From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Wed Dec  1 00:52:13 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 03:52:13 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Fallujah: Marine Eye-Witness Report
In-Reply-To: <41AB635C.4479.9BF692F@localhost>
Message-ID: <20041201085213.68875.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "James A. Donald" <jamesd at echeque.com> wrote: 
> [permanent holy war]
> Steve Thompson
> > True, but there's a question of the waste of resources and
> > man-years that would come from such a circumstance.
> 
> All the oil money has been wasted, most of the humans in the
> middle east have suffered poverty, ignorance, lack of freedom
> and the unproductive absence of useful labor.

Just like the good ol' USA, AFAIK.  It's just that the inequities at home
aren't limited to those that are a product of the petrochemical industry. 
All of which is not too different from what I see in the poorer parts of
the city I live in: Toronto.
 
> All my life, people have been proposing to solve this problem.
> Nearly every American president since 1950 announced some big
> and expensive initiative that would supposedly solve this
> problem, or make some substantial progress towards a solution.

Lately people were talking about PSE/COA topics which make moot much of
the bickering and squabbling that is a constant feature of capitalism.  We
don't hear much about PSE these days for some reason.  I suspect that the
path from here to there is still too far beyond the planning horizon of
too many people.  So, if PSE in a recognizeable form represents a rational
outcome of current economic progress, then I guess we must wait until it
looms nearer before selling it to the world.

> What is your solution?

PSE.  And the death of all superstitious nonsense.  Of course, there are
probably enough people around who like domination games that the
elimination of bogus memes such as those attached to theology may prove
difficult.

Do you have a better idea?
 
> > And then there's the ethical[1] side of the coin: do the
> > (largely financial benefits) that might come from a civil war
> > in Iraq really justify the consequent standard-of-living for
> > the residents of Iraq?
> 
> And your remedy for improving the standard of living in the
> arab world is?

Give them more money.  Aridrop directv dishes, televisions, and old
computers.  Hell, I don't know.  Winning arab hearts and minds is a topic
that is entirely beyond my area of expertise.
 
> Steve Thompson
> > Aren't we all about to run out of oil soon anyways?
> 
> Forty years or so, according to estimates by the more sane and
> conventional authorities.

And then what?  What are we and they going to do the following year?  And
the year after that?  I'm sure your military think-tanks have walked
through the scenarios and have a good handle on the likely outcomes, but
they aren't really talking at this time.  (And of course, I wouldn't trust
public military think-tank product to correctly predict the sunrise.)
 
> James A. Donald:
> > >  the people who organize large scale terror can be
> > > identified, particularly by locals and coreligionists,
> > > which is why they have been dying in large numbers in
> > > Afghanistan.
> 
> Steve Thompson
> > Um, what planet are you on?
> 
> The planet where the Afghans held an election, in which nearly
> everybody voted, some of them several times, and the Taliban
> were unable to carry out any of the threats they made against
> the voters, which indicates that the Afghans have been pretty
> efficient in killing Taliban.

Ok.  That may well be true.  And it is a step in the right direction. 
However I would guess that the long-term stable state of Afghanistan is
entirely up in the air.  Barring coups and such I guess we'll have to
revisit the Afghanistan question in a few decades.  At that time, and
after they've had a little practice with the democratic process, we'll
probably have a much better idea of how well their liberation from the
taliban went. 
 
> > The people who, as you say, organize large scale terror tend
> > to be protected by virtue of large bureaucratic firewalls,
> > legislated secrecy, misdirection (smoke and mirrors), and
> > even taboos.
> 
> The average Afghan warlord is untroubled by any of this crap. 

I suspect that not many of them get to the civilised portions of the
Internet all that often.

> He sees someone who looks suspicious, says "Hey, you don't look
> like you are from around here.  What are you doing?"  If he
> does not like the answers, he brings out his skinning knife,
> and asks a few more questions.  If the answers make him even
> more unhappy, he hands his skinning knife to the womenfolk, and
> tells them to take their time.

You gotta admire the hands-on leadership style, at the very least.

> > But perhaps you are not referring to Western terrorists, but
> > are expecting your reader to assume that terrorists always
> > wear turbans, and who generally will live and operate in the
> > Middle-Eastern theatre. Perhaps you have forgotten about the
> > people who planned and executed the operations that helped
> > South-American tyrants form up and train their death- and
> > terror-squads?
> 
> The parties that sponsored death squads of Latin America, when
> victorious, held free and fair elections, which they won, and
> those they had been fighting lost.  The death squads were an
> response to Soviet sponsored attempts to subjugate, enslave and
> terrorize Latin America, and when the Soviet Union passed, so
> did the death squads.

Of course.  All the soldiers just packed up and moved on, or retired into
the relative and mundane obscurity of civilian life.
 
> It seems most unlikely that Al Quaeda, the Taliban, and the
> rest, if victorious would hold free and fair elections, or be
> capable of winning them.

No, I imagine that isn't very likely.  So, it is clear that the answer is
to bomb the snot out of any country that harbours terrorist warlords. 
Then, we send in the educators and election facilitators.  Correct?

Perhaps I am too cynical and in short order, Afghanistan will quickly form
up and join the modern age.
 

Regards,

Steve
 

______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From isn at c4i.org  Wed Dec  1 03:10:19 2004
From: isn at c4i.org (InfoSec News)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 05:10:19 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [ISN] Universities struggling with SSL-busting spyware
Message-ID: <mailman.1096.1576007652.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2004/1130univestrug.html

By Paul Roberts
IDG News Service
11/30/04

U.S. universities are struggling with a flare-up of dangerous spyware
that can snoop on information encrypted using SSL. Experts are warning
that the stealthy software, called Marketscore, could be used to
intercept a wide range of sensitive information, including passwords
and health and financial data.

In recent weeks, information technology departments at a number of
universities issued warnings about problems caused by the Marketscore
software, which promises to speed up Web browsing. The program, which
routes all user traffic through its own network of servers, poses a
real threat to user privacy, security experts agree.

Columbia University, Cornell University, Indiana University, The State
University of New York (SUNY) at Albany, and The Pennsylvania State
University are among those noting an increase in the number of systems
running Marketscore software in recent weeks. Each institution warned
their users about Marketscore and posted instructions for removing the
software.

The software is bundled with iMesh peer-to-peer software, and may have
made it onto university networks that way, said David Escalante,
director of computer security at Boston College.

The company that makes the software, Marketscore, has headquarters in
Reston, Va., at the same mailing address as online behavior tracking
company comScore Networks. ComScore Networks did not respond to
repeated requests for comment.

Reports of infected systems on campuses ranged from a handful up to
about 200 on one large campus network, Escalante said.

Marketscore is just the latest incarnation of a spyware program called
Netsetter, which first appeared in January, said Sam Curry, vice
president of eTrust Security Management at Computer Associates.

"Basically it takes all your Web traffic and forces it through its own
proxy servers," he said.

Ostensibly, the redirection speeds up Web surfing, because pages
cached on Marketscore's servers load faster than they would if they
were served directly from the actual Web servers for sites such as
Google.com or Yahoo.com. However, those performance benefits have been
elusive.

"People who have installed the software complain to us that they're
not getting any improvement," Curry said.

Richard Smith, an independent software consultant in Boston, is also
skeptical of performance improvement claims made by Marketscore and
others, especially since many Internet service providers already offer
Web caching for their dial-up customers, he said in an e-mail message.

At Cornell, the university IT Security Office blocked connections
between Cornell's network and the Marketscore servers, according to a
message posted on the university's Web site. Administrators at SUNY
Albany took similar steps, according to a message posted on that
university's Web site.

While other legal software programs make similar claims about
improving Web browsing speed as Marketscore, Internet security experts
are troubled that the software creates its own trusted certificate
authority on computers. That certificate authority intercepts Web
communications secured using SSL, decrypting that traffic, then
sending it to the Marketscore servers before encrypting the traffic
and passing it along to its final destination. That traffic could
include sensitive information, including passwords, credit card and
Social Security numbers, Curry said.

Marketscore should be a big concern for companies -- especially those
like banks with employees who handle sensitive data, Escalante said.

"I don't know how good it is for parties on either end of a
transaction to have a third party listening in," he said.

If nothing else, all the extra decrypting and encrypting slows down
SSL traffic, casting doubt on Marketscore's claims to be an Internet
accelerator, Smith said.

CA's eTrust anti-virus software labeled Marketscore "spyware" up until
June of this year, but stopped doing so after Marketscore appealed
that designation using an established vendor appeal process, he said.
CA is currently re-evaluating the "spyware" designation using a
complicated, multifactor scoring system. The software is less
repugnant than its predecessor, Netsetter, which did not clearly
disclose to users what it did when installed and made itself difficult
to remove.

Marketscore is better on both those counts, clearly stating both in
the end user license agreement and during the installation process
what the product does, and providing users with an easy uninstall
program. CA considers Marketscore an example of a new breed of
software that lies in the gray area between spyware and legitimate
software, Curry said.

"Under the old definition, (Marketscore) clearly qualified as spyware.
But there are new categories emerging," he said.

While Marketscore clearly tracks user behavior, it doesn't hijack Web
browser home pages, spew pop-up advertisements or conceal its
presence, like earlier generations of spyware did, Curry said.

"There's more granularity. Companies have responded and ... are adding
benefits and value to these programs. We're looking at ways to more
accurately identify this," he said.

Perhaps trying to increase its appeal, Marketscore is now advertising
itself as an e-mail protection service, in addition to an Internet
accelerator. According to the Marketscore.com Web site, members will
receive Symantec's CarrierScan Server anti-virus technology at no
cost.

However, that promise doesn't sit well with Symantec, which said it
has no relationship with Marketscore and, in fact, considers the
software "spyware," said Genevieve Haldeman, a company spokeswoman.

"We don't have relationships with companies that make software we
consider malicious," she said. Symantec is considering legal action to
force Marketscore to stop using its name and logo on the
Marketscore.com Web site, she said.

Spyware or not, the lesson of Marketscore is that "if it sounds too
good to be true, it probably is," Curry said.



_________________________________________
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  1 05:37:18 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 08:37:18 -0500
Subject: Lockheed and the Future of Warfare
Message-ID: <p0611042bbdd374e3759a@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/28/business/yourmoney/28lock.html>

November 28, 2004
Lockheed and the Future of Warfare
By TIM WEINER

LOCKHEED MARTIN doesn't run the United States. But it does help run a
breathtakingly big part of it.

Over the last decade, Lockheed, the nation's largest military
contractor, has built a formidable information-technology empire that
now stretches from the Pentagon to the post office. It sorts your mail
and totals your taxes. It cuts Social Security checks and counts the
United States census. It runs space flights and monitors air traffic.
To make all that happen, Lockheed writes more computer code than
Microsoft.

Of course, Lockheed, based in Bethesda, Md., is best known for its
weapons, which are the heart of America's arsenal. It builds most of
the nation's warplanes. It creates rockets for nuclear missiles,
sensors for spy satellites and scores of other military and
intelligence systems. The Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency
might have difficulty functioning without the contractor's expertise.

But in the post-9/11 world, Lockheed has become more than just the
biggest corporate cog in what Dwight D. Eisenhower called the
military-industrial complex. It is increasingly putting its stamp on
the nation's military policies, too.

Lockheed stands at "the intersection of policy and technology," and
that "is really a very interesting place to me," said its new chief
executive, Robert J. Stevens, a tightly wound former Marine. "We are
deployed entirely in developing daunting technology," he said, and
that requires "thinking through the policy dimensions of national
security as well as technological dimensions."

To critics, however, Lockheed's deep ties with the Pentagon raise some
questions. "It's impossible to tell where the government ends and
Lockheed begins," said Danielle Brian of the Project on Government
Oversight, a nonprofit group in Washington that monitors government
contracts. "The fox isn't guarding the henhouse. He lives there."

No contractor is in a better position than Lockheed to do business in
Washington. Nearly 80 percent of its revenue comes from the United
States government. Most of the rest comes from foreign military sales,
many financed with tax dollars. And former Lockheed executives,
lobbyists and lawyers hold crucial posts at the White House and the
Pentagon, picking weapons and setting policies.

Obviously, war and crisis have been good for business. The Pentagon's
budget for buying new weapons rose by about a third over the last
three years, to $81 billion in fiscal 2004, up from $60 billion in
2001. Lockheed's sales also rose by about a third, to nearly $32
billion in the 2003 calendar year, from $24 billion in 2001. It was
the No. 1 recipient of Pentagon primary contracts, with $21.9 billion
in fiscal 2003. Boeing had $17.3 billion, Northrop Grumman had $11.1
billion and General Dynamics had $8.2 billion.

LOCKHEED also has many tens of billions of dollars in future orders on
its books. The company's stock has tripled in the last four years, to
just under $60.

"It used to be just an airplane company," said John Pike, a longtime
military analyst and director of GlobalSecurity.org, a research
organization in Alexandria, Va. "Now it's a warfare company. It's an
integrated solution provider. It's a one-stop shop. Anything you need
to kill the enemy, they will sell you."

As its influence grows, Lockheed is not just seeking to solve the
problems of national security. It is framing the questions as well:

Are there too few soldiers to secure the farthest reaches of Iraq?
Lockheed is creating robot soldiers and neural software - "intelligent
agents" - to do their work. "We've now created policy options where
you can elect to put a human in or you can elect to put an intelligent
agent in place," Mr. Stevens said.

Are thousands of C.I.A. and Pentagon analysts drowning under a flood
of data, incapable of seeing patterns? Lockheed's "intelligence
information factory" will do their thinking for them. Mining and
sifting categories of facts - for example, linking an adversary's
movements and telephone calls - would "offload the mental work by
making connections," said Stanton D. Sloane, executive vice president
for integrated systems and solutions at Lockheed.

Are American soldiers hard-pressed to tell friend from foe in the
crags of Afghanistan? Lockheed is transferring spy satellite
technology, created for mapping mountain ridges, to build a mobile lab
for reading fingerprints. Lockheed executives say the mobile lab, the
size of a laptop, is just the tool for special-operations commandos.
It can be loaded with the prints of suspected terrorists, they say,
and linked to the F.B.I.'s 470 million print files. They say they
think that American police departments will want it, too.

Does the Department of Homeland Security have the best tools to
protect the nation? Lockheed has a host of military and intelligence
technologies to offer. "What they do for the military in downtown
Falluja, they can do for the police in downtown Reno," said Jondavid
Black of the company's Horizontal Integration Vision division.
Lockheed is also building a huge high-altitude airship, 25 times
bigger than the Goodyear blimp, intended to help the Pentagon with the
unsolved problem of protecting the nation from ballistic missiles. The
airship, with two tons of surveillance sensors, could be used by the
Department of Homeland Security to stare down at the United States,
Lockheed officials said.

In a pilot program for the department, Lockheed has set up spy cameras
and sensors on the U.S.S. New Jersey, anchored in the Delaware River,
providing 24-hour surveillance of the ports of Philadelphia and
Camden, N.J. The program grew out of the Aegis weapons and
surveillance systems for Navy ships, and it soon may spread throughout
the United States.

The melding of military and intelligence programs,
information-technology and domestic security spending began in earnest
after the Sept. 11 attacks. Lockheed was perfectly positioned to take
advantage of the shift. When the United States government decided a
decade ago to let corporate America handle federal information
technology, Lockheed leapt at the opportunity. Its
information-technology sales have quadrupled since 1995, and, for all
those years, Lockheed has been the No. 1 supplier to the federal
government, which now outsources 83 percent of its I.T. work.

Lockheed has taken over the job of making data flow throughout the
government, from the F.B.I.'s long-dysfunctional computer networks to
the Department of Health and Human Services system for tracking child
support. The company just won a $525 million contract to fix the
Social Security Administration's information systems. It has an $87
million contract to make computers communicate and secrets stream
throughout the Department of Homeland Security. On top of all that,
the company is helping to rebuild the United States Coast Guard - a
$17 billion program - and to supply, under the Patriot Act, biometric
identity cards for six million Americans who work in transportation.

Lockheed is also the strongest corporate force driving the Pentagon's
plans for "net-centric warfare": the big idea of fusing military,
intelligence and weapons programs through a new military Internet,
called the Global Information Grid, to give American soldiers
throughout the world an instant picture of the battlefield around
them. "We want to know what's going on anytime, anyplace on the
planet," said Lorraine M. Martin, vice president and deputy of the
company's Joint Command, Control and Communications Systems division.

Lockheed's global reach is also growing. Its "critical mass" of
salesmanship lets it "produce global products for a global
marketplace," said Robert H. Trice Jr., the senior vice president for
corporate business development. With its dominant position in fighter
jets, missiles, rockets and other weapons, Lockheed's technology will
drive the security spending for many American allies in coming
decades. Lockheed now sells aircraft and weapons to more than 40
countries. The American taxpayer is financing many of those sales. For
example, Israel spends much of the $1.8 billion in annual military aid
from the United States to buy F-16 warplanes from Lockheed.

Twenty-four nations are flying the F-16, or will be soon. Lockheed's
factory in Fort Worth is building 10 for Chile. Oman will receive a
dozen next year. Poland will get 48 in 2006; the United States
Treasury will cover the cost through a $3.8 billion loan.

In the future, Lockheed hopes to build and sell hundreds of billions
of dollars' worth of the next generation of warplanes, the F-35, to
the United States Army, Navy and Air Force, and to dozens of United
States allies. Three years ago, Lockheed won the competition to be the
prime contractor for this aircraft, known as the Joint Strike Fighter.

The program was valued at $200 billion, the biggest Pentagon project
in history, but it may be worth more. The F-35 is in its first stages
of development in Fort Worth; its onboard computers will require 3.5
million lines of code. Each of the American military services wants a
different version of the jet.

There have been glitches involving the weight of the craft. "We did
not get it right the first time," said Tom Burbage, a Lockheed
executive vice president working on the program. But a day will come,
he said, "when everybody's flying the F-35." Lockheed hopes to sell
4,000 or 5,000 of the planes, with roughly half the sales to foreign
nations, including those that bought the F-16.

"It's a terrific opportunity for us," said Bob Elrod, a senior
Lockheed manager for the F-35 program. "It could be a tremendous
success, at the level of the F-16 - 4,000-plus and growing." That
would represent "world domination" for Lockheed, he said.

In the United States, where national security spending now surpasses
$500 billion a year, Lockheed's dominance is growing. Its own
executives say the concentration of power among military contractors
is more intense than in any other sector of business outside banking.
Three or four major companies - Lockheed, General Dynamics, Northrop
Grumman and arguably Boeing - rule the industry. They often work like
general contractors building customized houses, farming out the
painting, the floors and the cabinets to smaller subcontractors and
taking their own share of the money.

AND, after 9/11, cost is hardly the most important variable for
Pentagon planners. Lockheed has now won approval to build as many
F-22's as possible. The current price, $258 million apiece, easily
makes the F-22 the most expensive fighter jet in history.

Mr. Stevens, whose compensation last year as Lockheed's chief
operating officer was more than $9.5 million, says cost is essentially
irrelevant when national security is at stake. "Some folks might
think, well, here's a fighter that costs a lot," he said. "This is not
a business where in the purest economical sense there's a broad market
of supply and demand and price and value can be determined in that
exchange. It's more challenging to define its value."

Lockheed says it has transformed its corporate culture. In the 1970's,
it was discovered that the company had paid millions of dollars to
foreign officials around the world in order to sell its planes. In one
case, Kakuei Tanaka, who had been the prime minister of Japan, was
convicted of accepting bribes.

"Without Lockheed, there never would have been a Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act," said Jerome Levinson, who was the staff director of
the Senate subcommittee that uncovered the bribery.

The antibribery provisions of that law, passed in 1977, owed their
existence to the Lockheed investigation, he said. The last bribery
case involving Lockheed came a decade ago, when a Lockheed executive
and the corporation admitted paying $1.2 million in bribes to an
Egyptian official to seal the sales of three Lockheed C-130 cargo
planes.

Mr. Trice, Lockheed's senior vice president for business development,
says the company cleaned up its act at home and overseas since the
last of the series of major mergers and acquisitions that gave the
corporation its present shape in March 1995. "You simply have to look
people in the eye and say 'we don't do business that way,' " he said.

There really is no need to do business that way any more - not in a
world where so much of Lockheed's wealth flows directly from the
Treasury, where competition for foreign markets is both controlled and
subsidized by the White House and Congress, and where Lockheed's
influence runs so deep. Men who have worked, lobbied and lawyered for
Lockheed hold the posts of secretary of the Navy, secretary of
transportation, director of the national nuclear weapons complex and
director of the national spy satellite agency. The list also includes
Stephen J. Hadley, who has been named the next national security
adviser to the president, succeeding Condoleezza Rice.

Former Lockheed executives serve on the Defense Policy Board, the
Defense Science Board and the Homeland Security Advisory Council,
which help make military and intelligence policy and pick weapons for
future battles. Lockheed's board includes E. C. Aldridge Jr., who, as
the Pentagon's chief weapons buyer, gave the go-ahead to build the
F-22.

None of those posts and positions violate the Pentagon's rules about
the "revolving door" between industry and government. Lockheed has
stayed clear of the kind of conflict-of-interest cases that have
afflicted its competitor, Boeing, and the Air Force in recent months.

"We need to be politically aware and astute," Mr. Stevens said. "We
work with the Congress. We work with the executive branch." In these
dialogues, he said, Lockheed's end of the conversation is "saying we
think this is feasible, we think this is possible, we think we might
have invented a new approach."

Lockheed makes about $1 million a year in campaign contributions
through political action committees, singling out members of the
Congressional committees controlling the Pentagon's budget, and spends
many millions more on lobbying. Political stalwarts who have lobbied
for Lockheed at one point or another include Haley Barbour, the
governor of Mississippi and a former Republican national chairman;
Otto Reich, who persuaded Congress to sell F-16's to Chile before
becoming President Bush's main Latin America policy aide in 2002; and
Norman Y. Mineta, the transportation secretary and former member of
Congress.

Its connections give Lockheed a "tremendous opportunity to influence
contracts flowing to the company," said Ms. Brian of the Project on
Government Oversight. "More subtly valuable is the ability of the
company to benefit from their eyes and ears inside the government, to
know what's on the horizon, what are the best bets for the
government's future technology needs."

SO who serves as the overseer for the biggest military contractors and
their costly weapons? Usually, the customer itself: the Pentagon.

"These programs are huge," said Dov S. Zakheim, the Pentagon's
comptroller and chief financial officer for the last three years, who
recently joined Booz Allen Hamilton, the consulting firm. "There is a
historical tendency to underestimate their test schedules, their
technological hurdles, the likely weight of an airplane and, as a
result, to underestimate costs.

"Because you have so few contractors, you don't get the level of
attention that the average citizen would think would be devoted to a
program costing billions of dollars," he said. "With this massive
agglomeration into a very small number of companies, you get far less
visibility as to whether the subcontractors are effectively managed.
Problems accumulate."

"Twenty years ago, the complaint was, it takes so long to build
things," he said. Weapons designed in the depths of the cold war were
built long after the Berlin Wall crumbled. That led some people,
including George W. Bush while running for president in 1999, to
suggest that the Pentagon skip a generation of weapons set to roll off
the assembly line in this decade and concentrate instead on lighter,
faster, smarter systems for the future.

That didn't happen. It still takes two decades to build a major
weapons system, and the costs are still staggering.

"The complaints haven't changed 20 years later," Mr. Zakheim said. The
difference between then and now is the concentration of expertise,
experience and power in a few hands, he said, "and I don't think the
effect has necessarily been a good one."

Mr. Stevens rejected that criticism. "I can't tell you the number of
times I've heard 'not progressive, not sophisticated, ponderous, slow'
" as terms used to describe Lockheed, he said. "I see none of that."

What he sees is a far grander vision. Lockheed, he said, is promising
to transform the very nature of war. During the cold war, when
Lockheed and its component parts built an empire of nuclear weapons,
Mr. Stevens said, the watchword was: "Be more fearful. 'Deterrence,'
isn't that Latin? 'Deterrere.' Induce fear. Terrorize."

Today, Lockheed is building weapons so smart that they can change the
world by virtue of their precision, he said; they aim to wage war
without the death of innocents, without weapons misfiring, without
fatal miscalculation.

"I know the fog of war exists," Mr. Stevens said, adding that it could
be lifted. "We envision a world where you don't have any more
fratricide," no more friendly fire, he said. "With technology we've
been able to make ourselves more secure and more humane.

"And we aren't there yet - but we sure have pioneered the kind of work
that is taking us well along that trajectory. And there's a lot of
evidence that says we're doing well. And we're setting the bar high
and we expect to be able to do that. Now that's pretty exciting stuff.

"I don't say this lightly," he said. "Our industry has contributed to
a change in humankind."

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  1 05:58:12 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 08:58:12 -0500
Subject: [osint] Arabs launch money laundering, terror financing
  watchdog
Message-ID: <p0611042fbdd37e6ab14b@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text


To: "Bruce Tefft" <btefft at community-research.com>
Thread-Index: AcTXnb2VTpnLxWr1TYWTH/A76UVXkw==
From: "Bruce Tefft" <btefft at community-research.com>
Mailing-List: list osint at yahoogroups.com; contact osint-owner at yahoogroups.com
Delivered-To: mailing list osint at yahoogroups.com
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 08:00:49 -0500
Subject: [osint] Arabs launch money laundering, terror financing watchdog
Reply-To: osint at yahoogroups.com


http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_1-12-2004_pg4_1

Arabs launch money laundering, terror financing watchdog

* US hails Middle East-North Africa Financial Action Task Force

MANAMA: Arab states agreed on Tuesday to work together to try to keep money
out of the hands of terrorists.

Tuesday's creation of the 14-member Middle East-North Africa Financial
Action Task Force was hailed by the US Treasury Department official
responsible for fighting terrorist financing, Juan Carlos Zarate, who
attended the inaugural meeting in Bahrain.

The task force was "a testament to the fact that Gulf countries and
countries in the region have taken very seriously ... the threat of
terrorist financing," Zarate told reporters. "I think we need to do more.
There are still those who are providing support to Al Qaeda and to
like-minded terrorist groups ... who want to hide money in the international
financial system."

The task force is the first of its kind in the region, which has come under
increased scrutiny following the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks in the
United States. The United Arab Emirates, which joined the new task force and
is known for its freewheeling financial sector, has been identified by US
investigators as a major money transfer center for Al Qaeda, the terror
network responsible for Sept. 11.

The Emirates has tightened reporting and other regulations since September
11. Bahrain earlier this year signed the 1999 UN international convention
for the suppression of financing of terrorism. Saudi Arabia has cracked down
on charities suspected of funneling money to terrorists.

Emirates Central Bank Governor Sultan bin Nasser al-Suwaidi told reporters
at the Bahrain meeting that now countries in the region must ensure their
words are translated into action.

"We need to strengthen our regulations and enforce the right laws and
regulations," al-Suwaidi said. The watchdog bringing together Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Qatar, Kuwait, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco,
Egypt, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen will be a regional version
of the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force. The 33-member FATF was set
up in 1987 to monitor and fight money laundering, and in 2001 expanded its
role to combatting the financing of terror.

Iraqi officials attended the Bahrain meeting as observers, as did officials
from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United States, Britain and
France.

Bahraini Finance Minister Abdulla Saif said the task force showed officials
in his region were serious about ensuring their banking and financial
systems were transparent and could not be exploited by criminals.

Bahrain was to host the task force, which was to be headed initially by a
Lebanese president, an Egyptian vice president and a Saudi executive
director, according to the founding documents delegates signed Tuesday.

The presidency and vice-presidency will rotate annually among the member
countries. ap



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--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From sfurlong at acmenet.net  Wed Dec  1 06:07:24 2004
From: sfurlong at acmenet.net (Steve Furlong)
Date: 01 Dec 2004 09:07:24 -0500
Subject: geographically removed?  eHalal
In-Reply-To: <41AD2E37.95FC281A@cdc.gov>
References: <41AD2E37.95FC281A@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <1101910044.8504.0.camel@daft>

On Tue, 2004-11-30 at 21:36, Major Variola (ret) wrote:

> Halal was deemed a terrorist weapon, and contrary to the treasury's
> policies, game over.

Hawala




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  1 06:17:27 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 09:17:27 -0500
Subject: Perle: Rumsfeld Opposed, Powell Wanted Occupation
Message-ID: <p06110434bdd381db7fc6@[66.149.49.5]>

Remember what I said about the original estimate of only 50,000 men to take
down Iraq, with the next stop being Damascus?

:-)

Cheers,
RAH
-------

<http://newsmax.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=http://newsmax.com/archives/ic/2004/11/30/80903.shtml>

Reprinted from NewsMax.com
Tuesday, Nov. 30, 2004 8:03 a.m. EST

Perle: Rumsfeld Opposed, Powell Wanted Occupation

 Secretary Colin Powell, the State Department and the CIA - not Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld - are responsible for the chaos that has grown
out of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, says Richard Perle, the former chairman
of Pentagon's Defense Policy Review Board.

 Appearing on Fox News' "O'Reilly Factor" Monday night, Perle said the U.S.
made a most serious mistake after Iraq was liberated and the "keys" were
not handed over immediately to Iraqis to run their own country.

Thus, the U.S. military became an occupying force - and an increasingly
unpopular one.

 "We didn't hand the keys over to the Iraqis. Instead we embarked on what
became an extended occupation. That was fundamentally mistaken - it was
politically driven," Perle said.

 Perle's remarks places significant distance between postwar policies and
neo-conservatives like himself who have backed the war and have been
championed in the Bush administration by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, his
deputy Paul Wolfowitz, and Vice President Cheney.

Perle told O'Reilly the idea of a military occupation was not the
Pentagon's original plan.

 "It was not Don Rumsfeld's decision," he said.

 Asked by O'Reilly if handing the keys over to the Iraqis after deposing
Saddam would have sparked a civil war between the Sunnis, Kurds and
Shiites, Perle said he didn't think so. He noted that there were already
groups of anti-Saddam Iraqis in place when the dictator fell.

 "There was an umbrella group of opposition figures. It included Shia,
Sunnis, Kurds and in the end, of course, we did turn to the Iraqis. We
asked them to form a governing council, then an interim government, but we
made the big mistake of not trusting the Iraqis.

 "I'm not saying that everything would have worked out, but everything
certainly didn't work out the way we did it. My own view is we should have
supported a government in exile even before going into Iraq."

 O'Reilly asked how much responsibility Rumsfeld bears for the current
situation in Iraq.

 "I think the conduct of the war was brilliant," Perle observed. "The
campaign will go down in history as one of the greatest military campaigns
ever. Saddam was removed and his regime fell within three weeks.

 "The problems didn't start immediately after Saddam's removal. The
problems started when the occupation began to wear on the people, and that
was predictable."

 When O'Reilly cited Colin Powell as a dissenting voice who warned the
president that if "you break it [Iraq], you'll own it," Perle said, "the
irony is that it was Secretary Powell and some others who wanted the
extended occupation. They are the ones who did not want to turn things over
to the Iraqis, who feared and distrusted the Iraqis and blocked all efforts
to do precisely that."

 Perle then revealed that even before the war Rumsfeld's Department of
Defense had argued that we should train thousands of Iraqis "to go in with
us so that we wouldn't be the aggressor, we wouldn't be the occupying
power, and those proposals were blocked largely by the State Department and
the CIA. Rumsfeld was never able to get approval for the political strategy
that might well have saved us from much of the subsequent trouble."

 Responding to O'Reilly's remark that the we are now seen as the "bad
guys," Perle said that the situation in Iraq can be cleaned up.

 "Remember, we were portrayed as the bad guys when the only policy for
dealing with Saddam were sanctions and the argument was that Iraqi babies
were dying as result of the sanctions. We're making real progress and the
political evolution is critical. There is a desperate effort now to cope
with the fact that after these elections the Iraqis will be fully invested
in their own future, and I think we've already begun to turn the corner."


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  1 07:21:18 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 10:21:18 -0500
Subject: US netizens: white, wealthy and full of it - shock!
Message-ID: <p06110470bdd38e476927@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/01/us_doc_internet_survey/print.html>

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT


US netizens: white, wealthy and full of it - shock!
By Andrew Orlowski in San Francisco (andrew.orlowski at theregister.co.uk)
Published Wednesday 1st December 2004 00:34 GMT

"The Internet is becoming more and more widespread and will increasingly
represent a scientific random sample of the population," claims
(http://joi.ito.com/archives/2004/11/21/poor_librarian_immerses_self_in_irony.html#c018560)
ICANN's newest board member, Joi Ito. Quite what scientific experiments he
will wish to perform, once the desired sample size has been reached,
remains a mystery. But like many people who spend too long in front of
their computers, he's talking about a Platonic ideal rather than the real
world.

A survey by the US Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and
Information Administration shows that the internet has entrenched the
divide between rich and poor, and the races. Statistics reveal an internet
that's overwhelmingly white, wealthy and urban. And the net's best days may
even be behind it. The pace of internet adoption has tapered off to a
trickle, with a substantial part of the population not interested in the
internet at any price.

 (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/01/rainbow_nation.jpg)
Diversity in action: blogdom's Rainbow Nation

Only 13.9 per cent of black households and 12.6 per cent of Hispanic
households have an internet connection - and less than a quarter of rural
households. The spurt of internet adoption that coincided with the Napster
boom - which took penetration over the fifty per cent mark - is now a
distant memory. Although 13.1 per cent of the US came online in the year to
September 2001, only seven per cent have been added in the subsequent two
years. The lack of availability is cited by less than ten per cent of
non-wired households. Almost half, or 44.1 per cent, aren't interested at
all. 38.9 per cent say it doesn't represent value for money. The boredom is
apparent elsewhere in the survey: amazingly, 17.7pc of households have
dial-up, but don't use it. Having arrived on the Information Superhighway,
they've pulled over into the layby for a snooze.

Clearly rural areas can benefit greatly from an information service of some
kind. But it's becoming less apparent that the internet in its current
shape is the way to deliver such services. Braving this toxic wasteland of
spam, viruses and trolls requires a major investment for a low income
household, and it isn't clear that the payback is worth it. (Berating them
for "Not Getting It
" is no longer an option, and illustrates why Professor
Fisher's work
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/02/01/free_legal_downloads/) on a
digital pool for music is so important: it would give everyone a good
reason for having a computer connection).

We may even be approaching the problem from the wrong direction.

For a decade governments have tried to cajole the real world into jumping
into cyberspace, with grants and promotions to adopt internet adoption.
Perhaps what was needed instead was a drive to persuade techno utopian
bloggers to join the real world. With a compassionate approach - involving
patience, counseling and therapy - there's no reason they can't be fully
integrated back into society. At which point we may begin to get computer
networks that are really useful to all of us, and not just a technocratic
elite.
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  1 07:27:59 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 10:27:59 -0500
Subject: Anti-RFID outfit deflates Mexican VeriChip hype
Message-ID: <p0611046dbdd38e436843@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/30/mexican_verichip_hype/print.html>

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT


Anti-RFID outfit deflates Mexican VeriChip hype
By Thomas C Greene (thomas.greene at theregister.co.uk)
Published Tuesday 30th November 2004 18:00 GMT

Reports that 160 Mexican officials have had RFID chips implanted within
their flesh in some bizarre "security" scheme have been exaggerated,
Anti-RFID outfit CASPIAN (http://www.nocards.org/) (Consumers Against
Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering) says.

"Our concern is that dozens of news outlets have repeated the inflated
number, which has reached the level of an urban legend," CASPIAN Director
Katherine Albrecht said in a recent press release.


"I myself have repeated the erroneous figure in several media interviews,
and I want to set the record straight," she added.

The true number of Mexico's new robo-crats, based on a transcript
(http://www.spychips.com/press-releases/mexican-translation.html) from a
Televisa Mexican interview, is only 18, CASPIAN says.

In a 19 July, 2004 press release, Albrecht made a clear mention of the
imaginary 160:

"Promoting implanted RFID devices as a security measure is downright
'loco,'" says Katherine Albrecht. "Advertising you've got a chip in your
arm that opens important doors is an invitation to kidnapping and
mutilation."

That's Albrecht's response to the announcement by Mexican Attorney General
Rafael Macedo de la Concha that he and 160 other Mexican officials were
implanted with Verichip RFID devices.

We wondered how the inflated figure got circulating in the first place. The
earliest mention in English that we could find on the Web, following a
not-terribly-aggressive search, comes from a blog called igargoyle
(http://igargoyle.com/archives/000448.html) on 13 July 2004. This is
followed, with more details, by the Associated Press
(http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5439055/), The Guardian
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/life/news/story/0,12976,1260858,00.html), and
The Register
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/14/mexicans_get_chipped/), each on 14
July.

CASPIAN, weighing in several days later, is clearly not to blame for the
hype. And now the outfit has learned that classic lesson about believing
what one reads in the papers.

But who is to blame? Well, there is a 13 July item in Spanish
(http://www.el-universal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia_busqueda.html?id_nota=113215&tabla=nacion_h)
that seems to have words in it that relate to the RFID story, along with
the number 160; but this is unlikely to be the original source. There is
also (we believe) a brief mention
(http://presidencia.gob.mx/buenasnoticias/index.php?contenido=8614&pagina=28)
in a 13 July press release on what we think is the Mexican President's
official Web site.

The thirteenth seems to be when the story broke in Mexico, and the source
seems to be Attorney General Rafael Macedo de la Concha himself, although
we could not find a place where he is directly quoted as saying that 160
employees would be chipped. Reporters have offered the number in the
context of interviewing him, which suggests that he's the source, but there
are no specific, direct quotes that we could find. Perhaps, like many
senior bureaucrats, he had no idea what he was talking about.

Perhaps a companion press release contained the bogus number, or perhaps
the Spanish words for 18 and 160 sound alike, as fifteen and fifty do in
English.

In any case, we're pleased to have cleared this up. .


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From jya at pipeline.com  Wed Dec  1 10:59:46 2004
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Wed, 01 Dec 2004 10:59:46 -0800
Subject: Anti-RFID outfit deflates Mexican VeriChip hype
In-Reply-To: <20041201154046.GA2728@arion.soze.net>
References: <p0611046dbdd38e436843@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <p0611046dbdd38e436843@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <E1CZWxs-0007q2-00@mclean.mail.mindspring.net>

Lying about having an implant is kidnapping and mutilation
protection. Whether any justice official, with or without a
denied implant, will be believed by the slicers is no different
than the terrorism risk of anyone living within 100 miles of a
US defense base and/or industry, or Wall Street suckblood
HQ. No matter that the implantee likes to hide among the 
innocent, the families of the protective servicers are easy
ransom, easy lessons taught for no safe sanctuary.

Bring em on, oops, they are here already. Darn, it wasn't
the commies and nazis who were the threat, it was your
indolent life-style paid for by your swell-paid, smarter wife, 
up to women-empowered thieving the marketplace and 
making innumerable enemies for you to blame for your 
swelling brain fat-globules.

Pray the draft is women-empowered so there's no need
to shanghai the overaged, over-decrepit, over-funny-loving,
inbred-feeders, pray for the Condies and the Maggies to 
fight the gameboy-dreamy battles, really face-to-face,
not just stomp-hoof the youngsters into hell for a face-save
the empire.

And that's not all. James Donald, you're losing your vile
truth-twisting tongue, what with your conciliatory mein 
recently. Get your shaggy blue-balled mouth-organ off 
the commie-nazi symp gravy train.




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  1 09:05:44 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 12:05:44 -0500
Subject: Conversational Engagement Tracked
Message-ID: <p06110443bdd38deb538f@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/12/rnb_120104.asp?trk=nl>

Technology Review  


Conversational Engagement Tracked

December 1, 2004

It would be useful if a computer could sense ebbs and flows in conversation
in order to automatically adjust remote communications systems. It would be
useful, for instance, if a system automatically switched from a
walkie-talkie-type push-to-talk system to a telephone-like full duplex
audio connection when the participants become highly engaged in a
conversation.

Language is often fairly cryptic, however. The phrase "I am interested in
this conversation", for instance, can signal enjoyment or polite boredom.

Researchers from the University of Rochester and Palo Alto Research Center
are aiming to allow computers to automatically assess peoples' engagement
in a conversation by analyzing the way they speak rather than what they
say. The researchers' system analyzes tone of voice and prosodic style,
which includes changes in strength, pitch and rhythm.

 As voice communication shifts from traditional telephone networks to the
more flexible Internet it is becoming easier to seamlessly shift between
different communication channels. The system could automatically adapt
voice channels on-the-fly. It could also help a user who is engaged in
conversation avoid distractions by deferring loud and new email
announcements and changing instant messaging status to busy.

The researchers' system adds the ability to sense characteristics of
conversational engagement to previous methods of recognizing speech
emotion, taking into consideration changes in emotion over time and the
influence of participants on each other.

The system measures five levels of engagement. The researchers' used
recorded phone conversations to test the system. The system sensed users'
engagement accurately 63 percent of the time, more than triple the 20
percent accuracy that would result from random choices.

The method could be used in practical applications in three to six years,
according to the researchers. The work appeared in the proceedings of the
8th International Conference on Spoken Language Processing (ICSLP) held
October 4 to 8, 2004 on Jeju Island in Korea.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  1 09:29:31 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 12:29:31 -0500
Subject: Quantum key distribution
Message-ID: <p06110478bdd3afc442ba@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.aip.org/tip/INPHFA/vol-10/iss-6/p22.html>
  - The Industrial Physicist

?Quantum key distribution

Data carrying photons may be transmitted by laser and detected in such a
way that any interference will be noted

by Jennifer Ouellette

pdf version of this article

Computing's exponential increase in power requires setting the bar always
higher to secure electronicdata transmissions from would-be hackers. The
ideal solution would transmit data in quantum bits, but truly quantum
information processing may lie decades away. Therefore, several companies
have focused on bringing one aspect of quantum communications to market-
quantum key distribution (QKD), used to exchange secret keys that protect
data during transmission. Two companies, MagiQ Technologies (New York, NY)
and ID Quantique (Geneva, Switzerland), have released commercial QKD
systems, and several others plan to enter the marketplace within two years.
Figure 1. When blue light is pumped into a nonlinear crystal, entangled
photon pairs (imaged here as a red beam with the aid of a diode laser)
emerge at an angle of 30 to the blue beam, and the beams are sent into
single-mode fibers to be detected. Because the entangled photons "know"
each other, any interference will result in a mismatch when the two beams
are compared. (University of Vienna/Volker Steger)

 "There is a continuous war between code makers and code breakers," says
Alexei Trifonov, chief scientist with MagiQ. Cryptologists devise more
difficult coding schemes, only to have them broken. Quantum cryptography
has the potential to end that cycle. This is important to national security
and modern electronic business transactions, which transmit credit card
numbers and other sensitive information in encrypted form. The Department
of Defense (DoD) currently funds several quantum-cryptography projects as
part of a $20.6 million initiative in quantum information. Globally, public
and private sources will fund about $50 million in quantum-cryptography
work over the next several years. Andrew Hammond, a vice president of
MagiQ, estimates that the market for QKD systems will reach $200 million
within a few years, and one day could hit $1 billion annually.

Key types

QKD was proposed roughly 20 years ago, but its premise rests on the
formulation of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in 1927. The very act of
observing or measuring a particle-such as a photon in a data stream-changes
its behavior (Figure 1). Any moving photon can have one of four
orientations: vertical, horizontal, or diagonal in either direction. A
standard laser can be modified to emit single photons, each with a
particular orientation. Would-be hackers (eavesdroppers in cryptography
parlance) can record the orientations with photon detectors, but doing so
changes the orientation of some photons-and, thus, alerts the sender and
receiver of a compromised transmission.

An encryption key-the code needed to encrypt or decipher a message-consists
of a string of random bits.  Such a key is useless unless it is completely
random, known only to the communicating parties, and changed regularly. In
the one-time-pad approach, the key length must equal the message length,
and it should be used only once. In theory, this makes the encrypted
message secure, but problems arise in practice. In the real world, keys
must be exchanged by a CD-ROM or some other physical means, which makes
keys susceptible to interception. Reusing a key gives code breakers the
opportunity to find patterns in the encrypted data that might reveal the
key. Historically, the Soviet Union's accidental duplication of
one-time-pad pages allowed U.S. cryptanalysts to unmask the spy Klaus Fuchs
in 1949.

Rather than one-time-pad keys, many data-transmission security systems
today use public-key cryptography, which relies on very long prime numbers
to transmit keys. A typical public-key encryption scheme uses two keys. The
first is a public key, available to anyone with access to the global
registry of public keys, and the message is encrypted with it. The second
is private, accessible only to the receiver. Both keys are needed to
unscramble a message. The system's primary weakness is that a powerful
computer could use the public key to learn the private key (see The
Industrial Physicist, August 2000, pp. 29-33).

Quantum key distribution

A key distributed using quantum cryptography would be almost impossible to
steal because QKD systems continually and randomly generate new private
keys that both parties share automatically. A compromised key in a QKD
system can only decrypt a small amount of encoded information because the
private key may be changed every second or even continuously. To build up a
secret key from a stream of single photons, each photon is encoded with a
bit value of 0 or 1, typically by a photon in some superposition state,
such as polarization. These photons are emitted by a conventional laser as
pulses of light so dim that most pulses do not emit a photon. This approach
ensures that few pulses  contain more than one photon. Additional losses
occur as photons travel through the fiber-optic line. In the end, only a
small fraction  of the received pulses actually contain a photon. However,
this low yield is not problematic for QKD because only photons that reach
the receiver are used. The key is generally encoded in either the
polarization or the relative phase of the photon (see "Keeping Alice and
Bob secure", below).

 The most common standard protocol for QKD is called BB84, after its
inventors, IBM's Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Invented in 1984, it
uses a stream of single photons to transfer a cryptographic key between two
parties, who can use it to encode and decode data transmitted using
standard high-speed techniques. Right now, single photons allow real-time
data transmissions only at low speed, typically 100 bits/s-a hundred
millionth the speed of today's fastest fiber-optic transmission systems.
That explains why most companies have focused on commercializing QKD and
not on data encryption.
Polarization-based encoding works best for free-space communication systems
rather than fiber-optic lines. Data are transmitted faster in free-space
systems, but they cannot traverse the longer distances of fiber-optic
links. In July 2004, a team at the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), working with Acadia Optronics (Rockville, MD),
demonstrated the world's fastest quantum- cryptography system by sending a
quantum key over a 730-m free-space link at rates of up to 1 megabit/s-
1,000 times as fast as previously reported results. The NIST system uses an
infrared laser to generate the photons and reflecting telescopes with 8-in.
mirrors to send and receive the photons through air.

NIST's system differs from other existing QKD systems in how it identifies
a photon from the sender, as opposed to photons from another source, such
as the sun. The scientists record the exact time of each emission and look
for a photon only when one is expected. The window of observation time must
be very short, but NIST physicist Joshua Bienfang says that making frequent
brief observations enables the team to generate new keys more often.

Fiber-optic links

Randomly generated keys are changed up to 1,000 times/s in MagiQ's OPN
Security Gateway, which uses a secure fiber-optic link to transmit the
changing key sequence up to 120 km as a stream of polarized photons. The
company claims that linking its systems together can transmit a QKD several
hundred kilometers (Figures 2 and 3).
Quantum properties other than polarization can encode the value of a bit
for the quantum key, says Gregoire Ribordy, CEO of Swiss start-up ID
Quantique. His company introduced the first commercial quantum-cryptography
products in 2002: single-photon detectors and random-number generators, two
essential components for quantum-cryptography systems. In 2003, the company
partnered with two electronic-security firms to develop a commercial system.
Figure 3. A more detailed network shows routers for concentrating and
directing Internet traffic, Sonet telecommunications protocol, wave
division multiplexers, optical amplifiers, and repeaters.

ID Quantique's system encodes data in the phase of the photon instead of
its polarization state. An interferometer splits beams of light and then
recombines them at the output end, and it can do the same with a single
photon. Although a photon cannot split in two, its dual wave-particle
nature allows it to travel through both arms of the interferometer as a
wave, only becoming a particle again when it recombines and is detected at
the output end. It takes but a slight change in the length of one
interferometer arm to randomly alter a photon's phase.
Figure 4. Henry Yeh, director of programs, and Chip Elliot, principal
engineer, in the Quantum  Laboratory at BBN Technologies, which operates
the DARPA-funded world's first quantum key distribution network. (BBN
Technologies)

 In 2002, scientists at Northwestern University developed a
quantum-cryptography method capable of sending encr ypted data over a
fiber- optic line at 250 megabits/s, almost 1,000 times as fast as prior
quantum technology. The team used standard lasers and existing optical
technology to transmit large bundles of photons; other techniques used in
quantum cryptography rely on single photons, which are harder to detect.
BBN Technologies (Cambridge, MA) operates the world's first quantum
cryptographic network, which links several different kinds of QKD systems
(Figure 4). Some use off-the-shelf optical lasers and detectors to emit and
detect single photons; others use entangled pairs of photons.

 This DARPA-funded network runs between BBN, Harvard, and Boston
University, a citysized schematic designed to test the robustness of such
systems in real-world applications (Figure 5). It allows multiple users at
each organization to tap into a fiberoptic loop secured by a
quantum-cryptography system. BBN will soon add a free-space QKD link and an
entangled- photon QKD system.  Other companies are also investing in
quantum-cryptography systems. IBM's Almaden Research Center, the NEC
Research Institute, Toshiba, and Hewlett-Packard are on the brink of
introducing products. In March 2004, NEC scientists in Japan sent a single
photon over a 150-km fiber-optic link, breaking the transmissiondistance
record for quantum cryptography.
Figure 5. This network allows users at BBN Technologies, Harvard
University, and Boston  University to tap into a fiber-optic loop secured
by a quantum-cryptography  system. (BBN Technologies/Funding by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency)

To date, most commercially viable QKD systems rely on fiber-optic links
limited to 100 to 120 km. At longer distances, random noise degrades the
photon stream. Quantum keys cannot travel far over fiberoptic lines, and,
thus, they can work only between computers directly connected to each
other. The only way to achieve such a system with total security in a
networking environment and at greater distances is to add quantum
repeaters-rudimentary quantum computers- to regenerate the bits. NEC and
Hewlett- Packard are developing components needed to make quantum repeaters
a reality.

Entangled photons

To date, physicists have not developed an ideal single-photon source. In a
small number of instances, more than one photon is emitted, making the
system vulnerable. A hacker could tap the system and measure one of the
photons to discover what polarization the sender is using, and then send
the other onto the receiver-all without revealing his or her presence.

That explains why entangled photons present an attractive future option.
When two photons become entangled, if one is vertically polarized, the
other is always polarized horizontally. The polarization of a single photon
cannot be known until it is measured, and the measurement will
automatically determine the polarization of the other photon, even if it is
several hundred meters away. Albert Einstein dubbed this "spooky action at
a distance." A QKD system using entangled photons would have a critical
advantage: the key comes into existence simultaneously at both sender and
receiver nodes, eliminating the possibility of interception.

Entangled-state quantum cryptography works by generating entangled-photon
pairs and distributing them through fibers or free space so that each
arrives at the receiver's detectors simultaneously. Once measured, the
photons assume one of four polarization states at random. Entanglement
works over fiberoptic lines, but there are inevitable losses, which limits
transmission distance. Free-space techniques extend the entanglement to
distances in the range of 24 km.

Last April, a team from the University of Vienna, Austria's ARC Seibersdorf
Research (Seibersdorf), and Ludwig- Maximilians University (Munich,
Germany) performed the first quantum-secured transfer of money using
entangled photons. The scientists installed a 1.45-km fiber-optic line
under Vienna's streets to link a transmitter at city hall to a receiver at
the headquarters of an Austrian bank. They used a crystal with nonlinear
optical properties to split photons with wavelengths of 405 nm into
entangled pairs of photons with wavelengths of 810 nm. Using the key, the
team safely transferred funds from city hall to the bank.

In April 2004, the European Union launched the SECOQC project, which
involves 41 participants from 12 countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Participants have pledged 11.4 million
euro ($14.8 million U.S.) in funding over the next four years to create a
secure quantum network globally. One of the project's eight goals is to
develop a suitable QKD system. The techniques under consideration are the
University of Vienna's entangledphoton scheme, ID Quantique's attenuated
pulsed-laser source of single photons, and free-space links. The last would
also enable key distribution using modulated coherent states rather than
photon counting.

Faster detectors

Future developments will focus on faster photon detectors, a major factor
limiting the development of practical systems for widespread commercial
use. Chip Elliott, BBN's principal engineer, says the company is working
with the University of Rochester and NIST's Boulder Laboratories in
Colorado to develop practical superconducting photon detectors based on
niobium nitride, which would operate at 4 K and 10 GHz. Laboratory models
can already detect billions of photons per second-several hundred orders of
magnitude faster than today's commercial photon detectors.

The ultimate goal is to make QKD more reliable, integrate it with today's
telecommunications infrastructure, and increase the transmission distance
and rate of key generation. "It's one thing to achieve quantum cryptography
in the laboratory on a multimillion dollar government- funded project,"
says MagiQ's Trifonov. "It's quite another to make it reasonably
cost-effective for commercial applications."

 

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Dec  1 09:52:21 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 01 Dec 2004 12:52:21 -0500
Subject: Quantum key distribution
In-Reply-To: <p06110478bdd3afc442ba@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F898FB5288D2D92A915B359BBF0@phx.gbl>

"Andrew Hammond, a vice president of
MagiQ, estimates that the market for QKD systems will reach $200 million
within a few years, and one day could hit $1 billion annually."

What an idiot. OK, it's basically a marketing guy's job to make up all kinds 
of BS, but any reasonably comptetant marketing guy knows to make up BS that 
someone will actually BELIEVE.

-TD


>From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cryptography at metzdowd.com, cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Quantum key distribution
>Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 12:29:31 -0500
>
><http://www.aip.org/tip/INPHFA/vol-10/iss-6/p22.html>
>   - The Industrial Physicist
>
>?Quantum key distribution
>
>Data carrying photons may be transmitted by laser and detected in such a
>way that any interference will be noted
>
>by Jennifer Ouellette
>
>pdf version of this article
>
>Computing's exponential increase in power requires setting the bar always
>higher to secure electronicdata transmissions from would-be hackers. The
>ideal solution would transmit data in quantum bits, but truly quantum
>information processing may lie decades away. Therefore, several companies
>have focused on bringing one aspect of quantum communications to market-
>quantum key distribution (QKD), used to exchange secret keys that protect
>data during transmission. Two companies, MagiQ Technologies (New York, NY)
>and ID Quantique (Geneva, Switzerland), have released commercial QKD
>systems, and several others plan to enter the marketplace within two years.
>Figure 1. When blue light is pumped into a nonlinear crystal, entangled
>photon pairs (imaged here as a red beam with the aid of a diode laser)
>emerge at an angle of 30 to the blue beam, and the beams are sent into
>single-mode fibers to be detected. Because the entangled photons "know"
>each other, any interference will result in a mismatch when the two beams
>are compared. (University of Vienna/Volker Steger)
>
>  "There is a continuous war between code makers and code breakers," says
>Alexei Trifonov, chief scientist with MagiQ. Cryptologists devise more
>difficult coding schemes, only to have them broken. Quantum cryptography
>has the potential to end that cycle. This is important to national security
>and modern electronic business transactions, which transmit credit card
>numbers and other sensitive information in encrypted form. The Department
>of Defense (DoD) currently funds several quantum-cryptography projects as
>part of a $20.6 million initiative in quantum information. Globally, public
>and private sources will fund about $50 million in quantum-cryptography
>work over the next several years. Andrew Hammond, a vice president of
>MagiQ, estimates that the market for QKD systems will reach $200 million
>within a few years, and one day could hit $1 billion annually.
>
>Key types
>
>QKD was proposed roughly 20 years ago, but its premise rests on the
>formulation of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in 1927. The very act of
>observing or measuring a particle-such as a photon in a data stream-changes
>its behavior (Figure 1). Any moving photon can have one of four
>orientations: vertical, horizontal, or diagonal in either direction. A
>standard laser can be modified to emit single photons, each with a
>particular orientation. Would-be hackers (eavesdroppers in cryptography
>parlance) can record the orientations with photon detectors, but doing so
>changes the orientation of some photons-and, thus, alerts the sender and
>receiver of a compromised transmission.
>
>An encryption key-the code needed to encrypt or decipher a message-consists
>of a string of random bits.  Such a key is useless unless it is completely
>random, known only to the communicating parties, and changed regularly. In
>the one-time-pad approach, the key length must equal the message length,
>and it should be used only once. In theory, this makes the encrypted
>message secure, but problems arise in practice. In the real world, keys
>must be exchanged by a CD-ROM or some other physical means, which makes
>keys susceptible to interception. Reusing a key gives code breakers the
>opportunity to find patterns in the encrypted data that might reveal the
>key. Historically, the Soviet Union's accidental duplication of
>one-time-pad pages allowed U.S. cryptanalysts to unmask the spy Klaus Fuchs
>in 1949.
>
>Rather than one-time-pad keys, many data-transmission security systems
>today use public-key cryptography, which relies on very long prime numbers
>to transmit keys. A typical public-key encryption scheme uses two keys. The
>first is a public key, available to anyone with access to the global
>registry of public keys, and the message is encrypted with it. The second
>is private, accessible only to the receiver. Both keys are needed to
>unscramble a message. The system's primary weakness is that a powerful
>computer could use the public key to learn the private key (see The
>Industrial Physicist, August 2000, pp. 29-33).
>
>Quantum key distribution
>
>A key distributed using quantum cryptography would be almost impossible to
>steal because QKD systems continually and randomly generate new private
>keys that both parties share automatically. A compromised key in a QKD
>system can only decrypt a small amount of encoded information because the
>private key may be changed every second or even continuously. To build up a
>secret key from a stream of single photons, each photon is encoded with a
>bit value of 0 or 1, typically by a photon in some superposition state,
>such as polarization. These photons are emitted by a conventional laser as
>pulses of light so dim that most pulses do not emit a photon. This approach
>ensures that few pulses  contain more than one photon. Additional losses
>occur as photons travel through the fiber-optic line. In the end, only a
>small fraction  of the received pulses actually contain a photon. However,
>this low yield is not problematic for QKD because only photons that reach
>the receiver are used. The key is generally encoded in either the
>polarization or the relative phase of the photon (see "Keeping Alice and
>Bob secure", below).
>
>  The most common standard protocol for QKD is called BB84, after its
>inventors, IBM's Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Invented in 1984, it
>uses a stream of single photons to transfer a cryptographic key between two
>parties, who can use it to encode and decode data transmitted using
>standard high-speed techniques. Right now, single photons allow real-time
>data transmissions only at low speed, typically 100 bits/s-a hundred
>millionth the speed of today's fastest fiber-optic transmission systems.
>That explains why most companies have focused on commercializing QKD and
>not on data encryption.
>Polarization-based encoding works best for free-space communication systems
>rather than fiber-optic lines. Data are transmitted faster in free-space
>systems, but they cannot traverse the longer distances of fiber-optic
>links. In July 2004, a team at the National Institute of Standards and
>Technology (NIST), working with Acadia Optronics (Rockville, MD),
>demonstrated the world's fastest quantum- cryptography system by sending a
>quantum key over a 730-m free-space link at rates of up to 1 megabit/s-
>1,000 times as fast as previously reported results. The NIST system uses an
>infrared laser to generate the photons and reflecting telescopes with 8-in.
>mirrors to send and receive the photons through air.
>
>NIST's system differs from other existing QKD systems in how it identifies
>a photon from the sender, as opposed to photons from another source, such
>as the sun. The scientists record the exact time of each emission and look
>for a photon only when one is expected. The window of observation time must
>be very short, but NIST physicist Joshua Bienfang says that making frequent
>brief observations enables the team to generate new keys more often.
>
>Fiber-optic links
>
>Randomly generated keys are changed up to 1,000 times/s in MagiQ's OPN
>Security Gateway, which uses a secure fiber-optic link to transmit the
>changing key sequence up to 120 km as a stream of polarized photons. The
>company claims that linking its systems together can transmit a QKD several
>hundred kilometers (Figures 2 and 3).
>Quantum properties other than polarization can encode the value of a bit
>for the quantum key, says Gregoire Ribordy, CEO of Swiss start-up ID
>Quantique. His company introduced the first commercial quantum-cryptography
>products in 2002: single-photon detectors and random-number generators, two
>essential components for quantum-cryptography systems. In 2003, the company
>partnered with two electronic-security firms to develop a commercial 
>system.
>Figure 3. A more detailed network shows routers for concentrating and
>directing Internet traffic, Sonet telecommunications protocol, wave
>division multiplexers, optical amplifiers, and repeaters.
>
>ID Quantique's system encodes data in the phase of the photon instead of
>its polarization state. An interferometer splits beams of light and then
>recombines them at the output end, and it can do the same with a single
>photon. Although a photon cannot split in two, its dual wave-particle
>nature allows it to travel through both arms of the interferometer as a
>wave, only becoming a particle again when it recombines and is detected at
>the output end. It takes but a slight change in the length of one
>interferometer arm to randomly alter a photon's phase.
>Figure 4. Henry Yeh, director of programs, and Chip Elliot, principal
>engineer, in the Quantum  Laboratory at BBN Technologies, which operates
>the DARPA-funded world's first quantum key distribution network. (BBN
>Technologies)
>
>  In 2002, scientists at Northwestern University developed a
>quantum-cryptography method capable of sending encr ypted data over a
>fiber- optic line at 250 megabits/s, almost 1,000 times as fast as prior
>quantum technology. The team used standard lasers and existing optical
>technology to transmit large bundles of photons; other techniques used in
>quantum cryptography rely on single photons, which are harder to detect.
>BBN Technologies (Cambridge, MA) operates the world's first quantum
>cryptographic network, which links several different kinds of QKD systems
>(Figure 4). Some use off-the-shelf optical lasers and detectors to emit and
>detect single photons; others use entangled pairs of photons.
>
>  This DARPA-funded network runs between BBN, Harvard, and Boston
>University, a citysized schematic designed to test the robustness of such
>systems in real-world applications (Figure 5). It allows multiple users at
>each organization to tap into a fiberoptic loop secured by a
>quantum-cryptography system. BBN will soon add a free-space QKD link and an
>entangled- photon QKD system.  Other companies are also investing in
>quantum-cryptography systems. IBM's Almaden Research Center, the NEC
>Research Institute, Toshiba, and Hewlett-Packard are on the brink of
>introducing products. In March 2004, NEC scientists in Japan sent a single
>photon over a 150-km fiber-optic link, breaking the transmissiondistance
>record for quantum cryptography.
>Figure 5. This network allows users at BBN Technologies, Harvard
>University, and Boston  University to tap into a fiber-optic loop secured
>by a quantum-cryptography  system. (BBN Technologies/Funding by the Defense
>Advanced Research Projects Agency)
>
>To date, most commercially viable QKD systems rely on fiber-optic links
>limited to 100 to 120 km. At longer distances, random noise degrades the
>photon stream. Quantum keys cannot travel far over fiberoptic lines, and,
>thus, they can work only between computers directly connected to each
>other. The only way to achieve such a system with total security in a
>networking environment and at greater distances is to add quantum
>repeaters-rudimentary quantum computers- to regenerate the bits. NEC and
>Hewlett- Packard are developing components needed to make quantum repeaters
>a reality.
>
>Entangled photons
>
>To date, physicists have not developed an ideal single-photon source. In a
>small number of instances, more than one photon is emitted, making the
>system vulnerable. A hacker could tap the system and measure one of the
>photons to discover what polarization the sender is using, and then send
>the other onto the receiver-all without revealing his or her presence.
>
>That explains why entangled photons present an attractive future option.
>When two photons become entangled, if one is vertically polarized, the
>other is always polarized horizontally. The polarization of a single photon
>cannot be known until it is measured, and the measurement will
>automatically determine the polarization of the other photon, even if it is
>several hundred meters away. Albert Einstein dubbed this "spooky action at
>a distance." A QKD system using entangled photons would have a critical
>advantage: the key comes into existence simultaneously at both sender and
>receiver nodes, eliminating the possibility of interception.
>
>Entangled-state quantum cryptography works by generating entangled-photon
>pairs and distributing them through fibers or free space so that each
>arrives at the receiver's detectors simultaneously. Once measured, the
>photons assume one of four polarization states at random. Entanglement
>works over fiberoptic lines, but there are inevitable losses, which limits
>transmission distance. Free-space techniques extend the entanglement to
>distances in the range of 24 km.
>
>Last April, a team from the University of Vienna, Austria's ARC Seibersdorf
>Research (Seibersdorf), and Ludwig- Maximilians University (Munich,
>Germany) performed the first quantum-secured transfer of money using
>entangled photons. The scientists installed a 1.45-km fiber-optic line
>under Vienna's streets to link a transmitter at city hall to a receiver at
>the headquarters of an Austrian bank. They used a crystal with nonlinear
>optical properties to split photons with wavelengths of 405 nm into
>entangled pairs of photons with wavelengths of 810 nm. Using the key, the
>team safely transferred funds from city hall to the bank.
>
>In April 2004, the European Union launched the SECOQC project, which
>involves 41 participants from 12 countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, the
>Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden,
>Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Participants have pledged 11.4 million
>euro ($14.8 million U.S.) in funding over the next four years to create a
>secure quantum network globally. One of the project's eight goals is to
>develop a suitable QKD system. The techniques under consideration are the
>University of Vienna's entangledphoton scheme, ID Quantique's attenuated
>pulsed-laser source of single photons, and free-space links. The last would
>also enable key distribution using modulated coherent states rather than
>photon counting.
>
>Faster detectors
>
>Future developments will focus on faster photon detectors, a major factor
>limiting the development of practical systems for widespread commercial
>use. Chip Elliott, BBN's principal engineer, says the company is working
>with the University of Rochester and NIST's Boulder Laboratories in
>Colorado to develop practical superconducting photon detectors based on
>niobium nitride, which would operate at 4 K and 10 GHz. Laboratory models
>can already detect billions of photons per second-several hundred orders of
>magnitude faster than today's commercial photon detectors.
>
>The ultimate goal is to make QKD more reliable, integrate it with today's
>telecommunications infrastructure, and increase the transmission distance
>and rate of key generation. "It's one thing to achieve quantum cryptography
>in the laboratory on a multimillion dollar government- funded project,"
>says MagiQ's Trifonov. "It's quite another to make it reasonably
>cost-effective for commercial applications."
>
>
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Dec  1 12:10:06 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 01 Dec 2004 15:10:06 -0500
Subject: Jewish wholy words..
In-Reply-To: <c9dc59ecaf72ba8d73ba675dbff9c0e2@dizum.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F2596A4C2A451D4041346C79BBF0@phx.gbl>

No.

Technically speaking, only the Torah (the first 5 books of the Bible, 
written by Moses) are technically "scripture"...everything else is 
commentary.

-TD

>From: Nomen Nescio <nobody at dizum.com>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Jewish wholy words..
>Date: Wed,  1 Dec 2004 19:30:05 +0100 (CET)
>
>Is it true that the jews have these texts in their scriptures?
>
>
>#1. Sanhedrin 59a:
>"Murdering Goyim (Gentiles) is like killing a wild animal."
>
>#2. Aboda Sarah 37a:
>"A Gentile girl who is three years old can be violated."
>
>#3. Yebamoth 11b:
>"Sexual intercourse with a little girl is permitted if she is three
>years of age."
>
>#4. Abodah Zara 26b:
>"Even the best of the Gentiles should be killed."
>
>#5. Yebamoth 98a:
>"All gentile children are animals."
>
>#6. Schulchan Aruch, Johre Deah, 122:
>"A Jew is forbidden to drink from a glass of wine which a Gentile has
>touched, because the touch has made the wine unclean."
>
>#7. Baba Necia 114, 6:
>"The Jews are human beings, but the nations of the world are not
>human beings but beasts."




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Wed Dec  1 07:40:46 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 15:40:46 +0000
Subject: Anti-RFID outfit deflates Mexican VeriChip hype
In-Reply-To: <p0611046dbdd38e436843@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p0611046dbdd38e436843@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20041201154046.GA2728@arion.soze.net>

On 2004-12-01T10:27:59-0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> 
> <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/30/mexican_verichip_hype/print.html>
> 
> In a 19 July, 2004 press release, Albrecht made a clear mention of the
> imaginary 160:
> 
> "Promoting implanted RFID devices as a security measure is downright
> 'loco,'" says Katherine Albrecht. "Advertising you've got a chip in your
> arm that opens important doors is an invitation to kidnapping and
> mutilation."

But maybe the officials have a real (locating) transmitter implanted in
their leg.  The corrupt cops kidnap the official to get the fake
implant, and in the process the kidnappers expose their own operation?




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  1 13:40:26 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 16:40:26 -0500
Subject: Class fingerprint scans to stop truancy
Message-ID: <p061104b7bdd3ea9e0db2@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;sessionid=IF0PGSNPI5OKTQFIQMGCNAGAVCBQUJVC?xml=/news/2004/12/01/ntru01.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/12/01/ixhome.html>

The Telegraph

 Class fingerprint scans to stop truancy
By David Sapsted
(Filed: 01/12/2004)

Pupils at a secondary school are being "fingerprinted" before each lesson
in a bid to combat truancy.

All 1,300 students arriving for classes at Impington Village College, near
Cambridge, have to place their fingertips on a scanner, which then
registers them as present.

 The scheme is the first of its kind in the country.

If a pupil does not check in, the system sends a text message or e-mail to
his or her parents, telling them their child is absent.

 The school telephones parents who do not have a computer or mobile phone
alerts.

The system, which uses reference points taken from each child's finger
rather than a complete fingerprint, has been supplied free on an
experimental basis by a technology company.

If the scheme is a success, it is likely to be extended to verify the
identity of examination candidates; make head counts on school trips;
control the issuing of library books and monitor access to school buildings.

A spokesman for Cambridgeshire county council said yesterday: "We are
impressed by what we have seen so far. The system has many benefits."

The technology will also be used to introduce a cashless catering system,
which will avoid the need for pupils to carry money and help to increase
security. Jacqueline Kearns, the warden of Impington Village College, said:
"We are delighted with the new fingertip recognition technology.

"It will revolutionise the way students register and will enable us and
their parents to keep track of any who are late or absent.

"Staff and students have embraced the new technology and we are looking at
ways it can improve efficiency and pupil safety."

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  1 14:45:34 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 17:45:34 -0500
Subject: [ISN] Universities struggling with SSL-busting spyware
Message-ID: <p061104fabdd3f9faa774@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From nobody at dizum.com  Wed Dec  1 10:20:04 2004
From: nobody at dizum.com (Nomen Nescio)
Date: Wed,  1 Dec 2004 19:20:04 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Swedish military feared linked to Estonia ferry disaster
Message-ID: <9f301fcb5f21c233d04844f424d8205b@dizum.com>

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For those interested in intelligence, munitions smuggling by
authorities and so on - a few words concerning military smuggling of
munitions on the Estonia, feared to have played a part in the sinking
and killings of 852 people on Sept 28, 1994, when the ferry M/S
Estonia sinked during a journey from Estonia to Sweden. It has been
rumoured for a long time that there were some kind of smuggling of
sensitive material taking place on Estonia and that Russian
authorities did not like this, needless to say. The very stressed and
hasty investigation performed by the involved nations also raised
suspicions amongst a lot of people. On top of all this the Swedish
social democratic government did all they could to hinder future
investigations of the wreckage by trying to cover it with stones and
concrete.

First some other related info.

The reader should know that the Swedish social democratic party is
notorious for acting in undemocratic and deceitful manners against
the Swedish people. Two of the most infamous affairs being the "IB
affair" and the "Catalina affair".

In the IB affair it was shown that the social democratic party had
founded a secret and unlawful military intelligence bureau as the
party's own private spy organization to spy on other politcal
adversaries, a Swedish version of Watergate if you will, but it went
far beyond that. Hundreds of thousands of people were targeted during
a number of years. Even Olof Palme himself knew about break-ins that
the intelligence officers performed in other countries embassies in
Stockholm, one of them was Egypt's embassy. One major characteristic
is that the Swedish way of doing things means sweeping things under
the carpet and not letting the public know the truths, this is shown
in every "affair" known in resent years, including the Estonia
disaster. In all of these affairs it's the social democrats that has
been the most responsible party and the party almost in constant
power in Sweden historically speaking.

The magazine breaking the news in 1973 today has a web site about the
affair, http://www.fib.se/IB/

In the Catalina affair it was very recently shown actually, after the
planes was discovered east of the island Gotland in the Baltic Sea,
that they were both indeed gunned down, as had been suspected for
decades. On June 13 1952 the DC3 plane Hugin disappeared and the only
thing found was a trashed rescue raft. Three days later the rescure
plane of type "Catalina" was also gunned down and forced to emergency
landing. It's today also known however that the Swedish (social
democratic) governments have all been maliciously and intentionally
lying all along about the Hugin's purpose to both the Swedish people
as well as the families.

Hugin was in fact gathering intelligence very close (some say on the
wrong side even) of the Russian border and was relaying all this
signal intelligence directly to the Americans. USA was amongst other
things interested in Russias capacity to fight the B-47. This was
well known for the Russians and this was the direct cause of the
attacks in 1952. It is believed that the Swedish FRA, standing for
"Fvrsvarets RadioAnstalt", translating to "The Defence's Radio
Institution", which is Swedens NSA, signed secret treaties with the
US some three years prior to the assult on these planes. The FRA had
5 employees on the Hugin when it was gunned down. It wasn't until
1991 that the families knew what happened, that was when the Russians
admitted a Mig-15 gunned them down.

When the recon plane was found in June 2004 it was situated far east
of the earlier officially declared crash site which further fules the
speculation that Hugin was indeed flying where it shouldn't have
been, conducting its sigint operations and that the Swedish
governments knew this all along. The Hugin was found June 10, 2003.


I'm not sure how much of these affairs is known outside Sweden, but
it's interesting read that's for sure and I just may get back to
these things and others like them later on.


Back to other things now.

This was published today in Sweden, along with a tv show of one hour:

>    INRIKES Publicerad 30 november        
> 
>   "Krigsmateriel fraktades pe Estonia"   
> 
> 
>   Estonia hade veckorna fvre fvrlisning- 
>   en vid tve tillfdllen krigsmateriel    
>   fren Baltikum i lasten. Enligt kvdll-  
>   ens Uppdrag granskning i SVT rvrde     
>   det sig om rysk elektronik som svenska 
>   fvrsvaret tog in fvr att studera.      
> 
>   Lars Borgnds som gjort programmet      
>   sdger att avslvjandet belyser hur      
>   svenska myndigheter hanterat kata-     
>   strofen. -Man har t.ex. inte undersvkt 
>   bilddck, sdger han till SVT Text.      
> 
>   Den pensionerade tullintendenten       
>   Lennart Henriksson uppger att han fett 
>   order om att sldppa igenom bilarna pe  
>   begdran av fvrsvarsmakten.             
>        Lds mer pe svt.se/nyheter  



Which translates into something like this:

DOMESTIC Published November 30

"War material was freighted on the Estonia"

The weeks before the sinking the Estonia had at least at two
different occasions war material in its cargo. According to tonight's
Uppdrag Granskning(*) in the Swedish state television the equipment
was russian electronics that the Swedish military brought in for
studies.

Lars Borgnds who did the show says that the revelations shows how the
authorities have handled the situation. - One example is the failure
to examine the car deck, he says to SVT.

The retired former head of customs at the port of Stockholm Lennart
Henriksson says he was given direct orders to let the cars through
and that the order came from the military.



(*) The name of the tv show sent on Nov 30, featuring Wallraff styled
recordings of swedish officials verifying the smuggling of war
material on the direct order from the swedish military commander in
chief Owe Viktorin. It was showed in the show that Owe Viktorin
personally asked the chief of the swedish customs to order their
workers to let specific cars through customs without questions. And
so they did.


The "KSI" mentioned below is perhaps the most secret Swedish military
intelligence organization (we know of) today. The abbreviation stands
for "Kontoret fvr Sdrskild Inhdmtning", which translated into
something like "The office for special intelligence gatherings". They
are known to conduct regular espionage operations on foreign soil and
have been deeply involved in the smuggling of intelligence and the
recruiting of spies on the ground from Russia for quite some time.
They are more or less "not existing", you cannot phone MUST and ask
for KSI or someone you know working at KSI, they will not acknowledge
anything or anyone, although KSI is known to exist and is also
mentioned (briefly) in some official documents.

KSI is part of MUST, which stands for "Militdra Underdttelse och
Sdkerhetstjdnsten", translating to "The military intelligence and
security service" and is the Swedish version of CIA so essentially
KSI is like a bureau within CIA with some black bag types of jobs in
their resume as well.

MUST, http://www.hkv.mil.se/article.php?id=35
FRA, http://www.fra.se

MUST's annual report 2003
http://www.hkv.mil.se/attachments/sak_ar03_sv.pdf

MUST's annual report 2002
http://www.hkv.mil.se/attachments/sak_ar02_s5_sv.pdf


SVT Program homepage
http://svt.se/svt/jsp/Crosslink.jsp?d=2232

This is an english text present at the svt.se site.
http://svt.se/svt/jsp/Crosslink.jsp?d=13038&a=293822

- ---------------------------------------

In english: War materials smuggled on Estonia

Ten years after the Estonia ferry disaster, a former head of customs
in Stockholm has confirmed what has been the subject of much
speculation - the ferry was being used for smuggling across the
Baltic Sea. This secret cargo comprised Russian war materials that
had been let through customs on orders from the highest instance.

The person that has now chosen to tell all is Lennart Henriksson. He
was employed by the customs office in Stockholm for 38 years and was
customs inspector and head of the sea customs.
Ive been walking around thinking about what happened for ten years.
Each time Estonias name came up Ive thought the little I know should
be brought into the light of day. I want to clear my conscience, he
says.
 
His revelation has put a new light on the Estonia disaster and how it
has been handled by politicians and authorities. And its something
that has been unknown to the Accident Investigation Board that
investigated the disaster.
The evening before Lennart Henriksson got in touch with Uppdrag
Granskning, hed seen our report on what was happening ten years after
the Estonia disaster. The report took up the questions surrounding
the accident and how the experts in Sweden and abroad wanted to carry
out the investigation.
Also in the report were the rumours and speculation about the ferry
carrying smuggled goods and that it was the object of sabotage or an
explosion. We also told of some relatives to the deceased who
suspected that the truth behind the accident has not been uncovered.
And that the authorities have colluded and lied.
 
For ten years, Lennart Henriksson has borne this knowledge alone,
despite being personally acquainted with people who died when Estonia
went down on the night between the 27 and 28 September 1994.
Not long before the accident, something happened that he had never
experienced before during his many years in the customs.
 
Some time in the middle of September, I now know it was around the
12th or 13th, I went to my boss who said we were called to a meeting
with the director of customs. We went up there and the director said
that a vehicle would be arriving on the Estonia that shouldnt be
searched. He also gave me a licence number, Lennart Henriksson told
us.
He asked directly why it shouldnt be searched.
He said it was an order. 'But from where? I wondered. From the
highest quarters he answered, says Henriksson.
Normally, customs searched all the vehicles from Estonia, as
smuggling was rife. Lennart Henriksson had never experienced anything
like this before - that a vehicle was being let through without a
search.
 
When the ferry finally arrived, he went down to the ferry quay and
spoke to the driver, who was registered as Frank Larsson. The vehicle
was a Volvo 745 estate car.
 
I said the customs were carrying out inspections and he gave me a
look but I said the search would be faked. We opened a few boxes and
as far as I could see it was military electronics in them.
What did you base that on?
Anyone whos done their military service knows what it looks like. But
I dont know how old it was or what condition it was in.
 
The person that gave him the order, says Lennart Henriksson, was the
head of the Eastern customs region Inge Lindunger. Lennart
Henrikssons immediate superior, who was present when Lindunger gave
the order and who was also on the quay when the Volvo arrived, was
Superintendent Stig Sandelin.
Who this was that was bringing what looked like military electronics
into the country, Lennart Henriksson didnt know but he was curious
and made a note of the car's licence number.
Later that day, he found out who the car was registered to. He still
has that document.
 
The registered owner was Ericsson Access AB, a company that at this
time was part of the Ericsson group of companies.
But today, they say they know nothing about the incident.
 
Not long afterwards, it happened again. The ferry was schedule to
arrive on 20 September - and again there was a transport that was
waved through without inspection.
This time it was a van and Lennart Henriksson looked through the
boxes again.
 
It was the same stuff in this vehicle as well: military electronics.
I looked into a few boxes but not too closely.
What were you thinking this second time?
I thought it was a strange procedure. But orders are orders and you
dont reflect too much on why.
 
But what was it in those vehicles and who was bringing it in? And
perhaps the most important question: was there anything like it on
board Estonia on the night of the accident?
 
