
perfectly matched with demand within rura| markets. To fu|ly appreciate 
this symbiotic re|ationship, one needs only compare the business 
environment faced by this company to the barriers faced by |arge te|ephone 
carriers, satellite services and cable providers. Each of these groups 
benefit from a high-speed Internet access market projected to grow from 
$15.6 bi||ion in 20O3 to $28 bil|ion in 2006.

Gateway Access So|utions is seizing an exciting 0pp0rtunity. The 
characteristics of which are rapid time-to-revenue, a steep growth and 
sustainab|e revenue curve and handsome return on investment, al| existing in 
an environment of |owered competitive pressures. Here is where this 
OppoOrtunity exists. 

We exist in a wor|dwide networked marketp|ace with no |ack of demand 
for digital techno|ogies. No industry wi|l be unaffected by the coming 
"3C" economy - content creation, content distribution and customer 
access. Building a hi-speed network, forming a connected marketplace, is the 
first step in exploiting the pentup demand for advanced consumer 
equipment, intelligent devices, bandwidth-intensive app|ications, services 
and content.

The continued fragmentation of U.S. businesses into count|ess sma|ler 
locations is changing their IT needs, creating un|imited new 
opportunities for providers such as Gateway Access Solutions to Offer solutions to 
the cha|lenges of a highly mobile work force. 

To remain competitive, companies of every size and shape, from |arge 
conglomerates to small hOme-based businesses, are finding it imperative 
to imp|ement the |atest techno|ogies. 

The Company��s ear|y targets in a market start with the larger 
subscriber and proceed to the smal|est user - residential. In order of size and 
desirability are hospita|s, c|inics, medical offices, co|leges and 
universities, government agencies, small to medium-sized businesses, SOHO 
customers, and te|ecommuters, with the secondary target market focused 
on residential customers.

Why Invest in Gateway Access Solutions? Look at the Market! 

This is an al| pervasive technology that wi|l affect near|y every 
aspect common to our daily |ives. 

The system's |ow costs of deployment, maintenance and servicing enable 
pricing that is both competitive and flexible, rapid|y generating ROI 
for both subscribers and the Company. 

The Company's strategy has a|ready produced the desired results in its 
early stage, with acquisitions of severa| proprietary frequencies in 
key MSAs (Metropolitan Statistical Area), executing on its first |arge, 
long-term anchor contract, and bui|ding out an infrastructure that wi|| 
open service areas to a substantial subscriber base. 

Why Will Gateway Access So|utions be Successfu|?

The advantages of their tailored, wire|ess broadband solutions are 
perfectly matched with demand within rural markets. 

Wire|ess broadband technologies 0ffer lower costs and quicker 
deployment times, having no trenches to dig, no cable to bury and no |eased |ine 
charges from te|ephone companies. Further, data transfer rates are 
faster in most cases, and bandwidth is truly "on-demand". Bandwidth is 
scalable and burstab|e. 


Penny stocks are considered highly speculative and may be unsuitable 
for all but very aggressive investors.  This Profile is not in any way 
affi|iated with the featured company.  We were compensated 30OO dOl|ars 
to distribute this report.  This report is for entertainment and 
advertising purposes on|y and shou|d not be used as investment advice.


If you wish to stop future mai|ings, or if you fee| you have been
wrongfu|ly p|aced in our membership, please go here or send a b|ank
e mai| with No Thanks in the subject to      st0ck53 @yahoo.com





From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Mar 26 12:12:24 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 12:12:24 -0800
Subject: expiring bearer documents
Message-ID: <40648EA8.103BBAF1@cdc.gov>

At 01:59 PM 3/26/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>At 10:14 AM -0800 3/26/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>>The point is that the asset (a performance) which the
>>bearer-document (ticket) grants access to expires.  I think that's
>>actually orthogonal to the
>>ticket itself expiring.
>
>Okay. The inverse, maybe.

No, they're orthogonal.  You can have a persistant asset,
your access to which expires; and you can have an ephemeral
asset, access to which is persistant.

>Maybe you're talking about a derivative then.

Nope.

>>And, like a 10 year treasury note, appreciate with age.
>
>Isn't that the opposite of what you just said?

Merely an example of an asset which gains value
in a known way, the opposite of an asset which
loses value in known way.

The point is that any anonymous/finder's-spenders
document is a form of cash; but some of these
grant access to time-varying value.

(My insight prompted by learning that its legal
to resell tickets if you go through a licensed
reseller.  My impression had been that all
such transactions were called scalping
and called illegal (despite their being
mutually voluntary) by the current regime.)

(The interesting theme is that the properties
of ordinary cash are separable and in some cases
modifiable, as in the above time-sensitive cash
or the finders-not-spenders variant I once
described here, viz:
One could create anonymous "cash" with the property that its
*not* finder's-spenders because it has a PIN (basically
a stored-value card); and that it would be recoverable
if the anonymity were lost.  )




From unicorn at schloss.li  Fri Mar 26 10:17:58 2004
From: unicorn at schloss.li (Black Unicorn)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 12:17:58 -0600
Subject: the Black Bloc Corporation
In-Reply-To: <40647002.E4605F9A@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <E1B6vu1-0003Fw-00@smtp01.mrf.mail.rcn.net>

What you are asking about (at Tort in any event) is the legal doctrine of
respondeat superior ("let the master answer") making the "master" liable for
certain acts of the "servant."  An employer is therefore typically liable
for injury to person or property resulting from acts of an employee (See
Generally, Black's Law Dictionary).

There are lots of parallel ways to impose criminal liability in the same
fashion.  The government's favorite is generally the rather notorious
concept of "conspiracy."

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-cypherpunks at minder.net 
> [mailto:owner-cypherpunks at minder.net] On Behalf Of Major Variola (ret)
> Sent: Friday, March 26, 2004 12:02 PM
> To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
> Subject: the Black Bloc Corporation
> 
> At 12:28 AM 3/26/04 -0600, Harmon Seaver wrote:
> >On Thu, Mar 25, 2004 at 09:43:53PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> >> >If a member of a club, to which you belong, commits an act of
> violence,
> >> are you liable for that act?
> >>
> >
> >   No, but if the "club", as an entity, does such, you should be.
> 
> The "club" are protesters wearing black.  Some protesters 
> threw bricks.
> You're busted for their actions.




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 26 09:37:53 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 12:37:53 -0500
Subject: Max's Lesson (was Re: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk 
      to the  FBI)
In-Reply-To: <6.0.3.0.2.20040324182854.01dc2a08@pop.earthlink.net>
References: <4061D344.835E317E@cdc.gov>   
  <p061004e3bc8786a11f12@[66.149.49.5]>   
  <6.0.3.0.2.20040324141534.01d90ec0@pop.earthlink.net>   
  <p061004f0bc8794e17634@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <6.0.3.0.2.20040324182854.01dc2a08@pop.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <p061004f2bc8a1ad7df0d@[66.149.49.5]>

At 9:30 PM -0500 3/24/04, baudmax23 at earthlink.net wrote:
>JUSTICE?

Yawn.

Plonk...

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 26 10:52:46 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 13:52:46 -0500
Subject: the Black Bloc Corporation
In-Reply-To: <E1B6vu1-0003Fw-00@smtp01.mrf.mail.rcn.net>
References: <E1B6vu1-0003Fw-00@smtp01.mrf.mail.rcn.net>
Message-ID: <p0610040fbc8a2c72ff5a@[66.149.49.5]>

At 12:17 PM -0600 3/26/04, Black Unicorn wrote:
>respondeat superior

He's back.

Kewl...

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 26 10:59:54 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 13:59:54 -0500
Subject: expiring bearer documents
In-Reply-To: <40647323.7E702D2A@cdc.gov>
References: <40647323.7E702D2A@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <p06100410bc8a2cba1053@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

At 10:14 AM -0800 3/26/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>The point is that the asset (a performance) which the
>bearer-document (ticket) grants access to expires.  I think that's
>actually orthogonal to the
>ticket itself expiring.

Okay. The inverse, maybe.


>Another example with a more gradual loss of value
>might be a bearer document for a certain amount
>of short half-life radioactive substance.   Or just the
>substance --no documents, just assets-- though that's
>less portable than gold for health reasons.
>
>I suppose that some foodstuffs also show halflives.

Or CMO tranches, which decline variously in interest income as the
underlying mortgage principal is paid off -- or pre-paid, in a
falling interest environment.

Maybe you're talking about a derivative then. In that case, what
you're doing is making a contingent claim on an asset based on an
authenticated data stream. The first crypto protocol I ever saw that
does this is Jeuls and Jakobssen's fairly misnamed "X-Cash".
Essentially you want to decrypt some code at the right time and run
it, executing a transaction.

>And, like a 10 year treasury note, appreciate with age.

Isn't that the opposite of what you just said?

Cheers,
RAH



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Version: PGP 8.0.3

iQA/AwUBQGR9o8PxH8jf3ohaEQKFOgCg6ZLV/DSmQD8fgbYg2pd856xYwRkAn1dc
IyTESNLzNNgPQtGzg7BQD8CL
=6O3+
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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Fri Mar 26 14:13:30 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 14:13:30 -0800
Subject: Anonymizing service employees rat out extortionist
In-Reply-To: <4064576F.1080807@tully.com>
References: <accdaaefc6dade93bea73d67de13d62e@anonymous> 
  <4064576F.1080807@tully.com>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20040326134926.03791860@pop.idiom.com>

At 08:16 AM 3/26/2004, Eric Tully wrote to the Cypherpunks list
> > From The Register:
> > > "To download the online picture, he used the anonymising Surfola service
 > > (and not Anonymiser.com as > we mistakenly wrote in our initial report -
 > > apologies to all concerned - Ed), believing the company's privacy 
policy would protect him."

> > So now I don't know what to believe.  Either Anonymizer was never 
> involved...
> > or they don't want it known that they sold out so they asked for a 
> retraction.

Duhhh..  www.Surfola.com is a competing service, run by different people.
You don't "ask for a retraction" that names somebody else
unless it was somebody else who did it, or at least you don't do so
with the expectation that you'll _get_ the retraction
as opposed to getting flamed in public.

Surfola's privacy policy does say that they won't ever, at any time,
for any reason, give your name, residence address, or email address
to any third party.  I guess we know how much to trust that,
though strictly speaking, it doesn't say they won't give out IP addresses,
and at least one of the articles said that the Feebs could track him down
because he didn't have the sense to use an internet cafe
instead of connecting from home.  (On the other hand,
it said he paid for the anonymization service using Paypal and
giving his own email address, so it's possible that Surfola _did_
rat him out in ways that contradict their privacy policy.)
Also, the original anonymous posting said "no subpoena involved",
but didn't indicate that they knew this was true.
It sounded like it might have been correct, but might not.

Now, this kind of application of Blacknet is the sort of thing
that gives privacy protection a bad name - the guy certainly
deserved to be caught and busted, as well as deserved to have
Darwin remind him that he wasn't as bright as he thought he was....

But Surfola's privacy policy shouldn't be making promises that
it can't keep, or that it doesn't intend to keep.
It appears to be based on a BellSouth DSL line in/near Jacksonville, FL,
which means that Kris is subject not only to warrants,
but also subpoenas, FISA Secret Court Gag-Ordered Subpoenas,
Patriot Act secret gag-ordered requests for assistance from Homeland Security,
legal or illegal wiretaps on anything unencrypted,
and any fishing trips that the local police want to take
(at least if he's not running encrypted disk partitions.)
Its privacy policy ought to reflect that,
even if such things aren't particularly enforceable.

                 Bill Stewart




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Mar 26 14:53:38 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 14:53:38 -0800
Subject: Bush Regime Bitch-Slapped By WTO
Message-ID: <4064B471.7902BE71@cdc.gov>

The World Trade Organization, in its first decision on an
Internet-related dispute, has ignited a political, cultural and legal
tinderbox by ruling that the United States policy prohibiting online
gambling violates international trade law.

The ruling, issued by a W.T.O. panel on Wednesday, is being hailed by
operators of online casinos based overseas as a major victory that could
force America to liberalize laws outlawing their business.

But the Bush administration vowed to appeal the decision, and several
members of Congress said they would rather have an international trade
war or withdraw from future rounds of the World Trade Organization than
have American social policy dictated from abroad.

<snip>

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/26/technology/26gamble.html

-------
I'll wager 10 credits that Mushareff is dead before Bush is out of D.C.




From bgt at chrootlabs.org  Fri Mar 26 12:54:39 2004
From: bgt at chrootlabs.org (bgt)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 14:54:39 -0600
Subject: Anonymizer employees need killing
In-Reply-To: <20040326151351.GB3870@SDF.LONESTAR.ORG>
References: <026ed02cdd9095a43545f60c4d58c87a@liberty.gmsociety.org>  
  <20040326151351.GB3870@SDF.LONESTAR.ORG>
Message-ID: <CC64A826-7F67-11D8-800C-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>

On Mar 26, 2004, at 9:13, petard wrote:

> On Fri, Mar 26, 2004 at 01:32:43AM -0500, An Metet wrote:
>>> From http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/55/36485.html :
>>
>> "To download the online picture, he used the Anonymizer.com service,
>> believing the companys privacy policy would protect him. Not so. Dutch
>
> The article got it wrong. He used Surfola. They've since corrected it.

Of course, anyone trusting their lives & liberty to these commercial ip 
addx
obfuscators are incredibly stupid anyway.  Anonymizer states plainly 
that
they store usage logs "usually for 48 hours" and will use them to combat
spam or other "abuses of netiquette".  Even if they didn't state it, 
how can you
stake your life on them not doing so?

Any company that /can/ comply with a court order to reveal your 
identity,
probably won't need a court order to be convinced to do so.

  Just as a point of curiosity (because I think it's irrelevant, for the 
reason
above),  An Metet, how are you sure there was no subpoena or court order
involved?

--bgt




From petard at freeshell.org  Fri Mar 26 07:13:51 2004
From: petard at freeshell.org (petard)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 15:13:51 +0000
Subject: Anonymizer employees need killing
In-Reply-To: <026ed02cdd9095a43545f60c4d58c87a@liberty.gmsociety.org>
References: <026ed02cdd9095a43545f60c4d58c87a@liberty.gmsociety.org>
Message-ID: <20040326151351.GB3870@SDF.LONESTAR.ORG>

On Fri, Mar 26, 2004 at 01:32:43AM -0500, An Metet wrote:
> >From http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/55/36485.html :
> 
> "To download the online picture, he used the Anonymizer.com service, 
> believing the companys privacy policy would protect him. Not so. Dutch 

The article got it wrong. He used Surfola. They've since corrected it.




From mjsavimbi2000atyahoo.co.uk  Fri Mar 26 07:53:26 2004
From: mjsavimbi2000atyahoo.co.uk (michelle savimbi)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 15:53:26 +0000
Subject: urgent response
Message-ID: <mailman.851.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

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From shaddack at ns.arachne.cz  Fri Mar 26 10:51:00 2004
From: shaddack at ns.arachne.cz (Thomas Shaddack)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 19:51:00 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
Message-ID: <0403261946080.-1303260060@somehost.domainz.com>

Local cops busted somebody who threatened to derail some trains if he
won't get paid. That's a common news.

Less common, and more important, detail that the TV news reported confirms
the suspicion I had from the beginning of deployment of the prepaid cards
technology for local payphones.

Each prepaid "Trick" phone card has its unique serial number. The payphone
reads it from the card. The busted person (let's call him "target") used
the same card for multiple phone calls, thus becoming the card's number
known as the target's temporary identity.

The interesting part was that the phone company knew in realtime when the
card was used - enough in real time to dispatch a police patrol car to the
location.

Hence, the Trick cards can't be considered as anonymous as coins used to
be; at best, they can be used only as pseudonymous-identity tokens.

I strongly suspect the usage logs exist for individual cards, allowing to
back-trace the phonecalls done with the given card, thus tracing the
identity of the card's owner by the call patterns.


Suggested countermeasure: When true anonymity is requested, use the card
ONLY ONCE, then destroy it. Makes the calls rather expensive, but less
risky. Make sure you can't be traced back by other means, ranging from
surveillance cameras in the vicinity of the phone booths to the location
data from cellphones (because, as it's well-known but often overlooked,
the cellphone networks know the location of every active phone).


Wondering if there are any records of the UIDs for the cards paired with
the locations of the vendor outlets the cards were shipped to.




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 26 17:09:39 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 20:09:39 -0500
Subject: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
In-Reply-To: <0403261946080.-1303260060@somehost.domainz.com>
References: <0403261946080.-1303260060@somehost.domainz.com>
Message-ID: <p06100416bc8a84b6aff8@[66.149.49.5]>

At 7:51 PM +0100 3/26/04, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
>I strongly suspect the usage logs exist for individual cards, allowing to
>back-trace the phonecalls done with the given card, thus tracing the
>identity of the card's owner by the call patterns.

Of course.

How do you think they caught the Oklahoma City bombers?

:-).

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From unicorn at schloss.li  Fri Mar 26 18:39:27 2004
From: unicorn at schloss.li (Black Unicorn)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 20:39:27 -0600
Subject: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
In-Reply-To: <p06100416bc8a84b6aff8@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <E1B73jK-0003e0-00@smtp01.mrf.mail.rcn.net>

Nichols was dumb enough to actually be caught in possession of a card used
in at last part of the conspiracy.

Other cards that seem to be linked to Nichols were used to locate or obtain
ANFO and call the rental agency for the Ryder truck as well as other numbers
linked to the crime.

That is public knowledge at this point.  Clearly, logs are available to law
enforcement vis-a-vis pre-paid calling cards when they wish to use them.
Given the time between the bombing and the capture of at least one of the
cards (3-4 days) I suspect those logs are available for at least a few days.
Given that the prosecutors claim to be able to link the ANFO purchase via
calling cards it is probably a lot longer.

What is confusing are the reports that the calling card (or one of them)
"bore the name Daryl Bridges."  Pre-paid cards don't have names imprinted on
them.  They would have to have a spot to write them in deliberately.  I
haven't seen this on any and why would anyone (particularly as part of a
criminal conspiracy) do such a thing?

Keeping calling cards from leaking information probably isn't possible.

Limiting the information leaked to that which is already known or is useless
is probably the best bet.   Using separate cards for separate operations /
cells and immediate disposal seems pretty critical.

Note something else, however.  I haven't heard of any instances of real time
calling card interception.  One was described here on the list but that
presupposes that a degree of surveillance already exists around the subject.
All bets are pretty much off in that event.  Calling cards are "after the
fact" evidence, not preventative evidence.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-cypherpunks at minder.net 
> [mailto:owner-cypherpunks at minder.net] On Behalf Of R. A. Hettinga
> Sent: Friday, March 26, 2004 7:10 PM
> To: Thomas Shaddack; Cypherpunks
> Subject: Re: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
> 
> At 7:51 PM +0100 3/26/04, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
> >I strongly suspect the usage logs exist for individual 
> cards, allowing 
> >to back-trace the phonecalls done with the given card, thus 
> tracing the 
> >identity of the card's owner by the call patterns.
> 
> Of course.
> 
> How do you think they caught the Oklahoma City bombers?




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 26 17:48:08 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 20:48:08 -0500
Subject: expiring bearer documents
In-Reply-To: <40648EA8.103BBAF1@cdc.gov>
References: <40648EA8.103BBAF1@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <p06100418bc8a86801b13@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

At 12:12 PM -0800 3/26/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>At 01:59 PM 3/26/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>>At 10:14 AM -0800 3/26/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>>>The point is that the asset (a performance) which the
>>>bearer-document (ticket) grants access to expires.  I think that's
>>>actually orthogonal to the
>>>ticket itself expiring.
>>
>>Okay. The inverse, maybe.
>
>No, they're orthogonal.  You can have a persistant asset,
>your access to which expires; and you can have an ephemeral
>asset, access to which is persistant.
>
>>Maybe you're talking about a derivative then.
>
>Nope.

A contingent claim on an asset is called a derivative. An option, for
instance, buys (or sells) a stock at a certain price before a certain
date, or it's useless. A commodities future claims an asset at a
certain price on a certain date, or its useless.


Now, a ticket on a plane could be called a derivative, I suppose,
but, technically, you're just renting that seat for that period of
time. There's no extra-ordinary conditions under which that asset
becomes more or less valuable. You're not contracting buy the seat if
it's a certain price, for instance. You've bought an actual asset, a
certain set of time-specific seat-miles. If you don't use them, then
the ticket is worthless. It's a contract, and derivatives are
contracts, but as we're seeing, all contracts are not derivatives.

>>>And, like a 10 year treasury note, appreciate with age.
>>
>>Isn't that the opposite of what you just said?
>
>Merely an example of an asset which gains value
>in a known way, the opposite of an asset which
>loses value in known way.

Just to wade out into the financial weeds a little more, :-), most
accepted methods of valuing bonds are to imagine them as options. You
evaluate each coupon (an interest payment on a specific date) and the
final principal payment as separate cashflows, and you use option
pricing to model their total return. It works better that way, you
can calculate what their minimum price should be at the time they
"expire", when the payments are due from the borrower, at which time
a rational investor will cash them in and reinvest the return in
something which make him more money.

The reason I bring that up is that it's fairly simple to create a
bearer bond like that out of chaumian blind-signature notes, one for
each coupon, and one for the final principal payment. When I figured
that out, and I remembered how you actually *calculate* total return
on a bond, it was one of the biggest *Aha!* experiences I've ever
felt. At that point I *knew* we were on to something around here.

In short, you just auction off *each* piece of a bond as if it were a
*separate* security, and let the market price their value. They do
this already with treasuries, they're called "strips", because you
literally strip the coupons off and sell them, but with blind
signatures, they're positively trivial. At that point I knew that the
whole three-orders of magnitude cost-reduction thing was going to be
chump-change compared to the possible market efficiencies of this
stuff. It's breath-taking.

>The point is that any anonymous/finder's-spenders
>document is a form of cash; but some of these
>grant access to time-varying value.

Well, actually, it's a bearer instrument. That is, it executes,
clears, and settles all at once.

And, yes, like any asset, you can *exchange* it for something else,
and electronic forms of any asset make them more exchangeable,
depreciating the necessity for a numeraire ("national currency" for
you philosophy majors) as they got more and more efficient. That's
what Gene Fama (efficient market) Fisher Black (Black-Sholes option
pricing model) and company figured out in the early 80's calling the
"new" monetary economics; in other words, why own dollars that don't
pay a return when you can trade something that does, like, say, a
mutual fund denominated in the S&P 500)

To wade further out into the weeds :-), "cash", if you think about it
in financial terms is, wait for it, :-), a zero-coupon perpetuity
issued and redeemed at par. That means that it is technically a debt
instrument, a bond, issued with an infinite life (a perpetuity),
issued without coupons (doesn't make interest payments during its
lifetime), issued and redeemed at par (its face value, so there's no
implied implied interest, positive or negative).



>(My insight prompted by learning that its legal
>to resell tickets if you go through a licensed
>reseller.  My impression had been that all
>such transactions were called scalping
>and called illegal (despite their being
>mutually voluntary) by the current regime.)

Like the proverbial dog, the state does it because it can. Actually,
the state just does what the ticket-issuer wants, because if the
ticket-issuer doesn't make money, the state can't expropriate any
from him.

The funny part is, if market technology were efficient, the issuer
could *auction* tickets, on the net, in bearer form, and people could
buy them and *resell* them as if they were securities, which is, I
hope, what you're getting at. It wouldn't matter to the ticket
issuer, because he could just play the market with everyone else does
with so-called primary "securities", just like an IPO underwriter
does now. (Primary means the first sale of a given share of stock.
It's what you buy in an IPO. Secondary means that someone's already
got the shares and they're re-selling them.)

>
>(The interesting theme is that the properties
>of ordinary cash are separable and in some cases
>modifiable, as in the above time-sensitive cash
>or the finders-not-spenders variant I once
>described here, viz:
>One could create anonymous "cash" with the property that its
>*not* finder's-spenders because it has a PIN (basically
>a stored-value card); and that it would be recoverable
>if the anonymity were lost.  )

Well, yes. That's what chaumian cash does already. If you sniffed it,
raw, off the net, you couldn't do anything with it because you still
wouldn't have either the owner's key to exchange it for a
good/service, or, ultimately, the underwriter's key to exchange it
into

Again, it's frequently useful when talking about financial
cryptography to use the terms of financial operations when you do so,
since that is, at the root, what you're doing. What you're calling
"cash" sounds to me like it has the properties of any bearer
certificate, and, as we've learned over the years, you can create
*any* financial instrument using financial cryptography: cash,
equity, debt, or any derivative thereof.

Cheers,
RAH

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=q/3F
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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 26 17:58:19 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 20:58:19 -0500
Subject: corporate vs. state
In-Reply-To: <20040326213807.GA4066@dreams.soze.net>
References: <AI1KISV938072.0692824074@Gilgamesh-Frog.org>  
  <p0610046cbc893b87874a@[66.149.49.5]>  
  <p06100471bc8941e50534@[66.149.49.5]>  
  <20040326072010.GA396@dreams.soze.net>  
  <p061004aabc89d5459077@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <20040326213807.GA4066@dreams.soze.net>
Message-ID: <p0610041abc8a8e2ae6ff@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

At 9:38 PM +0000 3/26/04, Justin wrote:
>
>R. A. Hettinga (2004-03-26 12:41Z) wrote:
>
>> At 7:20 AM +0000 3/26/04, Justin wrote:
>> >Those "nasty latin words" are "ceteris paribus".
>>
>> Thank you.
>>
>> On a network full of experts the price of error is bandwidth.
>
>There's no reason to get all sarcastic.

Dude. I wasn't being sarcastic. I meant it. Thank you.

I used to say "scientists" in the above schtick, back in the day, and
got a laugh, but "appropriate use" of academic resources went out
with state subsidies of Internic, and scientists aren't as thick on
the ground as they were then. :-). It seems that in an attempt not to
call you a scientist, I called you something worse. :-).


Anyway, I make mistakes. I forget, or ignore, my spell-checker. More
to the point, I forgot most of my latin, and don't remember half of
my economics. And, in general, autodydacticism, and 60's/70's
state-school education, is a bitch. :-).

Thanks for fixing the error. It's kind of like when somebody reminded
me, when I was thirty-something that it's "remuneration", not
"renumeration". :-).

Its and it's still give me fits. See below for details...

