Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS

[John Young]

Cryptome hosts a 2000 book excerpt on PROMIS as
allegedly used by Mossad, though not much about
the technical details of the program:


http://cryptome.org/promis-mossad.htm

The file has links to other information on Riconosciuto
offered by Orlin Grabbe, a long-time supporter of
Riconosciuto.

Back then we telephoned Hamilton about his DoJ travails
and he politely refused to discuss the topic.

A TEMPEST backdoor in PROMIS would be interesting
for what it would take configure code to emit identifiable
signals. Code emits signals, as does any transmission, 
but not easily identifiable or correlatable with the code, 
but perhaps it can be done. 

Capabilities and sensitivity of interception is a dark world, 
as was TEMPEST in its early years. Now what passes 
for knowledge about TEMPEST is hardly all there is to 
know. Indeed, some think that most of the information 
about the technolody now in the public domain is disinfo.

The TEMPEST material released under FOI to Cryptome 
some years ago should be seen as part of the camouflage
about what's now being done in EM interception,
analysis, tracking, and not least, smoke blowing.

PROMIS is sufficiently old, if not a hoary horse, that
it could be used now to honey-pot eager buyers to
induce trust where it's not to be found, following the 
lead of Bill Gates, if not floater Robert Maxwell. Intel has
come a long way since the lazy days of the Cold War
when agent double-crossing and the inside US/USSR
mil-joke-con of Mutually Assured Destruction was all to 
worry about.