When Uppdrag Granskning spoke with customs superintendent Stig
Sandelin, he remains silent and refers to classified information and
national security.
On the other hand he does confirm the transports took place - and
that he saw the materials being shipped to Sweden.
But was there a similar cargo on the night of the accident? He says
he doesnt know.
Ive no idea. I dont know what was on board when she went down, says
Sandelin.
 
In a recorded conversation between Lennart Henriksson and Stig
Sandelin, he's more open. According to Stig Sandelin, there was an
agreement between the Commissioner of the Swedish Customs at the
time, Ulf Larsson, and Ove Wictorin, who was then Supreme Commander
of the Swedish armed forces, that Sandelin was to handle the customs
clearance when the materials arrived.
 
During the conversation, Lennart Henriksson asked if he knew who the
materials were for.
Yes, its the military. I dont know what they saw in it but then it
was exciting for them to get hold of old Russian stuff. Thats history
now, says Sandelin.
 
In other words, Lennart Henrikssons belief that it was military
material being brought in on the Estonia on 14 and 20 September was
correct. Stig Sandelin had confirmed it. It was Russian materials,
the Swedish defence was mixed up in it and it all took place in great
secrecy - that is still the case today.
 
Uppdrag Granskning has also received confirmation that the boxes
Lennart Henriksson looked inside contained military electronics, not
weapons or explosives. But we dont know what was in the boxes
Henriksson didnt look inside.
 
The international Accident Investigation Board, which had
investigated the accident for three years, never knew that the
Estonia passenger ferry was used to transport secret war materials
shortly before the accident.
 
But why was the Swedish defence smuggling war materials from Estonia?
It was 1994 and five years had passed since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, leaving the Baltic States free. The Soviet bases were
pulled down and all the materials were taken to Russia.
Svren Lindman was the Swedish defence attachi in the three Baltic
countries at that time.
 
It was his task to observe the military break-up in Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania on behalf of the Swedish defence. According to Lindman,
the Russians had already shipped home the most interesting materials
from the Baltic with just a few exceptions. There was not much left.
 
On the other hand, there was a lot of advanced equipment in the
nearby Leningrad area inside Russia.
Svren Lindman took military materials back with him from the Baltic
himself occasionally. With his diplomatic passport he could easily
pass through the controls.
 
Alexander Einseln, Estonias first Supreme Commander, confirms the
situation:
Everything was for sale and anything was available if you could pay
for it", he says.
Was the situation in Estonia such that it was possible to smuggle
equipment on board the ferry?
"Yes, without doubt. There were no controls at all", says Einseln.

Svren Lindman has no knowledge of the transports that Lennart
Henriksson is talking about - on the 14 and 20 September 1994.
In his opinion, as he didn't know about them, they might have
involved the most secret section of Swedish defence - KSI, the Office
of Special Intelligence. In other words the Swedish secret service.
It would be a dereliction of duty if KSI hadnt been in the Baltic
digging up whatever they could after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, says Lindman.

We have confirmation from Lennart Henriksson and Stig Sandelin that
covert transport of Russian war materials on Estonia took place on 14
and 20 September.
But now when we contact people higher up in the customs and military
organisations to obtain more information it seems their memories fail
them. Uppdrag Granskning asked Lennart Henriksson to phone director
of customs Inge Lindunger, who had given him the order to let the
first car through.
He says he doesnt remember now either.
Whatever it was, its a thing of the past now", says Inge Lindunger.

The Commissioner of the Swedish Customs at the time Ulf Larsson
answers likewise:
It doesnt ring any bells", he says.
We get the same response from the Supreme Commander of the day Ove
Wictorin: it's nothing he remembers.

Then can KSI, the secret service organisation, have acted
independently without the knowledge of the Supreme Commander?
Officially, KSI is part of the military's intelligence and security
service MUST but is such a secret organisation that nothing is said
about it and very few know how and where it operates or who works
there.
The head of MUST at this time was Erik Rossander.
Of course the intelligence service is interested in the material
standard of other powers. Thats one of the assignments. But Im not
saying how you get it, states Rossander.
Otherwise, he wouldnt comment on the issue.
Everything we did is covered by the secrets act and that still
applies.

The heads of customs had slight recollections or none at all; the
Supreme Commander and the head of Ericsson Access said they had no
knowledge of the covert transport of war materials on Estonia.
And yet we know they took place on the 14 and 20 September.
The question is, was there a cargo like it on the car deck when the
ferry sank on the 28th?

The former Supreme Commander of Estonia, Alexander Einseln, believes
that if there was a military cargo on the night of the accident, it
could explain, in his view, the extraordinary way in which the
Estonia disaster was handled.
It's unusually suspicious that a democratic country like Sweden
should react so quickly to cover the wreck and keep everyone away. I
saw the same behaviour from the Finns and the Estonians and thats
what has made me question whether something had to be concealed. Why
such a hurry? wonders Einseln.

What do you think should be done now?
The ship must be lifted and inspected. But I wouldnt let the three
countries involved be part of it. Countries without any national
interests to protect should be asked to help, he says.

REPORTER: Lars Borgnds

- ---------------------------------------


Links about the Estonia disaster

http://www.estoniasamlingen.se/
http://www.seainfo.se
http://user.tninet.se/~uht674g
http://www.estonia.kajen.com
http://w1.316.telia.com/~u31612930
http://www.multi.fi/~stigb/Estonia
http://www.titanicnorden.com/skepp/estonia.html
http://factgroup.nu
http://heiwaco.tripod.com
http://axelnelson.com/skepp/Estonia.html
http://susning.nu/Estonia
http://www.elaestonia.org



Yours
Berra

(Verification may not work due to high bit characters)


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From nobody at dizum.com  Wed Dec  1 10:30:05 2004
From: nobody at dizum.com (Nomen Nescio)
Date: Wed,  1 Dec 2004 19:30:05 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Jewish wholy words..
Message-ID: <c9dc59ecaf72ba8d73ba675dbff9c0e2@dizum.com>

Is it true that the jews have these texts in their scriptures?


#1. Sanhedrin 59a:
"Murdering Goyim (Gentiles) is like killing a wild animal."

#2. Aboda Sarah 37a:
"A Gentile girl who is three years old can be violated."

#3. Yebamoth 11b:
"Sexual intercourse with a little girl is permitted if she is three
years of age."

#4. Abodah Zara 26b:
"Even the best of the Gentiles should be killed."

#5. Yebamoth 98a:
"All gentile children are animals."

#6. Schulchan Aruch, Johre Deah, 122:
"A Jew is forbidden to drink from a glass of wine which a Gentile has
touched, because the touch has made the wine unclean."

#7. Baba Necia 114, 6:
"The Jews are human beings, but the nations of the world are not
human beings but beasts."




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Wed Dec  1 17:39:03 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 20:39:03 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Lockheed and the Future of Warfare
In-Reply-To: <p0611042bbdd374e3759a@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20041202013903.29080.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote: 
> <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/28/business/yourmoney/28lock.html>
> 
> November 28, 2004
> Lockheed and the Future of Warfare
> By TIM WEINER
> 
> LOCKHEED MARTIN doesn't run the United States. But it does help run a
> breathtakingly big part of it.
>
> [LockMart: corporate patriot collective]
>
> Today, Lockheed is building weapons so smart that they can change the
> world by virtue of their precision, he said; they aim to wage war
> without the death of innocents, without weapons misfiring, without
> fatal miscalculation.

That should be a no-brainer.
 
> "I know the fog of war exists," Mr. Stevens said, adding that it could
> be lifted. "We envision a world where you don't have any more
> fratricide," no more friendly fire, he said. "With technology we've
> been able to make ourselves more secure and more humane.

Like they're going to admit otherwise...

Look, managing the perception of friendly fire statistics is super-easy. 
All you have to do is use a little set-theory to define all casualties of
war as enemies.  Presto!  No more friendly-fire incident paperwork.

Take me, for example.  The good government of Canada has been slowly but
surely flushing my life down a toilet for years and years, perhaps even
with the help of foreigners.  (Don't ask, it's a long story.}  However it
is only in the last four or five years that the authorities in question
have been able to escalate the threat I pose to their retirement cachets
and pension benefits by way of cleverly manipulating their selective
disclosure of facts[1] and by virtue of the creative misunderstanding of
what I do in the course of conducting my own self-defense[2] operation. 
911 didn't hurt them any either.

The end result is that I become an enemy of the state as a direct
consequence of the attentions and interference of state actors.  No causal
chain is allowed to officially exist linking a state-sponsored
`harassment' campaign with my subsequent bad attitude, thus I
automatically become the Bad Guy(tm), who then deserves a total loss of
civil rights and forfeiture of present and future personal property
without counterfraudulent due process.

Apparently this method was perfected some years ago, and so I conclude
that LockMart is simply borrowing the technique for their present approach
to selling their corporate image and product line to the world.


[1] Fact as used in this context is to be taken as synonymous with
'rumour', 'meme complex', 'lie', and 'distortion'.

[2] Conducted, as it were, on a budget that is significantly lower than
the net disposable income of your average pan-handler.

[3] If you happen to be curious about the details of my state of affairs,
do not hesitate to interview Geoff Miller or any of his past and present
professional associates.

> "And we aren't there yet - but we sure have pioneered the kind of work
> that is taking us well along that trajectory. And there's a lot of
> evidence that says we're doing well. And we're setting the bar high
> and we expect to be able to do that. Now that's pretty exciting stuff.

Corporate productspeak for `nyah, nyah, nyah."
 
> "I don't say this lightly," he said. "Our industry has contributed to
> a change in humankind."

BFD.  The medical industry has also contributed to a 'change in
humankind'.  Similar sentiments can be attached to the public education
sector, the automotive industry, the steel industry, etc.  Oh, I suppose
we should not also forget the Internet and its boundless potential for
connecting people to each other for arbitrary business and leisure
activities.
 
But the really sad thing about the quoted article is that someone (or more
people) actually got paid to write it.


Regards,

Steve

______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Wed Dec  1 17:57:02 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 20:57:02 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Anti-RFID outfit deflates Mexican VeriChip hype
In-Reply-To: <20041201204820.8216E1174C@mail.cypherpunks.to>
Message-ID: <20041202015702.8625.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer <nobody at cypherpunks.to>
wrote: 
> [further snippage]
> > Pray the draft is women-empowered so there's no need
> > to shanghai the overaged, over-decrepit, over-funny-loving,
> > inbred-feeders, pray for the Condies and the Maggies to 
> > fight the gameboy-dreamy battles, really face-to-face,
> > not just stomp-hoof the youngsters into hell for a face-save
> > the empire.
> 
> Won't someone please slip a healthy dose of haloperidol into
> JYA's food?

Don't be cruel.  Let's all chip in and buy him a bottle of good scotch and
a shiny-new tinfoil hat for Christmas.

Think he'd accept graciously, or would that offend him too?


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From nobody at cypherpunks.to  Wed Dec  1 12:48:20 2004
From: nobody at cypherpunks.to (Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer)
Date: Wed,  1 Dec 2004 21:48:20 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Anti-RFID outfit deflates Mexican VeriChip hype
In-Reply-To: <E1CZWxs-0007q2-00@mclean.mail.mindspring.net>
Message-ID: <20041201204820.8216E1174C@mail.cypherpunks.to>

> Bring em on, oops, they are here already. Darn, it wasn't
> the commies and nazis who were the threat, it was your
> indolent life-style paid for by your swell-paid, smarter wife, 
> up to women-empowered thieving the marketplace and 
> making innumerable enemies for you to blame for your 
> swelling brain fat-globules.
> 
> Pray the draft is women-empowered so there's no need
> to shanghai the overaged, over-decrepit, over-funny-loving,
> inbred-feeders, pray for the Condies and the Maggies to 
> fight the gameboy-dreamy battles, really face-to-face,
> not just stomp-hoof the youngsters into hell for a face-save
> the empire.

Won't someone please slip a healthy dose of haloperidol into
JYA's food?




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  1 19:42:47 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 22:42:47 -0500
Subject: MapReduce for Decentralized Computation - zLabWiki
Message-ID: <p06110428bdd43f77f0e5@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://zlab.commerce.net/wiki/index.php/MapReduce_for_Decentralized_Computation>


MapReduce for Decentralized Computation

I was reading Dean and Ghemawat's MapReduce paper this morning. It
describes a way to write large-grain parallel programs to be executed on
Google's large clusters of computers in a simple functional style, in C++.
It occurred to me that the system as described might be well-suited to
computational cooperation between mutually untrusting entities, computation
in what we at CommerceNet refer to as a "decentralized" system.
 [edit]

 Decentralized computational cooperation

 There are five major problems with regard to computational cooperation, by
which I mean outsourcing some amount of your computation to servers run by
people you don't trust completely:
 Cracking 
 The server trusts the client not to break the server.
 Storage 
 The client trusts the server to store the client's data safely.
 Correctness 
 The client trusts the server to execute the client's code accurately and
produce results quickly.
 Confidentiality 
 The client trusts the server not to disclose the client's data against the
client's wishes.
 Payment 
 The server usually trusts the client to pay them for the service provided.

 Cracking can be dealt with by known methods: metered resource usage and
well-known isolation techniques.

 Payment can be dealt with in any number of ways; it should be noted that
it is not entirely separable from cracking.

 Storage can be dealt with by replicating or erasure-coding data across a
number of administratively-independent servers.

 This leaves the problems of correctness and confidentiality; I think the
MapReduce approach can help with correctness.
 [edit]

 Correctness

 The "map" function converts a record from an input file into a set of
records in an intermediate file; typically, each input record is replicated
in several places on the cluster, and the "map" function is deterministic.
The "reduce" function converts the set of all intermediate records sharing
the same key (gathered from the many map-stage output files) into a set of
output records, which are written to an output file; typically the "reduce"
function is also deterministic.

 In the usual case, where these functions are deterministic, they can be
executed on two administratively-independent servers, and the results
(which, in the Google case, are merely files) can be compared. If they
differ, the same results can be recomputed on more
administratively-independent servers to see which ones were correct.

 (It may be worthwhile to compare Merkle tree hashes of the output files,
rather than the output files themselves, since moving the output files over
the network may entail significant expense.)

 This prevents any single broken or dishonest machine or administrative
entity from affecting the correctness of the overall computation. Higher
levels of redundancy can be used to defend against stronger attackers at
relatively modest cost.

 Some threats can be defeated by even weaker means with negligible
computational cost. Computing each function for a randomly selected 1% of
input or intermediate records, then comparing the results, may provide an
acceptable probability of catching faults or compromises if they are
expected to affect a significant proportion of the output; and it requires
negligible computational cost. In the ten-billion-record performance tests
mentioned in the Google paper, a corrupt "map" function would have to
affect fewer than 694 of the input records to have less than a 50% chance
of detection by the 1% sample (including 100 million randomly selected
records). A corrupt "map" function that affected 5000 input records ---
only one out of every two million --- would have only an 0.7% chance of not
being caught.

 This probably deals adequately with machine failures and gross attacks,
but a careful attack might corrupt the output for only a single input
record --- and would have only a 1% chance of being caught. This may still
be enough if the problem is a result of a deliberate attack and the
attacker is vulnerable to sufficiently severe penalties.
 [edit]

 Confidentiality

 Confidentiality is a more difficult problem; computing with confidential
data on hardware that belongs to someone you don't trust requires that you
compute with encrypted data. In the general case, this is a very difficult
problem.

 (Perhaps this could be written with a real example.)

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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  1 19:43:15 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2004 22:43:15 -0500
Subject: Google Labs Publications: MapReduce
Message-ID: <p06110429bdd43fbd014a@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://labs.google.com/papers/mapreduce.html>
Google Labs Publication

MapReduce: Simplified Data Processing on Large Clusters
Jeffrey Dean and Sanjay Ghemawat
Google Inc.

Abstract

 MapReduce is a programming model and an associated implementation for
processing and generating large data sets. Users specify a map function
that processes a key/value pair to generate a set of intermediate key/value
pairs, and a reduce function that merges all intermediate values associated
with the same intermediate key. Many real world tasks are expressible in
this model, as shown in the paper.

 Programs written in this functional style are automatically parallelized
and executed on a large cluster of commodity machines. The run-time system
takes care of the details of partitioning the input data, scheduling the
program's execution across a set of machines, handling machine failures,
and managing the required inter-machine communication. This allows
programmers without any experience with parallel and distributed systems to
easily utilize the resources of a large distributed system.

 Our implementation of MapReduce runs on a large cluster of commodity
machines and is highly scalable: a typical MapReduce computation processes
many terabytes of data on thousands of machines. Programmers find the
system easy to use: hundreds of MapReduce programs have been implemented
and upwards of one thousand MapReduce jobs are executed on Google's
clusters every day.

 To appear in:
OSDI'04: Sixth Symposium on Operating System Design and Implementation,
 San Francisco, CA, December, 2004.

 Download: PDF Version
This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and
technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or
by other copyright holders. All person copying this information are
expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's
copyright. In most cases, these works may not be reposted without the
explicit permission of the copyright holder.
 Google Labs home page -  All About Google

 )2004 Google
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From dgerow at afflictions.org  Wed Dec  1 21:56:39 2004
From: dgerow at afflictions.org (Damian Gerow)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 00:56:39 -0500
Subject: Jewish wholy words..
In-Reply-To: <c9dc59ecaf72ba8d73ba675dbff9c0e2@dizum.com>
References: <c9dc59ecaf72ba8d73ba675dbff9c0e2@dizum.com>
Message-ID: <20041202055639.GG24631@afflictions.org>

Thus spake Nomen Nescio (nobody at dizum.com) [01/12/04 15:11]:
: Is it true that the jews have these texts in their scriptures?

While it may or may not be true, I sincerely doubt these words are wholy.




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  2 00:06:52 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 03:06:52 -0500
Subject: Itanium inventor bobs to surface as chip's savior?
Message-ID: <p06110447bdd47abcd59c@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/01/secure64_itanium_arrives/print.html>

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT

The Register ; Enterprise ; Servers ;

 Original URL:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/01/secure64_itanium_arrives/

Itanium inventor bobs to surface as chip's savior?
By Ashlee Vance in Chicago (ashlee.vance at theregister.co.uk)
Published Wednesday 1st December 2004 18:22 GMT

Exclusive Some start-ups are comprised of wide-eyed wheelers and dealers
with little technical expertise. Others have a decent mix of business types
and technology talents. Then there are start-ups like Secure64 Software
Corp. that have nothing but the richest pedigree of pure, unadulterated
genius running through their giddy veins.

The discovery of Secure64 happened by chance. The company's CEO Peter
Cranstone took exception with one of The Register's Itanium bashing
articles and sent an e-mail extolling the possible virtues of the chip.
This e-mail led to a brief look at Secure64's management team website at
which point jaws dropped and little hamsters started turning in heads.

Without slighting other members of the Secure64 team, we have to admit that
one name in particular caught our attention - Bill Worley, the startup's
CTO. Worley worked on a couple of minor projects during his lengthy tenure
at HP. Little things like being the principal architect of the PA-RISC
processor and later the principal architect of PA-WideWord - known today as
Itanium. Worley, however, didn't just do the initial Itanium designs, he
also led the decision, in 1993, to unite HP and Intel behind the project.
High-end computing has never been the same since - for better or for worse.
And few engineers have a more impressive resume.

Along with Worley, Secure64 has Cranstone, who co-developed the mod_gzip
data compression technology for the Apache web server. Its Chairman is
Denny Georg, former CTO of various parts of HP. Its VP of Product Delivery
is Joe Gersch who once managed HP's research and development organization.

But, as they say late at night, that's not all.

Larry Hambly, one of the first 100 employees at Sun Microsystems, also sits
on Secure64's advisory board along with Rajiv Gupta - the former GM of HP's
e-Speak web services unit and former head of the joint HP/Intel Itanium
development team.

Just an inconsequential, revolutionary OS

So what unambitious project are all these brains working on? Well, just the
creation of an abstracted type of operating system that could create
faster, more stable, more secure servers.

At present, Secure64 has declined requests for interviews with CEO
Cranstone saying the company will have a formal launch early next year.
This makes it a bit difficult to know exactly what the company is up to.
Thankfully, Worley has applied for a couple of patents that give a decent
idea of the direction Secure64 is taking.

At the heart of Worley's recent work is the notion that general purpose
operating systems such as Unix, Linux and Windows don't make the best use
of specific features in processors - namely features in Itanium. The
general purpose nature of today's server market means that systems perform
well on a wide-variety of applications, but the boxes aren't tuned as well
as they could be for specific tasks.

In the past, any number of companies have taken a stab at this problem by
creating server appliances designed to handle a small subset of
applications. Most of these appliances relied on sophisticated software to
make them different from the average server. Of late, other companies have
been trying to tackle the general purposeness of servers with various
add-ons. Products such as TCP/IP and SSL accelerators have arrived to speed
up the performance of boxes in specific areas.

The appliances and accelerators have largely been aimed at web edge types
of workloads - things like serving up web pages, processing web services
protocols and encryption. While load balancers and some security appliances
have been picked up a decent rate, most of these types of products really
haven't enjoyed much interest.

The boys at Secure64 appear to think they've figured out a way to make a
web edge system more attractive to customers.

An extensible application environment for you and me

Not surprisingly, the company's approach relies on making the most out of
Itanium.

When Itanium first hit the market, both Intel and HP spent a lot of time
touting some of the features that separated Itanium from other processors.
(They mention these features less often these days, focusing their
marketing efforts instead on defending the chip's existence.) The four main
"features" of Itanium at play here are its large register sets (128 general
purpose and 128 floating point registers), the fact that it can crank
through 6-8 instructions per cycle, its security compartments technology
and its 4 privilege levels - again for added security.

Secure64 rightly believes that none of the major OSes out there makes
terribly good use of these unique features in Itanium. The chance is there
for a company to build software that can scream on Itanium and do so with
very high levels of security. The company seems to think that the existence
of an OS that can truly make use of all Itanium has to offer will spur
adoption of the processor.

In its patent applications, Secure64 describes its Itanium-friendly
software as a type of "extensible application environment." The good, old
EAE.

A customer would hypothetically load a CD with the run-time EAE into a
low-end Itanium server with the EAE serving as the operating system. The
Secure64 EAE would then work its magic, initializing memory and setting up
the protection ID keys and compartments available with Itanium. All told,
the EAE eats up a minimal set of system resources - say 2 percent - and
turns over the rest of the server to the applications.

The first use for such a product will likely be something in the web
acceleration realm. The server would boot up with a caching engine,
real-time compression (gzip64), SSL64, DDoS, routing functions and support
for those third-party TCP/IP offload cards discussed above. Secure64's
patent materials describe the EAE-powered boxes generally being used as web
servers, secure web servers, proxy servers, secure proxy servers and
application servers.

Secure64 documentation obtained by The Register shows that the company
believes systems running its software will show a 20x performance
improvement on web workloads, while providing much improved scaling. In
addition, Secure64 is looking to provide customers with a 100x reduction in
the costs associated with churning through web services transactions.

Secure64 is claiming that it will be virtually impossible to write worms or
viruses that can attack the EAE, as it makes use of Itanium's rich security
features. Third-parties can write applications to the EAE that make similar
use of these security functions.

The Secure64 patent application also describes the EAE as having a rich set
of partitioning functions. The company has focused on making each partition
very stable and secure via the means described above and has also paid
attention to ways partitions can be tuned for specific applications.

"The customized execution environment then has direct access and control
over the system resources within its partition," Secure64 writes in one
application. "That is, there are no operating system abstractions
interposed between the customized execution environment and the system
resources allocated to the customized execution environment.
Advantageously, with the operating system abstractions out of the way, the
customized execution environment may implement a computational and/or I/O
structure that is simpler, is tuned for a particular application, and can
take advantage of certain processor or other system resource features that
are not exploited by the (general purpose OS)."

Itanic revival

Not knowing exactly what Secure64 will end up unveiling next year makes it
tough to guess how well the technology will be accepted or what exactly it
will compete against. Other companies - Sun comes most immediately to mind
- have talked about attacking web edge types of workloads with a new class
of multicore chips. These processors can handle numerous requests at once,
and Sun has discussed similar 20x performance improvements with web
services transactions. It's more difficult, however, to guess how well
products from Sun and others would stack up on the security front against
Secure64.

In some ways, the Secure64 EAE seems like a very sophisticated version of
VMware's ESX Server product aimed specifically at the 64-bit computing
market. Like ESX Server, the EAE pushes the OS out of the way and provides
a nice set of virtualization tools. Again, companies like Sun and HP have
been doing similar things with their versions of Unix. Secure64's biggest
plus would be that it has tuned its software for Itanium only and thrown
out any general purpose OS nonsense that would hamper web workload
performance. That certainly makes it a unique player in the market, which
is exactly what you want from a start-up.

With its rich ties to HP, it's not hard to imagine Secure64 quickly
appearing as an option for HP's Integrity server customers. This is a big
"in" since HP accounts for about 85 percent of the Itanium ecosystem.

The appliance idea never seems to take off as well as start-ups hope, and
we have our doubts Secure64's play. That said, it sure would be something
to see the originator of Itanium bring the chip back to life using his
intimate knowledge of the chip's architecture as Secure64's biggest weapon.
.

The present

Secure64 (http://www.secure64.com/)
Patent I
(http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-bool.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&co1=AND&d=PG01&s1=secure64&OS=secure64&RS=secure64)

Patent II
(http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-bool.html&r=2&f=G&l=50&co1=AND&d=PG01&s1=secure64&OS=secure64&RS=secure64)

The past

Worley pushes for Itanium (http://www.hpl.hp.com/news/2001/apr-jun/worley.html)
Worley interview (http://www.hpl.hp.com/news/2001/apr-jun/2worley.html)
Cranstone interview
(http://www.webreference.com/interviews/petercranstone.html)

Related stories

IBM, Moore's Law and the POWER 5 chip
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/26/ibm_power5_moores_law/)
How MS will end the Dell - Intel love-in
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/24/microsoft_dell_amd/)
Intel is killing Itanium one comment at a time
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/19/intel_itanium_mainframes/)
IBM benchmark leaves server rivals breathless
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/18/ibm_shatterrs_tpcc/)
Intel nuances Itanium; Microsoft ignores it
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/11/intel_ms_itanium_kick/)


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  2 01:44:49 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 04:44:49 -0500
Subject: Whatcha Gonna Do?
Message-ID: <p06110408bdd491d30572@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

John Ross' "Unintended Consequences" is a classic of the, um, gun culture,
:-) and a great read.

I have no idea who Mr. Hendrix is.

Cheers,
RAH
- --------

<http://www.john-ross.net/guest_rant.htm>



ROSS IN RANGE

Guest rant

A Post-Election Rant I Wish I'd Written, or
A Ross In Range EXTRA From Michael Hendrix
By John Ross (Introduction only) and Michael Hendrix (Body of Column)


Copyright 2004 by John Ross and Michel Hendrix.  Electronic reproduction of
this article freely permitted provided it is reproduced in its entirety
with attribution given.

         Every once in a while someone writes something that makes me
think, "Hey, I was about to do a piece like that, except I was doing
something else.  And he did it better than I would have, anyway."  Given my
last column about my cousin Jane Smiley, what follows is especially
germane.  Mike Hendrix's website is http://coldfury.com.  It takes a while
to find the page that tells you who's doing the writing, but it's there.
Mike, if you ever visit St. Louis, the ammo and the avgas are on me.--JR

Whatcha Gonna Do?

        Okay, is anybody but me sick yet of the Left's floundering and
flailing about, trying to find any way they possibly can to blame somebody
else for their failure to espouse a message remotely palatable to the
majority of eligible American voters? Is anybody but me wishing right about
now that somebody would clong them upside the head with a shovel and say,
"Look, morons, here's the dealB
."?

        Well, let's try this, then. Let's stipulate for the sake of
argument that everything the Left claims to fear about the Bush admin and
mainstream red-state America is true.

        Yep, that's right, you commie bastiches, we're coming for you. It's
only a matter of time now until you hear that late-night knock on the door
you've been dreading all along. Our jack-booted gendarmerie is going to be
working overtime rounding up every non-white and non-rich subject of our
fascist regime, and we're going to be baking every last one of you into
pies that we'll then refuse to share with the poor and hungry. We'll be
baking those pies in coal-fired ovens, and those ovens will be devoid of
any sort of exhaust-scrubber whatever, because we want to release all the
toxic gases and chemicals we can into the atmosphere.

        We'll be spiking the rivers with DDT, alar, thalidomide, and
whatever other chemical bugaboos we can think of so as to pollute the
drinking water, too. We'll cram the landfills (which will be more numerous
than ever) with deadly silicone breast implants, and we're going to wipe
our asses with copies of the Kyoto Treaty, after which we'll staple the
soiled pages to your foreheads. Halliburton will be sending you the bill
for that, too; we'll call it "cosmetic surgery" and charge a rate tied to
the market price for the harvested, tanned, and cured pelts of starving
homeless Americans, whose numbers will be rocketing even higher than those
for the aforementioned landfills, which is where said homeless will be
forced to live while we hunt them down for sport.

        We're going to subjugate the entire world through violence and
capitalist exploitation. We'll be sending our duped, mindless killerbot
soldiers to the remotest corners of the Earth to deny freedom to every
little brown person currently enjoying an idyllic, bucolic existence in
harmony with unspoiled nature, every racial, religious, and cultural
minority who has thus far lived relatively free of the sting of our
rapacious lash. We're all going to get rich from it, and we're going to
make the poor noble Bob Cratchets and Tiny Tims of the world pay for our
sumptuous lives of piggish, rankly self-indulgent consumerism, and then
we're going to kill them when we've bled them completely dry.

        Yep, it's all true, every bit of it; the New Gulags, which we
Nazified Tolkien geeks like to refer to as Barad Ashcroft, or just
Shrubthanc, have been under construction since early 2001 and are almost
ready to open for business. The ultra-right-wing corporate media
establishment has known all along, and have been helping us cover it all
up, and now it's too late; there's nothing you can do to stop us. You all
are going to be fed into the ovens by the millions, and we're going to
destroy the environment and nuke the Third World, and it's all going to be
done because Jesus told us to, and that's the only reason we're ever going
to need. Because hey, we're stupid.

        Michael Moore? Dead soon, at our hands, as punishment for daring to
dissent. Karen Finley? Ditto. Hillary Clinton? She'll be crawling around
our (segregated) private club on all fours in a Playboy Bunny costume,
forced to beg for the privilege of bringing us drinks, dropping grapes into
our mouths, and mopping the floors with her hair-just to remind any of you
other strong, uppity women who might get ideas about overturning the
established patriarchal order who's really in charge here. Other younger,
more attractive women will be forced into sexual slavery, and abortion will
absolutely not be an option for dealing with the inevitable unwanted
pregnancies that will result. Rusty coathangers will be available at the
door, although using them will be punishable by electrocution-electricity
provided by the nuke plants that will be on every corner and completely
unregulated and unsafe. But it's just as well that they are our slaves,
because there ain't gonna be no welfare to help them out, and they're not
going to be allowed to work at anything other than pleasing their
oppressors.

        We'll be burning the UN HQ in New York down, of course, and we'll
be locking all the delegates inside the building before we set it alight.
Then we'll be invading France, just to teach 'em a lesson about how we
Texas cowboys do bidness. The world's oil, of course, is ours, and we'll be
boiling tons of it and pouring it over the heads of those who refuse to
acknowledge our Xtian God. There'll be no stem cell research, there'll be
no health care at all for the poor (whose numbers we will be increasing by
every means we can think of), and if you dare to complain about life in the
New Conservative Amerikkka, we're going to kill you for it.

        All of that: so stipulated. Now, the question for you moonbat Lefty
baglappers: What the hell are you going to do about it?

        I mean, seriously; if you truly believe that all this is now in the
process of happening right before your very eyes, doesn't it become
incumbent upon you, as the most basic imaginable of moral obligations, to
do something to prevent it, or overturn it? I mean, obviously, you tried
peaceful means of stopping us, but that didn't work-because us
right-wingnuts rigged the election and disenfranchised everybody. And you
can't go to the courts because they're in the Bushitler's pocket too, all
the way up to the Supreme Court, which you've been saying for four years
now illegally handed him the White House after the tainted 2000 "election."
So your last legal, nonviolent means of resistance has been taken away from
you, and you can't even count on the media to publicize the reality of
what's going on because of their right-wing slant, their fondness for the
status quo, and of course the fact that they're really nothing but
money-grubbing corporations themselves whose only concern is the bottom
line.

        So what's left, Lefties? Where do you go from here? What are you
gonna do about it?

        I'll tell you what you're going to do about it: you're not going to
do one damned thing but continue with your whining, that's what, and it's
not because deep down you're all cowards either. It's because deep down,
you know you're full of shit. You don't even believe half the stuff you're
currently crying about yourselves.

        Because if you did, you wouldn't be talking about it. You wouldn't
be writing whiny letters to the editor; you wouldn't be fearfully mincing
down to the Canadian Consulate to half-seriously inquire about moving; you
wouldn't be sitting in coffee houses denouncing the moronic inhabitants of
Jesusland with your fellow smug, self-satisfied pseudo-hip doofuses. You'd
be gearing up and arming yourselves for the fight of your lives. And much
to your surprise, you'd have a lot of us over here on the right offering to
help load mags.

        And that's why you're going to keep right on losing elections. If
even one third of what you say was true, you'd have Americans of every
political stripe rushing to your side to man the barricades. But it isn't
anything like true, and we all know it, and we've all known it ever since
you tried to claim that proposed reductions in the annual rate of increase
of various federal budget items during the Reagan years were actually
heartless "slashing" of the budget by people who wanted poor people to die.
We've known it ever since you railed during the Clinton years about how the
welfare reform forced on him by the evil Gingrich Repubs amounted to
cultural and economic genocide, and then watched as hordes of welfare
cheats-who you always claimed didn't exist-were quietly expunged from the
rolls and went back to work.

        In other words, you're all hype and no hump. Your party has become
the Chicken Little Party, weeping and wailing about disaster, catastrophe,
and The End Of The World As We Know It every time a new idea for running
the government gets put forth by someone who isn't a card-carrying liberal.

        And the proof is in the pudding. Your delirious ideas don't even
inspire your like-minded cohorts-those who really do believe the sky is
falling-to get out and fight to save their very lives; you certainly aren't
going to inspire a majority of Americans to rally to your banner if you
can't even get your own true believers off their asses and into the
streets. That's the problem with what you people used to like to call
"false consciousness," which is exactly what you're now reduced to
peddling. Your hysteria is based on plain and simple untruths, and nobody
is willing to go out there and risk injury or death for something they know
in their hearts is a lie. There ain't gonna be any Revolution, televised or
otherwise, because too many of us know that none is really called for, and
the more you try to promote an addle-pated apocalyptic vision of a
theocratic MegaMurrika the more the rest of us just sit back and wonder
what the hell you're talking about, as we watch life gradually improve for
more and more of us despite your doomsaying.

        Afghanis just voted, in the first real free election they've ever
had; they didn't vote in any Lefty flamethrower, and they didn't vote in
any Islamist terrorist either. And this occurred only a couple of years
after we all watched you people wax apoplectic about the coming disastrous
"quagmire." Well, if that's a quagmire, most of us figure the world could
do with a few more of 'em. It didn't come cheap, and it didn't come easy,
but it came anyway, and no thanks to any of you, either.

        And the same thing is going to happen in Iraq soon; the ordinary
people you claim to be concerned about will see how their lives have
improved since Saddam's removal, and, despite all your supposed "concern"
for their welfare, they're also going to remember who it was who bitched
and whined about the only recent President who was willing to lift a finger
and take a political risk to help make it so.

        And you smarmily call yourselves the "reality-based community."
What a laugh that is.

        And that's what it all comes down to, really. Those of us who do
have some adult grasp of reality are sitting back and laughing at you and
your dipsomaniacal ravings. You don't inspire trust and confidence in your
ability to run the world's only remaining superpower, because you can't
resist the adolescent urge to hyperbolize every last little thing. Just as
a small example, look at your pals in the liberal MSM [mainstream
media--JR]. There are no mere "problems"; instead, we're deluged with one
"crisis" after another in their newspapers and on TV. You're like little
kids whose experience of the world is so limited as to define the
boundaries of your intellect far too narrowly to ever be trusted with the
responsibility of governing a nation.

        Grow up, Chicken Little. Lead, follow, or get out of the friggin'
way. Or, at the very least, you can stop trying to get the rest of us to
guzzle a bunch of Kool-Aid that you can't even swallow yourselves.


Michael Hendrix 11/12/04


- --
- -----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  2 07:05:15 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 10:05:15 -0500
Subject: Straighten Up and Fly Right
Message-ID: <p06110425bdd4a1329fc8@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110194850394688792,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal


 December 2, 2004

 COMMENTARY


Straighten Up and Fly Right

By HEATHER MAC DONALD
December 2, 2004; Page A12


One of the highest priorities for whoever succeeds Tom Ridge at Homeland
Security should be to take political correctness and a fear of litigation
out of national security decisions. From immigration enforcement to
intelligence gathering, government officials continue to compromise safety
in order to avoid accusations of "racial profiling" -- and in order to
avoid publicly acknowledging what the 9/11 Commission finally said: that
the enemy is "Islamist terrorism." This blind antidiscrimination reflex is
all the more worrying since radical Islam continues to seek adherents and
plan attacks in the U.S.

The government antidiscrimination hammer has hit the airline industry most
severely. Department of Transportation lawyers have extracted millions in
settlements from four major carriers for alleged discrimination after 9/11,
and they have undermined one of the most crucial elements of air safety: a
pilot's responsibility for his flight. Since the charges against the
airlines were specious but successful, every pilot must worry that his
good-faith effort to protect his passengers will trigger federal
retaliation.

Transportation's action against American Airlines was typical. In the last
four months of 2001, American carried 23 million passengers and asked 10 of
them not to board because they raised security concerns that could not be
resolved in time for departure. For those 10 interventions (and an 11th in
2002), DOT declared American Airlines a civil-rights pariah, whose
discriminatory conduct would "result in irreparable harm to the public" if
not stopped.

On its face, the government's charge that American engaged in
discriminatory conduct was absurd, given how few passenger removals
occurred. But the racism allegation looks all the more unreasonable when
put in the context of the government's own actions. Three times between
9/11 and the end of 2001, public officials warned of an imminent terror
attack. Transportation officials urged the airlines to be especially
vigilant. In such an environment, pilots would have been derelict not to
resolve security questions in favor of caution.

Somehow, DOT lawyers failed to include in their complaint one further
passenger whom American asked not to board in 2001. On Dec. 22, airline
personnel in Paris kept Richard Reid off a flight to Miami. The next day,
French authorities insisted that he be cleared to board. During the flight,
Reid tried to set off a bomb in his shoe, but a stewardess and passengers
foiled him. Had he been kept from flying on both days, he too might have
ended up on the government's roster of discrimination victims.

Jehad Alshrafi is typical of those who were included in the suit against
American. On Nov. 3, 2001, this Jordanian-American was scheduled to fly out
of Boston's Logan Airport (from which two of the hijacked planes --
including American Flight 11 -- departed on 9/11). A federal air marshal
told the pilot that Alshrafi's name resembled one on a terror-watch list --
and that he had been acting suspiciously, had created a disturbance at the
gate, and posed unresolved security issues. The pilot denied him boarding.
Alshrafi was later cleared and given first-class passage on another flight.

According to DOT, the only reason American initially denied Alshrafi
passage was because of his "race, color, national origin, religion, sex or
ancestry." Never mind that there were at least five other passengers of
Arab descent on his original flight, none of whom had been given additional
screening or kept from flying. In fact, on virtually every flight on which
the government claims that American acted out of racial animus, other
passengers of apparent Middle Eastern ancestry flew undisturbed.

If DOT believes that an air marshal's warnings about a passenger's name and
suspicious behavior are insufficient grounds for keeping him off a flight,
it is hard to imagine circumstances that would justify a security hold in
the department's view -- short of someone's declaring his intention to blow
up a plane. Given the information presented to the pilot, the only
conceivable reason to have allowed Alshrafi to board would have been fear
of a lawsuit.

And litigation phobia is precisely the mind-set that DOT is hoping to
cultivate in flight personnel: 10 days after 9/11, the department started
rolling out "guidance" documents on nondiscrimination. While heavy on
platitudes about protecting civil rights, they are useless in advising
airlines how to avoid the government's wrath. The closest the DOT gets to
providing airlines a concrete rule for avoiding litigation is a "but-for"
test: "Ask yourself," advise the guidelines, "But for this person's
perceived race, ethnic heritage or religious orientation, would I have
subjected this individual to additional safety or security scrutiny? If the
answer is 'no,' then the action may violate civil rights laws."

But security decisions are never that clear. A safety officer will consider
many factors in calculating someone's riskiness; any one of them could be
pulled out as a "but-for" element. As American's record makes clear, it is
almost never the case that someone gets additional screening based on his
apparent ethnic heritage or national origin alone; behavior and no-fly-list
matching are key in the assessment. (In fact, about half the complainants
in the government's action were not even Middle Eastern. DOT simply
assumes, without evidence, that American scrutinized the men because of the
mistaken belief that they were Arabs.) A pilot trying to apply the
"but-for" test to his own security judgment will inevitably reduce the test
to an easier calculus: "Deny passage to someone who is or could claim to
look Muslim only under the most extreme circumstances."

In application, the "but-for" test reduces to a "never-ever" rule: Ethnic
heritage, religion, or national origin may play no role in evaluating risk.
But when the threat at issue is Islamic terrorism, it is reckless to ask
officials to disregard the sole ironclad prerequisite for being an Islamic
terrorist: Muslim identity or its proxies -- national origin or ethnic
heritage. (Muslim identity should be at most only one factor in assessing
someone's security risk.)

American contested DOT's action, but fighting the government civil-rights
complex is futile. In February 2004, the airline, while denying guilt,
settled the action for $1.5 million, to be spent on yet more "sensitivity
training." American's pilots were outraged. "Pilots felt: 'How dare they
second-guess our decision?'" says Denis Breslin, a pilots' union official.

Not satisfied with just one scalp, DOT lawyers brought identical suits
against United, Delta and Continental. Those carriers also settled,
pledging more millions for "sensitivity training" -- money much better
spent on security training than on indoctrinating pilots to distrust their
own security judgments. And in the government's wake, the private
civil-rights bar, led by the ACLU, has brought its own airline
discrimination suits. An action against Northwest is seeking government
terror-watch lists, Northwest's boarding procedures, and its cabin-training
manual. If these materials got loose, they would be gold to terrorists
trying to figure out airline-security procedures

The first George W. Bush administration tried mightily not to offend the
antidiscrimination lobby. It's time to give up that game. From now on,
common sense alone should determine security decisions, the only course
which can protect all Americans, Muslims and non-Muslim, alike.

Ms. Mac Donald is a contributing editor at City Journal, from whose latest
issue this is adapted.

- -- 
- -----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Dec  2 07:14:37 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 2004 10:14:37 -0500
Subject: Jewish wholy words..
In-Reply-To: <200412021551.48961.pique@netspace.net.au>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F2548195830B6D853E49D8F9BB00@phx.gbl>

The idea of Jewish "Scripture" is far more complex than can be described in 
a short amount of time.

Clearly, the Torah is far more important than anything, even the other books 
of the "Old Testament" (for Jews the Old testament is actually in 3 or 4 
books). The Torah is the only piece of Jewish scripture said to be dictated 
letter-by-letter to Moses.

Now there are several "rings" of lesser works concentric around the Torah, 
including the Talmud and the Mishra and then a couple of dozens of centuries 
of other stuff. The Talmud is often called the "Oral Torah", but even this 
designates a slightly inferior status, being the written version of words 
originally spoken by Moses. The Mishnah are not scriptures at all, 
technically, though they can be given great reverence depending on the Rabbi 
that wrote/spoke a particular section.

Contrast that to the Protestant notion of Go/NoGo for scriptures...we don't 
even have the Apocryhpa anymore, despite the fact that Martin Luther had it 
in his Bible and quoted from it. It's eaither divinely inspired or it 
ain't...a simplisitic idea that probably helped spread Protestantism to the 
poor and uneducated.

In short, it's silly to somehow get on the Jews for something that shows up 
in some commentary written 20 centuries ago (eg, Baylonian Talmud).

-TD



>From: Tim Benham <pique at netspace.net.au>
>To: cypherpunks at waste.minder.net
>Subject: RE: Jewish wholy words..
>Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 15:51:48 +1100
>
>On Thursday 02 December 2004 10:46,  "Tyler Durden" wroye
><camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
> > Subject: RE: Jewish wholy words..
> >
> > No.
> >
> > Technically speaking, only the Torah (the first 5 books of the Bible,
> > written by Moses) are technically "scripture"...everything else is
> > commentary.
>
>Doesn't the commentary have equal if not superior status?
>
>Sanhedrin 59a I took the trouble to look up. In fact it says that a non-Jew
>who studies the Torah deserves death. It also says he is a "High Priest" 
>and
>rounds off with a discussion of which animals one may cut living parts from
>and eat.
>
>Whether googling the rabbinical Law qualifies me for the death penalty is
>unclear.
>
>cheers,
>Tim




From sunder at sunder.net  Thu Dec  2 07:27:04 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (Sunder)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 10:27:04 -0500 (est)
Subject: Optical Tempest FAQ
Message-ID: <Pine.BSO.4.58.0412021026290.15394@silkworth.sunder.net>

http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/emsec/optical-faq.html

Along with tips and examples.

Enjoy, and don't use a CRT in the dark. :-)

----------------------Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos---------------------------
 + ^ + :"Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we.  /|\
  \|/  :They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country /\|/\
<--*-->:and our people, and neither do we." -G. W. Bush, 2004.08.05 \/|\/
  /|\  :                                                             \|/
 + v + :    War is Peace, freedom is slavery, Bush is President.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Dec  2 09:32:09 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 2004 12:32:09 -0500
Subject: Optical Tempest FAQ
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSO.4.58.0412021026290.15394@silkworth.sunder.net>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F14D9EEDA82ED61167639429BB00@phx.gbl>

Interesting.
Contrary to what I thought (or what has been discussed here), only a 
'scalar' of detected light is needed, not a vector. In other words, merely 
measuring overall radiated intensity over time seems to be sufficient to 
recover the message. This means that certain types of diffusive materials 
will not necessarily mitigate against this kind of eavesdropping.

However, his discussion would indicate that the various practical concerns 
and limitations probably limit this to very niche-type applications...I'd 
bet that it's very rare when such a trechnique is both needed as well as 
useful, given the time, the subject and the place.

-TD

>From: Sunder <sunder at sunder.net>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Optical Tempest FAQ
>Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 10:27:04 -0500 (est)
>
>http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/emsec/optical-faq.html
>
>Along with tips and examples.
>
>Enjoy, and don't use a CRT in the dark. :-)
>
>----------------------Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos---------------------------
>  + ^ + :"Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we.  /|\
>   \|/  :They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country /\|/\
><--*-->:and our people, and neither do we." -G. W. Bush, 2004.08.05 \/|\/
>   /|\  :                                                             \|/
>  + v + :    War is Peace, freedom is slavery, Bush is President.
>-------------------------------------------------------------------------




From pique at netspace.net.au  Wed Dec  1 20:51:48 2004
From: pique at netspace.net.au (Tim Benham)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 15:51:48 +1100
Subject: Jewish wholy words..
In-Reply-To: <200412012346.iB1Nkin7015171@waste.minder.net>
References: <200412012346.iB1Nkin7015171@waste.minder.net>
Message-ID: <200412021551.48961.pique@netspace.net.au>

On Thursday 02 December 2004 10:46,  "Tyler Durden" wroye 
<camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
> Subject: RE: Jewish wholy words..
>
> No.
>
> Technically speaking, only the Torah (the first 5 books of the Bible,
> written by Moses) are technically "scripture"...everything else is
> commentary.

Doesn't the commentary have equal if not superior status?

Sanhedrin 59a I took the trouble to look up. In fact it says that a non-Jew 
who studies the Torah deserves death. It also says he is a "High Priest" and 
rounds off with a discussion of which animals one may cut living parts from 
and eat.

Whether googling the rabbinical Law qualifies me for the death penalty is 
unclear.

cheers,
Tim




From sunder at sunder.net  Thu Dec  2 14:52:26 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (Sunder)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 17:52:26 -0500 (est)
Subject: Optical Tempest FAQ
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F14D9EEDA82ED61167639429BB00@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F14D9EEDA82ED61167639429BB00@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <Pine.BSO.4.58.0412021750010.15394@silkworth.sunder.net>

IMHO, if you light up two or more other identical CRT's and have them 
display random junk it should throw enough noise to make it worthless - 
(and would put out enough similar RF to mess with RF tempest) there might 
be ways to filter the photons from the other monitors out, but, it would 
be difficult.

----------------------Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos---------------------------
 + ^ + :"Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we.  /|\
  \|/  :They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country /\|/\
<--*-->:and our people, and neither do we." -G. W. Bush, 2004.08.05 \/|\/
  /|\  :                                                             \|/
 + v + :    War is Peace, freedom is slavery, Bush is President.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

On Thu, 2 Dec 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:

> Interesting.
> Contrary to what I thought (or what has been discussed here), only a 
> 'scalar' of detected light is needed, not a vector. In other words, merely 
> measuring overall radiated intensity over time seems to be sufficient to 
> recover the message. This means that certain types of diffusive materials 
> will not necessarily mitigate against this kind of eavesdropping.
> 
> However, his discussion would indicate that the various practical concerns 
> and limitations probably limit this to very niche-type applications...I'd 
> bet that it's very rare when such a trechnique is both needed as well as 
> useful, given the time, the subject and the place.
> 
> -TD
> 
> >From: Sunder <sunder at sunder.net>
> >To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
> >Subject: Optical Tempest FAQ
> >Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 10:27:04 -0500 (est)
> >
> >http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/emsec/optical-faq.html
> >
> >Along with tips and examples.
> >
> >Enjoy, and don't use a CRT in the dark. :-)




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  2 17:57:27 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 20:57:27 -0500
Subject: Tenet calls for Internet security
Message-ID: <p06110404bdd571a43f12@[66.149.49.5]>

Now... Try not to laugh, here...

MMMGGGPPPFFFFFBWAHAHAHAHAHAHA!

Heh... Yes, well... Sorry about that.

Carry on.

Cheers,
RAH
-------

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041201-114750-6381r>

The Washington Times
 www.washingtontimes.com

Tenet calls for Internet security
By Shaun Waterman
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
Published December 2, 2004
Former CIA Director George J. Tenet yesterday called for new security
measures to guard against attacks on the United States that use the
Internet, which he called "a potential Achilles' heel."
     "I know that these actions will be controversial in this age when we
still think the Internet is a free and open society with no control or
accountability," he told an information-technology security conference in
Washington, "but ultimately the Wild West must give way to governance and
control."
     The former CIA director said telecommunications -- and specifically
the Internet -- are a back door through which terrorists and other enemies
of the United States could attack the country, even though great strides
have been made in securing the physical infrastructure.
     The Internet "represents a potential Achilles' heel for our financial
stability and physical security if the networks we are creating are not
protected," Mr. Tenet said.
     He said known adversaries, including "intelligence services, military
organizations and non-state actors," are researching information attacks
against the United States.
     Within the federal government, the Department of Homeland Security has
the lead role in protecting the Internet from terrorism. But the
department's head of cyber-security recently quit amid reports that he had
clashed with his superiors.
     Mr. Tenet, who retired in July as director of the CIA after seven
years, warned that al Qaeda remains a sophisticated group, even though its
first-tier leadership largely has been destroyed.
     It is "undoubtedly mapping vulnerabilities and weaknesses in our
telecommunications networks," he said.
     Mr. Tenet pointed out that the modernization of key industries in the
United States is making them more vulnerable by connecting them with an
Internet that is open to attack.
     The way the Internet was built might be part of the problem, he said.
Its open architecture allows Web surfing, but that openness makes the
system vulnerable, Mr. Tenet said.
     Access to networks like the World Wide Web might need to be limited to
those who can show they take security seriously, he said.
     Mr. Tenet called for industry to lead the way by "establishing and
enforcing" security standards. Products need to be delivered to government
and private-sector customers "with a new level of security and risk
management already built in."
     The national press, including United Press International (UPI), were
excluded from yesterday's event, at Mr. Tenet's request, organizers said.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec  2 21:23:40 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 2004 21:23:40 -0800
Subject: Hawala != Halal
Message-ID: <41AFF85B.1A6D05E5@cdc.gov>

At 09:07 AM 12/1/04 -0500, Steve Furlong wrote:
>On Tue, 2004-11-30 at 21:36, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>
>> Halal was deemed a terrorist weapon, and contrary to the treasury's
>> policies, game over.
>
>Hawala

Yep, sorry, I've got templegrandin.com on the brain.  Only PETA
thinks Halal is a terrorist, or at least carnivorous, weapon.




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec  2 21:26:13 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 2004 21:26:13 -0800
Subject: O'Reilly is a terrorist
Message-ID: <41AFF8F5.6479C0F@cdc.gov>

At 09:17 AM 12/1/04 -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> Appearing on Fox News' "O'Reilly Factor" Monday night

My favorite irony-pegging experience of the week was
Bill O accusing an Al-Jazeera spokesman of not being
fair and balanced.   Lets bomb those mofos and blame
it on an out-of-date Yugo map.




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec  2 21:28:20 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 2004 21:28:20 -0800
Subject: Got Chips? 
Message-ID: <41AFF974.478D9EE2@cdc.gov>

At 10:59 AM 12/1/04 -0800, John Young wrote:
>Lying about having an implant is kidnapping and mutilation
>protection.

If they even think you have a tracking chip, you'll be boxed up in
a Faraday cage faster than you can say Jimmy Walker-Lindh.

Clothing optional, baby.

Got 121.5 Mhz?




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec  2 21:30:52 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 2004 21:30:52 -0800
Subject: Unintended Consequences
Message-ID: <41AFFA0C.49AAC2B0@cdc.gov>

At 04:44 AM 12/2/04 -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
>John Ross' "Unintended Consequences" is a classic of the, um, gun
culture,
>:-) and a great read.

Made me want to name my first mulatto "Gonorreah" fer sure :-)




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec  2 21:33:36 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 2004 21:33:36 -0800
Subject: Jewish wholy words..
Message-ID: <41AFFAB0.56B3EA4E@cdc.gov>

Just remember this [C]Hanu[k]ka[h] that the Macabbees were
terrorists from the POV of the dominant hegemony...

Oh, but the [solstice-coopted 'holiday'] is about someone
topping off oil, not about rebellion against domination.  Ooops.

Nope, no parallels here.




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Thu Dec  2 19:49:21 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 22:49:21 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Optical Tempest FAQ
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSO.4.58.0412021750010.15394@silkworth.sunder.net>
Message-ID: <20041203034921.14719.qmail@web51810.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- Sunder <sunder at sunder.net> wrote: 
> IMHO, if you light up two or more other identical CRT's and have them 
> display random junk it should throw enough noise to make it worthless - 
> (and would put out enough similar RF to mess with RF tempest) there
> might 
> be ways to filter the photons from the other monitors out, but, it would
> 
> be difficult.

Every resistor/cap is different, as is just about every other electronic
component that you might find in either analogue or digital circuits --
including clock crystals.  Even VLSI chips cut from the same die will
exhibit (very) subtlely different analogue electrical properties as a
consequence of their initial physical location on the wafer.  Therefore,
it is reasonable to expect that otherwise "identical" CRT monitors will
exhibit subtle differences in signal timing, amplitude, and phase when
their primary and intermediate outputs are examined in detail. 

If I'm not entirely off the mark, this means that RF tempest gear can in
principle differentiate same make-and-model CRT devices.  This does not
mean that the suggestion is without merit, as it is likely that `jamming'
your primary monitor with another will make things somewhat more difficult
for an eavesdropper.  But that just means that he may have to hook up his
antenna directly to the water mains instead of sitting in his van down the
street.

As to the validity of this strategy to combat optical tempest, I am not
sure.  I would look up the state-of-the-art in audio-signal filtering to
see what can be done today to differentiate similar mixed signals.  

All in all I would suspect that to get halfway decent jamming, you would
have to synchronise your two monitors so that the video frames on each
were being started at the same instant, while also using different sources
and signals.  That is likely beyond the capability of anyone who is not
fairly good with electronics; off the top of my head I cannot suggest how
I would thing about doing it.

Caveat emptor: IANA electrical engineer by any stretch of the imagination,
so I may be entirely full of crap without knowing it.


Regards,

Steve




______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From chris.kuethe at gmail.com  Thu Dec  2 22:39:33 2004
From: chris.kuethe at gmail.com (Chris Kuethe)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 23:39:33 -0700
Subject: Optical Tempest FAQ
In-Reply-To: <20041203060156.GD20555@pig.dieconsulting.com>
References: <Pine.BSO.4.58.0412021026290.15394@silkworth.sunder.net> 	
  <BAY24-F14D9EEDA82ED61167639429BB00@phx.gbl> 	
  <20041203060156.GD20555@pig.dieconsulting.com>
Message-ID: <91981b3e041202223951424f68@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, 3 Dec 2004 01:01:57 -0500, Dave Emery <die at dieconsulting.com> wrote:
> ...
>         In fact the greater hazard may sometimes be from red, yellow or
> green LEDs on the front of equipment that are directly driven with
> real data in order to allow troubleshooting - recovering data from one
> of those at a distance using a good telescope may be possible and most
> people don't think of the gentle flicker of the LED as carrying actual
> information that could be intercepted.

Like this classic. Was just as much fun to reread as it was the first time. :)

http://www.google.ca/search?q=cache:YdHPMAbPMeAJ:www.applied-math.org/optical_tempest.pdf+black+tape+over+modem+lights+tempest&hl=en&client=firefox
http://www.applied-math.org/optical_tempest.pdf

-- 
GDB has a 'break' feature; why doesn't it have 'fix' too?




From dee3 at pothole.com  Thu Dec  2 20:40:07 2004
From: dee3 at pothole.com (dee3 at pothole.com)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 23:40:07 -0500 (EST)
Subject: [Interest] FWD: The last crusade of the Templars
Message-ID: <mailman.1097.1576007652.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1379629,00.html>

November 29, 2004

The last crusade of the Templars
By Ruth Gledhill

The knights want a Papal apology nearly 700 years after they were
disbanded and hounded into exile

THE VATICAN is giving "serious consideration" to apologising for the
persecution that led to the suppression of the Knights Templar. The
suppression, which began on Friday , October 13, 1307, gave Friday the
Thirteenth its superstitious legacy.


A Templar Order in Britain that claims to be descended from the original
Knights Templar has asked that the Pope should make the apology.

The Templars, based in Hertford, are hoping for an apology by 2007, the
700th anniversary of the start of the persecution, which culminated with
the torture and burning at the stake of the Grand Master Jacques de Molay
for heresy and the dissolution of the Order by apostolic decree in 1312.

The letter, signed by the Secretary of the Council of Chaplains on behalf
of the Grand Master of the Poor Fellow Soldiers of Jesus Christ and the
Temple of Solomon Grand Preceptory, with a PO box address in Hertford,
formally requests an apology for "the torture and murder of our
leadership", instigated by Pope Clement V.

"We shall witness the 700th anniversary of the persecution of our order on
13th October 2007", the letter says. "It would be just and fitting for the
Vatican to acknowledge our grievance in advance of this day of mourning."

Apologies have already been made by the Roman Catholic Church for the
persecution of Galileo and for the Crusades. The Templars hope that these
precedents will make their suit more likely to succeed.

Hertford Templar Tim Acheson, who is descended from the Scottish Acheson
family that has established Templar links and whose family lived until
recently in Bailey Hall, Hertford, said: "This letter is a serious attempt
by a Templar group which traces its roots back to the medieval Order to
solicit an apology from the Papacy."

He added: "The Papacy and the Kingdom of France conspired to destroy the
Order for reasons which modern historians judge to be primarily political.
Their methods and motives are now universally regarded as brutal, unfair
and unjustified.

"The Knights Templar officially ceased to exist in the early 1300s, but
the order continued underground. It was a huge organisation and the vast
majority of Templars survived the persecution, including most of their
leaders, along with much of their treasure and, most importantly, their
original values and traditions."

The Hertford Mercury newspaper has reported newly discovered Templar links
with Hertford, including a warren of tunnels beneath the town. At the
heart of the maze of tunnels is Hertford Castle, where in 1309 four
Templars from Temple Dinsley near Hitchin were imprisoned after their
arrest by Edward II, who believed that they were holding a lost treasure.
The treasure was never found.

When Subterranea Britannica, a group of amateur archaeologists, expressed
an interest in investigating Hertfords tunnels last month, they received
anonymous threats telling them not to.

The Templars captured Jerusalem during the Crusades and were known as
"keepers of the Holy Grail", said to be the cup used at the Last Supper or
as the receptacle used by Joseph of Arimathea to catch Christs blood as he
bled on the Cross, or both.

Interest in the Templars and the Holy Grail is at an unprecedented high
after the success of books such as The Da Vinci Code, by Dan Brown, and
the earlier Holy Blood Holy Grail, by Michael Baigent, Richard Leigh and
Henry Lincoln, which claimed that Jesus survived the crucifixion and
settled in France.

The Knights Templar were founded by Hugh de Payens, a French knight from
the Champagne area of Burgundy, and eight companions in 1118 during the
reign of Baldwin II of Jerusalem, when they took a perpetual vow to defend
the Christian kingdom. They were assigned quarters next to the Temple. In
1128, they took up the white habit of the Cistercians, adding a red cross.
The order knights, sergeants, farmers and chaplains amassed enormous
wealth.

In Rome, a Vatican spokesman said that the demand for an apology would be
given "serious consideration". However, Vatican insiders said that the
Pope, 84, was under pressure from conservative cardinals to "stop saying
sorry" for the errors of the past, after a series of papal apologies for
the Crusades, the Inquisition, Christian anti-Semitism and the persecution
of scientists and "heretics" such as Galileo.

_______________________________________________
Interest mailing list
Interest at pothole.com
http://pothole.com/mailman/listinfo/interest

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From die at dieconsulting.com  Thu Dec  2 22:01:57 2004
From: die at dieconsulting.com (Dave Emery)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 01:01:57 -0500
Subject: Optical Tempest FAQ
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F14D9EEDA82ED61167639429BB00@phx.gbl>
References: <Pine.BSO.4.58.0412021026290.15394@silkworth.sunder.net>
  <BAY24-F14D9EEDA82ED61167639429BB00@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041203060156.GD20555@pig.dieconsulting.com>

On Thu, Dec 02, 2004 at 12:32:09PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> However, his discussion would indicate that the various practical concerns 
> and limitations probably limit this to very niche-type applications...I'd 
> bet that it's very rare when such a trechnique is both needed as well as 
> useful, given the time, the subject and the place.
> 
> -TD

	The big problem with this technology (and classic Van Eck
electromagnetic interception too)  is that more and more folks are using
LCD screens or other display devices that do not do single thread raster
scans of what they are displaying.   Thus no single signal exists  to
detect with all the pixels of the image in it.

	In fact the greater hazard may sometimes be from red, yellow or
green LEDs on the front of equipment that are directly driven with
real data in order to allow troubleshooting - recovering data from one
of those at a distance using a good telescope may be possible and most
people don't think of the gentle flicker of the LED as carrying actual
information that could be intercepted.

-- 
   Dave Emery N1PRE,  die at dieconsulting.com  DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass 02493




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec  3 05:32:39 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 08:32:39 -0500
Subject: [Interest] FWD: The last crusade of the Templars
Message-ID: <p06110406bdd6164484fc@[66.149.49.5]>

I've liked to joke that, because of their encrypted "passbook" accounting
and payment system, a way for holy-land pilgrims to deposit money in
Europe, deduct amounts from an encrypted document for Templar-sponsored
passage, hostelry, etc., en route, and collect the remainder on arrival in
Jerusalem, that the Templars were the original financial cryptographers.
:-).

More seriously, it was operating this kind of medieval Western Union cum
Brinks cum Wells Fargo cum Hilton, which not only allowed them to
effectively transfer the asset value of whatever booty they may have
acquired in their early days back home, but also to make the lion's share
of the money they were eventually disbanded for...

Cheers,
RAH
Who put a "Templar's Square" maths puzzle on the IBUC shirt at the first
EFCE conference in Edinburgh because of Roslyn Chapel, just outside of
town, and who, coincidentally, has spent the last 16 years in the Boston
neighborhood of Roslindale, the former home of a large, discrete, Masonic
temple, speaking of punters who think they're modern Templars...
-------
--- begin forwarded text



From dailyarticle at mises.org  Fri Dec  3 06:24:52 2004
From: dailyarticle at mises.org (Mises Daily Article)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 09:24:52 -0500
Subject: The Source of Hitler's Success
Message-ID: <mailman.1098.1576007652.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

<https://www.mises.org/donate.asp> The Mises Institute is inviting
nominations for the best 15 Daily Articles of 2004, and the best 5
scholarly articles from either the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics
(6.3-7.2) or the Journal of Libertarian Studies (17.4-18.3). Send your
nominations to <mailto:contact at mises.org>contact at mises.org. (We'll leave
out best online books, since the the 2004 list is dominated by Menger,
Rothbard, and Mises.)


The Source of Hitler's Success

by Ludwig von Mises

<http://www.mises.org/fullstory.aspx?Id=1691>[Posted December 3, 2004]

The following, written in 1940, is excerpted from Interventionism, An
Economic Analysis, which was originally part of
<http://www.mises.org/humanaction/pdf/nationaloekonomie.pdf>Nationaloekonomie,
the German predecessor to Human Action.
<http://www.mises.org/etexts/mises/interventionism/contents.asp>The entire
text is online for the first time.
<https://www.mises.org/donate.aspx#support>Support Mises.org's online texts.

 Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini constantly proclaim that they are chosen by
destiny to bring salvation to this world. They claim they are the leaders
of the creative youth who fight against their outlived elders. They bring
from the East the new culture which is to replace the dying Western
civilization. They want to give the coup de grace to liberalism and
capitalism; they want to overcome immoral egoism by altruism; they plan to
replace the anarchic democracy by order and organization, the society of
classes by the total state, the market economy by socialism. Their war is
not a war for territorial expansion, for loot and hegemony like the
imperialistic wars of the past, but a holy crusade for a better world to
live in. And they feel certain of their victory because they are convinced
that they are borne by the wave of the future.

It is a law of nature, they say, that great historic changes cannot take
place peacefully or without conflict. It would be petty and stupid, they
contend, to overlook the creative quality of their work because of some
unpleasantness which the great world revolution must necessarily bring with
it. They maintain one should not overlook the glory of the new gospel
because of ill-placed pity for Jews and Masons, Poles and Czechs, Finns and
Greeks, the decadent English aristocracy and the corrupt French
bourgeoisie. Such softness and such blindness for the new standards of
morality prove only the decadence of the dying capitalistic pseudo-culture.
The whining and crying of impotent old men, they say, is futile; it will
not stop the victorious advance of youth. No one can stop the wheel of
history, or turn back the clock of time.

The success of this propaganda is overwhelming. People do not consider the
content of alleged new gospel; they merely understand that it is new and
believe to see in this fact its justification. As women welcome a new style
in clothes just to have a change, so the supposedly new style in politics
and economics is welcomed. People hasten to exchange their old ideas for
new ones, because they fear to appear old-fashioned and reactionary. They
join the chorus decrying the shortcomings of the capitalistic civilization
and speak in elated enthusiasm of the achievements of the autocrats.
Nothing is today more fashionable than slandering Western civilization.

This mentality has made it easy for Hitler to gain his victories. The
Czechs and the Danes capitulated without a fight. Norwegian officers handed
over large sections of their country to Hitlers army. The Dutch and the
Belgians gave in after only a short resistance. The French had the audacity
to celebrate the destruction of their independence as a national revival.
It took Hitler five years to effect the Anschluss of Austria;
two-and-one-half years later he was master of the European continent.

Hitler does not have a new secret weapon at his disposal. He does not owe
his victory to an excellent intelligence service which informs him of the
plans of his opponents. Even the much-talked-of fifth column was not
decisive. He won because the supposed opponents were already quite
sympathetic to the ideas for which he stood.

Only those who unconditionally and unrestrictedly consider the market
economy as the only workable form of social cooperation are opponents of
the totalitarian systems and are capable of fighting them successfully.
Those who want socialism intend to bring to their country the system which
Russia and Germany enjoy. To favor interventionism means to enter a road
which inevitably leads to socialism.

An ideological struggle cannot be fought successfully with constant
concessions to the principles of the enemy. Those who refute capitalism
because it supposedly is inimical to the interest of the masses, those who
proclaim as a matter of course that after the victory over Hitler the
market economy will have to be replaced by a better system and, therefore,
everything should be done now to make the government control of business as
complete as possible, are actually fighting for totalitarianism. The
progressives who today masquerade as liberals may rant against
fascism; yet it is their policy that paves the way for Hitlerism.

<http://www.mises.org/etexts/mises/interventionism/contents.asp> Nothing
could have been more helpful to the success of the National-Socialist
(Nazi) movement than the methods used by the progressives, denouncing
Nazism as a party serving the interests of capital. The German workers
knew this tactic too well to be deceived by it again.

Was it not true that, since the seventies of the last century, the
ostensibly pro-labor Social-Democrats had fought all the pro-labor measures
of the German government vigorously, calling them bourgeois and injurious
to the interests of the working class?

The Social-Democrats had consistently voted against the nationalization of
the railroads, the municipalization of the public utilities, labor
legislation, and compulsory accident, sickness, and old-age insurance, the
German social security system which was adopted later throughout the world.
Then after the war [World War l] the Communists branded the German
Social-Democratic party and the Social-Democratic unions as traitors to
their class. So the German workers realized that every party wooing them
called the competing parties willing servants of capitalism, and their
allegiance to Nazism would not be shattered by such phrases.

Unless we are utterly oblivious to the facts, we must realize that the
German workers are the most reliable supporters of the Hitler regime.
Nazism has won them over completely by eliminating unemployment and by
reducing the entrepreneurs to the status of shop managers (Betriebsfuhrer).
Big business, shopkeepers, and peasants are disappointed. Labor is well
satisfied and will stand by Hitler, unless the war takes a turn which would
destroy their hope for a better life after the peace treaty. Only military
reverses can deprive Hitler of the backing of the German workers.

The fact that the capitalists and entrepreneurs, faced with the alternative
of Communism or Nazism, chose the latter, does not require any further
explanation. They preferred to live as shop managers under Hitler than to
be liquidated as bourgeois by Stalin. Capitalists dont like to be
killed any more than other people do.

What pernicious effects may be produced by believing that the German
workers are opposed to Hitler was proved by the English tactics during the
first year of the war. The government of Neville
Chamberlain<http://www.mises.org/etexts/mises/interventionism/section7.asp#_ftn10>*
firmly believed that the war would be brought to an end by a revolution of
the German workers. Instead of concentrating on vigorous arming and
fighting, they had their planes drop leaflets over Germany telling the
German workers that England was not fighting this war against them, but
against their oppressor, Hitler. The English government knew very well,
they said, that the German people, particularly labor, were against war and
were only forced into it by their self-imposed dictator.

 The workers in the Anglo-Saxon countries, too, knew that the socialist
parties competing for their favor usually accused each other of favoring
capitalism. Communists of all shades advance this accusation against
socialists. And within the Communist groups the Trotskyites used this same
argument against Stalin and his men. And vice versa. The fact that the
progressives bring the same accusation against Nazism and Fascism will
not prevent labor some day from following another gang wearing shirts of a
different color.

What is wrong with Western civilization is the accepted habit of judging
political parties merely by asking whether they seem new and radical
enough, not by analyzing whether they are wise or unwise, or whether they
are apt to achieve their aims. Not everything that exists today is
reasonable; but this does not mean that everything that does not exist is
sensible.

The usual terminology of political language is stupid. What is left and
what is right? Why should Hitler be right and Stalin, his temporary
friend, be left? Who is reactionary and who is progressive? Reaction
against an unwise policy is not to be condemned. And progress towards chaos
is not to be commended. Nothing should find acceptance just because it is
new, radical, and fashionable. Orthodoxy is not an evil if the doctrine
on which the orthodox stand is sound. Who is anti-labor, those who want
to lower labor to the Russian level, or those who want for labor the
capitalistic standard of the United States? Who is nationalist, those who
want to bring their nation under the heel of the Nazis, or those who want
to preserve its independence?

What would have happened to Western civilization if its peoples had always
shown such liking for the new? Suppose they had welcomed as the wave of
the future Attila and his Huns, the creed of Mohammed, or the Tartars?
They, too, were totalitarian and had military successes to their credit
which made the weak hesitate and ready to capitulate. What mankind needs
today is liberation from the rule of nonsensical slogans and a return to
sound reasoning.

__________________________________

<http://www.mises.org/content/mises.asp>Ludwig von Mises (18811973) was
dean of the Austrian School.

In response to many requests, it is now possible to set your credit-card
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--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From njohnsn at njohnsn.com  Fri Dec  3 07:44:12 2004
From: njohnsn at njohnsn.com (Neil Johnson)
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 09:44:12 -0600
Subject: Tenet calls for Internet security
In-Reply-To: <p06110404bdd571a43f12@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p06110404bdd571a43f12@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <1102088652.13345.1.camel@njohnsn.com>

On Thu, 2004-12-02 at 20:57 -0500, R.A. Hettinga quoted:
> The national press, including United Press International (UPI), were
> excluded from yesterday's event, at Mr. Tenet's request, organizers
> said.

Yessiree, he sure knows how he wants it done, too!




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec  3 08:42:10 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 11:42:10 -0500
Subject: Tenet calls for Internet security
In-Reply-To: <p06110404bdd571a43f12@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F16D62866C169B3BE191EA19BB10@phx.gbl>

"The national press, including United Press International (UPI), were
excluded from yesterday's event, at Mr. Tenet's request, organizers said."

I guess that summarizes his 'vision' better than anything he actually said.

-TD


>From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cryptography at metzdowd.com, cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net, 
>osint at yahoogroups.com
>Subject: Tenet calls for Internet security
>Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 20:57:27 -0500
>
>Now... Try not to laugh, here...
>
>MMMGGGPPPFFFFFBWAHAHAHAHAHAHA!
>
>Heh... Yes, well... Sorry about that.
>
>Carry on.
>
>Cheers,
>RAH
>-------
>
><http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041201-114750-6381r>
>
>The Washington Times
>  www.washingtontimes.com
>
>Tenet calls for Internet security
>By Shaun Waterman
>UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
>Published December 2, 2004
>Former CIA Director George J. Tenet yesterday called for new security
>measures to guard against attacks on the United States that use the
>Internet, which he called "a potential Achilles' heel."
>      "I know that these actions will be controversial in this age when we
>still think the Internet is a free and open society with no control or
>accountability," he told an information-technology security conference in
>Washington, "but ultimately the Wild West must give way to governance and
>control."
>      The former CIA director said telecommunications -- and specifically
>the Internet -- are a back door through which terrorists and other enemies
>of the United States could attack the country, even though great strides
>have been made in securing the physical infrastructure.
>      The Internet "represents a potential Achilles' heel for our financial
>stability and physical security if the networks we are creating are not
>protected," Mr. Tenet said.
>      He said known adversaries, including "intelligence services, military
>organizations and non-state actors," are researching information attacks
>against the United States.
>      Within the federal government, the Department of Homeland Security 
>has
>the lead role in protecting the Internet from terrorism. But the
>department's head of cyber-security recently quit amid reports that he had
>clashed with his superiors.
>      Mr. Tenet, who retired in July as director of the CIA after seven
>years, warned that al Qaeda remains a sophisticated group, even though its
>first-tier leadership largely has been destroyed.
>      It is "undoubtedly mapping vulnerabilities and weaknesses in our
>telecommunications networks," he said.
>      Mr. Tenet pointed out that the modernization of key industries in the
>United States is making them more vulnerable by connecting them with an
>Internet that is open to attack.
>      The way the Internet was built might be part of the problem, he said.
>Its open architecture allows Web surfing, but that openness makes the
>system vulnerable, Mr. Tenet said.
>      Access to networks like the World Wide Web might need to be limited 
>to
>those who can show they take security seriously, he said.
>      Mr. Tenet called for industry to lead the way by "establishing and
>enforcing" security standards. Products need to be delivered to government
>and private-sector customers "with a new level of security and risk
>management already built in."
>      The national press, including United Press International (UPI), were
>excluded from yesterday's event, at Mr. Tenet's request, organizers said.
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec  3 08:50:35 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 11:50:35 -0500
Subject: Optical Tempest FAQ
In-Reply-To: <91981b3e041202223951424f68@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F63A4632A0F88542C75C489BB10@phx.gbl>

Well, the first one's a little "Hey this is scary give us some grant 
money"-ish. This has zero impact on real-world telecom systems in terms of 
detecting actual payloads BUT detecting some of the management channel info 
(via the external DS1 management channel) could actually matter in some 
cases.

I'm still waiting for someone to put a trojan into the telecom control 
channels causing them to randomly reprovision themselves. That could have an 
impact that far exceeds mere PR...

-TD

>From: Chris Kuethe <chris.kuethe at gmail.com>
>Reply-To: Chris Kuethe <chris.kuethe at gmail.com>
>To: die at dieconsulting.com
>CC: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>, sunder at sunder.net, 
>cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: Optical Tempest FAQ
>Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2004 23:39:33 -0700
>
>On Fri, 3 Dec 2004 01:01:57 -0500, Dave Emery <die at dieconsulting.com> 
>wrote:
> > ...
> >         In fact the greater hazard may sometimes be from red, yellow or
> > green LEDs on the front of equipment that are directly driven with
> > real data in order to allow troubleshooting - recovering data from one
> > of those at a distance using a good telescope may be possible and most
> > people don't think of the gentle flicker of the LED as carrying actual
> > information that could be intercepted.
>
>Like this classic. Was just as much fun to reread as it was the first time. 
>:)
>
>http://www.google.ca/search?q=cache:YdHPMAbPMeAJ:www.applied-math.org/optical_tempest.pdf+black+tape+over+modem+lights+tempest&hl=en&client=firefox
>http://www.applied-math.org/optical_tempest.pdf
>
>--
>GDB has a 'break' feature; why doesn't it have 'fix' too?




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec  3 08:53:16 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 11:53:16 -0500
Subject: A Plan for Liberty
Message-ID: <p0611043abdd64a5ebb09@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.theanarchistalternative.info/plan/>


A Plan for Liberty


 We yearn to experience a zero-government society (ZGS.) But how can we
cause it to happen?

 Opinions differ quite widely, and that suggests nobody really knows. Given
that it would be unique in human experience, that's unsurprising. Proposals
tend to group into four:

	1.  	 Enjoy life and do nothing, confident that eventually the State
will implode of its own accord, by the inexorable laws of economics
	2.  	 Work to reduce the State gradually, by any of a variety of means
such as political activism, tax and other resistance
	3.  	 Found a free society beyond a frontier, where no existing State
is operating
	4.  	 Educate opinion leaders, so that they will help us change our
existing society.

 I'm not convinced about #1, because the laws of economics have operated
for thousands of years but as far as we know have never yet caused a State
to implode. They did, it's true, pull the props from under the Soviet one,
but only because its leaders were so dumb as to flout them deliberately,
for the first time ever; other governments have been smart enough to allow
cows to live, in order to milk them. Thus, this option could involve a very
long wait.

 Option #2 is praiseworthy, but to my mind takes too little account of the
awesome power of government to close down any resistance as soon as it
shows promise of success. We're familiar with the political freeze-out, for
example; very skilfully, Libertarians are prevented from getting elected.
Those who lead tax revolts are silenced.

 Option #3 would be great, except that no frontiers exist any more, or not
on this Planet except for regions so barren and cold that normal life would
hardly be feasible. Additionally even if a ZGS were to prosper in
Antarctica, for example, what is to stop those States most shamed by its
success and appeal from nuking it out of existence? Fears of melted ice?

 Option #4 holds more promise, but so far has made very modest headway and
suffers from one flaw: no plan exists (to my knowledge) to bring about an
intellectual conversion of everyone in society - only of the leaders. The
usually-unspoken assumption is that once the elite sees the way to go, they
will take everyone else along; by force (eg by a majority-vote plebiscite)
if necessary. I have in the past made just such a proposal. Somehow,
though, that seems to sit ill with our self-ownership, no-force axiom.

 So this paper proposes a new and ambitious variation on Option 4:
universal re-education which will result in a fully anarchist America by
the year 2027. It rests upon the following assumptions:
	1.  	 All humans are rational, thus open to reasoned persuasion
	2.  	 The free market (market anarchism) is the only rational system
	3.  	 A thorough yet simple course can be designed, to teach such a
system on line
	4.  	 Once he understands it, every new anarchist will want to help
teach it to others
 Those assumptions should be checked. All are critical, but  here are
remarks about the first two.

The Nature of a ZGS
 A free society would consist only of people who wish to belong to it - who
transact with other people only by means of contracts they wish to make.