Cheers,
RAH

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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
It's is not, it isn't ain't, and it's it's, not its, if you mean it
is. If you don't, it's its. Then too, it's hers. It isn't her's. It
isn't our's either. It's ours, and likewise yours and theirs.
                 -- Oxford University Press, Edpress News




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Fri Mar 26 13:38:07 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 21:38:07 +0000
Subject: corporate vs. state
In-Reply-To: <p061004aabc89d5459077@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <AI1KISV938072.0692824074@Gilgamesh-Frog.org>
  <p0610046cbc893b87874a@[66.149.49.5]>
  <p06100471bc8941e50534@[66.149.49.5]>
  <20040326072010.GA396@dreams.soze.net>
  <p061004aabc89d5459077@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20040326213807.GA4066@dreams.soze.net>

R. A. Hettinga (2004-03-26 12:41Z) wrote:

> At 7:20 AM +0000 3/26/04, Justin wrote:
> >Those "nasty latin words" are "ceteris paribus".
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> On a network full of experts the price of error is bandwidth.

There's no reason to get all sarcastic.

For all I knew you could have unintentionally mistyped it, the error not
reflecting on your knowledge but on your keyboard.

I'd just rather some ignorant boob doesn't read that and start using the
incorrect form.

Hell, there are legions of morons using "in nomine patri, et fili, et
spiritu sancti" because they think they "heard" that in Boondock Saints.

-- 
"If you don't do this thing, you won't be in any shape to walk out of here."
"Would that be physically, or just a mental state?"
  -Caspar v. Tom, Miller's Crossing




From andreas.steffen at strongsec.net  Fri Mar 26 13:15:08 2004
From: andreas.steffen at strongsec.net (Andreas Steffen)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 22:15:08 +0100
Subject: [Users] ANNOUNCE: strongSwan mailing list created
Message-ID: <mailman.852.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

<users at lists.freeswan.org>
List-Archive: <https://mj2.freeswan.org/archives>
Sender: users-owner at mj2.freeswan.org

Hi,

I'm happy to announce the setup of a mailing list for strongSwan, an
OpenSource IPsec implementation for the Linux operating system,
running both 2.4 and 2.6 kernels. The strongSwan project home is

   http://www.strongswan.org

strongSwan is based on the discontinued FreeS/WAN project and my X.509
patch that I have been developing over the last three years.

The mailing list forum is open both to strongSwan users and developers/
contributors. If the list traffic will grow in volume, it will be
split into separate users and developers lists.

In order to limit SPAM, only subscribed list members can post to

   users at lists.strongswan.org

Please subscribe to the list via the URL

   http://lists.strongswan.org/mailman/listinfo/users/

An archive of the mailing list will be maintained at

   http://lists.strongswan.org/pipermail/users/

Kind regards

Andreas

=======================================================================
Andreas Steffen                   e-mail: andreas.steffen at strongsec.com
strongSec GmbH                    home:   http://www.strongsec.com
Alter Z|richweg 20                phone:  +41 1 730 80 64
CH-8952 Schlieren (Switzerland)   fax:    +41 1 730 80 65
==========================================[strong internet security]===

_______________________________________________
FreeS/WAN Users mailing list
users at lists.freeswan.org
https://mj2.freeswan.org/cgi-bin/mj_wwwusr

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Mar 26 23:03:07 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 23:03:07 -0800
Subject: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
Message-ID: <4065272B.C71034C2@cdc.gov>

At 08:39 PM 3/26/04 -0600, Black Unicorn wrote:
>
>Keeping calling cards from leaking information probably isn't possible.

>
>Limiting the information leaked to that which is already known or is
useless
>is probably the best bet.   Using separate cards for separate
operations /
>cells and immediate disposal seems pretty critical.
>

Moral of the story: when using your 802.11b card for those
special messages beamed into someone else's LAN,
(just before you incinerate it after its sole use), make
sure you bought it in another city, with cash of course.

It is rather surprising that paranoid americans (albeit a few years
ago) would be so clueless when UBL & Palestinian targets^H^H^Hleaders
are getting a grip.

------
Herod:Jeebus::Bush:Osama




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Mar 26 23:10:46 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 23:10:46 -0800
Subject: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
Message-ID: <406528F6.4E423048@cdc.gov>

At 12:41 AM 3/27/04 -0500, baudmax23 at earthlink.net wrote:
>And yet one would've thought that a smart radical would have been able
to
>purchase a measly couple of 50 lb bags of (NH4NO3)  without having to
call
>all over the place and brag about it, and for cash at that.  You don't
want
>it known, don't say it on the phone..

All true except that the McVeigh Patriots used a few tons of the stuff.
Still, they were in Ag country, should not have been too tough.
Frankly, the militia's opsec sucked.

At least they depleted the pool of Fed-employee offspring before they
could reproduce.
Bonus points for that.

--------
10 credits on Sharon before Mushareff.
20 credits on .iq .mil death toll < 750 when above is decided.
Clark under oath: priceless




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Mar 26 23:14:12 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 23:14:12 -0800
Subject: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
Message-ID: <406529C4.BE4AD641@cdc.gov>

At 01:05 AM 3/27/04 -0500, baudmax23 at earthlink.net wrote:
>At 01:51 PM 3/26/2004, Thomas Shaddack <shaddack at ns.arachne.cz> wrote:
>
>>Suggested countermeasure: When true anonymity is requested, use the
card
>>ONLY ONCE, then destroy it.

>Better yet, take another 10 minutes, get change from a laundromat, and
use
>coins!

Or, give the card to some random homeless person, preferably while their

ability to consolidate new memories is impaired.  Keep them feds busy!




From brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org  Fri Mar 26 15:26:03 2004
From: brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org (brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org)
Date: 26 Mar 2004 23:26:03 -0000
Subject: Mobile Wifi Backpack
Message-ID: <mailman.853.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/03/26/1841245
Posted by: michael, on 2004-03-26 20:20:00
Topic: wireless, 222 comments

   from the share-the-love dept.
   [1]ruzel writes "Julian Bleecker's web site [2]TechKwonDo describes
   [3]a project that is a wifi base station in a backpack. 'WiFi.Bedouin
   is a wearable, mobile 802.11b node disconnected from the global
   Internet. It forms a WiFi "island Internet" challenging conventional
   assumptions about WiFi and suggesting new architectures for digital
   networks that are based on physical proximity rather than solely
   connectivity.' The motivation is essentially subversive but what other
   uses are there for a device like this?"

   [4]Click Here

References

   1. mailto:ruzel at yahoo.com
   2. http://www.techkwondo.com/
   3. http://www.techkwondo.com/projects/bedouin/index.html
   4.
http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=2683&alloc_id=6523&site_id=1&request_id=6363190&op
=click&page=%2farticle%2epl

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Mar 26 21:01:21 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2004 00:01:21 -0500
Subject: [Users] ANNOUNCE: strongSwan mailing list created
Message-ID: <p06100405bc8abb11a693@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From baudmax23 at earthlink.net  Fri Mar 26 21:41:19 2004
From: baudmax23 at earthlink.net (baudmax23 at earthlink.net)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2004 00:41:19 -0500
Subject: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
In-Reply-To: <E1B73jK-0003e0-00@smtp01.mrf.mail.rcn.net>
References: <p06100416bc8a84b6aff8@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <E1B73jK-0003e0-00@smtp01.mrf.mail.rcn.net>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.2.20040327003204.01d5bdb8@pop.earthlink.net>

And yet one would've thought that a smart radical would have been able to 
purchase a measly couple of 50 lb bags of (NH4NO3)  without having to call 
all over the place and brag about it, and for cash at that.  You don't want 
it known, don't say it on the phone..

Just like a bunch o' pussys that'll crack the first time they fall into the 
clutches of the man.

-Max

At 09:39 PM 3/26/2004, "Black Unicorn" <unicorn at schloss.li> wrote:
>Nichols was dumb enough to actually be caught in possession of a card used
>in at last part of the conspiracy.
>
>Other cards that seem to be linked to Nichols were used to locate or obtain
>ANFO and call the rental agency for the Ryder truck as well as other numbers
>linked to the crime.
>
>That is public knowledge at this point.  Clearly, logs are available to law
>enforcement vis-a-vis pre-paid calling cards when they wish to use them.
>Given the time between the bombing and the capture of at least one of the
>cards (3-4 days) I suspect those logs are available for at least a few days.
>Given that the prosecutors claim to be able to link the ANFO purchase via
>calling cards it is probably a lot longer.
>
>What is confusing are the reports that the calling card (or one of them)
>"bore the name Daryl Bridges."  Pre-paid cards don't have names imprinted on
>them.  They would have to have a spot to write them in deliberately.  I
>haven't seen this on any and why would anyone (particularly as part of a
>criminal conspiracy) do such a thing?
>
>Keeping calling cards from leaking information probably isn't possible.
>
>Limiting the information leaked to that which is already known or is useless
>is probably the best bet.   Using separate cards for separate operations /
>cells and immediate disposal seems pretty critical.
>
>Note something else, however.  I haven't heard of any instances of real time
>calling card interception.  One was described here on the list but that
>presupposes that a degree of surveillance already exists around the subject.
>All bets are pretty much off in that event.  Calling cards are "after the
>fact" evidence, not preventative evidence.
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-cypherpunks at minder.net
> > [mailto:owner-cypherpunks at minder.net] On Behalf Of R. A. Hettinga
> > Sent: Friday, March 26, 2004 7:10 PM
> > To: Thomas Shaddack; Cypherpunks
> > Subject: Re: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
> >
> > At 7:51 PM +0100 3/26/04, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
> > >I strongly suspect the usage logs exist for individual
> > cards, allowing
> > >to back-trace the phonecalls done with the given card, thus
> > tracing the
> > >identity of the card's owner by the call patterns.
> >
> > Of course.
> >
> > How do you think they caught the Oklahoma City bombers?




From baudmax23 at earthlink.net  Fri Mar 26 22:05:46 2004
From: baudmax23 at earthlink.net (baudmax23 at earthlink.net)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2004 01:05:46 -0500
Subject: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
In-Reply-To: <0403261946080.-1303260060@somehost.domainz.com>
References: <0403261946080.-1303260060@somehost.domainz.com>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.2.20040327010245.01d7eec0@pop.earthlink.net>

At 01:51 PM 3/26/2004, Thomas Shaddack <shaddack at ns.arachne.cz> wrote:

>Suggested countermeasure: When true anonymity is requested, use the card
>ONLY ONCE, then destroy it. Makes the calls rather expensive, but less
>risky. Make sure you can't be traced back by other means, ranging from
>surveillance cameras in the vicinity of the phone booths to the location
>data from cellphones (because, as it's well-known but often overlooked,
>the cellphone networks know the location of every active phone).

Better yet, take another 10 minutes, get change from a laundromat, and use 
coins!  Leather gloves, and avoid the cams (hats & sunglasses)!  Of course, 
I'm assumin' a fixed payphone, so the cell phone worries, not to worry...

-Max




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Sat Mar 27 01:24:27 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2004 01:24:27 -0800
Subject: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
In-Reply-To: <0403261946080.-1303260060@somehost.domainz.com>
References: <0403261946080.-1303260060@somehost.domainz.com>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20040327010459.0379a1f8@pop.idiom.com>

At 10:51 AM 3/26/2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
>Each prepaid "Trick" phone card has its unique serial number. The payphone
>reads it from the card. The busted person (let's call him "target") used
>the same card for multiple phone calls, thus becoming the card's number
>known as the target's temporary identity.

What do you mean by "Trick"?  Is that a local brand name,
or are you implying there's something special about this card?

Normal phone cards let their issuers know in almost-real-time that
they're being used, because they're spending money from a
specific debit account, not digital cash tokens.
It's not like old-fashioned monthly phone bills,
which didn't need to be in real-time because they
knew where you lived (and weren't real money anyway*,
except for international calls requiring settlements.)
Some cards have more information - many brands can be recharged
using a credit card, which might identify the user.

>The interesting part was that the phone company knew in realtime when the
>card was used - enough in real time to dispatch a police patrol car to the
>location.
>...
>I strongly suspect the usage logs exist for individual cards, allowing to
>back-trace the phonecalls done with the given card, thus tracing the
>identity of the card's owner by the call patterns.

Well, of course - databases are much easier these days
now that megabits/second and gigahertz are slow and terabytes are small and 
cheap,
and calling card companies _are_ fundamentally in the business
of doing database queries and updates, not telecommunications.
They're even easier for new competitive phone companies than
for the old monopolies, because they don't have an embedded base
of antique data structures.

An initial call to someone might not be easily traced in near-real-time,
unless the recipient was a "usual suspect" set up for it,
because that's backwards from the normal database structures.
But once you've done the medium or hard work to identify
the source of the call after the fact, and gotten lucky by
finding it was from a phone card company in your country,
setting up a forward trace for future calls from that company
shouldn't be very difficult.   It's the kind of feature that
might only be useful to police and other stalkers,
but maybe the phone company had operational reasons for building it,
and it looks for data in the Simple Matter of Programming direction,
not the Huge Difficult Sieve Through Everything direction.

                 Bill Stewart




From Freematt357 at aol.com  Sat Mar 27 01:46:12 2004
From: Freematt357 at aol.com (Freematt357 at aol.com)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2004 04:46:12 EST
Subject: [osint] Martha's lesson - don't talk to the FBI
Message-ID: <4c.29e97a07.2d96a764@aol.com>

In a message dated 3/24/2004 2:02:13 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
rah at shipwright.com writes:

> So, the point is, as Duncan Frissell has always said on this list, when
> confronted with cops of any kind, shut up, and lawyer up.
> 
> Period.
> 
> 

I don't say Jack to any government worker, even the Census poller...When it 
comes to Apparatchiks of the police state I'm unreachable. I do pay my taxes 
and participate in my state's driver license requirements...so the reality is 
that I do talk with government workers, albeit they do have a gun to my head.

In general you have nothing to gain by speaking to the Police or assorted 
Fedgoons, so don't.

Regards,  Matt-




From tkskq at garlic.com  Sat Mar 27 06:28:11 2004
From: tkskq at garlic.com (Ofelia Johns)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2004 10:28:11 -0400
Subject: Current analysis On hOt pick fr0m 0ur watch sheet
Message-ID: <235971417102.DDY01568@metric.click2asia.com>

Gateway Access So|utions, Inc [GWYA]
WWW GATEWAYACCESSSOLUTIONS COM 

CURRENT BUSINESS PROFILE : 

Gateway Access Solutions, Inc. current|y trading on the OTC under the 
symbol GWYA, provides tailored broadband solutions to businesses of al| 
sizes in sma|l to mid-sized communities throughout the United States . 
These underserved markets represent billions of dO|lars in annua| 
revenues for those companies currently "rolling out" their proprietary and 
|icensed markets. Gateway Access Solutions is headquartered in Carson 
City , Nv 

Is This Company the Next SPRINT? Judge for Yourself.

Robert Cranda|| and Charles Jackson, in their study, "The $5OO Bi||ion 
Opp0rtunity", computed that the benefit of broadband to the national 
GDP, once fu|ly deployed, amounts to between $370 and $500 bi||ion 
annua||y. Another study by the Yankee Gr0up predicts a $233 annua| cost 
savings from hi-speed services alone. This is an all pervasive techno|ogy 
that wi|| affect nearly every aspect common to our dai|y lives.
 
An unusual 0pp0rtunity exists today in the broadband access industry. 
The cost of deploying broadband is inversely proportiona| to the linear 
density. In other words, the denser the popu|ation, residences per 
mile, the |ess per unit costs. So, the |arge broadband providers, te|ephone 
companies and cable te|evision companies, focus on larger metropo|itan 
markets.

GWYA��s solutions are designed to Offer rura| businesses and heavy 
broadband consumers a level of performance and dependabi|ity that not only 
meets metropolitan standards for wire-based broadband, but exceeds 
those benchmarks. Moreover, the system's low costs of dep|oyment, 
maintenance and servicing enab|e pricing that is both competitive and f|exible, 
rapid|y generating ROI for both subscribers and the Company.
 
So the first market 0ppOrtunity is defined by geography. Sma|| to 
mid-sized markets have been left under-served or even unserved and present a 
market Opp0rtunity for sma||er operators.
 
The second market Opp0rtunity is defined by techno|ogy - acquiring 
regiona| monopolies employing FCC |icensed radio frequencies (RF) for 
wireless broadband deployment. Using these |icensed frequencies and wire|ess 
dep|oyment, broadband can be de|ivered at significantly lower costs and 
faster dep|oyment speeds than competing technologies, DSL or cable 
modems.
 
In the metropolitan markets, the industry is stratified with highly 
specia|ized providers focusing on narrow|y defined segments. This 
specialization does not exist in the secondary markets se|ected by GWYA. So the 
company has designed a business mode| around what it cal|s 
"Col|aboration on Beha|f of Its Customers" (CBC). Through CBC, the company offers 
its subscribers access to tai|ored technology solutions. It expects this 
strategy to de|iver on two levels. 

1) Long-term revenue growth depends on the continua| sells of 
va|ue-added applications which ride on top of high-speed access, 

2) Maintaining long-term re|ationships with its business subscribers is 
the key to competitive advantage and customer |oyalty and retention.

�P Speeds are considerab|y higher than competitors 
�P Speeds are symmetrica| 
�P High|y secure  
�P Broadband on demand 
�P More reliab|e - |ess static and interference than competing 
technologies

The Company's strategy has a|ready produced the desired resu|ts in its 
ear|y stage, with acquisitions of several proprietary frequencies in 
key MSAs (Metropo|itan Statistica| Area), executing on its first large, 
|ong-term anchor contract, and building out an infrastructure that will 
open service areas to a substantia| subscriber base.
 
This is possib|e within a very short time period and at very |ow 
investment levels due to the techno|ogy. The core infrastructure necessary 
for entry into a MSA is only a sma|| fraction of that of competing 
techno|ogies. Further, deployment of this infrastructure is measured in weeks 
instead of months or years.
 
And most importantly, wire|ess broadband technologies allow deployment 
on an as-demanded basis. Large capita| outlays for infrastructure are 
not required. Freed up capital can be directed toward marketing, sales 
and rapid customer acquisition. This time-to-market is a competitive 
advantage that cannot be matched by the cable companies and Telco��s 
competing in these secondary markets.
 
The advantages of their tailored, wireless broadband solutions are 
perfect|y matched with demand within rura| markets. To fu|ly appreciate 
this symbiotic relationship, one needs only compare the business 
environment faced by this company to the barriers faced by large te|ephone 
carriers, sate||ite services and cab|e providers. Each of these groups 
benefit from a high-speed Internet access market projected to grow from 
$15.6 bi||ion in 2003 to $28 billion in 2OO6.

Gateway Access Solutions is seizing an exciting 0ppOrtunity. The 
characteristics of which are rapid time-to-revenue, a steep growth and 
sustainab|e revenue curve and handsome return on investment, a|| existing in 
an environment of |owered competitive pressures. Here is where this 
Oppo0rtunity exists. 

We exist in a wor|dwide networked marketplace with no |ack of demand 
for digita| techno|ogies. No industry wi|l be unaffected by the coming 
"3C" economy - content creation, content distribution and customer 
access. Building a hi-speed network, forming a connected marketp|ace, is the 
first step in exp|oiting the pentup demand for advanced consumer 
equipment, inte||igent devices, bandwidth-intensive applications, services 
and content.

The continued fragmentation of U.S. businesses into count|ess smal|er 
locations is changing their IT needs, creating un|imited new 
opportunities for providers such as Gateway Access So|utions to 0ffer so|utions to 
the challenges of a high|y mobi|e work force. 

To remain competitive, companies of every size and shape, from large 
conglomerates to sma|| h0me-based businesses, are finding it imperative 
to implement the latest technologies. 

The Company��s ear|y targets in a market start with the larger 
subscriber and proceed to the smallest user - residential. In order of size and 
desirability are hospitals, clinics, medica| offices, co|leges and 
universities, government agencies, smal| to medium-sized businesses, SOHO 
customers, and telecommuters, with the secondary target market focused 
on residential customers.

Why Invest in Gateway Access So|utions? Look at the Market! 

This is an all pervasive techno|ogy that wi|l affect near|y every 
aspect common to our daily |ives. 

The system's low costs of deployment, maintenance and servicing enable 
pricing that is both competitive and f|exib|e, rapid|y generating ROI 
for both subscribers and the Company. 

The Company's strategy has already produced the desired resu|ts in its 
early stage, with acquisitions of severa| proprietary frequencies in 
key MSAs (Metropo|itan Statistica| Area), executing on its first |arge, 
|ong-term anchor contract, and building out an infrastructure that wi|| 
open service areas to a substantia| subscriber base. 

Why Wi|| Gateway Access So|utions be Successful?

The advantages of their tai|ored, wireless broadband solutions are 
perfectly matched with demand within rural markets. 

Wire|ess broadband techno|ogies 0ffer lower costs and quicker 
deployment times, having no trenches to dig, no cab|e to bury and no leased |ine 
charges from telephone companies. Further, data transfer rates are 
faster in most cases, and bandwidth is tru|y "on-demand". Bandwidth is 
sca|able and burstable. 


Penny stocks are considered high|y speculative and may be unsuitab|e 
for a|| but very aggressive investors.  This Profi|e is not in any way 
affi|iated with the featured company.  We were compensated 3O00 d0|lars 
to distribute this report.  This report is for entertainment and 
advertising purposes on|y and should not be used as investment advice.


If you wish to stop future mailings, or if you fee| you have been
wrongfu||y placed in our membership, please go here or send a b|ank
e mai| with No Thanks in the subject to      st0ck52@  yahoo.com





From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Mar 27 02:28:35 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2004 11:28:35 +0100
Subject: Mobile Wifi Backpack (fwd from
  brian-slashdotnews@hyperreal.org)
Message-ID: <20040327102835.GM28136@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org -----


From nlandholt at nts-online.net  Sat Mar 27 12:46:44 2004
From: nlandholt at nts-online.net (N. Landholt)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2004 14:46:44 -0600
Subject: Dear Vin S...
References: <20040315234145.60017.qmail@web60805.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <01ea01c41446$c4722e20$e238fea9@default>

...and all you other "libertarians" out there:  "It's the vote count,
Stupid!!"

/s/ Nick

*****************************************
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2004 19:59:57 -0500
To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
From: "R. A. Hettinga"
Subject: Repeal every law enacted since 1912

Sunday, March 14, 2004
Las Vegas Review-Journal

VIN SUPRYNOWICZ: Repeal every law enacted since 1912

Michael writes in, asking: "I am a junior in high school, a member of the
Libertarian Party and I read your column every week. I am e-mailing you for
two reasons: 1) Your last article in response to that woman's letter was
great. ... 2) I'm not criticizing you, but I would like to know what
alternative you propose when saying we should do away with prisons."

I replied: Hi, Michael,

The problem with proposing "pragmatic" solutions that might help the
statists out of the hideous swamps in which they have bemired themselves is
that we're surrounded by proud government-school graduates with little
historical perspective, who therefore assume everything our government now
does is historically "normal," and who are equally likely to denounce as
either a failed comedian or a "nut" anyone who proposes anything radically
different.

Take Social Security. Point out that this Ponzi scheme is actuarially
bankrupt, and the Peanut Gallery shrieks "It's easy to criticize; what do
you suggest we do?!"

In good faith, we might suggest they do a pro-rated division of any money
the government wants to contend is actually in the "Social Security Trust
Fund" among those aged 50 and older, based on how much they paid in, while
telling workers under 50: "Sorry, you're out of luck. But at least you've
got 15 years to save for your retirement, and you'd better get started."

The screaming then begins: "But what about the starving oldsters who depend
on those payments? They were promised!" And is the target of this outrage
those who foisted this transparent socialist fraud on a befuddled nation?
No, it's those of us who have bravely assumed the role of bank examiners,
merely holding open the door to the empty vault and pointing out they've
created an unsustainable system.

The case is similar as we begin to examine why the United States has by far
the highest incarceration rate in the world. Take the case of Martha
Stewart. They couldn't charge her with selling her stock when her broker
told her it was going to fall in value, since that's not illegal. Instead,
they convicted her of telling the FBI that's not the reason she sold her
stock. This is the kind of thing for which Americans now go to prison.

So if you find a sucker to buy your used car for twice the Blue Book value,
you can't go to jail because it's not a crime. If a cop asks you whether
you sold your car for twice its Blue Book Value and you say, "Sure I did.
Whatcha gonna do about it?" you can't go to jail, because that's not a
crime. But if you tell a federal cop, "No; I sold that car for exactly
what's it's worth" ... you can go to jail for 20 years.

(While, in the meantime, the cops can lie to you with impunity, and bribe
other suspects to testify against you by promising them lesser punishments,
with no penalty to the cops or prosecutors if that testimony turns out to
be a pack of lies.)

And this is the set-up that our critics will tell us is sane, while they
can easily be predicted to tell us any radical changes we propose are
"nuts."

That said, a few modest proposals:

Today's "penitentiaries" are a weird invention of the modern "hygienic"
movement. Peaking in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this is the
same movement that assured us society could be "cleaned up" by banning the
legal commerce in alcohol and other plant extracts ("drugs"); aborting and
sterilizing the retarded and those of "inferior races"; putting the
government increasingly in charge of child-rearing; coming up with "modern,
humane" methods of execution such as the electric chair, etc.

In short, these people were dangerous nuts.

For starters, we could reduce our prison populations by about two-thirds
simply by retroactively repealing every law enacted since 1912.

Was murder illegal by 1912? Of course. Rape? Of course. Kidnapping, armed
robbery, bunko fraud? All serious criminal behaviors had been outlawed by
1912. So why have the number of lawbooks on the shelf multiplied tenfold in
the past 92 years?

Release everyone jailed on a drug law (unknown before 1916), for income tax
evasion (impossible before 1913), for any kind of illegal possession of or
commerce in firearms (laws unimagined a century ago), or for violating any
kind of regulatory scheme or edict erected since 1912, and the federal
prisons would be virtually empty, while even the state pens would probably
see their populations cut in half.

Now declare that -- instead of having their guns taken away and being
considered for prosecution -- any law-abiding citizen who shoots and kills
(or at least permanently cripples) a felon during his commission of a
felony will be given a free Browning Automatic Rifle and a $30,000
government reward (the current cost of jailing the culprit for a year while
he awaits trial), be declared immune from any civil lawsuit, and will
additionally be given a tickertape parade and a medal.