 Therefore, everyone - not just some - must be shown its virtues, and
desire them. Given that the first ZGS must occupy some geographic area
currently in control of a government, only two alternatives exist:

 (i) 100% of that population be re-educated so everyone volunteers, or

 (ii) Some volunteer and the rest are made to move out! - a step hardly
consistent with our nonagression axiom.

 I wondered about that possibility that a very small residue of ineducable
statists remained, intransigent. Must they be forced out? - I think not.
Nobody in the free society would (being well-educated) elect to trade with
them except under the terms of proper contracts, and so they would either
sign those contracts (to use somebody's road, for example, or to buy
someone's potatoes) or leave of their own accord. It would be possible to
live as a hermit with a veggie garden and no human interaction, but
statists are not made of such hardy stuff so I predict it would never
happen.

 So it seems to me our aim should be for 100%, and that is a new
proposition, a higher aim than anarchists have previously proposed.

 Society is Not an Onion
 It's often observed that a cultural or intellectual change needs to be
made by approaching society as if it were an onion; convert the outer (most
open-minded, leader-thinker) layer first, then peel off the next, and so on
until no further persuasion is possible. Certainly, we may suppose that
somewhere in there is to be found a hard, resistant core of government
junkies who would starve rather than work for their own living; and
certainly, everyday experience tells us that some listen better than others.

 However, a satisfactory plan for moving to a ZGS must involve everyone;
anything less will just not do. Therefore, it must not be limited to
converting just the outer "layers."

 The population concerned might occupy one existing State, such as Montana
or New Hampshire, or it might encompass the United States in total, or some
region of intermediate size; but given the FedGov's history of liquidating
States which secede, it seems to me we should aim for the lot. Then,
there'd be no nearby residual government strong enough to do any
liquidating.

 There, then, is the aim: to re-educate some 300 million Americans in a
time period short enough for most of us now living to enjoy the fruits of
success. How might it be done, given that pro-government interests control
almost all the means of communication?

 Universal Re-Education
 It's a tall order, indeed. 300 million students with a median IQ of 100,
to be helped to understand thoroughly that they are their own exclusive
self-owners, with inalienable rights. That they have absolute freedom to
make voluntary agreements with others but none at all to submit others to
their own will. That there are certain immutable principles of real-world
(Austrian) economics, that will operate to bring a vast range of
undreamed-of benefits. That there is no rational alternative to a free
market; that government and all its works are absolutely mythical,
absolutely irrational. And this inversion of 8 generations of government
brain-washing is to be accomplished in 2 or 3 decades. Isn't the "order" a
tad too tall?

 I dont think so (or I'd not be writing this) - primarily because I believe
that there really is no rational alternative to a free market; thus, since
humans are rational in the sense that we have the ability to reason
logically, once both the correct fundamental premises and the way
free-market concepts derive from them are patiently and properly spelled
out to him everyone will accept them. If the reader doubts that, let him
produce a rational alternative to the free market! and if my premise is
wrong that humans are rational at root, then abandon all hope and go drink
and make merry, for tomorrow we die.

 So consider: supposing an interactive course were put together, thoroughly
to cover the ground above, but simple enough for a 100-IQ person to master.
How long would the learning take, given strong motivation and well-focussed
attention?

 Experienced on-line educationalists are welcome to show otherwise, but I
suggest the answer is something between 100 and 1,000 hours of concentrated
study. An average of 500, perhaps; and if the motivation is strong enough
that means 100 days without 5 hours viewing government licenced television.
A third of a year, or two thirds for those with the fewest learning skills.

 Notice the two key prerequisites: a well-designed, interactive course and
a way systematically to motivate the students.

 I'm going to focus on the second of those, for I think there are quite a
number of articulate anarcho-capitalists who could design a course of that
caliber. I might even take a crack at it myself. Bear in mind: it's not an
Econ-PhD course we need here, but something Everyman can master.
Interactive, so that we can use the priceless advantage of the Internet
(and of CDs, lest government, in panic, close down our web site) - but with
some provision for the Unwired among us; a dwindling problem over a couple
of decades, but one that cannot be ignored. So, therefore...

 The Motivation
 Enormous numbers of students can be motivated to take and graduate from
this On Line Liberty School as follows: one at a time, by personal
recommendation and monitoring.

 The principle is far from new, though its vast implications may not have
been well counted: each person wishing to activate this Plan will set him-
or herself a personal target to...
 find ONE person per year who will agree to take the course and then do the
same; that is,
 to find one person per year who will agree to take the course and then do
the same.
 Such a personal objective is not at all burdensome. Some friendly
monitoring would be needed (to make sure the promise is kept, and to field
questions as they may arise) but the great bulk of the tuition would be
done by the automated on-line system with self-study.

 Notice: this process is one of education and replication. That's the whole
Plan.

 The intitial "selling" job may be the toughest part. One would have to
find a friend whose mind has not been riveted tight shut by government, and
present to him the enormous benefits that would come to him and his family
in a ZGS. He won't have to spend any money (or very little) but he will
have to invest a bunch of time, and so he'll need to be well sold on the
idea. And later, as a graduate, he will have to do such selling himself. It
may be necessary to approach several, and select the most willing for the
first year - and move on the the others in later years (I say "year"; some
will find it feasible to work much faster, but I want to stay conservative
here.)

 Notice, nothing in the Plan would commit the student to do anything,
except to learn and then sell and monitor, and of course to salivate for
the day when the theoretical society he is learning about will become a
reality. That's pretty close to what each of us is doing now. There would
be nothing like a "protest action" for him to take, or not until the end
stage (see below) when it would be very easy; no risk, no conflict.

 Now let's see how the numbers would work; and I'll assume that by mid-2005
one hundred of us agree to launch this venture and commence the first cycle
of education.

 By mid-2006, the 100 would have become 200 busy advocates for a ZGS. Then
400 by 2007. Then 800 by 2008 and 3,200 by 2010.

 Here's some of the rest of the progression:

 12,800
by 2012

204,800
by 2016

1.6 million
by 2019

26.2 million
by 2023

211 million
by 2026

 Some time during 2027, all 300 million will be converted, well-trained
believers in a ZGS and then (or more probably, progressively after 2025)
the "end stage" will take place. Hence: in just over two decades, well
within the life span of most of us now living, America will consist of 300
million anarchist "sleepers", ready to take peaceful action during...

 The End Stage
 Here's the fun bit: how does one predict a singularity? It's never
happened before in human history that a whole society wants it to have a
very different form, yet is living in the actual world of make-believe, ie
rule by government instead of voluntary contracts. Note, we are rightly
visualizing the whole of society with that desire; that's what the
education will have accomplished.

 Best I can tell, the entire apparatus of government will simply evaporate.
On a single day or during 2 or 3 years, who can say, it will simply cease
to exist. Why? Because there will no longer be anyone willing to work for
it. There will be a massive, unprecedented walk-out. There will be 80
million John Galts, each saying Take your government job and shove it. Take
your government school and turn it into a museum, for I'm going out to
learn something. Take your government Tax Mafia, I'm going to earn an
honest living - and a far better one.

 No violence, no bloodshed, no rioting or looting, not even an election.
Just history's most massive revolution, done with a whisper, with the
ancien rigime expiring like a punctured balloon.

 No doubt there will be a heap of mopping-up. How will all that real-estate
be re-titled? Who will acquire those millions of acres of "government"
land? How will the newly-free market evolve, fast enough to feed its
members through the first few weeks, as well as (easily) for the rest of
their lives? I don't have those answers. But if the end-stage is spread
over a year or two starting prior to 2027, as I think it may be, we'll
probably find out in time.

 Summary
The assumptions for this Plan to succeed are:
	1.  	 All humans are rational, thus open to reasoned persuasion
	2.  	 The free market (anarcho-capitalism) is the only rational system
	3.  	 A thorough yet simple course can be designed, to teach such a
system on line
	4.  	 Once he understands it, every new anarchist will want to help to
teach it to 1 per year
 The content of the on line course everyone will study has yet to be fixed
but it will include an introduction such as is now at  The Anarchist
Alternative with a particular stress on benefits, to help confirm the
student's decision to start. Graduates will have an adequate practical
understanding of philosophy, rights, ethics, and the nature of both
government and of life in a ZGS. It will be protected from government
sabotage and bypass completely its tight control over conventional
communication by being on the Internet for as long as feasible and then
upon CDs, distributed one-to-one via the government postal monopoly; hence
it will be entirely decentralized, with no one facility for a SWAT Team to
knock out. A version not requiring a PC will be developed and offered for
sale to the Unwired, though the on-line version would be free.

The spread of the knowledge will rely on 1-to-1 recommendation as explained
above and so nobody will have to introduce more than 23 others, at the rate
of one per year - nor to take any other action except to live a normal life
patiently until 2027.

 The result of executing this plan will be a zero-government America before
2028.

 I'm looking for volunteers. There's much to do in the next half-year; to
set up the course, iron out the wrinkles, anticipate and deal with the
objections.

 Will you join me?

Jim Davies
 November, 2004

 Feedback Form
To turn this Plan into reality, I need your advice. Please use this handy Form
to tell me what you think about it; what needs improvement, etc.

 Your Name:  Your Email Address:

 Do you share the objective of the Plan, ie to achieve a ZGS in America by
2027? Yes No

 Are the four assumptions above correct? Yes No

 If not, which are wrong and why?

 Is there any flaw in the logic I've built upon them, and if so what?

 What do you expect to be the main obstacles to overcome?

 Do you have any skills that might contribute to the creation of the
on-line School, and if so what?

 Would you be willing to donate them, during the next half-year? Yes No

 If all is in place as planned by mid-2005, will you undertake
 to find and monitor one friend per year through the School?  Yes No

 Please make any other comments that might help:




-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec  3 08:59:46 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 11:59:46 -0500
Subject: The Source of Hitler's Success
Message-ID: <p0611043cbdd64ae6dafb@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From chuckw at quantumlinux.com  Fri Dec  3 12:50:08 2004
From: chuckw at quantumlinux.com (Chuck Wolber)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 12:50:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Unintended Consequences
In-Reply-To: <1102096995.19995.5.camel@daft>
References: <41AFFA0C.49AAC2B0@cdc.gov> <1102096995.19995.5.camel@daft>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.60.0412031249230.16856@bailey.quantumlinux.com>

On Fri, 3 Dec 2004, Steve Furlong wrote:

> I also tried to get my wife to agree to a heroic name for our son. In 
> the tradition of Pericles and Sophocles, I present ... Testicles.

Similarly I preferred Falopia, and alas my wife was equally reticent.

-Chuck

-- 
http://www.quantumlinux.com 
 Quantum Linux Laboratories, LLC.
 ACCELERATING Business with Open Technology

 "The measure of the restoration lies in the extent to which we apply 
  social values more noble than mere monetary profit." - FDR




From sfurlong at acmenet.net  Fri Dec  3 10:03:15 2004
From: sfurlong at acmenet.net (Steve Furlong)
Date: 03 Dec 2004 13:03:15 -0500
Subject: Unintended Consequences
In-Reply-To: <41AFFA0C.49AAC2B0@cdc.gov>
References: <41AFFA0C.49AAC2B0@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <1102096995.19995.5.camel@daft>

On Fri, 2004-12-03 at 00:30, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> At 04:44 AM 12/2/04 -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> >John Ross' "Unintended Consequences" is a classic of the, um, gun
> culture,
> >:-) and a great read.
> 
> Made me want to name my first mulatto "Gonorreah" fer sure :-)

I tried, years before _UC_ came out, to get some friends to name their
daughter Chlamydia. They didn't know what the word meant, but for some
reason didn't trust my advice. Nor did they like Pudenda.

I also tried to get my wife to agree to a heroic name for our son. In
the tradition of Pericles and Sophocles, I present ... Testicles.

No, she didn't go for it.




From chuckw at quantumlinux.com  Fri Dec  3 13:08:55 2004
From: chuckw at quantumlinux.com (Chuck Wolber)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 13:08:55 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Unintended Consequences
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.60.0412031249230.16856@bailey.quantumlinux.com>
References: <41AFFA0C.49AAC2B0@cdc.gov> <1102096995.19995.5.camel@daft> 
  <Pine.LNX.4.60.0412031249230.16856@bailey.quantumlinux.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.60.0412031308410.16856@bailey.quantumlinux.com>

On Fri, 3 Dec 2004, Chuck Wolber wrote:

> On Fri, 3 Dec 2004, Steve Furlong wrote:
> 
> > I also tried to get my wife to agree to a heroic name for our son. In 
> > the tradition of Pericles and Sophocles, I present ... Testicles.
> 
> Similarly I preferred Falopia, and alas my wife was equally reticent.

s/Falopia/Fallopia/

-Chuck


-- 
http://www.quantumlinux.com 
 Quantum Linux Laboratories, LLC.
 ACCELERATING Business with Open Technology

 "The measure of the restoration lies in the extent to which we apply 
  social values more noble than mere monetary profit." - FDR




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec  3 10:42:37 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 13:42:37 -0500
Subject: They've Got Your Number
Message-ID: <p06110444bdd65e015527@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.12/phreakers_pr.html>

Wired 12.12:

They've Got Your Number 
 

 your text messages and address book, and a way to bug your calls. Why
spam, scams, and viruses are coming soon to a phone near you.

By Annalee NewitzPage 1 of 4 next ;


It's a beautiful afternoon in Shepherd's Bush, a bustling neighborhood on
the outskirts of London, and Adam Laurie is feeling peckish. Heading out of
the office, he's about to pick up more than a sandwich. As he walks, he'll
be probing every cell phone that comes within range of a hidden antenna he
has connected to the laptop in his bag. We stroll past a park near the Tube
station, then wander into a supermarket. Laurie contemplates which sort of
crisps to buy while his laptop quietly scans the 2.4-GHz frequency range
used by Bluetooth devices, probing the cell phones nestled in other
shoppers' pockets and purses.

Laurie, 42, the CSO of boutique security firm the Bunker, isn't going to
mess with anyone's phone, although he could: With just a few tweaks to the
scanning program his computer is running, Laurie could be crashing cell
phones all around him, cutting a little swath of telecommunications
destruction down the deli aisle. But today Laurie is just gathering data.
We are counting how many phones he can hack using Bluetooth, a wireless
protocol for syncing cell phones with headsets, computers, and other
devices.

We review the results of the expedition in a nearby pub. In the 17 minutes
we wandered around, Laurie's computer picked up signals from 39 phones. He
peers at his monitor for a while. "It takes only 15 seconds to suck down
somebody's address book, so we could have had a lot of those," he says at
last. "And at least five of these phones were vulnerable to an attack."

 The "attack" Laurie mentions so casually could mean almost anything - a
person using another person's cell to make long distance calls or changing
every phone number in his address book or even bugging his conversations.
There are, he says, "a whole range of new powers" available to the intrepid
phone marauder, including nasty viral attacks. A benign Bluetooth worm has
already been discovered circulating in Singapore, and Laurie thinks future
variants could be something really scary. Especially vulnerable are
Europeans who use their mobile phone to make micropayments - small
purchases that show up as charges on cell phone bills. A malicious virus
maker bent on a get-rich-quick scheme could take advantage of this feature
by issuing "reverse SMS" orders.

 Bluetooth security has become a pressing issue in Europe, where the
technology is ubiquitous. The problem will migrate to American shores as
the protocol catches on here, too. But in the long run, Bluetooth
vulnerabilities are manageable: Handset manufacturers can rewrite faulty
implementations, and cell phone users will learn to be more careful. A far
bigger security nightmare for the US is Internet telephony, which is fast
being adopted for large corporations and is available to consumers through
many broadband providers. Voice over IP is, by design, hacker-friendly. No
enterprising criminals have dreamed up a million-dollar scam exploiting
VoIP technology yet. But when they do, it likely won't be something a
simple patch can fix.

 Bluetooth hacking is technically very different from VoIP hacking, but
they're both surging for the same basic reason. Increasingly, telephones
have become indistinguishable from computers, which makes them more useful,
but also more vulnerable. VoIP, which routes calls over the Internet, gives
users the power to port their phone number anywhere, package voice messages
into MP3s and receive them as emails, and make cheap international calls.
Yet VoIP, like Bluetooth, exposes your telephone to the same ills that
regularly befall a desktop box - worms, spam, crashes.

 "It's not like we've fixed the vulnerabilities on computers," says
security expert Bruce Schneier, author of Secrets and Lies: Digital
Security in a Networked World. "The phone network used to get its security
from being closed, but VoIP phones will be just as bad as computers."

Many of today's hacks work because the traditional phone system was built
on the premise that only large, monopolistic phone companies would be using
it, and they would all play by the same rules. But the network isn't the
telcos' private sandbox anymore; it can be manipulated and controlled by
anybody who understands basic computer networking. The people who know this
best are a new generation of phone hackers - aka phreakers - who aren't
interested in following the rules. They're busy ripping apart the latest
phones to discover what can make them turn against their owners. As the
phone companies and handset makers lumber along, we can only hope that the
phreaks in white hats figure out some fixes before the blackhats move in
for the kill.

 Laurie, whose laptop is now packed with information from vulnerable cell
phones in the Shepherd's Bush, has become infamous in Britain for
conducting a similar experiment in the House of Parliament, where he had
the opportunity (which he didn't take) to copy the address books and
calendars of several prominent politicians. That excursion resulted in a
mandate that all Bluetooth devices be turned off in the House of Parliament.

 As the inventor of "bluesnarfing," a hack that uses Bluetooth to peek at
data stored on cell phones, Laurie is dedicated to publicizing the danger
of a wide-open Bluetooth connection. A bluesnarf attack can identify an
unprotected phone and copy its entire address book, calendar, photos, and
any other information that happens to be inside. Using a bluesnarf program,
a phreak can also crash any phone within range by using Bluetooth to
broadcast what Laurie calls "a corrupted message."

Bluesnarf was born after Laurie scrutinized the code running some Bluetooth
headsets his staff was using. He wasn't happy with what he found. "Gaping
security holes," he says with a frown. Rebuffed by the cell phone companies
to which he reported the problems, he conceived of bluesnarf as a publicity
stunt, a tool that would dramatize the danger of owning these phones.

 Compounding Bluetooth's technical vulnerabilities are problems with the
way people use it. Most folks leave Bluetooth on all the time, often
because they don't bother to learn how to turn it off. Even tech-savvy
types tend to keep their connections open. "People have heard about
'toothing,' where strangers send each other flirtatious messages via
Bluetooth," he says. Hoping to get toothed, they risk an entirely different
kind of penetration.


 The risk doesn't end with snarfing. Another way to use Bluetooth to hijack
a phone completely is bluebugging, and Laurie gives me a quick demo. He
runs the bluebug software on his laptop, and it quickly locates an Ericsson
t610 phone he's set on the table between us (not all phones can be
bluebugged, but this model can). His computer connects to the phone and
takes it over, remotely. Tapping the keyboard, Laurie sends the t610 a
command to ring up the phone on his belt. It bleeps. He answers. We've got
a bluebug.

Invented by Austrian researcher Martin Herfurt earlier this year,
bluebugging is the perfect weapon for corporate spies. Let's say you and I
are competing for a big contract with an oil company. I want to hear
everything that happens in your meeting with the VP of Massive Oil Inc., so
I hire a blackhat phreak to take over your cell phone. Once he's bluebugged
it, I tell him to have your mobile call mine. The phone that's sitting in
your jacket pocket is now picking up everything you and the VP say during
your conversation, and I can hear the prices you're quoting as clear as a
bell on my own phone. "A cell phone is the ultimate well-engineered bugging
device," Laurie says.

 Unlike bluesnarfers, who need only some gear and know-how, the bluebugger
first has to get your cell phone to pair with his computer, establishing a
"trusted" data link. Laurie explains one crafty way to make this happen.
"You just say, 'Gee, that's a cool phone, can I see it?'Punch a few buttons
to establish the pairing, and hand it back." As soon as the pairing is
complete, the bluebugger can commandeer every aspect of the phone. He can
initiate calls, send SMS messages, even overwrite the address book and
contacts list.

 Laurie's revelation is disturbing, but the fact that phreakers need to
approach and interact with their intended targets significantly cuts down
on the number of victims. Yet British security consultant Ollie Whitehouse,
whose Bluetooth-hunting program Redfang has made him a celebrity among
phreakers, describes another a way to bluebug - a method that doesn't
demand the eavesdropper come into physical contact with the target's phone.
In this case, the trick is to sniff the data traffic traveling to and from
a Bluetooth phone when it's pairing with another device, like a headset.
Armed with this information, an attacker can bluebug the phone by
pretending to be the trusted device with which it regularly networks.

Cell phone companies argue that bluesnarfing and bluebugging are minor
threats because Bluetooth is designed to work only over short distances, 20
feet or less, requiring attackers to be close to their targets.

 Enter the Bluetooth sniper rifle. Made from $200 worth of off-the-shelf
parts, the sniper is a Bluetooth antenna optimized for long-distance use.
It can send and receive faint signals at more than a thousand yards. With
the sniper - or a wireless weapon like it - bluesnarfers and bluebuggers no
longer have to be in the same room as their targets. "By smashing any
notion that distance is an issue," says 24-year-old inventor Jon Hering, a
student at the University of Southern California, "we showed that
bluebugging is a real-world threat."

Surely the phone companies must be doing something to protect us from all
this. Keith Nowak, a spokesperson at Nokia, suggests "just turning off
Bluetooth - or switching into hidden mode."

 Whitehouse laughs at that advice. Redfang, his signature phreak tool, is
specifically designed to find Bluetooth devices in hidden mode. And given
that so few people actually do turn off Bluetooth, their phones are
susceptible to countless hacks - ones that Hering's sniper rifle could
launch from half a mile away.

 The Default Radio boys, rock stars in the phreak underground, are onstage
at DefCon, the venerable hacker conference that's sort of a cross between
the Ozzfest mosh pit and an after-hours party for NSA agents. Wearing
baseball caps, T-shirts, and baggy jeans, the boys are doing a live version
of their phreak-friendly streaming-audio talk show. The long table in front
of them is covered with telephone equipment and computers.

 A Defaulter using the nom de phreak Lucky225 steps up to the mike. With a
phone tucked between his ear and shoulder and the keyboard under his
fingers, he looks like a cross between a DJ and a telephone line repairman.

 Lucky regales the audience with a tale about his favorite VoIP hack: He
can make a VoIP phone display whatever caller ID number he chooses. To
prove his point, he tells us he can impersonate "Jenny," the girl from the
pop song by Tommy Tutone.

 Earsplitting static issues from the speakers, and suddenly we hear a
thunderous dial tone. Lucky has routed his VoIP phone through the sound
system. He dials MCI's caller ID readback line, a service that identifies
whatever number you're calling from. A robotic voice slowly intones Lucky's
number: "eight-six-seven-five" - the crowd erupts, screams of laughter
mingling with groans - "three-zero-nine."

Having demonstrated his power over caller ID, Lucky proceeds to tell the
phreak-packed auditorium how he spoofed the number. Turns out the whole
thing is a social hack. A few days before, he called his service provider,
Vonage, and told them he wanted to port all his cell phone calls to the
Internet phone connected to his computer. His cell number is 867 5309, he
lied, and Vonage believed him. Now it's rerouting all calls made to Jenny
on the Vonage network to Lucky.

 Naturally, Vonage also set the caller ID on Lucky's VoIP phone to Jenny's
number - so any time he dials out, it looks like he's calling from 867
5309. A lot of systems depend on receiving accurate caller ID - credit
card-activation lines, voicemail systems, even 911. So being able to
control what a called party sees after you dial can be a potent weapon.
Armed with your caller ID, an identity thief could order a new ATM card,
activate it over the phone, and use it to empty your bank account. And,
given that many voicemail boxes will play their contents to any phone with
the right caller ID, you could be opening up your private life to anyone
with a Vonage phone.


 After the show, I ask Lucky why he got into the phreak scene. "Well,"
Lucky deadpans, sketching out plans for a network of cans and rubber bands,
"I wanted to start this elastic-based phone system " He's a prankster, but
with a purpose - to make clear to the public that VoIP is a privacy
nightmare. "Yup," he concludes, still pondering voice over elastic, "I
think this tin can shit is really going to take off."

Steve Wozniak, the Apple computer pioneer whose phreak days began in the
1970s, says pranks are what it's all about. "Those of us who have the
phreaker mentality see playing with the world as fun, but in these times
it's hard for people to see us as harmless."

 Maybe so, but Vonage doesn't seem too concerned. When I contact the
company later to find out whether they know about Lucky's caller ID trick
and what they are doing to stop it, executive VP Louis Holder admits
they're not doing anything. "We allow people to do what he did," Holder
says. "We give people a temporary phone number before we verify it with the
phone company, and verification takes a couple of weeks. Somebody could
pick the White House number and pretend to be the president."

 Today's phreaks have the power to crash the phone system - but they also
have the power to rebuild it. Lucky's joke about creating his own network
out of tin cans and rubber bands isn't that far from the truth. Slestak, Da
Beave, and GiD are the crew behind Florida-based Telephreak.org, a free
VoIP service that they've built to run on a roll-your-own, open source
private branch exchange (PBX) system called Asterisk.

 Typically used by businesses, a PBX consists of computers that route calls
between what amounts to a phone intranet and the public telephone system. A
company using a PBX might pay for 100 lines that service 500 employees,
linking callers to the outside world, voicemail, or conferences by
dynamically connecting phone calls using whichever landlines are open. In
the past, all these connections would be managed by the phone company or a
proprietary, closed black box in the server room. But with Asterisk,
there's no need for the phone company to manage your lines anymore. You can
do it yourself.

The Telephreak crew has created its own private phone company for
themselves and their friends - one that never sends a bill. Dial an access
line to check voicemail, create conference calls, forward calls to other
phones, even get a new number. And never pay a cent.

Currently, there are several hundred voicemail accounts, and the system can
handle a hundred simultaneous calls. Although the Telephreak crew has to
pay for connectivity to Ma Bell, the amount is so negligible that they're
willing to eat the money. It's a small price to pay for freedom.

I'm talking to them on a Telephreak conference call, and the sound is a
little fuzzy. Beave, identifiable by his slight southern twang, tells me
he's working on ironing out the bugs. It's a little strange to know someone
is manipulating your phone connection while talking to you. Suddenly, the
sound is perfect. We've been rerouted. Slestak's voice comes in loud and
clear: "My connection to you guys right now is going across a cordless
phone with a box to the server, then to Telephreak. My dial tone is coming
from the West Coast."

One of the best things about building your own PBX is that you can do what
Slestak calls "chemistry experiments" with the phone system. Some PBX
phreakers, like Telediablo, even provide a caller ID spoofing service: With
it, there's no need to lie to Vonage - you simply call up Telediablo's PBX,
plug in the number you want to use as your caller ID, then dial the party
you want to trick. When I try out his little hack, I pick the number 666
6666. Next, I key in a nearby friend's number. It rings. My friend shows me
his caller ID window: Now I feel like a phreak. Instead of displaying my
number, his phone is displaying the devil's digits.

 There are other PBX tricks - like caller ID unmasking, which can sometimes
reveal the actual phone number of a caller, regardless of whether they've
paid to have their number blocked. So if you think you're anonymous on the
telephone system, think again.

 Probably the most unsettling discovery made by whitehat phreakers is that
VoIP providers and wireless companies are willing to peddle phones and
services that they know perfectly well are vulnerable to all kinds of
attacks. After several months of bad publicity in the UK, where Laurie and
Whitehouse are based, the cell phone companies are responding. Nokia and
Sony Ericsson have issued patches, and Motorola says that its security
flaws have been fixed in the newer models. And upstart VoIP provider Skype
is marketing built-in encryption. Meanwhile, the Bluetooth Consortium - a
group of industry leaders, including Nokia and Sony Ericsson, whose
products incorporate Bluetooth - focused explicitly on security at its
UnPlugFest in Germany last month. At the meeting, security experts
(including Laurie) rated each company's phones in terms of their resistance
to common attacks. Still, nobody is tracking bluesnarf or bluebug attacks
to measure the extent of the problem - nobody but the whitehat phreaks
themselves.

Whitehouse has written a program he calls Sweet Tooth that can detect the
signature radio signals sent by bluesnarfers. Modeled on honeypot programs
that law enforcement and security analysts use to detect hackers on the
Internet, Sweet Tooth could provide accurate statistics on how prevalent
bluesnarf attacks really are. The program is ready for action, says
Whitehouse. The question now is whether law enforcement and the phone
companies will actually deploy it, however. Ignoring the problem is not
going to make it better - especially because phone hacking is only going to
get easier.

Bluetooth phreaking is just the beginning. The holes will get patched, but
the problem won't go away, because all the tools that hackers have spent
decades developing will now be repurposed to hijack your phone.
Next-generation handsets will have three entry points for the blackhats: If
a snarfer can't suck down your data with Bluetooth, he'll try your Wi-Fi
port, and if that doesn't work, infrared.

 "I guess that's the price you pay for convergence," Whitehouse says.

--------
The Great Cell Phone Robbery

How security flaws in today's mobile phones could add up to tomorrow's
perfect crime.

 Step 1: Approach
A virus-spreader enters Heathrow Airport toting a briefcase with a laptop
and an external antenna. The rig can sniff Bluetooth signals from up to 20
feet away - and with just a bit of hacking, it can be modified to send and
receive signals over much greater distances.

Step 2: Discover
Using a program like bluesnarf, the laptop automatically finds Bluetooth
phones with firmware vulnerable to remote takeover. This process is
completed in less than 15 seconds.

Step 3: Take over
The laptop sends a program to all the vulnerable phones. Disguised as a
game or a marketing promotion, the program is really a Trojan horse hiding
a nasty virus. Once the user launches it, the virus hijacks the phone's
operating system, taking over basic functions like dialing and messaging.

Step 4: Propagate
The target phone is now infected, and it reacts by broadcasting the virus
to other vulnerable Bluetooth phones within 20 feet. Within minutes,
thousands of phones can be infected.

Step 5: Steal
Commandeering the phones' SMS system, the virus uses a popular European
micropayment system called reverse SMS to transfer 10 euros from each phone
to a temporary account in Estonia. The virus requests the transfer and
stays in control until it can confirm the order. The account is closed long
before any user sees the charge reflected on the monthly bill.
Annalee Newitz (annalee at techsploitation.com), a policy analyst at the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, wrote about dating optimizers in issue
12.06.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec  3 11:37:05 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 14:37:05 -0500
Subject: Quantum memory for light
Message-ID: <p06110449bdd66757869b@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.physorg.com/news2227.html>

PhysOrg

 Nano and Quantum Physics Technology Applied Physics Space and Earth
science Electronic Devices Striking Research and Developments

Quantum memory for light

December 03, 2004


Realization of quantum memory for light allows the extension of quantum
communication far beyond 100 km

In the macroscopic classical world, it is possible to copy information from
one device into another. We do this everyday, when, for example, we copy
files in a computer or we tape a conversation. In the microscopic world,
however, it is not possible to copy the quantum information from one system
into another one. It can only be transferred, without leaving any trace on
the original one. The manipulation and transfer of quantum information is,
in fact, a very active field of research in physics and informatics, since
it is the basis of all the protocols and algorithms in the fields of
quantum communication and computation, which may revolutionize the world of
information. In the work published in Nature, November 25, 2004, scientists
from the Max Planck Institute for Quantum Optics in Garching and the Niels
Bohr Institute in Copenhagen have proposed a scheme to transfer the quantum
state of a pulse of light onto a set of atoms and have demonstrated it
experimentally.
------    
 Image: Experimental set-up: Atomic memory unit consisting of two caesium
cells inside magnetic shields 1 and 2. The path of the recorded and
read-out light pulses is shown with arrows. (Max Planck Institute of
Quantum Optics / Niels Bohr Institute Copenhagen)
-----
In the experiment, a pulse of light is prepared in a certain quantum state
whose properties (polarization) are randomly chosen. Then, the light is
sent through a set of atoms which are contained in a small transparent box
(an atomic cell) at room temperature. In the cell, the light and atoms
interact with each other, giving rise to an "entangled" state in which the
two systems remain correlated. After abandoning the atomic sample, the
pulse of light is detected. Due to the fact that the light and atoms are
entangled, the process of measurement on the light affects the quantum
state of the atoms in such a way that they acquire the original properties
of the light. In this way, the state of polarization of the photons is
transferred into the polarization state of the atoms. This "action at a
distance", in which by performing a measurement on a system it affects the
state of another system which is at a different location is one of the most
intriguing manifestations of Quantum Mechanics, and is the basis of
applications such as quantum cryptography or phenomena like teleportation.

In order to check that the transfer of polarization has indeed taken place,
the researcher measured the polarization of the atoms at the beginning of
the experiment and compared it with the original state of polarization of
the light. In the experiment, these two polarizations coincided up to a 70%
of the time. The main reason for the imperfections where the due to
spontaneous emission, a process in which the atoms absorb the photons but
then emit them in a different direction such that they do not go towards
the photo-detector.

A question that the authors of the paper had to carefully analyze was to
what extent 70% percent of coincidence is enough to claim that the process
was successful. Or, in other words, could they obtain the same result by
measuring the state of polarization of the photons and then preparing the
state of the atoms accordingly? The answer is no. Due to the basic
properties of quantum mechanics, the state of polarization of a laser pulse
cannot be fully detected. Due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, it
is impossible to measure the full polarization exactly. In fact, as some of
the authors together with K. Hammerer and M. Wolf (from the Max Planck
Institute of Quantum Optics) have recently shown, the best one can do using
this latter method would be 50%. This implies that the experiment indeed
has successfully demonstrated the transfer beyond what one could do without
creating the entangled state.

The current experiment paves the way for new experiments in which the
information contained in light can be mapped onto atomic clusters and then
back into the light again. In this way, one could not only store the state
of light in an atomic clusters, but also retrieve it. This process will be
necessary if we want to build quantum repeaters, that is, devices which
will allow the extension of quantum communication far beyond the distances
(of the order of 100 km) which are achieved nowadays.
 Original work:

B. Julsgaard, J. Sherson, J.I. Cirac, J. Fiuras
ek, und E.S. Polzik
Experimental demonstration of quantum memory for light
Nature 432, 482 (2004)

Source: Max Planck Institute


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec  3 15:02:30 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 18:02:30 -0500
Subject: Aide takes blame for tax return provision
Message-ID: <p06110403bdd6a0c16d5a@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20041203-124037-3201r.htm>

The Washington Times

  Aide takes blame for tax return provision

 Washington, DC, Dec. 3 (UPI) -- Language in the omnibus spending bill
giving congressional staff access to U.S. tax returns was inserted by a
mid-level aide, not a member of Congress.

 Richard Efford, a 19-year veteran of the House Appropriations Committee
staff, said he was responsible for the controversial provision, which
critics characterized as an invasion of privacy.

 Efford said he did not consult with Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman
Ernest Istook, R-Okla., before including the language, which he said was
simply an attempt to give committee staff the authority to enter Internal
Revenue Service facilities to inspect how taxpayer funds were being used.
He said the genesis of the provision was the IRS' objection to his request
to visit a tax return processing facility. "They said if someone's return
was up on a computer screen and you glanced at it there would be a release
of taxpayer information," a breach of privacy laws the IRS could not
accept, Efford told the Washington Post.

 The provision's existence became known just hours before a vote on the
spending package. It set off an uproar that led congressional leaders to
hold off on sending the bill to the president's desk until the provision
could be struck from the bill.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec  3 15:48:55 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 18:48:55 -0500
Subject: Liquidnet: "Anonymous" institutional transactions
Message-ID: <p06110424bdd6ab99f7f1@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.liquidnet.com/company/>



	 	The Company

	 	 Why Use Liquidnet

	 	 Membership

	 	 News and Stats

	 	 Careers
	 	Contact Us
About Liquidnet :: Senior Management :: Board of Directors :: Liquidnet Europe


Liquidnet is successfully redefining institutional trading.

Launched in April 2001, Liquidnet was built exclusively for institutional
trading. After only three years, we are now ranked as one of the top 14
largest NYSE institutional brokers and the 15th largest NASDAQ broker*
respectively. The Liquidnet global community has grown to represent more
than $6.8 trillion in equity assets under management.

Liquidnet's unique model brings natural buyers and sellers together and
enables them to anonymously negotiate trades among each other, without
intermediaries or information leaks. Liquidnet's institutional Members
trade large blocks of small-, mid- and large-cap stocks easily, efficiently
and with little to no market impact costs. The result is the
industry-leading average execution size of more than 42,000 shares since
inception, with 50% of all executions done at the mid-point and 92% done
within the spread.

 Liquidnet, Inc. is a registered broker/dealer, headquartered in New York
City. Liquidnet Europe Limited is regulated by the Financial Services
Authority and is headquartered in London.

* Based on Plexus Group analysis (03Q3 - 04Q2)
 November 29, 1999
Liquidnet Holdings, Inc. founded

January 10, 2000
Liquidnet, Inc. founded

April 10, 2001
Liquidnet launches in the United States with 38 Member firms

April 16, 2001
Liquidnet completes first week of trading with an average execution size of
86,000 shares

June 12, 2001
Liquidnet Europe Ltd. founded

October 23, 2001
Liquidnet executes its 500-millionth share

March 8, 2002
Liquidnet signs first European Member

April 4, 2002
Liquidnet executes its one-billionth share

June 3, 2002
100th Member firm goes live

August 2002
Liquidnet recognized by Plexus Group as one of the largest institutional
brokers for NYSE-listed stocks

November 2002
 Liquidnet recognized by Plexus Group as one of the largest institutional
brokers for NASDAQ stocks

November 20, 2002
 Liquidnet Europe launches, providing fund managers with access to six
global markets - UK, French, German, Swiss, Dutch and US

 December 31, 2002
 Liquidnet ends year with 136 live Members and completes strongest quarter
to date, executing 426 million shares

January 30, 2003
 Liquidnet executes its two-billionth share

October 14, 2003
 Liquidnet executes its largest single US equities trade to date -- 2.83
million shares.

November, 2003
 Liquidnet ranked as the 5th and 10th least expensive trading venue for
NYSE and Nasdaq stocks, respectively, by Elkins/McSherry.

 December 16, 2003
 Value traded in Liquidnet since inception reaches $100 billion.

 December 22, 2003
 Liquidnet breaks its single day record for US volume, executing nearly
29.5 million shares.

 January, 2004
 Liquidnet ranked as one of the Top 20 largest NYSE brokers in the Plexus
Group universe of 1,500 brokers.

 January 21, 2004


July 29, 2004

October 21, 2004

 

Liquidnet breaks its single day record for US volume, executing more than
30 million shares.

 Liquidnet brings anonymous block trading to Canada

Liquidnet Honored as the 5th Fastest Growing Private Company in America by
INC. MAGAZINE and THE fastest growing private Financial Services company.

  

 


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Fri Dec  3 01:21:35 2004
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2004 22:21:35 +1300
Subject: Anti-RFID outfit deflates Mexican VeriChip hype
In-Reply-To: <p0611046dbdd38e436843@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <E1Ca9d9-000640-00@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>

"R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> forwarded:

>"Promoting implanted RFID devices as a security measure is downright 'loco,'"
>says Katherine Albrecht. "Advertising you've got a chip in your arm that
>opens important doors is an invitation to kidnapping and mutilation."

Since kidnapping is sort of an unofficial national sport in Mexico (or at
least Mexico City), this is particularly apropos.  An implanted RFID seems to
be just asking for an "express kidnap", something more traditionally used to
get money from ATMs.

Peter.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sat Dec  4 07:24:33 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 2004 10:24:33 -0500
Subject: Liquidnet: "Anonymous" institutional transactions
In-Reply-To: <p06110424bdd6ab99f7f1@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F40B04A08853E22CE97FE7E9BB20@phx.gbl>

Holy Shit!

I point I made back in the May days was that a Blacknet able to accept 
anonymous trades would really have a major impact on the business world. 
Imagine getting early wind of some acquisition and then you could start 
trading on that? That would eliminate a lot of the bullshit 'arbitrage' such 
deals are often made out of, based on the rest of the world not knowing. For 
the deal to make sense, it could only survive on the basis of really being 
accretive to both companies.

This can't possibly be too anonymous, though. But one wonders if clever 
endpoints might be able to augment Liquidnet's own anonymity a bit!

-TD

>From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net, cryptography at metzdowd.com
>Subject: Liquidnet: "Anonymous" institutional transactions
>Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2004 18:48:55 -0500
>
><http://www.liquidnet.com/company/>
>
>
>
>	 	The Company
>
>	 	 Why Use Liquidnet
>
>	 	 Membership
>
>	 	 News and Stats
>
>	 	 Careers
>	 	Contact Us
>About Liquidnet :: Senior Management :: Board of Directors :: Liquidnet 
>Europe
>
>
>Liquidnet is successfully redefining institutional trading.
>
>Launched in April 2001, Liquidnet was built exclusively for institutional
>trading. After only three years, we are now ranked as one of the top 14
>largest NYSE institutional brokers and the 15th largest NASDAQ broker*
>respectively. The Liquidnet global community has grown to represent more
>than $6.8 trillion in equity assets under management.
>
>Liquidnet's unique model brings natural buyers and sellers together and
>enables them to anonymously negotiate trades among each other, without
>intermediaries or information leaks. Liquidnet's institutional Members
>trade large blocks of small-, mid- and large-cap stocks easily, efficiently
>and with little to no market impact costs. The result is the
>industry-leading average execution size of more than 42,000 shares since
>inception, with 50% of all executions done at the mid-point and 92% done
>within the spread.
>
>  Liquidnet, Inc. is a registered broker/dealer, headquartered in New York
>City. Liquidnet Europe Limited is regulated by the Financial Services
>Authority and is headquartered in London.
>
>* Based on Plexus Group analysis (03Q3 - 04Q2)
>  November 29, 1999
>Liquidnet Holdings, Inc. founded
>
>January 10, 2000
>Liquidnet, Inc. founded
>
>April 10, 2001
>Liquidnet launches in the United States with 38 Member firms
>
>April 16, 2001
>Liquidnet completes first week of trading with an average execution size of
>86,000 shares
>
>June 12, 2001
>Liquidnet Europe Ltd. founded
>
>October 23, 2001
>Liquidnet executes its 500-millionth share
>
>March 8, 2002
>Liquidnet signs first European Member
>
>April 4, 2002
>Liquidnet executes its one-billionth share
>
>June 3, 2002
>100th Member firm goes live
>
>August 2002
>Liquidnet recognized by Plexus Group as one of the largest institutional
>brokers for NYSE-listed stocks
>
>November 2002
>  Liquidnet recognized by Plexus Group as one of the largest institutional
>brokers for NASDAQ stocks
>
>November 20, 2002
>  Liquidnet Europe launches, providing fund managers with access to six
>global markets - UK, French, German, Swiss, Dutch and US
>
>  December 31, 2002
>  Liquidnet ends year with 136 live Members and completes strongest quarter
>to date, executing 426 million shares
>
>January 30, 2003
>  Liquidnet executes its two-billionth share
>
>October 14, 2003
>  Liquidnet executes its largest single US equities trade to date -- 2.83
>million shares.
>
>November, 2003
>  Liquidnet ranked as the 5th and 10th least expensive trading venue for
>NYSE and Nasdaq stocks, respectively, by Elkins/McSherry.
>
>  December 16, 2003
>  Value traded in Liquidnet since inception reaches $100 billion.
>
>  December 22, 2003
>  Liquidnet breaks its single day record for US volume, executing nearly
>29.5 million shares.
>
>  January, 2004
>  Liquidnet ranked as one of the Top 20 largest NYSE brokers in the Plexus
>Group universe of 1,500 brokers.
>
>  January 21, 2004
>
>
>July 29, 2004
>
>October 21, 2004
>
>
>
>Liquidnet breaks its single day record for US volume, executing more than
>30 million shares.
>
>  Liquidnet brings anonymous block trading to Canada
>
>Liquidnet Honored as the 5th Fastest Growing Private Company in America by
>INC. MAGAZINE and THE fastest growing private Financial Services company.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From roberte at ripnet.com  Sat Dec  4 14:07:43 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 2004 17:07:43 -0500
Subject: Immediate Exception
Message-ID: <41B2352F.7000702@ripnet.com>

Observe the subtle balance of the moment

 

Be aware of danger in short term bias, hyberbolic discounting and 
cognitive priming.

Understand that each and every thing we know  is framed by others 
expectations and fears

 

 

We are, each of us,in our diversity and self doubts

only stuff that matters. Our view from the nexus

of personal tangles and the social alienation in which we become ourselves

cannot be generalized away.There is no average, no scalar at all

We are all, each single one of us, much more than words

and more many, than one

 

Be kind to yourself, but never forget you're kind

 

Other people are the only reason for anything

So give not into the temptation of abstract authority

For the rule following consequence

 is misery and death

Cooperation is always needful work

For as surly as civilization trumps ideology,

the top down view is mortally flawed

Not only is the illusion deceiving

it degrades us all

 

Always know when to resort to chaos

To keep the rules dynamic

 

Our competency is orthodox

But our freedom is escape

>From the tyranny of rules

 

Methodology enables Analysis

Abstractions enable Truth

But the beauty of life

Is the immediate exception




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec  4 15:03:16 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 2004 18:03:16 -0500
Subject: Immediate Exception
In-Reply-To: <41B2352F.7000702@ripnet.com>
References: <41B2352F.7000702@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <p0611047abdd7f26a92c1@[66.149.49.5]>

At 5:07 PM -0500 12/4/04, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
>Be kind to yourself, but never forget you're kind

You're a fluke of the universe, and while your standing there looking
stupid, the universe is laughing behind your back...

Or something.

Cheers,
R.A. (Bob) Hettinga
Slack!!!!

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From roberte at ripnet.com  Sat Dec  4 15:24:20 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 2004 18:24:20 -0500
Subject: Immediate Exception
In-Reply-To: <p0611047abdd7f26a92c1@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <41B2352F.7000702@ripnet.com>
  <p0611047abdd7f26a92c1@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <41B24724.7020609@ripnet.com>

R.A. Hettinga wrote:

>At 5:07 PM -0500 12/4/04, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
>  
>
>>Be kind to yourself, but never forget you're kind
>>    
>>
>
>You're a fluke of the universe, and while your standing there looking
>stupid, the universe is laughing behind your back...
>
>Or something.
>
>Cheers,
>R.A. (Bob) Hettinga
>Slack!!!!
>
>  
>
Paranoia is our biological endowment, but rationality sounds like a good 
idea.
I''d dismiss the possibility that the universe exists for the express 
purpose of confounding me.
The practical logistics for  faking the coherrent correlations that 
inform me would entail a workload that exceedes my  concidered threat model

-- bob.




From roberte at ripnet.com  Sat Dec  4 15:42:01 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 2004 18:42:01 -0500
Subject: Word
Message-ID: <41B24B49.1060408@ripnet.com>

word

You want me to say what I mean.

You expect me to not waste your time, but you dont know why I am here yet.

So I tell you that I am here to show you something interesting in words.

You can be sure that I'm only talking about words and not about things 
that matter. You know the difference, between words and things that 
matter, just like I do.

Sometimes when people get to using fancy words, they forget the 
difference. Between you and me - we'll speak plainly - the country needs 
more clarity, 'cause we cant afford to forget what matters.

We may not agree on much, but I'm certain that you really do see how 
there's stuff that matters. I respect you for this. No doubt we can 
agree that it's frustrating at times, to talk with smart asses who lack 
this common sense.

Maybe you haven't felt like knocking some sense into this sort of fool, 
but I bet you know what I mean. Like the saying goes, you can lead a 
horse to water, but you cant make him talk plain.

So I've been thinking that maybe I can take a crack at translating their 
alien thinking, some of their "expert" science and philosophy mumbo 
jumbo to real talk. The Lord knows, we cant hope to make sense of all 
the babble. If you can give me a bit more of your time, I do believe 
that I can hook you up with a practical explanation for why those brainy 
idiots keep going on and on. They get themselves all worked up to a 
dizzy, trying to talk sense. Maybe we can do better.

Wish me luck!

--bob




From sfurlong at acmenet.net  Sat Dec  4 16:46:53 2004
From: sfurlong at acmenet.net (Steve Furlong)
Date: 04 Dec 2004 19:46:53 -0500
Subject: Immediate Exception
In-Reply-To: <41B24724.7020609@ripnet.com>
References: <41B2352F.7000702@ripnet.com> 	
  <p0611047abdd7f26a92c1@[66.149.49.5]>  <41B24724.7020609@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <1102207613.19995.1298.camel@daft>

On Sat, 2004-12-04 at 18:24, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
> I''d dismiss the possibility that the universe exists for the express 
> purpose of confounding me.

Much evidence to the contrary. My life is sucking pretty bad lately, due
to either a long series of fairly unlikely and uniformly unpleasant
coincidences or else the machinations of a malevolent universe set up
specifically to piss me off. Another possibility is that suggested by
the other RAH, the cosmology which presents all of us as mere characters
in the stories told by Authors, the multifarious and nefarious gods.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sat Dec  4 17:33:09 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 2004 20:33:09 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <41B24B49.1060408@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F378DBE15A7B0AA8A96A0FC9BB30@phx.gbl>

I thought JR "Bob" Dobbs got beamed up to that comet with those LA Koolaid 
kooks...
-TD



>From: "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Word
>Date: Sat, 04 Dec 2004 18:42:01 -0500
>
>word
>
>You want me to say what I mean.
>
>You expect me to not waste your time, but you dont know why I am here yet.
>
>So I tell you that I am here to show you something interesting in words.
>
>You can be sure that I'm only talking about words and not about things that 
>matter. You know the difference, between words and things that matter, just 
>like I do.
>
>Sometimes when people get to using fancy words, they forget the difference. 
>Between you and me - we'll speak plainly - the country needs more clarity, 
>'cause we cant afford to forget what matters.
>
>We may not agree on much, but I'm certain that you really do see how 
>there's stuff that matters. I respect you for this. No doubt we can agree 
>that it's frustrating at times, to talk with smart asses who lack this 
>common sense.
>
>Maybe you haven't felt like knocking some sense into this sort of fool, but 
>I bet you know what I mean. Like the saying goes, you can lead a horse to 
>water, but you cant make him talk plain.
>
>So I've been thinking that maybe I can take a crack at translating their 
>alien thinking, some of their "expert" science and philosophy mumbo jumbo 
>to real talk. The Lord knows, we cant hope to make sense of all the babble. 
>If you can give me a bit more of your time, I do believe that I can hook 
>you up with a practical explanation for why those brainy idiots keep going 
>on and on. They get themselves all worked up to a dizzy, trying to talk 
>sense. Maybe we can do better.
>
>Wish me luck!
>
>--bob




From roberte at ripnet.com  Sat Dec  4 17:42:34 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 2004 20:42:34 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F378DBE15A7B0AA8A96A0FC9BB30@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F378DBE15A7B0AA8A96A0FC9BB30@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <41B2678A.2040308@ripnet.com>

Bobhood is never a light burden, as I'm sure RAH can attest

--bob



Tyler Durden wrote:

>
> I thought JR "Bob" Dobbs got beamed up to that comet with those LA 
> Koolaid kooks...
> -TD
>
>
>
>> From: "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com>
>> To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>> Subject: Word
>> Date: Sat, 04 Dec 2004 18:42:01 -0500
>>
>> word
>>
>> You want me to say what I mean.
>>
>> You expect me to not waste your time, but you dont know why I am 
>> here yet.
>>
>> So I tell you that I am here to show you something interesting in words.
>>
>> You can be sure that I'm only talking about words and not about 
>> things that matter. You know the difference, between words and things 
>> that matter, just like I do.
>>
>> Sometimes when people get to using fancy words, they forget the 
>> difference. Between you and me - we'll speak plainly - the country 
>> needs more clarity, 'cause we cant afford to forget what matters.
>>
>> We may not agree on much, but I'm certain that you really do see how 
>> there's stuff that matters. I respect you for this. No doubt we can 
>> agree that it's frustrating at times, to talk with smart asses who 
>> lack this common sense.
>>
>> Maybe you haven't felt like knocking some sense into this sort of 
>> fool, but I bet you know what I mean. Like the saying goes, you can 
>> lead a horse to water, but you cant make him talk plain.
>>
>> So I've been thinking that maybe I can take a crack at translating 
>> their alien thinking, some of their "expert" science and philosophy 
>> mumbo jumbo to real talk. The Lord knows, we cant hope to make sense 
>> of all the babble. If you can give me a bit more of your time, I do 
>> believe that I can hook you up with a practical explanation for why 
>> those brainy idiots keep going on and on. They get themselves all 
>> worked up to a dizzy, trying to talk sense. Maybe we can do better.
>>
>> Wish me luck!
>>
>> --bob




From sfurlong at acmenet.net  Sat Dec  4 20:15:43 2004
From: sfurlong at acmenet.net (Steve Furlong)
Date: 04 Dec 2004 23:15:43 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <41B2678A.2040308@ripnet.com>
References: <BAY24-F378DBE15A7B0AA8A96A0FC9BB30@phx.gbl> 	
  <41B2678A.2040308@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <1102220142.19995.1409.camel@daft>

On Sat, 2004-12-04 at 20:42, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
> Bobhood is never a light burden, as I'm sure RAH can attest

Bobbittization would make the burden lighter. 




From njohnsn at njohnsn.com  Sun Dec  5 06:06:24 2004
From: njohnsn at njohnsn.com (Neil Johnson)
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 2004 08:06:24 -0600
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <41B31131.5010608@ripnet.com>
References: <BAY24-F378DBE15A7B0AA8A96A0FC9BB30@phx.gbl> 	
  <41B2678A.2040308@ripnet.com> <1102220142.19995.1409.camel@daft> 	
  <41B31131.5010608@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <1102255584.27138.0.camel@njohnsn.com>

On Sun, 2004-12-05 at 08:46 -0500, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:

> To be bobbed is never the goal, 
> but bobless fear steers the undifferentiated bob
> along conventional paths,
> to the abattoir


Where is Tim May when when you need him? :-)




From roberte at ripnet.com  Sun Dec  5 05:46:25 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 2004 08:46:25 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <1102220142.19995.1409.camel@daft>
References: <BAY24-F378DBE15A7B0AA8A96A0FC9BB30@phx.gbl>	
  <41B2678A.2040308@ripnet.com> <1102220142.19995.1409.camel@daft>
Message-ID: <41B31131.5010608@ripnet.com>

Steve Furlong wrote:

>On Sat, 2004-12-04 at 20:42, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
>  
>
>>Bobhood is never a light burden, as I'm sure RAH can attest
>>    
>>
>
>Bobbittization would make the burden lighter. 
>
>
>
>  
>
To be bobbed is never the goal, 
but bobless fear steers the undifferentiated bob
along conventional paths,
to the abattoir




From roberte at ripnet.com  Sun Dec  5 06:14:53 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 2004 09:14:53 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <1102255584.27138.0.camel@njohnsn.com>
References: <BAY24-F378DBE15A7B0AA8A96A0FC9BB30@phx.gbl>	
  <41B2678A.2040308@ripnet.com> <1102220142.19995.1409.camel@daft>	
  <41B31131.5010608@ripnet.com> <1102255584.27138.0.camel@njohnsn.com>
Message-ID: <41B317DD.7080200@ripnet.com>

Neil Johnson wrote:

>On Sun, 2004-12-05 at 08:46 -0500, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
>
>  
>
>>To be bobbed is never the goal, 
>>but bobless fear steers the undifferentiated bob
>>along conventional paths,
>>to the abattoir
>>    
>>
>
>
>Where is Tim May when when you need him? :-)
>
>
>  
>
Probably busy in his hilltop bunker
fiddling with prion generators
..cpunks write code




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec  5 06:30:20 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2004 09:30:20 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <1102255584.27138.0.camel@njohnsn.com>
References: <BAY24-F378DBE15A7B0AA8A96A0FC9BB30@phx.gbl> 	  
  <41B2678A.2040308@ripnet.com> <1102220142.19995.1409.camel@daft> 	  
  <41B31131.5010608@ripnet.com> <1102255584.27138.0.camel@njohnsn.com>
Message-ID: <p0611048cbdd8cbac7f40@[66.149.49.5]>

At 8:06 AM -0600 12/5/04, Neil Johnson wrote:
>Where is Tim May when when you need him? :-)

Nah, this is mere Younglish wierdness.

You have to talk about useless eaters to be totally mayified...

Cheers,
RAH
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"When I was your age we didn't have Tim May! We had to be paranoid
on our own! And we were grateful!" --Alan Olsen




From roberte at ripnet.com  Sun Dec  5 06:41:13 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 2004 09:41:13 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <p0611048cbdd8cbac7f40@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <BAY24-F378DBE15A7B0AA8A96A0FC9BB30@phx.gbl> 	 
  <41B2678A.2040308@ripnet.com> <1102220142.19995.1409.camel@daft> 	 
  <41B31131.5010608@ripnet.com> <1102255584.27138.0.camel@njohnsn.com>
  <p0611048cbdd8cbac7f40@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <41B31E09.2020507@ripnet.com>

R.A. Hettinga wrote:

>At 8:06 AM -0600 12/5/04, Neil Johnson wrote:
>  
>
>>Where is Tim May when when you need him? :-)
>>    
>>
>
>Nah, this is mere Younglish wierdness.
>
>You have to talk about useless eaters to be totally mayified...
>
>Cheers,
>RAH
>  
>
John would warn you about the organ cuts
Tim would rave about the sizzle stake
I'm just scoping out the meat-eye view through the grinder.

--bob
of mad cow metephors




From sfurlong at acmenet.net  Sun Dec  5 06:55:50 2004
From: sfurlong at acmenet.net (Steve Furlong)
Date: 05 Dec 2004 09:55:50 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <p0611048cbdd8cbac7f40@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <BAY24-F378DBE15A7B0AA8A96A0FC9BB30@phx.gbl> 	
  <41B2678A.2040308@ripnet.com> <1102220142.19995.1409.camel@daft> 	
  <41B31131.5010608@ripnet.com> <1102255584.27138.0.camel@njohnsn.com> 	
  <p0611048cbdd8cbac7f40@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <1102258550.19995.2052.camel@daft>

On Sun, 2004-12-05 at 09:30, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> At 8:06 AM -0600 12/5/04, Neil Johnson wrote:
> >Where is Tim May when when you need him? :-)
> 
> Nah, this is mere Younglish wierdness.
> 
> You have to talk about useless eaters to be totally mayified...

Random racist ranting is also required. There are some racist assholes
currently posting on cpunks, but none have quite the May flavor.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sun Dec  5 11:31:37 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 2004 14:31:37 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...RAHWEH
In-Reply-To: <1102258550.19995.2052.camel@daft>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F1CF2B4BBBDA691A1E851A9BB30@phx.gbl>

>Random racist ranting is also required. There are some racist assholes
>currently posting on cpunks, but none have quite the May flavor.

Yes, in comparison with May they are basically poseurs.

Oh, and in light of the Bob conversation, shouldn't we be describing 'RAH' 
(a Bob) as 'RAHWEH'?

-TD




From measl at mfn.org  Sun Dec  5 15:33:47 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2004 17:33:47 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <p061104a4bdd943849643@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <ce3333f65cabf9f802bad18d454da57a@dizum.com> 
  <p061104a4bdd943849643@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20041205173202.T9416@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sun, 5 Dec 2004, R.A. Hettinga wrote:

> At 6:20 PM +0100 12/5/04, Nomen Nescio wrote:
> >PROMIS
>
> Beat that horse, scraped it off the floor, sent it to the glue factory.
>
> Seven or Eight times. Musta had kin.

And all of them were related to a guy who had a habit of holding $7,000.00
ashtrays on TV.  A certain Proxmire IIRC?


> However, all you have to do is drop that acronym around here, and, sooner
> or later, like buzzards to a shitwagon,


That should have been buzzWORDS to a shitwagon.


> all the usual suspects will come
> home to roost.
>
> To beat a metaphor like a, heh, dead horse...

PROMIS's yet unkept.


> Cheers,
> RAH
> Who goes to Eliot Richardson's old church. When he ran for governor on the
> republican ticket, the boys from Southie made up a bumpersticker that said
> "Vote for Eliot, he's better than you". :-)

They were right too.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec  5 15:07:08 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2004 18:07:08 -0500
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <ce3333f65cabf9f802bad18d454da57a@dizum.com>
References: <ce3333f65cabf9f802bad18d454da57a@dizum.com>
Message-ID: <p061104a4bdd943849643@[66.149.49.5]>

At 6:20 PM +0100 12/5/04, Nomen Nescio wrote:
>PROMIS

Beat that horse, scraped it off the floor, sent it to the glue factory.

Seven or Eight times. Musta had kin.

However, all you have to do is drop that acronym around here, and, sooner
or later, like buzzards to a shitwagon, all the usual suspects will come
home to roost.

To beat a metaphor like a, heh, dead horse...

Cheers,
RAH
Who goes to Eliot Richardson's old church. When he ran for governor on the
republican ticket, the boys from Southie made up a bumpersticker that said
"Vote for Eliot, he's better than you". :-)
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From nobody at dizum.com  Sun Dec  5 09:20:02 2004
From: nobody at dizum.com (Nomen Nescio)
Date: Sun,  5 Dec 2004 18:20:02 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
Message-ID: <ce3333f65cabf9f802bad18d454da57a@dizum.com>

I read a few old email messages I had and stumbled over some
interesting material relating to NSA, CIA and one Michael
Riconosciuto among other things.

I followed up on the info and did some surfing on the subject and got
quite interested. I also did some searches in my cypherpunk mail
folder and got no hits. Surely this must have been up in the list?
Can someone give me some links please? There were also some talk
about some PROMIS software somewhere and modifications being made to
illegally obtained copies of proprietary software. This software was
then sold by the US gov to be able to spy on Canadian authoritites.
Is this also true?

I found the below text saved here locally, if I'm correctly informed
Mr. Michael Riconosciuto went to jail for this affidavit. Can someone
verify if this really is true. (It sounds bizarre but maybe this can
happen in Amerika?)

I am told that Michael Riconosciuto has been diagnosed with prostate
cancer and many delays in diagnosis and treatment have occurred and
people say it's becaus the US gov wants him dead because he knows too
much.

It's also rumoured that he never received a fair trial and that two
of his lawyers were murdered. Because the US government does not
admit anything about PROMIS he has been relegated as a nut and
serious efforts to isolate him have been going on for more than a
decade.


A friend of mine sent me this info on the case:

> Michael Riconosciuto was asked by Bill Hamilton, the proprietor of
> Promis, to sign an affidavit about his alterations to the
> software. A week before he signed, Michael was threatened. There
> had already been deaths around him and Michael informed his family
> that he was about to be murdered or jailed and that whatever the
> family was going to be told about him, it wasn't true, he was being
> framed for telling the truth. A week after signing the affidavit,
> Michael ended up in jail on fraudulent charges of running a drug
> lab.  


Can someone give me some more info on this?


Thank you 






AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL J. RICONOSCIUTO
  		The INSLAW CASE: AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL J. RICONOSCIUTO

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

In Re:
INSLAW, INC., Debtor.
CASE NO. 85-00070
(Chapter 11)
________________________________
INSLAW, INC., Plaintiff
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Defendants.
CASE NO. 85-00070
Adversary Proceeding
NO. 86-0069

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL J. RICONOSCIUTO

STATE OF WASHINGTON)                                   

I, MICHAEL J. RICONOSCIUTO, being duly sworn, do hereby state as
follows:

1. During the early 1980's, I served as the Director of Research for
a joint venture between the Wackenhut Corporation of Coral Gables,
Florida, and the Cabazon Band of Indians in Indio, California. The
joint venture was located on the Cabazon reservation.

2. The Wackenhut-Cabazon joint venture sought to develop and/or
manufacture certain materials that are used in military and national
security operations, including night vision goggles, machine guns,
fuel-air explosives, and biological and chemical warfare weapons.

EXHIBIT 1

3. The Cabazon Band of Indians are a sovereign nation. The sovereign
immunity that is accorded the Cabazons as a consequence of this fact
made it feasible to pursue on the reservation the development and/or
manufacture of materials whose development or manufacture would be
subject to stringent controls off the reservation. As a minority
group, the Cabazon Indians also provided the Wackenhut Corporation
with an enhanced ability to obtain federal contracts through the 8A
Set Aside Program, and in connection with Government-owned
contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities.

4. The Wackenhut-Cabazon joint venture was intended to support the
needs of a number of foreign governments and forces, including forces
and governments in Central America and the Middle East. The Contras
in Nicaragua represented one of the most important priorities for the
joint venture.

5. The Wackenhut-Cabazon joint venture maintained close liaison with
certain elements of the United States Government, including
representatives of intelligence, military and law enforcement
agencies.

6. Among the frequent visitors to the Wackenhut-Cabazon joint venture
were Peter Videnieks of the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington,
D.C., and a close associate of Videnieks by the name of Earl W.
Brian. Brian is a private businessman who lives in Maryland and who
has maintained close business ties with the U.S. intelligence
community for many years.

7. In connection with my work for Wackenhut, I engaged in some
software development and modification work in 1983 and 1984 on the
proprietary PROMIS computer software product. The copy of PROMIS on
which I worked came from the Department of Justice. Earl W. Brian
made it available to me through Wackenhut after acquiring it from
Peter Videnieks, who was then a Department of Justice contracting
official with responsibility for the PROMIS software. I performed the
modifications to PROMIS in Indio, California; Silver Spring,
Maryland; and Miami, Florida.

8. The purpose of the PROMIS software modifications that I made in
1983 and 1984 was to support a plan for the implementation of PROMIS
in law enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide. Earl W. Brian
was spearheading the plan for this worldwide use of the PROMIS
computer software.

9. Some of the modifications that I made were specifically designed
to facilitate the implementation of PROMIS within two agencies of 
the Government of Canada: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS). Earl W.
Brian would check with me from time to time to make certain that the
work would be completed in time to satisfy the schedule for the RCMP
and CSIS implementations of PROMIS.

10. The proprietary versions of PROMIS, as modified by me, was, in
fact, implemented in both the RCMP and the CSIS in Canada. It was my
understanding that Earl W. Brian had sold this version of PROMIS to
the Government of Canada.

11. In February 1991, I had a telephone conversation with Peter
Videnieks, then still employed by the U.S. Department of Justice.
Videnieks attempted during this telephone conversation to persuade me
not to cooperate with an independent investigation of the
government's piracy of INSLAW's proprietary PROMIS software being
conducted by the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of
Representatives.

12. Videnieks stated that I would be rewarded for a decision not to
cooperate with the House Judiciary Committee investigation. Videnieks
forecasted an immediate and favorable resolution of a protracted
child custody dispute being prosecuted against my wife by her former
husband, if I were to decide not to cooperate with the House
Judiciary Committee investigation.

13. Videnieks also outlined specific punishments that I could expect
to receive from the U.S. Department of Justice if I cooperate with
the House Judiciary Committee's investigation.

14. One punishment that Videnieks outlined was the future inclusion
of me and my father in a criminal prosecution of certain business
associates of mine in Orange County, California, in connection with
the operation of a savings and loan institution in Orange County. By
way of underscoring his power to influence such decisions at the U.S.
Department of Justice, Videnieks informed me of the indictment of
these business associates prior to the time when that  indictment was
unsealed and made public.

15. Another punishment that Videnieks threatened against me if I
cooperate with the House Judiciary Commitee [sic] is prosecution by
the U.S. Department of Justice for perjury. Videnieks warned me that
credible witnesses would come forward to contradict any damaging
claims that I made in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee,
and that I would subsequently be prosecuted for perjury by the U.S.
Department of Justice for my testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

[Signed]: Michael J. Riconosciuto

Signed and sworn to before me this 21st day of March, 1991.
John M. Rosellini
Notary Public
My Commission Expires: Sept 19, 1993




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Sun Dec  5 16:03:07 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2004 19:03:07 -0500 (EST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <1102255584.27138.0.camel@njohnsn.com>
Message-ID: <20041206000307.93617.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- Neil Johnson <njohnsn at njohnsn.com> wrote: 
> On Sun, 2004-12-05 at 08:46 -0500, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
> 
> > To be bobbed is never the goal, 
> > but bobless fear steers the undifferentiated bob
> > along conventional paths,
> > to the abattoir
> 
> 
> Where is Tim May when when you need him? :-)

Tuning the output stage of his useless eater welfare-mutant oven, in all
probability.  I think he wants to avoid criticisms from the
environmentalists by way of making sure his machinery conforms to Kyoto
Protocol expectations.


Bonus question:

Who is the author of the origin question that inspired the copycats?


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec  5 16:37:50 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2004 19:37:50 -0500
Subject: Retinal Scans, DNA Samples to Return to Fallujah
Message-ID: <p061104cebdd959b2c973@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2004/12/05/returning_fallujans_will_face_clampdown?mode=PF>

The Boston Globe


 US Marines rode in a convoy through Fallujah on Friday. The US military is
continuing missions to secure the city.  (AFP Photo / Mehdi Fedouach)

Returning Fallujans will face clampdown

By Anne Barnard, Globe Staff  |  December 5, 2004

FALLUJAH, Iraq -- The US military is drawing up plans to keep insurgents
from regaining control of this battle-scarred city, but returning residents
may find that the measures make Fallujah look more like a police state than
the democracy they have been promised.

Under the plans, troops would funnel Fallujans to so-called citizen
processing centers on the outskirts of the city to compile a database of
their identities through DNA testing and retina scans. Residents would
receive badges displaying their home addresses that they must wear at all
times. Buses would ferry them into the city, where cars, the deadliest tool
of suicide bombers, would be banned.

Marine commanders working in unheated, war-damaged downtown buildings are
hammering out the details of their paradoxical task: Bring back the 300,000
residents in time for January elections without letting in insurgents, even
though many Fallujans were among the fighters who ruled the city until the
US assault drove them out in November, and many others cooperated with
fighters out of conviction or fear.

One idea that has stirred debate among Marine officers would require all
men to work, for pay, in military-style battalions. Depending on their
skills, they would be assigned jobs in construction, waterworks, or
rubble-clearing platoons.

"You have to say, 'Here are the rules,' and you are firm and fair. That
radiates stability," said Lieutenant Colonel Dave Bellon, intelligence
officer for the First Regimental Combat Team, the Marine regiment that took
the western half of Fallujah during the US assault and expects to be based
downtown for some time.

Bellon asserted that previous attempts to win trust from Iraqis suspicious
of US intentions had telegraphed weakness by asking, " 'What are your
needs? What are your emotional needs?' All this Oprah [stuff]," he said.
"They want to figure out who the dominant tribe is and say, 'I'm with you.'
We need to be the benevolent, dominant tribe.

"They're never going to like us," he added, echoing other Marine commanders
who cautioned against raising hopes that Fallujans would warmly welcome
troops when they return to ruined houses and rubble-strewn streets. The
goal, Bellon said, is "mutual respect."

Most Fallujans have not heard about the US plans. But for some people in a
city that has long opposed the occupation, any presence of the Americans,
and the restrictions they bring, feels threatening.

"When the insurgents were here, we felt safe," said Ammar Ahmed, 19, a
biology student at Anbar University. "At least I could move freely in the
city; now I cannot."

A model cityUS commanders and Iraqi leaders have declared their intention
to make Fallujah a "model city," where they can maintain the security that
has eluded them elsewhere. They also want to avoid a repeat -- on a smaller
scale -- of what happened after the invasion of Iraq, when a quick US
victory gave way to a disorganized reconstruction program thwarted by
insurgent violence and intimidation.

To accomplish those goals, they think they will have to use coercive
measures allowed under martial law imposed last month by Prime Minister
Iyad Allawi.

"It's the Iraqi interim government that's coming up with all these ideas,"
Major General Richard Natonski, who commanded the Fallujah assault and
oversees its reconstruction, said of the plans for identity badges and work
brigades.

But US officers in Fallujah say that the Iraqi government's involvement has
been less than hoped for, and that determining how to bring the city safely
back to life falls largely on their shoulders.

"I think our expectations have been too high for a nascent government to be
perfectly organized" and ready for such a complex task, Colonel Mike Shupp,
the regimental commander, said at his headquarters in downtown Fallujah.

While one senior Marine said he fantasized last month that Allawi would
ride a bulldozer into Fallujah, the prime minister has come no closer than
the US military base outside the city.

The Iraqi Interior Ministry has not delivered the 1,200 police officers it
had promised, although the Defense Ministry has provided troops on
schedule, US officials said. Iraqi ministry officials have visited the
city, but delegations have often failed to show up. US officials say that
is partly out of fear of ongoing fighting that sends tank and machine-gun
fire echoing through the streets.

Meanwhile, the large-scale return of residents to a city where only Humvees
and dogs travel freely will make military operations as well as
reconstruction a lot harder. The military must start letting people in, one
neighborhood at a time, within weeks if Fallujans are to register for
national elections before the end of January. The government insists the
elections will proceed as scheduled despite widespread violence.

The Marines say several hundred civilians are hunkered down in houses or at
a few mosques being used as humanitarian centers. In the western half of
the city, civilians have not been allowed to move about unescorted. In the
eastern half, controlled by another regiment, they were allowed out a few
hours a day until men waving a white flag shot and killed two Marines.

"The clock is ticking. Civilians are coming soon," Lieutenant Colonel
Leonard DiFrancisci told his men one recent evening as they warmed
themselves by a kerosene heater in the ramshackle building they
commandeered as a headquarters. "It's going to get a lot more difficult.
We've had a little honeymoon period."

A tall order If DiFrancisci's experience dealing with a small delegation of
Iraqi aid workers is any indication, sorting out civilians from insurgents
in large numbers will be overwhelming.

One afternoon last week, DiFrancisci, a reservist from Melbourne, Fla., and
a mechanical engineer, was ordered to escort workers from the Iraqi Red
Crescent Society out of the city on their way back to Baghdad. The Red
Crescent, an equivalent to the Red Cross, had been butting heads for days
with Marines who initially denied the aid organization entry to the city,
insisting the military was taking care of civilians' needs. The society
finally won a Marine escort in and refused to leave, setting up in an
abandoned house.

Dr. Said Hakki, the group's president, met DiFrancisci and Lieutenant
Colonel Gary Montgomery at a mosque, eager to mend fences. "We want to play
by your rules," Hakki said.

Montgomery agreed that Marines would ferry a group of aid workers to
Baghdad, along with several women and children who had been rescued from
houses. But when the Humvees pulled up to the Red Crescent house, scores of
young men who had taken refuge there were milling around the streets. There
was no way to tell whether they were fighters.

"All these military-age males are out during curfew," Montgomery told
Hakki. "If you all don't follow the rules, you're going to get people
killed."

Tensions rose when about a dozen women and children started climbing into
ambulances for the ride to Baghdad. One man tried to get in, gave the
Marines who challenged him several versions of his age, then decided not to
go rather than discuss it further.

Suhad Molah, a young woman in a veil that showed only her eyes, was
indignant that a translator said she might be Syrian because of her accent,
implying she was the wife of a foreign fighter.

"I am Iraqi," she said, adding that she and her children had been trapped
in their house for weeks.

The Marines were also suspicious when more than a dozen men, not the
handful they expected, said they were Red Crescent staff members headed
back to Baghdad. Some had no identification, and there was no way to verify
whether they were the same men who had come out from Baghdad.

"This is not a 'muj' rescue service," DiFrancisci said, using slang for
mujahideen, or holy warriors. Montgomery remarked, "The real negotiations
start after you've agreed on something."

The Marines let the men go after Hakki vouched for them, but not before the
Iraqis grew angry that their motives had been questioned. The convoy headed
onto the highway, but only after a dozen Marines had spent two hours
organizing and searching the vehicles. Back at their headquarters, the team
debated the procedure for allowing civilians to return. Major Wade Weems
warned that there should be a set number per day so that a backlog would
not form behind the retina-scanning machine, fueling resentment.

When they heard of the proposal to require men to work, some Marines were
skeptical that an angry public would work effectively if coerced. Others
said the plan was based on US tactics that worked in postwar Germany.
DiFrancisci said he would wait for more details. "There's something to be
said for a firm hand," he said.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sun Dec  5 17:58:18 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 2004 20:58:18 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <20041206000307.93617.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F40D3A1F2DB06D480AD3BFA9BB40@phx.gbl>

>Bonus question:
>
>Who is the author of the origin question that inspired the copycats?

Well, I remember May posting it but I don't think he was the ultimate 
author. I suspect whoever posted it recently in fact dug it out of the 
archives and re-posted it, a particularly lame maneuver if so.

OR...perhaps ole' May is gettin' a little lonely out there!

-TD




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Sun Dec  5 17:58:30 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2004 20:58:30 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <ce3333f65cabf9f802bad18d454da57a@dizum.com>
Message-ID: <20041206015830.5830.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- Nomen Nescio <nobody at dizum.com> wrote: 
> I read a few old email messages I had and stumbled over some
> interesting material relating to NSA, CIA and one Michael
> Riconosciuto among other things.
> [PROMIS]

Does anyone here have a good idea of what the PROMIS code actuall does;
what its characteristics and capabilities are in terms of its function as
an aid to intellegence analysts, logistics technicians, or consultants?

I've only read vague hints and rumours concerning its implicit design
philosophy and architecture from the rare instances where it is mentioned
at all.  Yes, he code is probably classified (blah, blah, blah), but its
actual use must reveal its purpose and function to some degree.  And sure,
we know that feds and other ne'er-do-wells have a bug up their ass about
revealing sources and methods (unlike the public, who have no practical
option in that regard) so any information that does leak is bound to be
sketchy, but surely there must be _some_ accurate data available
concerning its nature, especially considering the fact that it has been
under development for two or three decades.


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From measl at mfn.org  Sun Dec  5 19:16:53 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2004 21:16:53 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <20041206015830.5830.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20041206015830.5830.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20041205211434.Y13412@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sun, 5 Dec 2004, Steve Thompson wrote:

> Does anyone here have a good idea of what the PROMIS code actuall does;
> what its characteristics and capabilities are in terms of its function as
> an aid to intellegence analysts, logistics technicians, or consultants?

We had a PROMIS system on our 370 something (168?) back in '81 - ran under
SPF/TSO [MVS] IIRC?  I always assumed the two were loosely related - I
believe it was an early and crude relational DB implementation.  But who
the hell really knows?

>

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From njohnsn at njohnsn.com  Sun Dec  5 19:52:52 2004
From: njohnsn at njohnsn.com (Neil Johnson)
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 2004 21:52:52 -0600
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <20041206015830.5830.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20041206015830.5830.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <1102305172.27835.16.camel@njohnsn.com>

On Sun, 2004-12-05 at 20:58 -0500, Steve Thompson wrote:
> I've only read vague hints and rumours concerning its implicit design
> philosophy and architecture from the rare instances where it is mentioned
> at all.  Yes, he code is probably classified (blah, blah, blah), but its
> actual use must reveal its purpose and function to some degree.  And sure,
> we know that feds and other ne'er-do-wells have a bug up their ass about
> revealing sources and methods (unlike the public, who have no practical
> option in that regard) so any information that does leak is bound to be
> sketchy, but surely there must be _some_ accurate data available
> concerning its nature, especially considering the fact that it has been
> under development for two or three decades.

Yes, I have found that puzzling too.

Articles I have read refer to the original version being "in the public
domain". You'd think the source code would be "out there" somewhere.

The least "Tin Foil Hat (TM)" version of the story I found is at Wired

http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1.01/inslaw.html

Which gives this description:

"Designed as case-management software for federal prosecutors, PROMIS
has the ability to combine disparate databases, and to track people by
their involvement with the legal system. Hamilton and others now claim
that the DOJ has modified PROMIS to monitor intelligence operations,
agents and targets, instead of legal cases."

I find the claims made about this software (it's ability to reconcile
data from many different sources "automagically" ) pretty vague and
frankly, a little far fetched, based on what I know about software,
databases, etc.

(And that's not even including the "modifications" supposedly made to
install a TEMPEST back door in later versions).

-Neil




From njohnsn at njohnsn.com  Sun Dec  5 19:57:05 2004
From: njohnsn at njohnsn.com (Neil Johnson)
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 2004 21:57:05 -0600
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <20041206015830.5830.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20041206015830.5830.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <1102305425.27835.20.camel@njohnsn.com>

One the claims I have problems with (from the WIRED article):

But the real power of PROMIS, according to Hamilton, is that with a
staggering 570,000 lines of computer code, PROMIS can integrate
innumerable databases without requiring any reprogramming.

If this were true, I can guarantee that there would lots of companies
clamoring for it.

-Neil




From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Sun Dec  5 01:00:44 2004
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 2004 22:00:44 +1300
Subject: Unintended Consequences
In-Reply-To: <1102096995.19995.5.camel@daft>
Message-ID: <E1CasG4-0007sj-00@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>

Steve Furlong <sfurlong at acmenet.net> writes:

>I tried, years before _UC_ came out, to get some friends to name their
>daughter Chlamydia. They didn't know what the word meant, but for some reason
>didn't trust my advice. Nor did they like Pudenda.