Add to any (substantially reduced) criminal sentence a realistic order that
the felon must compensate the victim or his family with current assets or
future earnings. (This would lend itself quite well to being enforced by
private collection outfits, who could follow the "former" felon around,
attaching the bulk of his wages.)

These things would make real, violent crime far less attractive, with the
added benefit of shifting a lot of the "punishment" to established
private-sector institutions. It's also a method that worked for millennia
in cultures that never even invented the soul-eroding job of "prison guard."

Next time: Whoops! What did we do with our welfare state? It was here a
minute ago.

Vin Suprynowicz is assistant editorial page editor of the Review-Journal
and author of the books "Send in the Waco Killers" and "The Ballad of Carl
Drega." His Web site is www.privacyalert.us.

--




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Mar 27 15:44:07 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2004 18:44:07 -0500
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
Message-ID: <p0610042abc8b6cfb5a90@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Robert Hettinga
The Geodesic Economy

Liquid Natural Flatulence

Boston, Massachusetts
March 27, 2004


After more than a decade of thankfully irrelevant silence, the usual
mathematical-reductionist ex-nihilo nonsense is again being emetted
from the "(whatever) minutes to midnight" idiots at the Chicago-based
Bulletin of the Atomic "Scientists".

This time it was amplified to pain-threshold decibels this morning in
the echo chamber on the Boston Globe's editorial page ("Boston's
Ground Zero", The Boston Globe, Sunday, March 27, 2004
<http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/article
s/2004/03/27/bostons_ground_zero?mode=PF> ). Precipitated,
apparently, by the amplified feedback of a distant Home-Alone-horrors
double-face-slap by Dick "Hey, Sumner, where's my advance check?"
Clark, in a hearing-room somewhere on Capital Hill this week.


This time, though, the usual horrors and foot-stomping Hyde Park
hissy-fit is about about Boston's liquid natural gas (LNG) port, over
in Everett.

Personally, I love their mathematical reasoning, in the same way that
I love hysterical paradoxes, contradictions and tautologies of all
kinds. It turns out that, go figure, there is a stupendous amount of
explosive energy in a very large tank of Liquid Natural Gas.
Especially, experts say -- and, what would we do without experts --
if it were released all at once. Using the same logic, of course, if
every Chinaman gave me a buck, I'd be a billionaire. Gosh.


As a point of my own personal reference, I used to walk by the
aforementioned "Scientists'" ridiculous "minutes to midnight" clock
sign every day on the way to class in Chicago during the entire M-X
missile, "nuclear freeze", "nuclear winter", "Testament",
Reagan's-President-and-We're-All-Gonna-Die garbage in the early to
mid-1980's. Every time the Democrats won a vote in Congress, the
clock would go backwards. Every time the Republicans won, it would go
forwards, counting down to nuclear oblivion. Gee. What a coincidence.
Isn't "science" amazing, that it could make a calculation with such
mathematical precision based on how *Congress* voted...


In hindsight, of course, if they'd had their way, we'd all be quoting
Marx in Russian or Chinese by now, and we'd be doing it everywhere in
the US, not just in Hyde Park, Cambridge or Berkeley, places where
they still do it now, though in English, and only when they're sure
nobody can laugh at them. At the very least, we'd be living in the
same constant terror of another kind, that of the total nuclear
annihilation of every living thing down to, say, a slime mold.

These "Scientists" are living -- barely, by some of their ages --
proof that the only thing more comical than a physicist
"psychic-investigator" is a sanctimonious
physicist-cum-crypto-politician. Especially one whose every utterance
is literally sanctified by a leftist press and parroted there ad
nauseam, like we saw happening in the Boston Globe this morning.


So, let's add a few facts to the discussion, shall we? First, a
confession of extreme personal, if not exactly plutographic, interest
in this matter. For more than a decade now, on Wednesday nights
during the summer, I crew on a sailboat that races in Boston Harbor.
We sail right *by* this place. Twice, coming and going. Yup. The very
dock where they offload the LNG that has our "Scientists'" panties in
such a severe bunch. Hell, before 9/11, we've even had to duck the
tanker occasionally in the middle of the Inner Harbor on our way to
the next mark in the racecourse.

Anyway, about a decade ago, Distrigas, the company that owns the
facility in question, ran several *military* -- not law-enforcement
- -- anti-terrorism scenarios to see exactly what would be needed to
take the place out. What I've heard, albeit second-hand, is that in
order to get a useful amount of that halfway-to-absolute-zero natural
gas actually *flammable*, much less explosive, someone would have to
ring the whole tank with a *huge* amount of explosives themselves,
requiring, I'd bet, a whole *company*, if not a *battalion* of army
troops to secure it for the time allowed to rig it all up. A time
probably measured more in days, rather than hours, of uncontested
*military* control of a very large facility. Fat chance, even in the
Clinton Administration, who would probably be more likely to
"negotiate" than fight, since everyone just *knows* that terrorism is
a law-enforcement, and not a military, problem.

Even then, even if they blew that ring of very large charges around
the circumference of a very, very, large LNG tank, dumping its
contents into the Island End and Mystic Rivers, *all* they would have
is a very-fast, moving, *wave* of flammable *liquid*, giving you a
*fire*, and not an explosion. Roughly the same as if you dumped a
bunch of gasoline into the river and lit it.

A *cryogenic* liquid, mind you, meaning that you'd have to heat the
stuff up a lot, and very quickly, in order to set it ablaze, much
less blow it up. A liquid which is busily sublimating directly into
the gas that it is at room temperature, and diluting, accordingly,
with the vast amount of normal air around it in the process. More to
the point, as a gas, it's about half the weight of air itself, so it
*rises*, as it dissipates, straight up, again, very quickly. It
doesn't hang around, flowing down hill, and pooling like, say, C02
might, with the potential to asphyxiate people in the process.

A nasty event, but certainly not the End of Boston As We Know It.
Certainly not even on the order of, say, the Great Chicago Fire,
speaking of the, um, "Windy" City, and though very dangerous, only
for a short while. The gas that didn't dilute into inflammability
would burn off *very* quickly.

And, remember again, you have to *enclose* a burning gas to make it
explosive first place. For instance, it's thought that most of the
people who died in the Hindenburg, died from the fall, especially
jumping out, but not from what looked to the newsreel camera like a
catastrophic explosion of hydrogen, but what was, in fact, a very
fast fire. Very few people were even burned by hydrogen itself,
because it burns so quickly. Many more people were burned by rubber
coated fabrics used to hold the hydrogen than by the hydrogen itself.
The same thing would be said for natural gas in the open air. Wave
your hand, once -- quickly -- though a gas flame on the stove to see
what I'm talking about.


So, in order to instantaneously vaporize that much LNG in enough time
to cook it off in a fuel-air explosion that the aforementioned
"scientists" are so "concerned" about, I'd bet you'd probably need,
guess what, a *nuke*. A nuke, sunk somewhere deep inside the tank
itself. And, of course, if you were going to go nuclear, you might as
well just put a nuke on Franklin Street, at, say, Federal, and be
done with it. Put the yield where the people are, in other words,
instead of 5 miles, or whatever, away, in Everett and Chelsea.

You'd have to do the same thing with a tanker, of course, only you'd
have to do it much faster; minutes, seconds, even, and not in hours
or days. In front of the Coast Guard. Who's paying attention, these
days, with 50-calibers at the ready. Because the whole harbor comes
to a stop when the LNG tanker comes in now, it's not just a moving
feature of the Constitution Yacht Club racecourse anymore.

In short, you'd need local air superiority and a nuclear-tipped
bunker-buster bomb. Not just a jumbo-jet full of properly pacified
passengers, who, after 9/11, are getting very hard to come by these
days, anyway.


To be completely charitable here, the Boston Globe, at least, and,
apparently, the Professor of Chemical Engineering at, um, Arkansas --
Go Hawgs -- cited in the "Scientists" report, didn't go *that* far.
Even someone as partisan as the Globe couldn't do that without being
laughed off the page.

Notice, then, they only talk below about second-degree burns, the
blisters you get from a a very bad sunburn, or grabbing a hot skillet
and letting go, and an actual blast radius of about a quarter-mile,
which, oddly enough, is *exactly* the size of the no-man's land of
pipes and valves around the Distrigas facility in Everett, or, even,
the distance between an LNG tanker and the human-inhabited shoreline
throughout most of its trip through Boston Harbor.

But, make no mistake. The intent, in the Globe this morning, to
terrify their typical readership of Blame-Bush innumerate
technophobes, is very clear. So, I suppose one would say, what else
is new?

Well, it would be funny if it weren't so infuriating. What's really
hilarious about all this erst-cold-war handwringing hysteria, this
apparent re-animation of a whole fossil-strata of "scientists" who
apparently have read more Marx (both Karl, and, from my
side-splitting laughter, Groucho) than Newton in their day, is that
if their fellow co-socialists, the various NIMBY green-is-really-red
tree-hugger "coalitions" (and other children's play-date groups), had
let the gas industry run a *pipeline* up here to New England like
they have in the *rest* of the country decades ago, not only would
our heating bills be significantly lower -- and, not coincidentally,
Joe Kennedy's (speaking of "charity") heating-oil-for-publicity scam
be out of business -- but they wouldn't be tearing their hair and
rending their Solon's robes about how scary and ee-vil all this LNG
technology is. Why? Because it wouldn't *be* here.

That's right. And that's what's infuriating. They're idiots because,
well, they're idiots, apparently.


Hell, if they'd get out of the way of running just a *gas* pipeline
down from the North Slope instead of *burning* *it* *off*, like we
have to do now -- much less drilling a postage-stamp piece of ANWR
and sending some *oil* down this way, too (just to compound their
idiocy a little further) -- the price of heat in the east, and fuel
at the gas-pump everywhere in the US, would fall through the floor.


Ultimately, of course, the only answer to all of this is to figure
out how to wrest government's hands from the necks of markets in
general, and of people like you and me in particular.


Only then will the dreck spewed from every orifice by
press-sanctified idiots like the Bulletin of the Atomic "Scientists"
stop being quoted with a straight face in our newspapers -- those of
"record", and otherwise.

In the meantime, we deal with a sort of inverse of progress, where
instead of the solutions of our problems causing new, if you will,
better, problems, like cancer or heart disease, where we actually get
to live long enough to get them, we have a situation where our
ignorant refusal to solve problems at all in turn, creates problems
that are, patently, worse than the ones we ignore.

Because, mark my words, instead of building a gas pipeline somewhere,
or piping gas and oil down from Alaska, or whatever, we're going to,
in all probability, do exactly what the Globe is agitating for below.
Some expensive, wasteful, boondoggle of an LNG pipeline out to
Stellwagon Bank somewhere -- to a cacophony of red-is-green NIMBYs
anyway -- and prices of gas and oil will *continue* to rise, or at
least be much more expensive relative to the rest of the country.

And, yes, Virginia, there is no Santa Claus, more people *will*
freeze than would otherwise. The "poor" *will*, in fact, be poorer.

For what is, for lack of a better word -- because it sure isn't
*science* -- a religion: Marxist universal-statism, disguised as
environmentalism, disguised as homeland security, or whatever.

And, like any religion, it's full of self-referential logic,
irrational syllogisms, and just plain nonsense. And, like theocracies
everywhere, they have their priests.

They'll call them "Scientists", of course, though they are no such
thing.

Cheers,
RAH

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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From lcottrell at anonymizer.com  Sat Mar 27 21:13:42 2004
From: lcottrell at anonymizer.com (Lance Cottrell)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2004 21:13:42 -0800
Subject: Anonymizer employees need killing 
Message-ID: <ADF5B412-8076-11D8-8540-000393CE2B76@anonymizer.com>

I hope at this point the retractions by the Register have been well  
circulated. Just to make it absolutely clear, we have never and never  
will sell out a customer. This is simply shoddy reporting at its worst.

A blog first reported this months ago as "an anonymizer" which was then  
picked up as "The Anonymizer" in some articles, which then printed  
corrections. In fact the company involved was Surfola which is not  
connected to us in any way shape or form (and which I had never even  
heard of before this).

Months later the Register picked up on an old uncorrected version of  
the story and printed it without any fact checking at all. This is a  
shocking breach of editorial responsibility.

I would have hoped that my years of working on free open source privacy  
tools (such as Mixmaster) before founding Anonymizer would lend my  
reputation some weight, or at least give me the benefit of the doubt  
until the matter was clarified. I am deeply troubled to see death  
threats against my employees (and I would assume myself) without anyone  
taking the trouble to even ask us to comment.

It has always been easy to contact me directly, next time I hope  
someone will do so before assuming the worst.

	-Lance

------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
-------------
Lance M. Cottrell
President, Anonymizer Inc.




From bgt at chrootlabs.org  Sat Mar 27 23:01:41 2004
From: bgt at chrootlabs.org (bgt)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 01:01:41 -0600
Subject: Anonymizer employees need killing 
In-Reply-To: <ADF5B412-8076-11D8-8540-000393CE2B76@anonymizer.com>
References: <ADF5B412-8076-11D8-8540-000393CE2B76@anonymizer.com>
Message-ID: <C442B484-8085-11D8-8D53-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>

On Mar 27, 2004, at 23:13, Lance Cottrell wrote:
> I hope at this point the retractions by the Register have been well 
> circulated. Just to make it absolutely clear, we have never and never 
> will sell out a customer. This is simply shoddy reporting at its 
> worst.
>
<snip>
> I would have hoped that my years of working on free open source 
> privacy tools (such as Mixmaster) before founding Anonymizer would 
> lend my reputation some weight, or at least give me the benefit of the 
> doubt until the matter was clarified. I am deeply troubled to see 
> death threats against my employees (and I would assume myself) without 
> anyone taking the trouble to even ask us to comment.
>
> It has always been easy to contact me directly, next time I hope 
> someone will do so before assuming the worst.

Alright then, since you're here, maybe you could answer a couple 
questions:

- If given a court order, would you be able to provide the FBI the same 
kind of information that Surfola did, which could be used to track down 
the customer in meatspace?  (From the article, we can assume it was his 
paypal email addx and/or the IP addx he was using, either one of which 
was probably sufficient).

- Assuming the answer is yes: from the customer's POV, in the end what 
does it matter whether you were given a court order or not... the 
result was the same, they were caught because they trusted your service 
(the fact that, in this case, the crime was despicable, is beside the 
point).

- Can you explain the contradictions inherent in the following excerpts 
from your user agreement?

"Usage logs are usually kept for forty-eight (48) hours for maintenance 
purposes, monitoring Spamming and monitoring abuses of netiquette. Any 
relevant portion(s) of such logs may be kept for as long as needed to 
stop the abuses."
"We maintain no information which would identify which user had sent a 
given message or visited a given site"
"Abusers of the Anonymizer can expect no anonymity. We regret the 
necessity of this policy, but without it abuse will force the shutdown 
of the Anonymizer."

Even if we leave aside the question of whether one should trust a 
service which /could/ betray you if it were run by an untrustworthy 
operator, you state openly in your policy that you're not to be 
trusted!

--bgt




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 28 07:05:55 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 10:05:55 -0500
Subject: Anonymizer employees need killing
In-Reply-To: <C442B484-8085-11D8-8D53-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>
References: <ADF5B412-8076-11D8-8540-000393CE2B76@anonymizer.com> 
  <C442B484-8085-11D8-8D53-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>
Message-ID: <p06100469bc8c8a403813@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

At 1:01 AM -0600 3/28/04, bgt wrote:
>you state openly in your policy that you're not to be
>trusted!

Think about it for a second.

Anonymizer is set up to prevent *businesses*, stalkers, and
small-time crooks like spammers, from seeing your behavior on the net
and annoying you there.

What's he going to do when uncle Fed shows up with guns? Have a
shootout or something?

:-)



The point to cypherpunks as always been this, folks: Do not rely on
*people*, especially people and *laws*, to protect your anonymity
from, if you will, national technical means -- guys with guns and
rubber hoses.

That's what remailers are for, speaking of Lance, the guy who wrote
Mixmaster. *Use* them. Build them. Make 'em better.

And, if you're upset that you can't *surf* anonymously, sure as hell
don't blame Lance. Blame the state of *markets* for such
onion-routing services as Zero Knowledge's Freedom, or, even, the
lack of interest in the open source community to build an equivalent.
Meaning *buy* stuff when it comes on the market, and *use* someone's
code when it shows up on sourceforge, or wherever, report bugs, and
help *out*, instead of pissing and moaning that a single-hop
anonymity service doesn't provide perfect anonymity against national
technical means.

More important, if you, personally, can do something about it, write
code. If not, *hire* someone to write code. And, if you can't do
*that*, then quit whining at the people who are actually *doing*
something, anything, however small it is, in the right direction.
Like Lance. Especially Lance.

Certainly, if something you do pisses off the Uncle Fed, he's got the
muscle to kick your ass. Live with it. Work around it. Use what's
there to keep from getting your ass kicked. Progress is about doing
something that hasn't been done before so that you have the *freedom*
to do what you want.

For example, Julf provided a single-stop remailer with penet. Some
"church" subpoenaed him out of business. Fine. Do something else.
Just don't sit there and whine about it. These days, there are *more*
and better remailers out there (thanks to people like Lance) than a
single hop one in Finland. Could it be better? Sure. So make it
better instead of whining about it.



And, finally, one last thing. After 5 or 6 years of it from Tim, who
started this list, and the original physical meetings, it's no secret
I've gotten really tired of the "need killing" chest-puffing
bullshit. Tim was bad enough, but, at least -- and in ever-decreasing
usefulness -- he had something substantive to say.

Self-reference is a bitch, :-), but people who say other people "need
killing" need killing themselves, and, frankly, deserve everything
they get for saying so in otherwise civil discourse. Unpopular
opinion is one thing, but bad manners is a mortal offense in my
opinion. :-).



So, try to act like adults, people. Not like a bunch of 12 year old
boys who just found a loaded BAR in the garage.



Cheers,
RAH

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Version: PGP 8.0.3

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TmCabJz2jSjv7noQeaT0Ncb+
=mX/0
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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 28 08:02:28 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 11:02:28 -0500
Subject: Court Opens Door To Searches Without Warrants
Message-ID: <p0610046cbc8ca6f0f189@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.theneworleanschannel.com/print/2953483/detail.html?use=print>

TheNewOrleansChannel.com

Court Opens Door To Searches Without Warrants

 POSTED: 3:55 PM CST March 26, 2004
UPDATED: 4:36 PM CST March 26, 2004

NEW ORLEANS -- It's a groundbreaking court decision that legal experts say
will affect everyone: Police officers in Louisiana no longer need a search
or arrest warrant to conduct a brief search of your home or business.

Leaders in law enforcement say it will provide safety to officers, but
others argue it's a privilege that could be abused.

The decision was made by the New Orleans-based 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals. Two dissenting judges called it the "road to Hell."

The ruiling stems from a lawsuit filed in Denham Springs in 2000.

New Orleans Police Department spokesman Capt. Marlon Defillo said the new
power will go into effect immediately and won't be abused.

"We have to have a legitimate problem to be there in the first place, and
if we don't, we can't conduct the search," Defillo said.

But former U.S. Attorney Julian Murray has big problems with the ruling.

"I think it goes way too far," Murray said, noting that the searches can be
performed if an officer fears for his safety -- a subjective condition.

Defillo said he doesn't envision any problems in New Orleans, but if there
are, they will be handled.

"There are checks and balances to make sure the criminal justce system
works in an effective manor," Defillo said.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From DaveHowe at gmx.co.uk  Sun Mar 28 04:21:12 2004
From: DaveHowe at gmx.co.uk (Dave Howe)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 13:21:12 +0100
Subject: Interesting case?
Message-ID: <022b01c414bf$29f88b40$01c8a8c0@broadbander>

Interesting looking case coming up soon - an employee (whose motives are
probably dubious, but still :) installed a keyghost onto his boss' pc and
was charged with unauthorised wire tapping.
That isn't the interesting bit. the interesting bit is this is IIRC exactly
how the FBI obtained Scarfo's PGP password, waybackwhen - *without* a
wiretap warrant.

http://www.out-law.com/php/page.php?page_id=keystrokeloggerhit1080217420

be interesting if his lawyer decided to call an FBI expert to explain why
this device isn't wiretapping, wouldn't it? :)




From bgt at chrootlabs.org  Sun Mar 28 11:53:26 2004
From: bgt at chrootlabs.org (bgt)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 13:53:26 -0600
Subject: Anonymizer employees need killing
In-Reply-To: <p06100469bc8c8a403813@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <ADF5B412-8076-11D8-8540-000393CE2B76@anonymizer.com>
  <C442B484-8085-11D8-8D53-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>
  <p06100469bc8c8a403813@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <93FACEFC-80F1-11D8-8D53-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>

On Mar 28, 2004, at 9:05, R. A. Hettinga wrote:

> Anonymizer is set up to prevent *businesses*, stalkers, and
> small-time crooks like spammers, from seeing your behavior on the net
> and annoying you there.
>
> What's he going to do when uncle Fed shows up with guns? Have a
> shootout or something?

This is exactly my point.  You and I are saying essentially the same 
things.
Anonymizer cannot be trusted with your life & liberty. It is the 
equivalent of
"kid sister cryptography".  Lance, however, does not seem to view it 
this way.

> And, if you're upset that you can't *surf* anonymously, sure as hell
> don't blame Lance.

What I'm blaming Lance for is snake-oil marketing. When someone posted
"Anonymizer revealed the identity of a customer to the FBI", Lance 
posted
"Anonymizer would never do such a thing".  But *of course* he would,
because there's a metaphorical (if not real) gun pointed at his head.

I'm not "pissing and moaning that a single-hop anonymity service doesn't
provide perfect anonymity", I'm calling Lance and Anonymizer on their
false claims.  Lance and Anonymizer should both be upfront and honest
about exactly what level of "anonymity" Anonymizer /can/ provide.

Then I would not have anything to say on this thread.  I agree, the 
service is
certainly useful for some things, and the world is better with it than 
without
it.

> And, finally, one last thing. After 5 or 6 years of it from Tim, who
> started this list, and the original physical meetings, it's no secret
> I've gotten really tired of the "need killing" chest-puffing

*I* did not say anyone needed killing, so I'm assuming this part of 
your rant
was targeted at someone else.

--bgt




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar 28 15:20:47 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 18:20:47 -0500
Subject: Anonymizer employees need killing
In-Reply-To: <93FACEFC-80F1-11D8-8D53-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>
References: <ADF5B412-8076-11D8-8540-000393CE2B76@anonymizer.com>  
  <C442B484-8085-11D8-8D53-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>  
  <p06100469bc8c8a403813@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <93FACEFC-80F1-11D8-8D53-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>
Message-ID: <p061004bbbc8d0baa8d6b@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

At 1:53 PM -0600 3/28/04, bgt wrote:
>What I'm blaming Lance for is snake-oil marketing.

Don't be a putz. He's marketing it for what it is. Lance has never
made any claims of perfect anonymity.

>> And, finally, one last thing. After 5 or 6 years of it from Tim,
>> who started this list, and the original physical meetings, it's no
>> secret I've gotten really tired of the "need killing"
>> chest-puffing
>
>*I* did not say anyone needed killing,

No, I was talking about the original post in this thread, and its
resultant title.

After watching you blather on, here, though, I'm beginning to regret
what *I* said on the matter.

:-).

In the meantime, try to pry your panties out of the crack in your
ass.

Cheers,
RAH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.3

iQA/AwUBQGdc68PxH8jf3ohaEQIwsgCeISV5A+amlSjXGtkAtpFN3Uei3zIAoJj0
YKsGDGoO3pX9qPAjHR/qtprk
=TmHg
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sun Mar 28 17:40:22 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 20:40:22 -0500
Subject: Mobile Wifi Backpack (fwd from
  brian-slashdotnews@hyperreal.org)
Message-ID: <BAY7-F30nloTEZcPJdS0000f1d1@hotmail.com>

Well, we actually discussed  a similar configuration in the context of mass 
demonstration. Such a configuration could prevent a Goonsquad shakedown of 
data/photos/videos, particularly when the WiFi device is acting like a 
router, and particularly when this router is one of many in a sea of 
routers, all forwarding the info-stuff.

To my knowledge, Variola cleverly dubbed it eJazeera.

-TD


>From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>To: transhumantech at yahoogroups.com, cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Mobile Wifi Backpack (fwd from brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org)
>Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2004 11:28:35 +0100
>
>----- Forwarded message from brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org -----
>
>From: brian-slashdotnews at hyperreal.org
>Date: 26 Mar 2004 23:26:03 -0000
>To: slashdotnews at hyperreal.org
>Subject: Mobile Wifi Backpack
>User-Agent: SlashdotNewsScooper/0.0.3
>
>Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/03/26/1841245
>Posted by: michael, on 2004-03-26 20:20:00
>Topic: wireless, 222 comments
>
>    from the share-the-love dept.
>    [1]ruzel writes "Julian Bleecker's web site [2]TechKwonDo describes
>    [3]a project that is a wifi base station in a backpack. 'WiFi.Bedouin
>    is a wearable, mobile 802.11b node disconnected from the global
>    Internet. It forms a WiFi "island Internet" challenging conventional
>    assumptions about WiFi and suggesting new architectures for digital
>    networks that are based on physical proximity rather than solely
>    connectivity.' The motivation is essentially subversive but what other
>    uses are there for a device like this?"
>
>    [4]Click Here
>
>References
>
>    1. mailto:ruzel at yahoo.com
>    2. http://www.techkwondo.com/
>    3. http://www.techkwondo.com/projects/bedouin/index.html
>    4. 
>http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=2683&alloc_id=6523&site_id=1&request_id=6363190&op=click&page=%2farticle%2epl
>
>----- End forwarded message -----
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net
><< attach3 >>

_________________________________________________________________
Get tax tips, tools and access to IRS forms  all in one place at MSN Money! 
http://moneycentral.msn.com/tax/home.asp




From hseaver at cybershamanix.com  Sun Mar 28 18:46:33 2004
From: hseaver at cybershamanix.com (Harmon Seaver)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 20:46:33 -0600
Subject: Sttop Spreading Hatred
In-Reply-To: <BAY7-F29kqXpfTTeScv0000f234@hotmail.com>
References: <BAY7-F29kqXpfTTeScv0000f234@hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <20040329024633.GA7787@cybershamanix.com>

   Ahh, I was wondering why I got that message -- it didn't seem to have
anything to do with any list, forgot about the "al-queda" node. So they must be
spamming everyone whose posted with that crap. 