One of the characters in Hercules Returns is called Labia, and lives in the
town of Chlamydia.  There are a number of other characters with similar names.

Peter.




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Sun Dec  5 22:22:42 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 2004 22:22:42 -0800
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <20041205211434.Y13412@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <20041206015830.5830.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com> 
  <20041205211434.Y13412@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20041205215922.03bbed80@pop.idiom.com>

>On Sun, 5 Dec 2004, Steve Thompson wrote:
> > Does anyone here have a good idea of what the PROMIS code actuall does;
> > what its characteristics and capabilities are in terms of its function as
> > an aid to intellegence analysts, logistics technicians, or consultants?

At 07:16 PM 12/5/2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:

>We had a PROMIS system on our 370 something (168?) back in '81 - ran under
>SPF/TSO [MVS] IIRC?  I always assumed the two were loosely related - I
>believe it was an early and crude relational DB implementation.  But who
>the hell really knows?

There are several different issues related to PROMIS
0 - What size tinfoil hat do you need?
         (It's probably still worth being paranoid about Echelon,
         but PROMIS is old hat...)
1 - Feds or somebody basically pirated their copy of the software,
         back when most mainframe software was expensive,
         and drove the company into bankruptcy rather than pay up,
         and they spent a lot of effort covering up their ripoff,
         possibly including the murder of a journalist.
2 - What are the basic capabilities of the software?
         I think Alif's got it about right, and remember that
         back in the early 80s, Codd & Date had written some really cool
         theory about how relational databases could and should work,
         but most computers didn't have the horsepower for them and
         the early implementations were mostly either crude or bloated.
         Also, mainframe software tended to be very customized,
         particularly if it had to interconnect with other mainframe software
         like somebody else's non-relational database with a different schema.
3 - What sets of data were the various spooks, feds, and staties
         _keeping_ in their databases, and how much of it did they
         share with each other or get from various other sources?

If you worked with databases back in the early 80s, remember that
a gigabyte of disk used to be pretty big, rather than wristwatch-sized,
and a megabyte of RAM was big and cost non-trivial amounts of money,
and magnetic tapes held less than 200MB and took tens of minutes to read,
and big database projects typically required departments of
dozens or hundreds of workers to spend months of budgeting and planning to
design schemas and processes that could take months to run,
instead of being ad-hoc queries any random employee can run on their desktop
over lunchtime if they feel like it, and might be able to run
on their pocket computer when riding home on the subway.

My department's ~1983 VAX had a 1 MIPS CPU, a gig of removable disk,
4MB RAM, and two tape drives, and cost about $400K.
It wasn't big iron - that was typically an order of magnitude bigger.
These days, $400 will get you a 3000 MIPS CPU, a gig of RAM,
and 100-200GB disk, and database software is free.

It's about a million times more cost-effective, depending on
whether you care more about CPU, disk, or RAM,
and there's an Internet hanging out the back side that will
let you use Google's farm of ~100K computers for free.




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec  5 20:06:55 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2004 23:06:55 -0500
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <1102305425.27835.20.camel@njohnsn.com>
References: <20041206015830.5830.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com> 
  <1102305425.27835.20.camel@njohnsn.com>
Message-ID: <p061104fdbdd98b31634e@[66.149.49.5]>

At 9:57 PM -0600 12/5/04, Neil Johnson wrote:
>is that with a
>staggering 570,000 lines of computer code,

Oh, please...

Try googling the "line-count" of any major piece of software, particularly
in an age of object-oriented code...

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From measl at mfn.org  Sun Dec  5 21:25:14 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2004 23:25:14 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <p061104fdbdd98b31634e@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <20041206015830.5830.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com> 
  <1102305425.27835.20.camel@njohnsn.com>
  <p061104fdbdd98b31634e@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20041205232414.S13566@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sun, 5 Dec 2004, R.A. Hettinga wrote:

> At 9:57 PM -0600 12/5/04, Neil Johnson wrote:
> >is that with a
> >staggering 570,000 lines of computer code,
>
> Oh, please...
>
> Try googling the "line-count" of any major piece of software, particularly
> in an age of object-oriented code...

OOP is a fairly recent phenomena when we are talking about code from the
'70s you know ;-)

In 1980, a half million lines of code was pretty hefty.

> Cheers,
> RAH


-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From arma at mit.edu  Sun Dec  5 23:00:23 2004
From: arma at mit.edu (Roger Dingledine)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 02:00:23 -0500
Subject: Tor 0.0.9rc6 is out
Message-ID: <mailman.1099.1576007652.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

This release improves reliability for clients. It's not perfect yet,
but I think it's better. Let me know if it breaks something.

tarball:   http://tor.freehaven.net/dist/tor-0.0.9rc6.tar.gz
signature: http://tor.freehaven.net/dist/tor-0.0.9rc6.tar.gz.asc
win32 exe: http://tor.freehaven.net/dist/tor-0.0.9rc6-win32.exe
win32 sig: http://tor.freehaven.net/dist/tor-0.0.9rc6-win32.exe.asc
(use -dPr tor-0_0_9rc6 if you want to check out from cvs)

  o Bugfixes on 0.0.9pre:
    - Clean up some more integer underflow opportunities (not exploitable
      we think).
    - While hibernating, hup should not regrow our listeners.
    - Send an end to the streams we close when we hibernate, rather
      than just chopping them off.
    - React to eof immediately on non-open edge connections.

  o Bugfixes on 0.0.8.1:
    - Calculate timeout for waiting for a connected cell from the time
      we sent the begin cell, not from the time the stream started. If
      it took a long time to establish the circuit, we would time out
      right after sending the begin cell.
    - Fix router_compare_addr_to_addr_policy: it was not treating a port
      of * as always matching, so we were picking reject *:* nodes as
      exit nodes too. Oops.

  o Features:
    - New circuit building strategy: keep a list of ports that we've
      used in the past 6 hours, and always try to have 2 circuits open
      or on the way that will handle each such port. Seed us with port
      80 so web users won't complain that Tor is "slow to start up".
    - Make kill -USR1 dump more useful stats about circuits.
    - When warning about retrying or giving up, print the address, so
      the user knows which one it's talking about.
    - If you haven't used a clean circuit in an hour, throw it away,
      just to be on the safe side. (This means after 6 hours a totally
      unused Tor client will have no circuits open.)

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec  6 00:10:11 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 09:10:11 +0100
Subject: Tor 0.0.9rc6 is out (fwd from arma@mit.edu)
Message-ID: <20041206081011.GH9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----


From kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com  Mon Dec  6 06:20:49 2004
From: kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com (John Kelsey)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 09:20:49 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
Message-ID: <32584682.1102342849851.JavaMail.root@huey.psp.pas.earthlink.net>

>From: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
>Sent: Dec 4, 2004 8:33 PM
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...

>I thought JR "Bob" Dobbs got beamed up to that comet with those LA Koolaid 
>kooks...

No, but I do believe the comet kooks engaged in bobbitization (or perhaps, merely "bobbing").  

>-TD

--John




From roberte at ripnet.com  Mon Dec  6 07:03:30 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2004 10:03:30 -0500
Subject: Word play bobs the literal minded
In-Reply-To: <32584682.1102342849851.JavaMail.root@huey.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
References: <32584682.1102342849851.JavaMail.root@huey.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <41B474C2.9030004@ripnet.com>

John Kelsey wrote:

>>From: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
>>Sent: Dec 4, 2004 8:33 PM
>>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>>Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
>>    
>>
>
>  
>
>>I thought JR "Bob" Dobbs got beamed up to that comet with those LA Koolaid 
>>kooks...
>>    
>>
>
>No, but I do believe the comet kooks engaged in bobbitization (or perhaps, merely "bobbing").  
>
>  
>
>>-TD
>>    
>>
>
>--John
>
>
>  
>
Word Play is disrespectful to the literal minded
who dont appreciate having their self-bobbing exposed.
Unauthorized decryption of motives and intentions must be outlawed.
The right to privacy and ignorance is paramount.




From ptrei at rsasecurity.com  Mon Dec  6 07:04:42 2004
From: ptrei at rsasecurity.com (Trei, Peter)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 10:04:42 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
Message-ID: <017630AA6DF2DF4EBC1DD4454F8EE29704776B94@rsana-ex-hq1.NA.RSA.NET>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-cypherpunks at minder.net
> [mailto:owner-cypherpunks at minder.net]On Behalf Of Neil Johnson
> Sent: Sunday, December 05, 2004 9:06 AM
> To: R.W. (Bob) Erickson
> Cc: Steve Furlong; cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
> Subject: Re: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
>
>
> On Sun, 2004-12-05 at 08:46 -0500, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
>
> > To be bobbed is never the goal,
> > but bobless fear steers the undifferentiated bob
> > along conventional paths,
> > to the abattoir
>
>
> Where is Tim May when when you need him? :-)
>
Try scruz.general.

Peter




From nobody at dizum.com  Mon Dec  6 01:50:04 2004
From: nobody at dizum.com (Nomen Nescio)
Date: Mon,  6 Dec 2004 10:50:04 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
Message-ID: <67353f81a7a43e1c9e59c77f2be9a48d@dizum.com>

Bill Stewart shrieb:

> There are several different issues related to PROMIS

Thanks for your comments.

But what about the person Michael Riconosciuto? I did some searches
online and I got the feeling that a lot people see him as an
extremely intelligent person, a one-in-a-million type of person,
being involved and on the front line with such diverse areas as human
intelligence, weapons, electronics, computers, cryptography,
bio-warfare etc.

It's stated online that he has warned US about several terrorist
attacks before they ocurred, including but not limited to the
al-qaeda attacks. Is this somewhat related to him being jailed? Can
he verify that US didn't act on alerts in ways so sensitive that the
government simply cannot afford to let him speak up? Does he know
things relating to US wanting some wars that the public simply cannot
be told?

I think I read somewhere that people from NSA or CIA thought of him
as simply put a genius. Is it likely that he as such a genius is
simply too dangerous for his own good when he decided to speak the
truth and that the government is actively trying to shut him down and
indirectly speed up his death by denying him medical care for his
illness?

Why did he come "clean" and sign the affidavit? He himself stated
that he though he risked being killed or harmed in various ways if he
went through with it. And indeed, just a week or two afterwards he
got arrested!

Smells like a government retaliation, set-up and cover-up if I ever
saw one!

This is almost to good for even Hollywood!

There are many interesting questions here. Keep in mind that not all
of us were around and active with intelligence/computers/cryptography
10-20 years ago.


John Young: Does Cryptome hold any interesting documents involving
this case?




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Mon Dec  6 08:39:11 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 11:39:11 -0500 (EST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F40D3A1F2DB06D480AD3BFA9BB40@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041206163911.78983.qmail@web51808.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote: 
> >Bonus question:
> >
> >Who is the author of the origin question that inspired the copycats?

> Well, I remember May posting it but I don't think he was the ultimate 
> author. I suspect whoever posted it recently in fact dug it out of the 
> archives and re-posted it, a particularly lame maneuver if so.

Wrong.  The origin quote is "Who is Socrates, now that we need him"
written by Richard Mitchell as the title of chapter one in "The Gift of
Fire".  Mitchell may have cribbed the line from another source, but in
this context it is the origin quote.  Ms. Harsh is in posession of the
original physical vector, having stolen it, but only the spooks will be
unofficially aware of that facet of the context.

Any non-spook readers (if any) can identify the copycats as spooks by
virtue of their use of mutations from the original.  The source is rare
enough that it is highly unlikely that anyone outside of English academia
would happen to bring it up of his own accord in 'casual' conversation. 
Google is, indeed, your friend in this matter.
 
> OR...perhaps ole' May is gettin' a little lonely out there!

I doubt it.  May has his gun collection for company.


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Mon Dec  6 08:48:54 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 11:48:54 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <1102305172.27835.16.camel@njohnsn.com>
Message-ID: <20041206164854.20888.qmail@web51809.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- Neil Johnson <njohnsn at njohnsn.com> wrote: 
> On Sun, 2004-12-05 at 20:58 -0500, Steve Thompson wrote:
> >[PROMIS]
> Yes, I have found that puzzling too.
> 
> Articles I have read refer to the original version being "in the public
> domain". You'd think the source code would be "out there" somewhere.

If that's true, then the government couldn't have stolen it.  However, I
suspect that mainfraim code of any sophistication is rarely released into
the public domain.  I imagine the author would be able to clear that up,
assuming he has no financial reason to falsify its history.
 
> The least "Tin Foil Hat (TM)" version of the story I found is at Wired
> 
> http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1.01/inslaw.html
> 
> Which gives this description:
> 
> "Designed as case-management software for federal prosecutors, PROMIS
> has the ability to combine disparate databases, and to track people by
> their involvement with the legal system. Hamilton and others now claim
> that the DOJ has modified PROMIS to monitor intelligence operations,
> agents and targets, instead of legal cases."

Interesting.
 
> I find the claims made about this software (it's ability to reconcile
> data from many different sources "automagically" ) pretty vague and
> frankly, a little far fetched, based on what I know about software,
> databases, etc.

No kidding.  Databases are _hard_ to write efficiently, let alone to
arbitrarily integrate.
 
> (And that's not even including the "modifications" supposedly made to
> install a TEMPEST back door in later versions).

Perhaps I am stupid.  I don't know how one would go about modifying
application software to include a 'back door' that would presumably
enhance its suceptibility to TEMPEST attacks.  Isn't tempest all about EM
spectrum signal detection and capture?
 

Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Mon Dec  6 12:36:26 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2004 12:36:26 -0800
Subject: Kerik, Homeland Security Czar - Scathing article from The  
  Register
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20041206122613.0399f098@pop.idiom.com>

The Register has a really friendly article about Kerik,
Giuliani's buddy who's proposed for Homeland Security Czar.
(El Reg is primarily an online technology newswire,
but they do comment on other issues, especially if they
have technical aspects - they especially rag on the
UK's Home Secretary Blunkett's National ID Card proposals.)

http://www.theregister.com/2004/12/06/kerik_homeland_security_secretary/

High-school drop-out to become Homeland Security Czar

By Thomas C Greene
Published Monday 6th December 2004 11:07 GMT

President George W. Bush has nominated former New York City Police
Commissioner Bernard Kerik to replace Tom Ridge as Homeland Security
Secretary, marking a significant departure from his tendency to choose
educated, Patrician types for his Cabinet.

Kerik, a high-school drop-out abandoned at age four by his prostitute
mother in the gritty town of Patterson, New Jersey, served as an Army MP in
South Korea, and later worked in private international security rackets,
most interestingly in Saudi Arabia.

He joined the New York City Police Department in 1985. He followed that
with a stint as Warden of the Passaic County Jail in New Jersey, and became
the Training Officer and Commander of the Special Weapons and Operations
Units. In 1998 he was named New York Corrections Commissioner, and
established an ironclad, head-cracking discipline in the City's notorious
detention facilities.

A favorite of former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, Kerik had the honor
of seeing the Manhattan Detention Complex, known to locals as "the Tombs,"
re-named the Bernard B. Kerik Complex by then-mayor Giuliani. Kerik left a
minor cloud of corruption behind, with allegations that one of his
lieutenants used correctional staff to work illegally in Republican
campaigns.


In 2000, Giuliani named Kerik Police Commissioner, to assist him in a vast
anti-crime crackdown, where the chief tactic was for police to pounce
aggressively on even the most chickenshit offences, such as spitting on the
sidewalk.

Upon his retirement from City politics, Giuliani decided to cash in on
post-9/11 security hysteria by founding his own security outfit, Giuliani
Partners LLC. Kerik has served as senior vice president at Giuliani
Partners, and CEO of Giuliani-Kerik LLC, a vendor of law-enforcement
"performance systems". Meanwhile, Giuliani has founded several spin-offs,
such as Giuliani Capital Advisors LLC, and the Rudolph W. Giuliani Advanced
Security Centers (ASC), a cyber-security outfit formed in connection with
Ernst & Young.

Recently, Kerik shipped out to Iraq to train the local policemen who are
routinely blown to pieces by insurgents and terrorists. There, he enjoyed
the snappy titles of Interim Minister of the Interior, and Senior Policy
Advisor to the US Presidential Envoy to Iraq's Coalition Provisional
Authority. Kerik lasted only four months, and the Iraqi police are still as
incompetent, weak, and corrupt as when he arrived in country.

Kerik began making his transition from local to national politics by
campaigning for President Bush's re-election, alongside his political
patron and business partner, Rudy Giuliani. Kerik has been a devoted
booster of the so-called Patriot Act, having given several speeches in its
support while campaigning for Bush.

In anticipation of his rise to national office, Kerik recently sold his
$5.8m in shares of Taser International, makers of absolutely safe police
stun guns that are now routinely used against old women and children.

He is expected to be confirmed by the Senate without difficulty. .




From jya at pipeline.com  Mon Dec  6 12:52:31 2004
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2004 12:52:31 -0800
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <20041206164854.20888.qmail@web51809.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <1102305172.27835.16.camel@njohnsn.com>
Message-ID: <E1CbN6m-00014k-00@barry.mail.mindspring.net>

Cryptome hosts a 2000 book excerpt on PROMIS as
allegedly used by Mossad, though not much about
the technical details of the program:


http://cryptome.org/promis-mossad.htm

The file has links to other information on Riconosciuto
offered by Orlin Grabbe, a long-time supporter of
Riconosciuto.

Back then we telephoned Hamilton about his DoJ travails
and he politely refused to discuss the topic.

A TEMPEST backdoor in PROMIS would be interesting
for what it would take configure code to emit identifiable
signals. Code emits signals, as does any transmission, 
but not easily identifiable or correlatable with the code, 
but perhaps it can be done. 

Capabilities and sensitivity of interception is a dark world, 
as was TEMPEST in its early years. Now what passes 
for knowledge about TEMPEST is hardly all there is to 
know. Indeed, some think that most of the information 
about the technolody now in the public domain is disinfo.

The TEMPEST material released under FOI to Cryptome 
some years ago should be seen as part of the camouflage
about what's now being done in EM interception,
analysis, tracking, and not least, smoke blowing.

PROMIS is sufficiently old, if not a hoary horse, that
it could be used now to honey-pot eager buyers to
induce trust where it's not to be found, following the 
lead of Bill Gates, if not floater Robert Maxwell. Intel has
come a long way since the lazy days of the Cold War
when agent double-crossing and the inside US/USSR
mil-joke-con of Mutually Assured Destruction was all to 
worry about.




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Mon Dec  6 12:34:18 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 15:34:18 -0500 (EST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <20041206163911.78983.qmail@web51808.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20041206203418.45654.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- Steve Thompson <steve49152 at yahoo.ca> wrote: 
>  --- Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote: 
> > >Bonus question:
> > >
> > >Who is the author of the origin question that inspired the copycats?
> 
> > Well, I remember May posting it but I don't think he was the ultimate 
> > author. I suspect whoever posted it recently in fact dug it out of the
> 
> > archives and re-posted it, a particularly lame maneuver if so.
> 
> Wrong.  The origin quote is "Who is Socrates, now that we need him"
> written by Richard Mitchell as the title of chapter one in "The Gift of
> Fire".  Mitchell may have cribbed the line from another source, but in
> this context it is the origin quote.  Ms. Harsh is in posession of the
> original physical vector, having stolen it, but only the spooks will be
> unofficially aware of that facet of the context.

On further reflection, I think it is necessary to go out on a limb and
suggest a correction to my comment above.

I "verified" the original quotation from a quick google search.  That was
probably not enough.  My recollection suggests that the original quote
should be "where is Socrates now that we need him".  I rather suspect that
the people who 0wn the upstream pipe from my points of access are toying
with their ability to interpose their data in place of quasi-authoritative
texts.  I cannot consult the physical document owing to the fact that its
rarity is such that there are no copies available at either the Metro
Central Reference Library, and I have no access to the stacks at the
University of Toronto Robarts library.  Someone who does may consult the
book themselves with its call number:  B72 .M55 1987.

Further, Ms. Harsh may be said to posess the probable physical vector.  I
cannot say what level of participation she has had in this travesty owing
to the fact that after she perjured herself in court in 2001, she has
entirely avoided using her actual identity online.  However, she could
answer the question with her copy of the book in principle if there were
any way to compel her testimony.  It is possible that the quote is being
used as a source by online spooks by virtue of the text's presence in
their funky everything database.
 
Any way you look at it, the phrase "tax money well spent" would seem to
apply here.


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec  6 12:49:28 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 15:49:28 -0500
Subject: Groups Probe FBI Spying in 'War on Terror'
Message-ID: <p06110459bdda728d9dda@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=26542>

Inter Press Service News Agency

 POLITICS-U.S.:
Groups Probe FBI Spying in 'War on Terror'

William Fisher*

U.S. civil rights groups have filed multiple freedom of information
requests around the country to uncover evidence that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and local police are spying on political, environmental
and faith-based groups in the name of fighting terrorism.

 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests were filed in 10 states and
the District of Columbia (DC) seeking details on the FBI's use of Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and local police to engage in political
surveillance.

 JTTFs are legal partnerships between the FBI and local police, in which
police officers are "deputised" as federal agents and work with the agency
to identify and monitor individuals and groups.

 Filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), the FOIAs seek FBI files of groups and
individuals targeted for speaking out or practising their faith, as well as
information on how the practices and funding structure of the JTTFs are
encouraging rampant and unwarranted spying.

 "Our goal in this is to learn to the greatest extent possible how much the
FBI is using JTTFs and their guidelines to infiltrate these groups," ACLU
attorney Ben Wizner told IPS.

 One of the FOIA requests names organisations such as anti-war group United
for Peace and Justice, Greenpeace, Code Pink, a women-initiated peace and
justice group, and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, which
might have been monitored by the task forces.

 According to Wizner, after the terrorist attacks of Sep. 11, 2001 sparked
the Bush administration's "war on terrorism," Attorney General John
Ashcroft scrapped an FBI guideline -- enacted after the agency infiltrated
numerous groups during the 1960s and 1970s civil rights movement -- that
blocked its agents from spying on groups and individuals unless they were
investigating a crime.

 By scrapping that policy Ashcroft was, "essentially encouraging FBI agents
to do fishing expeditions to spy in mosques, in anti-war meetings ...
without any reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed," added
Wizner.

 ADC President Mary Rose Oakar said her group "supports all efforts to keep
our country safe and we want law enforcement to protect us from real
terrorists and criminals. However, targeting Arabs and Muslims on the basis
of national origin and religion, sending undercover agents to anti-war
meetings, and infiltrating student groups is not making us any safer."

 "The FBI should not be wasting its time and our tax dollars spying on
groups that are critical of certain government actions," added the leader
of the Washington, DC-based non-profit group, in a statement.

 Earlier this year reports emerged that JTTFs had visited activists around
the country to ask about their plans for August's meeting of the Republican
National Committee (RNC) in New York.

 The committee officially nominated President George W Bush to run in the
Nov. 2 election.

 ''We hadn't even been following (news of the RNC); I didn't even know when
it was going to happen," activist Sarah Bardwell told IPS after being
visited by four FBI agents and two police officers at her Denver home. "I
think (the FBI is) basically just justifying violating people's first
amendment rights (of freedom of religion, speech and assembly),'' she added.

 In a statement in August, FBI Assistant Director Cassandra M Chandler
responded that the agency ''is not monitoring groups or interviewing
individuals unless we receive intelligence that such individuals or groups
may be planning violent and disruptive criminal activity or have knowledge
of such activity.''

 ''The F.B.I. conducted interviews, within the bounds of the U.S.
Constitution, in order to determine the validity of the threat
information,'' she added.

 Since the 9/11 attacks, the FBI -- part of the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) -- has vastly stepped up its monitoring and surveillance of
individuals and groups it considers suspicious. It and other law
enforcement agencies have also been given greatly increased authority under
the USA Patriot Act, which was hurriedly enacted and signed into law soon
after the attacks.

 The law permits agencies to conduct "sneak and peak" wiretaps and other
forms of surveillance without immediate notification to the target.

 The JTTFs, however, existed prior to 9/11.

 Groups representing Arab and Muslim-Americans are confused by what appear
to be conflicting signals from the Bush administration.

 The government claims to be making serious efforts to "build bridges" to
the constituencies, but simultaneously continues to practise discrimination
and harassment. The U.S. Civil Rights Commission, a bi-partisan government
agency, recently reported widespread evidence of racial profiling against
Arab and Muslim-Americans by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
other law enforcement agencies.

 These bodies respond that they are not conducting round-ups in any
community (and are) "not profiling based on race or religious affiliation
(or) instituting a blanket detention policy." But since 9/11, some 5,000
members of the groups have been arrested and detained -- some for long
periods without legal counsel -- but none have been convicted for
terror-related crimes.

 The ADC and 15 other human and civil rights groups have filed suits
against the DOJ demanding release of information about people arrested and
detained since Sep. 11, 2001.

 Thursday's ACLU/ADC requests "point to many documented examples of JTTF
involvement in the investigation of environmental activists, anti-war
protesters and others who are clearly neither terrorists nor involved in
terrorist activities."

 Their actions include: "aggressively questioning Muslims and Arabs on the
basis of religion or national origin rather than suspicion of wrongdoing;
tracking down parents of student peace activists; downloading anti-war
action alerts from Catholic Peace Ministries; infiltrating student groups,
and sending undercover agents to National Lawyers Guild meetings," the
documents allege.

 Requests were also filed on behalf of numerous individuals, including an
organiser for the Service Employees International Union, a former Catholic
priest and student activists.

 "They will say that a group whose means may include engaging in a sit-in
to block traffic or who in the past might have had a member who threw a
brick through a window is legitimately investigated by a joint terrorism
task force," said Wizner. "The question is: do we want that kind of civil
disobedience labelled and investigated as terrorism?"


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec  6 13:12:20 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 16:12:20 -0500
Subject: Certicom Extends Security Platform, Enabling Developers to 
  Address Government Market
Message-ID: <p0611043cbdda3fccb85b@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/12-06-2004/0002584252&EDATE=>

Certicom Extends Security Platform, Enabling Developers to Address
Government Market
                         
    Certicom Security Architecture for Government provides integrated suite
    of security toolkits that ensure critical FIPS 140-2 and ECC compliance

    MISSISSAUGA, ON, Dec. 6 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ - Certicom Corp.
(TSX: CIC), the authority for strong, efficient cryptography, has extended
its Certicom Security Architecture(TM), enabling developers to embed a
FIPS 140-2-validated cryptographic module into their products and be
eligible for sale into the federal government market. The Certicom Security
Architecture also provides developers with an efficient way to enhance new
and existing applications with elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and meet
the field-of-use guidelines set out by the National Security Agency (NSA)
to protect mission-critical national security information.
    The adoption of ECC within the U.S. federal government is proceeding
rapidly, and Certicom is taking a leadership role in enabling agencies and
government contractors to integrate the strongest security technology into
their products. The comprehensive Certicom Security Architecture provides a
bridge between legacy crypto systems and ECC, and gives developers the
flexibility to standardize code among different security environments and
platforms - maximizing code re-use and portability. This flexibility also
means developers will not need to redesign their solutions to meet future
government crypto requirements.
    "Hardware and software developers are increasingly realizing that
compliance with regulatory requirements for security is a pressing concern,"
said Dr. Jerry Krasner, vice president and chief analyst at Embedded Market
Forecasters (http://www.embeddedforecast.com ), the premier market
intelligence and
advisory firm in the embedded technology industry. "A cost-effective approach
is to use a tool that ensures compliance with FIPS 140-2 requirements and
eliminates the potentially costly step of third-party FIPS validation of a
device or application."
    Strong security is a key requirement across all networked applications
and devices. The Certicom Security Architecture allows developers who may have
little security expertise to add FIPS 140-2 validated security to their
solutions while avoiding the time and expense of the FIPS 140-2 validation
process. A common application programming interface (API) unifies Certicom's
proven developer toolkits to create a plug-and-play security architecture that
includes higher level protocol functionality that can operate in FIPS mode,
such as SSL and PKI.
    "Certicom Security Architecture for Government makes it easy for OEMs,
ISVs and integrators to sell products into the government sector that meet
strict government security requirements, including FIPS 140-2 and ECC," said
Roy Pereira, vice-president, marketing and product management at Certicom.
"The National Security Agency is committed to making elliptic curve
cryptography the most widely used public-key cryptosystem for securing U.S.
government information. Certicom is committed to providing the technology and
tools to make that possible."

    The Security Builder developer toolkits integrated into the Certicom
Security Architecture for Government include:
    -  Security Builder(R) GSE(TM), a FIPS 140-2-validated cryptographic
       toolkit;
    -  Security Builder(R) NSE(TM), a cryptographic toolkit for national
       security information;
    -  Security Builder(R) Crypto(TM), a cross-platform cryptographic
       toolkit;
    -  Security Builder(R) PKI(TM), a digital certificate management toolkit;
    -  Security Builder(R) SSL(TM), a complete Secure Sockets Layer toolkit;
       and
    -  Security Builder(R) IPSec(TM), a client-side virtual private network
       toolkit.

    Certicom Security Architecture for Government is available immediately,
except for Security Builder NSE which is available in Q1 2005. For more
information, visit http://www.certicom.com/gov .

    About Certicom
    Certicom Corp. (TSX:CIC) is the authority for strong, efficient
cryptography required by software vendors and device manufacturers to embed
security into their products. Adopted by the U.S. government's National
Security Agency (NSA), Certicom technologies for Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) provide the most security per bit of any known public-key scheme, making
it ideal for resource-constrained environments. Certicom products and services
are currently licensed to more than 300 customers including Motorola, Oracle,
Research In Motion, Terayon, Texas Instruments and Unisys. Founded in 1985,
Certicom is headquartered in Mississauga, ON, Canada, with offices in Ottawa,
ON; Reston, VA; San Mateo, CA; and London, England. Visit
http://www.certicom.com .

    Certicom, Certicom Security Architecture, Certicom CodeSign, Security
Builder, Security Builder Middleware, Security Builder API, Security Builder
Crypto, Security Builder SSL, Security Builder PKI, and Security Builder GSE
are trademarks or registered trademarks of Certicom Corp. Intel is registered
trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries in the United States and
other countries. All other companies and products listed herein are trademarks
or registered trademarks of their respective holders.
    Except for historical information contained herein, this news release
contains forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties.
Actual results may differ materially. Factors that might cause a difference
include, but are not limited to, those relating to the acceptance of mobile
and wireless devices and the continued growth of e-commerce and m-commerce,
the increase of the demand for mutual authentication in m-commerce
transactions, the acceptance of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) technology
as an industry standard, the market acceptance of our principal products and
sales of our customer's products, the impact of competitive products and
technologies, the possibility of our products infringing patents and other
intellectual property of fourth parties, and costs of product development.
Certicom will not update these forward-looking statements to reflect events or
circumstances after the date hereof. More detailed information about potential
factors that could affect Certicom's financial results is included in the
documents Certicom files from time to time with the Canadian securities
regulatory authorities.


 SOURCE Certicom Corp.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec  6 14:00:04 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 17:00:04 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <20041206203418.45654.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20041206203418.45654.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <p0611046ebdda86bd593d@[66.149.49.5]>

At 3:34 PM -0500 12/6/04, Steve Thompson wrote:
>I rather suspect that
>the people who 0wn the upstream pipe from my points of access are toying
>with their ability to interpose their data in place of quasi-authoritative
>texts.

Oh, *my*...

Where is Detweiller, now that we need him?

;-)

Cheers,
RAH


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec  6 14:45:11 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 17:45:11 -0500
Subject: Need a job? Get a card - arresting ID pitch to business
Message-ID: <p06110414bdda3fa3aec6@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/03/business_immigrant_checks/print.html>

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT

The Register ; Internet and Law ; Digital Rights/Digital Wrongs ;

 Original URL:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/03/business_immigrant_checks/

Need a job? Get a card - arresting ID pitch to business
By John Lettice (john.lettice at theregister.co.uk)
Published Friday 3rd December 2004 16:11 GMT

Analysis It might not be your Big Brother's Database, but the UK ID scheme
has certainly mastered doublespeak. Take, for example, the way it will
force businesses to joyfully embrace ID card checks - or else.

The Bill's Regulatory Impact Statement tells us that the bill has no
provisions "which allow the Government to require business, charities or
voluntary bodies to make identity checks using the identity cards scheme."
And indeed it doesn't. But David Blunkett gave us a taste of what this
really means in his speech to the IPPR last month. Referring to the
provisions of the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act which require employers
to check that potential employees are eligible for employment (i.e. not
illegal immigrants), he noted that "clause 8 has been very difficult to
implement because employers quite rightly say that they are not an
immigration service and they can't easily ascertain whether someone is
legally in the country without great difficulty."?

Under the Act it is a criminal offence for an employer to fail to make an
adequate check, but this particular provision is a difficult one to bring
in and to enforce, because employers and their organisations could
reasonably protest about cost and about not being an immigration service,
and because if the Home Office did prosecute then they'd most likely fail
to get a conviction because the employer could claim to have seen a
document that looked genuine, and how the blazes were they to know? Well,
hello employers, now you are an immigration service.

Blunkett continued: "The verification process under ID cards would remove
that excuse completely and people would know who was entitled to be here
and open to pay taxes and NI." So once the scheme exists there's no reason
for the Home Office not to enforce clause 8, and employers are going to
find using the ID scheme pretty compelling - or else.

The Impact Statement suggests the card will be beneficial to employers
because it will reduce the cost of compliance with the 1996 Act, and
therefore it can be expected that employers will want to use the scheme
"even in advance of any explicit requirement to use the scheme." Which does
rather sound like 'we're not making you use it in the Act, but just not
yet.' Note that the extra costs (large) that employers will be saving by
using the ID scheme are costs that have been imposed by the Government in
turning them into an immigration service under the 1996 Act. As an aside
you should also note that recent regulation of employment agencies has
imposed a broader requirement for them to check the identities of job
applicants - so they're a census bureau as well as an immigration service.

Employers don't have to check via the ID scheme, and under the Act it will
actually be illegal to insist on such a check prior to cards becoming
compulsory, but the scheme would "help to enforce the law against
unscrupulous employers who would no longer have a defence in claiming they
examined an unfamiliar document which appeared genuine to them. And:
"...the Government expects that legitimate employers would want to
encourage their employees to provide verifiable proof of identity when
taking up a job... The scheme allows for records of on-line verification
checks to be held, so establishing whether an employer has complied with
the law will be more straightforward."

Now, that one's very cute indeed. The Home Office is determined that the ID
scheme operates via checks to the National Identity Register, rather than
simply as a photo ID upgrade that can be checked locally, the main reason
for this being that widespread online checking will generate a nationwide
network of ID checks that track back to the Home Office. Here it is
pointing out that using an online check will protect the employer because
the NIR will have an audit trail proving that the check was made, whereas
if the employer just looked at the card, we'd only have their word for
that, wouldn't we? So we'll just rub it in: " Only an on-line check would
give an employer the assurance that a record of the check would be held on
the National Identity Register and would therefore provide a defence
against prosecution."

Clearly it's going to be a lot safer to embrace the ID scheme sooner rather
than later, but there's one snag here. It will, as the Act specifies, be
illegal for an employer to insist on an ID card as proof of identity, so if
the applicant insists on using something else then the employer would have
to accept it, right? But as not using the ID card would be more expensive
and riskier for the employer, one would expect employers to be less likely
to give the applicant a job. Particularly if they had a funny
foreign-sounding name. And as anybody checking ID will rightly be wary of
asking "only certain groups for proof of identity for fear of being accused
of discrimination", from the employer's point of view the sooner they can
get all applicants to submit an ID card for checking, the better.

The Government hasn't yet decided on whether or not to charge employers for
employee checks against the register. It observes that charging individual
citizens for compulsory notifications such as address changes "might be
counter-productive" (indeed - but what do they mean "might"?), and one
could speculate that charging employers might be similarly so. Once however
it's widely used by employers in order to avoid prosecution, then they can
be argued to be saving the costs they'd otherwise incur for checking ID
(via the 1996 Act requirement), and as they'll be using the ID scheme quite
a lot already, they'll also then be able to save money by using it more
generally, "simplifying the recording of employee data". They can therefore
give the money they've thus 'saved' to the Government when the fees are
introduced.

Most employers may wonder why they're being put through these hoops, and
forced to spend all this money, and then save a bit of it, on voluntarily
supporting the ID card scheme. With justification. The Impact Statement
identifies the problem of illegal working as occurring "in sectors where
principally casual, low-skilled jobs prevail e.g. construction,
textiles/clothing, hotel & catering, household services/cleaning,
agriculture and the sex industry." These industries aren't major
concentrations of Register readership (we don't think so, anyway), and
they're not likely to be busting guts to institute ID checks and start
paying national insurance contributions either.

Not voluntarily, so this is how it works. At the moment people operating in
these areas are subject to sporadic raids by the Immigration and
Nationalities Directorate, which unlike the police already has powers to
check ID. These raids frequently net illegal immigrants, overstayers etc,
but because of the current difficulties with the 1996 Act it's difficult to
prosecute the employers. But an employer caught repeatedly when there is
"no excuse" will surely have to start checking, meaning that the Government
feels it will be able to make a major impact on casual labour and illegal
immigrants in these industries (at the expense of all the other industries).

Other sectors are likely to face similarly persuasive efforts to get them
to 'volunteer' themselves into the scheme. Much of the public sector will
have little choice but to volunteer, and although the banks and credit card
companies are unlikely to want to supplant their own security with the ID
card (aside from using it to fulfill current legal identity requirements
for, say, opening a bank account), it's probably only a matter of time
before more sticks arrive. The Home Office says it's investigating
incorporation of ID card readers in next generation credit card
verification machines, and if it gets these there are a couple of
regulatory routes it could take. It could for example insist on ID checks
for card transactions over a certain value (as is the law in Spain), and it
could make loud outraged noises about false credit card applications and
require proof of ID when opening an account. The credit card companies will
embrace neither of these voluntarily (it discourages customers), but if the
card slots were there and everybody was ordered to do it, well, maybe
that'd be different. And then the supermarket checkout could be an
immigration service too.
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From roy at rant-central.com  Mon Dec  6 15:43:21 2004
From: roy at rant-central.com (Roy M. Silvernail)
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2004 18:43:21 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <p0611046ebdda86bd593d@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <20041206203418.45654.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>
  <p0611046ebdda86bd593d@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <41B4EE99.4030503@rant-central.com>

R.A. Hettinga wrote:

>At 3:34 PM -0500 12/6/04, Steve Thompson wrote:
>  
>
>>I rather suspect that
>>the people who 0wn the upstream pipe from my points of access are toying
>>with their ability to interpose their data in place of quasi-authoritative
>>texts.
>>    
>>
>
>Oh, *my*...
>
>Where is Detweiller, now that we need him?
>  
>
Huh?  I thought that *was* Detweiller!

-- 
Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
"It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT
SpamAssassin->procmail->/dev/null->bliss
http://www.rant-central.com




From sfurlong at acmenet.net  Mon Dec  6 17:59:13 2004
From: sfurlong at acmenet.net (Steve Furlong)
Date: 06 Dec 2004 20:59:13 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <p0611046ebdda86bd593d@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <20041206203418.45654.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com> 	
  <p0611046ebdda86bd593d@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <1102384753.18217.1.camel@daft>

On Mon, 2004-12-06 at 17:00, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> At 3:34 PM -0500 12/6/04, Steve Thompson wrote:
> >I rather suspect that
> >the people who 0wn the upstream pipe from my points of access are toying
> >with their ability to interpose their data in place of quasi-authoritative
> >texts.
> 
> Oh, *my*...
> 
> Where is Detweiller, now that we need him?

That was bad enough, but for a real "oh my" moment, see elsewhere in
Thompson's missive:

> Any way you look at it, the phrase "tax money well spent" would seem
> to apply here.

I can't think of any way to use that phrase non-sarcastically.




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Mon Dec  6 19:04:37 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 22:04:37 -0500 (EST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <p0611046ebdda86bd593d@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20041207030437.11877.qmail@web51809.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote: 
> At 3:34 PM -0500 12/6/04, Steve Thompson wrote:
> >I rather suspect that
> >the people who 0wn the upstream pipe from my points of access are
> toying
> >with their ability to interpose their data in place of
> quasi-authoritative
> >texts.
> 
> Oh, *my*...

Come on, tell us what you really think.

Anyhow, when I used to post to usenet via google, I experienced a number
of incidents in which there were minor changes to the text of articles I
wrote and posted.  I also regularly noticed people posting messages that
were being exempted from the normal posting delay.  

Articles that arrived at google were subject to a delay of a few hours
before their index entries propogated across to the entirety of the index
search cluster.  Some individuals evidently had acces to the google
database such that they were able to put their (suitably Date:ed) articles
at the head of the posting queues.

The apparent 0wn3rs of the continential US 1nt3rn3t are clearly making
sure they have capabilities that they may use to appear as if they are
super-3l33t.  Why, it wouldn't suprise me if I were to find that some of
them are busy playing 'alien' to unsuspecting unsophisticates at this very
moment.  Actually, it's a little more likely that they are playing "you
are trapped in the Matrix" on the gullible, isn't it.

> Where is Detweiller, now that we need him?

Probably off somewhere consulting in the industry, having tired of the
noise and wearied by the futility of hitting on Tim May.  I think that I
have better taste, personally, and am waiting for the chance to make a
pass at Condi.  Perhaps after the current presidential term she'll have
some time for me.
 
> ;-)

Is that a sincere emoticon?
 

Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec  6 19:04:49 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 22:04:49 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <1102384753.18217.1.camel@daft>
References: <20041206203418.45654.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com> 	  
  <p0611046ebdda86bd593d@[66.149.49.5]> <1102384753.18217.1.camel@daft>
Message-ID: <p061104afbddacdf109cd@[66.149.49.5]>

At 8:59 PM -0500 12/6/04, Steve Furlong wrote:
>> Any way you look at it, the phrase "tax money well spent" would seem
>> to apply here.
>
>I can't think of any way to use that phrase non-sarcastically.

I can't even parse the *sentence*...

:-)

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"...if a person can't communicate, the very least he can do is to
shut up."
	-- Tom Lehrer




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Mon Dec  6 19:12:58 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 22:12:58 -0500 (EST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <41B4EE99.4030503@rant-central.com>
Message-ID: <20041207031258.24580.qmail@web51805.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "Roy M. Silvernail" <roy at rant-central.com> wrote: 
> R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> >Oh, *my*...
> >
> >Where is Detweiller, now that we need him?
> 
> Huh?  I thought that *was* Detweiller!

Detwellier had an oral fixation, and while I may like a good argument as
much as anyone, mere talk about sex never really did it for me.  But I
confess that I like to watch sometimes.

At any rate, Detweiller is another person entirely.  But I cannot prove
it.


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec  6 19:47:07 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2004 22:47:07 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <20041207031258.24580.qmail@web51805.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20041207031258.24580.qmail@web51805.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <p061104b5bddad7b653e0@[66.149.49.5]>

At 10:12 PM -0500 12/6/04, Steve Thompson wrote:
>But I cannot prove
>it.

Tee hee...

<Plonk!>

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Mon Dec  6 21:47:13 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 00:47:13 -0500 (EST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <p061104b5bddad7b653e0@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20041207054713.54637.qmail@web51809.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote: 
> At 10:12 PM -0500 12/6/04, Steve Thompson wrote:
> >But I cannot prove
> >it.
> 
> Tee hee...
> 
> <Plonk!>

This from the guy who took over where Choate left off.  Although at least
you include the article text instead of simply posting links.

I'm not here to be nice and make friends.


Regards,

Steve



______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From nobody at paranoici.org  Mon Dec  6 16:23:20 2004
From: nobody at paranoici.org (Anonymous)
Date: Tue,  7 Dec 2004 01:23:20 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Retinal Scans, DNA Samples to Return to Fallujah
In-Reply-To: <p061104cebdd959b2c973@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <e5f30f8fe5814d19bf138bacbc81987a@paranoici.org>

> <http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2004/12/05/returning_fallujans_will_face_clampdown?mode=PF>
> 
> The Boston Globe
> 
> 
>  US Marines rode in a convoy through Fallujah on Friday. The US military is
> continuing missions to secure the city.  (AFP Photo / Mehdi Fedouach)
> 
> Returning Fallujans will face clampdown
> 
> By Anne Barnard, Globe Staff  |  December 5, 2004
> 
> FALLUJAH, Iraq -- The US military is drawing up plans to keep insurgents
> from regaining control of this battle-scarred city, but returning residents
> may find that the measures make Fallujah look more like a police state than
> the democracy they have been promised.
> 
> Under the plans, troops would funnel Fallujans to so-called citizen
> processing centers on the outskirts of the city to compile a database of
> their identities through DNA testing and retina scans. Residents would
> receive badges displaying their home addresses that they must wear at all
> times. Buses would ferry them into the city, where cars, the deadliest tool
> of suicide bombers, would be banned.

<tcm>
More useless eaters, in the guise of U.S. soldiers, begging to be
be sent up the chimneys by the displaced, denigrated Fallujans.
</tcm>




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec  7 06:48:36 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 09:48:36 -0500
Subject: Olivia Dillan and Rajiv Dholakia Join PGP
Message-ID: <p061104c4bddb7306bb7d@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=20041207005302&newsLang=en>




 
 December 07, 2004 08:30 AM US Eastern Timezone

PGP Corporation Expands Management Team with Group Vice President of
Technology and Vice President of Strategy & Solutions; Olivia Dillan and
Rajiv Dholakia Join PGP Corporation


  PALO ALTO, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Dec. 7, 2004--PGP Corporation, a
global leader in enterprise encryption solutions, today announced that
Olivia Dillan has joined the company as Group Vice President of Technology
and Rajiv Dholakia has joined the company as Vice President of Strategy &
Solutions. As Group Vice President of Technology, Ms. Dillan is responsible
for all aspects of PGP technology and services, including product
development, customer and technical support, office of the CTO & CSO, and
information systems and technology. As Vice President of Strategy &
Solutions, Mr. Dholakia is responsible for driving strategic business
initiatives to enhance core PGP technology and products. He also holds
responsibility for the definition and creation of industry solutions with
key PGP partners and customers.


 "We are fortunate to have Olivia and Rajiv join our management team," said
Phillip Dunkelberger, president and CEO of PGP Corporation. "Olivia has
more than 20 years of experience building innovative software solutions in
both startups and multi-billion-dollar corporations, including her work
with the original PGP Inc. Rajiv has more than 20 years of experience in
high-growth companies, taking new ideas from concept to innovative
products, including his experience at ValiCert. Both will enhance our
ability to meet our customers' needs."

 Ms. Dillan is an expert in product development, operations and services.
She has been responsible for many successful, award-winning products in the
areas of security, electronic commerce, application servers, database
management systems, application development tools, and new media tools and
applications. Most recently, she was Vice President of Engineering at
ServGate Technologies Inc., where she led the team responsible for
ServGate's award-winning security products, receiving PC Magazine's
Editor's Choice award, among others. Prior to ServGate, she held key senior
executive positions, including Co-founder and COO at Model N, VP of
Engineering at the NetDynamics Business Unit of Sun Microsystems, VP of the
New Media Tools & Applications Division at Oracle, VP of Product
Development at PGP Inc., and VP of Core Product Development at ASK/Ingres
(now Computer Associates). Ms. Dillan graduated summa cum laude with a B.A.
in Computer Science from Hunter College in New York.

 Mr. Dholakia has expertise in the areas of operating systems, electronic
commerce, AI and object-oriented development tools, security software for
electronic transactions, rights management and application vulnerability
detection. Most recently, as Vice President of Engineering at Cenzic, Mr.
Dholakia led the development of tools for assessing, testing and
remediating application security vulnerabilities. Prior to Cenzic, he was
Vice President of Product Development and later CTO at ValiCert, a leading
provider of secure authentication, messaging and collaboration software.
While at ValiCert, Mr. Dholakia created, implemented and oversaw the
products, secure data center and solutions that drove ValiCert's annual
revenues from zero to $24 million. In addition, he has held executive
positions at TestDrive, Taligent/IBM, Sun Microsystems and IntelliCorp. He
has a B.E. in Chemical Engineering from M.S. University in Baroda, India,
and did graduate work at the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida.

 About PGP Corporation

 Recognized worldwide as a leader in enterprise encryption technology, PGP
Corporation develops, markets and supports products used by more than
30,000 enterprises, businesses and governments worldwide, including 90% of
the Fortune 100 and 75% of the Forbes International 100. PGP products are
also used by thousands of individuals and cryptography experts to secure
proprietary and confidential information.

 During the past ten years, PGP(R) technology has earned a global
reputation for standards-based, trusted security products. PGP Corporation
is the only commercial security vendor to publish source code for peer
review. The unique PGP encryption product suite includes PGP Universal --
an automatic, self-managing, network-based solution for enterprises -- as
well as desktop, mobile and FTP/batch transfer solutions. Contact PGP
Corporation at www.pgp.com or 650-319-9000.

 PGP is a registered trademark and the PGP logo is a trademark of PGP
Corporation. Product and brand names used in the document may be trademarks
or registered trademarks of their respective owners. Any such trademarks or
registered trademarks are the sole property of their respective owners.
 Contacts
Jump Start Communications, LLC for PGP Corporation
Lori Curtis, 970-887-0044
lori at jumpstartcom dot com
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mixmaster at remailer.privacy.at  Tue Dec  7 01:00:51 2004
From: mixmaster at remailer.privacy.at (privacy.at Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Tue,  7 Dec 2004 10:00:51 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
Message-ID: <82919a23feba5d3c8ee6787f53d903be@remailer.privacy.at>

Steve Thompson:

> If that's true, then the government couldn't have stolen it. 
> However, I suspect that mainfraim code of any sophistication is
> rarely released into the public domain.  I imagine the author would
> be able to clear that up, assuming he has no financial reason to
> falsify its history.

    The page clearly states that the enhanced version was not in the
public domain or owned by the government, it was a completely new
version and the development was not funded by the government. The old
one was for 16 bit architecture whereas the new one was for 32 bit.


> > http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1.01/inslaw.html


> Perhaps I am stupid.  I don't know how one would go about modifying
> application software to include a 'back door' that would presumably
> enhance its suceptibility to TEMPEST attacks.  Isn't tempest all
> about EM spectrum signal detection and capture?

    ALL electronic devices emits signals that you can intercept and
obtain information from. Whether or not you can extract much useful
data or not depends, but generally you can always extract something.
This is a vast field and it's hard to generalize. I have personally
attended tests at a firm working for the military in a western
European country and I've seen how extremely easy it is to do remote
classic tempest-reading of the screen of a lap-top, to name only one
example. The equipment easily fits in only a station wagon. Generally
this is really hard to protect yourself from. Let's say you build
yourself a bunker and put your computer inside it but you forget to
run it on batteries, then you'll find out that signals will be
carried out on the electric cord entering your bunker and they'll be
readily readable outside anyway. You can't have any kind of opening
in and out of that bunker, not even for ventilation, so you see this
is hard to do.

    Maybe they built in other forms of remotely usable back-doors
too, just in case there were able to make contact with the computer
remotely over some network. This makes sense too, since one or two or
those computers surely were less protected.

    Some people falsely believe that only CRT screens can be read
remotely using TEMPEST techniques, this couldn't be more false, in
fact one of the test managers I spoke to said he thought it was
easier with TFT type monitors. Also remeber that we're not just
talking about monitors, many other devices emits interesting and
potential useful informaation: faxes, printers, networking hardware
etc.

    Those PROMIS people built in hardware on the motherboards that
emitted signals using a kind of jumping frequency technique. If you
have the key giving you he answer to how the frequencies are changed
you can easily intercept the data otherwise it becomes really hard to
do and esp hard to find out that there's anything emitting in the
first place - it looks like noise. The purpose of this was so that
they could sell the whole package, the PC with the software
pre-installed to customers and then they could sit in their wan down
the street and record.

It's no only happening in the movies you know :)

    BTW: I would also be interested in some more comments on Michael
Riconosciuto as a person, doesn't anyone have an opinion or know of
interesting info in this regard? Are there any books written by him
or by people on "his side" of the story?




From nobody at dizum.com  Tue Dec  7 01:50:04 2004
From: nobody at dizum.com (Nomen Nescio)
Date: Tue,  7 Dec 2004 10:50:04 +0100 (CET)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
Message-ID: <e4878ae71a1a20b24d5ae59072c79b4b@dizum.com>

Steve Furlong:

> Random racist ranting is also required. There are some racist
> assholes currently posting on cpunks, but none have quite the May
> flavor.

LOL

You can say that again. Here are a few examples of what this once
renowned cypherpunk usually writes nowadays.


First five quick quotes from Tim May, more further down.

> No wonder the white person wants the brown person sent up the
> chimneys, along with their Jew facillitators.


> I'm chortling. The burn-off of one hundred million useless eaters
> is going to be glorious.


> Me, I spend my years devoloping tools to fight the Zionist Entity,
> including the popular anonymous remailers and steganography to
> allow freedom fighters to fight Amerika and ZOG without detection, 
> to send the last evil Jew to the ovens.


> I cheered when this nigger was shot, in 1968, a very
> good year.


> We need to find ways to help Al Qaeda nuke Washington, D.C. Killing
> a quarter of a million government employee leeches and three
> quarters of a million negro welfare leeches sounds like a good
> deal.





Q: What do you call the death of a billion people from AIDS?
A: A good start.

Negroes in Africa believe that having sex with women and children
expells the virus from their body. (No, I did not just make this up.
Read the interviews with aid (no pun intended) workers.)

Basically, between AIDS, cannibalism, butchering of other tribes, bad
economic practices, corrupt liberal governments, the Dark Continent
is
burning off its negroes. The non-negro areas, in the extreme south
and
extreme north, are doing OK.

In 30 years the negro regions will have been cleansed, naturally, and
whites can colonize and make the entire continent prosperous.

--Tim May






Bush finally has admittted to "mistakes" in the planning of the war.
And now the search is on for which Jewish spy for ZOG bore the most
blame.

It's been clear for more than 16 months that ZOG viewed the war with
Iraq with delight, a chance to bloody one of their enemies without
themselves having to go to war. Feeding the DOD false information was
part of this disinformation campaign. And as the war with Iraq was
seen
to be winding down (though it has not, of course, as freedom fighters
in Iraq continue to kill Americans working for the ZOG state), the
Zionist Entity floated stories that _Syria_ was the _REAL_ enemy, or
maybe _Iran_, as the Ultimate Enemy.

We need to cut off funds to the ZOG state and let three million
ZOGster
figure out how to swim the Mediterranean, REAL FAST. The burn-off of
3
million ZOGsters would be glorious to behold.

The implicated ZOG spies should be given fair trials, and, if found
guilty, executed. None of the "kid glove treatment" that the ZOG spy
Pollard has been receiving.

Then we need to look very seriously at the Jews in our own midst.
Many
are not ZOGster, just Jews who fled oppressive regimes (which many of
their fellow Jews helped create, by the way, as the history of Lenin
and Marx and the early Jewish role in the formation of the Soviet
shows). But the many ZOGsters now feeding information to the ZOG
state
need to be rounded up, given fair trials, and liquidated. Entire
departments in the Pentagon will be decimated when this happens. Good
riddance.

As for the war in Iraq, we need to withdraw immediately, in 30 days.
This was ZOG's war, not ours. Let Ari Fleischer and Dov Zackheim and
Paul Wolfowith and Doug Feight become soldiers in the ZOG Army if
they
wish, and if they are not hung as spies, but get these united states
out of the business of fighting ZOG's wars.

--Tim May





You'll get the Trifecta with John Kerry: a Communist, a Jew (recently
acknowledged), and a Papist.  

Me, I'd rather we find the ZOG-employed traitors in the Pentagon, try
them, hang them, and then pull out of all such "foreign adventures"
or
"entanglements," which our first and most honest President warned us
about.

Let the Shiites and Sunnis fight it out in Iraq, let three million
ZOG
invaders swim for their lives, and let the entire Dark Continent deal
with its own savagery, AIDS, cannibalism, killings of Hutus, killings
of Tutsis, HIV, malaria, child rape, and voodoo in its own way. In 30
years the Dark Continent should be ready for white people, the last
Jew
in the ZOG state will have been nailed to a cross, and the world can
get on with things without U.S. Big Brother interference.


--Tim May





I "retired" more than 18 years ago, in 1986.

Near the beach, too. 

However, I don't believe active minds actually "retire." Rather, they
do what is important to them, whether or not K-Mart or Lockheed or
Apple or Intel is employing them.

Me, I spend my years devoloping tools to fight the Zionist Entity,
including the popular anonymous remailers and steganography to allow
freedom fighters to fight Amerika and ZOG without detection,  to send
the last evil Jew to the ovens.

And category theory, topos theory, Haskell, functional programmng,
and
crypto, so long as no Zionist criminals need to be dealt with.


--Tim May





Martian Luther King needed killing because he was just from fucking
Mars!

(Had this Martian not called for redistributing income from niggers
to
white people, he might still be alive. As it was, "good riddance to
nigger trash." I cheered when this nigger was shot, in 1968, a very
good year.)


--Tim May





Of course not. In many cases the orders to evacuate are the orders
for
the niggers to move in and start looting.

My sister was "ordered" to leave her home when Hurricane Hugo was
approaching Charleston in '89. She ignored this unconstitional order.
Her house was saved against the nigra looter who swarmed out of the
ghettoes. Her neighbors who obeyed Big Brother got fucked royally,
exactly as the nigger and his government allies wanted.

Those who tell us to leave our homes have earned killing. 

You hear that, Jeb, you nigger-loving statist criminal?


--Tim May




None of my Macs were built by niggers.

--Tim May




It is time we recognize the nigger, the spic, the layabout, the
addict,
the skank, the gutter sweepings, for what he or she is: trash.

The niggers and spics and garbage who demand that our Jew senators
tax
us to pay for their mistakes need killing. Our Jew politicians need
more than killing: they need their Jew spawn killed before their eyes
and then their Jew asses staked to the ground and left to slowly die.

Niggers in American ought to catch the next boat back to Sudan and
Zaire and Sierra Leone and Cannibaland, places where there whole
nigger
outlook is what they want, "respek, homes."

Fuck the nigger and his Jew lackey dead. 


--Tim May




As for you, you should be killed before the next new moon.

Good riiddance to nigger rubbish.

--Tim May





What was almost completed in the 1940s before the Jew Roosevelt
stopped
it, must be completed in the coming decades.

--Tim May




We need to find ways to help Al Qaeda nuke Washington, D.C. Killing a
quarter of a million government employee leeches and three quarters
of
a million negro welfare leeches sounds like a good deal.

Fuck them dead.

Allah Aqbar!


--Tim May





Anyone who thinks otherwise needs killing. Most Democrats and
Republicans need killing.

Fifty million niggers, Jews, Mexicans, and fellow travelers need
killing. 

Allah, we beseech thee: Kill the Sinful tens of millions.


--Tim May




We're talking about America and the U.S. Constitution, not something
called "The Geneva Convention" that Jews and niggers and commies in
Europe got passed.


--Tim May




We are taxed twice, thrice, even four times, for these facilities. We
are taxed at corporate rates, at individual rates, and then must pay
double or triple the actual rate to further subsidize these
hospitals.

No wonder the white person wants the brown person sent up the
chimneys,
along with their Jew facillitators.


--Tim May




I'm chortling. The burn-off of one hundred million useless eaters is
going to be glorious.


--Tim May




From nobody at dizum.com  Tue Dec  7 02:10:06 2004
From: nobody at dizum.com (Nomen Nescio)
Date: Tue,  7 Dec 2004 11:10:06 +0100 (CET)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
Message-ID: <9d9f62da83d244099605eb3bf9803261@dizum.com>

Peter Trei:

> > Where is Tim May when when you need him? :-)
> > 
> Try scruz.general.

or misc.survivalism




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Tue Dec  7 10:16:03 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 13:16:03 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Michael Riconosciuto, PROMIS
In-Reply-To: <82919a23feba5d3c8ee6787f53d903be@remailer.privacy.at>
Message-ID: <20041207181603.64174.qmail@web51809.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "privacy.at Anonymous Remailer" <mixmaster at remailer.privacy.at>
wrote: 
> Steve Thompson:
> 
> > If that's true, then the government couldn't have stolen it. 
> > However, I suspect that mainfraim code of any sophistication is
> > rarely released into the public domain.  I imagine the author would
> > be able to clear that up, assuming he has no financial reason to
> > falsify its history.
> 
>     The page clearly states that the enhanced version was not in the
> public domain or owned by the government, it was a completely new
> version and the development was not funded by the government. The old
> one was for 16 bit architecture whereas the new one was for 32 bit.

Excuse me; I only skimmed the article and missed the part that described
the original funding arrangements supporting the development of the
initial version.

You'd think that the development of software intended to be used by the
Justice Department, for an application of non-trivial sensitivity, would
be contracted out to a firm with existing connections to the government
law enforcement community.  But at that time, I suppose it could be said
that computer security and trust issues would have little chance of being
understood by largely computer-illiterate prosecutors and administrative
personnel.

Presumably today the award of software development contracts follows a
rigid and formal protocol -- for the protection of both parties.

> > > http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1.01/inslaw.html
> 
> > Perhaps I am stupid.  I don't know how one would go about modifying
> > application software to include a 'back door' that would presumably
> > enhance its susceptibility to TEMPEST attacks.  Isn't tempest all
> > about EM spectrum signal detection and capture?
> 
>     ALL electronic devices emits signals that you can intercept and
> obtain information from. Whether or not you can extract much useful
> data or not depends, but generally you can always extract something.

There are more general principles of information theory that apparently
apply to any instance in which code and a dictionary are used to process
information.  I believe that the extraction of information from such
processes at arbitrary points of access is something of a black art.

> This is a vast field and it's hard to generalize. I have personally
> attended tests at a firm working for the military in a western
> European country and I've seen how extremely easy it is to do remote
> classic tempest-reading of the screen of a lap-top, to name only one
> example. The equipment easily fits in only a station wagon. Generally

So goes the contemporary non-specialist understanding of the field.

> this is really hard to protect yourself from. Let's say you build
> yourself a bunker and put your computer inside it but you forget to
> run it on batteries, then you'll find out that signals will be
> carried out on the electric cord entering your bunker and they'll be
> readily readable outside anyway. You can't have any kind of opening
> in and out of that bunker, not even for ventilation, so you see this
> is hard to do.

Quite.  If you want to get any actual work done, the process exposes you
to the risk of leaking information to third-parties.  Assuming that is not
what is intended, I suppose you can spend a metric shitload of money on
measures designed to mitigate against specific risks, without any
guarantee of success.

>     Maybe they built in other forms of remotely usable back-doors
> too, just in case there were able to make contact with the computer
> remotely over some network. This makes sense too, since one or two or
> those computers surely were less protected.

In .5M LOC, just about anything is possible.  However, I don't believe
that  back-door code would have had anything to do with enhancing the
vulnerability of the system to TEMPEST attacks.
 
>     Some people falsely believe that only CRT screens can be read
> remotely using TEMPEST techniques, this couldn't be more false, in
> fact one of the test managers I spoke to said he thought it was
> easier with TFT type monitors. Also remeber that we're not just
> talking about monitors, many other devices emits interesting and
> potential useful informaation: faxes, printers, networking hardware
> etc.

Indeed.

I've heard rumours suggesting that arbitrary bus signals (SCSI, PCI, FSB)
are radiated with the same promiscuity as are monitor signals.  IIRC, a
sharp right-angle trace on a circuit board will allow the emmission a
detectable RF signal, contingent only on the sensitivity and proximity of
a suitably configured receiver.  Presumably the expense of designing
digital electronics with the criterion of minimising radiated signals is
not worth the bother for the vast majority of devices.  The status quo of
the commodity consumer market for computers and peripherals suggests that
the primary design criterion is the minimisation of manufacturing cost. 
Function and security criterion are necessarily compromised.
 
>     Those PROMIS people built in hardware on the motherboards that
> emitted signals using a kind of jumping frequency technique. If you
> have the key giving you he answer to how the frequencies are changed
> you can easily intercept the data otherwise it becomes really hard to
> do and esp hard to find out that there's anything emitting in the
> first place - it looks like noise. The purpose of this was so that
> they could sell the whole package, the PC with the software
> pre-installed to customers and then they could sit in their wan down
> the street and record.

Fascinating.
 
> It's no only happening in the movies you know :)

Don't get me started.  Social engineering on a grandiose scale; and that's
just about all anyone (in or out of the entertainment industry) needs to
know about Hollywood:  foresight that can be measured in calendar months;
ethics that make the BATF look good, etc.
 
>     BTW: I would also be interested in some more comments on Michael
> Riconosciuto as a person, doesn't anyone have an opinion or know of
> interesting info in this regard? Are there any books written by him
> or by people on "his side" of the story?

As people retire from the DOJ, FBI, and so on, it may happen that people
make mention of him in their biographies.  Assuming that they aren't
intimidated or into silence (or bought).


Regards,

Steve

______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Tue Dec  7 10:26:45 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 13:26:45 -0500 (EST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <e4878ae71a1a20b24d5ae59072c79b4b@dizum.com>
Message-ID: <20041207182645.20726.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- Nomen Nescio <nobody at dizum.com> wrote: 
> Steve Furlong:
> 
> > Random racist ranting is also required. There are some racist
> > assholes currently posting on cpunks, but none have quite the May
> > flavor.
> 
> LOL
> 
> You can say that again. Here are a few examples of what this once
> renowned cypherpunk usually writes nowadays.
> [snip]

Tim May has probably gotten all strange in the last few years, living in
his remote hilltop home, waiting to see the end that will not come since
the y2k crisis turned out to be nothing more than a financial boondoggle
for the companies that believed all the hype.

Imagine that his racist rantings are the expression of a frustration that
he cannot admit, and that the overtly bigoted expressions are a cover to
hide his real opinions on affairs over which he has no control.  I
sincerely doubt that he cares one way or another over the fate of
Washington welfare cases, the poor of Africa, or the 'Underground Zionist
Leaders of America' (or whatever).


Regards,

Steve



______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From roberte at ripnet.com  Tue Dec  7 12:08:31 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 15:08:31 -0500
Subject: loozers are lucky
Message-ID: <41B60DBF.5070407@ripnet.com>

What can society do about these people who think that they know something?

Well, first we deny the possibility that they have anything novel to 
say, then we arrange to have them find fault with themselves for what 
they perceive as their own shortcomings. Then after they have injured 
themselves trying to correct this implied deficiency, we tell them that 
maybe their ideas had merit, but the only efficient way to assess any 
idea, is for the originator to take responsibility for making them 
happen. If they are unable to demonstrate the successful application of 
the idea, we take this as proof that the idea was no good to begin with. 
Such is the application of market theory to the systematic suppression 
of unsupported ideas. The attitudes of Winners and Losers alike, are 
taken to be the causative factor. We recognize the effect of the self 
fulfilling prophesy. In both cases what is going unmentioned is the 
structural context. Winners are those we give credit to, Losers face 
responsibility for not being creditable. Winners will credit their 
success to luck and hard work, but Losers are left to reach the 
conclusion that either it is all their personal fault, or they have been 
the victim of bad luck.

 

What to do about the illusion of functional autonomy vs. the principle 
of independence?

 

Self control: we must become sufficiently self aware to realize that 
this vital instrument of independence is exactly the force that 
imprisons so many of us within a personal hell. As a society we would be 
well advised to examine the structural realities that leave so many of 
us with broken dreams and a poverty of options. The merit principle is 
all very well, but isnt it is a clear sign of a sick society, when we 
conflate winning the lottery, with demonstrating competence?

----------------------------


Tim would bake them
John word salads
While Bobrah sells tickets
to a geodesic  fantasyland


Detweiler mourns with Vulis,
Choate and Sunder trade insults

While Art and CJ make licences
in an authoritarian nightmare


me, I'm just a lawn mower




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec  7 14:46:43 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 17:46:43 -0500
Subject: Florida E-Vote Study Debunked
Message-ID: <p061104fabddbe310fe58@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,65896,00.html>

Wired News


Florida E-Vote Study Debunked 
By Kim Zetter?

Story location: http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,65896,00.html

02:00 AM Dec. 07, 2004 PT

A study by Berkeley grad students and a professor showing anomalies with
electronic-voting machines in Florida has been debunked by numerous
academics who say the students used a faulty equation to reach their
results and should never have released the study before getting it
peer-reviewed.

 The study, released three weeks ago by seven graduate students from the
University of California, Berkeley's Quantitative Methods Research Team and
sociology professor Michael Hout, presented analysis showing a discrepancy
in the number of votes Bush received in counties that used touch-screen
voting machines versus counties that used other types of voting equipment.


 But Bruce McCullough, a decisions science professor at Drexel University
in Philadelphia, and Binghamton University economics professor Florenz
Plassmann released an analysis (.pdf) of the Berkeley report criticizing
the results.

 According to the Berkeley study, the number of votes granted to Bush in
touch-screen counties far exceeded expectation, given a number of variables
-- including the number of votes those counties gave Bush in 2000 -- while
counties using other types of voting equipment gave Bush a predictable
number of votes.

 The analysis was not peer-reviewed, although Hout and the students said
that seven professors examined their numbers. They would not speculate
about what occurred with the voting machines, but voting activists on
internet forums seized the study as proof of faulty voting machines or
election fraud. Drexel University's McCullough, however, found fault with
the study.

 "What they did with their model is wrong, and their results are flawed,"
McCullough said. "They claim those results have some meaning, but I don't
know how they can do that."

 McCullough said they focused on one statistical model to conduct their
analysis while ignoring other statistical models that would have produced
opposite results.

 "They either overlooked or did not bother to find a much better-fitting
(statistical) regression model that showed that e-voting didn't account
(for the voting anomalies)," McCullough said.

 Charles Stewart, an MIT political science professor, called the study "the
type of exercise that you do in a graduate data-analysis class" rather than
as an academic paper.

 "If I were to get this article as (an academic) reviewer, I would turn it
around and say they were fishing to find a result," Stewart said. "I know
of no theory or no prior set of intuitions that would have led me to run
the analysis they ran."

 He pointed out that only two of the 15 counties using touch-screen
machines in Florida exhibited anomalous results.

 "There was something unusual that went on in two counties, but there are
many other things that could give rise to this anomaly," Stewart said.
"Most of them are things that we're pretty sure affected this presidential
election -- such as get-out-the-vote efforts by Republicans and special
efforts at mobilizing Jewish voters over the issue of Israel and terrorism."

 Hout defended his study, saying that he and the students tested several
alternative hypotheses, but none eliminated the machines as a possible
cause.

 "The point that there might be something else that these counties have in
common besides the technology is always a possibility in any statistical
analysis," he said. He acknowledged that he and the students were unable to
look at other data that might alter their conclusion, such as a breakdown
of votes for Bush per voting machine or an analysis of votes cast by
absentee paper ballots in the touch-screen counties.

 Regardless of the merits of the Berkeley study, Stewart said valid
questions about the election results in Florida and elsewhere remain
unanswered. To that end, a number of groups will be investigating and
releasing reports in coming months.

 On Tuesday, Common Cause, the Century Foundation and the Leadership
Council on Civil Rights are holding a day-long conference in Washington,
D.C., to discuss the election. And the nonpartisan Social Science Research
Council has launched a National Research Commission on Elections and Voting
to examine systemic issues with elections and voting as well as specific
issues from this year's elections, such as the disparity between exit polls
and final election results. The Government Accountability Office is also
looking into issues related to the election.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From shmoocon-news at lists.shmoo.com  Tue Dec  7 15:24:28 2004
From: shmoocon-news at lists.shmoo.com (shmoocon-news at lists.shmoo.com)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 18:24:28 -0500
Subject: [ShmooCon-News] ShmooCon Reserve-a-Room Raffle
Message-ID: <mailman.1100.1576007652.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Reserve a room for the nights of February 4th and 5th under the
ShmooCon group code at the Marriot Wardman Park Hotel by January 1st,
or while rooms last, and you will be entered in the in the first
annual ShmooCon Reserve-a-Room Raffle--which includes food, wireless
gear, Washington Wizards tickets, and believe it or not, a very sexy
OQO Model 01.

What's an OQO Model 01?  Check it out:

http://www.oqo.com

And you could have a chance to get one at ShmooCom 2005.  But only if
you reserve a room at the con hotel for ShmooCon!  Hurry!  We have a
limited number of rooms set aside for conference attendees!  More
information is HERE:

http://www.shmoocon.org/location.html

Specifically, you can reserve a room online with our group code via
the following link:

http://www.marriott.com/reservations/init.asp?marshacode=wasdt&path=marriott&gc=shoshoa

Check in on the 4th.  Check out on the 6th.

Note, and NOT mentioned on the website, we have exactly 100 rooms set
aside for the nights of the 4th and the 5th, and over 30 have already
been reserved as of this Monday.  That number appears to be steadily
dwindling, so heads up.

Sincerely,

Beetle
_______________________________________________
Shmoocon-News mailing list
Shmoocon-News at lists.shmoo.com
https://lists.shmoo.com/mailman/listinfo/shmoocon-news

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec  7 15:40:51 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 18:40:51 -0500
Subject: Fingerprint, photo system at border runs smoothly
Message-ID: <p061104f7bddbe2cbee0b@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://sun.yumasun.com/artman/publish/print/printer_13544.php>


Yuma Sun

Local News

Fingerprint, photo system at border runs smoothly
 BY JEFFREY GAUTREAUX, STAFF WRITER
 Dec 7, 2004



 SAN LUIS, Ariz. - While it was initially feared that new digital
fingerprint and photograph technology might slow visa issuance at United
States ports of entry, the first day at San Luis showed exactly the
opposite.

 Acting port director William Brooks, of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, said the new screening technology went live at 6 a.m. Monday
and ran smoothly throughout the morning.

 "One of the best things about it is that it's transparent," Brooks said.

 "It's been a savings of three minutes per person. It's actually sped it up
when there was fear it would be slow."

 The U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, or US-VISIT,
began Nov. 15 with pilot programs in Douglas; Laredo, Texas; and Port
Huron, Mich.

 According to the Department of Homeland Security Web site, US-VISIT
tightens border security by recording the entry and exit of people who are
not U.S. citizens, making sure that visas are used only by the people to
whom they were issued, and checking visitors against government watch lists.

 San Luis, Lukeville and Nogales in Arizona, and Calexico and Andrade in
California began using US-VISIT for the first time on Monday.

 Brooks said the new system was scheduled to be in operation in the 50
busiest ports by the end of this month. He said the San Luis port was in
the "upper portion" of that top 50.

 Most Mexican visitors to the United States who use a border-crossing card
to enter the border zone will not be screened by the system. Brooks said
Customs will process an average of 50 applications per day, and each will
take about five to eight minutes.

 While the technology has improved, the requirements and fees to get a visa
remain the same. The fee is $6, and visitors must establish sovereignty and
residency in their home country, Brooks said.

 Visas issued from different ports of entry entitle the bearer to different
opportunities within the U.S. Temporary visas issued from the San Luis port
allow visitors to travel within 25 miles of the border and stay no longer
than 72 hours. Visas for longer stays with more travel freedom are also
available.

 According to DHS, US-VISIT applies to all visitors (with limited
exemptions) holding nonimmigrant visas, regardless of country of origin.
Visas are required for most students, business travelers - depending on
their length of stay - and millions of other visitors, regardless of where
they live.

 For now, US-VISIT is focused only on those entering the country. However,
Brooks said similar technology is being developed for people who are
exiting the country. This equipment is scheduled for testing in 2005 and
2006.

 Brooks said Customs employees had no trouble getting used to the new "user
friendly" system. Four sets of digital cameras and fingerprint scanners are
placed right on the counter, so pictures and scans can be taken right
there, rather than having applicants have to go through a single line.

 Visas can be swiped through a card reader, so all of the information about
its holder comes up on the computer instantly. Brooks said this is why the
system can work more quickly than the old process, which relied heavily on
writing by hand.

 Brooks declined to identify what kinds of databases are searched when
people have their fingerprints scanned.

 "It checks various databases that are available to us for derogatory
information," he said.

 The digital cameras, fingerprint scanners and printers are all brand-new.
Brooks said the computer workstations had recently been upgraded, and there
are plans to redesign the counter area.

 After 21 years with Customs, Brooks said the US-VISIT technology was
another improvement on a long list of amazing changes.

 "The technology has grown by leaps and bounds," he said. "And now it goes
even faster."

 Jeffrey Gautreaux can be reached at jgautreaux at yumasun.com or 539-6858.
 The Associated Press contributed to this story.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec  7 15:48:04 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 18:48:04 -0500
Subject: [ShmooCon-News] ShmooCon Reserve-a-Room Raffle
Message-ID: <p06110403bddbf1a16863@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From marquezthierry at yahoo.fr  Tue Dec  7 09:53:27 2004
From: marquezthierry at yahoo.fr (MARQUEZ Thierry)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 18:53:27 +0100
Subject: [osint] Missing uniforms revive 9/11 fears in Canada
Message-ID: <mailman.1101.1576007652.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1141489,00050001.htm
Missing uniforms revive 9/11 fears in Canada
Gurmukh Singh
Vancouver, December 7

The 9/11 has cast its shadow over Canada as hundreds of uniforms, including
badges, worn by screeners at 89 airports across Canada have gone missing,
setting alarm bells ringing over air travel safety in North America.

Numbering 1,127, the uniforms and badges have been stolen or gone missing
over a period of nine months.

Canadian and American aviation authorities fear the uniforms and badges
might be used by terrorists to gain entry into airports and hijack planes.
Hundreds of planes fly into the US every day from Canadian destinations.

Transport minister Jean Lapierre sought a report from the Canadian Air
Transport Security Authority (CATSA), which looks after security at the
nation's airports, on Saturday.

The minister was booed in Parliament when he tried to assure the House that
all possible steps were being taken to check the misuse of the uniforms.
Airports had been alerted and the private firms conducting screening at
airports asked to double-check the ID of all employees.





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From roberte at ripnet.com  Tue Dec  7 16:21:34 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 19:21:34 -0500
Subject: Timing Paranoia
Message-ID: <41B6490E.3030603@ripnet.com>

One of the tools currently being used in the cognitive sciences is the 
measurement of reaction time to stimulus.
It turns out that the length of time it takes to given situations is a 
credible proxy for how difficult the discrimination is to make.
Imagine a paranoia  involving  mysterious e-mail delays and the length 
of time it takes to catagorize




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec  7 16:37:29 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 19:37:29 -0500
Subject: Klan's unmasked for city protests
Message-ID: <p06110406bddbfd321e68@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.nydailynews.com/news/local/v-pfriendly/story/259512p-222307c.html>

New York Daily News

Klan's unmasked for city protests
 BY DEREK ROSE
DAILY NEWS STAFF WRITER
 Tuesday, December 7th, 2004

 The hoods hiding under the white hoods of the Ku Klux Klan will have to
show their faces if they want to protest in New York City, the Supreme
Court decided yesterday.

 The high court put an end to a five-year legal battle yesterday by
refusing to hear an appeal of the city's mask ordinance filed by a KKK
offshoot group.

 The group had argued its rights were violated in 1999, when the city
barred its members from a masked protest in Foley Square. Seventeen members
demonstrated anyway - along with 6,000 counterprotesters.

 A federal appeals court ruled against the Church of the American Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan in January, calling the city's 159-year-old ordinance
constitutional.

 "While the First Amendment protects the rights of citizens to express
their viewpoints, however unpopular, it does not guarantee ideal conditions
for doing so," the appeals court said.

 The city ordinance forbids gatherings of three or more masked or hooded
people - unless they are attending "a masquerade party or like
entertainment."

 Since the law was dusted off to stop the KKK rally, it has been used
generally against left-wing protesters at events like May Day protests, the
Republican National Convention and the 2002 World Economic Forum.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Dec  7 19:45:24 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 19:45:24 -0800
Subject: primes as far as the eye can see, discrete continua
Message-ID: <41B678D4.1FCD8120@cdc.gov>

Saw in a recent _Science_ that Ben Green of Cambridge proved
that for any N, there are an infinite number of evenly spaced
progressions
of primes that are N numbers long.   He got a prize for that.  Damn
straight.

Now back to the decline of the neo-roman empire...




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Dec  7 19:53:38 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 19:53:38 -0800
Subject: malevolent randomness
Message-ID: <41B67AC2.C4FEF65C@cdc.gov>

At 07:46 PM 12/4/04 -0500, Steve Furlong wrote:
>Much evidence to the contrary. My life is sucking pretty bad lately,
due
>to either a long series of fairly unlikely and uniformly unpleasant
>coincidences or else the machinations of a malevolent universe set up
>specifically to piss me off.

Please remember to watch a random stream.  Random negatives will
occur in surprisingly long to your finite-state simian mind sequences.