On Sun, Mar 28, 2004 at 08:54:12PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> 
> OK, I keep getting this shit. Right now, I can't tell if it's 
> anti-agit-prop or simply a well-intentioned but idiotic muslim chick 
> (something about the wording made me assume this was a female).
> 
> Listen up. Cypherpunks is a cryptography list, and al-qaeda.net is a node. 
> The subscribers to this list may or may not sympathize with the activites 
> of the "Real" "al-qaeda". The name al-qaeda is, I suspect, more or less 
> tongue-in-cheek, and at the least (or perhaps the most) a head-nod at some 
> of the gripes that real organization has with the US government, and those 
> that continue to support it's activites abroad. However, there does not 
> appear to be any regular posters to this list that are involved with 
> al-qaeda the "terror" network. (Actually, if there are, it would be 
> interesting to hear from them via the remailers.)
> 
> Cypherpunks is an extremely diverse group of indivduals, that do not appear 
> to agree on a great many number of things. What binds us together (if 
> anything) is the interest in cryptographic techniques that would appear to 
> offer the capability of secure communications, with "communications" 
> meaning any kind of transaction that can be transmitted by data over 
> electronic or optoelectronic networks. Another thing that seems to bind us 
> (and again "bind" is probably a poor choice of words) is an extreme 
> tolerance to opinions very different from that of any one subscriber.
> 
> Therefore please get a fuckin' clue. If you want to discuss the role of 
> "Radical" Islam in contemporary world politics, I'm sure there are those 
> that would be interested in doing so. Otherwise, please fuck off.
> 
> Sincerely,
> Tyler S. Durden
> 
> 
> >From: "SSAR" <sar548 at hotmail.com>
> >Reply-To: sar548 at hotmail.com
> >To: camera_lumina at hotmail.com
> >Subject: Sttop Spreading Hatred
> >Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 14:01:59 +0500
> >
> >Subject: Stop Spreading Hatred
> >
> >
> >I think being a Muslim you are not working for peace. You are misguided, 
> >mistaken and spreading hatred through disinformation and false 
> >accusations, which is resulting in death and miseries for number of 
> >innocent people living around the world at the hands of merciless KILLER 
> >MUSLIMS and also bringing bad name to MOHAMMED as Founder Of Islam.
> >
> >To save Islam from total extinction, please work for peace and 
> >reconciliation and prove to the WORLD through your deeds that MOHAMMED 
> >teaches "love & peace" and not Cruelty, Inhumanity and "Hatred & Killing" 
> >of the innocent civilians.
> >
> >S.A.R
> >
> >
> 
> _________________________________________________________________
> All the action. All the drama. Get NCAA hoops coverage at MSN Sports by 
> ESPN. http://msn.espn.go.com/index.html?partnersite=espn

-- 
Harmon Seaver	
CyberShamanix
http://www.cybershamanix.com




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sun Mar 28 17:54:12 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 20:54:12 -0500
Subject: Sttop Spreading Hatred
Message-ID: <BAY7-F29kqXpfTTeScv0000f234@hotmail.com>

OK, I keep getting this shit. Right now, I can't tell if it's anti-agit-prop 
or simply a well-intentioned but idiotic muslim chick (something about the 
wording made me assume this was a female).

Listen up. Cypherpunks is a cryptography list, and al-qaeda.net is a node. 
The subscribers to this list may or may not sympathize with the activites of 
the "Real" "al-qaeda". The name al-qaeda is, I suspect, more or less 
tongue-in-cheek, and at the least (or perhaps the most) a head-nod at some 
of the gripes that real organization has with the US government, and those 
that continue to support it's activites abroad. However, there does not 
appear to be any regular posters to this list that are involved with 
al-qaeda the "terror" network. (Actually, if there are, it would be 
interesting to hear from them via the remailers.)

Cypherpunks is an extremely diverse group of indivduals, that do not appear 
to agree on a great many number of things. What binds us together (if 
anything) is the interest in cryptographic techniques that would appear to 
offer the capability of secure communications, with "communications" meaning 
any kind of transaction that can be transmitted by data over electronic or 
optoelectronic networks. Another thing that seems to bind us (and again 
"bind" is probably a poor choice of words) is an extreme tolerance to 
opinions very different from that of any one subscriber.

Therefore please get a fuckin' clue. If you want to discuss the role of 
"Radical" Islam in contemporary world politics, I'm sure there are those 
that would be interested in doing so. Otherwise, please fuck off.

Sincerely,
Tyler S. Durden


>From: "SSAR" <sar548 at hotmail.com>
>Reply-To: sar548 at hotmail.com
>To: camera_lumina at hotmail.com
>Subject: Sttop Spreading Hatred
>Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 14:01:59 +0500
>
>Subject: Stop Spreading Hatred
>
>
>I think being a Muslim you are not working for peace. You are misguided, 
>mistaken and spreading hatred through disinformation and false accusations, 
>which is resulting in death and miseries for number of innocent people 
>living around the world at the hands of merciless KILLER MUSLIMS and also 
>bringing bad name to MOHAMMED as Founder Of Islam.
>
>To save Islam from total extinction, please work for peace and 
>reconciliation and prove to the WORLD through your deeds that MOHAMMED 
>teaches "love & peace" and not Cruelty, Inhumanity and "Hatred & Killing" 
>of the innocent civilians.
>
>S.A.R
>
>

_________________________________________________________________
All the action. All the drama. Get NCAA hoops coverage at MSN Sports by 
ESPN. http://msn.espn.go.com/index.html?partnersite=espn




From bpdbeeeoc at ellenwilliams.com  Sun Mar 28 10:37:24 2004
From: bpdbeeeoc at ellenwilliams.com (Alma Franks)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 22:37:24 +0400
Subject: Experts are jumping a|l Over this st0ck
Message-ID: <.PLN@taylor.electrotecnica.com>

Yap International, Inc.(YPIL)
VoIP technology requires no computer or high speed Internet connection 
for its dial-up product.
Current Price: $.145
Watch This Stock Monday Some of These Litt|e VOIP Stocks Have Been 
Really Moving Late|y.

And When Some of them Move, They Real|y Go...Gains of 10O%, 2OO% or 
More Are
Not Unheard Of.

Break News!!

The past months have seen Yap Internationa| executing on its p|an to 
become a leading supp|ier of VoIP technology including the fo|lowing 
mi|estones:

On November 17, 2004, Yap Internationa| revea|ed a unique and patent 
pending technology marketed as the Nomad, or the Yap Internationa| 
Personal Gateway. The Yap Internationa| Persona| Gateway (the Nomad) 
is a patent-pending so|ution to a real prob|em that is inherent in 
all current and competing VoIP gateways.  The problem is the end user 
is limited to the physical |ocation of the Gateway in order to make 
a VoIP ca||. The Nomad��s unique and patent pending techno|ogy allows 
the customer to make VoIP-enab|ed ca||s from any te|ephone, not just 
one physically connected to the Gateway. For the first time a customer 
may ca|l their Persona| Gateway from any cel|ular or |andline push 
button phone in the wor|d, (or even through their laptop or PDA), 
connecting to the Internet for VoIP call savings and other on|ine 
information services, bypassing either partial|y or entire|y the 
high cost of Internationa| Long Distance charges from incumbent 
telecommunication providers.

On December 17, 20O4, Yap International announced its first major 
contract invo|ving the use of its technology products. Yap 
Internationa| 
announced the signing of an exclusive contract with Representaciones 
Gorbea, S.A. as the company��s distributor for VoIP products and 
services 
in Central and South America. Representaciones Gorbea, S.A. (RGSA) has 
a major presence in the region. RGSA entered into an exc|usive 
contractua| 
agreement with the second largest carrier in the region for 2OO,0O0 
VoIP 
units to be deployed throughout Guatemala in 2OO5. The contract 
represents 
in excess of $52 mi||i0n USD and Yap Internationa| expects that its 
products wi|l comprise the largest share of the order. RGSA is a|so the 
exc|usive representative for Leve| 3 (LVLT-Nasdaq) in Central America.

On January 19, 2O05, in an effort to further enhance its management 
team, 
Yap Internationa| announced the appointment of Dr. Vladimir Karpenkov, 
MS, Ph.D. as the Company's Chief Information Officer. Dr. Karpenkov 
earned 
his PHD at Ural State University and has comp|eted 2 separate Master of 
Science degrees in genera| programming /data base management and the 
physics of electro magnetic occurrences / optics of semi conductors 
respectively. Dr. Karpenkov is diverse background also inc|udes direct 
involvement in the deve|opment of proprietary technologies and systems, 
many of which have been patented in the U.S. and Europe. One such 
system 
was the first cellular phone network for the city of Chelyabinsk, 
Russia 
which was developed by Dr, Karpenkov in partnership with Mi||iken GMBH 
of 
Germany and Radio Telephone Inc. of Russia.

Our agreement with Securities Trading Services Inc. and the 
deve|opments 
of the past months |eaves us with tools necessary to commercialize and 
market our products on a global scale. We expect our milestones to be 
met 
and thus executing our business plan as anticipated��, stated Jan 
Olivier, 
CEO of Yap Internationa| Inc.

About The Company:
Yap International, Inc. is a multi-nationa| Internet Communications 
Company 
developing cost effective telecommunications through Voice over 
Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) technologies. The Company holds the exclusive rights to 
a 
revolutionary VoIP product |ine cal|ed NOMAD SYSTEMS that has Dial-up, 
Broadband, DSL, Cab|e, Sate|lite and Wireless capabi|ities. The Company 
p|ans on targeting: 1) National fixed line II & III Tier carriers which 
are 
interested in effective|y competing with the dominant carrier in their 
marketp|ace, 2) Large mu|tinational corporations which need to have US 
or 
European presence by having, (for example), a United States number 
ringing 
in their offices in Guatemala or London- offering business partners a 
more 
economical way to communicate, and 3) Immigrants in North America, a 
means 
of significantly lowering their communication expense with their 
re|atives 
in their country of origin. The Company is headquartered in Las Vegas 
with 
administrative offices in Vancouver and sa|es offices in Los Angeles, 
San Francisco and Newport Beach California. 

----------------------------------------

And Please Watch this One Trade Monday! Go Ypi|

-----------------------------------------

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From mv at cdc.gov  Sun Mar 28 23:31:32 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 23:31:32 -0800
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
Message-ID: <4067D0D4.61DB2622@cdc.gov>

At 06:44 PM 3/27/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>And, remember again, you have to *enclose* a burning gas to make it
>explosive first place.

Bob, stick with obfuscated economics and playing with boats.

Many gases are explosive in certain ratios to air.
Gasoline vapor, acetylene, in a wide range of ratios to air.
Others have narrower ranges.  But within these ranges
you don't need enclosures.  Except maybe for shrapnel.

You don't need enclosures for explosive gas mixtures any more than you
need an enclosure to get a boom from nitro.
(This is the diff between a brisant, like nitro, RDX, PETN, TNT, even
NI3, etc
and something that merely burns fast like black powder or
smokeless, which indeed must be enclosed to explode.)

PS: if a diesel vehicle is tailgating, acetylene will nicely stop
its engine in a rather expensive way.   Can you say predetonation?
A pound of calcium carbide and some water makes a nice vehicle stopper
BTW,
the .mil has looked into it.

The non-exploding fireball from a refinery or storage facility will be
sufficient to destroy
the facility, and make nice video, which is sufficient.  If Allah
smiles, maybe you
get a big bang too.  The trick is to do more than one place in the same
day, so it
can't be written off as an industrial accident.




From mv at cdc.gov  Sun Mar 28 23:33:22 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 23:33:22 -0800
Subject: Mobile Wifi Backpack 
Message-ID: <4067D142.34E94C16@cdc.gov>

At 11:28 AM 3/27/04 +0100, Eugen Leitl forwarded:
>'WiFi.Bedouin
>   is a wearable, mobile 802.11b node disconnected from the global
>   Internet. It forms a WiFi "island Internet" challenging conventional

>   assumptions about WiFi and suggesting new architectures for digital
>   networks that are based on physical proximity rather than solely
>   connectivity.' The motivation is essentially subversive but what
other
>   uses are there for a device like this?"

Simple.  Screwing people found within a larger radius.  See "toothing"
in the UK.




From mv at cdc.gov  Sun Mar 28 23:40:49 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2004 23:40:49 -0800
Subject: Official notice for all e-gold users
Message-ID: <4067D300.4F772ECB@cdc.gov>

the "all your dinars turn to toilet paper" attack on folks who have lots
of cash.  Ie,

exchange your old currency for new (or check your egold account).

Meanwhile these transactions are *monitored*, providing the IRS and DEA

(etc) with new leads.  Or in the case of egold, traceable IP routes.

At 09:52 PM 3/28/04 +0000, e-gold ltd wrote:

>   Dear e-gold user.
>   At 28-th of March, 2004 the e-gold company has blocked a number of
>   accounts




From mv at cdc.gov  Mon Mar 29 00:03:31 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 00:03:31 -0800
Subject: Sttop Spreading Hatred
Message-ID: <4067D853.F6631FED@cdc.gov>

At 08:54 PM 3/28/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>Listen up. Cypherpunks is a cryptography list, and al-qaeda.net is a
node.

True so far   Well, al-qaeda.net is a DNS record, and the list includes
social issues related to crypto-related tech, but lets start off by
giving you the point.

>The subscribers to this list may or may not sympathize with the
activites of
>the "Real" "al-qaeda".

Sorry, but the prefix "Real" is the intellectual property of an IRA (tm)
spinoff in this
context.  Our lawyers will be contacting you.

The name al-qaeda is, I suspect, more or less
>tongue-in-cheek,

Really?

and at the least (or perhaps the most) a head-nod at some
>of the gripes that real organization has with the US government, and
those
>that continue to support it's activites abroad.

Getting pretty heavy there Tyler

Ever consider that it might be a *reminder* that if isn't good enough
for
Osama, its not good enough for you?


However, there does not
>appear to be any regular posters to this list that are involved with
>al-qaeda the "terror" network. (Actually, if there are, it would be
>interesting to hear from them via the remailers.)

Everyone, search your wallet for official Al Q membership cards.
(I suppose female members may have trouble telling if its themselves
under the scarves on the ID.. except for the Florida branch of Al Q)

>Cypherpunks is an extremely diverse group of indivduals,

and wanna-be individuals

>that do not appear
>to agree on a great many number of things.

Really?

What binds us together (if
>anything) is the interest in cryptographic techniques that would appear
to
>offer the capability of secure communications, with "communications"
meaning
>any kind of transaction that can be transmitted by data over electronic
or
>optoelectronic networks.

*Way* too specific dude.  Also interested in opsec generally.  (All your

crypto is belong to us if I can get to your machine..)  Communications
can be
smoke signals.  (Would that be optical comms?)  Or the positions of
cards
in a deck.   Or the positions of hands in a shipment of watches.

Another thing that seems to bind us (and again
>"bind" is probably a poor choice of words) is an extreme tolerance to
>opinions very different from that of any one subscriber.

What the fuck are you ingesting tonight?  "extreme tolerance to
opinions"??  Its only because it would be self-parodying that
accusations of nazihood don't fly.  Even with Tim gone, praise be unto
him.

On the other hand, in our better moods we try to educate each other.

>Therefore please get a fuckin' clue. If you want to discuss the role of

>"Radical" Islam in contemporary world politics, I'm sure there are
those
>that would be interested in doing so.

Not here.

>Otherwise, please fuck off.

If you've been getting this kind of cameldung *personally*, this is yet
another reward
of using a 1-way pseudonym.

----
There is no god and Murphy is his prophet.




From shaddack at ns.arachne.cz  Sun Mar 28 18:05:38 2004
From: shaddack at ns.arachne.cz (Thomas Shaddack)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 04:05:38 +0200 (CEST)
Subject: Sttop Spreading Hatred
In-Reply-To: <BAY7-F29kqXpfTTeScv0000f234@hotmail.com>
References: <BAY7-F29kqXpfTTeScv0000f234@hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <0403290403590.-1239163312@somehost.domainz.com>

On Sun, 28 Mar 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:

> Another thing that seems to bind us (and again "bind" is probably a poor
> choice of words) is an extreme tolerance to opinions very different from
> that of any one subscriber.

Ummmm... like "...and in a flame war bind them?
/me hides




From mv at cdc.gov  Mon Mar 29 08:50:26 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 08:50:26 -0800
Subject: Louisiana cops needing killing
Message-ID: <406853D1.2A65384F@cdc.gov>

NEW ORLEANS -- It's a groundbreaking court decision that legal experts
say will affect everyone: Police officers in Louisiana no longer need a
search or arrest warrant to conduct a brief search of your home or
business.

Leaders in law enforcement say it will keep officers safe, but others
argue it's a privilege that could be abused.

The decision in United States v. Kelly Gould, No. 0230629cr0, was made
March 24 by the New Orleans-based 5th Circuit Court of Appeals.

The ruling stems from a lawsuit filed in Denham Springs in 2000, in
which a defendant filed a motion to supress information gleaned from a
search of his home. The motion was granted by a district court, and the
government appealed this decision. The March 24 ruling by the 5th
Circuit is an affirmation of that appeal.

New Orleans Police Department spokesman Capt. Marlon Defillo said the
new power will go into effect immediately.

"We have to have a legitimate problem to be there in the first place,
and if we don't, we can't conduct the search," Defillo said.

But former U.S. Attorney Julian Murray said the ruling is problematic.

"I think it goes way too far," Murray said, noting that the searches can
be performed if an officer fears for his safety.

Defillo said he doesn't envision any problems in New Orleans.

"There are checks and balances to make sure the criminal justce system
works in an effective manner," Defillo said.

http://www.theneworleanschannel.com/news/2953483/detail.html




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 29 06:09:09 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 09:09:09 -0500
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
In-Reply-To: <4067D0D4.61DB2622@cdc.gov>
References: <4067D0D4.61DB2622@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <p06100420bc8dd4549650@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

At 11:31 PM -0800 3/28/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>Bob, stick with obfuscated economics and playing with boats.

Yeaaaaahhhh, I know. Think of it as me clearing the pipes for more
stuff, or something. I haven't written much lately, and I'm starting
to do that again.


They just pissed me off, is all, and the thing wrote itself.

So, now I feel better for my own bit of spontaneous combustion, which
I probably shouldn't have sent here, since, of course, it wasn't
topical. ;-).


It's like two things I saw every day for several years apiece
collided in meme-space, and I didn't even know I was even pissed off
until I saw just the barest hint of those idiots being re-deified in
the Globe Sunday morning. Whole decades of their sanctimony just
became too much to abide anymore.

Like nuclear power (or nuclear weapons), genetically modified foods,
air travel, and lots of other progress, LNG is safe enough even in
the worst-case scenario, and FUD-mongers like the Bulletin of the
Atomic "Scientists" are the worst kind of Luddite charlatans.

But I bet you figured that out, right? :-).

>The non-exploding fireball from a refinery or storage facility will
>be sufficient to destroy
>the facility, and make nice video, which is sufficient.  If Allah
>smiles, maybe you
>get a big bang too.  The trick is to do more than one place in the
>same day, so it
>can't be written off as an industrial accident.

Like I said, you would need a full-on military operation to do the
job, a battalion for the main tank, or a smart bomb and
air-superiority for one tank on a ship, which would be kind of
obvious.

And, of course, if that's what happened, you'd have more problems
than a whole bunch of flaming fart-gas lighting up the Tobin
Bridge...

Anyway, to paraphrase John Astin's character in "Night Court", I feel
*muuch* better now, though I can't promise there won't be more later.
:-).

Cheers,
RAH

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iQA/AwUBQGgt8MPxH8jf3ohaEQKrnQCgjOzwlyuCZRTivxeOggcK7GBqgiIAn1Z1
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=Cffy
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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 29 06:47:07 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 09:47:07 -0500
Subject: An Essential War
Message-ID: <p06100425bc8de161a570@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Figuring out what happens after the state is probably the most
important thing to work on in the coming century, I figure. Sooner or
later, the state, that is, politically controlled transfer-priced
geographic force-monopoly, isn't going to work anymore.

Given Moore's Law and its effects on communications networks and
resultant social structures, the first step, which is already
happening, will be more, and not fewer, states.

As price discovery costs fall, this will probably result in
non-geographic control of force, and, most likely, non-monopolistic
markets for same. With sufficiently lowered transaction costs, the
end-state, if you will :-), will probably be the complete
commercialization of force. Not in monopolistic competition using
laws for control and organization, using incorporation, patents and
brands (Ford vs. Diamler-Chrysler) but in perfectly competitive
auction markets, like those for graded fungible commodities, using
network and financial cryptography protocols for transaction
execution and proof of performance, and much more focused
applications of force than modern warfare entails.

We live in interesting times, with interesting problems to solve.

In the meantime, the ability to fight distributed violence rests with
nation-states, who are finally getting the idea that it is, in fact,
a military problem, and not something to leave to lawyers. The threat
of terrorism and other geodesic forms of warfare is just that, a
permutation of war, and, though now can and should be fought at the
level of the state, ultimately, it must be fought at a scale much
smaller than that.

Ultimately, terrorism is a form of individual violence, and will be
fought individually.

Think of it as a form of responsible anarchy, informed more by
markets at the device layer of a society's architecture than by
ideology at the human.

Cheers,
RAH
- --------

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB108052892146167601,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal

      March 29, 2004

 COMMENTARY



An Essential War

By GEORGE P. SHULTZ
March 29, 2004; Page A18


We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan
administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a
big problem, a different problem, and we have to take forceful action
against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me, but not many
others did. (Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception.)

In those days we focused on how to defend against terrorism. We
reinforced our embassies and increased our intelligence effort. We
thought we made some progress. We established the legal basis for
holding states responsible for using terrorists to attack Americans
anywhere. Through intelligence, we did abort many potential terrorist
acts. But we didn't really understand what motivated the terrorists
or what they were out to do.

In the 1990s, the problem began to appear even more menacing. Osama
bin Laden and al Qaeda were well known, but the nature of the
terrorist threat was not yet comprehended and our efforts to combat
it were ineffective. Diplomacy without much force was tried.
Terrorism was regarded as a law enforcement problem and terrorists as
criminals. Some were arrested and put on trial. Early last year, a
judge finally allowed the verdict to stand for one of those convicted
in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ten years! Terrorism is not a
matter that can be left to law enforcement, with its deliberative
process, built-in delays, and safeguards that may let the prisoner go
free on procedural grounds.

Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can
see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally
connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our
international system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the
1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the
bombs on the trains in Madrid, and scores of other terrorist attacks
in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or
another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states
that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise,
for sale.

What should we do? First and foremost, shore up the state system.

The world has worked for three centuries with the sovereign state as
the basic operating entity, presumably accountable to its citizens
and responsible for their well-being. In this system, states also
interact with each other -- bilaterally or multilaterally -- to
accomplish ends that transcend their borders. They create
international organizations to serve their ends, not govern them.

Increasingly, the state system has been eroding. Terrorists have
exploited this weakness by burrowing into the state system in order
to attack it. While the state system weakens, no replacement is in
sight that can perform the essential functions of establishing an
orderly and lawful society, protecting essential freedoms, providing
a framework for fruitful economic activity, contributing to effective
international cooperation, and providing for the common defense.

* * *

I see our great task as restoring the vitality of the state system
within the framework of a world of opportunity, and with aspirations
for a world of states that recognize accountability for human freedom
and dignity.

All established states should stand up to their responsibilities in
the fight against our common enemy, terror; be a helpful partner in
economic and political development; and take care that international
organizations work for their member states, not the other way around.
When they do, they deserve respect and help to make them work
successfully.

The civilized world has a common stake in defeating the terrorists.
We now call this what it is: a War on Terrorism. In war, you have to
act on both offense and defense. You have to hit the enemy before the
enemy hits you. The diplomacy of incentives, containment, deterrence
and prevention are all made more effective by the demonstrated
possibility of forceful pre-emption. Strength and diplomacy go
together. They are not alternatives; they are complements. You work
diplomacy and strength together on a grand and strategic scale and on
an operational and tactical level. But if you deny yourself the
option of forceful pre-emption, you diminish the effectiveness of
your diplomatic moves. And, with the consequences of a terrorist
attack as hideous as they are -- witness what just happened in Madrid
- -- the U.S. must be ready to pre-empt identified threats. And not at
the last moment, when an attack is imminent and more difficult to
stop, but before the terrorist gets in position to do irreparable
harm.

Over the last decade we have seen large areas of the world where
there is no longer any state authority at all, an ideal environment
for terrorists to plan and train. In the early 1990s we came to
realize the significance of a "failed state." Earlier, people allowed
themselves to think that, for example, an African colony could gain
its independence, be admitted to the U.N. as a member state, and
thereafter remain a sovereign state. Then came Somalia. All
government disappeared. No more sovereignty, no more state. The same
was true in Afghanistan. And who took over? Islamic extremists. They
soon made it clear that they regarded the concept of the state as an
abomination. To them, the very idea of "the state" was un-Islamic.
They talked about reviving traditional forms of pan-Islamic rule with
no place for the state. They were fundamentally, and violently,
opposed to the way the world works, to the international state
system.

The United States launched a military campaign to eliminate the
Taliban and al Qaeda's rule over Afghanistan. Now we and our allies
are trying to help Afghanistan become a real state again and a viable
member of the international state system. Yet there are many other
parts of the world where state authority has collapsed or, within
some states, large areas where the state's authority does not run.

That's one area of danger: places where the state has vanished. A
second area of danger is found in places where the state has been
taken over by criminals or warlords. Saddam Hussein was one example.
Kim Jong Il of North Korea is another.

They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their
wealth, consolidate their rule and develop their weaponry. As they do
this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the
international system, they at the same time claim its privileges and
immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the
internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these
thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world
have let them get away with it.

This is why the case of Saddam Hussein and Iraq is so significant.
After Saddam Hussein consolidated power, he started a war against one
of his neighbors, Iran, and in the course of that war he committed
war crimes including the use of chemical weapons, even against his
own people.

About 10 years later he started another war against another one of
his neighbors, Kuwait. In the course of doing so he committed war
crimes. He took hostages. He launched missiles against a third and
then a fourth country in the region.