Myself, I run a geiger counter, and it makes me happy.  Some bins,
no counts, others, a few times higher than average.  Dig?

-----
"The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to
chance."
 -Robert R. Coveyou ORNL mathematician




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Dec  7 19:58:43 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 19:58:43 -0800
Subject: metaforce
Message-ID: <41B67BF3.35348C38@cdc.gov>

At 09:41 AM 12/5/04 -0500, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
>John would warn you about the organ cuts
>Tim would rave about the sizzle stake
>I'm just scoping out the meat-eye view through the grinder.
>
>--bob
>of mad cow metephors

Bleating and babbling we fell on his neck with a scream..

-Cows with guns == unintentional consequences




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Dec  7 20:08:59 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 20:08:59 -0800
Subject: tempest back doors
Message-ID: <41B67E5B.18ED78E7@cdc.gov>

>Perhaps I am stupid.  I don't know how one would go about modifying
>application software to include a 'back door' that would presumably
>enhance its suceptibility to TEMPEST attacks.  Isn't tempest all about
EM
>spectrum signal detection and capture?

You have your code drive a bus with signal.  The bus radiates, you
'TEMPEST' the signal, game over.  Back in the 60s folks programmed
PDPs to play music on AM radios.  Same thing.  Dig?




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Dec  7 20:12:56 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 20:12:56 -0800
Subject: Where is TM when you need him?
Message-ID: <41B67F48.3CFF8433@cdc.gov>

At 11:10 AM 12/7/04 +0100, Nomen Nescio wrote:
>Peter Trei:
>
>> > Where is Tim May when when you need him? :-)
>> >
>> Try scruz.general.
>
>or misc.survivalism

For some time after he left, he cruised a feline group, perhaps
because one of his cats died.   Perhaps this was the inspiration
for Puss, an anonymous freelance purveyor of force, in _Shrek II_.

Or not.




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Dec  7 20:15:22 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 20:15:22 -0800
Subject: cog sci as a tool of the beast? 
Message-ID: <41B67FDA.3864FFC8@cdc.gov>

At 07:21 PM 12/7/04 -0500, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
>One of the tools currently being used in the cognitive sciences is the
>measurement of reaction time to stimulus.
>It turns out that the length of time it takes to given situations is a
>credible proxy for how difficult the discrimination is to make.
>Imagine a paranoia  involving  mysterious e-mail delays and the length
>of time it takes to catagorize

The viewscreens of the future will simply monitor the blood flow
to various areas of the cortex to see if we are lying when we
express our minute of hate, or love for the rulers.  RT is so
passe.




From roberte at ripnet.com  Tue Dec  7 17:16:53 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 20:16:53 -0500
Subject: loozers are lucky
Message-ID: <41B65605.5090508@ripnet.com>

What can society do about these people who think that they know something?

Well, first we deny the possibility that they have anything novel to
say, then we arrange to have them find fault with themselves for what
they perceive as their own shortcomings. Then after they have injured
themselves trying to correct this implied deficiency, we tell them that
maybe their ideas had merit, but the only efficient way to assess any
idea, is for the originator to take responsibility for making them
happen. If they are unable to demonstrate the successful application of
the idea, we take this as proof that the idea was no good to begin with.
Such is the application of market theory to the systematic suppression
of unsupported ideas. The attitudes of Winners and Losers alike, are
taken to be the causative factor. We recognize the effect of the self
fulfilling prophesy. In both cases what is going unmentioned is the
structural context. Winners are those we give credit to, Losers face
responsibility for not being creditable. Winners will credit their
success to luck and hard work, but Losers are left to reach the
conclusion that either it is all their personal fault, or they have been
the victim of bad luck.



What to do about the illusion of functional autonomy vs. the principle
of independence?



Self control: we must become sufficiently self aware to realize that
this vital instrument of independence is exactly the force that
imprisons so many of us within a personal hell. As a society we would be
well advised to examine the structural realities that leave so many of
us with broken dreams and a poverty of options. The merit principle is
all very well, but is'nt it is a clear sign of a sick society, when we
conflate winning the lottery, with demonstrating competence?

----------------------------


Tim would bake them
John word salads
While Bobrah sells tickets
to a geodesic  fantasyland


Detweiler mourns with Vulis,
Choate and Sunder trade insults

While Art and CJ make licences
in an authoritarian nightmare


me, I'm just a lawn mower




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Dec  7 20:16:54 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 20:16:54 -0800
Subject: Supremes need hanging
Message-ID: <41B68036.E210D5C8@cdc.gov>

At 07:37 PM 12/7/04 -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
><http://www.nydailynews.com/news/local/v-pfriendly/story/259512p-222307c.html>

>Klan's unmasked for city protests
> The hoods hiding under the white hoods of the Ku Klux Klan will have
to
>show their faces if they want to protest in New York City, the Supreme
>Court decided yesterday.

Anonymity is as american as the BoR.  The supremes need thermal chimney
ascension for their deriliction of sworn duty.




From mpc at innographx.com  Tue Dec  7 19:56:22 2004
From: mpc at innographx.com (Matthew P. Cashdollar)
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 21:56:22 -0600
Subject: [i2p] I2P vs. Tor
Message-ID: <mailman.1102.1576007652.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Daniel Burton wrote:
>I was wondering if someone in the know could explain the principal
>differences between I2P and Tor to me, in both maturity level and
>connection methodology.

http://www.i2p.net/how_networkcomparisons

(Although I find it hard to imagine how Java rather than C is a /benefit/ :)
_______________________________________________
i2p mailing list
i2p at i2p.net
http://i2p.dnsalias.net/mailman/listinfo/i2p

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From chuckw at quantumlinux.com  Tue Dec  7 22:04:20 2004
From: chuckw at quantumlinux.com (Chuck Wolber)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 22:04:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: primes as far as the eye can see, discrete continua
In-Reply-To: <41B678D4.1FCD8120@cdc.gov>
References: <41B678D4.1FCD8120@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.60.0412072203170.3269@bailey.quantumlinux.com>

On Tue, 7 Dec 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:

> 
> Saw in a recent _Science_ that Ben Green of Cambridge proved that for 
> any N, there are an infinite number of evenly spaced progressions of 
> primes that are N numbers long.  He got a prize for that.  Damn 
> straight.

Where N is a natural number? How do they define "progression"? Depending 
on that definition, there are some trivial counter examples.

-Chuck


-- 
http://www.quantumlinux.com 
 Quantum Linux Laboratories, LLC.
 ACCELERATING Business with Open Technology

 "The measure of the restoration lies in the extent to which we apply 
  social values more noble than mere monetary profit." - FDR




From MPajer at aol.com  Wed Dec  8 05:06:44 2004
From: MPajer at aol.com (MPajer at aol.com)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 08:06:44 EST
Subject: Kein Thema
Message-ID: <78.67e630f8.2ee85664@aol.com>

unsubscribe




From kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com  Wed Dec  8 06:17:30 2004
From: kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com (John Kelsey)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 09:17:30 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
Message-ID: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>

>From: Steve Thompson <steve49152 at yahoo.ca>
>Sent: Dec 7, 2004 1:26 PM
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: "Word" Of the Subgenius...

...
>Tim May has probably gotten all strange in the last few years, living in
>his remote hilltop home, waiting to see the end that will not come since
>the y2k crisis turned out to be nothing more than a financial boondoggle
>for the companies that believed all the hype.

Maybe, maybe not.  The thing I always find interesting and annoying about Tim May's posts is that he's sometimes making really clearly thought out, intelligent points, and other times spewing out nonsense so crazy you can't believe it's coming from the same person.  It's also clear he's often yanking peoples' chains, often by saying the most offensive thing he can think of.  But once in awhile, even amidst the crazy rantings about useless eaters and ovens, he'll toss out something that shows some deep, coherent thought about some issue in a new and fascinating direction. 

...
>Steve

--John




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  8 06:26:51 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 09:26:51 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
References: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <p061104abbddcbf60a23d@[66.149.49.5]>

At 9:17 AM -0500 12/8/04, John Kelsey wrote:
> But once in awhile, even amidst the crazy rantings about useless eaters
>and ovens, he'll toss out something that shows some deep, coherent thought
>about some issue in a new and fascinating direction.

Yup.

Canonical Cypherpunk, and all that. Impossible to keep in a killfile, etc.

Like it or not, we live in a Maysian Universe...

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From MPajer at aol.com  Wed Dec  8 06:31:27 2004
From: MPajer at aol.com (MPajer at aol.com)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 09:31:27 EST
Subject: Kein Thema
Message-ID: <c1.4d22fa4c.2ee86a3f@aol.com>

unsubscribe




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Dec  8 07:30:22 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2004 10:30:22 -0500
Subject: primes as far as the eye can see, discrete continua
In-Reply-To: <41B678D4.1FCD8120@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F76231D409E759815A95809BB60@phx.gbl>

What about where N=1?

I don't understand. You can only have an infinite number (or number of 
progressions) where the number of numbers in a number is inifinite.

-TD

>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: primes as far as the eye can see, discrete continua
>Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 19:45:24 -0800
>
>Saw in a recent _Science_ that Ben Green of Cambridge proved
>that for any N, there are an infinite number of evenly spaced
>progressions
>of primes that are N numbers long.   He got a prize for that.  Damn
>straight.
>
>Now back to the decline of the neo-roman empire...




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Dec  8 07:34:36 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2004 10:34:36 -0500
Subject: Supremes need hanging
In-Reply-To: <41B68036.E210D5C8@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F127922500E1DEA01772E6A9BB60@phx.gbl>

Yes, this batch seems to sway in the collective wind.

Which actually suprised me...despite the source of appointment of Suter, I 
remember reading at the time about his track record somewhere and was 
actually under the impression that he was a very 'conservative' interpreter 
of Constitutional law...and by conservative I mean really does not stray 
from clear precedent unless it's called for...he actually seemed to have 
some kind of weird integrity.

But I was wrong. Where's the coal...

-TD

>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Supremes need hanging
>Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 20:16:54 -0800
>
>At 07:37 PM 12/7/04 -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> ><http://www.nydailynews.com/news/local/v-pfriendly/story/259512p-222307c.html>
>
> >Klan's unmasked for city protests
> > The hoods hiding under the white hoods of the Ku Klux Klan will have
>to
> >show their faces if they want to protest in New York City, the Supreme
> >Court decided yesterday.
>
>Anonymity is as american as the BoR.  The supremes need thermal chimney
>ascension for their deriliction of sworn duty.




From roberte at ripnet.com  Wed Dec  8 07:37:25 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2004 10:37:25 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <20041208142439.GF9221@leitl.org>
References: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
  <20041208142439.GF9221@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <41B71FB5.2020709@ripnet.com>

Eugen Leitl wrote:

>On Wed, Dec 08, 2004 at 09:17:30AM -0500, John Kelsey wrote:
>
>  
>
>>Maybe, maybe not.  The thing I always find interesting and annoying about Tim May's posts is that he's sometimes making really clearly thought out, intelligent points, and other times spewing out nonsense so crazy you can't believe it's coming from the same person.  It's also clear he's often yanking peoples' chains, often by saying the most offensive thing he can think of.  But once in awhile, even amidst the crazy rantings about useless eaters and ovens, he'll toss out something that shows some deep, coherent thought about some issue in a new and fascinating direction. 
>>    
>>
>
>There was no doubt he was trolling. I never figured out the precise reason,
>though. Attempted suicide by cop? Free speech illustration? You tell me.
>Neither is sufficient interesting. 
>
>  
>
the Zen Master's stick:
irrationality is not to be overcome
its value recognizes you
as you become undone




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Dec  8 07:37:49 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2004 10:37:49 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F154CB74F810A0C7D905FA19BB60@phx.gbl>

"But
once in awhile, even amidst the crazy rantings about useless eaters and 
ovens,
he'll toss out something that shows some deep, coherent thought about some 
issue
in a new and fascinating direction."

Agreed. Though even his racisism seemed to have some kind of half-baked 
thought behind it. Or at least, baked just enough to deflect most of those 
not fully prepared to assail it.

-TD

>From: John Kelsey <kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
>Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 09:17:30 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
>
> >From: Steve Thompson <steve49152 at yahoo.ca>
> >Sent: Dec 7, 2004 1:26 PM
> >To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
> >Subject: Re: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
>
>...
> >Tim May has probably gotten all strange in the last few years, living in
> >his remote hilltop home, waiting to see the end that will not come since
> >the y2k crisis turned out to be nothing more than a financial boondoggle
> >for the companies that believed all the hype.
>
>Maybe, maybe not.  The thing I always find interesting and annoying about 
>Tim May's posts is that he's sometimes making really clearly thought out, 
>intelligent points, and other times spewing out nonsense so crazy you can't 
>believe it's coming from the same person.  It's also clear he's often 
>yanking peoples' chains, often by saying the most offensive thing he can 
>think of.  But once in awhile, even amidst the crazy rantings about useless 
>eaters and ovens, he'll toss out something that shows some deep, coherent 
>thought about some issue in a new and fascinating direction.
>
>...
> >Steve
>
>--John




From sfurlong at acmenet.net  Wed Dec  8 07:38:29 2004
From: sfurlong at acmenet.net (Steve Furlong)
Date: 08 Dec 2004 10:38:29 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <p061104abbddcbf60a23d@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
  	 <p061104abbddcbf60a23d@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <1102520309.26009.11.camel@daft>

On Wed, 2004-12-08 at 09:26, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> At 9:17 AM -0500 12/8/04, John Kelsey wrote:
> > But once in awhile, even amidst the crazy rantings about useless eaters
> >and ovens, he'll toss out something that shows some deep, coherent thought
> >about some issue in a new and fascinating direction.
> 
> Yup.
> 
> Canonical Cypherpunk, and all that. Impossible to keep in a killfile, etc.
> 
> Like it or not, we live in a Maysian Universe...

All we need is a Bayesian Maysian filter to separate the wheat from the
(racist | deranged | anarchist | readthearchives) chaff.

On a related note, is it possible that Tim has syphillis and it went to
his brain? His earlier work was certainly insightful, well thought-out,
and useful. His later writings, generally useless and irritating though
they were, still had occasional relevance. Poor Tim, sharing Nietzsche's
fate.




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  8 07:46:45 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 10:46:45 -0500
Subject: k-way hash collisions
Message-ID: <p061104b7bddcd2481078@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text


Delivered-To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
Comment: DomainKeys? See http://antispam.yahoo.com/domainkeys
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 07:21:18 -0800 (PST)
From: kas kati <kaskati2003 at yahoo.com>
Subject: k-way hash collisions
To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
Sender: owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com

For an ideal hash function, the complexity of finding a k-way
collision is
O(2^{(k-1)n/k}) therefore as k becomes larger, the complexity of a
k-way collision attack approaches the complexity of a pre-image
attack.

Recently, Joux showed a generic multi-collision attack for iterated
hash functions to reduce the k-way collision complexity to
O(log(k)*2^{(n/2)}). But in his attack the pre-images are not
independent. They are just combinations of block collisions of k
blocks. Here are my questions:

1. How can the formula for the complexity of finding a k-way collision
be derived?

2. Is there any hash design that allows to reduce the complexity of
k-way collision for "independent" pre-images while preserving the
complexity of the pre-image attack?

Thanks in advance for your interest.




---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  8 07:47:48 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 10:47:48 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <1102520309.26009.11.camel@daft>
References: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
   	  <p061104abbddcbf60a23d@[66.149.49.5]>
  <1102520309.26009.11.camel@daft>
Message-ID: <p061104b8bddcd290218c@[66.149.49.5]>

At 10:38 AM -0500 12/8/04, Steve Furlong wrote:
>anarchist

Bzzt wrong answer.

Must filter that *in*, thankewverramuch...

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Wed Dec  8 10:48:53 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2004 10:48:53 -0800
Subject: Bugs in the belfry
In-Reply-To: <p061104b9bddcd2da32da@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p061104b9bddcd2da32da@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20041208103700.03b7a890@pop.idiom.com>

At 07:49 AM 12/8/2004, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
>So was Nietzsche suffering, as many have argued,
>from incipient paresis when he wrote "Twilight of the Idols," et al?
>If so, then (the argument goes) these late books,
>brilliant as they may appear to be, can't be taken as seriously as his
>earlier, saner writing. Or did the philosopher go mad from
>some other cause all of a sudden, in the space of a
>single day, as others prefer to believe?

If you're a literary-crit type, interested in the evolution of
Nietzsche's thought, that's an interesting kind of question,
and you can go looking for evidence in the changes in
ideas and expression between his earlier and later books.

However, if you're trying to examine the question of
whether his books should be taken seriously
as philosophy, as opposed to whether they're
Significant Art, then that doesn't really matter;
the question is whether the ideas as written
are any good or are crackpot lunacy,
which is independent of whether the author was a crackpot.

I suppose if you're trying to evaluate whether
they're a good philosophy for actual living,
you can look at the effects of Nietzsche's
ideas on his life, but that's a much broader study,
and the direct lesson here is that
unsafe sex isn't a good idea..

Disclaimer - most of what I've read of Nietzsche was
when we had to translate some of it in high school German class.
It's very frustrating to be reading something that
appears to say that the destruction of the human race
would be a good thing and have to figure out if that's
because you got a verb tense wrong or because it's Nietzsche.


----
Bill Stewart  bill.stewart at pobox.com 




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  8 07:49:09 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 10:49:09 -0500
Subject: Bugs in the belfry
Message-ID: <p061104b9bddcd2da32da@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2004/11/28/bugs_in_the_belfry?mode=PF>

The Boston Globe

THE EXAMINED LIFE

Bugs in the belfry

By Joshua Glenn, Globe Staff  |  November 28, 2004

FOR OVER a century, philosophers and literary scholars have debated whether
or not the apocalyptic, sometimes megalomaniacal qualities of the final
books written by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche can be chalked
up to the gradually unfolding delusions and personality disturbances of the
author's paresis (tertiary syphilis). In the current issue of Daedalus, the
journal of the Cambridge-based American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the
distinguished UMass-Amherst geobiologist Lynn Margulis announces that the
answer to this longstanding riddle has been discovered floating in a Cape
Cod pond.

To recap: In 1888, a sickly Nietzsche wrote the tracts "Twilight of the
Idols," "The Antichrist," "Ecce Homo," and "The Case of Wagner" in a burst
of productivity. But the following January in Turin, he flung his arms
around the neck of a horse being flogged, collapsed in the piazza, and
swiftly descended into a raving dementia brought on -- as records of a
young Nietzsche's treatment for syphilis 30 years earlier would appear to
indicate -- by paresis. So was Nietzsche suffering, as many have argued,
from incipient paresis when he wrote "Twilight of the Idols," et al? If so,
then (the argument goes) these late books, brilliant as they may appear to
be, can't be taken as seriously as his earlier, saner writing. Or did the
philosopher go mad from some other cause all of a sudden, in the space of a
single day, as others prefer to believe?

That's where Margulis, an expert in microorganisms who has no reputation as
a Nietzsche scholar, comes in -- to say "neither."

After explaining that syphilis is a syndrome caused by the ravages of the
spirochete Treponema pallidum (the lively, corkscrew-shaped bacterium
pictured at right), Margulis elaborates on her own recent research into
spirochetes by weighing in on the long-running debate over Nietzsche's
brain. Yes, Nietzsche's madness was undoubtedly caused by paresis, she
writes -- but he most likely went crazy quite suddenly, as opposed to over
the course of weeks and months. "Nietzsche's brain on January 3, 1889
experienced a transformation," she states -- which means that his books of
1888 weren't written by a delusional kook.

But is it possible for paresis to appear overnight, instead of slowly?
Margulis believes it is, and as evidence points to studies of microbial mat
samples taken from Eel Pond in Woods Hole and kept in a jar in a
UMass-Amherst lab. Although no typical spirochetes were found in these
samples, Margulis recounts, when food and water known to support spirochete
activity were added to some samples, spirochetes that could only have been
been lying dormant suddenly awoke from their slumber. Extrapolating from
these experiments, Margulis argues that inactive Treponema pallidum
spirochetes had been hiding out in Nietzsche's tissues ever since his
syphilis treatment some 30 years earlier."

But on January 3, 1889 in Turin," Margulis concludes, channeling Vincent
Price, "armies of revived spirochetes munched on his brain tissue. The
consequence was the descent of Nietzsche the genius into Nietzsche the
madman in less than one day." ? ) Copyright  2004 The New York Times Company
 

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Wed Dec  8 11:01:40 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2004 11:01:40 -0800
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <1102523144.26009.86.camel@daft>
References: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
   <p061104abbddcbf60a23d@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <1102520309.26009.11.camel@daft> 
  <p061104b8bddcd290218c@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <1102523144.26009.86.camel@daft>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20041208105234.03b8ccb0@pop.idiom.com>

At 08:25 AM 12/8/2004, Steve Furlong wrote:
>I know what you mean, but (a) I didn't write what I meant, and (b) I
>don't think a true anarchy would be the proper environment for your
>anarcho-capitalism.
>
>My complaints about Tim's anarchistic writings were about his desire to
>watch DC detonate, or to watch a rampage against useless eaters of one
>type or another, or the like.

If you think those are anarchist ideas, you've missed the
main ideas about anarchy and anarcho-capitalism and such.
Anarchism isn't about getting rid of the _current_ people in charge,
it's about getting rid of _having_ people be in charge.

On a cypherpunks-history track, Tim or Eric once proposed that
the way to deal with slander in an uncensorable anonymous
communication environment was to make sure that there was
_always_ a wide current of anonymous slander against you going on,
so you can dismiss any _real_ slander by saying it's just more
of the same crap that some anonymous people always say about you,
and that there may even be a market for it.
(And Tim didn't even pay me to say that he's Detweiler's father...)



----
Bill Stewart  bill.stewart at pobox.com 




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  8 08:02:29 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 11:02:29 -0500
Subject: FTC spotlights proposals on P2P risks
Message-ID: <p061104bdbddcd4bea474@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://news.com.com/2102-1025_3-5482429.html?tag=st.util.print>

CNET News


 FTC spotlights proposals on P2P risks

 By John Borland
http://news.com.com/FTC+spotlights+proposals+on+P2P+risks/2100-1025_3-5482429.html


 Story last modified Tue Dec 07 18:41:00 PST 2004



The head of the Federal Trade Commission sent a letter to Congress on
Tuesday highlighting efforts that file-swapping companies are making to
disclose potential online risks.

Legislators have criticized software such as Kazaa, Morpheus and eDonkey
for exposing users to spyware, pornography and the risk of lawsuits.
Although protesting that their software was no more risky than use of the
Internet at large, peer-to-peer companies have worked with the FTC to
develop better consumer notification techniques.

 The FTC included several of those proposals with its letter to Congress,
saying that when implemented, they would do a better job of warning
consumers.

 "(Peer-to-peer) industry members have developed proposed risk disclosures
that we believe would be a substantial improvement over current practices,"
FTC Chair Deborah Platt Majoras wrote in the letter. "We intend to monitor
and report back to interested members of Congress on the extent to which
P2P file-sharing program distributors implement these proposed risk
disclosures."

 The letter follows a tumultuous year in Congress for file-swapping
companies, which faced proposed legislation that would have overturned a
series of court rulings to make them responsible for copyright infringement
on their networks.

 That legislation ultimately did not pass but could return next year.

 Under the new proposals, consumers would be notified when the software is
installed that downloading music, games, movies or software without
authorization is illegal. The companies' Web sites would also have detailed
information about other possible risks in using the software.

 Representatives for file-swapping trade associations said the FTC letter
could help show legislators that they are serious about playing by the
rules.

 "We are grateful for the interest that the Federal Trade Commission has
taken in this young industry's efforts at self-regulation," Distributed
Computing Industry Alliance Chief Executive Officer Marty Lafferty said in
a statement. "We hope the FTC letter to Congress will help foster a better
understanding on the Hill of the realities of P2P technologies and of the
actions being taken by responsible parties to commercially develop this new
distribution channel."

 The FTC will hold a two-day session studying the consumer impacts of
file-swapping technology beginning Dec. 15.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From roy at rant-central.com  Wed Dec  8 08:10:28 2004
From: roy at rant-central.com (Roy M. Silvernail)
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2004 11:10:28 -0500
Subject: primes as far as the eye can see, discrete continua
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F76231D409E759815A95809BB60@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F76231D409E759815A95809BB60@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <41B72774.10807@rant-central.com>

Tyler Durden wrote:

> What about where N=1?
>
> I don't understand. You can only have an infinite number (or number of 
> progressions) where the number of numbers in a number is inifinite.

After googling up some references, it seems the Major made a small 
misstatement.  Green appears to have proven that for any number N 
greater than 1, there are an infinite number of prime progressions where 
the primes are separated by N.  For example, 3,5,7 are all primes 
differing by 2.  The _Science_ article is behind their paid-subscription 
wall, so I can't look at the source, but 
http://www.sciencenews.org/articles/20040424/mathtrek.asp talks a bit 
about the general subject.

-- 
Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
"It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT
SpamAssassin->procmail->/dev/null->bliss
http://www.rant-central.com




From sfurlong at acmenet.net  Wed Dec  8 08:25:44 2004
From: sfurlong at acmenet.net (Steve Furlong)
Date: 08 Dec 2004 11:25:44 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <p061104b8bddcd290218c@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
  	 <p061104abbddcbf60a23d@[66.149.49.5]>
  <1102520309.26009.11.camel@daft> 	
  <p061104b8bddcd290218c@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <1102523144.26009.86.camel@daft>

On Wed, 2004-12-08 at 10:47, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> At 10:38 AM -0500 12/8/04, Steve Furlong wrote:
> >anarchist
> 
> Bzzt wrong answer.
> 
> Must filter that *in*, thankewverramuch...

I know what you mean, but (a) I didn't write what I meant, and (b) I
don't think a true anarchy would be the proper environment for your
anarcho-capitalism.

My complaints about Tim's anarchistic writings were about his desire to
watch DC detonate, or to watch a rampage against useless eaters of one
type or another, or the like. However, unless there were a mass uprising
against the current government, or the idea of any government, any
limited demonstration would simply be an excuse for the ratchet to turn
another few clicks. Viz the OKC bombing.

As for anonymous bearer transactions in an anarchy, I'm going to have to
bag on that for now. Not cowardice -- work to do. Later, if I remember,
which I won't because I'm a burnout.

Regards,
SRF




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  8 09:47:41 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 12:47:41 -0500
Subject: U.S. to Order Wire-Transfer Firms To Boost Their Vigilance 
  Overseas
Message-ID: <p061104ecbddcee65a76f@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110246667558793883,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal


 December 8, 2004

 U.S. BUSINESS NEWS


U.S. to Order Wire-Transfer Firms
 To Boost Their Vigilance Overseas

By GLENN R. SIMPSON
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
December 8, 2004; Page A2


WASHINGTON -- The booming U.S. money-transfer industry must step up efforts
to ensure that its overseas agents aren't engaging in corrupt activity,
federal regulators say.

Under rules expected to be issued today, the Treasury Department's
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is ordering First Data Corp.'s Western
Union and other wire-transfer companies to closely monitor their foreign
agents for suspicious activity and to make sure they have policies against
money laundering and no affiliations with criminal enterprises.

During the next 180 days companies are expected to come up with programs
for conducting due diligence of foreign agents, monitoring them and
terminating them when necessary. Firms will be audited for compliance by
the Internal Revenue Service.

"If they are going to take steps to help protect the gateways to the U.S.
financial system, this is a rational thing for them to be doing," said
FinCEN director William Fox. The global-remittance industry moves more than
$70 billion across international borders annually, mostly for migrant
workers and small  businesses, and is growing.

Regulators are concerned that foreign agents of U.S. fund-transfer
companies are a vulnerable area in the struggle against money laundering
and other criminal activity because weak regulations in many other nations
make it hard to keep criminals out. A page-one article in The Wall Street
Journal in October reported that at Western Union alone, the number of
agents has mushroomed, to more than 200,000 today from 50,000 in 1998, with
much of the growth overseas where it is difficult to vet local operators.

In justifying its new "guidance," FinCEN officials said they uncovered
"several instances" of suspected criminal activity by foreign agents of
U.S. businesses. "There are a variety of ways in which a money-services
business may be  susceptible to the unwitting facilitation of money
laundering through foreign agents or counterparties," the agency said. The
cases depict an elaborate and largely successful strategy to launder money
through the U.S. financial system.

First, FinCEN said,  transfer agents made bulk sales of sequentially
numbered travelers checks and large blocks of money orders to suspected
criminals. These financial instruments "usually had illegible signatures or
failed to designate a beneficiary or payor," FinCEN said. " The instruments
were then negotiated with one or more dealers in goods, such as diamonds,
gems or precious metals, deposited in foreign banks, and cleared through
U.S. banks." By the end of the process, "the clearing banks were so far
removed from the transactions that they could not trace back or screen
either the intervening transactions or the individuals involved in the
transactions."

Mr. Fox said the examples cited aren't from one specific region of the
world, and declined to name the companies. "It is a generalized problem and
one we need to address across the board," he said.

He emphasized that companies will have discretion to determine the exact
steps needed for individual foreign partners depending on their assessment
of the risks involved, and that the government isn't trying to discourage
firms from entering into such relationships. "Our notion is to make this
safer and more transparent, so it does not go underground," he said.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec  8 03:53:55 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 12:53:55 +0100
Subject: cog sci as a tool of the beast?
In-Reply-To: <41B67FDA.3864FFC8@cdc.gov>
References: <41B67FDA.3864FFC8@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20041208115355.GZ9221@leitl.org>

On Tue, Dec 07, 2004 at 08:15:22PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:

> The viewscreens of the future will simply monitor the blood flow
> to various areas of the cortex to see if we are lying when we
> express our minute of hate, or love for the rulers.  RT is so
> passe.

Not enough resolution. You might do with a skullcap, but even that is
doubtful.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec  8 03:56:44 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 12:56:44 +0100
Subject: [i2p] I2P vs. Tor (fwd from mpc@innographx.com)
Message-ID: <20041208115644.GA9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from "Matthew P. Cashdollar" <mpc at innographx.com>
-----


From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec  8 10:44:44 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 13:44:44 -0500
Subject: Anti-Syphilis TV Message Finds Few Takers
Message-ID: <p06110416bddcfbf3d4d6@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-syphilis2dec02,1,2275683,print.story>

The Los Angeles Times


Anti-Syphilis TV Message Finds Few Takers

Many stations reject public service spot aimed at gay men as inappropriate.
 By Jia-Rui Chong
 Times Staff Writer

 December 2, 2004

 A public service ad paid for by the Los Angeles County public health
agency to raise awareness about the dangers of syphilis has been rejected
by local television stations that consider the content inappropriate.

 County health officials had signed off on the admittedly adult-oriented
spot aimed at reaching gay men who are at greatest risk of getting the
disease. But they said they were frustrated by their inability to get the
ads broadcast at a time when Los Angeles was struggling with a high number
of syphilis cases.

 "It's distressing to hear that some important public health messages are
not being aired," said Dr. Jonathan Fielding, county public health
director. "My question would be, 'Is this content more "adult" than others
that are being shown 
 in the evening hours?' "

 "I don't find it objectionable," he said. "Would I show it to a 4- to
5-year-old? No. But do I think it's appropriate for an adult audience? Yes,
I do."

 The debate comes as the Federal Communications Commission has increased
its scrutiny of programming in recent months, following headline-grabbing
incidents such as Janet Jackson's "wardrobe malfunction" during the Super
Bowl half-time show.

 Last week, Viacom agreed to pay the federal government $3.5 million to
settle complaints that it broadcast sexually explicit material on its radio
and TV shows, though it is still fighting the $550,000 fine that resulted
from the Super Bowl incident.

 The 30-second syphilis public service spot features "Phil the Sore," a
lumpy, red cartoon character with an earring, who follows two men going
home together. As the men later part, one of them, dressed in a bathrobe
and underwear, says, "Let's do it again sometime." Phil then calls in his
whole family, whose members carry boxes labeled "brain damage," "rash" and
"blindness" - all potential results of syphilis.

 Public health officials said they worked with the AIDS Healthcare
Foundation to develop a campaign to combat the sexually transmitted disease
after a dramatic rise in cases beginning in 2000, mostly among gay men. The
agency said countywide early syphilis cases reported for that group grew
from 93 to 364 between 2000 and 2003. This year, the numbers have dipped
slightly to 254.

 In the general population, reported cases rose from 256 to 535 between
2000 and 2003, then declined to 407 this year.

 Broadcasters, however, said they considered the ad in poor taste. KCBS-TV
Channel 2 spokesman Mike Nelson said he was troubled that the ad took such
a light-hearted tone about a serious disease. He denied that recent FCC
actions had any effect on the station's evaluation of the ad.

 "We found it to be inappropriate for a broadcast audience," Nelson said.
"We consider the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases to be a
serious matter. It's an issue we have addressed and will continue to
recognize through fair, accurate and balanced news reporting, as well as
broadcasting public service announcements."

 Despite pleas from the AIDS Healthcare Foundation, none of the five local
television stations that were approached - including affiliates for NBC,
Fox, UPN and the WB - have run the ad. Two, however, have said they would
consider showing the spot between 11:30 p.m. and 5 a.m., an offer that
health officials said was not satisfactory because so few people would see
it.

 KNBC-TV Channel 4 spokeswoman Erin Dittman said her station rejected a
request to run the spot during prime-time's "Will & Grace," a show that
features gay characters. But Dittman said the ad could run much later -
sometime after midnight.

 The groups were able to get several cable stations, whose content is not
regulated by the FCC, to air the spot.

 When network TV and radio stations' licenses come up for review every
seven years, the FCC takes into account public complaints, said Christie
Nordhielm, an associate professor of marketing at the University of
Michigan. As a result, television stations don't want to take any risks.

 "It's an easy decision," she said. "Between running the ad and getting
money and the risk of losing their license or paying lawyers, they're going
to reject the ad. It's a no-brainer."

 Officials at the American Family Assn., a Tupelo, Miss.-based organization
that has pushed for the tightening of FCC standards on decency, expressed
support for the stations' stance on the syphilis ads.

 But the organization's president, Tim Wildmon, said he was surprised that
the ad had raised hackles in Los Angeles.

 "That's a pretty liberal, socially liberal place," he said. "We're not
talking about the heartland or the South. It's good at least the station
managers and operators are giving consideration to taste and
appropriateness and seriousness. That's at least refreshing."

 Wildmon said he thought the ad did not take the disease seriously enough
and seemed to embrace promiscuous sex.

 "I think if you're going to deal with something like this, you need to
deal with it in a more serious manner," he said.

 Citing the part in the spot where one man says to another, "Let's do it
again sometime," Wildmon said, "This doesn't address the root of the
problem. The root of the problem is 
 sexual activity."

 Les Pappas, creative director at the San Francisco ad agency that created
the spot, said the anti-syphilis message had already been toned down.

 Two and a half years ago, Better World Advertising and the AIDS Healthcare
Foundation presented both Los Angeles and San Francisco health departments
with a "Healthy Penis" campaign featuring a smiling cartoon penis. San
Francisco officials accepted the ads, calling them "fun." But Los Angeles
wanted a more conservative version and went with "Stop the Sores."

 Pappas and officials of the AIDS Healthcare Foundation said they wanted
the "Stop the Sores" campaign to grab attention and chose to give the
message a playful tone.

 Karen Mall of the healthcare foundation said she believed the campaign had
been a success with its billboards and public appearances by a 6-foot-tall
"Phil the Sore" mascot.

 A survey in 2003 showed that gay men who had seen the campaign messages
were three times more likely to get tested for syphilis.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rsw at jfet.org  Wed Dec  8 12:00:10 2004
From: rsw at jfet.org (Riad S. Wahby)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 14:00:10 -0600
Subject: loosing mail..
In-Reply-To: <799291762b5952ee7c877d828cd20e4a@dizum.com>
References: <799291762b5952ee7c877d828cd20e4a@dizum.com>
Message-ID: <20041208200010.GE11851@positron.jfet.org>

Nomen Nescio <nobody at dizum.com> wrote:
> I seem to have not received a few of the emails in the PROMIS thread.
> What is the best approach if one really wants to receive all emails?

Subscribe to multiple feeds, filter identical message-ids?  You'll get
lots of spam, but you're already doing that if you're on minder.

> Is there (still) an online archive somewhere being saved of the
> cypherpunks messages?

I don't think so.  I thought about it at one point, and maybe I'll think
about it again in the future, but it ain't gonna happen right this
second...

-- 
Riad S. Wahby
rsw at jfet.org




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec  8 06:24:39 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 15:24:39 +0100
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
References: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <20041208142439.GF9221@leitl.org>

On Wed, Dec 08, 2004 at 09:17:30AM -0500, John Kelsey wrote:

> Maybe, maybe not.  The thing I always find interesting and annoying about
Tim May's posts is that he's sometimes making really clearly thought out,
intelligent points, and other times spewing out nonsense so crazy you can't
believe it's coming from the same person.  It's also clear he's often yanking
peoples' chains, often by saying the most offensive thing he can think of.
But once in awhile, even amidst the crazy rantings about useless eaters and
ovens, he'll toss out something that shows some deep, coherent thought about
some issue in a new and fascinating direction.

There was no doubt he was trolling. I never figured out the precise reason,
though. Attempted suicide by cop? Free speech illustration? You tell me.
Neither is sufficient interesting.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Wed Dec  8 09:01:45 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 17:01:45 +0000
Subject: primes as far as the eye can see, discrete continua
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F76231D409E759815A95809BB60@phx.gbl>
References: <41B678D4.1FCD8120@cdc.gov>
  <BAY24-F76231D409E759815A95809BB60@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041208170145.GA30681@arion.soze.net>

On 2004-12-08T10:30:22-0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> >From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
> >
> >Saw in a recent _Science_ that Ben Green of Cambridge proved
> >that for any N, there are an infinite number of evenly spaced
> >progressions
> >of primes that are N numbers long.   He got a prize for that.
> 
> What about where N=1?
> 
> I don't understand. You can only have an infinite number (or number of 
> progressions) where the number of numbers in a number is inifinite.

True for N=1 trivially, because it's easily proven that there are
infinitely many primes.  (For a set of primes S, find the product of
them all and add 1.  The result is obviously not divisible by any prime
in S, so it's either a prime or a composite that factors into at least
two smaller primes not in S.  Either way, add the new prime(s) to S, and
repeat.)

I looked at B. Green's paper, but got lost around page 10 (of 50).

He apparently proves that there are arbitrarily long progressions of
primes.  From that, you can cut some such arbitrarily long progression
of primes into k-length progressions, and as N->infinity, you end up
approaching an infinite number of k-length progressions.

It's even easier (conceptually) if you accept two different progressions
that have different spacing.  for instance, when N=3,

5,11,17
17,23,29
31,37,43
would be a set of equal-spacing progressions.

5,11,17
17,53,89
would be a set of unequal-spacing progressions.  Different progressions
have different spacings.

The paper was giving me a headache so I don't want to try to figure out
which he meant.  Clearly, the former is stronger.




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Wed Dec  8 09:11:24 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 17:11:24 +0000
Subject: primes as far as the eye can see, discrete continua
In-Reply-To: <41B72774.10807@rant-central.com>
References: <BAY24-F76231D409E759815A95809BB60@phx.gbl>
  <41B72774.10807@rant-central.com>
Message-ID: <20041208171124.GA30886@arion.soze.net>

On 2004-12-08T11:10:28-0500, Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
> 
> Tyler Durden wrote:
> 
> >What about where N=1?
> >
> >I don't understand. You can only have an infinite number (or number of 
> >progressions) where the number of numbers in a number is inifinite.
> 
> differing by 2.  The _Science_ article is behind their paid-subscription 
> wall, so I can't look at the source, but 

I'm not sure if this is the right paper, but it's what I was looking at:

http://front.math.ucdavis.edu/math.NT/0404188

(linked from http://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~bjg23/preprints.html)




From s.schear at comcast.net  Wed Dec  8 17:35:17 2004
From: s.schear at comcast.net (Steve Schear)
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2004 17:35:17 -0800
Subject: ABC News: Some Say U.S. No Longer Feels Like Home - are leaving
Message-ID: <6.0.1.1.0.20041208173254.046ee408@mail.comcast.net>

http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=235904&page=1

...Sinicki, who has been job hunting in his wife's native France,
doesn't blame Bush for what he believes is happening in America, but
he doesn't believe Bush will change things for the better, either.

"All these things were going on before Bush got elected," he said.
"But I also think they got worse since Bush got elected. He's a
symptom of the problem and he's making it worse."




From paul at nmedia.net  Wed Dec  8 16:42:50 2004
From: paul at nmedia.net (paul at nmedia.net)
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2004 19:42:50 -0500
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Automatic reputation systems for P2P security?
Message-ID: <mailman.1103.1576007652.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

I've seen several papers referencing advogato, among other things, and it
seems
like reputation/trust systems solve a lot of problems related to P2P
misbehavior. For
instance, clients can track other clients that send out bogus files, that
report a file
and then refuse to share it, that create bogus queueing data (big problem with
Emule/Edonkey networks), that might outright lie or otherwise cheat/steal and
attempt to disrupt a Chord network, etc.

It seems that scalar trust systems aren't going to do it because it is fairly
easy to
cheat by creating fake nodes, etc. So the real trick is the "group" or vector
trust
metrics.

However, that may solve the theoretical issue but I haven't seen any real
examples
of implementation. For instance, most of the papers referring to Advogato and
Advogato-like systems are based on the client-server model. And to implement
trust
networks as it appears that they are done now, the shear amount of data
necessary
makes them pretty darned unwieldy.

In addition, it is relatively well known (but time/bandwidth consuming) for a
node to
detect misbehaving nodes. But translating that to a trust metric, or even how
to
handle that on an implementation level has not been published anywhere.

SO...is there anything out there on this sort of idea, especially on the
implementation side? I mean...if this can be done in reality, then it has a
whole host
of uses even just in the small world of file sharing networks. As it stands,
any trust
metric that's been tried so far is easily tampered with by the clients.

_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From nobody at dizum.com  Wed Dec  8 10:50:50 2004
From: nobody at dizum.com (Nomen Nescio)
Date: Wed,  8 Dec 2004 19:50:50 +0100 (CET)
Subject: loosing mail.. 
Message-ID: <799291762b5952ee7c877d828cd20e4a@dizum.com>

I seem to have not received a few of the emails in the PROMIS thread.
What is the best approach if one really wants to receive all emails?

I'm currently only on minder and it seems from time to time mail
doesn't get through?

Should one simply subscribe to several nodes (and receive some
redundant traffic)?

I sent test messages (help command) to several of the listed mail
servers a whort while back but only these responded:

 majordomo at ds.pro-ns.net
 majordomo at algebra.com
 majordomo at al-qaeda.net

I did not receive an answer at all from minder even though I'm
receiving my list mail through minder, so it cannot be all dead.

Is there (still) an online archive somewhere being saved of the
cypherpunks messages?


Comments?




From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Dec  8 21:37:52 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2004 21:37:52 -0800
Subject: primes as far as the eye can see, discrete continua
Message-ID: <41B7E4B0.A9840341@cdc.gov>

copied under fair use only because Roy put in the research...



NUMBER THEORY:
 Proof Promises Progress in Prime Progressions

 Barry Cipra

 The theorem that Ben Green and Terence Tao set out to prove would have
been impressive enough. Instead, the two
 mathematicians wound up with a stunning breakthrough in the theory of
prime numbers. At least that's the preliminary assessment
 of experts who are looking at their complicated 50-page proof.

 Green, who is currently at the Pacific Institute for the Mathematical
Sciences in Vancouver, British Columbia, and Tao of the
 University of California (UC), Los Angeles, began working 2 years ago
on the problem of arithmetic progressions of primes:
 sequences of primes (numbers divisible only by themselves and 1) that
differ by a constant amount. One such sequence is 13,
 43, 73, and 103, which differ by 30.

 In 1939, Dutch mathematician Johannes van der Corput proved that there
are an infinite number of arithmetic progressions of
 primes with three terms, such as 3, 5, 7 or 31, 37, 43. Green and Tao
hoped to prove the same result for four-term
 progressions. The theorem they got, though, proved the result for prime
progressions of all lengths.

 "It's a very, very spectacular achievement," says Green's former
adviser, Timothy Gowers of the University of Cambridge, who
 received the 1998 Fields Medal, the mathematics equivalent of the Nobel
Prize, for work on related problems. Ronald Graham, a combinatorialist
at UC San Diego,
 agrees. "It's just amazing," he says. "It's such a big jump from what
came before."

 Green and Tao started with a 1975 theorem by Endre Szemeridi of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Szemeridi proved that arithmetic
progressions of all
 lengths crop up in any positive fraction of the integers--basically,
any subset of integers whose ratio to the whole set doesn't dwindle away
to zero as the numbers get
 larger and larger. The primes don't qualify, because they thin out too
rapidly with increasing size. So Green and Tao set out to show that
Szemeridi's theorem still
 holds when the integers are replaced with a smaller set of numbers with
special properties, and then to prove that the primes constitute a
positive fraction of that set.

                                       Prime suspect. Arithmetic
progressions such as this 10-prime sequence are infinitely abundant, if
a new proof
                                       holds up.


 To build their set, they applied a branch of mathematics known as
ergodic theory (loosely speaking, a theory of mixing or averaging) to
mathematical objects called
 pseudorandom numbers. Pseudorandom numbers are not truly random,
because they are generated by rules, but they behave as random numbers
do for certain
 mathematical purposes. Using these tools, Green and Tao constructed a
pseudorandom set of primes and "almost primes," numbers with relatively
few prime
 factors compared to their size.

 The last step, establishing the primes as a positive fraction of their
pseudorandom set, proved elusive. Then Andrew Granville, a number
theorist at the University of
 Montreal, pointed Green to some results by Dan Goldston of San Jose
State University in California and Cem Yildirim of Bo_gazigi University
in Istanbul, Turkey.

 Goldston and Yildirim had developed techniques for studying the size of
gaps between primes, work that culminated last year in a dramatic
breakthrough in the
 subject--or so they thought. Closer inspection, by Granville among
others, undercut their main result (Science, 4 April 2003, p. 32; 16 May
2003, p. 1066),
 although Goldston and Yildirim have since salvaged a less far-ranging
finding. But some of the mathematical machinery that these two had set
up proved to be
 tailor-made for Green and Tao's research. "They had actually proven
exactly what we needed," Tao says.

 The paper, which has been submitted to the Annals of Mathematics, is
many months from acceptance. "The problem with a quick assessment of it
is that it
 straddles two areas," Granville says. "All of the number theorists
who've looked at it feel that the number-theory half is pretty simple
and the ergodic theory is
 daunting, and the ergodic theorists who've looked at it have thought
that the ergodic theory is pretty simple and the number theory is
daunting."

 Even if a mistake does show up, Granville says, "they've certainly
succeeded in bringing in new ideas of real import into the subject." And
if the proof holds up? "This
 could be a turning point for analytic number theory," he says.




From marquezthierry at yahoo.fr  Wed Dec  8 14:13:17 2004
From: marquezthierry at yahoo.fr (MARQUEZ Thierry)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 23:13:17 +0100
Subject: [osint]  Militants and the Latest Mobile Phone Technology
Message-ID: <mailman.1104.1576007652.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



Militants and the Latest Mobile Phone Technology
Dec 08, 2004 1843 GMT

Norwegian police said Dec. 8 they want to stop the sale of cell phone cards
that allow the caller to remain anonymous. Their fear is that criminals
will exploit these cards to avoid detection. This concern, which has been
raised by law enforcement agencies elsewhere, could -- and should -- be
extended to terrorists.

Cell phones used in the planning and execution of attacks pose a serious
obstacle to the security and counterterrorism forces charged with
disrupting militant activities. These phones allow militants to communicate
with one another while in the field, in real time and over long distances
using cheap and readily available technology. Couple those advantages with
the latest technology -- camera phones -- and law enforcement faces a
walking, talking terrorist workshop.

On the other hand, a phone is another link in the militant chain,
presenting the opportunity for law enforcement to detect -- and thwart --
an attack before it takes place. Technology does allows security and law
enforcement agencies to determine who places a phone call or sends an SMS
text message, and to track the call to its source. This kind of evidence
has been presented in a number of criminal cases around the world, most
recently in October in a U.S. case involving a fake kidnapping in
Massachusetts.

Then again, there are ways to avoid detection.

Savvy criminals, including militants, can evade detection in a number of
ways, especially if they are operating in a developing country where
security agencies might lack the necessary tracking technology or where the
mobile phone industry is much less regulated. However, even in developed
countries, there are easy and relatively inexpensive ways to get around law
enforcement.

The cheapest and most effective method is through the use of multiple
Subscriber Identity Modules (SIM) cards -- the digital fingerprint of a
mobile phone. Authorities can track a cell phone user by tracking the SIM
card -- even if the user has not made a call. In order to avoid detection,
a savvy militant will use the SIM card only once -- to decrease the number
of chances for detection and association -- and then toss it away.
High-ranking Hamas officials allegedly use this tactic to avoid
identification and targeting by Israeli authorities. Indian authorities
warned earlier this year that militants in the Kashmir region were using
pre-paid phones (presumably with different SIM cards) to coordinate and
plan operations.

This tactic is a relatively new development -- conceived by the always
innovative criminal mind in response to law enforcement successes in
tracking suspected militants through their phones. For example, a
multinational mobile phone sting operation was integral in the capture of
suspected Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Furthermore, mobile phones also have become almost standard equipment in
the construction of remotely detonated bombs, as they make inexpensive and
fairly reliable triggers. The March 11 Madrid train bombers used this
method to trigger their bombs -- though Spanish authorities later
successfully tracked the bombers via one of the cell phone-triggered bombs
that failed to detonate.

Cell phones used in preoperational surveillance also can present a serious
challenge to law enforcement, largely because of their now-ubiquitous
nature. In other words, a person -- criminal or not -- talking on a cell
phone outside of a building or a landmark raises no alarm bells. A cell
phone with instantaneous picture transmission can be an even better
terrorist tool.

Based on the creativity already demonstrated by some militants in the use
of cell phones -- an SMS message instructed a jailed Abu Sayyaf member to
escape from an Indonesian prison in 2003 -- new methods of evading
detection using mobile technology are likely to emerge. The development of
technology to allow users to use the same phone to call from around the
world, while changing its SIM cards, possibly is the next step.





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec  8 23:29:32 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 08:29:32 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Re: [trustcomp] Memory and reputation calculation
  (fwd from clausen@gnu.org)
Message-ID: <20041209072932.GY9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Andrew Clausen <clausen at gnu.org> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  9 06:14:41 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 09:14:41 -0500
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
Message-ID: <p0611047dbdde0d42e48f@[66.149.49.5]>

Lions and Tigers and Steganography, Nell...

For those of you without a program, here is the new, official, Horsemen of
the Infocalypse Scorecard:

At 3:14 PM -0400 10/3/04, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>   Horseman             Color      Character   Nickname
>
>1  Terrorism            Red        Shadow      "Blinky"
>2  Narcotics            Pink       Speedy      "Pinky"
>3  Money Laundering     Aqua       Bashful     "Inky"
>4  Paedophilia          Yellow     Pokey       "Clyde"

Cheers,
RAH
-------

<http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2004/12/08/pf-773871.html>
 December 8, 2004

 RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
By JIM BRONSKILL

 OTTAWA (CP) - The RCMP has warned its investigators to be on the lookout
for cleverly disguised messages embedded by al-Qaida in digital files
police seize from terror suspects.

 An internal report obtained by The Canadian Press gives credence to the
long-rumoured possibility Osama bin Laden's terrorist network and other
extremist groups are using a technique known as steganography to hide the
existence of sensitive communications.

 Steganography, from the Greek word stegos, meaning covered, and graphie,
or writing, involves concealing a secret message or image within an
apparently innocuous one.

 For instance, a seemingly innocent digital photo of a dog could be
doctored to contain a picture of an explosive device or hidden wording.

 "Investigators in the course of their work on terrorist organizations and
their members, including al-Qaida and affiliated groups, need to consider
the possible use of steganography and seek to identify when steganography
is known or suspected of being used," the report says.

 It recommends investigators consult the RCMP's technological crime program
for assistance, including "comprehensive forensic examinations" of seized
digital media.

 A heavily edited copy of the January 2004 report, Computer-assisted and
Digital Steganography: Use by Al-Qaida and Affiliated Terrorist
Organizations, was recently obtained from the Mounties under the Access to
Information Act.

 Among the material stripped from the document is information on how best
to detect, extract and view surreptitious messages.

 Steganography dates to before 400 B.C. The ancient Greeks hid messages in
wax tablets, while invisible inks have long been used to convey secrets.

 Simple computer-assisted steganography helps apply such traditional
methods in an electronic environment, the report notes. The messages may
also be scrambled using cryptography to prevent them falling into the wrong
hands.

 The RCMP seems especially concerned, however, about digital steganography
- the use of special computer programs to embed messages.

 "There now exist nearly 200 software packages which perform digital
steganography," the report says.

 A limited number of publicly available software tools are designed to
detect the use of steganography, but the "success rate of these tools is
questionable," the RCMP adds.

 Some only detect the use of specific software, while others are useful for
scouring only certain types of files in which the secret message may be
hidden.

 There have been numerous media reports in recent years that terrorist
groups, including al-Qaida, were using steganographic techniques.

 The phenomenon is "deeply troubling," said David Harris, a former Canadian
Security Intelligence Service officer now with Ottawa-based Insignis
Strategic Research.

 He suggested any delay in detecting disguised messages could be disastrous.

 "We're talking very often about time-sensitive issues: where is the bomb?
Who's operating in connection with whom?" he said.

 "On that kind of basis, this is really, really disturbing as a development."

 Harris also questioned whether western security agencies have sufficient
personnel and resources to uncover the messages.



-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From clausen at gnu.org  Wed Dec  8 14:25:38 2004
From: clausen at gnu.org (Andrew Clausen)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 09:25:38 +1100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Re: [trustcomp] Memory and reputation calculation
Message-ID: <mailman.1105.1576007652.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


On Wed, Dec 08, 2004 at 10:00:30PM +0000, Farez Rahman wrote:
> Does anyone have any reference to work/paper which looked at how much
> history is useful in reputation systems? Perhaps some analysis of
> tradeoffs between size of memory and effective sample size?

The first working paper on Chris Dellarocas' site claims that the
history size doesn't matter:

	http://ccs.mit.edu/dell/reputation.html

Cheers,
Andrew



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_________

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_______________________________________________
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Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
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----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  9 07:47:20 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 10:47:20 -0500
Subject: Horseman #3, "Inky": Money Laundering in America
Message-ID: <p06110419bddd00b2f195@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.mensnewsdaily.com/archive/k/kouri/2004/kouri120704.htm>


MND COMMENTARY
- Jim Kouri - MensNewsDaily.com


Money Laundering in America


 December 7, 2004
 by Jim Kouri


 Federal law enforcement officials estimate that between $100 billion and
$300 billion is laundered in this country each year. While illegal drug
trafficking accounts for much of the funds being laundered, other criminal
activities, including terrorism and tax evasion, also account for an
extensive amount. In the past two decades, federal law enforcement efforts
to combat money laundering have focused on requiring financial institutions
to report currency transactions that exceed $10,000.

 Beginning in 1988, these reports have been supplemented by reports of
suspicious transactions. Many of the transactions reported as suspicious
involve individuals who appear to be attempting to avoid the $10,000
reporting requirement. However, any activity that deviates from the norm
for a particular account can be considered suspicious. The Right to
Financial Privacy Act, enacted in 1978, raised questions as to whether
financial institutions were authorized to report suspicious transactions.
To address these concerns, legislation has been enacted to provide
protection against civil liability for institutions reporting suspicious
transactions. Banks and other financial institutions report tens of
thousands of suspicious transactions each year. The reports have led to the
initiation of major investigations into various types of criminal activity.

 However, because there is no overall control or coordination of the
reports, there is no way of ensuring that the information is being used to
its full potential. Financial institutions report suspicious transactions
on a variety of different forms that provide different types of information
and that are filed with different law enforcement and regulatory agencies.
The form that is filed most frequently is filed with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and kept on a centralized database. However, the form does
not contain any information describing the suspicious activity that would
allow law enforcement agencies to evaluate the usefulness of the
information on the basis of the form alone.

 Moreover, some institutions have been filing these forms erroneously. IRS
and other federal and state law enforcement agencies use the database on a
reactive basis; that is, to provide additional information on an
investigation that has already been initiated. Other forms used to report
suspicious transactions do describe the activity so that the information
can be evaluated. However, these forms are filed with six different federal
financial regulatory agencies. Because the forms are not maintained on a
centralized database, they are not used on a reactive basis. Financial
institutions filing this form are required to send a copy of it to the
nearest district office of IRS' Criminal Investigation Division.

 However, IRS has not developed any guidance or directives as to how the
information is to be managed as an intelligence resource. Use of the
reports to initiate investigations varies among the 35 district offices.
The Government Accounting Office identified 15 states that receive copies
of suspicious transaction reports filed on one or both of these two-forms.
Nine of these states told GAO that they use the information to initiate
criminal investigations. The Department of the Treasury, the financial
regulatory agencies, and IRS have recently agreed to substantial changes
regarding how suspicious transactions are to be reported and how the
information is to be used. These proposals, which were made with input from
the financial community, have the potential for significantly improving the
contribution that suspicious transaction reports make to law enforcement at
both the federal and state levels.

 The IRS does not have agencywide policies or procedures for managing
suspicious transaction reports. Consequently, the extent to which special
agents in the 35 CID district offices solicit, process, and evaluate the
reports is up to the discretion of the district CID chief and varies
significantly among districts. The percentage of investigations initiated
on the basis of suspicious transaction reports also varies significantly
among districts.

 >From October 1990 to June 1994 CID initiated 21,507 investigations
nationwide. About 4 percent of the cases were initiated as a result of a
suspicious transaction report. Among the district offices, however, the
percentage varied from 0 to over 18 percent. GAO believes that the varying
rates are an indication that use of the reports may not be emphasized to
the same extent among the districts.

 Sources: US Department of Justice, US Department of the Treasury and
National Security Institute

 Jim Kouri


 DISCUSS THIS ARTICLE IN THE FORUM!

Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vice-president of the National
Association of Chiefs of Police. He's former chief at a New York City
housing project in Washington Heights nicknamed "Crack City" by reporters
covering the drug war in the 1980s.   He's also served on the National Drug
Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the
country.  He writes for many police and crime magazines including Chief of
Police, Police Times, The Narc Officer, Campus Law Enforcement Journal, and
others.  He's appeared as on-air commentator for over 100 TV and radio news
and talk shows including Oprah, McLaughlin Report, CNN Headline News, MTV,
Fox News, etc.  His book Assume The Position is available at Amazon.Com,
Booksamillion.com, and can be ordered at local bookstores.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  9 07:51:56 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 10:51:56 -0500
Subject: SEC Probes Firms That Gather Data on Who Owns What Shares
Message-ID: <p0611040dbddcf0a82f1e@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110247556985994158,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal


 December 8, 2004

 PAGE ONE


Tracking Stocks
 SEC Probes Firms That Gather
 Data on Who Owns What Shares
Its Question: Have They Paid
 Custodian Banks' Staffers
 To Give Up Information?
Free Steaks and Game Tickets

By SUSAN PULLIAM
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
December 8, 2004; Page A1


A back-office clerk at CIBC Mellon Trust Co. was filling in for a colleague
this summer when she got an unusual e-mail. The sender wanted data about
which of the big investors the company dealt with owned a particular stock
-- information the clerk knew was supposed to be top secret.

The employee refused to provide the data. An internal probe concluded that
the clerk she was filling in for had for years been giving out data on
stockholdings, according to people close to the situation. They say the
probe found that in return, this clerk got baseball and hockey tickets and
cash payments of $50 to $100 per tip. The people add that a separate
internal probe found that four employees of Mellon Financial Corp. had
received Pittsburgh Pirates tickets, $50 American Express gift certificates
and boxes of steaks for such data.

The incident offers a window into a secret Wall Street world of gathering
and selling real-time data about big investors' stock trading. This
information, which is generally confidential, is so valuable that a whole
industry has sprung up around finding it out. Businesses known as
stock-surveillance firms gather trading data as best they can and market it
to corporations that are curious about who is buying and selling their
shares.

Because small bits of trading data can be gleaned through legitimate
sources, the business model is perfectly legal. But there's the potential
for stock-surveillance firms to veer off the legal track if they use
improper means to find out who is buying or selling what. There's also the
potential for illegal insider trading if the information falls into the
hands of investors who use it in their trading.

Now the Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating the
stock-surveillance business, sending out subpoenas to several data firms,
according to people close to the situation. Among issues the SEC is looking
into: Whether, at banks that act as custodians of stock during the trading
process, some back-office workers systematically received gratuities for
leaking data. The SEC also wants to know whether any trading data may have
been turned over to investors and led to insider trading.

SEC enforcement chief Stephen Cutler said, "As a general matter, we are
interested in whether confidential portfolio information has been leaked at
any point along the chain." A person close to the situation said the SEC
probe focuses on possible data leaks as far back as 2000.

The CIBC Mellon Trust case helped spur the SEC's enforcement division to
action, people familiar with the matter say. The trust, based in Toronto,
is a joint venture of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Pittsburgh's
Mellon Financial. A spokeswoman for CIBC Mellon said it has taken steps to
correct the problem uncovered by the joint venture's internal
investigation. A spokesman for Mellon Financial said that regulators were
notified quickly after the problem emerged, adding that Mellon "regrets the
unauthorized disclosure of custodial information" and was "very proactive"
in informing clients. A spokesman for CIBC said it doesn't carry out
custodial activities in the U.S. but declined to comment further.

The joint-venture employee who the probe concluded had been giving out data
for years was Yvonne Williams, say people close to the situation. She was
fired in July after the venture's internal investigation. Ms. Williams
couldn't be reached for comment. Three of the four Mellon Financial
employees cited in a Mellon probe also have been dismissed. No employees
have been charged with anything.

Among firms subpoenaed in the SEC's investigation, say people familiar with
the matter, is Thomson Financial, a unit of Thomson Corp. of Toronto.
Thomson Financial's Capital Markets Intelligence unit is one of the largest
stock-surveillance firms. The unit told its employees this week that one
CMI executive had left after an internal probe found business practices
conflicting with its code of conduct, say people close to the situation.
They add that at least two other employees are expected to depart.

Thomson wouldn't comment on the probe but said it has taken steps to
correct problems. "We take any allegation of impropriety or wrongdoing
seriously and will not tolerate any such behavior," said a spokesman. He
added that Thomson provides the trading data it gathers only to its
corporate clients and their agents.

Also receiving subpoenas, according to people familiar with the SEC probe,
are Ilios Partners; the Georgeson Shareholder Communications Inc. unit of
Computershare Ltd.; and Miller Tabak & Co., an institutional trading firm
that has a unit called Strategic Stock Surveillance.

Corporations pay fees to stock-surveillance firms in order to know who is
buying and selling their shares. They have various motives for wanting to
know, such as to gauge the effectiveness of their investor-relations
efforts and, in rare cases, to find out if a potential hostile bidder is
accumulating their shares.

Some stock traders covet information about big investors' buying and
selling for a different reason: It gives a sense of which way a stock is
likely to move. For just that reason, those big investors like to keep
their moves secret.

When a mutual-fund family has a large chunk of stock it wants to buy or
sell, it often does the trading in pieces over several days. A key reason
is to disguise its intentions, so others can't jump in and buy or sell the
stock first -- driving up the fund's cost of buying or reducing what it
gets from selling. But if a trader knew a big fund had begun buying, he
could assume there was more buying to come, and that the stock would tend
to rise.

"If speculators know in real time what you were doing they can jump aboard
and piggyback you or work against you," says Samuel Hayes, a Harvard
Business School professor. If a mutual fund's performance suffered as a
result, among those hurt would be fund shareholders, he adds. Mutual funds
typically disclose changes in their holdings only four times a year, after
the end of each quarter.

The business of ferreting out data about big investors' holdings has its
roots in takeover battles. There, warring camps want to know the identities
of shareholders so they can appeal to them for their votes. The camps hire
proxy-solicitation firms, whose job includes identifying shareholders and
lobbying them.

The business shifted when hostile takeovers started to wane in the early
1990s. Some proxy-solicitation firms began building a business in stock
surveillance, hoping to make customers of corporations that simply want to
know who their shareholders are.

Stock-surveillance firms developed an ability to tap into the arcane
processing world that exists behind the scenes as investors buy and sell.

For instance, when a pension or mutual fund buys shares, it places the
order with a broker, who goes to a stock marketplace to have the order
matched with a seller. After the order is filled, the fund sends
instructions to the broker about where to deliver the shares and which
"custodian bank" will make payment for them. The fund also sends
instructions to that custodian bank, telling it to receive the shares and
pay the broker.

Both the broker and the custodian bank send instructions about the trade to
the Depository Trust & Clearing, or "the DTC." It is part of a private
organization set up in the 1970s to formally process and make final the
trades -- steps known as "settlement" and "clearing," respectively -- for
the bulk of the U.S. stock trading.

The DTC formally moves ownership of the shares to the buyer and sends
payment for the trade through one of the Federal Reserve banks. This is the
final step in a process that can take up to three days to complete.

Stock-surveillance firms rely partly on their access to reports from the
DTC. This access is legitimate, explains Larry Thompson, senior deputy
counsel of DTCC, holding company for the DTC. That's because SEC rules
require the DTC to provide, at a company's request, daily reports of where
its shares are held in custody once settlement is completed. And with a
company's permission, the DTC can also turn over such reports to "agents"
-- such as proxy solicitors and stock-surveillance firms.

Mr. Thompson says that the DTC lists give only the total number of a
company's shares held at each custodian bank. They don't provide data about
specific investors' holdings or other sensitive trading information.

But stock-surveillance firms combine these DTC listings with their own
database of information about where big investors keep their shares -- such
as what banks they use as custodians. Sometimes, these two bits of data --
combined with regulatory filings and information about the investment
strategies of mutual funds -- are enough to get to the bottom of who is
buying or selling shares, says Kevin Marcus, head of the part of Thomson
that includes Capital Markets Intelligence.

"It is to some extent a process of deduction," he says.

Since DTC listings don't provide the up-to-the-minute information that some
corporations want about who is buying and selling their shares,
stock-surveillance firms turn to various market contacts to try to provide
this. Among them are stock-exchange "specialists" -- the traders on the New
York Stock Exchange floor whose job is to match buy orders with sell
orders. Employees of stock-surveillance firms say they sometimes even turn
to employees at the mutual funds themselves in hopes of getting such
information.

And they sometimes ask employees at the custodian banks -- a particular
focus of the SEC probe. These employees are continually receiving
up-to-the-minute information from mutual funds, pension funds and other
institutional investors about what they're buying and selling.

Companies use stock-surveillance services for a variety of legitimate
business purposes. Ralph Poltermann, treasurer of AptarGroup Inc., a maker
of packages such as flip-tops for ketchup bottles, says his company hired
Thomson to help it track trading in its own shares after meetings with
investors.

For instance, AptarGroup met with big investors at a Credit Suisse First
Boston conference in San Francisco on Sept. 28. Within a week, Mr.
Poltermann says, an analyst at Thomson told him that at least one of those
big investors was trading in AptarGroup shares. "It's magic to me," Mr.
Poltermann says. "They have insights and contacts we don't have."

Big investors, on the other hand, are annoyed that a business has sprung up
to try to find out about their trading. John Wheeler, head trader at the
American Century mutual-fund family, recalls having an eerie feeling a few
years back when he was told that Sprint Corp.'s chief executive had called
his firm. American Century had bought Sprint shares just the day before.
But William Esrey, then Sprint's CEO, already had called to thank the fund
family for its purchase.

"Appreciate your support," Mr. Wheeler recalls Mr. Esrey telling an
American Century executive. Mr. Esrey says through a Sprint spokesman that
he doesn't recall the conversation but that it wasn't unusual for him to
make such a call to investors.

The trade hadn't even "settled" yet. The fund hadn't paid for the Sprint
stock. So normally only American Century, its broker, custodian bank and
others in the custody chain would have known who was buying the shares.
Sprint, it turned out, had legitimately gotten its information from
Thomson's stock-surveillance unit, a Sprint spokesman says.

Many large companies use such services, getting daily updates and glossy
monthly and quarterly summaries about activity in their shares. Dow Jones &
Co., publisher of The Wall Street Journal, once used stock-surveillance
services but no longer does. Thomson says its CMI unit has about 800
corporate clients, which pay $40,000 to $60,000 a year each for the
service. The stock-surveillance unit had about $33 million in revenue last
year, a tiny sliver of Thomson Corp.'s $7.44 billion revenue.

Andrew Brooks, head trader at mutual-fund giant T. Rowe Price, says his
trading desk often receives mysterious calls asking about changes in its
holdings. Often, he says, the callers say they are "just checking your
ownership on behalf of the company." He says callers typically hang up when
pressed for more information on why they're calling.

Mr. Brooks and a few other mutual-fund managers, including American Century
officials, discussed their concerns about trading leaks 18 months ago with
Lori Richards, head of the SEC's office of compliance and inspection, after
she contacted them.

In the case of CIBC Mellon Trust, the joint venture notified regulators of
the incident involving Ms. Williams, the back-office clerk, this summer.
Officials of the trust learned of the problem after Ms. Williams's fill-in
told a supervisor of a surveillance firm's request for data, say people
close to the matter.

Ms. Williams's knowledge of stockholdings was broad. It wasn't limited to
the names of shareholders who had permitted the custodian bank to release
data about their holdings -- so-called Non-Objecting Beneficial Owners, or
"nobos." Her knowledge would have included all shareholders of companies.

Mellon Financial scoured e-mails, faxes and phone records to find out
whether others might have accepted payments for data. It determined that
the leaks had occurred in the area of the bank that handles communications
with shareholders on matters like stock splits and dividends, the people
familiar with the matter say. They say Mellon concluded that four employees
had provided data about specific stockholdings of big investors, including
Fidelity Investments. A spokeswoman for Fidelity says it has "always been
concerned about disclosure of this information outside of required
regulatory filings."

The Mellon employees had access to a full list of investors for each stock.
The bank's probe concluded, according to people close to the situation,
that they released data about the holdings of shareholders who hadn't given
the custodian bank such permission. In return, it concluded, they got
sports tickets, steaks and gift certificates. Mellon Financial and its
joint venture with CIBC notified hundreds of customers of the problem this
summer through calls and e-mails.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Dec  9 08:13:12 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 11:13:12 -0500
Subject: primes as far as the eye can see, discrete continua
In-Reply-To: <41B7E4B0.A9840341@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F2107A4F3ABDCD2805CC2219BB70@phx.gbl>

So the obvious question is, does this speed up the cracking capabilities of 
computers? On the surface, I'd say no, but then again I'm no computational 
science expert. (I say no because any of the primes used in X-bitlength 
encryption are already known, and these strings of primes aren't going to be 
used any more frequently than any random batch of primes.)

-TD

>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Re: primes as far as the eye can see, discrete continua
>Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2004 21:37:52 -0800
>
>copied under fair use only because Roy put in the research...
>
>
>
>NUMBER THEORY:
>  Proof Promises Progress in Prime Progressions
>
>  Barry Cipra
>
>  The theorem that Ben Green and Terence Tao set out to prove would have
>been impressive enough. Instead, the two
>  mathematicians wound up with a stunning breakthrough in the theory of
>prime numbers. At least that's the preliminary assessment
>  of experts who are looking at their complicated 50-page proof.
>
>  Green, who is currently at the Pacific Institute for the Mathematical
>Sciences in Vancouver, British Columbia, and Tao of the
>  University of California (UC), Los Angeles, began working 2 years ago
>on the problem of arithmetic progressions of primes:
>  sequences of primes (numbers divisible only by themselves and 1) that
>differ by a constant amount. One such sequence is 13,
>  43, 73, and 103, which differ by 30.
>
>  In 1939, Dutch mathematician Johannes van der Corput proved that there
>are an infinite number of arithmetic progressions of
>  primes with three terms, such as 3, 5, 7 or 31, 37, 43. Green and Tao
>hoped to prove the same result for four-term
>  progressions. The theorem they got, though, proved the result for prime
>progressions of all lengths.
>
>  "It's a very, very spectacular achievement," says Green's former
>adviser, Timothy Gowers of the University of Cambridge, who
>  received the 1998 Fields Medal, the mathematics equivalent of the Nobel
>Prize, for work on related problems. Ronald Graham, a combinatorialist
>at UC San Diego,
>  agrees. "It's just amazing," he says. "It's such a big jump from what
>came before."
>
>  Green and Tao started with a 1975 theorem by Endre Szemeridi of the
>Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Szemeridi proved that arithmetic
>progressions of all
>  lengths crop up in any positive fraction of the integers--basically,
>any subset of integers whose ratio to the whole set doesn't dwindle away
>to zero as the numbers get
>  larger and larger. The primes don't qualify, because they thin out too
>rapidly with increasing size. So Green and Tao set out to show that
>Szemeridi's theorem still
>  holds when the integers are replaced with a smaller set of numbers with
>special properties, and then to prove that the primes constitute a
>positive fraction of that set.
>
>                                        Prime suspect. Arithmetic
>progressions such as this 10-prime sequence are infinitely abundant, if
>a new proof
>                                        holds up.
>
>
>  To build their set, they applied a branch of mathematics known as
>ergodic theory (loosely speaking, a theory of mixing or averaging) to
>mathematical objects called
>  pseudorandom numbers. Pseudorandom numbers are not truly random,
>because they are generated by rules, but they behave as random numbers
>do for certain
>  mathematical purposes. Using these tools, Green and Tao constructed a
>pseudorandom set of primes and "almost primes," numbers with relatively
>few prime
>  factors compared to their size.
>
>  The last step, establishing the primes as a positive fraction of their
>pseudorandom set, proved elusive. Then Andrew Granville, a number
>theorist at the University of
>  Montreal, pointed Green to some results by Dan Goldston of San Jose
>State University in California and Cem Yildirim of Bo_gazigi University
>in Istanbul, Turkey.
>
>  Goldston and Yildirim had developed techniques for studying the size of
>gaps between primes, work that culminated last year in a dramatic
>breakthrough in the
>  subject--or so they thought. Closer inspection, by Granville among
>others, undercut their main result (Science, 4 April 2003, p. 32; 16 May
>2003, p. 1066),
>  although Goldston and Yildirim have since salvaged a less far-ranging
>finding. But some of the mathematical machinery that these two had set
>up proved to be
>  tailor-made for Green and Tao's research. "They had actually proven
>exactly what we needed," Tao says.
>
>  The paper, which has been submitted to the Annals of Mathematics, is
>many months from acceptance. "The problem with a quick assessment of it
>is that it
>  straddles two areas," Granville says. "All of the number theorists
>who've looked at it feel that the number-theory half is pretty simple
>and the ergodic theory is
>  daunting, and the ergodic theorists who've looked at it have thought
>that the ergodic theory is pretty simple and the number theory is
>daunting."
>
>  Even if a mistake does show up, Granville says, "they've certainly
>succeeded in bringing in new ideas of real import into the subject." And
>if the proof holds up? "This
>  could be a turning point for analytic number theory," he says.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Dec  9 08:21:00 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 11:21:00 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <6.0.3.0.0.20041208105234.03b8ccb0@pop.idiom.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F405B9DE01151E0F058E0D79BB70@phx.gbl>

>If you think those are anarchist ideas, you've missed the
>main ideas about anarchy and anarcho-capitalism and such.
>Anarchism isn't about getting rid of the _current_ people in charge,
>it's about getting rid of _having_ people be in charge.

Well, May seemed to try to make the case that all of those "useles eaters" 
were in large part responsible for the very existence of the state, and that 
collapse of the state meant the inevitable downfall of huge numbers of 
minorities (why he focused on them as opposed to white trailer trash I don't 
know).

But he was definitely advocating that racist viewpoints fall naturally out 
of a crypto-anarchic approach.

-TD




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Dec  9 08:25:34 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 11:25:34 -0500
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <p0611047dbdde0d42e48f@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F36E60C0435070651B260C39BB70@phx.gbl>

What a fuckin' joke. You mean they're only now realizing that Al-Qaeda could 
use stego? Do they think they're stupid?

Nah...certainly the NSA are fully prepared to handle this. I doubt it's much 
of a development at all to those in the know.

-TD

>From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cryptography at metzdowd.com, cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net, 
>osint at yahoogroups.com
>Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
>Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 09:14:41 -0500
>
>Lions and Tigers and Steganography, Nell...
>
>For those of you without a program, here is the new, official, Horsemen of
>the Infocalypse Scorecard:
>
>At 3:14 PM -0400 10/3/04, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
> >   Horseman             Color      Character   Nickname
> >
> >1  Terrorism            Red        Shadow      "Blinky"
> >2  Narcotics            Pink       Speedy      "Pinky"
> >3  Money Laundering     Aqua       Bashful     "Inky"
> >4  Paedophilia          Yellow     Pokey       "Clyde"
>
>Cheers,
>RAH
>-------
>
><http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2004/12/08/pf-773871.html>
>  December 8, 2004
>
>  RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
>By JIM BRONSKILL
>
>  OTTAWA (CP) - The RCMP has warned its investigators to be on the lookout
>for cleverly disguised messages embedded by al-Qaida in digital files
>police seize from terror suspects.
>
>  An internal report obtained by The Canadian Press gives credence to the
>long-rumoured possibility Osama bin Laden's terrorist network and other
>extremist groups are using a technique known as steganography to hide the
>existence of sensitive communications.
>
>  Steganography, from the Greek word stegos, meaning covered, and graphie,
>or writing, involves concealing a secret message or image within an
>apparently innocuous one.
>
>  For instance, a seemingly innocent digital photo of a dog could be
>doctored to contain a picture of an explosive device or hidden wording.
>
>  "Investigators in the course of their work on terrorist organizations and
>their members, including al-Qaida and affiliated groups, need to consider
>the possible use of steganography and seek to identify when steganography
>is known or suspected of being used," the report says.
>
>  It recommends investigators consult the RCMP's technological crime 
>program
>for assistance, including "comprehensive forensic examinations" of seized
>digital media.
>
>  A heavily edited copy of the January 2004 report, Computer-assisted and
>Digital Steganography: Use by Al-Qaida and Affiliated Terrorist
>Organizations, was recently obtained from the Mounties under the Access to
>Information Act.
>
>  Among the material stripped from the document is information on how best
>to detect, extract and view surreptitious messages.
>
>  Steganography dates to before 400 B.C. The ancient Greeks hid messages in
>wax tablets, while invisible inks have long been used to convey secrets.
>
>  Simple computer-assisted steganography helps apply such traditional
>methods in an electronic environment, the report notes. The messages may
>also be scrambled using cryptography to prevent them falling into the wrong
>hands.
>
>  The RCMP seems especially concerned, however, about digital steganography
>- the use of special computer programs to embed messages.
>
>  "There now exist nearly 200 software packages which perform digital
>steganography," the report says.
>
>  A limited number of publicly available software tools are designed to
>detect the use of steganography, but the "success rate of these tools is
>questionable," the RCMP adds.
>
>  Some only detect the use of specific software, while others are useful 
>for
>scouring only certain types of files in which the secret message may be
>hidden.
>
>  There have been numerous media reports in recent years that terrorist
>groups, including al-Qaida, were using steganographic techniques.
>
>  The phenomenon is "deeply troubling," said David Harris, a former 
>Canadian
>Security Intelligence Service officer now with Ottawa-based Insignis
>Strategic Research.
>
>  He suggested any delay in detecting disguised messages could be 
>disastrous.
>
>  "We're talking very often about time-sensitive issues: where is the bomb?
>Who's operating in connection with whom?" he said.
>
>  "On that kind of basis, this is really, really disturbing as a 
>development."
>
>  Harris also questioned whether western security agencies have sufficient
>personnel and resources to uncover the messages.
>
>
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From perry at piermont.com  Thu Dec  9 08:32:59 2004
From: perry at piermont.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 11:32:59 -0500
Subject: export regulations updated
Message-ID: <mailman.1106.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


Cryptome just published some updates to the crypto export regulations:

http://cryptome.org/bis120904.txt

Perry

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The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec  9 03:06:26 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 12:06:26 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Automatic reputation systems for P2P security?
  (fwd from paul@nmedia.net)
Message-ID: <20041209110626.GJ9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from paul at nmedia.net -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  9 09:15:35 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 12:15:35 -0500
Subject: Australian snooping laws pass lower house
Message-ID: <p061104babdde34fe34fa@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://australianit.news.com.au/common/print/0,7208,11636719%5E15319%5E%5Enbv%5E15306,00.html>

Australian IT

Snooping laws pass lower house

DECEMBER 09, 2004

POLICE will be able to access stored voice mail, email and mobile phone
text messages under new laws passed by federal parliament today.

The laws recognise voice mail, email and SMS messages should fall outside
telecommunication interception laws originally designed to stop law
enforcement agencies from intercepting phone calls.