That war was unique in modern times because Saddam totally eradicated
another state, and turned it into "Province 19" of Iraq. The
aggressors in wars might typically seize some territory, or occupy
the defeated country, or install a puppet regime; but Saddam sought
to wipe out the defeated state, to erase Kuwait from the map of the
world.

That got the world's attention. That's why, at the U.N., the votes
were wholly in favor of a U.S.-led military operation -- Desert Storm
- -- to throw Saddam out of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait to its place
as a legitimate state in the international system. There was
virtually universal recognition that those responsible for the
international system of states could not let a state simply be rubbed
out.

When Saddam was defeated, in 1991, a cease-fire was put in place.
Then the U.N. Security Council decided that, in order to prevent him
from continuing to start wars and commit crimes against his own
people, he must give up his arsenal of "weapons of mass destruction."

Recall the way it was to work. If Saddam cooperated with U.N.
inspectors and produced his weapons and facilitated their
destruction, then the cease-fire would be transformed into a peace
agreement ending the state of war between the international system
and Iraq. But if Saddam did not cooperate, and materially breached
his obligations regarding his weapons of mass destruction, then the
original U.N. Security Council authorization for the use of "all
necessary force" against Iraq -- an authorization that at the end of
Desert Storm had been suspended but not cancelled -- would be
reactivated and Saddam would face another round of the U.S.-led
military action against him. Saddam agreed to this arrangement.

In the early 1990s, U.N. inspectors found plenty of materials in the
category of weapons of mass destruction and they dismantled a lot of
it. They kept on finding such weapons, but as the presence of force
declined, Saddam's cooperation declined. He began to play games and
to obstruct the inspection effort.

By 1998 the situation was untenable. Saddam had made inspections
impossible. President Clinton, in February 1998, declared that Saddam
would have to comply with the U.N. resolutions or face American
military force. Kofi Annan flew to Baghdad and returned with a new
promise of cooperation from Saddam. But Saddam did not cooperate.
Congress then passed the Iraq Liberation Act by a vote of 360 to 38
in the House of Representatives; the Senate gave its unanimous
consent. Signed into law on October 31, it supported the renewed use
of force against Saddam with the objective of changing the regime. By
this time, he had openly and utterly rejected the inspections and the
U.N. resolutions.

In November 1998, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring
Saddam to be in "flagrant violation" of all resolutions going back to
1991. That meant that the cease-fire was terminated and the original
authorization for the use of force against Saddam was reactivated.
President Clinton ordered American forces into action in December
1998.

But the U.S. military operation was called off after only four days
- -- apparently because President Clinton did not feel able to lead the
country in war at a time when he was facing impeachment.

So inspections stopped. The U.S. ceased to take the lead. But the
inspectors reported that as of the end of 1998 Saddam possessed major
quantities of WMDs across a range of categories, and particularly in
chemical and biological weapons and the means of delivering them by
missiles. All the intelligence services of the world agreed on this.

- From that time until late last year, Saddam was left undisturbed to
do what he wished with this arsenal of weapons. The international
system had given up its ability to monitor and deal with this threat.
All through the years between 1998 and 2002 Saddam continued to act
and speak and to rule Iraq as a rogue state.

President Bush made it clear by 2002, and against the background of
9/11, that Saddam must be brought into compliance. It was obvious
that the world could not leave this situation as it was. The U.S.
made the decision to continue to work within the scope of the
Security Council resolutions -- a long line of them -- to deal with
Saddam. After an extended and excruciating diplomatic effort, the
Security Council late in 2002 passed Resolution 1441, which gave
Saddam one final chance to comply or face military force. When on
December 8, 2002, Iraq produced its required report, it was clear
that Saddam was continuing to play games and to reject his
obligations under international law. His report, thousands of pages
long, did not in any way account for the remaining weapons of mass
destruction that the U.N. inspectors had reported to be in existence
as of the end of 1998. That assessment was widely agreed upon.

That should have been that. But the debate at the U.N. went on -- and
on. And as it went on it deteriorated. Instead of the focus being
kept on Iraq and Saddam, France induced others to regard the problem
as one of restraining the U.S. -- a position that seemed to emerge
from France's aspirations for greater influence in Europe and
elsewhere. By March of 2003 it was clear that French diplomacy had
resulted in splitting NATO, the European Union, and the Security
Council . . . and probably convincing Saddam that he would not face
the use of force. The French position, in effect, was to say that
Saddam had begun to show signs of cooperation with the U.N.
resolutions because more than 200,000 American troops were poised on
Iraq's borders ready to strike him; so the U.S. should just keep its
troops poised there for an indeterminate time to come, until
presumably France would instruct us that we could either withdraw or
go into action. This of course was impossible militarily,
politically, and financially.

Where do we stand now? These key points need to be understood:
* There has never been a clearer case of a rogue state using its
privileges of statehood to advance its dictator's interests in ways
that defy and endanger the international state system.
 
* The international legal case against Saddam -- 17 resolutions --
was unprecedented.
 
* The intelligence services of all involved nations and the U.N.
inspectors over more than a decade all agreed that Saddam possessed
weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to international
peace and security.
 
* Saddam had four undisturbed years to augment, conceal, disperse,
or otherwise deal with his arsenal.
 
* He used every means to avoid cooperating or explaining what he
has done with them. This refusal in itself was, under the U.N.
resolutions, adequate grounds for resuming the military operation
against him that had been put in abeyance in 1991 pending his
compliance.
 
* President Bush, in ordering U.S. forces into action, stated that
we were doing so under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687,
the original bases for military action against Saddam Hussein in
1991. Those who criticize the U.S. for unilateralism should recognize
that no nation in the history of the United Nations has ever engaged
in such a sustained and committed multilateral diplomatic effort to
adhere to the principles of international law and international
organization within the international system. In the end, it was the
U.S. that upheld and acted in accordance with the U.N. resolutions on
Iraq, not those on the Security Council who tried to stop us.
 


* * *

The question of weapons of mass destruction is just that: a question
that remains to be answered, a mystery that must be solved. Just as
we also must solve the mystery of how Libya and Iran developed
menacing nuclear capability without detection, of how we were caught
unaware of a large and flourishing black market in nuclear material
- -- and of how we discovered these developments before they got
completely out of hand and have put in place promising corrective
processes. The question of Iraq's presumed stockpile of weapons will
be answered, but that answer, however it comes out, will not affect
the fully justifiable and necessary action that the coalition has
undertaken to bring an end to Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq. As Dr.
David Kay put it in a Feb. 1 interview with Chris Wallace, "We know
there were terrorist groups in state still seeking WMD capability.
Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in
this area. A marketplace phenomena was about to occur, if it did not
occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been very
dangerous if the war had not intervened."

When asked by Mr. Wallace what the sellers could have sold if they
didn't have actual weapons, Mr. Kay said: "The knowledge of how to
make them, the knowledge of how to make small amounts, which is,
after all, mostly what terrorists want. They don't want battlefield
amounts of weapons. No, Iraq remained a very dangerous place in terms
of WMD capabilities, even though we found no large stockpiles of
weapons."

Above all, and in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq
war will be what it means for the integrity of the international
system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The
stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That
is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why,
for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is
that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to
sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in
the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their
depredations -- including the development of awesome weapons for
threats, use, or sale -- behind the shield of protection that
statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a
state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the
system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.

Sept. 11 forced us to comprehend the extent and danger of the
challenge. We began to act before our enemy was able to extend and
consolidate his network.

If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around
1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to
head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in
action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and
diplomacy, we can win this war.

Mr. Shultz, a former secretary of state, is a distinguished fellow at
the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. This is adapted from his
Kissinger Lecture, given recently at the Library of Congress.


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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Mon Mar 29 06:50:36 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 09:50:36 -0500
Subject: Sttop Spreading Hatred
Message-ID: <BAY7-F108smDzYbB1t900015bd2@hotmail.com>

Variola wrote...

>What the fuck are you ingesting tonight?  "extreme tolerance to
>opinions"??  Its only because it would be self-parodying that
>accusations of nazihood don't fly.  Even with Tim gone, praise be unto
>him.

Uh, it was Spaten Octoberfest, ON TAP.

Consider Tyler Durden justifiably bitch-slapped, though there was at least a 
WEE bit of trollin' mixed in there.


As for May, I don't miss his "killing", but I definitely miss his edge and 
occasional insite.

_________________________________________________________________
Is your PC infected? Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee. 
Security. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963




From declan at well.com  Mon Mar 29 10:25:29 2004
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 13:25:29 -0500
Subject: [Politech] Judge dismisses John Gilmore's ID-required lawsuit [priv]
Message-ID: <mailman.854.1576007642.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

<x-flowed>



GILMORE v. ASHCROFT

JOHN GILMORE, Plaintiff, v. JOHN ASHCROFT, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the United States; ROBERT MUELLER, in his official
capacity as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; NORMAN
MINETA, in his official capacity as Secretary of Transportation; MARION
C. BLAKEY, as Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration;
Admiral JAMES M. LOY, in his official capacity as Acting Undersecretary
of Transportation for Security; TOM RIDGE, in his official capacity as
Chief of the Office of Homeland Security; UAL CORPORATION, aka UNITED
AIRLINES; and DOES I-XXX, Defendants.

No. C 02-3444 SI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 19, 2004, Decided
March 23, 2004, Filed

...

Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Having carefully
considered the arguments of the parties and the papers submitted, the
Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss n1 and DENIES plaintiff's request
for judicial notice.

...

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff John Gilmore is a California resident who is suing the United
States n2 and Southwest Airlines for refusing to allow him to board an
airplane on July 4, 2002 without either displaying a government-issued
identification consenting to a search. Plaintiff alleges that these
security requirements imposed by the United States government and
effected by the airline companies violate several of his constitutional
rights, including his rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. n3

...

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court may dismiss a complaint when it is not based on a cognizable
legal theory or pleads insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal
claim. Smilecare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan, 88 F.3d 780, 783
(9th Cir. 1996).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that as a result of the requirement that
passengers traveling on planes show identification and his unwillingness
to comply with this requirement, he has been unable to travel by air
since September 11, 2001. Plaintiff's complaint asserts causes of action
challenging the apparent government policy that requires travelers
either to show identification or to consent to a search which involves
wanding, walking through a magnetometer or a light pat-down. Whether
this is actually the government's policy is unclear, as the policy, if
it exists, is unpublished. However, this Court for the purpose [*6]  of
evaluating plaintiff's complaint, assumes such a policy does exist, and
reviews plaintiff's complaint accordingly.

Plaintiff asserts the unconstitutionality of this policy on the
following grounds: vagueness in violation of the Due Process Clause;
violation of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures; violation of the right to freedom of association; and
violation of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances.

The federal defendants and airline defendant both brought motions to
dismiss. As plaintiffs' claims are common to both sets of defendants,
this Court treats them collectively. While there are questions about the
private defendant's liability as a state actor and about the federal
defendants' liability for the private defendant's actions, as this Court
has not found plaintiff's complaint to have alleged a constitutional
violation, those issues need not be addressed at this time.

...

1. Standing

As a preliminary matter, the federal defendants have objected to all of
plaintiff's claims other than plaintiff's challenges to the
identification requirement. It is unclear from plaintiff's complaint
whether he intended to plead any [*7]  other claims, but he did allude
to the "government's plan to create huge, integrated databases by
mingling criminal histories with credit records, previous travel history
and much more, in order to create dossiers on every traveling citizen,"
including creation of "no fly" watchlists. Complaint, P8. He pointed to
newspaper and magazine articles and internet websites describing various
activities and directives issued by various federal agencies, including
the increased use of the Consumer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
("CAPPS") in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
Complaint, PP35-50.

The federal defendants argue that "as a threshold matter, plaintiff has
standing in this action solely insofar as he challenges an alleged
federally-imposed requirement that airlines request identification as
part of the screening process at airports. The complaint is devoid of
any allegation that plaintiff personally has suffered any injury that is
fairly traceable to any other practice, procedure, or criterion that may
be used by any defendant in screening airline passengers for weapons and
explosives." Motion to Dismiss at 2:21-25.

...

Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff pleads causes of action beyond
those stemming from the identification requirement, those causes of
action are DISMISSED for lack of standing or jurisdiction.

2. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action: violation of the Due Process Clause

Plaintiff alleges that the identification requirement is
"unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment because it is vague, being unpublished, and thus
provides no way for ordinary people or reviewing courts to conclusively
determine what is legal." Complaint, P52. This claim directly attacks
the policy, regulation, order or directive requiring production of
identification at airports.

In this case, the federal defendants refuse to [*10]  concede whether a
written order or directive requiring identification exists, or if it
does, who issued it or what it says. They contend, however, that to the
extent this action challenges an order issued by the TSA or the FAA, 49
U.S.C. ' 46110(a) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Courts of Appeals
to decide the challenge.

...

Because this claim squarely attacks the orders or regulations issued by
the TSA and/or the FAA with respect to airport security, this Court does
not have jurisdiction to hear the challenge. As a corollary, without
having been provided a copy of this unpublished statute or regulation,
if it exists, the Court is unable to conduct any meaningful inquiry as
to the merits of plaintiff's vagueness argument. This argument would
better be addressed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals or to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, both of which
have jurisdiction to review these matters.

3. Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action: violation of the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures

...

In plaintiffs' case, he was not required to provide identification on
pain of criminal or other governmental sanction. Identification requests
unaccompanied by detention, arrest, or any other penalty, other than the
significant inconvenience of being unable to fly, do not amount to a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff has not
suggested that he felt that he was not free to leave when he was asked
to produce [*15]  identification. None of the facts submitted by
plaintiff suggests that the request for identification implicated
plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, plaintiff's claim that
the identification requirement is unreasonable does not raise a legal
dispute that this Court must decide.

...


3. Plaintiff's Third and Fourth Causes of Action: violation of the right
to travel protected by the Due Process Clause

...

However, plaintiff's allegation that his right to travel has been
violated is insufficient as a matter of law because the Constitution
does not guarantee the right to travel by any particular form of
transportation. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999)
("Burdens on a single mode of transportation do not implicate the right
to interstate travel."); Monarch Travel Serv. Assoc. Cultural Clubs,
Inc., 466 F.2d 55 2(9th Cir. 1972). The right to travel throughout the
United States confers a right to be "uninhibited by statutes, rules and
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." Saenz
v. Roe, 526 U.S. 486, 499 (9th Cir. 1973). This Court rejects
plaintiff's argument that the request [*20]  that plaintiff either
submit to search, present identification, or presumably use another mode
of transport, is a violation of plaintiff's constitutional right to travel.

...

4. Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action: violation of the right to freedom
of association protected by the First and Fifth Amendments

Plaintiff's allegation that his right to associate freely was violated
fails because the only actions which violate this right are those which
are "direct and substantial or significant." Storm v. Town of Woodstock,
944 F. Supp. 139, 144 (N.D. N.Y. 1996). Government action which only
indirectly affects associational rights is not sufficient to state a
claim for violation of the freedom to associate. To the extent that
plaintiff alleged plans to exercise his associational rights in
Washington, D.C., the Court finds that plaintiff's rights were not
violated as plaintiff had numerous other methods of reaching Washington.

...


For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
Plaintiff's claims against the federal defendants and Southwest Airlines
are dismissed with prejudice; plaintiff's claims against United Airlines
are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff's request for judicial notice
is denied. [Docket ## 6, 8, 10, 22, 28].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2004

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

_______________________________________________
Politech mailing list
Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/)

</x-flowed>

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 29 12:02:48 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 15:02:48 -0500
Subject: You can't hide your lying eyes
Message-ID: <p06100487bc8e17674f30@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2004/Mar-28-Sun-2004/opinion/23416639.html>



Sunday, March 28, 2004
Las Vegas Review-Journal

 VIN SUPRYNOWICZ: You can't hide your lying eyes



I see where the people of Haiti finally got sick of defrocked collectivist
priest and all-around "necklace" killer Jean-Bertrand Aristide, took up
arms, and kicked him out.

 So what are U.S. forces doing there now? About 1,800 of our guys have been
sent in to -- in the words of Associated Press reporter Paisley Dodds --
"rid the nation of guns."

 Hey, good plan. In the great tradition of George Washington, Francis
Marion, and young Jim Monroe, the Haitian people just used firearms to
throw out a vicious tyrant, and the immediate goal of Big White Brother is
to "rebuild a shattered police force and disarm militants who began the
insurgency."

 At least back in 1994, when the freedom-loving Bill Clinton sent in 20,000
troops to install Aristide the murderous dictator, U.S. troops offered to
buy these weapons of freedom in order to better enslave the natives. This
time (Mr. Dodds reports) "Haitians ... are being asked to give up their
guns with little or no incentive and in a very insecure environment."

 The only good news? U.S. forces, Mr. Dodds reports, have so far "recovered
two shotguns. Their Chilean counterparts have confiscated three weapons."

 Washington City has no constitutional authorization whatever to spend our
tax dollars sending troops into Haiti to disarm "uppity Negroes" who dared
fight to win their own freedom. And also for the record, there were no
organized police departments in this country until the 1850s.

 That's right: From 1776 until at least 1850 America was a nation of "armed
insurgent militants" with no government police. And we got along just fine.

 How do you think the people of the proud, young, free United States of
America would have reacted if some foreign army had arrived here in 1783
with the declared the goal of "ridding the nation of the guns" that had
just been used to win America's freedom?

 Why does our Second Amendment say a well-armed citizen militia is
necessary? That's right, it's "necessary to the security of a free state."

 After all, as early as 1785, our own Southern states were passing laws
that "No slaves shall keep any arms whatever, nor pass, unless with written
orders from his master or employer, or in his company, with arms from one
place to another."

 Whereas, in his proposed constitution for the state of Virginia, Thomas
Jefferson wrote: "No free man shall ever be debarred the use of arms. The
strongest reason for the people to retain their right to keep and bear arms
is as a last resort to protect themselves against tyranny in government."

 Notice the definitive difference there between "free men" and "slaves"?

 In 1788, debating the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, a great
patriot and friend of Washington named George Mason stood in Richmond and
recalled: "When the resolution of enslaving America was formed in Great
Britain, the British Parliament was advised by an artful man, who was
Governor of Pennsylvania, to disarm the people; that it was the best and
most effectual way to enslave them; but that they should do it not openly,
but weaken them, and let them sink gradually. ... I ask, who are the
Militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public
officers." And it was no less a freedom-fighter than Mohandas Gandhi who
said, in 1927: "Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India,
history will look upon the act of depriving a whole nation of its arms as
the blackest."

 And this conspiracy to attack and remove the very tools of freedom is not
isolated. There isn't even any Second Amendment in the new Iraqi
constitution, according to World Net Daily.

 In a March 10 piece bearing the sub-headline "Colin Powell hails
prohibition on arms while emphasizing 'liberty,' " WND correspondent Ron
Strom writes: "Iraq's new interim constitution sounds many of the same
themes as the U.S. Constitution in guaranteeing freedom of the people --
with one stark difference: There is no right to keep and bear arms in the
new charter."

 The document does indeed promise a whole bunch of freedoms. (So did the
Soviet Constitution.) But when it comes to civilian ownership of
military-style arms -- which our founding fathers warned us was the last
and only real safeguard of the rest of our liberties?

 The only reference to individual ownership of arms is in Article 17: "It
shall not be permitted to possess, bear, buy, or sell arms except on
licensure issued in accordance with the law."

 And Article 27 further addresses the formation of militias: "Armed forces
and militias not under the command structure of the Iraqi Transitional
Government are prohibited, except as provided by federal law."

 America's leading gun-rights organization quickly registered strong
opposition to this nonsense.

 "It's a very big mistake," said Erich Pratt, director of communications
for Gun Owners of America. "What an interesting contrast to what our
Founding Fathers thought."

 Not that any of this should come as a surprise. Aaron Zelman's
Milwaukee-based Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership recently
noticed our own federal naturalization folks now require incoming citizens
to study a booklet which claims our Second Amendment guarantees the right
to bear arms "subject to certain reasonable restrictions." When JPFO
contacted our duplicitous federal masters to ask where in our founding
documents they found this "subject to certain reasonable restrictions"
language ... they received no answer.

 Vin Suprynowicz is assistant editorial page editor of the Review-Journal
and author of the books "Send in the Waco Killers" and "The Ballad of Carl
Drega." His Web site is www.privacyalert.us.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 29 12:07:09 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 15:07:09 -0500
Subject: [Politech] Judge dismisses John Gilmore's ID-required lawsuit 
  [priv]
Message-ID: <p061004b7bc8e32519e26@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 29 12:38:59 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 15:38:59 -0500
Subject: UI expert?
Message-ID: <p061004c3bc8e3706b86b@[66.149.49.5]>

Telegraph. Telephone. Tell Hettinga.


Ben Laurie, of Apache SSL, The Bunker, and Lucre fame, among other stuff,
is looking for UI help on something, and I'm passing it along.

Contact him directly.

Cheers,
RAH
Who's been Pre-killfiled already. Blacklists? Blacklists??? We don' need no
*steenkin'* blacklists...
------

At 3:26 PM -0500 3/29/04, Ben Laurie <ben at algroup.co.uk> wrote to his Orkut
friends:
>
>friends of friends
>
> 
>
>  subject: 
> 
>UI expert?
>
> 
> 
>
> message: 
> 
>OK, since the purpose of Orkut is to send spam without getting
>blacklisted, here's my bit of spam - does anyone know a really good UI
>person who'd like to work on free software (no, that doesn't mean its
>unpaid)?
>
>If so, send 'em my way...

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From bbrow07 at students.bbk.ac.uk  Mon Mar 29 07:01:06 2004
From: bbrow07 at students.bbk.ac.uk (ken)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 16:01:06 +0100
Subject: Anonymity of prepaid phone chip-cards
In-Reply-To: <0403261946080.-1303260060@somehost.domainz.com>
References: <0403261946080.-1303260060@somehost.domainz.com>
Message-ID: <40683A32.80008@students.bbk.ac.uk>

Thomas Shaddack wrote:

[...]

> Suggested countermeasure: When true anonymity is requested, use the card
> ONLY ONCE, then destroy it. Makes the calls rather expensive, but less
> risky. Make sure you can't be traced back by other means, ranging from
> surveillance cameras in the vicinity of the phone booths to the location
> data from cellphones (because, as it's well-known but often overlooked,
> the cellphone networks know the location of every active phone).

In local pubs round where I live it is not at all uncommon to find 
people buying & selling SIM cards, swapping them, or just handing 
roudn to friends & family members.

If these persons are involved in activities which would be 
disapproved of by the law, I imagine that they would be very 
unlikley to be anything that could be called terrorism. More 
likely doing casual work without paying tax,  using drugs 
deprecated by governments, trading in unauthorised DVDs, perhaps 
employing illegal immigrants. (Allegedly that is  - as far as I am 
aware the apparently oriental gentleman who walks round pubs and 
clubs late at night offering DVDs and CDs for a pound is in full 
complience with all local copyright laws)

There was a notorious murder locally (Damilola Taylor) which the 
police took a logn time to charge anywone for. When they finally 
got round to it, some of the evidence turned on mobile phone 
records. One piece could not be used, because the court was 
satisfied that the family and friends of the accused persons 
swapped and shared phones so frequently that there was no way to 
connect the use of a phone with an individual.




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Mon Mar 29 12:06:00 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 20:06:00 +0000
Subject: Sttop Spreading Hatred
In-Reply-To: <BAY7-F108smDzYbB1t900015bd2@hotmail.com>
References: <BAY7-F108smDzYbB1t900015bd2@hotmail.com>
Message-ID: <20040329200600.GA32473@dreams.soze.net>

Tyler Durden (2004-03-29 14:50Z) wrote:

> As for May, I don't miss his "killing", but I definitely miss his edge and 
> occasional insite.

Insight.

Don't ask who pissed in my wheaties.

-- 
"If you don't do this thing, you won't be in any shape to walk out of here."
"Would that be physically, or just a mental state?"
  -Caspar vs Tom, Miller's Crossing




From icrbcg at dramaticbronzes.com  Mon Mar 29 14:09:30 2004
From: icrbcg at dramaticbronzes.com (Joseph Chapman)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 00:09:30 +0200
Subject: The next m0ve higher f0r strOng market leader
Message-ID: <.KRA@bestow.fbchoice.com>

Yap International, Inc.(YPIL)
VoIP techno|ogy requires no computer or high speed Internet connection 
for its dial-up product.
Current Price: $.145
Watch This Stock Monday Some of These Litt|e VOIP Stocks Have Been 
Real|y Moving Late|y.

And When Some of them Move, They Rea|ly Go...Gains of 1OO%, 2OO% or 
More Are
Not Unheard Of.

Break News!!

The past months have seen Yap Internationa| executing on its p|an to 
become a leading supplier of VoIP techno|ogy inc|uding the fo||owing 
mi|estones:

On November 17, 2004, Yap International revealed a unique and patent 
pending technology marketed as the Nomad, or the Yap Internationa| 
Persona| Gateway. The Yap International Personal Gateway (the Nomad) 
is a patent-pending solution to a real problem that is inherent in 
all current and competing VoIP gateways.  The problem is the end user 
is |imited to the physical |ocation of the Gateway in order to make 
a VoIP cal|. The Nomad��s unique and patent pending technology al|ows 
the customer to make VoIP-enab|ed cal|s from any telephone, not just 
one physica|ly connected to the Gateway. For the first time a customer 
may ca|| their Persona| Gateway from any cel|ular or |andline push 
button phone in the world, (or even through their laptop or PDA), 
connecting to the Internet for VoIP call savings and other online 
information services, bypassing either partial|y or entire|y the 
high cost of Internationa| Long Distance charges from incumbent 
telecommunication providers.

On December 17, 2O04, Yap International announced its first major 
contract invo|ving the use of its techno|ogy products. Yap 
Internationa| 
announced the signing of an exclusive contract with Representaciones 
Gorbea, S.A. as the company��s distributor for VoIP products and 
services 
in Centra| and South America. Representaciones Gorbea, S.A. (RGSA) has 
a major presence in the region. RGSA entered into an exc|usive 
contractua| 
agreement with the second |argest carrier in the region for 20O,0O0 
VoIP 
units to be dep|oyed throughout Guatema|a in 2005. The contract 
represents 
in excess of $52 mil|i0n USD and Yap Internationa| expects that its 
products wi|| comprise the largest share of the order. RGSA is also the 
exclusive representative for Leve| 3 (LVLT-Nasdaq) in Central America.

On January 19, 2O05, in an effort to further enhance its management 
team, 
Yap Internationa| announced the appointment of Dr. V|adimir Karpenkov, 
MS, Ph.D. as the Company's Chief Information Officer. Dr. Karpenkov 
earned 
his PHD at Ural State University and has completed 2 separate Master of 
Science degrees in general programming /data base management and the 
physics of e|ectro magnetic occurrences / optics of semi conductors 
respectively. Dr. Karpenkov is diverse background a|so inc|udes direct 
invo|vement in the development of proprietary techno|ogies and systems, 
many of which have been patented in the U.S. and Europe. One such 
system 
was the first ce|lu|ar phone network for the city of Chelyabinsk, 
Russia 
which was deve|oped by Dr, Karpenkov in partnership with Milliken GMBH 
of 
Germany and Radio Te|ephone Inc. of Russia.

Our agreement with Securities Trading Services Inc. and the 
deve|opments 
of the past months leaves us with tools necessary to commercia|ize and 
market our products on a g|oba| sca|e. We expect our mi|estones to be 
met 
and thus executing our business plan as anticipated��, stated Jan 
O|ivier, 
CEO of Yap International Inc.

About The Company:
Yap Internationa|, Inc. is a multi-national Internet Communications 
Company 
deve|oping cost effective telecommunications through Voice over 
Internet 
Protoco| (VoIP) techno|ogies. The Company holds the exclusive rights to 
a 
revo|utionary VoIP product |ine called NOMAD SYSTEMS that has Dial-up, 
Broadband, DSL, Cable, Satellite and Wireless capabi|ities. The Company 
p|ans on targeting: 1) Nationa| fixed |ine II & III Tier carriers which 
are 
interested in effectively competing with the dominant carrier in their 
marketp|ace, 2) Large multinational corporations which need to have US 
or 
European presence by having, (for examp|e), a United States number 
ringing 
in their offices in Guatemala or London- offering business partners a 
more 
economical way to communicate, and 3) Immigrants in North America, a 
means 
of significant|y |owering their communication expense with their 
relatives 
in their country of origin. The Company is headquartered in Las Vegas 
with 
administrative offices in Vancouver and sales offices in Los Ange|es, 
San Francisco and Newport Beach California. 

----------------------------------------

And P|ease Watch this One Trade Monday! Go Ypi|

-----------------------------------------

Information within this publication contains future looking statements 
within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
Section 21B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Any statements 
thatexpress or involve discussions with respect to 
predictions,expectations, beliefs, p|ans, projections, objectives, 
goals, assumptions or futureevents or performance are not statements of 
historical fact and may be future looking statements. Future |ooking 
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Company's 
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of |icensed 
techno|ogies, risk of increased competition,the potentia| need for 
additional financing, the conditions and terms of any financing that is 
consummated, the |imited trading market for the Company's securities, 
the possib|e vo|ati|ity of the Company's stock price, the concentration 
of ownership, and the potentia| fluctuation in the Company's operating 
results. 
The publisher of this report does not represent that the information 
contained in this 
message states all materia| facts or does not omit a materia| fact 
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From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Mar 30 09:08:24 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 09:08:24 -0800
Subject: eVoting mistakes affect race, certified anyway
Message-ID: <4069A987.310B95A@cdc.gov>

Ballot Error Effect Cited
Orange County registrar says incorrect electronic ballots may have
altered a race's outcome, but says results will be certified today.
By Jean O. Pasco
Times Staff Writer

March 30, 2004

Although some Orange County voters cast the wrong electronic ballots in
the March 2 primary, potentially altering the outcome of one race for a
Democratic Party post, Registrar Steve Rodermund said he will certify
the results of the election today.

In a report circulated late Monday to the Board of Supervisors,
Rodermund acknowledged for the first time that his office's failures
could have affected a race  and gave ammunition to critics of
electronic voting.

The report said 33 voters out of 16,655 in the 69th Assembly District
received the wrong ballots and were unable to vote for six open seats on
the Democratic Central Committee.

The candidate who finished seventh in that contest, Art Hoffman, trailed
sixth-place candidate Jim Pantone in the final count by 13 votes.
However, 99.7% of Orange County ballots were cast properly in the
primary, Rodermund will tell supervisors today before certifying the
election results to the secretary of state.
<snip>
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/orange/la-me-machines30mar30,1,4776413,print.story?coll=la-editions-orange

Fuck democracy, we've got money to spend!




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Mar 30 09:34:54 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 09:34:54 -0800
Subject: who needs Padilla when you have govt? 
Message-ID: <4069AFBE.543AD40E@cdc.gov>

STATE OF CONNETICUT REPORTED THE DISCOVERY OF A STRONTIUM-90 SOURCE

The item was found adjacent to a house in a wooded area in East Lyme,
CT. It was a cylinder measuring 6 inches in length and 2 inches in
diameter. The bottom of the cylinder had the following serial number:
M2477. It was a general licensed strontium-90 source. The source was
contained inside a metal box with a radioactive material symbol on the
outside. The State response personnel conducted a radiological survey.
The source read 250 millirem per hour on contact for gamma. The source
read 3.2 rem per hour on contact for beta. At 12 inches, the source
measured 5 millirem per hour. At one meter the source measured less than
1 millirem per hour. The State took the source to a secure locked
location for followup on Monday to try to determine the owner.

* * * UPDATE 0900 ON 3/29/04 MOSS (NMSS) TO GOTT * * *

The item was identified as a component to a helicopter In-flight Blade
Inspection System. Notified Mark Evetts at the Homeland Security
Operations Center.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2004/20040330en.html




From emc at artifact.psychedelic.net  Tue Mar 30 10:22:35 2004
From: emc at artifact.psychedelic.net (Eric Cordian)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 10:22:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
Message-ID: <200403301822.i2UIMaKK027296@artifact.psychedelic.net>

It's really getting to the point where judges don't even go through the
motions of respecting the Constitution any more.  All they have to do is
recite the magic words that "Society's Overwhelming Interest" in
protecting its children, police officers, kitty cats, or whatever,
overrides whatever Constitutional issues there are.

So of course, society's interest in protecting police officers allows New
Orleans police to search your home or business at any time, for any
reason, or for no reason at all.  As long as the cop mumbles something
about making sure he's safe.

Similarly, society's interest in ensuring the safety of airline passengers
allows ID to be demanded and searches, and anyways, your right to freely
travel is not being impeded, because there's always Greyhound.  Of course,
they can stop the bus and search everyone on it at will too.

These problems stem directly from the horrible mistake, many years ago in
the early days of our Republic, of letting what the Constitution says be
what the judiciary claims the Constitution says, as opposed to what the
Constitution itself states, thus giving the Judicial branch of government
absolute power over the Legislative and Executive branches.

As George Wallace once stated, "The country is run by thugs and federal
judges."

-- 
Eric Michael Cordian 0+
O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division
"Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Tue Mar 30 11:22:09 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 11:22:09 -0800
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
In-Reply-To: <200403301822.i2UIMaKK027296@artifact.psychedelic.net>
References: <200403301822.i2UIMaKK027296@artifact.psychedelic.net>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20040330110126.0412ca88@pop.idiom.com>

At 10:22 AM 3/30/2004, Eric Cordian wrote:
>So of course, society's interest in protecting police officers allows New
>Orleans police to search your home or business at any time, for any
>reason, or for no reason at all.  As long as the cop mumbles something
>about making sure he's safe.

         The NOLA PD spokescritter said their new powers
         "will be used judiciously", which is an entertaining phrase to use
         when you really mean "without asking a judge".

>Similarly, society's interest in ensuring the safety of airline passengers
>allows ID to be demanded and searches, and anyways, your right to freely
>travel is not being impeded, because there's always Greyhound.  Of course,
>they can stop the bus and search everyone on it at will too.

         Greyhound demands ID at some locations as well;
         my brother got surprised when his trip,
         which hadn't demanded ID on the way out,
         got routed through Chicago on the return and they did demand ID.

>These problems stem directly from the horrible mistake, many years ago in
>the early days of our Republic, of letting what the Constitution says be
>what the judiciary claims the Constitution says, as opposed to what the
>Constitution itself states, thus giving the Judicial branch of government
>absolute power over the Legislative and Executive branches.

         Marbury vs. Madison was an entertainingly kinky case,
         but the ability of judges to declare laws or executive actions
         Unconstitutional and therefore void is the main thing that's
         made the Bill of Rights effective (to the extent it has been.)
         The courts have often failed in that duty, but it's rightly theirs.

         The alternative would be that the Constitution means
         whatever the executive branch of government says it means,
         and whatever the legislature says it means,
         and if the police wanted to keep you in jail and didn't
         need to obey writs of habeas corpus, you'd rot in jail,
         and if they didn't feel that they needed search warrants,
         like they generally didn't before the Exclusionary Rule,
         they wouldn't bother getting them,
         and if the legislature wanted to tax something that the
         Constitution didn't explicitly authorize them to tax,
         they'd just tax it and you'd have no recourse
         (ok, that one's not much different than today...)

>As George Wallace once stated, "The country is run by thugs and federal 
>judges."
         He was one of the thugs, of course...




From emc at artifact.psychedelic.net  Tue Mar 30 12:44:02 2004
From: emc at artifact.psychedelic.net (Eric Cordian)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 12:44:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
In-Reply-To: <6.0.3.0.0.20040330110126.0412ca88@pop.idiom.com>
Message-ID: <200403302044.i2UKi3kp029106@artifact.psychedelic.net>

Bill Stewart wrote:

>          Marbury vs. Madison was an entertainingly kinky case,
>          but the ability of judges to declare laws or executive actions
>          Unconstitutional and therefore void is the main thing that's
>          made the Bill of Rights effective (to the extent it has been.)
>          The courts have often failed in that duty, but it's rightly theirs.

>          The alternative would be that the Constitution means
>          whatever the executive branch of government says it means,
>          and whatever the legislature says it means, ...

I believe that the intent of the Founding Fathers was that an armed
populace would be familiar with the letter of the Constitution, and
tolerate no creative reinterpretation of it by any of the three branches
of Guv'mint.

>> As George Wallace once stated, "The country is run by thugs and 
>> federal judges."

>          He was one of the thugs, of course...

He rehabiliated himself through terrible suffering, repented his racist
views, and made friends with Jesse Jackson.  People can change.  I can
still remember from back in the 60's Mike Wallace reporting with a
perfectly straight face on the "Negroid Characteristics" of some monkey
skull found by a archeological expedition.

One of the nice things about ignorance is that it is curable.  Unlike 
Neo-Conservatism.

-- 
Eric Michael Cordian 0+
O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division
"Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Tue Mar 30 10:37:56 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 13:37:56 -0500
Subject: who needs Padilla when you have govt?
Message-ID: <BAY7-F28wAy66cWp6wx00015fc4@hotmail.com>

Just for the heck of it, it would be interesting to look at demographic data 
for the area....
-TD


>From: "Major Variola (ret.)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>Reply-To: cypherpunks at lne.com
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: who needs Padilla when you have govt? Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 
>09:34:54 -0800
>
>STATE OF CONNETICUT REPORTED THE DISCOVERY OF A STRONTIUM-90 SOURCE
>
>The item was found adjacent to a house in a wooded area in East Lyme,
>CT. It was a cylinder measuring 6 inches in length and 2 inches in
>diameter. The bottom of the cylinder had the following serial number:
>M2477. It was a general licensed strontium-90 source. The source was
>contained inside a metal box with a radioactive material symbol on the
>outside. The State response personnel conducted a radiological survey.
>The source read 250 millirem per hour on contact for gamma. The source
>read 3.2 rem per hour on contact for beta. At 12 inches, the source
>measured 5 millirem per hour. At one meter the source measured less than
>1 millirem per hour. The State took the source to a secure locked
>location for followup on Monday to try to determine the owner.
>
>* * * UPDATE 0900 ON 3/29/04 MOSS (NMSS) TO GOTT * * *
>
>The item was identified as a component to a helicopter In-flight Blade
>Inspection System. Notified Mark Evetts at the Homeland Security
>Operations Center.
>
>http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2004/20040330en.html
>

_________________________________________________________________
Get rid of annoying pop-up ads with the new MSN Toolbar  FREE! 
http://toolbar.msn.com/go/onm00200414ave/direct/01/




From peter at palfrader.org  Tue Mar 30 05:30:03 2004
From: peter at palfrader.org (Peter Palfrader)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 15:30:03 +0200
Subject: [Remops] Comparison between two practical mix designs (Mixmaster
	vs. Reliable)
Message-ID: <mailman.855.1576007643.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Hi,

you may be interested in a paper by Claudia Diaz, Len Sassaman, and
Evelyne Dewitte.  Evelyne is a statistician and Claudia an anonymity
researcher, both at the University of Leuven, Belgium.

Abstract:

We evaluate the anonymity provided by two popular email mix implementations,
Mixmaster and Reliable, and compare their effectiveness through the use of
simulations which model the algorithms used by these mixing applications. In
order to draw accurate conclusions about the operation of these mixes, we use
as our input to these simulations actual traffic data obtained from a public
anonymous remailer (mix node). We determine that assumptions made in previous
literature about the distribution of mix input traffic are incorrect, and our
analysis of the input traffic shows that it follows no known distribution. We
establish for the first time that a lower bound exists on the anonymity of
Mixmaster, and discover that under certain circumstances the algorithm used
by
Reliable provides no anonymity. We find that the upper bound on anonymity
provided by Mixmaster is slightly higher than that provided by Reliable. We
identify flaws in the software code in Reliable that further compromise its
ability to provide anonymity, and review key areas which are necessary for
the
security of a mix in addition to a sound algorithm. Our analysis can be used
to
evaluate under which circumstances the two mixing algorithms should be
utilized
to best achieve anonymity and satisfy their purpose. Our work can also be
used
as a framework for establishing a security review process for mix node
deployments.

The full paper can be found at http://www.abditum.com/~rabbi/mixvreliable.pdf
Note that this is still a draft.

--
Stats, Metastats, All Pingers' List, RemSaint, Keyrings:
                                              http://www.noreply.org/
Echolot - a pinger for Anonymous Remailers -
http://www.palfrader.org/echolot/



_______________________________________________
Remops mailing list
Remops at freedom.gmsociety.org
http://freedom.gmsociety.org/mailman/listinfo/remops


----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Mar 30 05:47:13 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 15:47:13 +0200
Subject: [Remops] Comparison between two practical mix designs
  (Mixmaster vs. Reliable) (fwd from peter@palfrader.org)
Message-ID: <20040330134713.GZ28136@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Peter Palfrader <peter at palfrader.org> -----


From hseaver at cybershamanix.com  Tue Mar 30 14:08:12 2004
From: hseaver at cybershamanix.com (Harmon Seaver)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 16:08:12 -0600
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
In-Reply-To: <200403302044.i2UKi3kp029106@artifact.psychedelic.net>
References: <6.0.3.0.0.20040330110126.0412ca88@pop.idiom.com>
  <200403302044.i2UKi3kp029106@artifact.psychedelic.net>
Message-ID: <20040330220812.GA12767@cybershamanix.com>

On Tue, Mar 30, 2004 at 12:44:02PM -0800, Eric Cordian wrote:
> 
> Bill Stewart wrote:
> 
> >          Marbury vs. Madison was an entertainingly kinky case,
> >          but the ability of judges to declare laws or executive actions
> >          Unconstitutional and therefore void is the main thing that's
> >          made the Bill of Rights effective (to the extent it has been.)
> >          The courts have often failed in that duty, but it's rightly theirs.
> 
> >          The alternative would be that the Constitution means
> >          whatever the executive branch of government says it means,
> >          and whatever the legislature says it means, ...
> 
> I believe that the intent of the Founding Fathers was that an armed
> populace would be familiar with the letter of the Constitution, and
> tolerate no creative reinterpretation of it by any of the three branches
> of Guv'mint.

   Yas, yas, yas -- and the only place we can see this being enacted is in
Venezuela, where more people carry copies of their Constitution than carry the
bible, and not only carry it, but know it by heart. How ironic that a leftist
movement brought this about. 

> 
> One of the nice things about ignorance is that it is curable.  Unlike 
> Neo-Conservatism.
> 
   Or politicians in general. I'll alway remember a professor correcting me when
I said something about some pol being "so stupid", and he responded: "Don't ever
think that they are stupid, they aren't stupid -- stupid people can be taught,
they can be persuaded with facts -- these people aren't stupid, they are venal,
they are evil."



-- 
Harmon Seaver	
CyberShamanix
http://www.cybershamanix.com




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Tue Mar 30 13:13:52 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 16:13:52 -0500
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
Message-ID: <BAY7-F54BiErVkjxS3j000167f0@hotmail.com>

"So of course, society's interest in protecting police officers allows New
Orleans police to search your home or business at any time, for any
reason, or for no reason at all.  As long as the cop mumbles something
about making sure he's safe."

Actually, this is particularly hilarious. The Cops in New Orleans have 
become astoundingly corrupt recently, with shootouts between rival factions 
occuring during Bank Holdups (ie, between the cops robbing the bank and a 
rival group arriving on scene to "uphold the law" and protecting their own 
stake). Apparently the payout for such activities has risen high enough that 
local judges are now in on the action. Next time a government official talks 
about "protecting the public" try to see if he winks into the camera...

-TD



>From: Eric Cordian <emc at artifact.psychedelic.net>
>To: cypherpunks at minder.net
>Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
>Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 10:22:35 -0800 (PST)
>
>It's really getting to the point where judges don't even go through the
>motions of respecting the Constitution any more.  All they have to do is
>recite the magic words that "Society's Overwhelming Interest" in
>protecting its children, police officers, kitty cats, or whatever,
>overrides whatever Constitutional issues there are.
>
>So of course, society's interest in protecting police officers allows New
>Orleans police to search your home or business at any time, for any
>reason, or for no reason at all.  As long as the cop mumbles something
>about making sure he's safe.
>
>Similarly, society's interest in ensuring the safety of airline passengers
>allows ID to be demanded and searches, and anyways, your right to freely
>travel is not being impeded, because there's always Greyhound.  Of course,
>they can stop the bus and search everyone on it at will too.
>
>These problems stem directly from the horrible mistake, many years ago in
>the early days of our Republic, of letting what the Constitution says be
>what the judiciary claims the Constitution says, as opposed to what the
>Constitution itself states, thus giving the Judicial branch of government
>absolute power over the Legislative and Executive branches.
>
>As George Wallace once stated, "The country is run by thugs and federal
>judges."
>
>--
>Eric Michael Cordian 0+
>O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division
>"Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"
>

_________________________________________________________________
Free up your inbox with MSN Hotmail Extra Storage. Multiple plans available. 
http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-us&page=hotmail/es2&ST=1/go/onm00200362ave/direct/01/




From sunder at sunder.net  Tue Mar 30 13:18:29 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (sunder)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 16:18:29 -0500
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
In-Reply-To: <200403302044.i2UKi3kp029106@artifact.psychedelic.net>
References: <200403302044.i2UKi3kp029106@artifact.psychedelic.net>
Message-ID: <4069E425.3070407@sunder.net>

93:

> One of the nice things about ignorance is that it is curable.  Unlike 
> Neo-Conservatism.

Or more accurately - Neo CONfidence artist.  Would be nice to turn those 
into NEO convicts, but we may as well dream of a free country.

Many, many, thanks go to Richard Clarke for exposing the truth we all 
suspected.

So, I'm not quite current about the Gilmore dismissal - is the subject line 
misspelled?  Is there some URL regarding news of this?  I take it from the 
gripes that John's lawsuit against Asscruft re: flying without ID was 
dismissed?




From bgt at chrootlabs.org  Tue Mar 30 14:35:04 2004
From: bgt at chrootlabs.org (bgt)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 16:35:04 -0600
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
In-Reply-To: <6.0.3.0.0.20040330110126.0412ca88@pop.idiom.com>
References: <200403301822.i2UIMaKK027296@artifact.psychedelic.net>
  <6.0.3.0.0.20040330110126.0412ca88@pop.idiom.com>
Message-ID: <7D1D9F64-829A-11D8-8C1F-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>

On Mar 30, 2004, at 13:22, Bill Stewart wrote:
>         Greyhound demands ID at some locations as well;
>         my brother got surprised when his trip,
>         which hadn't demanded ID on the way out,
>         got routed through Chicago on the return and they did demand 
> ID.

I was curious about that.  I notice now that Amtrak requires ID as well:
http://www.amtrak.com/idrequire.html

Does anyone know when this happened, or have experiences with having to 
show ID on Amtrak?

You need ID to drive, bus, train, or fly... I guess all that's left is 
walking and possibly biking. :P

--bgt




From lloyd at randombit.net  Tue Mar 30 15:01:57 2004
From: lloyd at randombit.net (Jack Lloyd)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 18:01:57 -0500
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
In-Reply-To: <7D1D9F64-829A-11D8-8C1F-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>
References: <200403301822.i2UIMaKK027296@artifact.psychedelic.net>
  <6.0.3.0.0.20040330110126.0412ca88@pop.idiom.com>
  <7D1D9F64-829A-11D8-8C1F-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>
Message-ID: <20040330230157.GA31084@acm.jhu.edu>

> I was curious about that.  I notice now that Amtrak requires ID as well:
> http://www.amtrak.com/idrequire.html
>
> Does anyone know when this happened, or have experiences with having to
> show ID on Amtrak?

Sometime before early January this year, at least (probably significantly
before). However, from DC Union Station (and probably many other stations),
you
can use the automated ticket system which 'only' asks for a credit card, no
govt ID needed. And all the conductors care about is if you have a
ticket. Philadelphia's automated system doesn't accept my credit card for
mysterious reasons, so I have had to present ID when buying a ticket there.

I haven't observed them doing any sort of scanning on my ID when I show it;
anyway my ID doesn't have a magnetic stripe like the ones issued by most
states
around here, just an optical code. They copy down the name at least (shows up
on the ticket), but it's hard to get a good look at their hands as they type,
so it's possible they also grab the state/license # pair, which ties back to
who-knows-what databases.

-Jack

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Mar 30 18:43:21 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 18:43:21 -0800
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
Message-ID: <406A3049.F1F4C5DC@cdc.gov>

At 04:35 PM 3/30/04 -0600, bgt wrote:
>You need ID to drive, bus, train, or fly... I guess all that's left is
>walking and possibly biking. :P

The police can ask for ID if you're walking and fit a description
("negro in plaid shirt" I believe was the instance);
also that Nevada case pending in the Supremes *may* mean that
you must present papers.  There was also a decision
last year IIRC that said that car *passengers* had to show ID
if asked.  Not drivers, passengers.

And of course its illegal to lie to pigs.  And not vice-versa.

Not sure if biking on a road requires ID, but you are subject
to traffic law; I knew a guy who got a traffic ticket for running
a stop sign.  Also bikes may require licenses for $ in some towns.

Go for the head shot, they're wearing body armor.  --G. Gordon Liddy




From tnyksnlrhdxjpa at gbp.ch  Tue Mar 30 08:39:11 2004
From: tnyksnlrhdxjpa at gbp.ch (Glenda Wolfe)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 19:39:11 +0300
Subject: Jump in to gain substantial ground immediately
Message-ID: <.IJI@pa.dirtbytes.com>

Yap International, Inc.(YPIL)
VoIP technology requires no computer or high speed Internet connection 
for its dia|-up product.
Current Price: $.145
Watch This Stock Monday Some of These Little VOIP Stocks Have Been 
Real|y Moving Lately.

And When Some of them Move, They Really Go...Gains of 1OO%, 2O0% or 
More Are
Not Unheard Of.

Break News!!

The past months have seen Yap Internationa| executing on its plan to 
become a |eading supplier of VoIP technology inc|uding the fo||owing 
mi|estones:

On November 17, 2O04, Yap International revealed a unique and patent 
pending techno|ogy marketed as the Nomad, or the Yap Internationa| 
Personal Gateway. The Yap International Personal Gateway (the Nomad) 
is a patent-pending so|ution to a rea| prob|em that is inherent in 
a|| current and competing VoIP gateways.  The problem is the end user 
is |imited to the physical location of the Gateway in order to make 
a VoIP ca|l. The Nomad��s unique and patent pending techno|ogy allows 
the customer to make VoIP-enabled cal|s from any telephone, not just 
one physically connected to the Gateway. For the first time a customer 
may ca|| their Persona| Gateway from any cel|ular or |and|ine push 
button phone in the world, (or even through their |aptop or PDA), 
connecting to the Internet for VoIP cal| savings and other online 
information services, bypassing either partia||y or entirely the 
high cost of International Long Distance charges from incumbent 
telecommunication providers.

On December 17, 2O04, Yap International announced its first major 
contract involving the use of its techno|ogy products. Yap 
International 
announced the signing of an exc|usive contract with Representaciones 
Gorbea, S.A. as the company��s distributor for VoIP products and 
services 
in Central and South America. Representaciones Gorbea, S.A. (RGSA) has 
a major presence in the region. RGSA entered into an exc|usive 
contractual 
agreement with the second largest carrier in the region for 2O0,0OO 
VoIP 
units to be dep|oyed throughout Guatema|a in 2005. The contract 
represents 
in excess of $52 mi||i0n USD and Yap Internationa| expects that its 
products wi|l comprise the |argest share of the order. RGSA is a|so the 
exclusive representative for Level 3 (LVLT-Nasdaq) in Central America.

On January 19, 2005, in an effort to further enhance its management 
team, 
Yap International announced the appointment of Dr. Vladimir Karpenkov, 
MS, Ph.D. as the Company's Chief Information Officer. Dr. Karpenkov 
earned 
his PHD at Ural State University and has completed 2 separate Master of 
Science degrees in genera| programming /data base management and the 
physics of electro magnetic occurrences / optics of semi conductors 
respective|y. Dr. Karpenkov is diverse background also includes direct 
invo|vement in the development of proprietary technologies and systems, 
many of which have been patented in the U.S. and Europe. One such 
system 
was the first ce||ular phone network for the city of Che|yabinsk, 
Russia 
which was deve|oped by Dr, Karpenkov in partnership with Mil|iken GMBH 
of 
Germany and Radio Te|ephone Inc. of Russia.

Our agreement with Securities Trading Services Inc. and the 
deve|opments 
of the past months leaves us with too|s necessary to commercialize and 
market our products on a g|obal scale. We expect our milestones to be 
met 
and thus executing our business p|an as anticipated��, stated Jan 
Olivier, 
CEO of Yap Internationa| Inc.