 Police and other law enforcement officers will still need a search warrant
or a right of access to communications or storage equipment to access voice
mail, email and SMS under the changes.

 "These amendments make it easier for our law enforcement and regulatory
agencies to access stored communications that could provide evidence of
criminal activity," Attorney-General Philip Ruddock said.

 "They will also assist in securing information systems by allowing network
administrators to review stored communications for viruses and other
inappropriate content."

 Labor referred the proposed law to a Senate committee three times before
agreeing to it today.

 Opposition homeland security spokesman Robert McClelland said there needed
to be a distinction between stored messages and live telephone
conversations.

 "There have been concerns expressed about privacy and there always has
been a distinction between an eavesdropper and the reader of other people's
correspondence," he said.

 "But written documents have always been susceptible to legal process, to
warrants.

 "Everyone that creates a document does so knowing that that document can
be read by others and can be subject to legal process.

 "I don't think anything turns on the fact the document is written on a
computer and sent by email as opposed to being written in long hand and
popped in the letter box."

 The laws are a temporary measure and will cease to have effect after 12
months when a review of the measures will be undertaken.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  9 09:19:26 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 12:19:26 -0500
Subject: export regulations updated
Message-ID: <p061104c5bdde399a4978@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From measl at mfn.org  Thu Dec  9 10:19:55 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 12:19:55 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F36E60C0435070651B260C39BB70@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F36E60C0435070651B260C39BB70@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041209121614.K40200@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Thu, 9 Dec 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:

> What a fuckin' joke. You mean they're only now realizing that Al-Qaeda could
> use stego? Do they think they're stupid?
>
> Nah...certainly the NSA are fully prepared to handle this. I doubt it's much
> of a development at all to those in the know.
>
> -TD


As recently as two years ago, I had a classroom full of cops (mostly fedz
from various well-known alphabets) who knew *nothing* about stego.  And I
mean *NOTHING*.  They got a pretty shallow intro: here's a picture, and
here's the secret message inside it, followed by an hour of theory and
how-to's using the simplest of tools - every single one of them was just
blown away. Actually, that's not true - the Postal Inspectors were bored,
but everyone _else_ was floored.

While the various alphabets have had a few years to get up to speed, the
idea that they are still 99% ignorant does not surprise me in the least.

//Alif

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  9 09:21:45 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 12:21:45 -0500
Subject: Horseman number 4: 'Paedophiles Pose Greatest Threat Facing 
  Internet'
Message-ID: <p061104b8bdde34fb3464@[66.149.49.5]>

Okay, so it's a trifecta, today...

:-)

Cheers,
RAH
-------

<http://news.scotsman.com/print.cfm?id=3859699&referringtemplate=http%3A%2F%2Fnews%2Escotsman%2Ecom%2Flatest%2Ecfm&referringquerystring=id%3D3859699>
print
  

Wed 8 Dec 2004

4:51pm (UK)
'Paedophiles Pose Greatest Threat Facing Internet'

By David Barrett, PA Home Affairs Correspondent


 Online paedophiles are the greatest threat facing the internet, government
research said today.

 A variety of internet child porn issues dominated a "top 10" of criminal
threats posed by new technology, a Home Office report revealed.

 The survey of 53 internet and technology experts saw seven different child
porn concerns ranked in the 10 most serious "netcrime" threats, with
grooming and possible stalking of children ranked as the top fear.

 In second place was the growing use of the internet for espionage by
corporate spies.

 Out of a total of 101 crime issues in the league table compiled by the
survey, 12 related to child porn.

 The top 10 rankings were:-

 1. Increased online grooming and possible stalking using the internet.

 2. Espionage by corporate spies.

 3. Increased access to paedophile content sold by organised criminals
through various online platforms.

 4. Use of online storage for paedophile images to bypass seizure of home
computers.

 5. Use of secure "peer to peer" technology for all types of paedophile
activity.

 6. Use of encryption for secure access to paedophile networks.

 7. Theft of personal digital assistants or mobile phones containing
personal information to commit fraud on the internet.

 8. Growing access to "real-time" child abuse on the web.

 9. Use of "peer to peer" technology for pirate activity.

 10. Grooming of children for abuse using advanced mobile phone technology.

 The study, entitled "The Future of Netcrime Now", said police were already
working to combat internet child porn and the issue's high media profile
may have contributed to its prominent place in the poll.

 "The Government, law enforcement and industry needs to 'gear up' their
capability to continuously look forward, attempting to identify new forms
of criminal technology misuse as soon as they emerge, or even before they
are seized upon by the criminal community," it concluded.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  9 10:41:51 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 13:41:51 -0500
Subject: [osint] Ex-Stasi Spy Chief Markus Wolf Hired By Homeland 
  Security?
Message-ID: <p0611040abdde4cc9c897@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text


To: "Bruce Tefft" <btefft at community-research.com>
Thread-Index: AcTeFypjnXqh3PHmQpq2wCUI7SfIsQAANSaQ
From: "Bruce Tefft" <btefft at community-research.com>
Mailing-List: list osint at yahoogroups.com; contact osint-owner at yahoogroups.com
Delivered-To: mailing list osint at yahoogroups.com
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 12:53:57 -0500
Subject: [osint] Ex-Stasi Spy Chief Markus Wolf Hired By Homeland Security?
Reply-To: osint at yahoogroups.com


http://www.stevequayle.com/News.alert/04_Global/041209.Stasi.html

Ex-Stasi Spy Chief Markus Wolf Hired By Homeland Security?



Dec. 6, 2004
Alex Jones
Prison Planet

Political analyst Al Martin, who has in the past proven accurate in getting
ahead of the news curve, is reporting that Homeland Security have hired
former Stasi head, the 'Silver Fox' Markus Wolf.

Martin states, "Wolf is the man that effectively built the East German state
intelligence operation's internal directorate," Martin continues. "He turned
half the population into informants. That is his specialty, is taking a
population, constructing the various state divisions, mechanisms of control,
in order to organize informants within the population. That is his real
specialty. And that is precisely, as Primakov has intimated, why Wolf is
being brought in. The regime knows that once all of Patriot II is in law and
they begin working on Patriot III, they will then begin to establish the
internal mechanism to coordinate, as an official function of state, a system
of informants. Wolf's speciality was to turn East Germany into the greatest
and most efficient informant state ever created."

On a radio appearance earlier today Martin stated that the admission that
Wolf would be hired was made in a BBC radio interview given by the former
head of the KGB, General Yevgeni Primakov.

Martin had previously reported that Primakov had been hired as a consultant
by the US Department of Homeland Security to implement CAPPS II and the
national iD card system which he dubbed an 'internal passport'.

Sources close to Martin have told Alex Jones confidentially that the
appointment of Wolf was also confirmed by a US Congressman.

During his radio interview, Martin outlined the immediate agenda. The
remaining portions of the 9/11 Commission intelligence reccomendations which
include the introduction of a national ID card would be passed and
subsequently 'Patriot Act 3,' which would include the formal establishment
of a Stasi-like domestic spying organisation which would be similar in scope
to the TIPS program.

TIPS, which was supposedly nixed by Congress, would have recruited one in
twenty-four Americans as domestic informants, a higher percentage than was
used by the Stasi in East Germany.

Government funding was cut but private funding continues and the same
program was intriduced under a number of sub-divisions including AmeriCorps,
SecureCorps and the Highway Watch program.

After the passage of Patriot Act 3 Wolf and Primakov would be tapped for
their expertise in further collapsing America into a surveillance grid
police state. Primakov has openly stated that they are working on behalf of
Bush and Cheney to complete the 'Sovietization of America.

http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?disc=149495;article=72168;title=APFN



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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From seth.johnson at RealMeasures.dyndns.org  Thu Dec  9 11:28:34 2004
From: seth.johnson at RealMeasures.dyndns.org (Seth Johnson)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 14:28:34 -0500
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Don't Let the RIAA Put the Net at Risk!
Message-ID: <mailman.1107.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


> http://www.nyfairuse.org/action/ftc/


Don't Let the RIAA Put the Net at Risk!

Tell the FTC that the Internet is Peer to Peer, It is Ours, and
We Intend to Keep It!


Please forward this notice to any other concerned parties you may
know.


Please tell the FTC not to allow a few rich cartels and
monopolies such as the RIAA, MPAA and Microsoft to put the
Internet at risk:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/filesharing/comments.htm


What's Going On:

The FTC has issued a call for participation announcing a workshop
on "P2P Filesharing" technology to take place in Washington, DC
this December 15th and 16th.

An RIAA-sponsored CapAnalysis paper submitted to the FTC, calls
for an investigation of "P2P Filesharing" applications for
deceptive practices that affect the privacy and security of
users, subjecting them to such risks as adware, viruses, exposure
to undesirable material, impairments of computer function, and
last but not least, liability to charges of copyright
infringement. Congress is also calling the FTC to investigate
these products.

We call all those who know the Internet is a common good, who
make productive use of it and who develop applications for it as
a regular part of their daily lives, to join us in telling the
FTC what the real sources of these risks are.

Please tell the FTC not to allow a few rich cartels and
monopolies such as the RIAA, MPAA and Microsoft to put the
Internet at risk:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/filesharing/comments.htm


Get On the Bus!

We are organizing a caravan of concerned citizens to travel to
the nation's capital and defend our rights and powers against the
RIAA, the MPAA and Microsoft.

When we arrive:

    * We will call the FTC to protect Internet users by acting
against a few rich cartels and monopolies that impede innovation
and access to robust solutions, choice, transparency and control.

    * We will call the FTC to focus their attention on the real
sources of the risks in question, and to respond to them
appropriately.

    * We will pose the question to the FTC of how they can
distinguish the applications they have selected for consideration
at this workshop from the multitude of applications of the
Internet and the ordinary functions of operating systems now in
use on millions of interconnected desktops across the planet.

    * We will press the FTC to explain what risks are actually
unique to the applications they have singled out.

    * We will call the FTC to separate copyright matters from
consideration of the private interests of computer owners.

    * We will call the FTC to refer copyright policy to the
appropriate body, the United States Congress.


Please submit comments to the FTC here:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/filesharing/comments.htm

Please contact us to let us know you will join us in this action
and to offer your assistance with travel, lodging and sustenance:
http://www.nyfairuse.org/cgi-bin/nyfu/contactus

Links:

The FTC "P2P Filesharing" Workshop:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/filesharing/index.htm

The CapAnalysis/RIAA Paper:
http://ipcentral.info/blog/P2P%20White%20Paper.doc

House and Senate Members Urge FTC Action Against P2P:
http://www.gnutellanews.com/article/13743

>From Clean System to Zombie Bot in Four Minutes:
http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/11/30/1932245

In Praise of P2P:
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_id=3422905
New Yorkers for Fair Use - www.nyfairuse.org

--

DRM is Theft!  We are the Stakeholders!

New Yorkers for Fair Use
http://www.nyfairuse.org

[CC] Counter-copyright: http://realmeasures.dyndns.org/cc

I reserve no rights restricting copying, modification or
distribution of this incidentally recorded communication.
Original authorship should be attributed reasonably, but only so
far as such an expectation might hold for usual practice in
ordinary social discourse to which one holds no claim of
exclusive rights.

_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Dec  9 11:47:49 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 14:47:49 -0500
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <20041209121614.K40200@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F35DD13E5529163C8625A149BB70@phx.gbl>

Oh, general cluelessness doesn't suprise me. What suprises me is that the 
writer of the original article seemed to believe that Stego was a new 
development.

Those cops you taught...do you think they were stupid enough to assume that, 
because this was their first time hearing about Stego, that Al Qaeda was 
only starting to use it right then? (I assume the answer is 'no'...they'll 
be smart enough at least to recognize that this was something around for a 
while that they were unaware of).

NSA folks, on the other hand, I would assume have a soft version of a 
Variola Stego suitcase...able to quickly detect the presence of pretty much 
any kind of stego and then perform some tests to determine what kind was 
used. I bet they've been aware of Al Qaeda stego for a long time...that's 
probably the kind of thing they are very very good at.

In the end it probably comes down to Arabic, however, and that language has 
many built-in ways of deflecting the uninitiated. I'd bet even NSA has a 
hard time understanding an Arabic language message, even after they de-stego 
and translate it.

-TD

>From: "J.A. Terranson" <measl at mfn.org>
>To: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
>CC: rah at shipwright.com, cryptography at metzdowd.com, 
>cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net,        osint at yahoogroups.com
>Subject: RE: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
>Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 12:19:55 -0600 (CST)
>
>On Thu, 9 Dec 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:
>
> > What a fuckin' joke. You mean they're only now realizing that Al-Qaeda 
>could
> > use stego? Do they think they're stupid?
> >
> > Nah...certainly the NSA are fully prepared to handle this. I doubt it's 
>much
> > of a development at all to those in the know.
> >
> > -TD
>
>
>As recently as two years ago, I had a classroom full of cops (mostly fedz
>from various well-known alphabets) who knew *nothing* about stego.  And I
>mean *NOTHING*.  They got a pretty shallow intro: here's a picture, and
>here's the secret message inside it, followed by an hour of theory and
>how-to's using the simplest of tools - every single one of them was just
>blown away. Actually, that's not true - the Postal Inspectors were bored,
>but everyone _else_ was floored.
>
>While the various alphabets have had a few years to get up to speed, the
>idea that they are still 99% ignorant does not surprise me in the least.
>
>//Alif
>
>--
>Yours,
>
>J.A. Terranson
>sysadmin at mfn.org
>0xBD4A95BF
>
>  Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
>upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
>destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
>freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
>healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
>whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
>poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
>biologically and ecologically sustainable.
>
>The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
>indicates that mental illness starts at the top.
>
>Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From measl at mfn.org  Thu Dec  9 14:15:28 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 16:15:28 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F35DD13E5529163C8625A149BB70@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F35DD13E5529163C8625A149BB70@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041209160715.U40200@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Thu, 9 Dec 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:

> Those cops you taught...do you think they were stupid enough to assume that,
> because this was their first time hearing about Stego, that Al Qaeda was
> only starting to use it right then?


Thats an interesting question on several different levels:

(1) There is (both within LEAs and the rest of us) a wide range of
opinions as to the feasability of stego being used in the field for
anything useful.  Remember that USA "professional spies" (who spent over a
year learning tradcraft IIRC) had continuous problems with very simple
encryptions/decryptions in the real world.

(2) The folks in the "Al Qaeda is Satan" camp generally believe that not
only is stego in wide use, but that AlQ has somehow managed to turn it
into a high bandwidth channel which is being used every day to Subvert The
American Way Of Life and infect Our Precious Bodily Fluids.  No amount of
education seems to dissuade these people from their misbeliefs.

(3) The other camp believes that stego is a lab-only toy, unsuitable for
much of anything besides scaring the shit out of the people in the Satan
camp.

(4) I have yet to meet a full dozen people who share my belief that while
stego *may* be in use, if it is, that use is for one way messages of
semaphore-class messages only.  I really do not understand why this view
is poopoo'd by all sides, so I must be pretty dense?

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From roberte at ripnet.com  Thu Dec  9 14:43:25 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 17:43:25 -0500
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <20041209160715.U40200@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <BAY24-F35DD13E5529163C8625A149BB70@phx.gbl>
  <20041209160715.U40200@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <41B8D50D.30105@ripnet.com>

J.A. Terranson wrote:

>
>On Thu, 9 Dec 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:
>
>  
>
>>Those cops you taught...do you think they were stupid enough to assume that,
>>because this was their first time hearing about Stego, that Al Qaeda was
>>only starting to use it right then?
>>    
>>
>
>
>Thats an interesting question on several different levels:
>
>(1) There is (both within LEAs and the rest of us) a wide range of
>opinions as to the feasability of stego being used in the field for
>anything useful.  Remember that USA "professional spies" (who spent over a
>year learning tradcraft IIRC) had continuous problems with very simple
>encryptions/decryptions in the real world.
>
>(2) The folks in the "Al Qaeda is Satan" camp generally believe that not
>only is stego in wide use, but that AlQ has somehow managed to turn it
>into a high bandwidth channel which is being used every day to Subvert The
>American Way Of Life and infect Our Precious Bodily Fluids.  No amount of
>education seems to dissuade these people from their misbeliefs.
>
>(3) The other camp believes that stego is a lab-only toy, unsuitable for
>much of anything besides scaring the shit out of the people in the Satan
>camp.
>
>(4) I have yet to meet a full dozen people who share my belief that while
>stego *may* be in use, if it is, that use is for one way messages of
>semaphore-class messages only.  I really do not understand why this view
>is poopoo'd by all sides, so I must be pretty dense?
>
>  
>
It only makes sense that transmitted stego payloads be simple codewords 
or signals.
For hand carried chunks of data, simple disguise is sufficient
The bulk transport of dangerous data is a threat model  that doesnt fit 
the situation.
Perhaps LEA confuse themselves thinking al-q is inciting a cultural 
revolution?
.
.




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec  9 18:33:09 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 18:33:09 -0800
Subject: punkly current events
Message-ID: <41B90AE5.B4313EDA@cdc.gov>

Someone should have commented here, so I will, that some judges (earning

hanging) basically said that anonymity is not a right.  This
in the context of mask-wearing in public.  If the Klan doesn't have
a right to wear pillowcases what makes you think mixmaster will
survive?




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec  9 18:43:50 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 18:43:50 -0800
Subject: SEC Probes Firms That Gather Data on Who Owns What Shares
Message-ID: <41B90D66.3621B145@cdc.gov>

At 10:51 AM 12/9/04 -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
>cash payments of $50 to $100 per tip. The people add that a separate
>internal probe found that four employees of Mellon Financial Corp. had
>received Pittsburgh Pirates tickets, $50 American Express gift
certificates
>and boxes of steaks for such data.

Just for the newbies, these are all bearer instruments, in RAHspeak.
Bearer instruments (incl. gold, tobacco, whiskey, goats, etc.)
let you do things that you don't want monitored.  They also have
'finders keepers' property, which is a corollary, and a bug (not a
feature) should you lose your wallet/stash.  This is a hard property
to imbue digicash with because you need to prevent double-spending,
which generally requires some kind of online access, also a feature.
(Think gas station in the boonies without a credit card terminal;
only cash, gold, silver, Pu, etc if the vendor believes he is competent
to verify
those precious elements, etc.)




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec  9 09:48:09 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 18:48:09 +0100
Subject: New Global Directory of OpenPGP Keys
Message-ID: <20041209174809.GN9221@leitl.org>

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/12/09/1446203
Posted by: michael, on 2004-12-09 15:50:00

   from the how-may-i-direct-your-call dept.
   Gemini writes "The [1]PGP company just announced a new type of
   [2]keyserver for all your OpenPGP keys. This server verifies (via
   mailback verification, like mailing lists) that the email address on
   the key actually reaches someone. Dead keys age off the server, and
   you can even remove keys if you forget the passphrase. In a classy
   move, they've included support for those parts of the OpenPGP standard
   that PGP doesn't use, but [3]GnuPG does."

   [4]Click Here

References

   1. http://www.pgp.com/downloads/beta/globaldirectory/index.html
   2. http://keyserver-beta.pgp.com/
   3. http://www.gnupg.org/
   4.
http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=5671&alloc_id=12342&site_id=1&request_id=2385427&o
p=click&page=%2farticle%2epl

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec  9 19:01:04 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 19:01:04 -0800
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
Message-ID: <41B91170.D2E8B4AC@cdc.gov>

At 11:21 AM 12/9/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>
>Well, May seemed to try to make the case that all of those "useles
eaters"
>were in large part responsible for the very existence of the state, and
that
>collapse of the state meant the inevitable downfall of huge numbers of
>minorities (why he focused on them as opposed to white trailer trash I
don't
>know).
>
>But he was definitely advocating that racist viewpoints fall naturally
out
>of a crypto-anarchic approach.

Tyler:

A rational person has to admit that many parasitic folks of all albedos
are able to exist
because they occupy a govt-funded niche.

Without a welfare govt, those people would either 1. subsist on private
(ie voluntary) charity, 2. become useful by necessity 3. die of
starvation
4. die during attempts to coerce others with violence.

Depending on your beliefs about human demographics/nature, you will
assign variable percentages to these outcomes.

It *is* racist to think that genotypes in each bin will differ *IFF* you

*don't* ascribe this outcome to culture associated with genotypes.

But culturism is not racism, its recognition of how behavior and
evolution work.  I subscribe to and will defend culturism.

(I speak for myself, not TM (tm), though I may or may not be a duly
appointed pope of the church of strong cryptography; though recently
I've been trending towards being an Earthquaker,
who believes in tectonics, esp. during seismic events.  Our vatican
is in Parkfield BTW :-)




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec  9 19:04:39 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 19:04:39 -0800
Subject: tempest back doors
Message-ID: <41B91247.83D89065@cdc.gov>

At 07:46 PM 12/9/04 -0500, Steve Thompson wrote:
> --- "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov> wrote:
>> >Perhaps I am stupid.  I don't know how one would go about modifying
>> >application software to include a 'back door' that would presumably
>> >enhance its suceptibility to TEMPEST attacks.  Isn't tempest all
about
>> EM
>> >spectrum signal detection and capture?
>>
>> You have your code drive a bus with signal.  The bus radiates, you
>> 'TEMPEST' the signal, game over.  Back in the 60s folks programmed
>> PDPs to play music on AM radios.  Same thing.  Dig?
>
>Fine.  That's great as an example of transmitting data over a covert
>channel, but so what?  As you suggest, people have been doing that with
AM
>radios since the 60's, although the folklore mentions the phenomenon in

>the context of monitoring the computer's heartbeat, purely as a
debugging
>technique.

The poster didn't understand how to backdoor a program using
unintentional RF as the channel.  I told them.  That's "so what"




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Thu Dec  9 16:37:38 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 19:37:38 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Timing Paranoia
In-Reply-To: <41B6490E.3030603@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <20041210003738.84391.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote: 
> One of the tools currently being used in the cognitive sciences is the 
> measurement of reaction time to stimulus.

What's this?  The cognitive equivalent to wacking someone on the knee with
a rubber hammer to measure the mentak kick reflex of the subject?

> It turns out that the length of time it takes to given situations is a 
> credible proxy for how difficult the discrimination is to make.

For the individual subject.  I would imagine that such testing would
(among other things) allow some measurement of the thoughtfullness put
into a response.  Careful construction of the tests to control for various
factors might then allow inferences to be made about the relative
sophistication to be found in the cognitive structures involved in the
test-response on a subject-by-subject basis.

> Imagine a paranoia  involving  mysterious e-mail delays and the length 
> of time it takes to catagorize

Imagine hordes of otherwise unemployable psychologists and cognitive
psychologists deployed on mailing lists and Usenet, harassing the fuck out
of `persons of interest'.  Civil rights, for the majority of the civilian
population, are entirely non-existent for all intents and purposes.  I
imagine that a great many self-styled scientists are happily engaged in
the cultivation and acquisition of psycho-social data and knowledge, in
public fora, without too much thought about the morality of their
intrusive meddling in the commons.

All in the name of science, of course.


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Thu Dec  9 16:46:12 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 19:46:12 -0500 (EST)
Subject: tempest back doors
In-Reply-To: <41B67E5B.18ED78E7@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20041210004612.94571.qmail@web51802.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov> wrote: 
> >Perhaps I am stupid.  I don't know how one would go about modifying
> >application software to include a 'back door' that would presumably
> >enhance its suceptibility to TEMPEST attacks.  Isn't tempest all about
> EM
> >spectrum signal detection and capture?
> 
> You have your code drive a bus with signal.  The bus radiates, you
> 'TEMPEST' the signal, game over.  Back in the 60s folks programmed
> PDPs to play music on AM radios.  Same thing.  Dig?

Fine.  That's great as an example of transmitting data over a covert
channel, but so what?  As you suggest, people have been doing that with AM
radios since the 60's, although the folklore mentions the phenomenon in
the context of monitoring the computer's heartbeat, purely as a debugging
technique.

What makes this odd is that the Wired article makes no mention of Tempest,
only of the possibility of there being a back door, which in the usual
vernacular of computer security, usually implies a method for unauthorised
access or use of the software system in question.


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From ashwood at msn.com  Thu Dec  9 19:47:50 2004
From: ashwood at msn.com (Joseph Ashwood)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 19:47:50 -0800
Subject: punkly current events
References: <41B90AE5.B4313EDA@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <BAY0-SMTP11F258F15221BEE5FE645FACA80@phx.gbl>

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
Subject: punkly current events


> If the Klan doesn't have
> a right to wear pillowcases what makes you think mixmaster will
> survive?

Well besides the misinterprettaion of the ruling, which I will ignore, what 
makes you think MixMaster isn't already dead?

MixMaster is only being used by a small percentage of individuals. Those 
individuals like to claim that everyone should send everything anonymously, 
when in truth communication cannot happen with anonymity, and trust cannot 
be built anonymously. This leaves MixMaster as only being useful for a small 
percentage of normal people, and those using it to prevent being identified 
as they communicate with other known individuals.

The result of this is rather the opposite of what MixMaster is supposed to 
create. A small group to investigate for any actions which are illegal, or 
deemed worth investigating. In fact it is arguable that for a new face in 
action it is probably easier to get away with the actions in question to 
send the information in the clear to their compatriots than it is to use 
MixMaster, simply because being a part of the group using MixMaster 
immediately flags them, as potential problems.

In short, except for those few people who have some use for MixMaster, 
MixMaster was stillborn. I'm not arguing whether such a situation should be 
the correct way things happened, but that is the way things happened.
                Joe 




From measl at mfn.org  Thu Dec  9 17:48:04 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 19:48:04 -0600 (CST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <20041210011906.5802.qmail@web51806.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20041210011906.5802.qmail@web51806.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20041209194633.N42471@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Thu, 9 Dec 2004, Steve Thompson wrote:

<snip one of the funniest posts in recent cpunk history>

(STANDING OVATION) (SOUNDS OF MANY HANDS CLAPPING)

Thank you Steve, for that short but entertaining look into the dark
recesses of our collective consciousness :-)


-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Thu Dec  9 17:19:06 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 20:19:06 -0500 (EST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <25427560.1102515450304.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <20041210011906.5802.qmail@web51806.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- John Kelsey <kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com> wrote: 
>>[May]
> 
> Maybe, maybe not.  The thing I always find interesting and annoying
> about Tim May's posts is that he's sometimes making really clearly
> thought out, intelligent points, and other times spewing out nonsense so
> crazy you can't believe it's coming from the same person.  It's also
> clear he's often yanking peoples' chains, often by saying the most
> offensive thing he can think of.  But once in awhile, even amidst the
> crazy rantings about useless eaters and ovens, he'll toss out something
> that shows some deep, coherent thought about some issue in a new and
> fascinating direction. 

That paragraph could easily be modified to make it a commentary on my
posting habits, or indeed, on my general presentation from day to day. 
So, I will comment.

On a pseudo-random but cyclic schedule, I am harassed, provoked, or
otherwise experience incidents of aggression of one sort or another.  This
affects my mood and general state of mind to varying degrees. 
Furthermore, I do not have consistent dietary intake, nor do I live in an
environment which allows or provides privacy, security, or consistency
save that which I impose with the expenditure of a great deal of effort
and patience.

If you also consider the fact that I have been variously poisoned in
recent years with everything from sedatives to stimulants to hormones to
psychoactive compounds to low-level hallucinogens, and as well have been
subjected to uncounted appeals to my subconscious in the main through the
use of direct and indirect sexually exploitative imagery and encounters,
you might get the idea that consistent literary output is simply not in
the offing.

Before anyone goes to the trouble of suggesting that I discuss matters
with the police, I'll save them the bother.  The police have entirely
failed to allow my allegations the courtesy of a hearing.  Not even once. 
I belive that those who have not merely dirties their own hands in some
way, are too chikenshit to recognise some of the more subtle criminality
that goes on in this country.  Or they may be intimidated by the kind of
agency[1] that has invoved itself in the kind of clandestine activity that
is at issue.

Add in the fact that I've been dealing with _some_ sort of malicious and
interfereing bullshit for quite a few years without any sincere assistance
of any sort beyond the odd informational giveaway of dubious provenance,
and you might well conclude that whatever else is going on, I'm not a
happy camper.  Perhaps my inconsistent presentation mimics the
inconclusive partial criterion for certain classical mental afflictions. 
This is convenient as such afflictions are conveniently viewed by the
layman and professional alike as having an origin that is entirely
internal to the individual in question.

However, I have quite a bit of evidence of varying grades that support my
position rather well.  Time will tell, perhaps, the true nature of the
matter in a fashion that leaves no doubt in the mind of the uninvolved
spectator.

But in the interim, that will have to stand as my overbrief outline of the
reason why I exhibit inconsistency in writing, speech, and action.  I am
simply way too busy dealing with what can in one way be viewed as a
chronic and personalised denial of service attack.

Perhaps Tim May has an entirely different set of factors influencing his
online behaviour.  You will have to ask him to explain his circumstances,
and hope that he consents to it.

As for my case, I do not really wish to make it a topic of discussion on
the Cypherpunks list.  The law enforecement (and perhipheral) personnel
who have involvement in my affairs, for whatever reason, are (and should
be) fully aware of the external influences on my psychology.  They have
the investigative tools and authority to make definitive findings of fact,
and to take corrective action should they find incidents of criminal
liability, but as yet have refused to do so.  And *that* is another matter
entirely.



Regards,

Steve



[1] general sense of the term.  I'm not referring to, say, the CIA
specifically in this instance.  

______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Thu Dec  9 17:36:32 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 20:36:32 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <p0611047dbdde0d42e48f@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20041210013632.21904.qmail@web51809.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote: 
> Lions and Tigers and Steganography, Nell...
> 
> For those of you without a program, here is the new, official, Horsemen
> of
> the Infocalypse Scorecard:
> 
> At 3:14 PM -0400 10/3/04, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
> >   Horseman             Color      Character   Nickname
> >
> >1  Terrorism            Red        Shadow      "Blinky"
> >2  Narcotics            Pink       Speedy      "Pinky"
> >3  Money Laundering     Aqua       Bashful     "Inky"
> >4  Paedophilia          Yellow     Pokey       "Clyde"
> 
> Cheers,
> RAH
> -------
> 
> <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2004/12/08/pf-773871.html>
>  December 8, 2004
> 
>  RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
> By JIM BRONSKILL

<snort>

The RCMP couldn't find a hidden terrorist message even if someone shoved
half of it up the ass of Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli, and the other
half up the ass of Deputy Commissioner Paul Gauvin, and then sent them a
map with clear directions written on it leading directly to the location
of both assholes.

No, I don't like them at all.


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From roberte at ripnet.com  Thu Dec  9 17:36:42 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 20:36:42 -0500
Subject: Sheep Herding
Message-ID: <41B8FDAA.9050206@ripnet.com>

The secular bible: Our project

 

First let me speak to my Christian brothers and sisters. I mean you no 
disrespect by using the term "bible" in an unholy attack on your faith.

The project of this secular bible honors the sanctity of holy documents.

A secular bible could only be true to itself is it stood for tolerance 
and cooperation.

 

 

We all know of the worldwide spread of dissatisfaction and unhappiness. 
We acknowledge the existence of what we can only call "evil" in the world.

We have less agreement on what we call "good" or "godlike"  We have not 
found enough agreement on what to do about evil.

 

There are those among us who hold to the principle no agreement is 
required. The proper agents in the war against chaos are the free and 
independent thinkers of the mythical open society. The radical edge of 
this stance is the notion that cooperation always entails disaster in 
the form of unintended consequences.

 

There are those among us who are afraid of the unknown. Many of us 
prefer to keep to the familiar. We find ourselves in circles of friends 
and relatives and find comfort or at least solace in the company of 
these others. We become "us".

 

There is a subtle danger in this. The formation of community is also the 
formation of "them"

 

There are those among us who fear "them" so much that the very thought 
of cooperation is scary. To them the idea that there could be a science 
of cooperation is absurd. They will cite economics and rational self 
interest to avoid gambling on trust. The run-away paranoia that can 
ensue will tax their freedom as surely as the state must.

 

The project of the science of understanding, this secular bible giving 
people an understanding of their part in the universe, and the tools 
they need to get along with all manner of thinkers.

 

(tbc)


Of course this is all meant sarcastically.

The Lord knows, nobody wants to just get along.




From roberte at ripnet.com  Thu Dec  9 17:50:32 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 20:50:32 -0500
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <20041210013632.21904.qmail@web51809.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20041210013632.21904.qmail@web51809.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <41B900E8.1060203@ripnet.com>

Steve Thompson wrote:

> --- "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote: 
>  
>
>>Lions and Tigers and Steganography, Nell...
>>
>>For those of you without a program, here is the new, official, Horsemen
>>of
>>the Infocalypse Scorecard:
>>
>>At 3:14 PM -0400 10/3/04, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>>    
>>
>>>  Horseman             Color      Character   Nickname
>>>
>>>1  Terrorism            Red        Shadow      "Blinky"
>>>2  Narcotics            Pink       Speedy      "Pinky"
>>>3  Money Laundering     Aqua       Bashful     "Inky"
>>>4  Paedophilia          Yellow     Pokey       "Clyde"
>>>      
>>>
>>Cheers,
>>RAH
>>-------
>>
>><http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2004/12/08/pf-773871.html>
>> December 8, 2004
>>
>> RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
>>By JIM BRONSKILL
>>    
>>
>
><snort>
>
>The RCMP couldn't find a hidden terrorist message even if someone shoved
>half of it up the ass of Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli, and the other
>half up the ass of Deputy Commissioner Paul Gauvin, and then sent them a
>map with clear directions written on it leading directly to the location
>of both assholes.
>
>No, I don't like them at all.
>
>
>Regards,
>
>Steve
>
>
>______________________________________________________________________ 
>Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca
>
>
>  
>
You tell them, Steve

Insanity is a great cover for an insurectionist!




From roberte at ripnet.com  Thu Dec  9 17:56:39 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 20:56:39 -0500
Subject: Nul Context
Message-ID: <41B90257.8070207@ripnet.com>

Communication is about context

Sometimes the context is so obvious that the frame is nearly invisible, 
sometimes the context is so subtle that indications of obvious 
significance can only be detected after much study.

Language and meaning involve sharing of contexts.

This is obvious, what is less obvious is the way that communication 
implicates a context one might call, A Theory of Mind

What does this mean? Well a lot of it is hidden in what we call common 
sense, or folk psychology. You know what I mean because I'm behaving 
conventionally in my choice of words, and saying stuff that makes sense.

When we use language conventionally, we talk about things that are 
happening and what people are thinking. When we talk about things that 
matter we wonder what others think. We think about what other people are 
thinking, all the time.

Its a common enough usage of language, and quite comprehensible. Which 
makes it all the more peculiar that for a long time science had a weird 
rule that said that unempirical terms like intention and purpose, not to 
mention perception and comprehension were "metaphysical nonsense".

Science has come a long way since the logical positivists held sway. Its 
not that they were wrong, the problem was they couldnt be right. The 
original proof that they were wrong was at hand for most of the 20th 
century, in the interference pattern between the works of Wittgenstein 
and Gvdel,

As recently as the middle of the last century, back when Chomsky was 
doing his seminal work in deep structures, psychology was firmly stuck 
with Pavlovian Reflexes and Skinner Boxes and vigorously opposed 
adopting any working theory of mind. Stimulus Response Theory just cant 
handle task of explaining what an artist does. Into this context, Modern 
Linguistics was born.




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec  9 12:16:37 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 21:16:37 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Don't Let the RIAA Put the Net at Risk! (fwd from
  seth.johnson@RealMeasures.dyndns.org)
Message-ID: <20041209201637.GQ9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Seth Johnson
<seth.johnson at RealMeasures.dyndns.org> -----


From measl at mfn.org  Thu Dec  9 19:29:16 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 21:29:16 -0600 (CST)
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <41B90AE5.B4313EDA@cdc.gov>
References: <41B90AE5.B4313EDA@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20041209212823.J42984@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Thu, 9 Dec 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:

> Someone should have commented here, so I will, that some judges (earning
>
> hanging) basically said that anonymity is not a right.  This
> in the context of mask-wearing in public.  If the Klan doesn't have
> a right to wear pillowcases what makes you think mixmaster will
> survive?

Mixmaster's death is in fact coming - you can bank on it.  Every fed I
know is violently aware of every operating remailer.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  9 19:03:06 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 22:03:06 -0500
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <41B90AE5.B4313EDA@cdc.gov>
References: <41B90AE5.B4313EDA@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <p06110447bddec1792263@[66.149.49.5]>

At 6:33 PM -0800 12/9/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>If the Klan doesn't have
>a right to wear pillowcases what makes you think mixmaster will
>survive?

"Which was me point", mutters Killick, under his breath...

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  9 19:07:02 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 22:07:02 -0500
Subject: SEC Probes Firms That Gather Data on Who Owns What Shares
In-Reply-To: <41B90D66.3621B145@cdc.gov>
References: <41B90D66.3621B145@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <p0611044abddec2f57b6e@[66.149.49.5]>

At 6:43 PM -0800 12/9/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>Just for the newbies, these are all bearer instruments, in RAHspeak.

Now, *that* I wasn't paying attention to, having just seen the "omigawd,
more financial proctology" aspects at the beginning of the article.

Thank you.

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From roy at rant-central.com  Thu Dec  9 19:16:10 2004
From: roy at rant-central.com (Roy M. Silvernail)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 22:16:10 -0500
Subject: Timing Paranoia
In-Reply-To: <20041210003738.84391.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20041210003738.84391.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <41B914FA.50805@rant-central.com>

Steve Thompson wrote:

> --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote: 
>  
>
>>Imagine a paranoia  involving  mysterious e-mail delays and the length 
>>of time it takes to catagorize
>>    
>>
>
>Imagine hordes of otherwise unemployable psychologists and cognitive
>psychologists deployed on mailing lists and Usenet, harassing the fuck out
>of `persons of interest'.
>
Imagine using observed timing to conclude that your agent provocateur 
operates from geostationary orbit.

R. W. may be annoying, but at least he's derivative.

-- 
Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
"It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT
SpamAssassin->procmail->/dev/null->bliss
http://www.rant-central.com




From roberte at ripnet.com  Thu Dec  9 19:34:22 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 22:34:22 -0500
Subject: Timing Paranoia
In-Reply-To: <41B914FA.50805@rant-central.com>
References: <20041210003738.84391.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>
  <41B914FA.50805@rant-central.com>
Message-ID: <41B9193E.8060602@ripnet.com>

Roy M. Silvernail wrote:

>
> Steve Thompson wrote:
>
>> --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote:  
>>
>>> Imagine a paranoia  involving  mysterious e-mail delays and the 
>>> length of time it takes to catagorize
>>>   
>>
>>
>> Imagine hordes of otherwise unemployable psychologists and cognitive
>> psychologists deployed on mailing lists and Usenet, harassing the 
>> fuck out
>> of `persons of interest'.
>>
> Imagine using observed timing to conclude that your agent provocateur 
> operates from geostationary orbit.
>
> R. W. may be annoying, but at least he's derivative.
>
Total novelty is a fiction.
If its not familiar, you wouldnt recognize it
We all work with the same handicaps
but some of us have agenda's
and others have excuses.

I am a collection of projects,
mine is the semantic path,
if anything of significance is missed,
I'll send back reports from the other side

--bob
maker of absurtities
no tangle too complex
to fit through the I of  my needle




From roberte at ripnet.com  Thu Dec  9 19:48:22 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 22:48:22 -0500
Subject: tangled contexts
Message-ID: <41B91C86.9090707@ripnet.com>

Process and perception

 

This capacity for making high order discriminations about relationships 
between objects in our world, can be taken as the proper function of our 
cognitive competency. The attribute of intentionality, to this way of 
thinking, is best understood as "work product" of a discrete sub-module 
of our brain.

We infer agency from our observations. What is agency? Well first and 
foremost, it is that which is recognizable to the competencies in 
process, that form these judgments.

Does this sound circular? Surely it is circular in a crucial sense. All 
that we "know" comes to our attention as the work product of process in 
various competencies. Ultimately the "authority" of  these high order 
discriminations comes not from a judgment about the correlation between 
our perceptions and the state of the "objective" world, but instead from 
their immediacy. This is to say that we do not perceive and then make 
judgments, our first awareness of every "thing"  is located in the 
moment that the competent module forms some thing out of the possibilities.

These awareness's are not in the semantic domain. Our knowing of 
particular attributes precedes the semantic transform that tags and 
packages up insights, for storage and shipping. We know what we know and 
we apologize for not being able to convey this knowing more effectively.

That we are able to communicate at all, is a testament to the power of 
trial and error and the phenomenal similarity of our minds. This 
similarity is not accidental. Even as each person is an absolutely 
unique instance of humanity, what we are, is the embodiment of a 
phenomenally complex tangle of historical accomplishments that is  
fundamentally common to us all.


Creativity emerges via the capacity/ability to merge contexts

 

Biological instrumentality:

The complex objects of our knowings come to our awareness as 
circumstances demand, literally selected by their features. Apprehension 
of the world via a sophisticatedly evolved biological instrumentality is 
an entropy hack. Life is the opportunistic bloom of a viral exploitation 
of regularity in the universe.

 

In the beginning there was sequence, and it begat pattern and context 
space. Within every context space there is a tree of combinatorial 
consequences some leaves of which are potentially lucky. Blind evolution 
isn't trial and error testing of mistakes (mutations), it is the random 
testing of legal combinations

 

So who set up the game, where did the rules come from, and the design 
language?

 

The dynamic core of our consciousness consists of transient alignments 
of Feature Value - Action loops that compete for selection in a 
flicker-dance-sort of associations and sensory stimuli.

 

 

 

Perception is a physics hack. Timing is everything. Three dimensionality 
is accessible to us via  a cross mapping within the temporal manifold. 
Propagation of coherent correlations between map-mapped sheets of 
neurons act as a massively parallel delay line with multiple taps. 
Because both spatial and temporal coherence is preserved, the network 
sorts up the objects of perception and tracks them real time. Reality is 
best fit. Misperceptions happen, but its better than being blind.

 

Our competency at this is not postulated, it is stipulated that the high 
order discriminations we perceive as qualia are exactly as amazing as 
the incredible complexity of the neurological stack that gives us them.

Intentionality is an emergent design goal in secondary consciousness.

(before getting upset about intentional language, remember that it works 
because reality fits.)

 

 

Phenomenal transform is a semantic label for a context shift. If you 
insist on thinking of it as a happening, what's happening is that we 
find ourselves switching lexicons when we discuss certain things. Its 
not a description of a change of state in the object, it is a handle for 
referring to a pragmatic feature of discourse about it.

 

 The important thing to realize is that this sorting out of the features 
of the objects of our perception usually is done before we are aware of 
the process, but this does not mean that the process is different for 
hard discriminations, just that they are taking longer than the ~400ms 
self context loop, that feeds a product of the net's immediate state 
back into itself. Think convolving and converging. Discrimination occurs 
opportunistically, our competencies do not require conscious attention. 
In the formation of PV Action loops each project become one of the 
factions in our interior parliament.

 

We have lots of timing to tap. Response times, flicker fusion times, 
saccades, pulse, peristalsis, menstruation. The royal road to cognitive 
illumination is the path of chronus.


--bob


"me, I'm just a lawn mower"




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  9 20:01:31 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 23:01:31 -0500
Subject: Timing Paranoia
In-Reply-To: <41B914FA.50805@rant-central.com>
References: <20041210003738.84391.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com> 
  <41B914FA.50805@rant-central.com>
Message-ID: <p06110453bdded0068bb3@[66.149.49.5]>

At 10:16 PM -0500 12/9/04, Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
>Imagine using observed timing to conclude that your agent provocateur
>operates from geostationary orbit.

...And here I thought VALIS was all in his head...

Cheers,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec  9 20:26:55 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 23:26:55 -0500
Subject: Cryptography firm Certicom posts quarterly loss, year after big
   U.S. contract
Message-ID: <p06110458bdded5d7e8b0@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/TechNews/TechInvestor/2004/12/09/pf-775547.html>

CNEWS - Tech News:

 December 9, 2004

 Cryptography firm Certicom posts quarterly loss, year after big U.S. contract
By CRAIG WONG

 TORONTO (CP) - Data encryption company Certicom Corp. is reporting a
second-quarter loss of about $1 million US, down sharply from a profit of
$22.3 million a year earlier when the numbers were boosted by a lucrative
contract from the U.S. National Security Agency.

 Certicom (TSX:CIC) reported Thursday quarterly revenue of $2.6 million US,
compared with $2.7 million US a year ago - excluding revenues from the
$25-million NSA contract. The Mississauga-based firm reports in U.S.
dollars. CEO Ian McKinnon said the NSA contract has given the company a
boost to help sell its technology as the standard for encryption around the
world.

 "It has also hiked Certicom's position as the authority for strong
efficient cryptography," McKinnon said during a conference call with
analysts.

 The technology at the core of Certicom's products - elliptic-curve
cryptography, or ECC - is well suited to such purposes since it can work
faster and requires less computing power and storage than conventional
forms of cryptography.

 "We see the greatest potential in intellectual property licensing as ECC
adoption grows. Our focus is to maximize our share of that market,"
McKinnon said.

 During the quarter, the company used $10 million to retire its convertible
debentures, which matured on Aug. 30, making the company debt free.

 In its outlook the company said it expects operating expenses, including
cost of sales, are expected to range from $3.3 million to $3.6 million in
its third-quarter of its 2005 financial year.

 Research Capital analyst Bruce Krugel said the NSA gave Certicom some
profile, but it has yet to be seen if Certicom can deliver consistently on
its strategy to sign intellectual property deals.

 "There's no denying they have a good stroke of valid, but what I'm
wrestling with at the moment is rate of adoption and what people are
prepared to pay for it," he said

 "We've seen two nice intellectual property licensing deals be announced so
far . . . we just need to see more which would give us at least better
comfort as to what the potential might be."

 At its annual meeting in October, Certicom said it saw a growing demand
for its data encryption technology in both government and the private
sector, including the entertainment industry.

 The company said the explosion of digital music, movies and books that are
easily copied is causing companies such as Disney and Time Warner to demand
that electronic devices and distribution networks be fully secure.

 In its most recent quarter the company reported two important contracts
including one with software integration company Sybase and another with a
customer that could not be disclosed for confidentiality reasons.

 For the six months ended Oct. 31, Certicom reported a loss for $2.2
million or six cents per share on revenue of $5.5 million. That compared
with a profit of $20.7 million or 65 cents per share on revenue of $29.8
million for the same period a year earlier.

 During the 1999-2000 boom in technology stocks, Certicom shares (TSX:CIC)
traded above $100 Cdn. However, as the dot-com mania faded and technology
spending dried up, the shares fell and Certicom downsized repeatedly.

 Certicom shares closed up nine cents at $3.42 on the Toronto Stock
Exchange on Thursday.



-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From roy at rant-central.com  Thu Dec  9 20:37:13 2004
From: roy at rant-central.com (Roy M. Silvernail)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 23:37:13 -0500
Subject: Timing Paranoia
In-Reply-To: <p06110453bdded0068bb3@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <20041210003738.84391.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>  
  <41B914FA.50805@rant-central.com>
  <p06110453bdded0068bb3@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <41B927F9.2060902@rant-central.com>

R.A. Hettinga wrote:

>At 10:16 PM -0500 12/9/04, Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
>  
>
>>Imagine using observed timing to conclude that your agent provocateur
>>operates from geostationary orbit.
>>    
>>
>
>...And here I thought VALIS was all in his head...
>  
>
Right idea, wrong book.

R. W. "Bob" is the frog on Detweiller's shoulder.

-- 
Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
"It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT
SpamAssassin->procmail->/dev/null->bliss
http://www.rant-central.com




From roberte at ripnet.com  Thu Dec  9 20:58:33 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 23:58:33 -0500
Subject: Timing Paranoia
In-Reply-To: <41B927F9.2060902@rant-central.com>
References: <20041210003738.84391.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>  
  <41B914FA.50805@rant-central.com>
  <p06110453bdded0068bb3@[66.149.49.5]>
  <41B927F9.2060902@rant-central.com>
Message-ID: <41B92CF9.6010607@ripnet.com>

Roy M. Silvernail wrote:

>
> R.A. Hettinga wrote:
>
>> At 10:16 PM -0500 12/9/04, Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
>>  
>>
>>> Imagine using observed timing to conclude that your agent provocateur
>>> operates from geostationary orbit.
>>>   
>>
>>
>> ...And here I thought VALIS was all in his head...
>>  
>>
> Right idea, wrong book.
>
> R. W. "Bob" is the frog on Detweiller's shoulder.
>
Tim would bake them
John word salads
While Bobrah sells tickets
to a geodesic  fantasyland


Detweiler mourns with Vulis,
Choate and Sunder trade insults
While Art and CJ make licences
in an authoritarian nightmare


me, I'm just a lawn mower




From rabbi at abditum.com  Fri Dec 10 01:08:57 2004
From: rabbi at abditum.com (Len Sassaman)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 01:08:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: CodeCon CFP deadline nearing
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0412100108430.6962@thetis.deor.org>

CodeCon 4.0
February 11-13, 2005
San Francisco CA, USA
www.codecon.org

Call For Papers

CodeCon is the premier showcase of cutting edge software development. It
is an excellent opportunity for programmers to demonstrate their work and
keep abreast of what's going on in their community.

All presentations must include working demonstrations, ideally accompanied
by source code. Presenters must be done by one of the active developers of
the code in question. We emphasize that demonstrations be of *working*
code.

We hereby solicit papers and demonstrations.

    * Papers and proposals due: December 15, 2004
    * Authors notified: January 1, 2005

Possible topics include, but are by no means restricted to:

    * community-based web sites - forums, weblogs, personals
    * development tools - languages, debuggers, version control
    * file sharing systems - swarming distribution, distributed search
    * security products - mail encryption, intrusion detection, firewalls

Presentations will be a 45 minutes long, with 15 minutes allocated for
Q&A. Overruns will be truncated.

Submission details:

Submissions are being accepted immediately. Acceptance dates are November
15, and December 15. After the first acceptance date, submissions will be
either accepted, rejected, or deferred to the second acceptance date.

The conference language is English.

Ideally, demonstrations should be usable by attendees with 802.11b
connected devices either via a web interface, or locally on Windows,
UNIX-like, or MacOS platforms. Cross-platform applications are most
desirable.

Our venue will be 21+.

To submit, send mail to submissions-2005 at codecon.org including the
following information:

    * Project name
    * url of project home page
    * tagline - one sentence or less summing up what the project does
    * names of presenter(s) and urls of their home pages, if they have any
    * one-paragraph bios of presenters, optional, under 100 words each
    * project history, under 150 words
    * what will be done in the project demo, under 200 words
    * slides to be shown during the presentation, if applicable
    * future plans

General Chairs: Jonathan Moore, Len Sassaman
Program Chair: Bram Cohen

Program Committee:

    * Jeremy Bornstein, AtomShockwave Corp., USA
    * Bram Cohen, BitTorrent, USA
    * Jered Floyd, Permabit, USA
    * Ian Goldberg, Zero-Knowledge Systems, CA
    * Dan Kaminsky, Avaya, USA
    * Klaus Kursawe, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, BE
    * Ben Laurie, A.L. Digital Ltd., UK
    * David Molnar, University of California, Berkeley, USA
    * Jonathan Moore, Mosuki, USA
    * Len Sassaman, Nomen Abditum Services, USA

Sponsorship:

If your organization is interested in sponsoring CodeCon, we would love to
hear from you. In particular, we are looking for sponsors for social meals
and parties on any of the three days of the conference, as well as
sponsors of the conference as a whole and donors of door prizes. If you
might be interested in sponsoring any of these aspects, please contact the
conference organizers at codecon-admin at codecon.org.

Press policy:

CodeCon provides a limited number of passes to bona fide press.
Complimentary press passes will be evaluated on request. Everyone is
welcome to pay the low registration fee to attend without an official
press credential.

Questions:

If you have questions about CodeCon, or would like to contact the
organizers, please mail codecon-admin at codecon.org. Please note this
address is only for questions and administrative requests, and not for
workshop presentation submissions.




From gabe at seul.org  Fri Dec 10 03:01:25 2004
From: gabe at seul.org (Gabriel Rocha)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 06:01:25 -0500
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <20041210101347.GC9221@leitl.org>
References: <41B90AE5.B4313EDA@cdc.gov>
  <20041210101347.GC9221@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <20041210110125.GA31472@moria.seul.org>

		On Dec 10 2004, Eugen Leitl wrote:
| 
| Because nodes are not geographically constrained to US jurisdiction?
| 
| If mixter won't survive, it's due to spammers, and malware spreaders.

The latter statement my well be true, I don't use the network, nor know
the ratios of good/bad traffic. But I am very curious to find out what
would be considered geographically "safe" jurisdictions in this sense.
Not just today, but given the general trend, where would you see such a
jurisdition being found in a year or five or ten?




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Dec 10 06:41:55 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 06:41:55 -0800
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
Message-ID: <41B9B5B2.8606F39D@cdc.gov>

At 07:47 PM 12/9/04 -0800, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
>> If the Klan doesn't have
>> a right to wear pillowcases what makes you think mixmaster will
>> survive?
>
>Well besides the misinterprettaion of the ruling, which I will ignore,
what
>makes you think MixMaster isn't already dead?

OK, substitute "wardriving email injection when wardriving is otherwise
legal" for Mixmastering, albeit the former is less secure since the
injection lat/long is known.  And you need to use a disposable
Wifi card or at least one with a mutable MAC.

Or consider a Napster-level popular app which includes mixing or
onion routing.




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Dec 10 06:53:26 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 06:53:26 -0800
Subject: punkly current events
Message-ID: <41B9B866.36005A3F@cdc.gov>

At 11:13 AM 12/10/04 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>
>Because nodes are not geographically constrained to US jurisdiction?

Name a place which is not subject to US juridiction?   Ok, Iran, N Kr,
until
we pull a regime change (tm) on them.  Yeah, they have a lot of 'net
bandwidth, right.

Some of the ex-soviets perhaps,
only because the rubles / threats from the mafia exceed the rubles
from the USG.  Otherwise our "advisors" will help you "Round Up" your
local cash crops, you how to shoot down missionaries, teach you
how to gore an election.  Even the chinese want trade enough to pander
and are not unwilling to enforce a police state.
Meanwhile all your Pakis are belong to u$ (except for those that
don't, but hide the fact and um Sheik Yerbouti).
And if extradition isn't happening fast enough, we'll send a DEA
agent or snatch-und-grab specops to kidnap them.

Hegemony isn't just for breakfast anymore.  If you think you're not
under Bush's boot, you just haven't pissed him off enough, yet.




From ew206 at cam.ac.uk  Fri Dec 10 00:54:04 2004
From: ew206 at cam.ac.uk (Mr Ellis Weinberger)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 08:54:04 +0000 (GMT)
Subject: [wearables] Nokia cellular cameras
Message-ID: <mailman.1108.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


Nokia sell cameras which contain motion sensors, temperature sensors,
microphones, and cell phones, and which can send sms, mms, and smtp messages:

Nokia Observation Camera:
http://www.nokia.com/nokia/0,,4654,00.html

Nokia Remote Camera:
http://www.nokia.com/nokia/0,,63911,00.html

--
Mr Ellis Weinberger          | West Road | t: (+44) (0)1223 333054
Research Associate           | Cambridge | f: (+44) (0)1223 333160
Cambridge University Library | CB3 9DR   | e: ew206 at cam.ac.uk
               url: http://www.cus.cam.ac.uk/~ew206/





----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com  Fri Dec 10 06:22:42 2004
From: kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com (John Kelsey)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 09:22:42 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
Message-ID: <32813501.1102688562464.JavaMail.root@rowlf.psp.pas.earthlink.net>

>From: "J.A. Terranson" <measl at mfn.org>
>Sent: Dec 9, 2004 1:19 PM
>To: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
>Cc: rah at shipwright.com, cryptography at metzdowd.com, cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net, 
>	osint at yahoogroups.com
>Subject: RE: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages

..
>As recently as two years ago, I had a classroom full of cops (mostly fedz
>from various well-known alphabets) who knew *nothing* about stego.  And I
>mean *NOTHING*.  They got a pretty shallow intro: here's a picture, and
>here's the secret message inside it, followed by an hour of theory and
>how-to's using the simplest of tools - every single one of them was just
>blown away. Actually, that's not true - the Postal Inspectors were bored,
>but everyone _else_ was floored.

But the real thing they needed to know was "there can be hidden information in files that look innocent" and what they need to do to find that hidden information.  I expect the answer to that will involve either shipping it off to some expert at the FBI (who will have to do some serious flow control, or he'll be receiving copies of all the video games on every small-time drug dealer's computer), or running some tools to look for the hidden data.  It's not like you're going to expect a random detective to learn how to cryptanalyze stego schemes, anymore than you're going to expect him to learn how to check for DNA matches in a lab.  He'll need to have some notion of how the technology works, and some rules of thumb for how to handle the evidence to keep from tainting it, and that's about it.  

>J.A. Terranson
>sysadmin at mfn.org
>0xBD4A95BF

--John




From paul at ref.nmedia.net  Fri Dec 10 09:29:27 2004
From: paul at ref.nmedia.net (Paul Campbell)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 09:29:27 -0800
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Re: Memory and reputation calculation
Message-ID: <mailman.1109.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

With regards to the history function, I recall seeing a paper (no idea where
or what the title was) that looked at it a different way.

The concern is that in a P2P environment, there's no central assumed
tamper-proof central server. One must rely on the peers themselves for
history.

It would be relatively easy for a peer to simply erase and ignore bad
history, or for peers to be able to collude to report false history, unless
one of two things happens:

1. The vector/group concept of Advogato among others prevents collusion
simply
because there are no multple paths...the false history shows up as a
self-referential structure and not as a web of trust links. The group/vector
concept searches for multiple disjoint paths of trust, which lessens or
destroys collusion.

2. That the history passed on by a peer should be serialized in such a way
that it is tamper-proof. That is, the client can't selectively delete events
from the history. For instance, a one-way accumulator-type function
intertwined
into the data performs the protection. It doesn't circumvent the possibility
of a client simply deleting the last few events in the history (and nothing
is going to stop a client from doing a snapshot to achieve this), but it at
least makes such selective editting an all-or-nothing function.

_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com  Fri Dec 10 06:31:14 2004
From: kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com (John Kelsey)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 09:31:14 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
Message-ID: <15992000.1102689074725.JavaMail.root@rowlf.psp.pas.earthlink.net>

>From: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
>Sent: Dec 9, 2004 2:47 PM
>To: measl at mfn.org
>Cc: rah at shipwright.com, cryptography at metzdowd.com, cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net, 
>	osint at yahoogroups.com
>Subject: RE: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages

...
>NSA folks, on the other hand, I would assume have a soft version of a 
>Variola Stego suitcase...able to quickly detect the presence of pretty much 
>any kind of stego and then perform some tests to determine what kind was 
>used. I bet they've been aware of Al Qaeda stego for a long time...that's 
>probably the kind of thing they are very very good at.

Maybe, but I think it would be very hard to write a general-purpose stego detector, without knowing the techniques used for encoding the message.  And if you know the distribution of your cover channel as well as your attacker, or can generate lots of values from that distribution even if you can'd describe it, you can encode messages in a way that provably can't be detected, down to the quality of your random number generator and the difficulty of guessing your key.  

I imagine this as something much like a virus scanner.  Look for known stego programs, and also for signatures of known stegp programs.  Really good programs might be impossible to find without doing, say, a password search.  

But it's worth noting that AQ has to do key management just like the rest of us, and that's hard when you are communicating with a lot of different people.  If your stego is password-protected, some terrorist's laptop is going to have a post-it note on the screen with the password.  

...
>-TD

--John Kelsey




From muller at emse.fr  Fri Dec 10 00:33:39 2004
From: muller at emse.fr (MULLER Guillaume)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 09:33:39 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Re: Memory and reputation calculation
Message-ID: <mailman.1110.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Hi all,

Right, I would have cited Dellarocas' papers also because he is the only
one I know that worked on this subject.

However, IMHO, his claim that size of history doesn't matter is false.
He took this conclusion in very a specific domain that is eBay-like
market-places with very specific assumption (cf. cited paper).

My idea is that size of history DOES matter. Let's imagine a system
(even eBay-like) where every agent *knows* that the history is a list of
the X last encounters experiences. Then it is easy to see that cheating
1/X times  is a strategy that pays off (particularly in systems where
ratings might be noisy).

IMHO, the key point with respect to the history is that others should
not be able guess its size. If it has a fixed size, I believe it doesn't
matter if (and only if) other can guess its size (and therefore cannot
use strategy as described above).

However, I'm sorry I didn't have time to make any experimentations, but
I'd like to hear if anybody has.

Regards

G. MULLER

--
*************** http://www.guillaume-muller.tk/ ***************
*MULLER Guillaume        *** *** Office : 532                 *
*Phone: 33 4 77 42 66 84  ** **  29 rue des Frhres Ponchardier*
*Fax:   33 4 77 42 66 66 *** *** 42023 Saint-Itienne CIDEX 2  *
*Principe unixien : "faire une seule chose et la faire bien". *
***************************************************************


_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From roberte at ripnet.com  Fri Dec 10 06:34:03 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 09:34:03 -0500
Subject: Nul Context
Message-ID: <41B9B3DB.701@ripnet.com>

Communication is about context

Sometimes the context is so obvious that the frame is nearly invisible,
sometimes the context is so subtle that indications of obvious
significance can only be detected after much study.

Language and meaning involve sharing of contexts.

This is obvious, what is less obvious is the way that communication
implicates a context one might call, A Theory of Mind

What does this mean? Well a lot of it is hidden in what we call common
sense, or folk psychology. You know what I mean because I'm behaving
conventionally in my choice of words, and saying stuff that makes sense.

When we use language conventionally, we talk about things that are
happening and what people are thinking. When we talk about things that
matter we wonder what others think. We think about what other people are
thinking, all the time.

Its a common enough usage of language, and quite comprehensible. Which
makes it all the more peculiar that for a long time science had a weird
rule that said that unempirical terms like intention and purpose, not to
mention perception and comprehension were "metaphysical nonsense".

Science has come a long way since the logical positivists held sway. Its
not that they were wrong, the problem was they couldnt be right. The
original proof that they were wrong was at hand for most of the 20th
century, in the interference pattern between the works of Wittgenstein
and Gvdel,

As recently as the middle of the last century, back when Chomsky was
doing his seminal work in deep structures, psychology was firmly stuck
with Pavlovian Reflexes and Skinner Boxes and vigorously opposed
adopting any working theory of mind. Stimulus Response Theory just cant
handle task of explaining what an artist does. Into this context, Modern
Linguistics was born.




From roberte at ripnet.com  Fri Dec 10 06:34:29 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 09:34:29 -0500
Subject: tangled contexts
Message-ID: <41B9B3F5.2060607@ripnet.com>

Process and perception



This capacity for making high order discriminations about relationships
between objects in our world, can be taken as the proper function of our
cognitive competency. The attribute of intentionality, to this way of
thinking, is best understood as "work product" of a discrete sub-module
of our brain.

We infer agency from our observations. What is agency? Well first and
foremost, it is that which is recognizable to the competencies in
process, that form these judgments.

Does this sound circular? Surely it is circular in a crucial sense. All
that we "know" comes to our attention as the work product of process in
various competencies. Ultimately the "authority" of  these high order
discriminations comes not from a judgment about the correlation between
our perceptions and the state of the "objective" world, but instead from
their immediacy. This is to say that we do not perceive and then make
judgments, our first awareness of every "thing"  is located in the
moment that the competent module forms some thing out of the possibilities.

These awareness's are not in the semantic domain. Our knowing of
particular attributes precedes the semantic transform that tags and
packages up insights, for storage and shipping. We know what we know and
we apologize for not being able to convey this knowing more effectively.

That we are able to communicate at all, is a testament to the power of
trial and error and the phenomenal similarity of our minds. This
similarity is not accidental. Even as each person is an absolutely
unique instance of humanity, what we are, is the embodiment of a
phenomenally complex tangle of historical accomplishments that is
fundamentally common to us all.


Creativity emerges via the capacity/ability to merge contexts



Biological instrumentality:

The complex objects of our knowings come to our awareness as
circumstances demand, literally selected by their features. Apprehension
of the world via a sophisticatedly evolved biological instrumentality is
an entropy hack. Life is the opportunistic bloom of a viral exploitation
of regularity in the universe.



In the beginning there was sequence, and it begat pattern and context
space. Within every context space there is a tree of combinatorial
consequences some leaves of which are potentially lucky. Blind evolution
isn't trial and error testing of mistakes (mutations), it is the random
testing of legal combinations



So who set up the game, where did the rules come from, and the design
language?



The dynamic core of our consciousness consists of transient alignments
of Feature Value - Action loops that compete for selection in a
flicker-dance-sort of associations and sensory stimuli.







Perception is a physics hack. Timing is everything. Three dimensionality
is accessible to us via  a cross mapping within the temporal manifold.
Propagation of coherent correlations between map-mapped sheets of
neurons act as a massively parallel delay line with multiple taps.
Because both spatial and temporal coherence is preserved, the network
sorts up the objects of perception and tracks them real time. Reality is
best fit. Misperceptions happen, but its better than being blind.



Our competency at this is not postulated, it is stipulated that the high
order discriminations we perceive as qualia are exactly as amazing as
the incredible complexity of the neurological stack that gives us them.

Intentionality is an emergent design goal in secondary consciousness.

(before getting upset about intentional language, remember that it works
because reality fits.)





Phenomenal transform is a semantic label for a context shift. If you
insist on thinking of it as a happening, what's happening is that we
find ourselves switching lexicons when we discuss certain things. Its
not a description of a change of state in the object, it is a handle for
referring to a pragmatic feature of discourse about it.



The important thing to realize is that this sorting out of the features
of the objects of our perception usually is done before we are aware of
the process, but this does not mean that the process is different for
hard discriminations, just that they are taking longer than the ~400ms
self context loop, that feeds a product of the net's immediate state
back into itself. Think convolving and converging. Discrimination occurs
opportunistically, our competencies do not require conscious attention.
In the formation of PV Action loops each project become one of the
factions in our interior parliament.



We have lots of timing to tap. Response times, flicker fusion times,
saccades, pulse, peristalsis, menstruation. The royal road to cognitive
illumination is the path of chronus.


--bob


"me, I'm just a lawn mower"




From roberte at ripnet.com  Fri Dec 10 06:35:05 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 09:35:05 -0500
Subject: Sheep Herding
Message-ID: <41B9B419.1030903@ripnet.com>

The secular bible: Our project



First let me speak to my Christian brothers and sisters. I mean you no
disrespect by using the term "bible" in an unholy attack on your faith.

The project of this secular bible honors the sanctity of holy documents.

A secular bible could only be true to itself is it stood for tolerance
and cooperation.





We all know of the worldwide spread of dissatisfaction and unhappiness.
We acknowledge the existence of what we can only call "evil" in the world.

We have less agreement on what we call "good" or "godlike"  We have not
found enough agreement on what to do about evil.



There are those among us who hold to the principle no agreement is
required. The proper agents in the war against chaos are the free and
independent thinkers of the mythical open society. The radical edge of
this stance is the notion that cooperation always entails disaster in
the form of unintended consequences.



There are those among us who are afraid of the unknown. Many of us
prefer to keep to the familiar. We find ourselves in circles of friends
and relatives and find comfort or at least solace in the company of
these others. We become "us".



There is a subtle danger in this. The formation of community is also the
formation of "them"



There are those among us who fear "them" so much that the very thought
of cooperation is scary. To them the idea that there could be a science
of cooperation is absurd. They will cite economics and rational self
interest to avoid gambling on trust. The run-away paranoia that can
ensue will tax their freedom as surely as the state must.



The project of the science of understanding, this secular bible giving
people an understanding of their part in the universe, and the tools
they need to get along with all manner of thinkers.



(tbc)


Of course this is all meant sarcastically.

The Lord knows, nobody wants to just get along.




From ptrei at rsasecurity.com  Fri Dec 10 06:50:10 2004
From: ptrei at rsasecurity.com (Trei, Peter)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 09:50:10 -0500
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
Message-ID: <017630AA6DF2DF4EBC1DD4454F8EE29704776BB1@rsana-ex-hq1.NA.RSA.NET>

J.A. Terranson wrote:
> (4) I have yet to meet a full dozen people who share my
> belief that while stego *may* be in use, if it is, that
> use is for one way messages of semaphore-class messages
> only.  I really do not understand why this view
> is poopoo'd by all sides, so I must be pretty dense?

For semaphores and codewords, stego isn't needed. Simply
agree on a signal - if a post appears in
alt.anonymous.messages with the subject "To JAT", the
intended recipient has got all the info he needs.

Stego is needed only when the message is too complex
to have a codeword.

Even without software, 'numbers station' type
transmissions can be sent anonymously through the net.




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 10 06:55:20 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 09:55:20 -0500
Subject: [osint] Permanent jail set for Guantánamo
Message-ID: <p0611048abddf694f7970@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text


User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624
Netscape/7.1 (ax; CDonDemand-Dom)
To: osint at yahoogroups.com
From: Mike Lee <BMCLEE at aol.com>
Mailing-List: list osint at yahoogroups.com; contact osint-owner at yahoogroups.com
Delivered-To: mailing list osint at yahoogroups.com
Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 07:22:33 -0500
Subject: [osint] Permanent jail set for Guantanamo
Reply-To: osint at yahoogroups.com


[Excerpt: The Pentagon has plans to build a $25 million prison and
establish a permanent guard force in its detention center at Guantanamo
Bay, The Herald has learned.]

{Note: This is almost certainly going to be used to incarcerate U.S.
citizens as well. Helps to isolate them from troublesome lawyers, ACLU,
etc.}

Posted on Thu, Dec. 09, 2004
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/nation/10372662.htm?1c

DETENTION CENTER

Permanent jail set for Guantanamo

The Pentagon has plans to build a $25 million prison and establish a
permanent guard force in its detention center at Guantanamo Bay, The
Herald has learned.

BY CAROL ROSENBERG

crosenberg at herald.com

Even as federal judges weigh whether the U.S. has the authority to
detain and try suspects in the war on terror, the Pentagon is quietly
planning for permanency at the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo Bay,
The Herald has learned.

Pentagon planners are now seeking $25 million to build a
state-of-the-art 200-cell concrete building meant to eventually replace
the rows of rugged cells fashioned from shipping containers at Camp Delta.

At the same time, the Army is creating a full-time, professional guard
force -- a 324-member Military Police Internment and Resettlement
Battalion that will replace a temporary, mostly reserve force at Guantanamo.

A Department of Army memorandum to Congress obtained by The Herald
envisions the new military police force being included in the 2005 and
2006 budgets. ''This action is part of a systematic process to enhance
Army's capabilities required to defend the Nation's interests at home
and abroad,'' says the undated memo from the Army's legislative liaison
office.

It gave two key dates: Oct. 16, 2004, to activate the battalion
headquarters and its first company, and Oct. 16, 2005, to activate
another company.

Not all 20 officers and 304 enlisted soldiers have been activated, said
Army Col. David McWilliams of the Southern Command. But an advance team
is already at the base preparing to take up guard duties in the spring,
he said.

A second Army memo to answer congressional queries about the new unit
says it ''doctrinally supports a sensitive operational requirement'' and
``helps to mitigate the high operational tempo of the military police
force.''

Aside from the Marine force that set up the prison nearly three years
ago, many troops who guarded captives in Guantanamo have been Army
reservists mobilized from civilian law enforcement duties in the Midwest.

550 CAPTIVES

The prison today has about 550 captives from 42 nations who have been
brought to Cuba from Afghanistan, the first front in the war against
terrorism. Only four have been charged with crimes, a trial process now
stalled in federal courts.

On Nov. 8, U.S. District Judge James Robertson in Washington, D.C.,
ruled unconstitutional a Military Commission's war crimes trial for
Osama bin Laden driver Salim Ahmed Hamdan, 34, of Yemen. The Pentagon
then suspended all war crimes trials while the Justice Department
appealed his decision.

Meanwhile, U.S. District Judge Joyce Hens Green is deciding on habeas
corpus petitions brought by civilian lawyers for 53 prisoners alleging
they are illegally detained.

''They're betting that the courts are going to, in the end, find for the
government, that they can keep these enemy combatants, as they label
them, indefinitely, as long as they have some kind of an annual review
process,'' said retired Army Col. Dan Smith, a Vietnam veteran who is
now a senior military affairs fellow at the Friends Committee on
National Legislation, a Quaker lobby.

''So Guantanamo becomes an extra-territorial -- I don't want to say
gulag -- a prison for anyone we want to put down there and label an
unlawful enemy combatant,'' Smith said.

Bush administration officials describe any possible judicial proceedings
there as secondary to the prison's main purpose of holding and
interrogating suspects for intelligence on how al Qaeda works.
Commanders describe the guards' work there as at times humiliating and
testing soldiers' patience because some captives have spewed insults and
spit on guards.

CAMP DELTA

That kind of contact would be reduced under the Pentagon plan to replace
Camp Delta, which was projected to last five years when it opened in May
2002.

Built by KBR, a subsidiary of Pentagon contractor Halliburton, Delta's
cells were welded from steel shipping containers by laborers brought in
from South Asia.

''Camp Delta is comprised of temporary facilities that are rapidly
reaching the end of their design life, and therefore a more permanent
facility is needed,'' said Army spokesman Lt. Col. Leon Sumpter. The new
mortar-and-steel prison, called Camp 6, should cost $25 million.
Commanders hope to consolidate most Camp Delta prisoners into ''these
hardened facilities,'' he said.

Pentagon officials are still crunching the prison project's overall cost
in response to a 2-month-old Herald request. A Senate tally, as of April
2003, estimated building costs only at $104 million. Virtually all
expenditures have come from post-Sept. 11 emergency funding rather than
line-item appropriations by Congress.

A Pentagon spokesman said it was still unclear how the military would
pay for Camp 6. ''There's a lot of unknowns about the project,'' said
Navy Lt. Cmdr. Alvin Plexico.

Begun as a short-term detention and interrogation solution to relieve
overwhelmed troops in Afghanistan, the prison on the Navy base in
southeastern Cuba has had a nearly nonstop three-year building boom.

CAMP 5

Besides the 1,000-cell Camp Delta, the Pentagon has also built Camp 5, a
100-cell version of the new prison being proposed; a new command center,
a laundry, fitness center, movie theater, and extensive dining and
recreation facilities -- all sprawled across an area called Radio Range,
that overlooks the Caribbean. Reporters got a glimpse of the future in
November in a brief tour of Camp 5, which commanders called efficient,
effective and humane despite repeated allegations that U.S.-approved
interrogation techniques are tantamount to torture.

The designs for Camp 5 and 6 copy a medium-security prison in Indiana,
the Miami Correctional Facility at Bunker Hill.
enditem



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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 10 06:57:58 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 09:57:58 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <20041210011906.5802.qmail@web51806.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F4238260F4F3A46134A1839BA80@phx.gbl>

"If you also consider the fact that I have been variously poisoned in
recent years with everything from sedatives to stimulants to hormones to
psychoactive compounds to low-level hallucinogens, and as well have been
subjected to uncounted appeals to my subconscious in the main through the
use of direct and indirect sexually exploitative imagery and encounters,
you might get the idea that consistent literary output is simply not in
the offing."

Sounds like a fuckin' party, if you ask me! Quit bogartin' that J...

-TD


>From: Steve Thompson <steve49152 at yahoo.ca>
>To: John Kelsey <kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com>
>CC: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
>Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 20:19:06 -0500 (EST)
>
>  --- John Kelsey <kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> >>[May]
> >
> > Maybe, maybe not.  The thing I always find interesting and annoying
> > about Tim May's posts is that he's sometimes making really clearly
> > thought out, intelligent points, and other times spewing out nonsense so
> > crazy you can't believe it's coming from the same person.  It's also
> > clear he's often yanking peoples' chains, often by saying the most
> > offensive thing he can think of.  But once in awhile, even amidst the
> > crazy rantings about useless eaters and ovens, he'll toss out something
> > that shows some deep, coherent thought about some issue in a new and
> > fascinating direction.
>
>That paragraph could easily be modified to make it a commentary on my
>posting habits, or indeed, on my general presentation from day to day.
>So, I will comment.
>
>On a pseudo-random but cyclic schedule, I am harassed, provoked, or
>otherwise experience incidents of aggression of one sort or another.  This
>affects my mood and general state of mind to varying degrees.
>Furthermore, I do not have consistent dietary intake, nor do I live in an
>environment which allows or provides privacy, security, or consistency
>save that which I impose with the expenditure of a great deal of effort
>and patience.
>
>If you also consider the fact that I have been variously poisoned in
>recent years with everything from sedatives to stimulants to hormones to
>psychoactive compounds to low-level hallucinogens, and as well have been
>subjected to uncounted appeals to my subconscious in the main through the
>use of direct and indirect sexually exploitative imagery and encounters,
>you might get the idea that consistent literary output is simply not in
>the offing.
>
>Before anyone goes to the trouble of suggesting that I discuss matters
>with the police, I'll save them the bother.  The police have entirely
>failed to allow my allegations the courtesy of a hearing.  Not even once.
>I belive that those who have not merely dirties their own hands in some
>way, are too chikenshit to recognise some of the more subtle criminality
>that goes on in this country.  Or they may be intimidated by the kind of
>agency[1] that has invoved itself in the kind of clandestine activity that
>is at issue.
>
>Add in the fact that I've been dealing with _some_ sort of malicious and
>interfereing bullshit for quite a few years without any sincere assistance
>of any sort beyond the odd informational giveaway of dubious provenance,
>and you might well conclude that whatever else is going on, I'm not a
>happy camper.  Perhaps my inconsistent presentation mimics the
>inconclusive partial criterion for certain classical mental afflictions.
>This is convenient as such afflictions are conveniently viewed by the
>layman and professional alike as having an origin that is entirely
>internal to the individual in question.
>
>However, I have quite a bit of evidence of varying grades that support my
>position rather well.  Time will tell, perhaps, the true nature of the
>matter in a fashion that leaves no doubt in the mind of the uninvolved
>spectator.
>
>But in the interim, that will have to stand as my overbrief outline of the
>reason why I exhibit inconsistency in writing, speech, and action.  I am
>simply way too busy dealing with what can in one way be viewed as a
>chronic and personalised denial of service attack.
>
>Perhaps Tim May has an entirely different set of factors influencing his
>online behaviour.  You will have to ask him to explain his circumstances,
>and hope that he consents to it.
>
>As for my case, I do not really wish to make it a topic of discussion on
>the Cypherpunks list.  The law enforecement (and perhipheral) personnel
>who have involvement in my affairs, for whatever reason, are (and should
>be) fully aware of the external influences on my psychology.  They have
>the investigative tools and authority to make definitive findings of fact,
>and to take corrective action should they find incidents of criminal
>liability, but as yet have refused to do so.  And *that* is another matter
>entirely.
>
>
>
>Regards,
>
>Steve
>
>
>
>[1] general sense of the term.  I'm not referring to, say, the CIA
>specifically in this instance.
>
>______________________________________________________________________
>Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From ptrei at rsasecurity.com  Fri Dec 10 07:01:42 2004
From: ptrei at rsasecurity.com (Trei, Peter)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 10:01:42 -0500
Subject: punkly current events
Message-ID: <017630AA6DF2DF4EBC1DD4454F8EE29704776BB2@rsana-ex-hq1.NA.RSA.NET>

Eugen Leitl
> You could claim your machine was infected with
> mixmaster malware, or something.

Now that would be an interesting worm - one
which, instead of installing a spamalator,
installed a remailer and posted public keys
and contact info to usenet.

(Disclaimer: No, I don't do things like that).

Peter




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 10 07:10:14 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 10:10:14 -0500
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <15992000.1102689074725.JavaMail.root@rowlf.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F153C297B943E6D5D5C10869BA80@phx.gbl>

>Maybe, but I think it would be very hard to write a general-purpose stego 
>detector, without >knowing the techniques used for encoding the message.  
>And if you know the distribution of your >cover channel as well as your 
>attacker, or can generate lots of values from that distribution even if 
> >you can'd describe it, you can encode messages in a way that provably 
>can't be detected, down >to the quality of your random number generator and 
>the difficulty of guessing your key.

Well, the first thing to remember is that Arabic more or less has a built-in 
method for distributing covert information...kind of like Hebrew, an Arabic 
word can be viewed in terms of a subset of consonants...for specific 
groupings there are lots of well-known associated words with the same 
letters. I'd bet a careful examination of bin Laden communiques will reveal 
the existence of pointers to such special words...the initated will know how 
to pull out those words and use them as passwords, etc...