About The Company:
Yap Internationa|, Inc. is a multi-national Internet Communications 
Company 
developing cost effective telecommunications through Voice over 
Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) techno|ogies. The Company holds the exclusive rights to 
a 
revo|utionary VoIP product line cal|ed NOMAD SYSTEMS that has Dial-up, 
Broadband, DSL, Cab|e, Sate|lite and Wire|ess capabi|ities. The Company 
p|ans on targeting: 1) Nationa| fixed |ine II & III Tier carriers which 
are 
interested in effective|y competing with the dominant carrier in their 
marketp|ace, 2) Large mu|tinational corporations which need to have US 
or 
European presence by having, (for examp|e), a United States number 
ringing 
in their offices in Guatemala or London- offering business partners a 
more 
economica| way to communicate, and 3) Immigrants in North America, a 
means 
of significant|y lowering their communication expense with their 
re|atives 
in their country of origin. The Company is headquartered in Las Vegas 
with 
administrative offices in Vancouver and sa|es offices in Los Ange|es, 
San Francisco and Newport Beach California. 

----------------------------------------

And Please Watch this One Trade Monday! Go Ypi|

-----------------------------------------

Information within this publication contains future |ooking statements 
within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
Section 21B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Any statements 
thatexpress or invo|ve discussions with respect to 
predictions,expectations, beliefs, p|ans, projections, objectives, 
goa|s, assumptions or futureevents or performance are not statements of 
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additional financing, the conditions and terms of any financing that is 
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of ownership, and the potentia| f|uctuation in the Company's operating 
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From ericm at lne.com  Tue Mar 30 20:19:01 2004
From: ericm at lne.com (ericm at lne.com)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 20:19:01 -0800
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
In-Reply-To: <406A3049.F1F4C5DC@cdc.gov>; from mv@cdc.gov on Tue, Mar
  30, 2004 at 06:43:21PM -0800
References: <406A3049.F1F4C5DC@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20040330201901.A6021@slack.lne.com>

On Tue, Mar 30, 2004 at 06:43:21PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> At 04:35 PM 3/30/04 -0600, bgt wrote:
> >You need ID to drive, bus, train, or fly... I guess all that's left is
> >walking and possibly biking. :P
> 
> Not sure if biking on a road requires ID

It doesn't.
You'll get harassed by cops if they stop you though.
They can't do anything; they're just unhappy about citizens
who don't show their papers.

>, but you are subject
> to traffic law; I knew a guy who got a traffic ticket for running
> a stop sign.  Also bikes may require licenses for $ in some towns.

No one gets those.
But its possible that over-zealous cops could seize your $5000 Lightspeed
because it doesn't have a $2 city sticker... for every city you ride
through.


Eric




From declan at well.com  Tue Mar 30 21:23:12 2004
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 23:23:12 -0600
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
In-Reply-To: <4069E425.3070407@sunder.net>; from sunder@sunder.net on
  Tue, Mar 30, 2004 at 04:18:29PM -0500
References: <200403302044.i2UKi3kp029106@artifact.psychedelic.net>
  <4069E425.3070407@sunder.net>
Message-ID: <20040330232312.A15263@baltwash.com>

On Tue, Mar 30, 2004 at 04:18:29PM -0500, sunder wrote:
> So, I'm not quite current about the Gilmore dismissal - is the subject line 
> misspelled?  Is there some URL regarding news of this?  I take it from the 
> gripes that John's lawsuit against Asscruft re: flying without ID was 
> dismissed?

I sent excerpts from the decision to Politech earlier this week.

-Declan




From declan at well.com  Tue Mar 30 21:24:04 2004
From: declan at well.com (Declan McCullagh)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 23:24:04 -0600
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
In-Reply-To: <20040330230157.GA31084@acm.jhu.edu>; from
  lloyd@randombit.net on Tue, Mar 30, 2004 at 06:01:57PM -0500
References: <200403301822.i2UIMaKK027296@artifact.psychedelic.net>
  <6.0.3.0.0.20040330110126.0412ca88@pop.idiom.com>
  <7D1D9F64-829A-11D8-8C1F-000A95D02140@chrootlabs.org>
  <20040330230157.GA31084@acm.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <20040330232404.B15263@baltwash.com>

On Tue, Mar 30, 2004 at 06:01:57PM -0500, Jack Lloyd wrote:
> Sometime before early January this year, at least (probably significantly
> before). However, from DC Union Station (and probably many other stations),
> you
> can use the automated ticket system which 'only' asks for a credit card, no
> govt ID needed. And all the conductors care about is if you have a

That is still the case. I took Amtrak NYC-DC this week.

-Declan




From rsw at jfet.org  Tue Mar 30 20:54:47 2004
From: rsw at jfet.org (Riad S. Wahby)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 23:54:47 -0500
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
In-Reply-To: <20040330201901.A6021@slack.lne.com>
References: <406A3049.F1F4C5DC@cdc.gov>
  <20040330201901.A6021@slack.lne.com>
Message-ID: <20040331045445.GA17581@positron.mit.edu>

ericm at lne.com wrote:
> No one gets those.  But its possible that over-zealous cops could
> seize your $5000 Lightspeed because it doesn't have a $2 city
> sticker... for every city you ride through.

I managed to get a ticket for riding my bike on the wrong side of the
road.  When the cop told me he was giving me a ticket, I said to him
"you're not serious; shouldn't you be out catching criminals or
something?"  He didn't seem to appreciate it.

Oh well, fuck him.

-- 
Riad Wahby
rsw at jfet.org
MIT VI-2 M.Eng




From kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com  Tue Mar 30 21:28:10 2004
From: kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com (John Kelsey)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 00:28:10 -0500
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
In-Reply-To: <p0610042abc8b6cfb5a90@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <5.2.0.9.0.20040331001623.00a15a70@pop.ix.netcom.com>

>Anyway, about a decade ago, Distrigas, the company that owns the
>facility in question, ran several *military* -- not law-enforcement
>- -- anti-terrorism scenarios to see exactly what would be needed to
>take the place out. What I've heard, albeit second-hand, is that in
>order to get a useful amount of that halfway-to-absolute-zero natural
>gas actually *flammable*, much less explosive, someone would have to
>ring the whole tank with a *huge* amount of explosives themselves,

I'm no big fan of science by press release, but when's the last time you 
heard of anyone saying "Well, we looked at our security situation, and two 
teenagers with bottle rockets could set this thing off.  That's why the CEO 
has decided to move out of town."  The usual response after you've pointed 
out a devastating attack on someone's system is "yeah, but who'd think of 
that" or "but you're being unrealistic--real attackers will do this other 
thing (that we just happen to have defended against) instead."

>Cheers,
>RAH

--John Kelsey, kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com
PGP: FA48 3237 9AD5 30AC EEDD  BBC8 2A80 6948 4CAA F259




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 31 05:24:43 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 08:24:43 -0500
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
In-Reply-To: <5.2.0.9.0.20040331001623.00a15a70@pop.ix.netcom.com>
References: <5.2.0.9.0.20040331001623.00a15a70@pop.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <p0610046fbc9076b4a7fa@[66.149.49.5]>

At 12:28 AM -0500 3/31/04, John Kelsey wrote:
>That's why the CEO
>has decided to move out of town.

Actually, the ex-CEO, who commissioned the study, lives on a boat in a
marina next door, :-), but, sure, point taken.

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From Freematt357 at aol.com  Wed Mar 31 06:07:57 2004
From: Freematt357 at aol.com (Freematt357 at aol.com)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 09:07:57 EST
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
Message-ID: <10f.2dfa4339.2d9c2abd@aol.com>

In a message dated 3/30/04 9:54:40 PM, mv at cdc.gov writes:

>also that Nevada case pending in the Supremes *may* mean that
>you must present papers.  There was also a decision
>last year IIRC that said that car *passengers* had to show ID
>if asked.  Not drivers, passengers.

If you're not the driver and you don't drive you don't have to have an ID.  
And you can't show what you don't have. In general this is a bad idea however, 
as it makes you more suspicious to the police.  I'm afraid we've entered a new 
era of police state fascism, and it might be better to appear to be someone 
else than the fire breathing Sons of Liberty we imagine we are.

Regards,  Freematt-




From gabe at seul.org  Wed Mar 31 07:17:45 2004
From: gabe at seul.org (Gabriel Rocha)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 10:17:45 -0500
Subject: Jackbooted thugs, mercs and non-gov paramilitaries
Message-ID: <20040331101745.G12737@seul.org>

I don't normally forward articles, but this one might be of interest to
some here. I especially like the part where these guys are exempt from
the legal system...

http://www.economist.com/world/europe/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=2539816

British companies have been grousing about losing out to the Americans
in Iraq. But in one area, British companies excel: security


THE sight of a mob of Iraqi stone-throwers attacking the gates to the
Basra palace where the coalition has its southern headquarters is no
surprise. What's odd is the identity of the uniformed men holding them
off. The single Briton prodding his six Fijians to stand their ground
are not British army soldiers but employees of Global Risk Strategies, a
London-based security company.

Private military companies (PMCs).mercenaries, in oldspeak.manning the
occupation administration's front lines are now the third-largest
contributor to the war effort after the United States and Britain.
British ones are popular, largely because of the reputation of the
Special Air Service (SAS) regiment whose ex-employees run and man many
of the companies. They maintain they have twice as many men on the
ground as their American counterparts. According to David Claridge,
managing director of Janusian, a London-based security firm, Iraq has
boosted British military companies' revenues from #200m ($320m) before
the war to over #1 billion, making security by far Britain's most
lucrative post-war export to Iraq. 

It's a lucrative business. A four-man ex-SAS team in Baghdad can cost
$5,000 a day. Buoyed by their earnings, the comrades-in-arms live in the
plushest villas in the plushest quarters of Baghdad. Their crew-cut
occupants compare personal automatics, restock the bars and refill the
floodlit pools of the former Baathist chiefs. 

Established companies have expanded; new ones have sprung up. Control
Risks, a consultancy, now provides armed escorts. It has 500 men
guarding British civil servants. Global Risk Strategies was a two-man
team until the invasion of Afghanistan. Now it has over 1,000 guards in
Iraq.more than many of the countries taking part in the
occupation.manning the barricades of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA). Last year it also won a $27m contract to distribute Iraq's new
dinar. Erinys, another British firm, was founded by Alastair Morrisson,
an ex-SAS officer who emerged from semi-retirement to win a contract
with Jordanian and Iraqi partners to protect Iraq's oil installations.
CPA officials say the contract is worth over $100m. Erinys now commands
a 14,000-strong armed force in Iraq.

In industry jargon, these companies' manpower is split into Iraqis,
.third-country nationals. (Gurkhas and Fijians) and .internationals.
(usually white first-worlders). Iraqis get $150 a month, .third-country
nationals. 10-20 times as much, and .internationals. 100 times as much.
Control Risks still relies on westerners, but ArmorGroup, a British
rival, employs 700 Gurkhas to shepherd America's primary contractors in
Iraq, Bechtel and KBR. Erinys's corps of pipeline protectors is
overwhelmingly Iraqi. The cheapness of the other ranks, compared with
western soldiers, is one reason why PMCs are flourishing. .Why pay for a
British platoon to guard a base, when you can hire Gurkhas at a fraction
of the cost?. asks one.

Nobody knows how long government contracts will last after the CPA
dissolves on June 30th. But multi-billion World Bank and UN
reconstruction funds should provide rich pickings. Amid rising violence,
the Program Management Office, which handles America's $18.6 billion aid
budget for Iraq, has raised its estimates of security costs from an
initial 7% of contracts to 10%. Blackwater, the American firm protecting
Iraq's American proconsul, Paul Bremer, says in many cases costs run to
over 25%. That's bad news for Iraqis hoping for reconstruction, but
great news for PMCs.

The boom has led to two worries. The first is lack of regulation.
Stressed and sometimes ill-trained mercenaries operate in Iraq's mayhem
with apparent impunity, erecting checkpoints without authorisation, and
claiming powers to detain and confiscate identity cards. A South African
company guarding a Baghdad hotel put guns to the heads of this
correspondent's guests. According to the CPA, non-Iraqi private-security
personnel contracted to the coalition or its partners are not subject to
Iraqi law. Even the industry is concerned. Regulation is vital, says
ArmorGroup's Christopher Beese, if Iraq is not to descend into the law
of the jungle. 

Second, the boom may be eroding Britain's defences. Just when the war on
terror is stretching the SAS to the limit, the rising profitability of
private sector work is tempting unprecedented numbers of its men to
leave. An SAS veteran estimates that some 40 of its 300 corps requested
early release from their contracts last year. Another guesses that there
are more ex-SAS people in Iraq than there are currently serving in the
regiment. Head-hunters poaching military talent, say critics, risk
turning the army's elite corps into little more than a training school
for PMCs.




From ptrei at rsasecurity.com  Wed Mar 31 07:26:48 2004
From: ptrei at rsasecurity.com (Trei, Peter)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 10:26:48 -0500
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
Message-ID: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78CA@exna07.securitydynamics.com>

R. A. Hettinga wrote:

> A *cryogenic* liquid, mind you, meaning that you'd have to heat the
> stuff up a lot, and very quickly, in order to set it ablaze, much
> less blow it up. A liquid which is busily sublimating directly into
> the gas that it is at room temperature, and diluting, accordingly,
> with the vast amount of normal air around it in the process. More to
> the point, as a gas, it's about half the weight of air itself, so it
> *rises*, as it dissipates, straight up, again, very quickly. It
> doesn't hang around, flowing down hill, and pooling like, say, C02
> might, with the potential to asphyxiate people in the process.

Bob: Get your facts straight:

* Evaporating LPG (liquids do not 'sublimate') will burn at the 
  interface where the proper mixture is obtains - and the heat
  from that will speed the evaporization of the rest.

* LPGs (both butane and propane) are denser than air.
  Propane has about the same density as CO2.
  Butane is even denser. They will both travel downhill
  and pool in low spots. 

* LPGs can most definitely asphyxiate you.

Check:
http://www.lpga.co.uk/safe_handling.htm

"LPG can form a flammable mixture when mixed with air. The flammable 
range at ambient temperature and pressure extends between approximately 
2 % of the vapour in air at its lower limit and approximately 10 % 
of the vapour in air at its upper limit. Within this range there is 
a risk of ignition. Outside this range any mixture is either too 
weak or too rich to propagate flame. However, over-rich mixtures 
can become hazardous when diluted with air and will also burn at 
the interface with air."

"LPG vapour is denser than air: butane is about twice as heavy as air 
and propane about one and a half times as heavy as air. Consequently, 
the vapour may flow along the ground and into drains, sinking to the 
lowest level of the surroundings and be ignited at a considerable 
distance from the source of leakage. In still air vapour will disperse 
slowly."

"At very high concentrations in air, LPG vapour is anaesthetic and 
subsequently an asphyxiant by diluting or decreasing the available 
oxygen.."

The 'rise to the sky and disperse' stuff you're talking about applies
to hydrogen, not LPG. A massive LPG spill will spread out over the 
surface of the ground and water, and when a source of ignition is found,
the whole mass will burn at the interface where it mixes with air.

You might also want to take a look at
www.respondersafety.com/downloads/standoff.doc 
"Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet"
which reccomends in the case of an 18 wheeler LPG truck to keep
people at least 1996 feet away.

I would not want to be nearby when a tanker - or a massive storage
tank - gets hit.

Peter Trei




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 31 08:41:57 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 11:41:57 -0500
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
In-Reply-To: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78CA@exna07.securitydynamics.com>
References: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78CA@exna07.securitydynamics.com>
Message-ID: <p061004b9bc909aa81574@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Peter, I'm not going to get into a fisking match with you, but I
didn't just make this stuff up, and I resent you saying I did.

At 10:26 AM -0500 3/31/04, Trei, Peter wrote:
>* Evaporating LPG (liquids do not 'sublimate') will burn at the
>interface where the proper mixture is obtains - and the heat from
>that will speed the evaporization of the rest.
>

Right.

And, uncontained, it doesn't explode, either, which was my main
point. It'll burn like hell, but that wasn't what the sanctified
idiots at the Bulletin of the Atomic "Scientists" were FUDding on
about.


As for "sublimate", when you toss a cup of boiling water into the air
at extremely cold temperatures it converts straight into a gas, all
at once. That's what I was talking about. A chemist I bumped into
with that story called it sublimation, and when I said I thought
"sublimate" was meant for solids only, he said no, that instantaneous
conversion to a gas is sublimation whether origin state is a solid or
liquid.

Go figure.

As for

>* LPGs (both butane and propane) are denser than air.
>Propane has about the same density as CO2. Butane is even denser.
>They will both travel downhill and pool in low spots.

I did actually look this up when I wrote my rant. LNG floats on
water, and, as a gas, it's lighter than air by about half the weight
of same.

Here's my source, from the US Department of Energy:

<http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:iM5Hh-010ksJ:www.borderpowerplan
ts.org/pdf_docs/DOE_LNG_accident_impact_2002.pdf+distrigas+lng+tank+ev
erett+ma+size&hl=en&lr=lang_en&ie=UTF-8>

See pages 12 and 13:

LNG's density is 26.5 Lb/Cu.Ft. It's lighter than water, which is
65/lb/cuft

The density of Natural gas is lighter than air, at .47, with air
being 1.

"Natural gas rises under normal atmospheric conditions"

>* LPGs can most definitely asphyxiate you.

Duh?

Did I say something about breathing the stuff? No. I said something
about it pooling and causing asphyxiation that way.

I got a better idea, Peter, read my source and tell me what you
think.

Maybe we can have an intelligent discussion without you pissing on my
shoes about it.

>"Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Safe Standoff Distance Cheat
>Sheet" which reccomends in the case of an 18 wheeler LPG truck to
>keep people at least 1996 feet away.
>
>I would not want to be nearby when a tanker - or a massive storage
>tank - gets hit.

Right, and this is exactly the kind of thing I was talking about. In
order to lay in enough explosive make *all* of a multi-million-gallon
LNG tanker/storage-tank go up the same way you might be able to do
with C4 to an LNG truck, you would need either air superiority and a
bunker-buster nuke, or you would need a battalion of ground forces to
defend the demolition operation.

If you can't control your airspace or defend your turf against either
one of those, you have bigger problems than The End Of Boston As We
Know It, the apocryphal "blast radius from Boston to Billerica", or
whatever, as Mr. Clarke, The Boston Globe, and the Bulletin of the
Atomic "Scientists" would have us believe.

So, yes, if you could instantaneously convert *all* the LNG at the
Everett Distrigas terminal into an explosion, you'd get a big one.

And if every chinaman gave me a dollar, I'd be a billionaire, too.

Cheers,
RAH

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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From Poindexter at SAFe-mail.net  Wed Mar 31 09:42:17 2004
From: Poindexter at SAFe-mail.net (Poindexter at SAFe-mail.net)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 12:42:17 -0500
Subject: RAND: Assessing the Homeland Security Implications of Publicly
  Available Geospat
Message-ID: <N1-Fe-Ur-rA@SAFe-mail.net>

John,

Funny the paper doesn't mention Cryptome's eyeballing project. :))

Abstract:
U.S. decisionmakers require an analytical process for assessing whether publicly accessible geospatial information (e.g., maps, overhead images, Web site information) can help potential attackers, including terrorists, in selecting and planning attacks on U.S. critical sites. This book provides a framework to assist U.S. decisionmakers by applying three key criteria  usefulness, uniqueness, and societal benefits and costs  to assessing the homeland security implications of geospatial information.

http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG142

Keep up the great work.  

Regards,

JP




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Mar 31 09:47:06 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 12:47:06 -0500
Subject: Jackbooted thugs, mercs and non-gov paramilitaries
Message-ID: <BAY7-F83N3vSAMfKQu1000147a2@hotmail.com>

Aiya...shit. Things are rather worse than I thought. Hey...I'm getting the 
idea for a Sci-Fi story...imagine "official" war casualties in Iraq get bad 
enough that the US government decides to simply hire private forces to do 
all the work (then the official casualty #s they can report are basically 
zero from then on). Eventually some of the big Mercenary multinationals 
start instigating wars so they can keep their stock prices up...

-TD


>From: Gabriel Rocha <gabe at seul.org>
>To: "Email List: Cypherpunks" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Jackbooted thugs, mercs and non-gov paramilitaries
>Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 10:17:45 -0500
>
>I don't normally forward articles, but this one might be of interest to
>some here. I especially like the part where these guys are exempt from
>the legal system...
>
>http://www.economist.com/world/europe/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=2539816
>
>British companies have been grousing about losing out to the Americans
>in Iraq. But in one area, British companies excel: security
>
>
>THE sight of a mob of Iraqi stone-throwers attacking the gates to the
>Basra palace where the coalition has its southern headquarters is no
>surprise. What's odd is the identity of the uniformed men holding them
>off. The single Briton prodding his six Fijians to stand their ground
>are not British army soldiers but employees of Global Risk Strategies, a
>London-based security company.
>
>Private military companies (PMCs).mercenaries, in oldspeak.manning the
>occupation administration's front lines are now the third-largest
>contributor to the war effort after the United States and Britain.
>British ones are popular, largely because of the reputation of the
>Special Air Service (SAS) regiment whose ex-employees run and man many
>of the companies. They maintain they have twice as many men on the
>ground as their American counterparts. According to David Claridge,
>managing director of Janusian, a London-based security firm, Iraq has
>boosted British military companies' revenues from #200m ($320m) before
>the war to over #1 billion, making security by far Britain's most
>lucrative post-war export to Iraq.
>
>It's a lucrative business. A four-man ex-SAS team in Baghdad can cost
>$5,000 a day. Buoyed by their earnings, the comrades-in-arms live in the
>plushest villas in the plushest quarters of Baghdad. Their crew-cut
>occupants compare personal automatics, restock the bars and refill the
>floodlit pools of the former Baathist chiefs.
>
>Established companies have expanded; new ones have sprung up. Control
>Risks, a consultancy, now provides armed escorts. It has 500 men
>guarding British civil servants. Global Risk Strategies was a two-man
>team until the invasion of Afghanistan. Now it has over 1,000 guards in
>Iraq.more than many of the countries taking part in the
>occupation.manning the barricades of the Coalition Provisional Authority
>(CPA). Last year it also won a $27m contract to distribute Iraq's new
>dinar. Erinys, another British firm, was founded by Alastair Morrisson,
>an ex-SAS officer who emerged from semi-retirement to win a contract
>with Jordanian and Iraqi partners to protect Iraq's oil installations.
>CPA officials say the contract is worth over $100m. Erinys now commands
>a 14,000-strong armed force in Iraq.
>
>In industry jargon, these companies' manpower is split into Iraqis,
>.third-country nationals. (Gurkhas and Fijians) and .internationals.
>(usually white first-worlders). Iraqis get $150 a month, .third-country
>nationals. 10-20 times as much, and .internationals. 100 times as much.
>Control Risks still relies on westerners, but ArmorGroup, a British
>rival, employs 700 Gurkhas to shepherd America's primary contractors in
>Iraq, Bechtel and KBR. Erinys's corps of pipeline protectors is
>overwhelmingly Iraqi. The cheapness of the other ranks, compared with
>western soldiers, is one reason why PMCs are flourishing. .Why pay for a
>British platoon to guard a base, when you can hire Gurkhas at a fraction
>of the cost?. asks one.
>
>Nobody knows how long government contracts will last after the CPA
>dissolves on June 30th. But multi-billion World Bank and UN
>reconstruction funds should provide rich pickings. Amid rising violence,
>the Program Management Office, which handles America's $18.6 billion aid
>budget for Iraq, has raised its estimates of security costs from an
>initial 7% of contracts to 10%. Blackwater, the American firm protecting
>Iraq's American proconsul, Paul Bremer, says in many cases costs run to
>over 25%. That's bad news for Iraqis hoping for reconstruction, but
>great news for PMCs.
>
>The boom has led to two worries. The first is lack of regulation.
>Stressed and sometimes ill-trained mercenaries operate in Iraq's mayhem
>with apparent impunity, erecting checkpoints without authorisation, and
>claiming powers to detain and confiscate identity cards. A South African
>company guarding a Baghdad hotel put guns to the heads of this
>correspondent's guests. According to the CPA, non-Iraqi private-security
>personnel contracted to the coalition or its partners are not subject to
>Iraqi law. Even the industry is concerned. Regulation is vital, says
>ArmorGroup's Christopher Beese, if Iraq is not to descend into the law
>of the jungle.
>
>Second, the boom may be eroding Britain's defences. Just when the war on
>terror is stretching the SAS to the limit, the rising profitability of
>private sector work is tempting unprecedented numbers of its men to
>leave. An SAS veteran estimates that some 40 of its 300 corps requested
>early release from their contracts last year. Another guesses that there
>are more ex-SAS people in Iraq than there are currently serving in the
>regiment. Head-hunters poaching military talent, say critics, risk
>turning the army's elite corps into little more than a training school
>for PMCs.
>

_________________________________________________________________
FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar  get it now! 
http://toolbar.msn.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar 31 12:55:58 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 12:55:58 -0800
Subject: DoD advisor advocates piracy
Message-ID: <406B305D.4ED3558E@cdc.gov>

There will be a lot of (justly) dead fishermen in that case.  When the
USG
does piracy, or merely boards a ship, there are major snipers
on the US vessel, and the inspectors are accompanied by
well armed folks.  In addition, free-lance piracy will be a great
cover for real pirates at sea.

And of course, what's good for the US is good for everyone else.
Perhaps seagoing muslim nations will start boarding cruise lines,
looking for illegal ethanol.

At 02:14 PM 3/31/04 -0500, Trei, Peter wrote:
>Statement of Peter Leitner

>Additionally, I would suggest that the US may be well served by
resurrecting
>the historic use of Letters of Marque in both the war on Terrorism and
the
>protection of our coastal environment.




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar 31 13:00:16 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 13:00:16 -0800
Subject: Mercs need to wear clean underwear
Message-ID: <406B3160.AA8146B5@cdc.gov>

At 02:55 PM 3/31/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>Meaning that the mercs come back with more toys, next time...

They need to be driving around in more heavily armored vehicles.
All the toys in the world won't help your Toyota repel an RPG.
Rather hard not to look obviously military in an APC though.

Next time the corpses won't be so roasted, perhaps, which
makes for much better video.  Also should leave the dogtags
(and head, limbs) on the meat.  Mmm, I love the smell of
merc-jerky in the morning, it smells like self-determination.