As for the sophistication of Al Qaeda software, remember we're probably not 
talking about a very centrally-organized group. Their members are scattered 
in all sorts of socio-eco-bandwidth environments so that off-the-shelf 
(where shelf=internet) stuff is going to be common.

Remember too that broad categories of Stego can apparently be detected by 
FFT (someone here posted a link to a paper describing that). Put that and 
all sorts of other routines looking for specific Stego signatures inot a 
Variola suitcase and I bet they (NSA, though not police) can pull out 
practically anything they want to. BUT...that probably doesn't do them a ton 
of good...the plaintext will be in Arabic, it will speak symbolically, and 
maybe use some even more clever techniques for info obfscuration.

As for the 'semaphore' theory I consider that likely...lots of info will be 
sent out-of-band (ie, verbally) and Stego'd info will perhaps be triggers or 
possibly meeting coordinates. Maybe an account number every now and then 
(VERY easy to hide using Arabic letter-numerals).

-TD


>
>I imagine this as something much like a virus scanner.  Look for known 
>stego programs, and also for signatures of known stegp programs.  Really 
>good programs might be impossible to find without doing, say, a password 
>search.
>
>But it's worth noting that AQ has to do key management just like the rest 
>of us, and that's hard when you are communicating with a lot of different 
>people.  If your stego is password-protected, some terrorist's laptop is 
>going to have a post-it note on the screen with the password.
>
>...
> >-TD
>
>--John Kelsey




From roberte at ripnet.com  Fri Dec 10 07:14:29 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 10:14:29 -0500
Subject: tangled context probe
Message-ID: <41B9BD55.7020604@ripnet.com>

(curious thing about this spew, it keeps disappearing into the bit 
bucket, I know its raw verbiage, but is it so incoherent it 
self-destructs? -bob)


Process and perception



This capacity for making high order discriminations about relationships
between objects in our world, can be taken as the proper function of our
cognitive competency. The attribute of intentionality, to this way of
thinking, is best understood as "work product" of a discrete sub-module
of our brain.

We infer agency from our observations. What is agency? Well first and
foremost, it is that which is recognizable to the competencies in
process, that form these judgments.

Does this sound circular? Surely it is circular in a crucial sense. All
that we "know" comes to our attention as the work product of process in
various competencies. Ultimately the "authority" of  these high order
discriminations comes not from a judgment about the correlation between
our perceptions and the state of the "objective" world, but instead from
their immediacy. This is to say that we do not perceive and then make
judgments, our first awareness of every "thing"  is located in the
moment that the competent module forms some thing out of the possibilities.

These awareness's are not in the semantic domain. Our knowing of
particular attributes precedes the semantic transform that tags and
packages up insights, for storage and shipping. We know what we know and
we apologize for not being able to convey this knowing more effectively.

That we are able to communicate at all, is a testament to the power of
trial and error and the phenomenal similarity of our minds. This
similarity is not accidental. Even as each person is an absolutely
unique instance of humanity, what we are, is the embodiment of a
phenomenally complex tangle of historical accomplishments that is
fundamentally common to us all.


Creativity emerges via the capacity/ability to merge contexts



Biological instrumentality:

The complex objects of our knowings come to our awareness as
circumstances demand, literally selected by their features. Apprehension
of the world via a sophisticatedly evolved biological instrumentality is
an entropy hack. Life is the opportunistic bloom of a viral exploitation
of regularity in the universe.



In the beginning there was sequence, and it begat pattern and context
space. Within every context space there is a tree of combinatorial
consequences some leaves of which are potentially lucky. Blind evolution
isn't trial and error testing of mistakes (mutations), it is the random
testing of legal combinations



So who set up the game, where did the rules come from, and the design
language?



The dynamic core of our consciousness consists of transient alignments
of Feature Value - Action loops that compete for selection in a
flicker-dance-sort of associations and sensory stimuli.







Perception is a physics hack. Timing is everything. Three dimensionality
is accessible to us via  a cross mapping within the temporal manifold.
Propagation of coherent correlations between map-mapped sheets of
neurons act as a massively parallel delay line with multiple taps.
Because both spatial and temporal coherence is preserved, the network
sorts up the objects of perception and tracks them real time. Reality is
best fit. Misperceptions happen, but its better than being blind.



Our competency at this is not postulated, it is stipulated that the high
order discriminations we perceive as qualia are exactly as amazing as
the incredible complexity of the neurological stack that gives us them.

Intentionality is an emergent design goal in secondary consciousness.

(before getting upset about intentional language, remember that it works
because reality fits.)





Phenomenal transform is a semantic label for a context shift. If you
insist on thinking of it as a happening, what's happening is that we
find ourselves switching lexicons when we discuss certain things. Its
not a description of a change of state in the object, it is a handle for
referring to a pragmatic feature of discourse about it.



The important thing to realize is that this sorting out of the features
of the objects of our perception usually is done before we are aware of
the process, but this does not mean that the process is different for
hard discriminations, just that they are taking longer than the ~400ms
self context loop, that feeds a product of the net's immediate state
back into itself. Think convolving and converging. Discrimination occurs
opportunistically, our competencies do not require conscious attention.
In the formation of PV Action loops each project become one of the
factions in our interior parliament.



We have lots of timing to tap. Response times, flicker fusion times,
saccades, pulse, peristalsis, menstruation. The royal road to cognitive
illumination is the path of chronus.


--bob


"me, I'm just a lawn mower"




From roy at rant-central.com  Fri Dec 10 07:56:59 2004
From: roy at rant-central.com (Roy M. Silvernail)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 10:56:59 -0500
Subject: tangled context probe
In-Reply-To: <41B9BD55.7020604@ripnet.com>
References: <41B9BD55.7020604@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <41B9C74B.8090100@rant-central.com>

R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
> (curious thing about this spew, it keeps disappearing into the bit 
> bucket, 

Yawn.  Roboposting this babble doesn't really increase its chances of 
getting read.  I work through JY because I know there's uranium in that 
ore.  But I'm about 2 posts away from ensconcing RW"B"E in my procmail 
file next to TM, choate and proffr.
-- 
Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
"It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT
SpamAssassin->procmail->/dev/null->bliss
http://www.rant-central.com




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 10 02:13:47 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 11:13:47 +0100
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <41B90AE5.B4313EDA@cdc.gov>
References: <41B90AE5.B4313EDA@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20041210101347.GC9221@leitl.org>

On Thu, Dec 09, 2004 at 06:33:09PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> Someone should have commented here, so I will, that some judges (earning
> hanging) basically said that anonymity is not a right.  This
> in the context of mask-wearing in public.  If the Klan doesn't have
> a right to wear pillowcases what makes you think mixmaster will
> survive?

Because nodes are not geographically constrained to US jurisdiction?

If mixter won't survive, it's due to spammers, and malware spreaders.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From roberte at ripnet.com  Fri Dec 10 08:29:21 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 11:29:21 -0500
Subject: tangled context probe
In-Reply-To: <41B9C74B.8090100@rant-central.com>
References: <41B9BD55.7020604@ripnet.com>
  <41B9C74B.8090100@rant-central.com>
Message-ID: <41B9CEE1.6070004@ripnet.com>

Roy M. Silvernail wrote:

>
> R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
>
>> (curious thing about this spew, it keeps disappearing into the bit 
>> bucket, 
>
>
> Yawn.  Roboposting this babble doesn't really increase its chances of 
> getting read.  I work through JY because I know there's uranium in 
> that ore.  But I'm about 2 posts away from ensconcing RW"B"E in my 
> procmail file next to TM, choate and proffr.

OK, it was just an unknown context for me..
My sincere apologies for subjecting you to a decrease in signal to noise.
I know that I have to work on my presentation.
Without sufficient introduction  anything new is indistinguishable from 
cracked pottery.

The synthetic perspective I am toying with is built upon some premises 
from cogsci
In my opinion there are real strategic implications in the modern 
scientific perception of the individual as a tangle of competing  interests.
Self interest is one of given principles.
In so far as the "self" is a personal mythology,
and the irrationality of sheep hood is built in,
I think three could be policy implications.

As to the crypto relevance: context
Arranged signals can be anything at all.
If you don't share the context of the communicators,
you have no idea what they  convey
in their conversation about the "whether".

Once again, I plead stupidity for the duplicates
I will do penance

--bob




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 10 08:37:15 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 11:37:15 -0500
Subject: tangled context probe
In-Reply-To: <41B9C74B.8090100@rant-central.com>
References: <41B9BD55.7020604@ripnet.com> 
  <41B9C74B.8090100@rant-central.com>
Message-ID: <p06110497bddf80f90545@[66.149.49.5]>

At 10:56 AM -0500 12/10/04, Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
>But I'm about 2 posts away from ensconcing RW"B"E in my procmail
>file

What's taking you so long?

:-)

Cheers,
RAH
cf: various imprecations against feeding trolls &cet...
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From roberte at ripnet.com  Fri Dec 10 08:43:08 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 11:43:08 -0500
Subject: Obligatory Comprehension
Message-ID: <41B9D21C.1060906@ripnet.com>

Say what you mean, mean what you say
Speaking in metaphor is anti-social

If I cant understand you,
I cannot trust you.

Encrypted, encoded, or implied
Secrets are a threat to the homeland




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 10 02:48:36 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 11:48:36 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Re: Memory and reputation calculation (fwd from
  muller@emse.fr)
Message-ID: <20041210104836.GI9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from MULLER Guillaume <muller at emse.fr> -----


From roberte at ripnet.com  Fri Dec 10 08:51:00 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 11:51:00 -0500
Subject: tangled context probe
In-Reply-To: <p06110497bddf80f90545@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <41B9BD55.7020604@ripnet.com>
  <41B9C74B.8090100@rant-central.com>
  <p06110497bddf80f90545@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <41B9D3F4.10707@ripnet.com>

R.A. Hettinga wrote:

>At 10:56 AM -0500 12/10/04, Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
>  
>
>>But I'm about 2 posts away from ensconcing RW"B"E in my procmail
>>file
>>    
>>
>
>What's taking you so long?
>
>:-)
>
>Cheers,
>RAH
>cf: various imprecations against feeding trolls &cet...
>  
>
Aww, come on guys
i only eat little sheep
and i hide from the wolves under cover of  a bridge

--bob




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 10 09:03:50 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 12:03:50 -0500
Subject: tangled context probe
In-Reply-To: <41B9CEE1.6070004@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F8A4169D9CF66F0F36D7959BA80@phx.gbl>

>As to the crypto relevance: context Arranged signals can be anything at 
>all. If you don't share the context of the communicators, you have no idea 
>what they  convey in their conversation about the "whether".

That's a stretch. Soon you'll say that Post-modernist literary theory is 
Cypherpunkish content because it deals with 'context'.

I suggest you take up your theories with Mr Choate and the Dallas 
Cypherpunk(s). In that 'context' your posts will appear lucid.

-TD


>From: "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com>
>To: "Roy M. Silvernail" <roy at rant-central.com>
>CC: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Re: tangled context probe
>Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 11:29:21 -0500
>
>Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
>
>>
>>R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
>>
>>>(curious thing about this spew, it keeps disappearing into the bit 
>>>bucket,
>>
>>
>>Yawn.  Roboposting this babble doesn't really increase its chances of 
>>getting read.  I work through JY because I know there's uranium in that 
>>ore.  But I'm about 2 posts away from ensconcing RW"B"E in my procmail 
>>file next to TM, choate and proffr.
>
>OK, it was just an unknown context for me..
>My sincere apologies for subjecting you to a decrease in signal to noise.
>I know that I have to work on my presentation.
>Without sufficient introduction  anything new is indistinguishable from 
>cracked pottery.
>
>The synthetic perspective I am toying with is built upon some premises from 
>cogsci
>In my opinion there are real strategic implications in the modern 
>scientific perception of the individual as a tangle of competing  
>interests.
>Self interest is one of given principles.
>In so far as the "self" is a personal mythology,
>and the irrationality of sheep hood is built in,
>I think three could be policy implications.
>
>As to the crypto relevance: context
>Arranged signals can be anything at all.
>If you don't share the context of the communicators,
>you have no idea what they  convey
>in their conversation about the "whether".
>
>Once again, I plead stupidity for the duplicates
>I will do penance
>
>--bob




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 10 03:20:58 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 12:20:58 +0100
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <20041210110125.GA31472@moria.seul.org>
References: <41B90AE5.B4313EDA@cdc.gov>
  <20041210101347.GC9221@leitl.org>
  <20041210110125.GA31472@moria.seul.org>
Message-ID: <20041210112058.GK9221@leitl.org>

On Fri, Dec 10, 2004 at 06:01:25AM -0500, Gabriel Rocha wrote:

> The latter statement my well be true, I don't use the network, nor know
> the ratios of good/bad traffic. But I am very curious to find out what

I don't have data either. I'm guessing the "bad" traffic part is 95-98%.
(I'm extrapolating from absence, as the only responses to the abuse address
were people harassed by idiots).

> would be considered geographically "safe" jurisdictions in this sense.
> Not just today, but given the general trend, where would you see such a
> jurisdition being found in a year or five or ten?

While there is a distinct trend in NA, EU and elsewhere to try to snoop, and
to control, it's not obvious the development is permanent, and irreversible.
P2P traffic in general is increasing, and trivial remixing and encryption is
becoming more and more widespread (arrr!). Spam and malware traffic also
increases the noise level. You could claim your machine was infected with
mixmaster malware, or something.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From roberte at ripnet.com  Fri Dec 10 09:27:08 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 12:27:08 -0500
Subject: tangled context probe
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F8A4169D9CF66F0F36D7959BA80@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F8A4169D9CF66F0F36D7959BA80@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <41B9DC6C.3030002@ripnet.com>

Tyler Durden wrote:

>> As to the crypto relevance: context Arranged signals can be anything 
>> at all. If you don't share the context of the communicators, you have 
>> no idea what they  convey in their conversation about the "whether".
>
>
> That's a stretch. Soon you'll say that Post-modernist literary theory 
> is Cypherpunkish content because it deals with 'context'.
>
> I suggest you take up your theories with Mr Choate and the Dallas 
> Cypherpunk(s). In that 'context' your posts will appear lucid.
>
> -TD
>
No,  all that european bs is only relevent because it adds to the 
piling  evidence of irrationality.
Whats the connect between irrationality an C-punks?
Well aside from colorful characters
its also key to any understanding of the minimum mass mind.
There are policy implications inherent in innate incomplitence and 
compliance.

There are also important ecconomic understandings
that hinge upon understanding irrational choices
c.f hyperbolic discounting, aka matching theory.

There are also techie implications:
The human semantic competency is hackable

--bob




From measl at mfn.org  Fri Dec 10 11:19:26 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 13:19:26 -0600 (CST)
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <20041210101347.GC9221@leitl.org>
References: <41B90AE5.B4313EDA@cdc.gov>
  <20041210101347.GC9221@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <20041210131659.K47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Fri, 10 Dec 2004, Eugen Leitl wrote:

> If mixter won't survive, it's due to spammers, and malware spreaders.

I disagree.  Except for the early days, spammers have been little more
than a low volume nuisance on Mix.  What killed mix was it's complexity -
Joe Blow can't figure out how to use it, and new reops have a hell of a
time getting a node running (with pingers and other required tools).

Take away complexity, and Mix *could* flourish - in spite of the fedz.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 10 11:13:18 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 14:13:18 -0500
Subject: tangled context probe
In-Reply-To: <41B9DC6C.3030002@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F31AD8A0195D6273411B5299BA80@phx.gbl>

Well, when you put it that way, that changes everything.

All is now clear. Please continue downloading the syntactic mappings of 
random neural firing...I'm using your output to seed a random number 
generator.

Oh, and don't forget to cc Choate.

-TD


>From: "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com>
>To: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
>CC: roy at rant-central.com,  cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: tangled context probe
>Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 12:27:08 -0500
>
>Tyler Durden wrote:
>
>>>As to the crypto relevance: context Arranged signals can be anything at 
>>>all. If you don't share the context of the communicators, you have no 
>>>idea what they  convey in their conversation about the "whether".
>>
>>
>>That's a stretch. Soon you'll say that Post-modernist literary theory is 
>>Cypherpunkish content because it deals with 'context'.
>>
>>I suggest you take up your theories with Mr Choate and the Dallas 
>>Cypherpunk(s). In that 'context' your posts will appear lucid.
>>
>>-TD
>>
>No,  all that european bs is only relevent because it adds to the piling  
>evidence of irrationality.
>Whats the connect between irrationality an C-punks?
>Well aside from colorful characters
>its also key to any understanding of the minimum mass mind.
>There are policy implications inherent in innate incomplitence and 
>compliance.
>
>There are also important ecconomic understandings
>that hinge upon understanding irrational choices
>c.f hyperbolic discounting, aka matching theory.
>
>There are also techie implications:
>The human semantic competency is hackable
>
>--bob




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Fri Dec 10 11:37:33 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 14:37:33 -0500 (EST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <20041209194633.N42471@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <20041210193733.83225.qmail@web51808.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "J.A. Terranson" <measl at mfn.org> wrote: 
> 
> 
> On Thu, 9 Dec 2004, Steve Thompson wrote:
> 
> <snip one of the funniest posts in recent cpunk history>
> 
> (STANDING OVATION) (SOUNDS OF MANY HANDS CLAPPING)
> 
> Thank you Steve, for that short but entertaining look into the dark
> recesses of our collective consciousness :-)

That's what I'm here for.  Now, perhaps we can get back to discussing
issues with more direct relevance to cypherpunks?


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 10 11:39:47 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 14:39:47 -0500
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <20041210131659.K47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F2558FB410B9C9510D4356B9BA80@phx.gbl>

And don't forget...Spam is a good thing as long as it doesn't clog the 
Mixmaster bandwidth.

-TD


>From: "J.A. Terranson" <measl at mfn.org>
>To: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>CC: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: punkly current events
>Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 13:19:26 -0600 (CST)
>
>On Fri, 10 Dec 2004, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>
> > If mixter won't survive, it's due to spammers, and malware spreaders.
>
>I disagree.  Except for the early days, spammers have been little more
>than a low volume nuisance on Mix.  What killed mix was it's complexity -
>Joe Blow can't figure out how to use it, and new reops have a hell of a
>time getting a node running (with pingers and other required tools).
>
>Take away complexity, and Mix *could* flourish - in spite of the fedz.
>
>--
>Yours,
>
>J.A. Terranson
>sysadmin at mfn.org
>0xBD4A95BF
>
>  Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
>upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
>destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
>freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
>healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
>whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
>poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
>biologically and ecologically sustainable.
>
>The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
>indicates that mental illness starts at the top.
>
>Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From roberte at ripnet.com  Fri Dec 10 11:42:30 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 14:42:30 -0500
Subject: tangled context probe
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F31AD8A0195D6273411B5299BA80@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F31AD8A0195D6273411B5299BA80@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <41B9FC26.1020604@ripnet.com>

Tyler Durden wrote:

> Well, when you put it that way, that changes everything.
>
> All is now clear. Please continue downloading the syntactic mappings 
> of random neural firing...I'm using your output to seed a random 
> number generator.
>
> Oh, and don't forget to cc Choate.
>
> -TD
>
You could do worse, my entropy is real.
Whatever your take on "memes"
I predict that certain messages play better than others.
Analysis of the opposition's frame of minds are key.

The immediate tool is that of insinuation.
You dismiss some things as chaff or fluff
put you cannot avoid the priming effect
that well crafted misdirection employs.

We protect our selves from disruptive knowledge
We artistically wield our ignorance like a shield
Our creativity hides our blind spots.
Security through certainty is surely vunerable

--bob




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Fri Dec 10 11:44:05 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 14:44:05 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <41B900E8.1060203@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <20041210194405.80615.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote: 
> Steve Thompson wrote:
> >[assholes]
>
> You tell them, Steve

I believe I just did.
 
> Insanity is a great cover for an insurectionist!

I suppose it could be, although I am give to belive that residents of the
White Room Hotel may only carry out insurection in the program room, and
even then only while under direct adult supervision.  I have been told
that this makes the task somewhat more difficult, what with the sometimes
necessity of colouring outside the lines on the page (so to speak).


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 10 11:47:35 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 14:47:35 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <41B91170.D2E8B4AC@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F34200DCD54D94CC985EAE89BA80@phx.gbl>

Oh no, I fully understood those arguments and conceeded that in certain 
scenarios such ethnic groups might experience disproportionate amounts of 
impact.

However, when we start talking about actively putting them up the chimneys, 
then we've moved into making such ethnic groups targets.

Hey...there's nothing saying a smart person can't end up a racist. However, 
it is to be expected that a smart racist will have particularly clever 
arguments to justify such racism.

In addition, I suspect that some of our more robust inner-city dwellers 
might actually adapt quite quickly to such scenarios. As for trailer trash, 
however...

-TD



>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Re: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
>Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 19:01:04 -0800
>
>At 11:21 AM 12/9/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> >
> >Well, May seemed to try to make the case that all of those "useles
>eaters"
> >were in large part responsible for the very existence of the state, and
>that
> >collapse of the state meant the inevitable downfall of huge numbers of
> >minorities (why he focused on them as opposed to white trailer trash I
>don't
> >know).
> >
> >But he was definitely advocating that racist viewpoints fall naturally
>out
> >of a crypto-anarchic approach.
>
>Tyler:
>
>A rational person has to admit that many parasitic folks of all albedos
>are able to exist
>because they occupy a govt-funded niche.
>
>Without a welfare govt, those people would either 1. subsist on private
>(ie voluntary) charity, 2. become useful by necessity 3. die of
>starvation
>4. die during attempts to coerce others with violence.
>
>Depending on your beliefs about human demographics/nature, you will
>assign variable percentages to these outcomes.
>
>It *is* racist to think that genotypes in each bin will differ *IFF* you
>
>*don't* ascribe this outcome to culture associated with genotypes.
>
>But culturism is not racism, its recognition of how behavior and
>evolution work.  I subscribe to and will defend culturism.
>
>(I speak for myself, not TM (tm), though I may or may not be a duly
>appointed pope of the church of strong cryptography; though recently
>I've been trending towards being an Earthquaker,
>who believes in tectonics, esp. during seismic events.  Our vatican
>is in Parkfield BTW :-)




From roberte at ripnet.com  Fri Dec 10 12:01:28 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 15:01:28 -0500
Subject: Insurrectionist covers
In-Reply-To: <20041210194405.80615.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20041210194405.80615.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <41BA0098.8090903@ripnet.com>

Steve Thompson wrote:

> --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote: 
>  
>
>>Steve Thompson wrote:
>>    
>>
>>>[assholes]
>>>      
>>>
>>You tell them, Steve
>>    
>>
>
>I believe I just did.
> 
>  
>
>>Insanity is a great cover for an insurectionist!
>>    
>>
>
>I suppose it could be, although I am give to belive that residents of the
>White Room Hotel may only carry out insurection in the program room, and
>even then only while under direct adult supervision.  I have been told
>that this makes the task somewhat more difficult, what with the sometimes
>necessity of colouring outside the lines on the page (so to speak).
>
>
>Regards,
>
>Steve
>
>
>______________________________________________________________________ 
>Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca
>
>  
>
Yes, you have a point there.I guess a better cover would be as local 
coordinator of Neighborhood Watch

--bob




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Fri Dec 10 12:01:29 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 15:01:29 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Timing Paranoia
In-Reply-To: <41B914FA.50805@rant-central.com>
Message-ID: <20041210200129.33000.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "Roy M. Silvernail" <roy at rant-central.com> wrote: 
> Steve Thompson wrote:
> > [imagine]
>
> Imagine using observed timing to conclude that your agent provocateur 
> operates from geostationary orbit.

That would be a neat trick considering the variety of likely signal path
lengths to be found in the terrestial telephone network or the terrestial
Internet.  All in all, there are so many varibles in such conjecture as to
make the hypothesis largely indeterminate.

But it is amusing to consider the potential existence of the CIA Orbital
Alien Mind Control Laser Cannon(tm).
 
> R. W. may be annoying, but at least he's derivative.

Derivative of what, exactly?


Regards,

Steve



______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Fri Dec 10 12:08:51 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 15:08:51 -0500 (EST)
Subject: tangled contexts
In-Reply-To: <41B91C86.9090707@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <20041210200851.17418.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote: 
> Process and perception
> [snip]
> We have lots of timing to tap. Response times, flicker fusion times, 
> saccades, pulse, peristalsis, menstruation. The royal road to cognitive 
> illumination is the path of chronus.
 
If you go about tapping the peristaltic functions of the general public,
you will definately get in shit.  Why, you might even get your hands
dirty.


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Fri Dec 10 12:31:34 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 15:31:34 -0500 (EST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F4238260F4F3A46134A1839BA80@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041210203134.94897.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote: 
> [snip]
> Sounds like a fuckin' party, if you ask me! Quit bogartin' that J...
 
Oh, sure.  It wasn't all bad.  Just ask the chick who is known in certain
circles as Nefertiti.  (That's her code-name).  We had an excellent time
together; or at least we did until the wheels fell off... But that's a
story for another day.

While we're speaking of pot, I should note that the grass available in
this neck of the woods is substandard at best.  What with all the illegal
suburban grow-ops in Toronto, you'd think one would be able to buy
half-decent weed from time to time.  But no... It's all crap.


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 10 12:42:07 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 15:42:07 -0500
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <20041210203134.94897.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F24158A3D2CA437F8B6EDE89BA80@phx.gbl>

In my family there's a famous story told of a particular musician who was 
busted on marijuana possession. His defense: "But your honor...it was only 
lemonade."

-TD

>From: Steve Thompson <steve49152 at yahoo.ca>
>To: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
>CC: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
>Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 15:31:34 -0500 (EST)
>
>  --- Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com> wrote:
> > [snip]
> > Sounds like a fuckin' party, if you ask me! Quit bogartin' that J...
>
>Oh, sure.  It wasn't all bad.  Just ask the chick who is known in certain
>circles as Nefertiti.  (That's her code-name).  We had an excellent time
>together; or at least we did until the wheels fell off... But that's a
>story for another day.
>
>While we're speaking of pot, I should note that the grass available in
>this neck of the woods is substandard at best.  What with all the illegal
>suburban grow-ops in Toronto, you'd think one would be able to buy
>half-decent weed from time to time.  But no... It's all crap.
>
>
>Regards,
>
>Steve
>
>
>______________________________________________________________________
>Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Fri Dec 10 12:50:22 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 15:50:22 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Insurrectionist covers
In-Reply-To: <41BA0098.8090903@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <20041210205022.34679.qmail@web51810.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote: 
> Steve Thompson wrote:
> 
> > --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote: 
> > [Colouring outside the lines]
> >
> Yes, you have a point there.I guess a better cover would be as local 
> coordinator of Neighborhood Watch

c.f. "Take back the night", et. cetera.  (And put it where?)

Anyhow, isn't insurrection illegal or something?  ISTR reading about the
natural right of the corrupt state to exist unconditionally, and it's
obligation to crush any question of change for any reason.

The structure of the state in fact defines its identity as a 'person'; and
since changeing the state structure could be viewed as the murder of the
state's personality, the state has the right, nay, obligation to preserve
its identity unchanged.  (Isn't this pretty much polysci 101 material?)


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From roberte at ripnet.com  Fri Dec 10 13:03:02 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 16:03:02 -0500
Subject: Insurrectionist covers
In-Reply-To: <20041210205022.34679.qmail@web51810.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20041210205022.34679.qmail@web51810.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <41BA0F06.5030305@ripnet.com>

Steve Thompson wrote:

>c.f. "Take back the night", et. cetera.  (And put it where?)
>
>Anyhow, isn't insurrection illegal or something?  ISTR reading about the
>natural right of the corrupt state to exist unconditionally, and it's
>obligation to crush any question of change for any reason.
>
>The structure of the state in fact defines its identity as a 'person'; and
>since changeing the state structure could be viewed as the murder of the
>state's personality, the state has the right, nay, obligation to preserve
>its identity unchanged.  (Isn't this pretty much polysci 101 material?)
>
>
>Regards,
>
>Steve
>  
>
Yep, the state fights to preserve its "life"
while the people suffer their own.
The mistake of top down thinking
lies in the inability to really model large populations with rules,
too much of the action happens at the fine grained level
of every day staying alive.

When change comes, it will happen as the cummulative effects
of millions of stuborn folk who subvert excessive authourity, 'cause 
they need to.
As the state tries to squeeze more gold out of the untaxed ecconomy
ordinary people will swarm to new work-arounds

--bob
cpunks write scripts




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 10 07:18:17 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 16:18:17 +0100
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <41B9B866.36005A3F@cdc.gov>
References: <41B9B866.36005A3F@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20041210151817.GP9221@leitl.org>

On Fri, Dec 10, 2004 at 06:53:26AM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>
> Name a place which is not subject to US juridiction?   Ok, Iran, N Kr,

Most places outside US which are not banana republics. I'm living in one.

> until
> we pull a regime change (tm) on them.  Yeah, they have a lot of 'net
> bandwidth, right.
>
> And if extradition isn't happening fast enough, we'll send a DEA
> agent or snatch-und-grab specops to kidnap them.

What, all this to shut down a remop? Could as well reprogram one of these
aging ICBMs...

> Hegemony isn't just for breakfast anymore.  If you think you're not
> under Bush's boot, you just haven't pissed him off enough, yet.

Which threat model? Individual remop, a country, a bloc?

Last time I looked US deficit was well on the way to turn thalers into
Soviet-era paper. It is somewhat hard to posture as a world hegemon if
everybody knows you're only operating because every significant investor is
propping you up, since running danger of losing their entire investment (in
for a penny...).

If it's going to give, it's going to be a landslide. Of course, then the
entire house of cards is going to crash down, which would suck. It could even
bring down the tigers/dragons, though they probably have enough own momentum
by now.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From macavity at well.com  Fri Dec 10 08:40:53 2004
From: macavity at well.com (Will Morton)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 16:40:53 +0000
Subject: tangled context probe
In-Reply-To: <41B9C74B.8090100@rant-central.com>
References: <41B9BD55.7020604@ripnet.com>
  <41B9C74B.8090100@rant-central.com>
Message-ID: <41B9D195.1080001@well.com>

Roy M. Silvernail wrote:

> R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:
>
>> (curious thing about this spew, it keeps disappearing into the bit 
>> bucket, 
>
>
> Yawn.  Roboposting this babble doesn't really increase its chances of 
> getting read.  I work through JY because I know there's uranium in 
> that ore.  But I'm about 2 posts away from ensconcing RW"B"E in my 
> procmail file next to TM, choate and proffr.


    Is there a term for messages that are indistinguishable from those 
generated by Dissociated Press or one of its superior modern cousins?  A 
kind of inverse Turing Test?

    W




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 10 13:50:30 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 16:50:30 -0500
Subject: Complaints About TSA Screenings Skyrocket
Message-ID: <p0611042ebddfca8d4441@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110247168313594059,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal

      December 8, 2004


Complaints About
 TSA Screenings Skyrocket

By AMY SCHATZ
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
December 8, 2004; Page D4


WASHINGTON -- For months, top Transportation Security Administration
officials have pledged to improve customer service at airport checkpoints.
It doesn't appear to be working.

The number of complaints and comments filed by passengers skyrocketed in
October, according to a recent federal report. Almost 700 passengers
called, wrote or e-mailed about rude or discourteous service -- more in one
month than in the past six months combined.

Complaints and comments rose sharply in almost every category, suggesting
that the agency's customer-service woes are far broader than widely
publicized reports about female passengers complaining about being groped
at security checkpoints.

TRAVELER FEEDBACK More passengers filed comments about screening in October
than the previous three months combined

Comments
October
July to September

Customer treatment
690
 359

 Screening procedures
385
 300

 Time to clear security
70
 62

 Handling personal property
809
 1,400

 Damage claims on handling of luggage*
438
 1,108

 Total complaints
2,392
 3,229
 *At security checkpoints

Source: DOT Air Travel Consumer Report for July-Oct.

The number of "contacts" from the public about inappropriate screeners more
than doubled, to 385 complaints from 150 in September, when new procedures
were put into place that instruct screeners to touch intimate areas of a
passenger's body to ensure no explosives or guns are hidden.

More passengers also complained that their personal property was
mishandled, with 809 complaints in October, compared with 436 in September.
TSA improved in just one area: The number of claims for bags damaged at
checkpoints fell slightly to 438.

TSA is required by Congress to report figures about its customer service,
and those numbers are included in a monthly report about airline on-time
data and passenger complaints released by the Department of Transportation.

A TSA spokeswoman said the agency's figures include complaints, comments
and questions received from the flying public, and don't necessarily
suggest customer service is worsening. The sharp increase shows TSA has
been effective in telling customers how to contact the agency, said
spokeswoman Amy von Walter. "We see this as a positive," she said. "We
encourage comments. We want to hear the good and the bad, so we can refine
our procedures." TSA declined to release a breakdown of the figures that
showed the complaints versus questions or compliments.

Not only are the total numbers up, but so is the rate of complaints per
passenger. TSA received 1.61 comments for each 100,000 passengers about
mishandled property in October, compared with 0.88 the month before. The
rate was even worse for passengers concerned about discourteous TSA
employees: The agency received 1.38 complaints for each 100,000 passengers
about rudeness in October, compared with 0.23 in September and 0.27 in
August.

TSA says it has responded to some complaints by retraining screeners to be
more open about what they are doing and why, particularly during pat-down
searches. So far, TSA has no plans to relax its revised pat-down rules that
went into effect in late September, allowing full-body searches.

TSA is in a bind: Its metal detectors won't catch hidden explosives, but
the agency can't afford to replace them. The expensive "puffer" machines
can detect the whiff of explosives by shooting puffs of air at passengers
as they walk through.

The agency also hasn't gotten past the serious privacy issues surrounding
its other option: new X-ray technology that clearly slows guns or
explosives hidden on a passenger's body, but also produces an image of the
passenger, sans clothing, to screeners. A version of that technology is
being tested on volunteers at London's Heathrow Airport, but it has been
met with mixed customer response.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 10 13:50:47 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 16:50:47 -0500
Subject: Airport-Screening Rules Are Eased
Message-ID: <p0611042cbddfca8a43da@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110265033103496694,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal

      December 10, 2004

 POLITICS AND POLICY



Airport-Screening Rules Are Eased

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter
December 10, 2004; Page A5


WASHINGTON -- Bowing to passenger outrage over pat-down procedures at
airport checkpoints, the Transportation Security Administration will alter
its rules beginning Monday to allow passengers to lower their arms during
screening.

The change is minor and TSA officials say they have no plans to rescind
pat-down procedures that require screeners to touch passengers' chest and
groin areas while checking for weapons or explosives. Nevertheless, it
represents an attempt by the TSA to improve its image among travelers.

The agency also backed off a plan announced in late November that would
require airports to immediately report any suspicious activities, even
routine problems such as unruly or drunken passengers, to TSA headquarters.
That reporting now will be optional.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From measl at mfn.org  Fri Dec 10 16:25:35 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 18:25:35 -0600 (CST)
Subject: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
In-Reply-To: <20041210203134.94897.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <20041210203134.94897.qmail@web51801.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20041210182421.T47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Fri, 10 Dec 2004, Steve Thompson wrote:

> While we're speaking of pot, I should note that the grass available in
> this neck of the woods is substandard at best.  What with all the illegal
> suburban grow-ops in Toronto, you'd think one would be able to buy
> half-decent weed from time to time.  But no... It's all crap.

You're scroing in the wrong neighborhoods.  Try the areas which rely on
grass for their day to day needs.  A neighborhood heavily populated by
Tims "eaters" would be best ;-)

> Steve


-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 10 09:31:41 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 18:31:41 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Re: Memory and reputation calculation (fwd
  from paul@ref.nmedia.net)
Message-ID: <20041210173141.GX9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Paul Campbell <paul at ref.nmedia.net> -----


From measl at mfn.org  Fri Dec 10 16:41:14 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 18:41:14 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <017630AA6DF2DF4EBC1DD4454F8EE29704776BB1@rsana-ex-hq1.NA.RSA.NET>
References: <017630AA6DF2DF4EBC1DD4454F8EE29704776BB1@rsana-ex-hq1.NA.RSA.NET>
Message-ID: <20041210183651.H47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Fri, 10 Dec 2004, Trei, Peter wrote:

> J.A. Terranson wrote:
> > (4) I have yet to meet a full dozen people who share my
> > belief that while stego *may* be in use, if it is, that
> > use is for one way messages of semaphore-class messages
> > only.  I really do not understand why this view
> > is poopoo'd by all sides, so I must be pretty dense?
>
> For semaphores and codewords, stego isn't needed. Simply
> agree on a signal - if a post appears in
> alt.anonymous.messages with the subject "To JAT", the
> intended recipient has got all the info he needs.

Assuming you are willing to use your semaphores over overt channels.
Rudimentary stego is useful when you want those same low-bandwidth
messages delivered covertly.


> Stego is needed only when the message is too complex
> to have a codeword.

Yet at the same time, stego is such a low bandwidth medium as to argue
strongly against it's use for truly complex messaging systems.


> Even without software, 'numbers station' type
> transmissions can be sent anonymously through the net.

We're not necessarily talking about an IP transport for these messages.
My belief is that any unicast IP transport is inherently dangerous for
critical *must-be-truly-anonymous* messaging.  To put it another way, I
would not (if I was AlQ, which I'm not.  At least not this week...) use
the internet for critical messaging.  Just like I wouldn't use a satellite
phone ;-)

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From measl at mfn.org  Fri Dec 10 17:07:29 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 19:07:29 -0600 (CST)
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F2558FB410B9C9510D4356B9BA80@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F2558FB410B9C9510D4356B9BA80@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041210190623.K47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Fri, 10 Dec 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:

> And don't forget...Spam is a good thing as long as it doesn't clog the
> Mixmaster bandwidth.

No, it's not.  There are other things that can produce the same cover
effects: cron jobs or daemons that fire off random chaff work just as
well, without the mess of allowing UCE.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From measl at mfn.org  Fri Dec 10 17:11:35 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 19:11:35 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <41B8D50D.30105@ripnet.com>
References: <BAY24-F35DD13E5529163C8625A149BB70@phx.gbl>
  <20041209160715.U40200@ubzr.zsa.bet>  <41B8D50D.30105@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <20041210190945.H47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Thu, 9 Dec 2004, R.W. (Bob) Erickson wrote:

> Perhaps LEA confuse themselves thinking al-q is inciting a cultural
> revolution?

In all seriousness, there is some of that fear within the LE community.
I'm sure it's about the same as when the weathermen were running around
the pentagon's bathrooms (i.e., a very small subset of only the dumbest
LEAs belive it), but that is certainly in the background noise.


-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From nobody at dizum.com  Fri Dec 10 11:20:16 2004
From: nobody at dizum.com (Nomen Nescio)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 20:20:16 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Cypherpunks archives online
Message-ID: <e91fd2bd107bf02147da73625a236f6f@dizum.com>

There were some talk about archives here recently.

I found two here:
http://www.mail-archive.com/index.php?hunt=cypherpunks

And this does indeed seem to be an active archive of the list:
http://www.mail-archive.com/cypherpunks%40minder.net/




From ashwood at msn.com  Fri Dec 10 21:47:25 2004
From: ashwood at msn.com (Joseph Ashwood)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 21:47:25 -0800
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
References: <41B9B5B2.8606F39D@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <BAY0-SMTP11750EE27A16762ADA476AACA90@phx.gbl>

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving


> At 07:47 PM 12/9/04 -0800, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
>>> If the Klan doesn't have
>>> a right to wear pillowcases what makes you think mixmaster will
>>> survive?
>>
>>Well besides the misinterprettaion of the ruling, which I will ignore,
> what
>>makes you think MixMaster isn't already dead?
>
> OK, substitute "wardriving email injection when wardriving is otherwise
> legal" for Mixmastering, albeit the former is less secure since the
> injection lat/long is known.  And you need to use a disposable
> Wifi card or at least one with a mutable MAC.

Wardriving is also basically dead. Sure there are a handful of people that 
do it, but the number is so small as to be irrelevant. Checking the logs for 
my network (which does run WEP so the number of attacks may be reduced from 
unprotected) in the last 2 years someone (other than those authorized) has 
attempted to connect about 1000 times, of those only 4 made repeated 
attempts, 2 succeeded and hit the outside of the IPSec server (I run WEP as 
a courtesy to the rest of the connection attempts). That means that in the 
last 2 years there have been at most 4 attempts at wardriving my network, 
and I live in a population dense part of San Jose. Wardriving can also be 
declared dead. Glancing at the wireless networks visible from my computer I 
currently see 6, all using at least WEP (earlier there were 7, still all 
encrypted). I regularly drive down through Los Angeles, when I have stopped 
for gas or food and checked I rarely see an unprotected network. The WEP 
message has gotten out, and the higher security versions are getting the 
message out as well. Now all it will take is a small court ruling that 
whatever comes out of your network you are responsible for, and the 
available wardriving targets will quickly drop to almost 0.

Wardriving is either dead or dying.

> Or consider a Napster-level popular app which includes mixing or
> onion routing.

Now we're back to the MixMaster argument. Mixmaster was meant to be a 
"Napster-level popular app" for emailing, but people just don't care about 
anonymity. Such an app would need to have a seperate primary purpose. The 
problem with this is that, as we've seen with Freenet, the extra security 
layering can actually undermine the usability, leading to a functional 
collapse. If a proper medium can be struck then such an application can 
become popular, I don't expect this to happen any time soon.
                Joe 




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Fri Dec 10 16:59:35 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 00:59:35 +0000
Subject: Insurrectionist covers
In-Reply-To: <20041210205022.34679.qmail@web51810.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <41BA0098.8090903@ripnet.com>
  <20041210205022.34679.qmail@web51810.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20041211005935.GA17882@arion.soze.net>

On 2004-12-10T15:50:22-0500, Steve Thompson wrote:
>
>  --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote:
> > Steve Thompson wrote:
> >
> > > --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote:
> > > [Colouring outside the lines]
> > >
> > Yes, you have a point there.I guess a better cover would be as local
> > coordinator of Neighborhood Watch
>
> c.f. "Take back the night", et. cetera.  (And put it where?)
>
> Anyhow, isn't insurrection illegal or something?  ISTR reading about the
> natural right of the corrupt state to exist unconditionally, and it's
> obligation to crush any question of change for any reason.
>
> The structure of the state in fact defines its identity as a 'person'; and
> since changeing the state structure could be viewed as the murder of the
> state's personality, the state has the right, nay, obligation to preserve
> its identity unchanged.  (Isn't this pretty much polysci 101 material?)

Not typically.  The idea that the state has its own identity is obvious,
because it has a name -- the "state".  It is clearly an atomic entity,
in the same sense as a beehive or ant colony (to borrow unapologetically
from R. Dawkins).  However, discussion of the state as an singular
entity that acts to preserve itself is typically delayed until study of
Leviathan.  Then it's expanded when studying Kant's theory of
International Relations.

Those are typically 2nd-year courses, at a minimum.  IR is typically 3rd
or 4th year, but Leviathan is discussed in any number of classes, just
not polysci 101.




From mv at cdc.gov  Sat Dec 11 06:39:13 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 06:39:13 -0800
Subject: punkly current events
Message-ID: <41BB0691.7BE54E11@cdc.gov>

At 01:19 PM 12/10/04 -0600, J.A. Terranson wrote:
>I disagree.  Except for the early days, spammers have been little more
>than a low volume nuisance on Mix.  What killed mix was it's complexity
-
>Joe Blow can't figure out how to use it, and new reops have a hell of a

>time getting a node running (with pingers and other required tools).
>
>Take away complexity, and Mix *could* flourish - in spite of the fedz.

I agree, with the additional constraint that mix functionality piggyback

with a more popular feature.  Most folks won't install even the most
benign, easy to use mixer; but include a mix server in a jazzy
IM or next-gen napster program, and you get deployed.




From mv at cdc.gov  Sat Dec 11 06:43:43 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 06:43:43 -0800
Subject: TSA groping
Message-ID: <41BB079F.A12C0DB@cdc.gov>

At 04:50 PM 12/10/04 -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
>The change is minor and TSA officials say they have no plans to rescind

>pat-down procedures that require screeners to touch passengers' chest
and
>groin areas while checking for weapons or explosives. Nevertheless, it
>represents an attempt by the TSA to improve its image among travelers.

I flew monthly for several years after 2001.  I was never touched.
Should I be surprised to find a goon touching me that way, I would not
be
able to stop certain reflexes involving ballistic application of
elbows and knees.  I am surprised this has not happened or perhaps it is

not reported.




From mv at cdc.gov  Sat Dec 11 06:48:41 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 06:48:41 -0800
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
Message-ID: <41BB08C9.7BD36C2F@cdc.gov>

At 09:47 PM 12/10/04 -0800, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
>Wardriving is also basically dead.

On the contrary.  A recent article (zdnet IIRC) described a non-hacker
visiting his father, and using a neighbor's connection accidentally.
This is very common.  My own non-tech father regularly finds
other nets in his neighborhood, using default apps (not 'Stumbler, etc).

Sure there are a handful of people that
>do it, but the number is so small as to be irrelevant.

That 'wardrive' knowing its called that, yes.  That do so accidentally,
no.

>> Or consider a Napster-level popular app which includes mixing or
>> onion routing.
>
>Now we're back to the MixMaster argument. Mixmaster was meant to be a
>"Napster-level popular app" for emailing, but people just don't care
about
>anonymity.

Mixmaster is the most godawful complex thing to use, much less
administer, around.  Even Jack B Nymble is complex.
It needs a simple luser interface and something
to piggyback servers on.




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Sat Dec 11 04:57:13 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 07:57:13 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Insurrectionist covers
In-Reply-To: <41BA0F06.5030305@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <20041211125713.49712.qmail@web51809.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote: 
> Steve Thompson wrote:
> > [take back the night]
>
> Yep, the state fights to preserve its "life"
> while the people suffer their own.
> The mistake of top down thinking
> lies in the inability to really model large populations with rules,
> too much of the action happens at the fine grained level
> of every day staying alive.

Actually, there's a false dichotomy there, but the misconception is so
common that nobody notices it.
 
> When change comes, it will happen as the cummulative effects
> of millions of stuborn folk who subvert excessive authourity, 'cause 
> they need to.

Perhaps not.  It may be that enough people are not too inconvenienced by
the way things are today (and tomorrow).  Only people on the margins will
be affected in that scenario, which is largely insignificant to the
perpetuation of the corrupt state.  Right?

> As the state tries to squeeze more gold out of the untaxed ecconomy
> ordinary people will swarm to new work-arounds

And so it goes.
 
> --bob
> cpunks write scripts

And code.  Can't forget the code.


Regards,

Steve

  

______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Sat Dec 11 05:16:43 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 08:16:43 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Insurrectionist covers
In-Reply-To: <20041211005935.GA17882@arion.soze.net>
Message-ID: <20041211131643.99299.qmail@web51805.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- Justin <justin-cypherpunks at soze.net> wrote: 
> On 2004-12-10T15:50:22-0500, Steve Thompson wrote:
[snip]
> > state's personality, the state has the right, nay, obligation to
> preserve
> > its identity unchanged.  (Isn't this pretty much polysci 101
> material?)
> 
> Not typically.  The idea that the state has its own identity is obvious,
> because it has a name -- the "state".  It is clearly an atomic entity,
> in the same sense as a beehive or ant colony (to borrow unapologetically
> from R. Dawkins).  However, discussion of the state as an singular
> entity that acts to preserve itself is typically delayed until study of
> Leviathan.  Then it's expanded when studying Kant's theory of
> International Relations.

This is what happens when one picks up ideas from people who present them
second-hand (or at even greater distances from their origin) and who do
not make proper footnotes.
 
> Those are typically 2nd-year courses, at a minimum.  IR is typically 3rd
> or 4th year, but Leviathan is discussed in any number of classes, just
> not polysci 101.

My bad.


Regards,

Steve
  

______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From rsw at jfet.org  Sat Dec 11 06:17:32 2004
From: rsw at jfet.org (Riad S. Wahby)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 08:17:32 -0600
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
In-Reply-To: <013501c4df46$ce9a73f0$6401a8c0@JOSEPHAS>
References: <41B9B5B2.8606F39D@cdc.gov> <013501c4df46$ce9a73f0$6401a8c0@JOSEPHAS>
Message-ID: <20041211141732.GA20964@positron.jfet.org>

Joseph Ashwood <ashwood at msn.com> wrote:
> I regularly drive down through Los Angeles, when I have stopped 
> for gas or food and checked I rarely see an unprotected network.

This seems like a peculiarity of your location.  Here in Austin almost
all of downtown is covered by free wireless.

-- 
Riad S. Wahby
rsw at jfet.org




From measl at mfn.org  Sat Dec 11 06:29:31 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 08:29:31 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
In-Reply-To: <20041211141732.GA20964@positron.jfet.org>
References: <41B9B5B2.8606F39D@cdc.gov> <013501c4df46$ce9a73f0$6401a8c0@JOSEPHAS>
 <20041211141732.GA20964@positron.jfet.org>
Message-ID: <20041211082731.C47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>


On Sat, 11 Dec 2004, Riad S. Wahby wrote:

> Joseph Ashwood <ashwood at msn.com> wrote:
> > I regularly drive down through Los Angeles, when I have stopped
> > for gas or food and checked I rarely see an unprotected network.
>
> This seems like a peculiarity of your location.  Here in Austin almost
> all of downtown is covered by free wireless.

Looking out of my fifth floor window I can connect to ~20 802.x nets
*without* directional antennas or high powered cards.  With extra gear, I
can hit almost 50, and in both cases, roughly a third are completely open,
another third are trivially "protected", and the remaining third have done
the best they can under the circumstances :-)

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From pique at netspace.net.au  Fri Dec 10 14:35:23 2004
From: pique at netspace.net.au (Tim Benham)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 09:35:23 +1100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Re: Memory and reputation calculation
In-Reply-To: <200412101253.iBACrf51054696@waste.minder.net>
References: <200412101253.iBACrf51054696@waste.minder.net>
Message-ID: <200412110935.23066.pique@netspace.net.au>

> From: MULLER Guillaume <muller at emse.fr>
> Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 09:33:39 +0100
> To: p2p-hackers at zgp.org
>
> Hi all,
>
> Right, I would have cited Dellarocas' papers also because he is the only=20
> one I know that worked on this subject.
>
> However, IMHO, his claim that size of history doesn't matter is false.=20
> He took this conclusion in very a specific domain that is eBay-like=20
> market-places with very specific assumption (cf. cited paper).
>
> My idea is that size of history DOES matter. Let's imagine a system=20
> (even eBay-like) where every agent *knows* that the history is a list of=20
> the X last encounters experiences. Then it is easy to see that cheating=20
> 1/X times  is a strategy that pays off (particularly in systems where=20
> ratings might be noisy).
>
> IMHO, the key point with respect to the history is that others should=20
> not be able guess its size. If it has a fixed size, I believe it doesn't=20
> matter if (and only if) other can guess its size (and therefore cannot=20
> use strategy as described above).
>
> However, I'm sorry I didn't have time to make any experimentations, but=20
> I'd like to hear if anybody has.

(1) You'll never eliminate cheating.

(2) Making the size of the history file a secret is probably unworkable. 
Better to make deletion from the history non-deterministic, so the longer a 
record has been been in the list the more likely it is to get dropped. A 
potential cheater would never be certain when the incriminating evidence 
would be gone. 

If which records were disreputable was known then their lifetime could be 
extended.

cheers,
Tim




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 11 06:38:44 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 09:38:44 -0500
Subject: No End To His Imagination
Message-ID: <p06110435bde0aab743d6@[66.149.49.5]>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

<http://www.investors.com/editorial/lands.asp?view=1>


Today in Investor's Business Daily stock analysis and business news

Leaders & Success

No End To His Imagination

BY KEN SPENCER BROWN

INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY

Imagination should have no limits. And for Alan Turing, it didn't.

By refusing to envision only what was strictly practical, he expanded the
bounds of what was possible. Blending his command of mathematics with
boundless imagination, he pioneered the notion of a thinking machine and
paved the way for the computer age.

By the time he died at age 42, Turing had become a renowned British
mathematician, logician, cryptographer and war hero.

Later, Turing's most advanced ideas became a foundation for computer
science with the dawning of the digital age he'd envisioned. If things like
software code, cryptography and artificial intelligence leave you
scratching your head, just imagine wrestling with those concepts decades
before the invention of the computer.

Turing (1912-54) wasn't an outstanding student. But as a child, his focus
was already keen, and he loved to experiment. In her 1959 biography of her
son, "Alan M. Turing," Sara Turing recalled that some of Turing's
grade-school inventions included a typewriter and a camera.

 His math skills quickly showed themselves, though the young Turing drew
complaints from teachers for his messiness and penchant for neglecting the
basics as he dived ahead into more advanced topics. As a house master put
it in 1927, Turing was "trying to build a roof before he has laid the
foundations."

Actually, Turing figured that as he already understood basic concepts, it
was little use wasting time on them when he could home in on more complex
ideas. He was thinking beyond the educational system - and it would become
key to his future breakthroughs.

 Early Inspiration

Despite his shyness and occasional social awkwardness, friends knew Turing
as an avid runner and rower, and fiercely loyal. Normally gentle in speech,
Turing would defend his friends' views intensely when they were challenged.

 They often inspired him, too. The death of a close schoolmate in February
1930 sparked Turing's first published thoughts in metaphysics. In letters
to the friend's mother, Turing pondered the connection between the human
mind and the brain. These ideas sparked his thinking on artificial
intelligence, which tries to model the human brain and the thought process.

Turing failed to win a scholarship to his first-choice school, Trinity
College, because of his erratic academic performance. But he didn't let
that hold him back.

Turing quickly made a name for himself at King's College in Cambridge, his
second choice, on a math scholarship. He studied hard, striving to excel in
each class. In 1935, at age 22, he received a fellowship there - a
remarkable achievement for one so young.

Still, he stayed his usual humble self. On his first night as a fellow,
Turing's mother recalled that her son was happier that he'd beaten the
school's provost at rummy, not that he was a fellow at 22.

And though entitled to dine at the school's "high table," some complained
that he seemed to prefer the company of other undergraduates. In her
biography, Sara Turing says this was a sign her son simply didn't want to
flaunt his new privileges.

This isn't to say he held himself in low esteem. On the contrary, Turing
was confident in his work, certain that he'd win academic prizes for
several papers he submitted over the years. Invariably, he did.

Even so, Turing insisted on giving others proper credit in collaborative
projects, often downplaying his own contributions. This was one of many
thoughtful traits that won Turing friends.

On May 28, 1936, he submitted a paper titled "On Computable Numbers, With
an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem."

 Designed to solve a 400-year-old logic problem, Turing described the
functions of a machine that could solve any problem stated as a
mathematical algorithm.

 Now known as a Turing machine, the theoretical device was the first to
conceive of a general-use device that could store data and instructions and
be programmed for lots of different math problems. Turing's attempts to
build such a machine failed, but many of his ideas helped create the
electronic computer.

He wasn't living in a theoretical world, however; Turing searched for
practical applications for his work. He put some of his ideas to use during
World War II, when he helped crack secret codes used by the German air
force. Turing's "bombe" machine sped up the decryption process through an
electro-mechanical process of elimination.

 Cracking the Enigma codes used by the German navy proved tougher. But
Turing loved a challenge.

 In 1936 - 11 years before the invention of the transistor and more than
two decades before the integrated circuit - he envisioned his Turing
machine as a mechanical device. This made it too slow for practical use.
His exposure to the military's electronic calculators pulled his earlier
ideas within reach.

In 1946, Turing got the OK from England's National Physical Laboratory to
create an electronic version of the Turing Machine, now dubbed the
Automatic Computing Engine or ACE. It aimed to rival a planned U.S. system
called the Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer.

As biographer Andrew Hodges notes in "Alan Turing: the Enigma," Turing's
ACE was a radical break from the electronic calculators of the time. It
could be set up for all sorts of calculations, making it far more useful
than existing machines.

"He had created something quite original and something all of his own,"
Hodges wrote. "He had invented the art of computer programming."

The machine was never built, but Turing's ideas played a big role in other
early computers, including one built in 1948 that proved his basic ideas.
Yet Turing continued imagining what the still-crude technology could do.

Ahead Of His Time

In 1950, he published the seminal essay "Computing Machinery and
Intelligence" in the journal Mind. Here, he proposed the question "Can
machines think?"

He didn't believe there was an answer, but suggested that computers would
someday be able to fool humans into believing they could think.

 He proposed what is now called the "Turing Test," an experiment to see
whether people could tell human from machine in a typewritten chat. The
test is still used today in artificial intelligence experiments.

In the paper, Turing also was one of the first to suggest that computers
would someday triumph over humans at chess.

 Again, he was way ahead of his time. A computer didn't beat a human until
1958, playing against a secretary who'd learned how to play the game only
an hour before.

Computers wouldn't become decent chess players until 1962, and wouldn't
beat the best players in a regular game until 1997. That's when IBM's Deep
Blue machine defeated champion Garry Kasparov.

Despite his work in artificial intelligence, Turing was no robot. He had a
deep concern for other people. When colleagues went through difficult
periods, Turing helped them in their research to ease their schedule, or
lent a sympathetic ear. Compassion, he believed, was as important as
innovation.

 And technology, in Turing's eyes, was no substitute for humanity.


- -- 
- -----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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From measl at mfn.org  Sat Dec 11 09:10:22 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 11:10:22 -0600 (CST)
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <20041211165056.GM9221@leitl.org>
References: <41BB0691.7BE54E11@cdc.gov>
  <20041211165056.GM9221@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <20041211110840.N47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sat, 11 Dec 2004, Eugen Leitl wrote:

> Can you use UDP broadcast on cable or xDSL?

Completely provider dependent.  For instance, I have SWB DSL as my work
provider, and (AFAICT) am free to use whatever I want.  My home cable
connection prohibits any standard form of traceroute, but allows pings and
UDP...  Move across town, and everything changes.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From roberte at ripnet.com  Sat Dec 11 08:52:56 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 11:52:56 -0500
Subject: Half baked troll
Message-ID: <41BB25E8.6000504@ripnet.com>

The need for a coherent framework to hang our speculations on is obvious.
The impossibility of any consensus based prototype is pure politics.

We need a way out, and that way is to take a lesson from the theory of 
evolution.
The lucky semantic construction is tested in practice by a virtual swarm 
of users.
If a given notion doesnt hold together the pieces of it
still populate the thoughtscape with a free radical chemistry.


Agreeing to disagree is insufficient,
Critical thought can reveal common folding lines
if we accept the notion that whats seperates people
are their individual stances, we are on the edge of something interesting.

Its my premiss that people are extrodinarily clever at making things fit.
We do see that individual pairs of people can find a bridge to 
understanding,
even between radically different world view.
We just have never found a way to generalise such mutual understandings.


I posit the existence of a net path whereby all people could come to 
know their commonality.


Not saying the path is accessable, but as long as we are unable to free 
ourselves from ideology,
whats wrong with one that builds on our best?




From measl at mfn.org  Sat Dec 11 10:08:31 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 12:08:31 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
In-Reply-To: <20041211180100.GB30548@arion.soze.net>
References: <41BB08C9.7BD36C2F@cdc.gov>
  <20041211180100.GB30548@arion.soze.net>
Message-ID: <20041211120729.P47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sat, 11 Dec 2004, Justin wrote:

> Not necessarily.  Mixmaster is trivial to use with Mutt.
>
> 1. Compile Mixmaster
> 2. Put the binary in some directory somewhere.
> 3. Configure Mutt with --with-mixmaster  (sadly not enabled by default)
> 4. add the line 'set mixmaster="/location/to/bin/mixmaster"' to .muttrc
> 5. mkdir ~user/Mix/
> 6. Add a script to crontab that does:
>
>   cd ~user/Mix/
>   mv -f mlist.txt mlist.txt.old
>   wget -q http://stats.melontraffickers.com/mlist.txt
>   mv -f rlist.txt rlist.txt.old
>   wget -q http://stats.melontraffickers.com/rlist.txt
>   mv -f pubring.mix pubring.mix.old
>   wget -q http://stats.melontraffickers.com/pubring.mix
>   mv -f type2.list type2.list.old
>   wget -q http://stats.melontraffickers.com/type2.list
>   mv -f pubring.asc pubring.asc.old
>   wget -q http://stats.melontraffickers.com/pgp-all.asc
>   mv -f pgp-all.asc pubring.asc

You just made my case for me.  Joe Sixpack will not wtf you are talking
about.  Hell, half the RedHat users won't know either ("where's the
RPM?").

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Sat Dec 11 13:01:17 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 13:01:17 -0800
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
In-Reply-To: <20041211120729.P47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <41BB08C9.7BD36C2F@cdc.gov> 
  <20041211180100.GB30548@arion.soze.net> 
  <20041211120729.P47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20041211125615.03aec128@pop.idiom.com>

At 10:08 AM 12/11/2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:
>On Sat, 11 Dec 2004, Justin wrote:
> > Not necessarily.  Mixmaster is trivial to use with Mutt.
> >
> > 1. Compile Mixmaster
>.....
>You just made my case for me.  Joe Sixpack will not wtf you are talking
>about.  Hell, half the RedHat users won't know either ("where's the RPM?").

Joe Sixpack got lost at "Compile".
It's still easier to use than the early versions of FreeS/WAN
("First do a clean compile of your kernel...")

On the other hand, if you're using Mutt, you're already
more complex than Joe Sixpack is likely to use.

Also, rather than a virus installer, it'd be interesting if there were
an anonymizer package built for Apache.  Widespread anonymous web browsing
would mean that simple web-based remailers would be easily usable.


----
Bill Stewart  bill.stewart at pobox.com 




From arma at mit.edu  Sat Dec 11 10:24:55 2004
From: arma at mit.edu (Roger Dingledine)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 13:24:55 -0500
Subject: Tor 0.0.9 is imminent
Message-ID: <mailman.1111.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Hi folks,

If you've been stunned by the frequency of new release candidates and
you've been waiting for The Actual Release Candidate, 0.0.9rc7 is it.

If you have a free moment this weekend, please pull it down and try to
break it. If no major problems come up, we'll be releasing 0.0.9 in a
few days.

Thanks!
--Roger

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Sat Dec 11 13:27:00 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 13:27:00 -0800
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <p0611047dbdde0d42e48f@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p0611047dbdde0d42e48f@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20041211131927.03998ce0@pop.idiom.com>

>  For instance, a seemingly innocent digital photo of a dog could be
>doctored to contain a picture of an explosive device or hidden wording.

Of course, the _real_ message wasn't hidden in subtle stego bits -
it was whether the picture was Bush's dog, Cheney's dog, or Blair's dog.

>  It recommends investigators consult the RCMP's technological crime program
>for assistance, including "comprehensive forensic examinations" of seized
>digital media.

The more serious problem is what this means for computer evidence
search and seizure procedures - the US has some official rules about
"copy the disk and return the computer" that came out of the Steve Jackson
case, not that they're always followed; I don't know if the Canadians
are more or less polite about returning computers,
but this kind of thing increases the chances of harassment
of various ethnic and political organizations
"We're keeping your computer as evidence of potential crimes,
but we haven't actually charged you with a crime yet
and won't do so unless we can find the hidden stego evidence."



----
Bill Stewart  bill.stewart at pobox.com 




From jamesd at echeque.com  Sat Dec 11 14:29:20 2004
From: jamesd at echeque.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 14:29:20 -0800
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <41B9B866.36005A3F@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <41BB0440.13660.109E3EB0@localhost>

    --
On 10 Dec 2004 at 6:53, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> Name a place which is not subject to US juridiction?   Ok, 
> Iran, N Kr, until we pull a regime change (tm) on them. Yeah, 
> they have a lot of 'net bandwidth, right.

If Afghanistan was subject to US jurisdiction, it would not 
have a bumper opium crop.  If Saudi Arabia was subject to US 
jurisdiction, they would not be funding terrorism. If Israel
was subject to US jurisdiction, they would be less cavalier
about murdering American trouble makers.

The reason that taliban caught in Afghanistan, and people with 
the wrong accent caught in Afghanistan, tend to wind up in 
Guantanamo Bay is not because Afghan warlords are taking orders 
from US overlords, it is because Afghan warlords are fighting a 
holy war against the same people who are our enemies.

Similarly Sistani is busily subverting the US favored parties 
in Iraq, at the same time he is busily subverting US enemies in 
Iran.   He has his own agenda, which on some matters agrees 
with the US agenda, and others contradicts the US agenda. 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
     2c9x3EgsLT44LpYQQUlGud/yFuYB783XVxKtOPRY
     4FmUuq0u9cIG0iHSOk5xjllcON90ZXsAI+IcJG7X8




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Sat Dec 11 15:40:49 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 15:40:49 -0800
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <41BB0440.13660.109E3EB0@localhost>
References: <41B9B866.36005A3F@cdc.gov> 
  <41BB0440.13660.109E3EB0@localhost>
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20041211153628.03b80b40@pop.idiom.com>

At 02:29 PM 12/11/2004, James A. Donald wrote:
>If Afghanistan was subject to US jurisdiction, it would not
>have a bumper opium crop.  If Saudi Arabia was subject to US
>jurisdiction, they would not be funding terrorism.  [...]
>
>The reason that taliban caught in Afghanistan, and people with
>the wrong accent caught in Afghanistan, tend to wind up in
>Guantanamo Bay is not because Afghan warlords are taking orders
>from US overlords, it is because Afghan warlords are fighting a
>holy war against the same people who are our enemies.

But the Taliban were the US warlords' *friends*.
After all, that's why the US paid them $43m for doing
such a great job in their holy war against opium farmers.





----
Bill Stewart  bill.stewart at pobox.com 




From adam at homeport.org  Sat Dec 11 13:52:46 2004
From: adam at homeport.org (Adam Shostack)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 16:52:46 -0500
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <87zn0kttom.fsf@deneb.enyo.de>
References: <p0611047dbdde0d42e48f@[66.149.49.5]>
  <87zn0kttom.fsf@deneb.enyo.de>
Message-ID: <20041211215246.GA62645@lightship.internal.homeport.org>

On Sat, Dec 11, 2004 at 10:24:09PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
| * R. A. Hettinga quotes a news article:
| 
| >  There have been numerous media reports in recent years that terrorist
| > groups, including al-Qaida, were using steganographic techniques.
| 
| As far as I know, these news stories can be tracked back to a
| particular USA Today story.  There's also been a bunch of stories how
| a covert channel in TCP could be used by terrorists to hide their
| communication.

There's very good evidence that Al Qaida does *not* use strong crypto.

I blogged on this at http://www.emergentchaos.com/archives/000561.html

is was the first time I'd given such a talk since 9/11. It wasn't
useful after we'd made the decision to stop hemorrhaging money by
shutting down the Freedom Network. (That was May or June of 2001.) So
I did a fair bit of reading about Al Qaeda's use of crypto. One of the
more interesting techniques I found was the 'draft message' method.
(http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/002871.php)

It seems consistent that Al Qaeda prefers being 'fish in the sea' to
standing out by use of crypto. Also, given the depth and breadth of
conspiracies they believe in, it seems that they might see all us
cryptographers as a massive deception technique to get them to use bad
crypto. (And hey, they're almost right! We love that they use bad
crypto.)

There's other evidence for this. In particular, the laptops captured
have been exploited very quickly, in one case by a Wall St Journal
reporter. So rumors of steganography or advanced crypto techniques
have a burden of proof on them.

And see the link there to Ian Grigg's
http://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000246.html




From cluesink at i2pmail.org  Sat Dec 11 09:31:43 2004
From: cluesink at i2pmail.org (cluesink)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 17:31:43 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
In-Reply-To: <41BB08C9.7BD36C2F@cdc.gov>
References: <41BB08C9.7BD36C2F@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20041211173143.0C16DB787@a.mx.i2pmail.org>

Major Variola (ret) wrote:

>Mixmaster is the most godawful complex thing to use, much less
>administer, around.  Even Jack B Nymble is complex.
>It needs a simple luser interface and something
>to piggyback servers on.
>  
>
Mixminion is a little better, but needs more market penetration and 
still has no good client integration.  i2p is looking good, since out of 
the box it comes with proxy pop and smtp servers.  The downside is that 
they proxy to a single mail provider in the i2p cloud.  Also, 
communications outside the cloud isn't a high priority now.  But the 
framework is building.

However, both suffer from a J. 6pack problem, because to use either, you 
have to run a node.

Jack B Nymble is complex because as you know, bidirectional pseudonymity 
is complex.  It's the return channel implementation that causes the 
problems.




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 11 08:41:26 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 17:41:26 +0100
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
In-Reply-To: <20041211141732.GA20964@positron.jfet.org>
References: <41B9B5B2.8606F39D@cdc.gov>
  <013501c4df46$ce9a73f0$6401a8c0@JOSEPHAS>
  <20041211141732.GA20964@positron.jfet.org>
Message-ID: <20041211164126.GK9221@leitl.org>

On Sat, Dec 11, 2004 at 08:17:32AM -0600, Riad S. Wahby wrote:

> This seems like a peculiarity of your location.  Here in Austin almost
> all of downtown is covered by free wireless.

I wonder how much of it is deliberate. I run my AP open for any passerby, and
expect similiar in return when I pass through their area.

Speaking of wireless, I'm very impressed with LinkSys WRT54GS alternative
firmware advances. It's only a question of time before robust ad hoc meshes
are available by simply reflashing your AP with alternative firmware.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From measl at mfn.org  Sat Dec 11 15:49:24 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 17:49:24 -0600 (CST)
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <41BB0440.13660.109E3EB0@localhost>
References: <41BB0440.13660.109E3EB0@localhost>
Message-ID: <20041211174848.U47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sat, 11 Dec 2004, James A. Donald wrote:

> If Afghanistan was subject to US jurisdiction, it would not
> have a bumper opium crop.

This assumes that the US wants the opium trade stopped.  Be serious.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 11 08:50:56 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 17:50:56 +0100
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <41BB0691.7BE54E11@cdc.gov>
References: <41BB0691.7BE54E11@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20041211165056.GM9221@leitl.org>

On Sat, Dec 11, 2004 at 06:39:13AM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:

> I agree, with the additional constraint that mix functionality piggyback
> with a more popular feature.  Most folks won't install even the most
> benign, easy to use mixer; but include a mix server in a jazzy
> IM or next-gen napster program, and you get deployed.

The major advantage of massive rollout is speedy traffic remixing on the
local loop, which requires a high occupation density in address space.

The advantages are ~realtime, reliable traffic remixing.

Can you use UDP broadcast on cable or xDSL?

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Sat Dec 11 10:01:00 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 18:01:00 +0000
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
In-Reply-To: <41BB08C9.7BD36C2F@cdc.gov>
References: <41BB08C9.7BD36C2F@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20041211180100.GB30548@arion.soze.net>

On 2004-12-11T06:48:41-0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> 
> At 09:47 PM 12/10/04 -0800, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
> >Now we're back to the MixMaster argument. Mixmaster was meant to be a
> >"Napster-level popular app" for emailing, but people just don't care
> >about anonymity.
> 
> Mixmaster is the most godawful complex thing to use, much less
> administer, around.  Even Jack B Nymble is complex.  It needs a simple
> luser interface and something to piggyback servers on.

Not necessarily.  Mixmaster is trivial to use with Mutt.

1. Compile Mixmaster
2. Put the binary in some directory somewhere.
3. Configure Mutt with --with-mixmaster  (sadly not enabled by default)
4. add the line 'set mixmaster="/location/to/bin/mixmaster"' to .muttrc
5. mkdir ~user/Mix/
6. Add a script to crontab that does:

  cd ~user/Mix/
  mv -f mlist.txt mlist.txt.old
  wget -q http://stats.melontraffickers.com/mlist.txt
  mv -f rlist.txt rlist.txt.old
  wget -q http://stats.melontraffickers.com/rlist.txt
  mv -f pubring.mix pubring.mix.old
  wget -q http://stats.melontraffickers.com/pubring.mix
  mv -f type2.list type2.list.old
  wget -q http://stats.melontraffickers.com/type2.list
  mv -f pubring.asc pubring.asc.old
  wget -q http://stats.melontraffickers.com/pgp-all.asc
  mv -f pgp-all.asc pubring.asc

6.5.  And run it once for good measure.
7. When sending email, at the summary page just before sending, hit 'M'.




From measl at mfn.org  Sat Dec 11 16:06:38 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 18:06:38 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Steve Thompson
In-Reply-To: <20041211205911.4C7DC116EA@mail.cypherpunks.to>
References: <20041211205911.4C7DC116EA@mail.cypherpunks.to>
Message-ID: <20041211180617.V47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sat, 11 Dec 2004, Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer wrote:

> Out of nowhere cometh Steve Thompson, and sayeth he all manner of
> things.  But, while his mouth moveth one way, he seemeth to move the
> other.
>
> http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=%22steve+thompson%22&start=0&hl=en&safe=off&
>
> What hath suddenly attracted our AUK creep?

Who cares?  You got a beef, state it.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From measl at mfn.org  Sat Dec 11 16:09:40 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 18:09:40 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <6.0.3.0.0.20041211131927.03998ce0@pop.idiom.com>
References: <p0611047dbdde0d42e48f@[66.149.49.5]>
  <6.0.3.0.0.20041211131927.03998ce0@pop.idiom.com>
Message-ID: <20041211180832.Y47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sat, 11 Dec 2004, Bill Stewart wrote:

> The more serious problem is what this means for computer evidence
> search and seizure procedures - the US has some official rules about
> "copy the disk and return the computer" that came out of the Steve Jackson
> case, not that they're always followed;

Actually (at least here in the Midwest), it's copy ("image") the machine
and provide a copy of that image.  The computer and original drive stay
locked in the evidence locker till the case is over.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From jamesd at echeque.com  Sat Dec 11 19:12:49 2004
From: jamesd at echeque.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 19:12:49 -0800
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <6.0.3.0.0.20041211153628.03b80b40@pop.idiom.com>
References: <41BB0440.13660.109E3EB0@localhost>
Message-ID: <41BB46B1.22352.11A1C5D0@localhost>

    --
James A. Donald:
> > The reason that taliban caught in Afghanistan, and people
> > with the wrong accent caught in Afghanistan, tend to wind
> > up in Guantanamo Bay is not because Afghan warlords are
> > taking orders from US overlords, it is because Afghan
> > warlords are fighting a holy war against the same people
> > who are our enemies.

Bill Stewart:
> But the Taliban were the US warlords' *friends*

Learn some history.

The current holy war was going at a slow burn even during the
war against the Soviet Union.  Once the Soviet Union fell back,
any pretense of alliance was dropped, and the flames were in
plain sight.

These terrorists have been bugging various muslims they deem
insufficiently muslim long before they were bugging the west. 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
     wUajaZLtoiBjJKFNy8BqbXfYOsgcNOgbhUPRDpeN
     4bqrDBnbVHsw8K/4rUF8UkC0k60jpoqzZoKNYpz03




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 11 16:51:28 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 19:51:28 -0500
Subject: Kazaa can't bar child pornographers, court told
Message-ID: <p06110463bde113a2db7f@[66.149.49.5]>

Quadrafecta!!!

Horse Number Four, Paedophilia, or "Pokey", to his friends...

Only took 36 hours, true to his namesake... Or something.

Cheers,
RAH
-------

<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/10/kazaa_p2p_trial/print.html>

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT

The Register ; Internet and Law ; Digital Rights/Digital Wrongs ;

 Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/10/kazaa_p2p_trial/

Kazaa can't bar child pornographers, court told
By Tim Richardson (tim.richardson at theregister.co.uk)
Published Friday 10th December 2004 17:16 GMT

Sharman Networks - the company behind peer-to-peer file sharing outfit
Kazaa - has denied it is able to block users who use the service to share
child pornography.

Sharman Networks is currently in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney
facing allegations that it created the world's largest music piracy network
and knew that its software was being used to distribute music illegally.

Earlier in the trial, Tony Bannon, QC - representing dozens of music
companies including Universal, EMI, Warner and Sony BMG - dismissed Sharman
Networks' claim that the company had no control over how its software was
used.

Quoting the company's policy on child pornography, he said: "If at any time
Kazaa finds that you are using Kazaa to collect or distribute child
pornography or other obscene material, [Sharman] reserves the right to
permanently bar you and your computers from accessing Kazaa and other Kazaa
services."

The argument went on, that if Kazaa could bar traders in illegal child porn
images, then it could block users who illegally distribute music.

However, Philip Morle, Sharman Network's chief technology officer, told the
court yesterday that he did not think the company could bar people who used
its P2P software to distribute child pornography. He went on to say that he
didn't know how people could be blocked; nor was he aware of Kazaa's policy
on child pornography, reported ZD Net Australia.

The trial continues. .

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Dec 11 11:54:53 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 20:54:53 +0100
Subject: Tor 0.0.9 is imminent (fwd from arma@mit.edu)
Message-ID: <20041211195453.GT9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----


From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Sat Dec 11 18:19:55 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 21:19:55 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Steve Thompson
In-Reply-To: <20041211180617.V47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <20041212021955.40101.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "J.A. Terranson" <measl at mfn.org> wrote: 
> On Sat, 11 Dec 2004, Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer wrote:
> 
> > Out of nowhere cometh Steve Thompson, and sayeth he all manner of
> > things.  But, while his mouth moveth one way, he seemeth to move the
> > other.
> >
> >
>
http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=%22steve+thompson%22&start=0&hl=en&safe=off&
> >
> > What hath suddenly attracted our AUK creep?

AUK denizens have lots and lots of credibility, and even though I don't
sell shit on eBay, I suppose I should be worried about being mistaken for
someone who does.  Perhaps I should be thankful for the warning?
 
> Who cares?  You got a beef, state it.

My detractors are strangely unwilling to state their 'beef' with any
significant degree of specificity.  Rather, they typically prefer to
employ misdirection.  I can't seem to wrap my head around their
motivations, but I do have a tentative hypothesis -- which I will spare
discussing on the list in the spirit of conserving the existing signal to
noise ratio.
 

Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From nobody at cypherpunks.to  Sat Dec 11 12:59:11 2004
From: nobody at cypherpunks.to (Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 21:59:11 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Steve Thompson
Message-ID: <20041211205911.4C7DC116EA@mail.cypherpunks.to>

Out of nowhere cometh Steve Thompson, and sayeth he all manner of things.  But, while his mouth moveth one way, he seemeth to move the other.

http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=%22steve+thompson%22&start=0&hl=en&safe=off&

What hath suddenly attracted our AUK creep?




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Sat Dec 11 19:01:16 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 22:01:16 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <20041211180832.Y47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <20041212030116.47868.qmail@web51807.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- "J.A. Terranson" <measl at mfn.org> wrote: 
> On Sat, 11 Dec 2004, Bill Stewart wrote:
> 
> > The more serious problem is what this means for computer evidence
> > search and seizure procedures - the US has some official rules about
> > "copy the disk and return the computer" that came out of the Steve
> Jackson
> > case, not that they're always followed;
> 
> Actually (at least here in the Midwest), it's copy ("image") the machine
> and provide a copy of that image.  The computer and original drive stay
> locked in the evidence locker till the case is over.

I can't say what the legal practice is in Canada.  I imagine it depends on
whether the legal proceedings are politically charged; whether the cops
are out to discover evidence, or if they are looking to destroy evidence;
or any of a number of motivating factors.

>From a purely technical perspective, there is no possible reason why the
police would ever need to keep the computers and all copies of data
related to an investigation.  It is possible to image everything on a hard
disk in an afternoon, including the extra bits available through, say,
the, READ LONG(10) command in the SCSI protocol, which are normally used
for ECC and CRC on each sector.  Depending on the device, it may also be
possible to access the spares tracks.  

In the rare event that a forensics firm is looking to scoop data that was
overwritten, the police should be able to provide a copy of the original
data back to the individual or business at a trivial cost in comparison to
the costs of the forensic proceedures.  Apart from data stored in flash
memory, or similar less common places, there is no good reason why the
actual computer hardware would need to be confiscated, except in the most
exceptional circumstances where in-situ testing might need to be done with
the original equipment.  But in that case, the police should be required
to acquire hardware that duplicates the original, so that they cannot be
said to have tampered or damaged the originals.

For correctness, the original computer equipment should be used once for
the acquisition of a read-only copy of the data residing on it.

However, it seems that the police will pretend that they are more
incompetent than they actually are in order to use confiscation as
extra-judicial punishment -- and that is just the common case where there
are only legitimate legal proceedings at issue.

In some cases, the police (in canada) are apparently willing to go to
great lengths to destroy evidence and impose extra-judicial sanction on
the subject of an `investigation', which may not exist at all in a legal
sense, by way of employing clandestine tactics.  In terms of my
experience, the near total loss of my computers and other materials was
carried out over a period of about three years, in an incrimental fashion
that did not have even the pretense of legitimacy, but which nevertheless
accompanied a subtle PR campaign that sought to suggest that there was
some sort of hush-hush investigation that as a result of so-called
exceptional circumstances, necessitated the particular methods that I
observed.