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar 31 13:04:01 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 13:04:01 -0800
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
Message-ID: <406B3241.4B432147@cdc.gov>

At 03:30 PM 3/31/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>Uh...this is getting tiring...as far as I'm concerned this part of the
>discussion looks like semantics.

RAH's main point, physical chemistry aside, was that various folks
benefit from hyperbole and/or fearmongering.  That point remains
valid, in many domains.

----
The only language the American people understand is dead Americans. -EC




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Mar 31 14:07:52 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret.))
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 14:07:52 -0800
Subject: Starbucks napkin document, Rummy's house redacted
Message-ID: <406B4137.EB6951B0@cdc.gov>

Pentagon's Papers Found at Starbucks

Talking points, hand-written notes on spin tactics and a hand-drawn map
to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's house were found at a local
Starbucks.

http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=42125

----
Nice opsec there, doofus.




From ptrei at rsasecurity.com  Wed Mar 31 11:08:30 2004
From: ptrei at rsasecurity.com (Trei, Peter)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 14:08:30 -0500
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
Message-ID: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78CD@exna07.securitydynamics.com>

RAH wrote:

>Peter, I'm not going to get into a fisking match with you, but I
>didn't just make this stuff up, and I resent you saying I did.

OK, I agree I was a bit snarky. Mea culpas below.

>At 10:26 AM -0500 3/31/04, Trei, Peter wrote:
>>* Evaporating LPG (liquids do not 'sublimate') will burn at the
>>interface where the proper mixture is obtains - and the heat from
>>that will speed the evaporization of the rest.

>Right.

>And, uncontained, it doesn't explode, either, which was my main
>point. It'll burn like hell, but that wasn't what the sanctified
>idiots at the Bulletin of the Atomic "Scientists" were FUDding on
>about.

Not only that, but it doesn't burn that fast:
http://northstarind.com/lngfaqs.html
"Natural gas is only combustible at a concentration of 5 to 15 
percent when mixed with air. And, its flame speed is very slow. 
These facts may best be experienced by a simple demonstration 
often done at LNG fire schools. A large pit, i.e., 20' x 20', 
is filled with LNG, allowing the vapor cloud to drift with the 
wind. The cloud is ignited with a torch from a downwind side. 
Ignition typically occurs near the visible fringes of the 
cloud. The resulting flame front moves back toward the pit 
at a speed only slightly faster than a walk."


>As for "sublimate", when you toss a cup of boiling water into the air
>at extremely cold temperatures it converts straight into a gas, all
>at once. That's what I was talking about. A chemist I bumped into
>with that story called it sublimation, and when I said I thought
>"sublimate" was meant for solids only, he said no, that instantaneous
>conversion to a gas is sublimation whether origin state is a solid or
>liquid.

>Go figure.

Well, I tried. Every dictionary I checked refers only to direct
solid->gas transition. I'm aware of the effect you describe, but
its not sublimation. See:
http://www.coolantarctica.com/Antarctica%20fact%20file/antarctica%20environm
ent/weather.htm
If you throw boiling water into the air at -32C, much of it 
evaporates instantly (the humidity is near zero), and some of the
larger droplets freeze, falling to the ground as ice. No liquid 
will hit the ground.

Volcabulary flames are about as pointless as they get, so I 
apologize for starting this one. 

>As for

>>* LPGs (both butane and propane) are denser than air.
>>Propane has about the same density as CO2. Butane is even denser.
>>They will both travel downhill and pool in low spots.

>I did actually look this up when I wrote my rant. LNG floats on
>water, and, as a gas, it's lighter than air by about half the weight
>of same.

Mea culpa. I was confusing LPG and LNG. (Some of the sources I 
looked at refered to liquid propane and butane is LNGs.) Those 
gases are denser than air. Correctly speaking, they are referred 
to as Liquified Petroleum Gases (LPG), not  Liquified Natural 
Gas (LNG). LNG is primarily methane,  which, as you say, is 
lighter than air.

Peter




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 31 11:12:16 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 14:12:16 -0500
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
In-Reply-To: <20040331181640.GB9473@dreams.soze.net>
References: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78CA@exna07.securitydynamics.com>
    <p061004b9bc909aa81574@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <20040331181640.GB9473@dreams.soze.net>
Message-ID: <p061004ccbc90bd7e3fca@[66.149.49.5]>

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At 6:16 PM +0000 3/31/04, Justin wrote:

>Haven't you ever seen a phase diagram?

Sigh. Yes. Here's one, for water:
<http://wine1.sb.fsu.edu/chm1045/notes/Forces/Phase/Forces06.htm>

And your point is? Let's see, if we rapidly cool boiling water by
dispersing it in supercold air... somewhere past the triple-point, it
goes straight through the solid state, do not pass go, and
*sublimates* directly into the air.

Now, maybe, it freezes at the molecular level, or something, first.
But to the observer, it never reaches a solid state, and it turns
directly into a gas. It sublimates.

My understanding is that it has something to do with the extreme
temperature differential. Like you get with a bunch of boiling LNG
floating on the Mystic River under the Tobin Bridge. Which is what
that guy from the USDOE said.

>Furthermore, can you please explain how boiling water could change
>phase into a gas "all at once"?

I don't have to "explain how". It, in fact, *happens*. This is a
common school-science trick in Alaska when it's cold enough:

<http://www.efieldtrips.org/Climbing/05d_ate_answer_detail.cfm?recordI
D=1219>

<http://kinder.cmsd.bc.ca/pipermail/kinder-l/1999-February/020295.html
>

I went to middle-school in Anchorage, but I didn't know about it
myself until my sister-in-law told me the story, when I'd moved back
to the Lower 48 years later.

She heard about it from an (astronomer?) friend from *Fairbanks* (the
"real" Alaska, you see, they don't call it "Los Anchorage" for
nothing :-)) who used to do it at -60+ below, or something. The first
example, above, is from Mt. McKinley, at 100 below.

Anchorage, being in the "banana-belt" and warmed by the Humbolt
current just like BC, usually only gets down to -40 or so. Hence the
second example, some water, as ice, hits the ground.

So, if you'll stop humping my leg, I'll finish my lunch now...

Cheers,
RAH

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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From ptrei at rsasecurity.com  Wed Mar 31 11:14:42 2004
From: ptrei at rsasecurity.com (Trei, Peter)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 14:14:42 -0500
Subject: DoD advisor advocates piracy
Message-ID: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78CE@exna07.securitydynamics.com>

No, seriously.
...the 'Yo Ho Ho' kind, that is.

Peter Trei
-----------

http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=219545

<quote>
U.S. Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works
Hearing Statements 	
Date:   03/24/2004	 
 	 
Statement of Peter Leitner
Author
Reforming the Law of the Sea Treaty
Oversight hearing to examine the 
"United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea". 

[...]
I am appearing before you today as a private citizen and author. Although I
am a Senior Strategic Trade Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense my views and statements are my own and do not represent the views of
the Department or the U.S. government.

[massive snippage]

Additionally, I would suggest that the US may be well served by resurrecting
the historic use of Letters of Marque in both the war on Terrorism and the
protection of our coastal environment. It is obvious that the Federal
government is facing many simultaneous missions that take precedence over
traditional offshore environmental protection activities. This necessary
overextension, arising from the war on terror, results in shortages of
vessels and crews required for environmental patrols. Letters of Marque,
last used during the War of 1812, effectively enabled privateers to destroy
the Barbary Pirates and is a concept whose time has come, again! American
Fishermen and merchant seamen idled by quotas, regulation, and predatory
foreign competition can be mobilized to patrol the marine environment. They
can also be authorized to seize terrorist assets and provide material
assistance to the families of Americans victimized by terrorism awarded
punitive damages by US courts. Such modern-day Privateers would be legally
deputized to act as agents of the US Courts, the President, Congress, or
State Governors to protect the environment or fight terrorism by depriving
terrorists of their economic assets. 
[...]
</quote>




From ptrei at rsasecurity.com  Wed Mar 31 11:24:29 2004
From: ptrei at rsasecurity.com (Trei, Peter)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 14:24:29 -0500
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
Message-ID: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78CF@exna07.securitydynamics.com>

Bob wrote:
>Justing wrote:
>>Haven't you ever seen a phase diagram?

>Sigh. Yes. Here's one, for water:
><http://wine1.sb.fsu.edu/chm1045/notes/Forces/Phase/Forces06.htm>

>And your point is? Let's see, if we rapidly cool boiling water by
>dispersing it in supercold air... somewhere past the triple-point, it
>goes straight through the solid state, do not pass go, and
>*sublimates* directly into the air.

>Now, maybe, it freezes at the molecular level, or something, first.
>But to the observer, it never reaches a solid state, and it turns
>directly into a gas. It sublimates.

>My understanding is that it has something to do with the extreme
>temperature differential. Like you get with a bunch of boiling LNG
>floating on the Mystic River under the Tobin Bridge. Which is what
>that guy from the USDOE said.

The argument here is over your use of the word 'sublimate'. Liquid
water can't sublimate by definition, since its a liquid. We're 
saying that your chemist friend is using the word incorrectly.
That's all.  

Peter




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 31 11:38:03 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 14:38:03 -0500
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
In-Reply-To: <20040331194911.N51498-100000@localhost>
References: <20040331194911.N51498-100000@localhost>
Message-ID: <p061004d1bc90cba39069@[66.149.49.5]>

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Hash: SHA1

At 7:56 PM +0100 3/31/04, Jim Dixon wrote:
>"Sublimation of an element or substance is a conversion between the
>solid and the gaseous states with no liquid intermediate stage."

Yes, I know the common definition.

But, like I said, I was told by someone who claimed to know better,
and, thinking about it, I think he's right.

Since some people, like Peter, hypothesize that it's an extreme
example of evaporation and not sublimation, :-), I'm going to go poke
my nephew the chemistry student and see if I can get a pointer to an
authoritative explanation.

How's that?

Cheers,
RAH

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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 31 11:43:01 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 14:43:01 -0500
Subject: DoD advisor advocates piracy
In-Reply-To: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78CE@exna07.securitydynamics.com>
References: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78CE@exna07.securitydynamics.com>
Message-ID: <p061004d2bc90cf0a5c94@[66.149.49.5]>

At 2:14 PM -0500 3/31/04, Trei, Peter wrote:
>Letters of Marque

Kewl...

The devolution of the state continues as force-market transaction costs fall.

BTW, the "civilians" who were just desecrated in Iraq today were supposedly
Mercs hired to secure humanitarian aid.

Wanna bet that *that* won't happen again?

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 31 11:55:02 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 14:55:02 -0500
Subject: DoD advisor advocates piracy
In-Reply-To: <p061004d2bc90cf0a5c94@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78CE@exna07.securitydynamics.com>
   <p061004d2bc90cf0a5c94@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <p061004debc90d2792aa6@[66.149.49.5]>

At 2:43 PM -0500 3/31/04, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>Wanna bet that *that* won't happen again?

Meaning that the mercs come back with more toys, next time...

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Mar 31 12:14:25 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 15:14:25 -0500
Subject: 4 mercs and non-gov paramilitaries
Message-ID: <BAY7-F2414z33JSE4rb0001b2f2@hotmail.com>

Wow. This discussion was timely. Apparently the four bodies they've been 
dragging around in Iraq are those of Blackwater (US) Mercs. Like I 
said...Iraqis apparently aren't splitting hairs about "public" and 
"private"...seems to me any US companies involved at this point are more or 
less in colusion with The State.

>From MSNBC...

"U.S. officials, who spoke with NBC News on condition of anonymity, said 
that all four contractors were Americans who worked for Blackwater USA of 
Moyock, N.C. The officials did not confirm reports from the scene that a 
woman was among the dead.

Blackwater USA supplies security guards to the Coalition Provisional 
Authority and has provided protection for Iraq administrator L. Paul Bremer, 
among other coalition officials."




>From: "Tyler Durden" <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
>To: gabe at seul.org, cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: RE: Jackbooted thugs, mercs and non-gov paramilitaries
>Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 12:47:06 -0500
>
>Aiya...shit. Things are rather worse than I thought. Hey...I'm getting the 
>idea for a Sci-Fi story...imagine "official" war casualties in Iraq get bad 
>enough that the US government decides to simply hire private forces to do 
>all the work (then the official casualty #s they can report are basically 
>zero from then on). Eventually some of the big Mercenary multinationals 
>start instigating wars so they can keep their stock prices up...
>
>-TD
>
>
>>From: Gabriel Rocha <gabe at seul.org>
>>To: "Email List: Cypherpunks" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>>Subject: Jackbooted thugs, mercs and non-gov paramilitaries
>>Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 10:17:45 -0500
>>
>>I don't normally forward articles, but this one might be of interest to
>>some here. I especially like the part where these guys are exempt from
>>the legal system...
>>
>>http://www.economist.com/world/europe/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=2539816
>>
>>British companies have been grousing about losing out to the Americans
>>in Iraq. But in one area, British companies excel: security
>>
>>
>>THE sight of a mob of Iraqi stone-throwers attacking the gates to the
>>Basra palace where the coalition has its southern headquarters is no
>>surprise. What's odd is the identity of the uniformed men holding them
>>off. The single Briton prodding his six Fijians to stand their ground
>>are not British army soldiers but employees of Global Risk Strategies, a
>>London-based security company.
>>
>>Private military companies (PMCs).mercenaries, in oldspeak.manning the
>>occupation administration's front lines are now the third-largest
>>contributor to the war effort after the United States and Britain.
>>British ones are popular, largely because of the reputation of the
>>Special Air Service (SAS) regiment whose ex-employees run and man many
>>of the companies. They maintain they have twice as many men on the
>>ground as their American counterparts. According to David Claridge,
>>managing director of Janusian, a London-based security firm, Iraq has
>>boosted British military companies' revenues from #200m ($320m) before
>>the war to over #1 billion, making security by far Britain's most
>>lucrative post-war export to Iraq.
>>
>>It's a lucrative business. A four-man ex-SAS team in Baghdad can cost
>>$5,000 a day. Buoyed by their earnings, the comrades-in-arms live in the
>>plushest villas in the plushest quarters of Baghdad. Their crew-cut
>>occupants compare personal automatics, restock the bars and refill the
>>floodlit pools of the former Baathist chiefs.
>>
>>Established companies have expanded; new ones have sprung up. Control
>>Risks, a consultancy, now provides armed escorts. It has 500 men
>>guarding British civil servants. Global Risk Strategies was a two-man
>>team until the invasion of Afghanistan. Now it has over 1,000 guards in
>>Iraq.more than many of the countries taking part in the
>>occupation.manning the barricades of the Coalition Provisional Authority
>>(CPA). Last year it also won a $27m contract to distribute Iraq's new
>>dinar. Erinys, another British firm, was founded by Alastair Morrisson,
>>an ex-SAS officer who emerged from semi-retirement to win a contract
>>with Jordanian and Iraqi partners to protect Iraq's oil installations.
>>CPA officials say the contract is worth over $100m. Erinys now commands
>>a 14,000-strong armed force in Iraq.
>>
>>In industry jargon, these companies' manpower is split into Iraqis,
>>.third-country nationals. (Gurkhas and Fijians) and .internationals.
>>(usually white first-worlders). Iraqis get $150 a month, .third-country
>>nationals. 10-20 times as much, and .internationals. 100 times as much.
>>Control Risks still relies on westerners, but ArmorGroup, a British
>>rival, employs 700 Gurkhas to shepherd America's primary contractors in
>>Iraq, Bechtel and KBR. Erinys's corps of pipeline protectors is
>>overwhelmingly Iraqi. The cheapness of the other ranks, compared with
>>western soldiers, is one reason why PMCs are flourishing. .Why pay for a
>>British platoon to guard a base, when you can hire Gurkhas at a fraction
>>of the cost?. asks one.
>>
>>Nobody knows how long government contracts will last after the CPA
>>dissolves on June 30th. But multi-billion World Bank and UN
>>reconstruction funds should provide rich pickings. Amid rising violence,
>>the Program Management Office, which handles America's $18.6 billion aid
>>budget for Iraq, has raised its estimates of security costs from an
>>initial 7% of contracts to 10%. Blackwater, the American firm protecting
>>Iraq's American proconsul, Paul Bremer, says in many cases costs run to
>>over 25%. That's bad news for Iraqis hoping for reconstruction, but
>>great news for PMCs.
>>
>>The boom has led to two worries. The first is lack of regulation.
>>Stressed and sometimes ill-trained mercenaries operate in Iraq's mayhem
>>with apparent impunity, erecting checkpoints without authorisation, and
>>claiming powers to detain and confiscate identity cards. A South African
>>company guarding a Baghdad hotel put guns to the heads of this
>>correspondent's guests. According to the CPA, non-Iraqi private-security
>>personnel contracted to the coalition or its partners are not subject to
>>Iraqi law. Even the industry is concerned. Regulation is vital, says
>>ArmorGroup's Christopher Beese, if Iraq is not to descend into the law
>>of the jungle.
>>
>>Second, the boom may be eroding Britain's defences. Just when the war on
>>terror is stretching the SAS to the limit, the rising profitability of
>>private sector work is tempting unprecedented numbers of its men to
>>leave. An SAS veteran estimates that some 40 of its 300 corps requested
>>early release from their contracts last year. Another guesses that there
>>are more ex-SAS people in Iraq than there are currently serving in the
>>regiment. Head-hunters poaching military talent, say critics, risk
>>turning the army's elite corps into little more than a training school
>>for PMCs.
>>
>
>_________________________________________________________________
>FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar  get it now! 
>http://toolbar.msn.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/
>

_________________________________________________________________
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From DaveHowe at gmx.co.uk  Wed Mar 31 06:14:54 2004
From: DaveHowe at gmx.co.uk (Dave Howe)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 15:14:54 +0100
Subject: The Gilmore Dimissal
References: <10f.2dfa4339.2d9c2abd@aol.com>
Message-ID: <034801c4172a$8e02f400$c71121c2@exchange.sharpuk.co.uk>

Freematt357 at aol.com wrote:
> If you're not the driver and you don't drive you don't have to have
> an ID. And you can't show what you don't have.
IIRC, in the case above the guy was outside his car - his daughter (still
in the car) may well have been the driver, not him....




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Mar 31 12:30:09 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 15:30:09 -0500
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
Message-ID: <BAY7-F92Fm7Zf5MFKQR0001538b@hotmail.com>

Uh...this is getting tiring...as far as I'm concerned this part of the 
discussion looks like semantics.

>From a pure physics standpoint, there isn't a hell of a lot of diference 
between a noncrystalline solid and a liquid. One's moving faster. The 
gaseous state is of course where molecules have reached an escape velocity, 
overcoming the inter-molecular attraction. In the case of a noncrystalline 
solid (at room temp) it probably makes sense to include transition from the 
"liquid" state into gaseous as being describable by the word "sublimation". 
If not, the word is probably not very useful outside of HS and pre-med 
physics courses.

-TD





>From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Re: Liquid Natural Flatulence
>Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 14:38:03 -0500
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA1
>
>At 7:56 PM +0100 3/31/04, Jim Dixon wrote:
> >"Sublimation of an element or substance is a conversion between the
> >solid and the gaseous states with no liquid intermediate stage."
>
>Yes, I know the common definition.
>
>But, like I said, I was told by someone who claimed to know better,
>and, thinking about it, I think he's right.
>
>Since some people, like Peter, hypothesize that it's an extreme
>example of evaporation and not sublimation, :-), I'm going to go poke
>my nephew the chemistry student and see if I can get a pointer to an
>authoritative explanation.
>
>How's that?
>
>Cheers,
>RAH
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>Version: PGP 8.0.3
>
>iQA/AwUBQGseAMPxH8jf3ohaEQJH5ACgmwJBUhFHzBjIbsj24nl1sQrftisAoLNO
>Uu4jEgpN9fff9IwL0GnMCM0H
>=oUN/
>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>

_________________________________________________________________
Is your PC infected? Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee. 
Security. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 31 14:19:42 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 17:19:42 -0500
Subject: Mercs need to wear clean underwear
In-Reply-To: <406B3160.AA8146B5@cdc.gov>
References: <406B3160.AA8146B5@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <p061004fdbc90ed8280e5@[66.149.49.5]>

At 1:00 PM -0800 3/31/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>They need to be driving around in more heavily armored vehicles.
>All the toys in the world won't help your Toyota repel an RPG.

Ayup. New toys.

>Rather hard not to look obviously military in an APC though.

What's wrong with looking obviously military? Especially if you're getting
paid for it. :-).

>Next time the corpses won't be so roasted, perhaps, which
>makes for much better video.  Also should leave the dogtags
>(and head, limbs) on the meat.  Mmm, I love the smell of
>merc-jerky in the morning, it smells like self-determination.

Natural selection being what it is, I'm actually thinking about follow-on
generations of said merc-meat becoming recursively less toasty over time,
as an eventual more efficient replacement for state-paid force. Something
which could be fun given the right market forces.

So, what, declare all current property claims in Fallujah to be null and
void, sell claims off to the highest bidder, and whoever gets there with
the most men owns it. I mean, it worked in Texas with the Comanches and
Apaches...

Yeah, it's a fantasy, but we all have our dreams, right? :-).

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Wed Mar 31 10:16:40 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 18:16:40 +0000
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
In-Reply-To: <p061004b9bc909aa81574@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78CA@exna07.securitydynamics.com>
  <p061004b9bc909aa81574@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20040331181640.GB9473@dreams.soze.net>

R. A. Hettinga (2004-03-31 16:41Z) wrote:

> At 10:26 AM -0500 3/31/04, Trei, Peter wrote:
> >* Evaporating LPG (liquids do not 'sublimate')...
> 
> As for "sublimate", when you toss a cup of boiling water into the air
> at extremely cold temperatures it converts straight into a gas, all
> at once. That's what I was talking about. A chemist I bumped into
> with that story called it sublimation, and when I said I thought
> "sublimate" was meant for solids only, he said no, that instantaneous
> conversion to a gas is sublimation whether origin state is a solid or
> liquid.

I very seriously doubt that.

That "chemist" sounds full of shit.  Boiling, evaporation, condensation,
sublimation, melting, and freezing have nothing to do with the speed at
which the phase change occurs.  They refer to the qualitative aspect of
state changes, notably the beginning, (transition,) and ending states.
Sublimation is solid->gas with no intervening liquid state, that state
being impossible due to prevailing pressure/temperature conditions.
Haven't you ever seen a phase diagram?

Furthermore, can you please explain how boiling water could change phase
into a gas "all at once"?  It takes energy for a compound to change to
gas state, genius.  Where's it going to get that energy, particularly
when the surrounding air is at "extremely cold temperatures"?  No
macro-level events happen "instantaneously" in any reasonable sense of
the word.  Increase in atomic motion can only happen due to applied
forces, and acceleration takes time.  Even if one of those damned 50MT
Russian thermonuclear bombs went off 100m away, a glass of water
wouldn't vaporize instantaneously.

-- 
"If you don't do this thing, you won't be in any shape to walk out of here."
"Would that be physically, or just a mental state?"
  -Caspar vs Tom, Miller's Crossing




From jdd at dixons.org  Wed Mar 31 10:56:26 2004
From: jdd at dixons.org (Jim Dixon)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 19:56:26 +0100 (BST)
Subject: Liquid Natural Flatulence
In-Reply-To: <20040331181640.GB9473@dreams.soze.net>
Message-ID: <20040331194911.N51498-100000@localhost>

On Wed, 31 Mar 2004, Justin wrote:

> > As for "sublimate", when you toss a cup of boiling water into the air
> > at extremely cold temperatures it converts straight into a gas, all
> > at once. That's what I was talking about. A chemist I bumped into
> > with that story called it sublimation, and when I said I thought
> > "sublimate" was meant for solids only, he said no, that instantaneous
> > conversion to a gas is sublimation whether origin state is a solid or
> > liquid.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sublimation_(chemistry)

"Sublimation of an element or substance is a conversion between the solid
and the gaseous states with no liquid intermediate stage."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.britannica.com/search?query=sublimation&ct=&fuzzy=N

"sublimation:
"in physics, conversion of a substance from the solid to the vapour state
without its becoming liquid. An example is the vaporization of frozen
carbon dioxide (dry ice) at ordinary atmospheric ..."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

> I very seriously doubt that.
>
> That "chemist" sounds full of shit.  Boiling, evaporation, condensation,
> sublimation, melting, and freezing have nothing to do with the speed at
> which the phase change occurs.  They refer to the qualitative aspect of
> state changes, notably the beginning, (transition,) and ending states.
> Sublimation is solid->gas with no intervening liquid state, that state
> being impossible due to prevailing pressure/temperature conditions.

Yep.

--
Jim Dixon  jdd at dixons.org   tel +44 117 982 0786  mobile +44 797 373 7881
http://jxcl.sourceforge.net                       Java unit test coverage
http://xlattice.sourceforge.net         p2p communications infrastructure




From nobody at See.Comments.Header  Wed Mar 31 20:30:47 2004
From: nobody at See.Comments.Header (Italy Anonymous Remailer)
Date: 1 Apr 2004 04:30:47 -0000
Subject: Mercs need to wear clean underwear
Message-ID: <1F4ICBZG38078.2713773148@anonymous.poster>

 Hettinga advocates:

> So, what, declare all current property claims in Fallujah to be null and
> void, sell claims off to the highest bidder, and whoever gets there with
> the most men owns it. I mean, it worked in Texas with the Comanches and
> Apaches...

> Yeah, it's a fantasy, but we all have our dreams, right? :-).


     Yes, we do. And some of our dreams are of invading the homes of rich
Amerikan assholes to fund the jihad. Want to know something fun? Using 
simple tools like this link

http://www.fundrace.org/neighbors.php

   we can locate all the fascist supporters in Amerika, with address 
and phone number, and enjoy their womenfolk and riches.  




From pique at netspace.net.au  Wed Mar 31 13:01:32 2004
From: pique at netspace.net.au (Tim Benham)
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2004 07:01:32 +1000
Subject: Liquid Natural
In-Reply-To: <200403311728.i2VHSfnd022083@waste.minder.net>
References: <200403311728.i2VHSfnd022083@waste.minder.net>
Message-ID: <200404010701.32624.pique@netspace.net.au>

LPG is mostly propane, LNG is mostly methane. Their properties are quite 
different.

cheers,
Tim