Total bullshit, actually, but we know that SpookWorld is exempt from the
normal rules of civilised behaviour because of the special nature of its
denizens.

Anyhow, my assessment of the needs of computer forensic proceedures is
probably quite accurate.  The reality of conflicting and extra-legal
agendas at work in some cases (such as the Steve Jackson incident) has
apparently dictated a deliberately 'stupid' approach on the part of law
enforcement personnel when it suits them.


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From fw at deneb.enyo.de  Sat Dec 11 13:24:09 2004
From: fw at deneb.enyo.de (Florian Weimer)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 22:24:09 +0100
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <p0611047dbdde0d42e48f@[66.149.49.5]> (R. A. Hettinga's
  message 	of "Thu, 9 Dec 2004 09:14:41 -0500")
References: <p0611047dbdde0d42e48f@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <87zn0kttom.fsf@deneb.enyo.de>

* R. A. Hettinga quotes a news article:

>  There have been numerous media reports in recent years that terrorist
> groups, including al-Qaida, were using steganographic techniques.

As far as I know, these news stories can be tracked back to a
particular USA Today story.  There's also been a bunch of stories how
a covert channel in TCP could be used by terrorists to hide their
communication.

Unfortunately, when such stories are retold for the second time, the
"could be used" part tends to change to "is used". 8-(




From mixmaster at remailer.privacy.at  Sat Dec 11 14:50:34 2004
From: mixmaster at remailer.privacy.at (privacy.at Anonymous Remailer)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 23:50:34 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Steve Thompson
Message-ID: <7eca77d9555d7af395245e98c6c6ee0e@remailer.privacy.at>

Out of nowhere cometh Steve Thompson, and sayeth he all manner of things.  But, while his mouth moveth one way, he seemeth to move the other.

http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=%22steve+thompson%22&start=0&hl=en&safe=off&

What hath suddenly attracted our AUK creep?




From roberte at ripnet.com  Sun Dec 12 08:05:48 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 11:05:48 -0500
Subject: commitment trust
Message-ID: <41BC6C5C.3060209@ripnet.com>

from R. H Frank's "Passion within reason"

to gain trust we show our commitment by doing hard work.

In web's of trust, one way to add to new reputation would be to require 
each new node to perform an asymmetrically difficult task for more than 
one pre-existing node, on top of existing anti-faking provisions.

hash-cash buys a chance to earn trust, it functions as a hard to fake 
gesture of sincerity

--bob




From mv at cdc.gov  Sun Dec 12 14:08:41 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 14:08:41 -0800
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
Message-ID: <41BCC169.F39F6ABE@cdc.gov>

At 06:01 PM 12/11/04 +0000, Justin wrote:
>On 2004-12-11T06:48:41-0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>> Mixmaster is the most godawful complex thing to use, much less
>> administer, around.  Even Jack B Nymble is complex.  It needs a
simple
>> luser interface and something to piggyback servers on.
>
>Not necessarily.  Mixmaster is trivial to use with Mutt.
>
>1. Compile Mixmaster

You've already lost 90% of your possible hosts

>2. Put the binary in some directory somewhere.
>3. Configure Mutt with --with-mixmaster  (sadly not enabled by default)

>4. add the line 'set mixmaster="/location/to/bin/mixmaster"' to .muttrc

>5. mkdir ~user/Mix/
>6. Add a script to crontab that does:

You're obviously talking about some fringe unix-like OS...

>7. When sending email, at the summary page just before sending, hit
'M'.

And if you forget then your message is sent to the To: recipient.  Nice
easy-to-screw-up UI there :-(




From mv at cdc.gov  Sun Dec 12 14:17:46 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 14:17:46 -0800
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
Message-ID: <41BCC38A.10D69416@cdc.gov>

At 02:47 PM 12/9/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>Oh, general cluelessness doesn't suprise me. What suprises me is that
the
>writer of the original article seemed to believe that Stego was a new
>development.

The high-level pigs try to introduce this hysteria-generator
periodically.
The dumb typists eat what they're fed.

Eventually it reaches critical mass in Joe Sixpacks and Tipper Gore
comes out whining about the chiiildren.  This is the intent of the high
level pigs.

Psyops ain't just for the (overt) military you know...

--------
Stego rules for a safer tomorrow:
1. Always use original carrier image/sounds/whatever
2. Generally broadcasting (eg eBay) is best, recipients should
download lots of similar carriers
3. Keep S/N low so detection is problematic
4. Wardrive injection/download is best
5. Keep your tools on your flash drive not your HD




From mv at cdc.gov  Sun Dec 12 14:48:19 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 14:48:19 -0800
Subject: Gentlemen don't read each others' mail.. bush no gman
Message-ID: <41BCCAB3.D33FCD9@cdc.gov>

Anyone surprised that the US spooks are admitting to wiretapping
UN people?  If they really had info they'd state it but refuse to answer

how they got it.

Somehow I doubt that UN officials and the people they might
chat with will get the secure phones they need.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57928-2004Dec11.html?nav=rss_nation




From measl at mfn.org  Sun Dec 12 16:14:36 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 18:14:36 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <41BCC38A.10D69416@cdc.gov>
References: <41BCC38A.10D69416@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20041212181353.S62036@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sun, 12 Dec 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:

> Psyops ain't just for the (overt) military you know...


http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/newssentinel/news/editorial/10367781.htm

Truth be told, lies are part of Pentagon strategy

By JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY

Knight Ridder Newspapers

WASHINGTON - "The first casualty when war comes is truth." So said Sen.
Hiram Johnson, a California Republican, in the year 1917.

There is a struggle inside the Pentagon over where to draw the line in
conducting so-called information operations or propaganda in the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq and who will be involved. On one side are the
information warfare activists, led by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
and Assistant Secretary Douglas Feith. On the other are those who believe
that telling lies to the media is wrong and military public affairs
officers should never be involved in that.

The wrangling has been going on since soon after the 9/11 attacks in 2001
when a Pentagon war planner, speaking anonymously, told a Washington Post
reporter, "This is the most information-intensive war you can imagine.
We're going to lie about things."

Not long afterward the Pentagon opened its controversial Office of
Strategic Influence amid reports that its mission included planting false
news stories in the international media. A public outcry led to the hasty
shuttering of that office, but Rumsfeld served notice that while the
office may have been closed, its mission would be continued by other
entities.

The defense secretary told reporters on Nov. 18, 2002: "Fine, you want to
savage this thing, fine. I'll give you the corpse. There's the name. You
can have the name, but I'm going to keep doing every single thing that
needs to be done, and I have."

This week the Los Angeles Times reported that CNN had been targeted in an
information war operation three weeks before the start of the attack
against Fallujah. On Oct. 14 Marine 1st Lt. Lyle Gilbert, a public affairs
spokesman, went on camera to declare that "troops crossed the line of
departure" - that the Fallujah operation was under way.

It was not. The U.S. commanders obviously hoped that the false news
broadcast by CNN would trigger certain moves by the insurgents and foreign
terrorists holding the Sunni city - moves that then could be analyzed to
gain information on how they would defend Fallujah.

Marine sources in Iraq flatly deny that Lt. Gilbert's statement to CNN was
a deception operation or part of a larger psy-war operation. They say the
distinction between public affairs and information operations is very
clear and jealously guarded by the public affairs community.

Also this week the Washington Post brought new attention on the
friendly-fire killing of Army Ranger Pat Tillman, a former NFL football
star who gave up the spotlight to become a soldier. For days after the
death of Tillman, military commanders and spokesmen both in Afghanistan
and at Fort Bragg left out any mention of his having been killed by
American bullets as they spun the story of a hero killed in battle.

That incident brought to mind the false stories about the rescue and
heroism of Pvt. Jessica Lynch foisted on reporters during the opening days
of the attack into Iraq. The official picture painted initially was of a
young woman who fought to the last bullet before being wounded and
captured. The truth was that Pvt. Lynch was injured when the vehicle in
which she was riding crashed and she was knocked unconscious. She never
fired a shot.

An investigation of the Tillman death and the information given to the
media is presently under way, according to an Army spokesman. Defense
Department spokesman Larry DiRita says he has asked his staff for "more
information" on how the Oct. 14 Marine incident came to pass.

Critics point to one troubling recent development: the decision by
commanders in Iraq in mid-September to combine information operations,
psychological operations and public affairs into a single strategic
communications office run by an Air Force brigadier general who reports
directly to Gen. George Casey, the American commander.

Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote a
letter in late September warning American commanders of the problems of
lumping military public affairs in with information operations.

Myers warned that public affairs and information operations must remain
separate. But his warning seems to have fallen on deaf ears in Iraq
because civilian leaders in the Pentagon and the National Security Council
insisted on a blended effort of both public affairs and psy-ops to woo
Iraqi and Arab support for America's efforts in Iraq.

In the old days of the Cold War America's propaganda war was fought by the
U.S. Information Agency, which was strictly forbidden from distributing
any propaganda inside the United States. USIA was first gutted and then
folded into the State Department during the mid-1990s.

Everyone involved in this argument would do well to heed Gen. Myers'
warning against mixing the liars and the truth-tellers in one pot. That
distinction was blurred during the Vietnam War and the image the American
public carried away was of the Five O'Clock Follies, the daily official
news briefing in Saigon where lies and spin were dispensed along with the
facts.

Believe me, we do not want to go there again.

ABOUT THE WRITER

Joseph L. Galloway is the senior military correspondent for Knight Ridder
Newspapers and co-author of the national best-seller "We Were Soldiers
Once ... and Young." Readers may write to him at
jgalloway at krwashington.com




From jamesd at echeque.com  Sun Dec 12 19:45:09 2004
From: jamesd at echeque.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 19:45:09 -0800
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <011d01c4de6d$630ceed0$6401a8c0@JOSEPHAS>
Message-ID: <41BC9FC5.17287.176DEC8@localhost>

    --
On 9 Dec 2004 at 19:47, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
> In short, except for those few people who have some use for
> MixMaster, MixMaster was stillborn.

As one of those few people who have had some use for Mixmaster,
it does not seem stillborn to me. 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
     Ro+kP9M7vm+5D5reA+LsRnc0ZS0gmtCx5gMXfF1C
     4b44ZbduosEwPf20ABp+i55nWmvT0qNthPt1OryTC




From jamesd at echeque.com  Sun Dec 12 19:45:10 2004
From: jamesd at echeque.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 19:45:10 -0800
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <20041209160715.U40200@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <BAY24-F35DD13E5529163C8625A149BB70@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <41BC9FC6.9666.176E2F7@localhost>

    --
On 9 Dec 2004 at 16:15, J.A. Terranson wrote:
> (3) The other camp believes that stego is a lab-only toy, 
> unsuitable for much of anything besides scaring the shit out 
> of the people in the Satan camp.

I have used stego for practical purposes.  The great advantage
of stego is that it conceals your threat model. 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
     aV25L9tGoz00uU3bzcY+rbFDV5nX9BCkK67CRwcd
     4mBXnVakFBPiPRCdugeDolUdtnd8iueWgYFwR3Pch




From juicy at melontraffickers.com  Sun Dec 12 19:58:49 2004
From: juicy at melontraffickers.com (A.Melon)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 19:58:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Steve Thompson
Message-ID: <aca751bdb1dde9ce32390b5774f78833@melontraffickers.com>

Out of nowhere cometh Steve Thompson, and sayeth he all manner of things. 
But, while his mouth moveth one way, he seemeth to move the other.

http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=%22steve+thompson%22&start=0&hl=en&safe=off&

What hath suddenly attracted our AUK creep?




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Sun Dec 12 20:04:08 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 20:04:08 -0800
Subject: Gary Webb dies - reported on CIA Cocaine Connections
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20041212195944.03ae9ae8@pop.idiom.com>

http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/local/states/california/peninsula/10399522.htm
http://www.sacbee.com/state_wire/story/11745531p-12630606c.html (AP Storty)

Gary Webb, 49, former Mercury News reporter, author

INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALIST WROTE CONTROVERSIAL SERIES

By Jessica Portner

Mercury News

Gary Webb, a former Mercury News investigative reporter, author and 
legislative staffer who ignited a firestorm with his controversial stories, 
died Friday in an apparent suicide in his suburban Sacramento home. He was 49.

The Sacramento County coroner's office said that when A Better Moving 
Company arrived at Mr. Webb's Carmichael home at about 8:20 a.m. Friday, a 
worker discovered a note posted to the front door which read: ``Please do 
not enter. Call 911 and ask for an ambulance.''

Mr. Webb, an award-winning journalist, was found dead of a gunshot wound to 
the head, Sacramento County Deputy Coroner Bill Guillot said Saturday.

Mr. Webb's friends and colleagues described him as a devoted father and a 
funny, dogged reporter who was passionate about investigative journalism.

As a staff writer for the Mercury News from 1989 to 1997, he exposed 
freeway retrofitting problems in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake and wrote 
stories about the Department of Motor Vehicles' computer software fiascos.

Mr. Webb was perhaps best known for sparking a national controversy with a 
1996 story that contended supporters of a CIA-backed guerrilla army in 
Nicaragua helped trigger America's crack-cocaine epidemic in the 1980s. The 
``Dark Alliance'' series in the Mercury News came under fire by other news 
organizations, and the paper's own investigation concluded the series did 
not meet its standards.

Mr. Webb resigned a year and a half after the series appeared in the paper. 
He then published his book, ``Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras and the 
Crack Cocaine Explosion.''

In the past few years, Mr. Webb worked in the California Assembly Speaker's 
Office of Member Services and for the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. 
The committee investigated charges that Oracle received a no-bid contract 
from Gov. Gray Davis. After being laid off from his legislative post last 
year, Mr. Webb was hired by the Sacramento News and Review, a weekly 
publication.

Tom Dresslar, a spokesman for state Attorney General Bill Lockyer who has 
known Mr. Webb for more than a decade, was distraught Saturday when he 
heard that his friend may have taken his own life.

``He had a fierce commitment to justice, truth and cared a lot about people 
who are forgotten and society tries to shove into the dark corners,'' 
Dresslar said. ``It's a big loss for me personally and a great loss for the 
journalism community.''

Services for Mr. Webb are pending.


----
Bill Stewart  bill.stewart at pobox.com 




From jamesd at echeque.com  Sun Dec 12 20:05:28 2004
From: jamesd at echeque.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 20:05:28 -0800
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
In-Reply-To: <20041211082731.C47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <20041211141732.GA20964@positron.jfet.org>
Message-ID: <41BCA488.2321.18975C6@localhost>

    --
On 11 Dec 2004 at 8:29, J.A. Terranson wrote:
> Looking out of my fifth floor window I can connect to ~20
> 802.x nets *without* directional antennas or high powered
> cards.  With extra gear, I can hit almost 50, and in both
> cases, roughly a third are completely open, another third are
> trivially "protected", and the remaining third have done the
> best they can under the circumstances

This may explain the lack of wardriving.  Why bother to drive? 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
     GZxQHl5Ys94JIEGFGqHzFIw0CwTw+cJrG2kcpVuC
     4om0VpAEKeFBIkSSAJXTDq0ocurOXkmRwScqZa3fV




From jamesd at echeque.com  Sun Dec 12 20:05:30 2004
From: jamesd at echeque.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 20:05:30 -0800
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
In-Reply-To: <013501c4df46$ce9a73f0$6401a8c0@JOSEPHAS>
Message-ID: <41BCA48A.5783.1897ECF@localhost>

    --
On 10 Dec 2004 at 21:47, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
> Wardriving is also basically dead. Sure there are a handful 
> of people that do it, but the number is so small as to be 
> irrelevant.

I regularly use the internet through other people's unprotected 
wireless networks, simply for convenience while travelling, not 
for any stego or anonymity purpose.   So do lots of other 
people.  I only target places convenient to tourists and likely 
to be rich in unprotected networks.   Maybe your network is 
located someplace where it is not worth the trouble to find it.
Sometimes I go down the street and steal some bandwidth just
because I find it a change to work in the open air. 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
     hOnTAnMFC4mbjwvyxYfLSmvpUXtw2xutPOvdyU0k
     4Jx3r8szirxwjD/2L68Q0/BDk3jSlebytG9a9+2IQ




From iang at systemics.com  Sun Dec 12 17:32:49 2004
From: iang at systemics.com (Ian Grigg)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 20:32:49 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <20041211215246.GA62645@lightship.internal.homeport.org>
References: <p0611047dbdde0d42e48f@[66.149.49.5]>    
  <87zn0kttom.fsf@deneb.enyo.de>    
  <20041211215246.GA62645@lightship.internal.homeport.org>
Message-ID: <3372.82.70.142.134.1102901569.squirrel@82.70.142.134>

> It seems consistent that Al Qaeda prefers being 'fish in the sea' to
> standing out by use of crypto. Also, given the depth and breadth of
> conspiracies they believe in, it seems that they might see all us
> cryptographers as a massive deception technique to get them to use bad
> crypto. (And hey, they're almost right! We love that they use bad
> crypto.)

Right.  Although only based on very limited experiences,
where I've come across those in "interesting lines of
business", the strong impression I get is that they would
not touch any new or geeky tool that had some claimed
benefits that couldn't be proven on examination.

This was most forcefully put to me by a dealer of narcotics
in Amsterdam (I wasn't buying, just trying to be polite at
a party ;) who said that he and his like would not use any
of the payment systems that had supposed privacy built in,
as they assumed that the makers were lying about the privacy
provisions.  As far as 3 systems that the guy was aware of,
he was dead right twice, and for the third, I'd say he was
approximately right.

So, if this is a valid use case and we can extend from small
time narcotics payments to big time terrorism chitchat, we
could suggest that they will be using standard people tools,
and trying hard to stay unobservable in the mass of traffic.
In this sense, one could say they were using steganography,
but I think it is more useful to say they are simply staying
out of sight.

Either way, the public policy implication is to challenge
any specious claims of how we need to control XXX because
terrorists use it.  In the case of crypto, it would appear
they don't use much, and what's more, they shouldn't.

> And see the link there to Ian Grigg's
> http://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000246.html

I was hoping that the 'Terrorist Encyclopedia' had made its
way to somewhere like smoking gun or cryptome by now.

iang




From arma at mit.edu  Sun Dec 12 17:51:51 2004
From: arma at mit.edu (Roger Dingledine)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 20:51:51 -0500
Subject: Tor 0.0.9 is out
Message-ID: <mailman.1112.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Aside from the many bug fixes, 0.0.9 includes a win32 installer, better
circuit building algorithms, bandwidth accounting and hibernation,
more efficient directory fetching, and support for a separate Tor GUI
controller program (once somebody writes one for us).

tarball:   http://tor.freehaven.net/dist/tor-0.0.9.tar.gz
signature: http://tor.freehaven.net/dist/tor-0.0.9.tar.gz.asc
win32 exe: http://tor.freehaven.net/dist/tor-0.0.9-win32.exe
win32 sig: http://tor.freehaven.net/dist/tor-0.0.9-win32.exe.asc
(use -dPr tor-0_0_9 if you want to check out from cvs)

  o Bugfixes on 0.0.8.1 (Crashes and asserts):
    - Catch and ignore SIGXFSZ signals when log files exceed 2GB; our
      write() call will fail and we handle it there.
    - When we run out of disk space, or other log writing error, don't
      crash. Just stop logging to that log and continue.
    - Fix isspace() and friends so they still make Solaris happy
      but also so they don't trigger asserts on win32.
    - Fix assert failure on malformed socks4a requests.
    - Fix an assert bug where a hidden service provider would fail if
      the first hop of his rendezvous circuit was down.
    - Better handling of size_t vs int, so we're more robust on 64
      bit platforms.

  o Bugfixes on 0.0.8.1 (Win32):
    - Make windows sockets actually non-blocking (oops), and handle
      win32 socket errors better.
    - Fix parse_iso_time on platforms without strptime (eg win32).
    - win32: when being multithreaded, leave parent fdarray open.
    - Better handling of winsock includes on non-MSV win32 compilers.
    - Change our file IO stuff (especially wrt OpenSSL) so win32 is
      happier.
    - Make unit tests work on win32.

  o Bugfixes on 0.0.8.1 (Path selection and streams):
    - Calculate timeout for waiting for a connected cell from the time
      we sent the begin cell, not from the time the stream started. If
      it took a long time to establish the circuit, we would time out
      right after sending the begin cell.
    - Fix router_compare_addr_to_addr_policy: it was not treating a port
      of * as always matching, so we were picking reject *:* nodes as
      exit nodes too. Oops.
    - When read() failed on a stream, we would close it without sending
      back an end. So 'connection refused' would simply be ignored and
      the user would get no response.
    - Stop a sigpipe: when an 'end' cell races with eof from the app,
      we shouldn't hold-open-until-flush if the eof arrived first.
    - Let resolve conns retry/expire also, rather than sticking around
      forever.
    - Fix more dns related bugs: send back resolve_failed and end cells
      more reliably when the resolve fails, rather than closing the
      circuit and then trying to send the cell. Also attach dummy resolve
      connections to a circuit *before* calling dns_resolve(), to fix
      a bug where cached answers would never be sent in RESOLVED cells.

  o Bugfixes on 0.0.8.1 (Circuits):
    - Finally fix a bug that's been plaguing us for a year:
      With high load, circuit package window was reaching 0. Whenever
      we got a circuit-level sendme, we were reading a lot on each
      socket, but only writing out a bit. So we would eventually reach
      eof. This would be noticed and acted on even when there were still
      bytes sitting in the inbuf.
    - Use identity comparison, not nickname comparison, to choose which
      half of circuit-ID-space each side gets to use. This is needed
      because sometimes we think of a router as a nickname, and sometimes
      as a hex ID, and we can't predict what the other side will do.

  o Bugfixes on 0.0.8.1 (Other):
    - Fix a whole slew of memory leaks.
    - Disallow NDEBUG. We don't ever want anybody to turn off debug.
    - If we are using select, make sure we stay within FD_SETSIZE.
    - When poll() is interrupted, we shouldn't believe the revents values.
    - Add a FAST_SMARTLIST define to optionally inline smartlist_get
      and smartlist_len, which are two major profiling offenders.
    - If do_hup fails, actually notice.
    - Flush the log file descriptor after we print "Tor opening log file",
      so we don't see those messages days later.
    - Hidden service operators now correctly handle version 1 style
      INTRODUCE1 cells (nobody generates them still, so not a critical
      bug).
    - Handle more errnos from accept() without closing the listener.
      Some OpenBSD machines were closing their listeners because
      they ran out of file descriptors.
    - Some people had wrapped their tor client/server in a script
      that would restart it whenever it died. This did not play well
      with our "shut down if your version is obsolete" code. Now people
      don't fetch a new directory if their local cached version is
      recent enough.
    - Make our autogen.sh work on ksh as well as bash.
    - Better torrc example lines for dirbindaddress and orbindaddress.
    - Improved bounds checking on parsed ints (e.g. config options and
      the ones we find in directories.)
    - Stop using separate defaults for no-config-file and
      empty-config-file. Now you have to explicitly turn off SocksPort,
      if you don't want it open.
    - We were starting to daemonize before we opened our logs, so if
      there were any problems opening logs, we would complain to stderr,
      which wouldn't work, and then mysteriously exit.
    - If a verified OR connects to us before he's uploaded his descriptor,
      or we verify him and hup but he still has the original TLS
      connection, then conn->nickname is still set like he's unverified.

  o Code security improvements, inspired by Ilja:
    - tor_snprintf wrapper over snprintf with consistent (though not C99)
      overflow behavior.
    - Replace sprintf with tor_snprintf. (I think they were all safe, but
      hey.)
    - Replace strcpy/strncpy with strlcpy in more places.
    - Avoid strcat; use tor_snprintf or strlcat instead.

  o Features (circuits and streams):
    - New circuit building strategy: keep a list of ports that we've
      used in the past 6 hours, and always try to have 2 circuits open
      or on the way that will handle each such port. Seed us with port
      80 so web users won't complain that Tor is "slow to start up".
    - Make kill -USR1 dump more useful stats about circuits.
    - When warning about retrying or giving up, print the address, so
      the user knows which one it's talking about.
    - If you haven't used a clean circuit in an hour, throw it away,
      just to be on the safe side. (This means after 6 hours a totally
      unused Tor client will have no circuits open.)
    - Support "foo.nickname.exit" addresses, to let Alice request the
      address "foo" as viewed by exit node "nickname". Based on a patch
      from Geoff Goodell.
    - If your requested entry or exit node has advertised bandwidth 0,
      pick it anyway.
    - Be more greedy about filling up relay cells -- we try reading again
      once we've processed the stuff we read, in case enough has arrived
      to fill the last cell completely.
    - Refuse application socks connections to port 0.
    - Use only 0.0.9pre1 and later servers for resolve cells.

  o Features (bandwidth):
    - Hibernation: New config option "AccountingMax" lets you
      set how many bytes per month (in each direction) you want to
      allow your server to consume. Rather than spreading those
      bytes out evenly over the month, we instead hibernate for some
      of the month and pop up at a deterministic time, work until
      the bytes are consumed, then hibernate again. Config option
      "MonthlyAccountingStart" lets you specify which day of the month
      your billing cycle starts on.
    - Implement weekly/monthly/daily accounting: now you specify your
      hibernation properties by
      AccountingMax N bytes|KB|MB|GB|TB
      AccountingStart day|week|month [day] HH:MM
        Defaults to "month 1 0:00".
    - Let bandwidth and interval config options be specified as 5 bytes,
      kb, kilobytes, etc; and as seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks.

  o Features (directories):
    - New "router-status" line in directory, to better bind each verified
      nickname to its identity key.
    - Clients can ask dirservers for /dir.z to get a compressed version
      of the directory. Only works for servers running 0.0.9, of course.
    - Make clients cache directories and use them to seed their router
      lists at startup. This means clients have a datadir again.
    - Respond to content-encoding headers by trying to uncompress as
      appropriate.
    - Clients and servers now fetch running-routers; cache
      running-routers; compress running-routers; serve compressed
      running-routers.z
    - Make moria2 advertise a dirport of 80, so people behind firewalls
      will be able to get a directory.
    - Http proxy support
      - Dirservers translate requests for http://%s:%d/x to /x
      - You can specify "HttpProxy %s[:%d]" and all dir fetches will
        be routed through this host.
      - Clients ask for /tor/x rather than /x for new enough dirservers.
        This way we can one day coexist peacefully with apache.
      - Clients specify a "Host: %s%d" http header, to be compatible
        with more proxies, and so running squid on an exit node can work.
    - Protect dirservers from overzealous descriptor uploading -- wait
      10 seconds after directory gets dirty, before regenerating.

  o Features (packages and install):
    - Add NSI installer contributed by J Doe.
    - Apply NT service patch from Osamu Fujino. Still needs more work.
    - Commit VC6 and VC7 workspace/project files.
    - Commit a tor.spec for making RPM files, with help from jbash.
    - Add contrib/torctl.in contributed by Glenn Fink.
    - Make expand_filename handle ~ and ~username.
    - Use autoconf to enable largefile support where necessary. Use
      ftello where available, since ftell can fail at 2GB.
    - Ship src/win32/ in the tarball, so people can use it to build.
    - Make old win32 fall back to CWD if SHGetSpecialFolderLocation
      is broken.

  o Features (ui controller):
    - Control interface: a separate program can now talk to your
      client/server over a socket, and get/set config options, receive
      notifications of circuits and streams starting/finishing/dying,
      bandwidth used, etc. The next step is to get some GUIs working.
      Let us know if you want to help out. See doc/control-spec.txt .
    - Ship a contrib/tor-control.py as an example script to interact
      with the control port.
    - "tor --hash-password zzyxz" will output a salted password for
      use in authenticating to the control interface.
    - Implement the control-spec's SAVECONF command, to write your
      configuration to torrc.
    - Get cookie authentication for the controller closer to working.
    - When set_conf changes our server descriptor, upload a new copy.
      But don't upload it too often if there are frequent changes.

  o Features (config and command-line):
    - Deprecate unofficial config option abbreviations, and abbreviations
      not on the command line.
    - Configuration infrastructure support for warning on obsolete
      options.
    - Give a slightly more useful output for "tor -h".
    - Break DirFetchPostPeriod into:
      - DirFetchPeriod for fetching full directory,
      - StatusFetchPeriod for fetching running-routers,
      - DirPostPeriod for posting server descriptor,
      - RendPostPeriod for posting hidden service descriptors.
    - New log format in config:
      "Log minsev[-maxsev] stdout|stderr|syslog" or
      "Log minsev[-maxsev] file /var/foo"
    - DirPolicy config option, to let people reject incoming addresses
      from their dirserver.
    - "tor --list-fingerprint" will list your identity key fingerprint
      and then exit.
    - Make tor --version --version dump the cvs Id of every file.
    - New 'MyFamily nick1,...' config option for a server to
      specify other servers that shouldn't be used in the same circuit
      with it. Only believed if nick1 also specifies us.
    - New 'NodeFamily nick1,nick2,...' config option for a client to
      specify nodes that it doesn't want to use in the same circuit.
    - New 'Redirectexit pattern address:port' config option for a
      server to redirect exit connections, e.g. to a local squid.
    - Add "pass" target for RedirectExit, to make it easier to break
      out of a sequence of RedirectExit rules.
    - Make the dirservers file obsolete.
      - Include a dir-signing-key token in directories to tell the
        parsing entity which key is being used to sign.
      - Remove the built-in bulky default dirservers string.
      - New config option "Dirserver %s:%d [fingerprint]", which can be
        repeated as many times as needed. If no dirservers specified,
        default to moria1,moria2,tor26.
      - Make 'Routerfile' config option obsolete.
    - Discourage people from setting their dirfetchpostperiod more often
      than once per minute.

  o Features (other):
    - kill -USR2 now moves all logs to loglevel debug (kill -HUP to
      get back to normal.)
    - Accept *:706 (silc) in default exit policy.
    - Implement new versioning format for post 0.1.
    - Distinguish between TOR_TLS_CLOSE and TOR_TLS_ERROR, so we can
      log more informatively.
    - Check clock skew for verified servers, but allow unverified
      servers and clients to have any clock skew.
    - Make sure the hidden service descriptors are at a random offset
      from each other, to hinder linkability.
    - Clients now generate a TLS cert too, in preparation for having
      them act more like real nodes.
    - Add a pure-C tor-resolve implementation.
    - Use getrlimit and friends to ensure we can reach MaxConn (currently
      1024) file descriptors.
    - Raise the max dns workers from 50 to 100.

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec 12 18:43:32 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 21:43:32 -0500
Subject: Gary Webb, 49; Wrote Series Linking CIA, Drugs
Message-ID: <p06110468bde2ad974cd6@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.latimes.com/features/health/medicine/la-me-webb12dec12,1,7938237,print.story?coll=la-health-medicine>

The Los Angeles Times


OBITUARIES

Gary Webb, 49; Wrote Series Linking CIA, Drugs
 By Nita Lelyveld and Steve Hymon
 Times Staff Writers

 December 12, 2004

 Gary Webb, an investigative reporter who wrote a widely criticized series
linking the CIA to the explosion of crack cocaine in Los Angeles, was found
dead in his Sacramento-area home Friday. He apparently killed himself,
authorities said.

 Webb had suffered a gunshot wound to the head, according to the Sacramento
County coroner's office. He was 49.

 His 1996 San Jose Mercury News series contended that Nicaraguan drug
traffickers had sold tons of crack cocaine from Colombian cartels in Los
Angeles' black neighborhoods and then funneled millions in profits back to
the CIA-supported Nicaraguan Contras.

 Three months after the series was published, the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department said it conducted an exhaustive investigation but
found no evidence of a connection between the CIA and Southern California
drug traffickers.

 Major newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times, New York Times and
Washington Post, wrote reports discrediting elements of Webb's reporting.
The Los Angeles Times report looked into Webb's charges "that a CIA-related
drug ring sent 'millions' of dollars to the Contras; that it launched an
epidemic of cocaine use in South-Central Los Angeles and America's other
inner cities; and that the agency either approved the scheme or
deliberately turned a blind eye."

 "But the available evidence, based on an extensive review of court
documents and more than 100 interviews in San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Washington and Managua, fails to support any of those allegations," The
Times reported.

 Months later, the Mercury News also backed away from the series,
publishing an open letter to its readers, admitting to flaws.

 "We oversimplified the complex issue of how the crack epidemic in America
grew," wrote the paper's executive editor, Jerry Ceppos, adding, "I believe
that we fell short at every step of our process - in the writing, editing
and production of our work."

 The paper reassigned Webb to a suburban bureau. In December 1997, he quit.

 "All he ever wanted to do was write," said Webb's ex-wife, Susan Bell, who
met him when they were both high school students in Indiana. "He never
really recovered from it."

 Webb was born in Corona to a military family and moved around the country
throughout his youth. He dropped out of journalism school just shy of
graduating to accept his first newspaper job at the Kentucky Post, then
went to the Cleveland Plain Dealer and the Mercury News.

 Within two years of arriving at the paper, Webb was part of a team that
won the Pulitzer Prize in 1990 for coverage of the Loma Prieta earthquake.

 Webb continued to defend his reporting, most notably in a 548-page book,
"Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion,"
which was published in 1999.

 After leaving the Mercury News, Webb worked in state government, including
the Joint Legislative Audit Committee's investigation into then-Gov. Gray
Davis' controversial award of a $95-million, no-bid contract to Oracle in
2001.

 "The guy had a fierce commitment to justice and truth. He cared deeply
about the people who are forgotten, that we try to shove into the dark
recesses of our minds and world," said Tom Dresslar, a spokesman for the
California attorney general's office who worked with Webb on the Oracle
investigation.

 But Webb's career remained troubled. While working for another legislative
committee in Sacramento, Webb wrote a report accusing the California
Highway Patrol of unofficially condoning and even encouraging racial
profiling in its drug interdiction program.

 Legislative officials released the report in 1999 but cautioned that it
was based mainly on assumptions and anecdotes. Earlier this year, Webb was
one of a group of employees fired from the Assembly speaker's Office of
Member Services for failing to show up for work.

 Webb, who lived in Carmichael, continued to write occasionally for a
variety of publications. Last summer, the weekly Sacramento News & Review
hired Webb to cover government and politics. He had recently written two
cover stories, including one on how much money Sacramento County was making
off the use of red-light cameras.

 "He's obviously a skilled reporter and writer and he was doing good work
for us and the evidence was on the page," said News & Review Editor Tom
Walsh.

 Webb is survived by two sons, Ian and Eric; and a daughter, Chr
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Sun Dec 12 23:03:13 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 23:03:13 -0800
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
Message-ID: <41BD3EB1.EB95E43F@cdc.gov>

At 12:01 AM 12/13/04 -0600, J.A. Terranson wrote:
 Interestingly, I don't
>know of anyone who still actively wardrives at random (as opposed to
>against specific targets) for this same reason.

I've met some people this year who war-fly SoCal: a cessna, laptop, and
regular dipole
suffices, and a GPS helps with the mapping, but it was only for
curiosity's sake,
esp given the short time you're in a given net.




From measl at mfn.org  Sun Dec 12 21:12:34 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 23:12:34 -0600 (CST)
Subject: To the Computer, You're Still Beautiful
In-Reply-To: <p0611046ebde2d17bb671@[66.149.49.5]>
References: <p0611046ebde2d17bb671@[66.149.49.5]>
Message-ID: <20041212231103.N65310@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sun, 12 Dec 2004, R.A. Hettinga wrote:


> computer chip. In airports and at border crossings, a machine will read the
> chip to see if the information there matches the bearer's face. But the
> machine can be flummoxed by smiles, which introduce teeth, wrinkles, seams
> and other distortions.

<snip>

> In the end, some critics say, the joke may be on the government, because
> the face recognition system may deal poorly with aging, and a passport is
> good for 10 years.

On the other hand, this provides a "reason" for passports to be reduced to
5 years.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From fw at deneb.enyo.de  Sun Dec 12 14:52:11 2004
From: fw at deneb.enyo.de (Florian Weimer)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 23:52:11 +0100
Subject: Blinky Rides Again: RCMP suspect al-Qaida messages
In-Reply-To: <20041211215246.GA62645@lightship.internal.homeport.org>
  (Adam 	Shostack's message of "Sat, 11 Dec 2004 16:52:46 -0500")
References: <p0611047dbdde0d42e48f@[66.149.49.5]> 
  <87zn0kttom.fsf@deneb.enyo.de> 
  <20041211215246.GA62645@lightship.internal.homeport.org>
Message-ID: <87acsjdt9g.fsf@deneb.enyo.de>

* Adam Shostack:

> On Sat, Dec 11, 2004 at 10:24:09PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> | * R. A. Hettinga quotes a news article:
> |
> | >  There have been numerous media reports in recent years that terrorist
> | > groups, including al-Qaida, were using steganographic techniques.
> |
> | As far as I know, these news stories can be tracked back to a
> | particular USA Today story.  There's also been a bunch of stories how
> | a covert channel in TCP could be used by terrorists to hide their
> | communication.
>
> There's very good evidence that Al Qaida does *not* use strong crypto.

However, they use some form of crypto.  From a recent press release of
our attorney general:

| Als mitgliedschaftliche Betdtigung im Sinne der Strafvorschrift des '
| 129b StGB f|r die "Ansar al Islam" wird den Beschuldigten vor allem
| zur Last gelegt, einen Mordanschlag auf den irakischen
| Ministerprdsidenten wdhrend seines Staatsbesuches in Deutschland am
| 2. und 3. Dezember 2004 geplant zu haben. Dies ergibt sich aus dem
| Inhalt einer Vielzahl zwischen den Beschuldigten seit dem 28. November
| 2004 verschl|sselt gef|hrter Telefongesprdche

<http://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/news/index.php?Artikel=158&Thema=5&Start=0
>

(Very rough translation: "The persons are accused of being members of
"Ansar al Islam" and planning the assassination of the Iraqi prime
minister during his visit to Germany on the 2nd and 3rd December,
2004.  This follows from the contents of a multitude of encrypted
telephone calls the accussed exchanged since November 28, 2004.")

Probably, they just used code words, and no "real" cryptography.  I'm
trying to obtain a confirmation, though.




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec 12 20:57:05 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 23:57:05 -0500
Subject: To the Computer, You're Still Beautiful
Message-ID: <p0611046ebde2d17bb671@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/12/weekinreview/12bigp.html?oref=login&pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

December 12, 2004

To the Computer, You're Still Beautiful
 By MATTHEW L. WALD


UNATTRACTIVE passport photos, once merely traditional, may become
mandatory. The reason is that computers do not like smiles.

A United Nations agency that sets standards for passports wants all
countries to switch to a document that includes a "biometric feature," a
digital representation of the bearer's face recorded on an embedded
computer chip. In airports and at border crossings, a machine will read the
chip to see if the information there matches the bearer's face. But the
machine can be flummoxed by smiles, which introduce teeth, wrinkles, seams
and other distortions.

The State Department issued instructions that passport photos "should be
neutral (non-smiling) with both eyes open, and mouth closed." In a grudging
sop to the irrepressible, a "smile with closed jaw is allowed, but is not
preferred."

A State Department spokeswoman pointed to another page of the Web site
where "neutral" had been changed to "natural." But it, too, said that the
mouth should be closed. Canada and Britain have issued similar instructions.

In the end, some critics say, the joke may be on the government, because
the face recognition system may deal poorly with aging, and a passport is
good for 10 years.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From measl at mfn.org  Sun Dec 12 22:01:39 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 00:01:39 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
In-Reply-To: <41BCA488.2321.18975C6@localhost>
References: <20041211141732.GA20964@positron.jfet.org>
  <41BCA488.2321.18975C6@localhost>
Message-ID: <20041212235806.V65504@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sun, 12 Dec 2004, James A. Donald wrote:

> On 11 Dec 2004 at 8:29, J.A. Terranson wrote:
> > Looking out of my fifth floor window I can connect to ~20
> > 802.x nets *without* directional antennas or high powered
> > cards.  With extra gear, I can hit almost 50, and in both
> > cases, roughly a third are completely open, another third are
> > trivially "protected", and the remaining third have done the
> > best they can under the circumstances
>
> This may explain the lack of wardriving.  Why bother to drive?

Exactly.  I also run an open WiFi (labelled as "Open Wifi" :-) for others,
as a payment for those that I use around town.  Interestingly, I don't
know of anyone who still actively wardrives at random (as opposed to
against specific targets) for this same reason.  Why bother?  The only
thing you really *should* have is a high powered card with any reasonably
directional antenna (~$120.00usd as a set).  That and a laptop and you can
run any midsized office that doesn't need to provide services at a fixed
IP :-)

>     --digsig
>          James A. Donald


-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Sun Dec 12 21:24:36 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 00:24:36 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Insurrectionist covers
In-Reply-To: <20041211173757.GA30548@arion.soze.net>
Message-ID: <20041213052436.35431.qmail@web51808.mail.yahoo.com>

 --- Justin Guyett <justin at soze.net> wrote: 
> On 2004-12-11T08:10:27-0500, Steve Thompson wrote:
> > [snip]
> > This is what happens when one picks up ideas from people who present
> them
> > second-hand (or at even greater distances from their origin) and who
> do
> > not make proper footnotes.
> 
> That's just a symptom of the problem that there's no clear line past
> which ideas must be cited.  How infrequently do you have to see an idea
> in print, and how novel must it be, before a citation is appropriate?

Depends, I suppose, on a number of factors.

> Ideas are a continuum.  Plagiarism is an artificial notion constructed
> as a result of the need to measure individuals' progress in higher
> education, as well as to protect intellectual property (which didn't
> really exist before the invention of the printing press).  People used
> to have scribes copy books.  They were treated as tomes of knowledge,
> not as property.  Now that they are property, people have more books
> than ever before, and are reading them less carefully than ever before.

Well, previously there was more importance put towards knowledge, and less
on making money with same.  Today the emphasis is somewhat different.

> Even Dawkins and Hobbes picked up ideas and used them without explicit
> citation.  Hobbes didn't arrive at his conception of the State of Nature
> in a void.  He got those ideas in reaction against Greek history,
> Descartes, and several other people.

Everybody does that, or at least those who create knowledge either as a
process of study and synthesis, or as a result of original research.  Some
ideas are prevalent to the extent that it is obvious as to their origin. 
Ideally, someone who presents an idea as his or her own will take some
pains to indicate the fact, and will distinguish their sources by way of
appropriate references.
 
> Which brings up an interesting thought relating to entropy.  Does it
> matter whether a prior author breaks up a subject into N pieces, proving
> N-1 pieces unworkable but leaving the "last" unaddressed?  Someone who

Now you're talking about SLAC.

> takes those ideas and writes a defense of the "last" piece might be
> copying the prior author's ideas, even though they were not written
> anywhere.  Intellectual property and ideas are often traceable directly,
> but sometimes they are not.  Requiring citations for ideas often results
> in incorrect citations or citations to secondary or tertiary (or worse)
> sources.

Theft of IP is a complicated endeavour these days.
 
> Hijacking that thought a bit, lack of citations is one of my pet peeves.

Me too.

> Nobody makes proper footnotes or citations these days; it's particularly
> noticeable in quote collections.  There are fake quotes from the
> founders floating around, as well as fake quotes from Marcus Aurelius
> ("Times are bad; children no longer obey their parents, and everyone is
> writing a book.") as well as from all sorts of other historical figures.
 
Opinion:  It seems there is a new trend towards guild-like protection of
scientific and scientific-like diciplines.  People who like the idea of
guilds are working towards making participation contingent upon
membership.

Membership may eventually only be granted to individuals who submit to
arbitrary rules.  And note that I am not referring to ethical restrictions
in this instance.  Ethics -- good ones that dicate a minimum of racism and
like discrimination, for instance -- are becoming somehwat rare.


Regards,

Steve


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From eugen at leitl.org  Mon Dec 13 00:05:25 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 09:05:25 +0100
Subject: Tor 0.0.9 is out (fwd from arma@mit.edu)
Message-ID: <20041213080525.GM9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 13 06:09:10 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 09:09:10 -0500
Subject: Cyphermint Partners With PayStar to Provide Prepaid Visa Debit 
  Services to Worldwide Communications Group
Message-ID: <p06110470bde352cf06a1@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.cyphermint.com/news/2004_12_08_paystar.html>

Cyphermint, Inc. - News: NOW Card

PayStar

Cyphermint Partners With PayStar to Provide Prepaid Visa Debit Services to
Worldwide Communications Group

December 8, 2004, Marlborough, Massachusetts - Cyphermint, Inc., a leading
provider of secure electronic payment solutions, announced today that it
will partner with PayStar Corporation, a provider of stored value debit
cards, banking debit card load centers and kiosks. This strategic alliance
of Cyphermint and PayStar will supply Worldwide Communications Group,
Inc.'s (WWCG) underserved low income Government Section 8 housing
recipients with Cyphermint's PayCash Now
 Visa. Debit Card.

The PayCash Now Visa Debit Card, issued by BankFirst, will serve as the
vehicle to deliver the nationwide ATM debit card services for the program
called the Community Technology Network Project (CTNP). WWCG developed the
"CTNP" stored value card program and is the administrator of the project.
PayStar will offer the ATM debit card program to approximately 16 million
existing SEC8 families.

The CTNP Project provides a convenient venue for participants to access the
Internet and several substantial discounted medical programs for
underserved families. The CTNP ATM Card will provide the participants who
may not qualify for credit or checking accounts, a flexible and secure
cashless payment option. Additionally, recipients of the program will be
able to render payment for rent, utilities and pay for discounted program
benefits without the use of a major credit card, a checking account or
actual cash.

The CTNP Card Program will generate a significant number of new PayCash
users and may potentially equate to 200,000 or more new PayCash customers
for Cyphermint in 2005.

"PayStar now participates with the CTNP project through PayStar's GLOBAL
Cash division", said William D. Yotty, Chairman and CEO, PayStar
Corporation, "we are pleased to have Cyphermint join us in fulfilling this
very useful program".

"Cyphermint is pleased to help emerging and underserved consumers gain
financial independence through the use of our PayCash prepaid Visa card",
stated Joe Barboza, President and CEO of Cyphermint, "we are pleased to
participate in this opportunity and are excited to be a part of the CTNP
Project with PayStar".

About PayStar
 PayStar Corporation (www.paystar.com) provides its distributors and
clients with a suite of prepaid, stored value products, national bank load
center locations and Kiosk marketing and management. PayStar's GLOBALCash,
Inc. (www.globalcash.us) distributes prepaid ATM debit and stored value
cards that can be used just like regular credit cards. Prepaid ATM debit
cards can be used everywhere major credit cards are accepted (stores,
restaurants, theaters) and online. PayStar is a partner in a prepaid ATM
debit card program for a national government project that will enable
millions of underserved and subsidized housing individual's access to
prepaid ATM debit cards. PayStar's corporate and distributor sales, as well
as mergers and acquisitions, will continue to drive growth.

About Cyphermint
 Headquartered in Marlborough, Mass., Cyphermint is a provider of Global
Electronic Cash Payment and e-commerce infrastructure/integration
solutions. Our core technology, PayCash
 is used in three major areas: (1)
Internet Cash Payment Systems, for B2C e-commerce via the Cyphermint
PayCash System, (2) Kiosk Solutions - delivering Web-enabled self-service
B2C merchandising systems, and (3) The PayCash Now
 Visa. Debit Prepaid
Card. Cyphermint's Kiosk Integration Division provides solutions to online
retailers enabling full integration with kiosk networks and also sets up
existing kiosk networks with eCommerce capabilities. Cyphermint's core
technology, the PayCash System provides businesses complete turnkey
solutions.

For more information about the PayCash Now Visa Debit or other PayCash
products, please contact Kenneth Stempler, VP of Sales, Cyphermint at
508-787-4811 or by email at sales at cyphermint.com. Learn more about
Cyphermint at www.cyphermint.com.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 13 06:54:58 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 09:54:58 -0500
Subject: [osint] Missing uniforms revive 9/11 fears in Canada
Message-ID: <p06110472bde35db79516@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 13 06:55:18 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 09:55:18 -0500
Subject: [osint]  Militants and the Latest Mobile Phone Technology
Message-ID: <p06110473bde35dcd9a2d@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text



From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 13 07:01:07 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 10:01:07 -0500
Subject: [osint] Armed Jews Week
Message-ID: <p06110479bde35f0ce515@[66.149.49.5]>

--- begin forwarded text


To: "Bruce Tefft" <btefft at community-research.com>
Thread-Index: AcTf1qSOh7x08m1TSIC4MNZclyU3mgADr4Rg
From: "Bruce Tefft" <btefft at community-research.com>
Mailing-List: list osint at yahoogroups.com; contact osint-owner at yahoogroups.com
Delivered-To: mailing list osint at yahoogroups.com
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 21:19:58 -0500
Subject: [osint] Armed Jews Week
Reply-To: osint at yahoogroups.com




http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6662217/

Armed Jews Week

Guest blogging for Glenn this week is Dave Kopel, Research Director at the
Independence Institute, and co-author of several articles with Glenn.


. December 10, 2004 | 11:51 AM ET

Tonight is the fourth night of Armed Jews Week, or as it is more popularly
known, Hanukkah.  Hanukkah is an eight-day celebration of the Jewish
revolution against Syria in the second century B.C.  The Syrian government
(a remnant of Alexander the Great's empire) attempted to wipe out the Jewish
religion by forcing the Jews to conform to Greek culture.  Some of them
refused, and a tiny militia, led by Judah the Maccabee ("the hammer") began
a guerilla war.

The Jewish militia grew in force, and repeatedly destroyed much larger
Syrian armies which were sent to smash the revolution.  Syria's King
Antiochus decided that the Jewish people were so much trouble that he would
just get rid of them entirely-slaughtering as many as necessary, and selling
all the rest into slavery.  But his wicked plans failed, and after years of
war, the Jews won their independence.

During the years of Syrian tyranny, Syrian officers enjoyed the droit du
seigneur-the authority to deflower virgin Jewish brides on their wedding
nights, before they could join their husbands.  So some stories which Jewish
families retell at Hanukkah, such as the Book of Judith,extol brave Jewish
women who went to the tent of enemy officers who were expecting sex-but who
instead met their deaths as the hands of lone Jewish women.

During centuries of oppression in Christian and Moslem lands, many Jews
adopted attitudes of passivity and helplessness.  Those attitudes began to
change in the late nineteenth century, with the growth of the Zionist
movement.

Zionists believed that Jews had become disconnected from the physical world.
That the Jews had no homeland was the most extreme manifestation of the
disconnection, but the disconnect could be seen on many levels.  Often pale
and weak, Jewish boys were easy targets for bullies.  Usually passive and
timid, Jewish communities were easy targets for mobs.  The root cause of
Jewish physical weakness and of disrespect by gentiles was the Jewish lack
of self-respect.

The Zionists set out to restore a Jewish homeland, and they recognized that
such a project would require a widespread change in Jewish consciousness.

So in counties such as Russia and Israel (which was ruled as colony by the
Ottoman Empire and then by the British), Zionists organized Jewish
self-defense groups.  Many of the young Jewish men and women who would lead
the resistance to Hitler were members of these Zionist self-defense youth
groups in the 1930s in Eastern Europe.

Although there is a widespread myth that Jews in the Holocaust were passive,
they were actually more active than any other conquered people.  In 1942-43,
Jews constituted half of all the partisans in Poland.  Overall, about thirty
thousand Jewish partisans fought in Eastern Europe.  There were armed
revolts in over forty different ghettos, mostly in Eastern Poland.

In other parts of Europe, Jews likewise joined the resistance at much higher
rates than the rest of the population.  Unlike in Eastern Europe, though,
Jews were generally able to participate as individuals in the national
resistance, rather than having to fight in separate units.

For example, in France, Jews amounted to than one percent of French
population, but comprised about 15-20 percent of the French Resistance.

In Greece too, Jews were disproportionately involved in the resistance.  In
Thessaly, a Jewish partisan unit in the mountains was led by the
septuagenarian Rabbi Moshe Pesah, who carried his own rifle.  The Athenian
Jew Jacques Costis led the team which demolished the Gorgopotamos Bridge,
thereby breaking the link between the mainland and Peloponnesian Peninsula,
and interfering with the delivery of supplies to Rommel's Afrika Korps.

One of the great centers of resistance was Vilna, Lithuania, which before
the Nazi conquest had been an outstanding center of Jewish learning,
compared by some to Jerusalem.

Plans for resistance began in January 1942.  The Jews' only weapons were
smuggled in from nearby German arms factories where the Jews performed slave
labor.  Hopeful of liberation by the Russian army, many of the Vilna Jews
did not support the partisans.  Partisan resistance postponed by three weeks
the German plans to transport all the inhabitants of the Vilna ghetto to
death camps, but the deportation of 40,000 Jews was accomplished by the end
of September 1943.

A young poet named Abba Kovner led the resistance movement known as the
Avengers in the woods around Vilna.  His lieutenants, and bedmates, were
teenage girls, Vitka Kempner and Ruzka Korczak.

The Avengers were the first partisans in Nazi Europe to blow up a German
train.

Towards the end of the war, the Avengers shepherded huge numbers of Jews to
Palestine, in violation of the British blockade.

Before the war, Ruzka had belonged to left-wing Zionist youth group called
"The Young Guard" (HaShomer HaTza'ir) which trained Jews in self-defense,
and taught the older boys how to shoot.  Abba was not religious, but he was
a fervent Zionist, loving to read the Bible stories of Jewish warriors, and
aiming to emulate the Jewish Bible heroes.

In the Vilna Ghetto, it was Abba Kovner who first saw that the tightening of
the Nazi oppression was not just a temporary imposition by a local German
official; it was a step towards the total destruction of the Jews.  The only
way out, he argued, was "Revolt and armed defense.  This is the only way
which promises any dignity for our people."

Other Jews countered that revolt was hopeless because the Germans were so
strong, and that collective reprisals by the Germans would just lead to more
Jewish deaths.  Ruzka Korczak retorted that the stories of Jewish heroism
could not remain only "a part of our ancient history. They must be part of
our real life as well."  The next generation of Jews must have something to
admire.  "How good will they be if their entire history is one of slaughter
and extermination?  We cannot allow that.  It must also have heroic
struggles, self-defense, war, even death with honor."

Vilna was typical, in that the young people were usually the ones who wanted
to fight, and the elders usually counseled against causing trouble.  Most of
the partisan leaders and fighters were young.

Niuta Teitelbaum was a beautiful 24-year-old Jewish Polish woman who looked
like she was sixteen.  Known as "Little Wanda with the Braids," she was an
expert smuggler of people and weapons, and instructed women's partisan
cells.  Her units blew up trains, artillery emplacements, and other German
targets.

Once, wearing traditional Polish clothing and a kerchief on her hair, she
talked her way past a series of Gestapo guards, whispering that she was
going to see the SS commander on "private business."  Alone with the
commander in his office, she drew a revolver, shot him dead, and calmly left
the building.

Because generation after generation after generation of Jewish families told
their children the heroic Hanukkah stories of Judah the Macabbee and Judith,
the spirit of freedom and resistance lived in modern heroes such as Abba
Kovner and Niuta Teitelbaum.

At the annual Passover Seder, Jewish families say:

In every generation, each person must look upon himself or herself as if he
or she personally had come out of Egypt.  As the Book of Exodus says, "You
shall tell your children on that day: it is because of what the Eternal One
did for me when I went forth from Egypt."  For it was not our fathers and
mothers alone whom the Holy One redeemed.  We too were redeemed along with
them.

The point has a broader application than just for Jews at Passover.
Hanukkah teaches that God's redemption of the Jewish people is a continuing
act of history-and so does Jewish armed resistance during the Holocaust.
The resistance proved to the world that Jews were active fighters, and not
mere passive victims.  That resistance (most famously, in the Warsaw Ghetto)
was an indispensable step towards the rebirth of the modern state of Israel.

The Books of Maccabees and the Book of Judith are part of the Roman
Catholic, Episcopalian, and Orthodox Bibles; the stories of resistance to
the Nazis are part of the heritage of freedom-loving people everywhere.  So
as Jewish families light Menorah candles during the eight days of Hanukkah,
may people of good will, of all faiths, use the time as an occasion to teach
their children about the inspiring Jewish and Gentile men and women who,
even in the darkest times, have kept alive the sacred light of freedom.







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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From sunder at sunder.net  Mon Dec 13 10:04:11 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (Sunder)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 13:04:11 -0500 (est)
Subject: Acoustic Keyboard Eavesdropping
Message-ID: <Pine.BSO.4.58.0412131302550.18681@silkworth.sunder.net>

Not new news, but interesting anyway.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/12/magazine/12ACOUSTIC.html
(bugmenot's your uncle)

Acoustic Keyboard Eavesdropping
By STEPHEN MIHM

Published: December 12, 2004

When it comes to computer security, do you have faith in firewalls? Think 
passwords will protect you? Not so fast: it is now possible to eavesdrop 
on a typist's keystrokes and, by exploiting minute variations in the 
sounds made by different keys, distinguish and decipher what is being 
typed. 

<SNIP>

This means that firewalls and passwords will amount to nothing if someone 
manages to bug a room and record the cacophony of keystrokes. Asonov 
managed to pull off this feat with readily available recording equipment 
at a short distance. Even as far away as 50 feet, and with significant 
background noise, he was able to replicate his success using a parabolic 
microphone. He also anticipated an obvious practical objection: how does a 
would-be eavesdropper get into a building and spend enough time to 
''train'' a computer program to recognize the keystrokes of a particular 
keyboard? Not a problem: it seems that keyboards of the same make and 
model sound sufficiently alike -- regardless of who is typing -- that a 
computer trained on one keyboard can be unleashed on another.

<SNIP>



----------------------Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos---------------------------
 + ^ + :"Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we.  /|\
  \|/  :They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country /\|/\
<--*-->:and our people, and neither do we." -G. W. Bush, 2004.08.05 \/|\/
  /|\  :                                                             \|/
 + v + :    War is Peace, freedom is slavery, Bush is President.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 13 11:52:16 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 14:52:16 -0500
Subject: Toshiba shows practical quantum cryptography
Message-ID: <p06110422bde3a2696fdd@[66.149.49.5]>

<http://www.zdnet.co.uk/print/?TYPE=story&AT=39181033-39020357t-10000013c>

Toshiba shows practical quantum cryptography
Rupert Goodwins
ZDNet UK
December 13, 2004, 18:15 GMT

Toshiba Research Europe demonstrated last week what it claims is the
world's first reliable automated quantum cryptography system and run it
continuously for over a week.

 The system, which relies on single photons to transmit an untappable key
over standard optical fibres, is capable of delivering thousands of keys a
second and can be effective over distances of more than 100km.

 Although no price or launch date has been set yet, Toshiba is already in
talks with a number of telcos and end users in preparation for
commercialisation of the technology -- which offers the possibility of
significantly more secure networking.

 "We're talking to a number of potential end users at the minute," Dr
Andrew Shields, group leader of Toshiba's Cambridge-based Quantum
Information Group told ZDNet UK. "We're planning to do some trials in the
City of London next year, and are targeting users in the financial sector.
We've also had some interest from telcos, including MCI with whom we've
been running the installed fibre tests."

 The system works by transmitting a long stream of photons modulated to
represent ones and zeros, most of which are lost along the way. These
photons can be modulated in one of two ways through two different kinds of
polarisation, but according to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle it is
impossible to know both the kind of polarisation and the data represented
by the photon. The receiver has to assume one to get the other, which it
will frequently get wrong.

 The receiver picks up and attempts to decode a few out of those that make
it, and reports back to the sender which ones it received and decoded thus
making up a key that both ends know. Any interceptor can't know what the
value of those photons is, because by reading them in transit it will
destroy them, and it can't replace them after reading them because it can
never know their exact details.

 Although Toshiba has been developing special hardware to create and
analyse single photon transactions by quantum dots -- effectively
artificial atoms integrated with control circuitry -- the current
cryptographic equipment uses standard parts, including Peltier-effect
cooled detectors operating at very low noise levels. The next generation of
equipment is expected to use this new technology.

 Toshiba is also looking at ways to increase the range of the systems
beyond the limitations of a single fibre -- because a photon can't be
intercepted and retransmitted, it's not possible for the technology to
incorporate repeaters to overcome the losses in multiple segments. However,
says Shields, there is a possibility that repeaters may be created using
quantum teleportation -- a new and still experimental effect where the
quantum state of a particle can be transmitted across distances without it
needing to be fully measured.

 Toshiba Research Europe Ltd is part of the European SECOQC project, which
is working towards the development of a global network for secure
communication using quantum technology.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From measl at mfn.org  Mon Dec 13 20:07:50 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2004 22:07:50 -0600 (CST)
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <d05f879065aec73edef9cb9b57e82dd5@dizum.com>
References: <d05f879065aec73edef9cb9b57e82dd5@dizum.com>
Message-ID: <20041213220524.U71871@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Tue, 14 Dec 2004, Nomen Nescio wrote:

> On Fri, 10 Dec 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:
> > Take away complexity, and Mix *could* flourish - in spite of the fedz.
>
> What about mixminion? Setting up a node is about five minutes of work on
> a somewhat current Linux system.

I began to implement a mixminion system just before it's release, and got
sidetracked by paying work :-/  From what little time I spent on the
prerelease, it was already a big improvement in installation, although to
be honest, I never got a chance to look closely enough at it to have
comfort as to any protocol changes (I believe there were some?).  I still
have that mixm box sitting in the rack, waiting for me to get off my lazy
ass and play with it: I will try and make that a priority during january.


-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From nobody at dizum.com  Mon Dec 13 18:50:11 2004
From: nobody at dizum.com (Nomen Nescio)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 03:50:11 +0100 (CET)
Subject: punkly current events
In-Reply-To: <20041210131659.K47159@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <d05f879065aec73edef9cb9b57e82dd5@dizum.com>

-----BEGIN TYPE III ANONYMOUS MESSAGE-----
Message-type: plaintext

On Fri, 10 Dec 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:
> Take away complexity, and Mix *could* flourish - in spite of the fedz.

What about mixminion? Setting up a node is about five minutes of work on
a somewhat current Linux system.

-----END TYPE III ANONYMOUS MESSAGE-----




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Tue Dec 14 07:12:51 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 10:12:51 -0500
Subject: Steve Thompson
In-Reply-To: <20041213052436.35431.qmail@web51808.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F30066F4CA5B98724C92B2A9BAC0@phx.gbl>

Something occurred to me...it probably occurred to others already but I am a 
stoopid Cypherpunk, don't forget.

Anyone think it a TINY bit odd that someone with a fairly mundane complaint 
about bad  computer gear would know to come in on an anonymous remailer?

My first thought was that they had gotten burned by a Steve Thompson (maybe 
the same, maybe not) did a google search and came across Cypherpunks and 
then tossed in a couple of stinky posts.

But it seems a little farfetched to me that such a person would also have 
bothered (by accident) reading about the anonymous remailers and then use 
one.

So...the complainer must have already been aware of remailers and Mr 
Thompson's contribution to Cypherpunks.

Kind of interesting.

-TD




From roberte at ripnet.com  Tue Dec 14 07:32:32 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 10:32:32 -0500
Subject: Steve Thompson
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F30066F4CA5B98724C92B2A9BAC0@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F30066F4CA5B98724C92B2A9BAC0@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <41BF0790.3060202@ripnet.com>

Tyler Durden wrote:

>
> Something occurred to me...it probably occurred to others already but 
> I am a stoopid Cypherpunk, don't forget.
>
> Anyone think it a TINY bit odd that someone with a fairly mundane 
> complaint about bad  computer gear would know to come in on an 
> anonymous remailer?
>
> My first thought was that they had gotten burned by a Steve Thompson 
> (maybe the same, maybe not) did a google search and came across 
> Cypherpunks and then tossed in a couple of stinky posts.
>
> But it seems a little farfetched to me that such a person would also 
> have bothered (by accident) reading about the anonymous remailers and 
> then use one.
>
> So...the complainer must have already been aware of remailers and Mr 
> Thompson's contribution to Cypherpunks.
>
> Kind of interesting.
>
> -TD

Somebody has been experimenting  with reputation cracking

--bob




From sunder at sunder.net  Tue Dec 14 09:31:15 2004
From: sunder at sunder.net (Sunder)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 12:31:15 -0500 (est)
Subject: Gait advances in emerging biometrics
Message-ID: <Pine.BSO.4.58.0412141229280.30666@silkworth.sunder.net>

Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/14/alt_biometrics/
Gait advances in emerging biometrics

By John Leyden (john.leyden at theregister.co.uk)
Published Tuesday 14th December 2004 15:07 GMT

"Great Juno comes; I know her by her gait."
William Shakespeare, The Tempest

Retinal scans, finger printing or facial recognition get most of the 
publicity but researchers across the world are quietly labouring away at 
alternative types of biometrics.

Recognition by the way someone walk (their gait), the shape of their ears, 
the rhythm they make when they tap and the involuntary response of ears to 
sounds all have the potential to raise the stock of biometric techniques. 
According to Professor Mark Nixon, of the Image Speech and Recognition 
Research Group at the University of Southampton, each has unique 
advantages which makes them worth exploring.

<SNIP>

----------------------Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos---------------------------
 + ^ + :"Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we.  /|\
  \|/  :They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country /\|/\
<--*-->:and our people, and neither do we." -G. W. Bush, 2004.08.05 \/|\/
  /|\  :                                                             \|/
 + v + :    War is Peace, freedom is slavery, Bush is President.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------




From jrandom at i2p.net  Tue Dec 14 12:58:08 2004
From: jrandom at i2p.net (jrandom)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 12:58:08 -0800
Subject: [i2p] weekly status notes [dec 14]
Message-ID: <mailman.1113.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Hi y'all, time for the weekly status notes

* Index
1) Net status
2) mail.i2p
3) roadmap
4) i2pcontent
5) i2p-bt
6) ???

* 1) Net status

The 0.4.2.3 release included a whole slew of fixes and the net
handled things pretty well.  Over time we ran into a few long
standing peer selection and overload problems on duck's irc server
though, but after some patches that seems to have recovered nicely.

There are a few key modifications that have been made since 0.4.2.3
that we'll be rolling out into a 0.4.2.4 release fairly soon:
= bandwidth-based tunnel throttling
= reenabling (with some tweaks) the probabalistic dropping of
  messages under heavy congestion
= various profiling and ranking fixes
= some time sync related updates.

That last one is worth a bit more discussion, as it relates to
something we've been seeing over the last day or two.  For some
reason, we have had a small portion of the network somehow get their
clocks skewed by 5 minutes.  We've recently improved the safe and
automatic healing of the time synchronization, and there's also
some new code to proactively kick out peers whose clocks skew after
the connection is established.  These are only partial solutions
though - in the long run, we need secure NTP synchronization (or at
least synchronization within our 60s margin of error).  Before you
say it, let me just reiterate that I'd love to get rid of the clock
synchronization issue, and if you can come up with a way to do so
securely, we'll do so.

In any case, with the various fixes in place I do expect we'll have
a new 0.4.2.4 release in the next day or three, so keep your ears to
the ground.

* 2) mail.i2p

I've been hearing some whispering of some neat features coming from
mail.i2p lately, and postman has some things he wants to discuss -
swing on by the meeting and see what's up!

* 3) roadmap

No Dorothy, we aren't going to have the 1.0 release this month.

I've updated http://www.i2p.net/roadmap with both revised content
and a more conservative schedule.  The old 0.4.3 release is being
placed as 0.5 and 0.4.4 is being placed as 0.6, since they're both
pretty hefty updates.  You'll also note one of 0.6's new items -
"Basic content distribution infrastructure".  Thats...

* 4) I2PContent

Frosk has been posting [1] up some really cool ideas for a content
distribution network on top of I2P, merging the old MyI2P with the
original P2P network, the only one that can push terrabytes of data
around without batting an eye and has a 20+ year track record -
Usenet.  Frosk's work on this is looking pretty exciting, so check
out the posts on his blog and get in touch with him if you want to
help!

[1] http://frosk.i2p/

* 5) i2p-bt

As announced [2] last week, duck & gang have claimed the swarming
file transfer bounty [3] with their port [4] of the original
BitTorrent to I2P!  See the announcement for more details.

[2] http://dev.i2p.net/pipermail/i2p/2004-December/000517.html
[3] http://www.i2p.net/bounties
[4] http://duck.i2p/i2p-bt/

* 6) ???

I'm sure there are thing that I'm overlooking and there's much left
unsaid, so swing on by the meeting tonight and discuss things
further.

=jr
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_______________________________________________
i2p mailing list
i2p at i2p.net
http://i2p.dnsalias.net/mailman/listinfo/i2p

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From roberte at ripnet.com  Tue Dec 14 10:51:30 2004
From: roberte at ripnet.com (R.W. (Bob) Erickson)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 13:51:30 -0500
Subject: Gait advances in emerging biometrics
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSO.4.58.0412141229280.30666@silkworth.sunder.net>
References: <Pine.BSO.4.58.0412141229280.30666@silkworth.sunder.net>
Message-ID: <41BF3632.8080501@ripnet.com>

Sunder wrote:

>Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/14/alt_biometrics/
>Gait advances in emerging biometrics
>  
>
Timing  is everything.
The coherence of timing patterns
is a proxy for identity

Measure their timing and you can glimpse their mind
Mess with their timing and you can disrupt their intentions
Mask your own timing and you can stay outside their track

--bob




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Tue Dec 14 17:43:26 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 20:43:26 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Steve Thompson
In-Reply-To: <41BF0790.3060202@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <20041215014326.63888.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>

Alright.  Time for a little 'fun'.

 --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote: 
> Tyler Durden wrote:
> 
> >
> > Something occurred to me...it probably occurred to others already but 
> > I am a stoopid Cypherpunk, don't forget.

I like the nomenclature of AI: it makes for an interesting tool in the
analysis of day-to-day interpersonal relations.  Here, for instance, I am
in the habit of making a mental note of the above as a frame axiom, one
which is intended to influence the state of the fluents that might be said
to accompany this message, or which are intended to be assumed by it.

So, Mr. Erickson here wishes to assert and emphasise that he is a "stupid
cypherpunk", a proposition that may or may not conflict with extant
fluents held by readers of Cypherpunks.  Or, put another way, it might
conflict (or be designed to conflict) with frame axioms that Mr. Erickson
knows or suspects to be held by his audience.  Without knowing the
internal mental state of Cypherpunks' subscription base, and without
knowing the frame within which Mr. Erickson is operatiing (either his
'global' frame, or the 'local' frame of convenience that he may have
adopted), it is nearly impossible to infer what he or she is intending by
writing a statement like "I am a stoopid Cypherpunk" when its banality
might suggest to some that it is blatantly insincere.

There's really nowhere to take this digression, what with the limited
information that is available in context, and so we can only speculate as
to what relation Mr. Erickson's possible stoopidity has to the topic at
hand, which is (if we are to take the message at face value), that he is
concerned with a complaint about a bad eBay sale, which is the
responsibility of someone using the name "Steve Thompson", and which was
made to Cypherpunks (a known spook-haven[1]), via an anonymous message
that appears to have been sent through a cypherpunks remailer.

> > Anyone think it a TINY bit odd that someone with a fairly mundane 
> > complaint about bad  computer gear would know to come in on an 
> > anonymous remailer?

Yes, it is quite odd.

> > My first thought was that they had gotten burned by a Steve Thompson 
> > (maybe the same, maybe not) did a google search and came across 
> > Cypherpunks and then tossed in a couple of stinky posts.

That condition may satisfy the principle of least hypothesis, which has
much to recommend it, but is it really the likely scenario?

> > But it seems a little farfetched to me that such a person would also 
> > have bothered (by accident) reading about the anonymous remailers and 
> > then use one.

Without a detailed psychological workup on the person who sent the
message, the question is largely indeterminate.  Perhaps the person making
the complaint was coincidentally familiar with anonymous remailers prior
to their interaction with eBay.

> > So...the complainer must have already been aware of remailers and Mr 
> > Thompson's contribution to Cypherpunks.

I am not sure whether that conclusion is supported by the data available
at this time.

> > Kind of interesting.

To someone who is genuinely 'stoopid', perhaps.

> > -TD
> 
> Somebody has been experimenting  with reputation cracking

Did you just happen to notice?

I have informally noted a number of messages in which the authors purport
to present information that seeks to damage or modify another's
reputation, using a variety of subtle language- and psychology-oriented
special effects.  Whether one puts stock in the veracity of each instance
is probably a matter of personal preference; expediency and convenience in
such a busy environment dictates that for practical reasons one simply
cannot chase down every half-assed assertion merely to verify its
accuracy.

In the print and televised media, the flood of information shovelled at
the reader (or watcher) is such that distortions, omissions, and outright
falsehoods are expected to lodge in the public mind as they accompany a
wealth of otherwise useful information that is of some accuracy.  The
repetition of like falsehoods is carried out over time with the
expectation that it will be reinforced.

A favoirite example of mine is to be found in one of the two local
entertainment weeklies.  Recently it was asserted that `reincarnation is
the new black' in reference to the intended memetic propogation of the
associated frame axioms, and their intended effect on the readers' fluents
vulnerable to modification by the memes in question.  My tentative
analysis of the PR intent prompted me to stop reading the weekly in
question as I have no interest in wasting my time with such unimportant
drivel.  In my case, I feel there are much better things to spend time on
-- as interesting as watching the PR spin might be as viewed from a
cultural-anthropological perspective.


Regards,

Steve
 


[1] Choate, et al.


______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From jya at pipeline.com  Tue Dec 14 21:01:25 2004
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 21:01:25 -0800
Subject: Steve Thompson
In-Reply-To: <20041215014326.63888.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>
References: <41BF0790.3060202@ripnet.com>
Message-ID: <E1CeOYL-0004Xh-00@tisch.mail.mindspring.net>

One of the earliest lessons learned on cypherpunks is to
post pseudonymously in several disguises, saving one
nym for really trustworthy comments. The credibility of
that No. 1 nym is slowly built by attacking it yourself and
either mounting impressive defenses, bribing others to
defend it, making a fool of yourself when you get your
nyms confused and use the wrong grammar and syntax
and forwardings and remailings and backtrackings and
oops sorry I sent that private mail to the list, and 
coca-cola noseblowing, and indignant unsubbing,
resubbing to send nastygrams to those who pilloried
and ridiculed you while you covertly lurked to see if
anybody gave a damn about your worthless existence
and superficial, apish ideas.

Getting soundly trashed is an honor among net trash
haulers, so pay your dues and shit on yourself from
multitudes of personas, it's what the founders did and
do.

Nobody leaves cypherpunks, nobody gets in. You claim
an identity you a lying ignorant sumbitch addicted to
dingleberries.

None of this applies to real people out there, lost in
impersonation.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Tue Dec 14 18:11:02 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 21:11:02 -0500
Subject: Steve Thompson
In-Reply-To: <20041215014326.63888.qmail@web51804.mail.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F210C231072ABC67231B3B89BAD0@phx.gbl>

No, it was I who laid claim to stoopidity. However, as for...

>My tentative
>analysis of the PR intent prompted me to stop reading the weekly in
>question as I have no interest in wasting my time with such unimportant
>drivel.  In my case, I feel there are much better things to spend time on
>-- as interesting as watching the PR spin might be as viewed from a
>cultural-anthropological perspective.

When the intent of the PR is obviously banal (eg, sell movie tickets) then I 
agree that analysis is a waste of time. When there's a suspicious pattern of 
misinformation, the (ultimate) intent of which is unknown, than analysis 
equals consciously understanding that something shifty is afoot. Otherwise, 
one's opinions about the slandered change every so slightly, no matter how 
much we may dismiss such slander on the verbal/conscious level.

I consider it no coincidence too that we had that recent little 
Jew-hater-baiting post from the same remailer. Someone is poking Cypherpunks 
for the fun of it, or as part of their job description.

Remember, tiny impulses at a system's natural frequencies (ie, eigenvalues) 
will eventually cause that system to dis-integrate.

Then again, as none of you are hot chicks I won't necessarily binge-purge if 
Cypherpunks collapses in a fit of Twilight Zone-ish infighting.

-TD


>From: Steve Thompson <steve49152 at yahoo.ca>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: Steve Thompson
>Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 20:43:26 -0500 (EST)
>
>Alright.  Time for a little 'fun'.
>
>  --- "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com> wrote:
> > Tyler Durden wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > Something occurred to me...it probably occurred to others already but
> > > I am a stoopid Cypherpunk, don't forget.
>
>I like the nomenclature of AI: it makes for an interesting tool in the
>analysis of day-to-day interpersonal relations.  Here, for instance, I am
>in the habit of making a mental note of the above as a frame axiom, one
>which is intended to influence the state of the fluents that might be said
>to accompany this message, or which are intended to be assumed by it.
>
>So, Mr. Erickson here wishes to assert and emphasise that he is a "stupid
>cypherpunk", a proposition that may or may not conflict with extant
>fluents held by readers of Cypherpunks.  Or, put another way, it might
>conflict (or be designed to conflict) with frame axioms that Mr. Erickson
>knows or suspects to be held by his audience.  Without knowing the
>internal mental state of Cypherpunks' subscription base, and without
>knowing the frame within which Mr. Erickson is operatiing (either his
>'global' frame, or the 'local' frame of convenience that he may have
>adopted), it is nearly impossible to infer what he or she is intending by
>writing a statement like "I am a stoopid Cypherpunk" when its banality
>might suggest to some that it is blatantly insincere.
>
>There's really nowhere to take this digression, what with the limited
>information that is available in context, and so we can only speculate as
>to what relation Mr. Erickson's possible stoopidity has to the topic at
>hand, which is (if we are to take the message at face value), that he is
>concerned with a complaint about a bad eBay sale, which is the
>responsibility of someone using the name "Steve Thompson", and which was
>made to Cypherpunks (a known spook-haven[1]), via an anonymous message
>that appears to have been sent through a cypherpunks remailer.
>
> > > Anyone think it a TINY bit odd that someone with a fairly mundane
> > > complaint about bad  computer gear would know to come in on an
> > > anonymous remailer?
>
>Yes, it is quite odd.
>
> > > My first thought was that they had gotten burned by a Steve Thompson
> > > (maybe the same, maybe not) did a google search and came across
> > > Cypherpunks and then tossed in a couple of stinky posts.
>
>That condition may satisfy the principle of least hypothesis, which has
>much to recommend it, but is it really the likely scenario?
>
> > > But it seems a little farfetched to me that such a person would also
> > > have bothered (by accident) reading about the anonymous remailers and
> > > then use one.
>
>Without a detailed psychological workup on the person who sent the
>message, the question is largely indeterminate.  Perhaps the person making
>the complaint was coincidentally familiar with anonymous remailers prior
>to their interaction with eBay.
>
> > > So...the complainer must have already been aware of remailers and Mr
> > > Thompson's contribution to Cypherpunks.
>
>I am not sure whether that conclusion is supported by the data available
>at this time.
>
> > > Kind of interesting.
>
>To someone who is genuinely 'stoopid', perhaps.
>
> > > -TD
> >
> > Somebody has been experimenting  with reputation cracking
>
>Did you just happen to notice?
>
>I have informally noted a number of messages in which the authors purport
>to present information that seeks to damage or modify another's
>reputation, using a variety of subtle language- and psychology-oriented
>special effects.  Whether one puts stock in the veracity of each instance
>is probably a matter of personal preference; expediency and convenience in
>such a busy environment dictates that for practical reasons one simply
>cannot chase down every half-assed assertion merely to verify its
>accuracy.
>
>In the print and televised media, the flood of information shovelled at
>the reader (or watcher) is such that distortions, omissions, and outright
>falsehoods are expected to lodge in the public mind as they accompany a
>wealth of otherwise useful information that is of some accuracy.  The
>repetition of like falsehoods is carried out over time with the
>expectation that it will be reinforced.
>
>A favoirite example of mine is to be found in one of the two local
>entertainment weeklies.  Recently it was asserted that `reincarnation is
>the new black' in reference to the intended memetic propogation of the
>associated frame axioms, and their intended effect on the readers' fluents
>vulnerable to modification by the memes in question.  My tentative
>analysis of the PR intent prompted me to stop reading the weekly in
>question as I have no interest in wasting my time with such unimportant
>drivel.  In my case, I feel there are much better things to spend time on
>-- as interesting as watching the PR spin might be as viewed from a
>cultural-anthropological perspective.
>
>
>Regards,
>
>Steve
>
>
>
>[1] Choate, et al.
>
>
>______________________________________________________________________
>Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 14 19:09:01 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 22:09:01 -0500
Subject: Hollywood fights illegal downloads by targeting servers
Message-ID: <p0611040bbde55b25bd41@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.reuters.co.uk/printerFriendlyPopup.jhtml?type=entertainmentNews&storyID=638186>

 
Reuters News Article


Hollywood fights illegal downloads by targeting servers
 Tue Dec 14, 2004 08:29 AM ET

 By Jesse Hiestand

 LOS ANGELES (Hollywood Reporter) - Hollywood's major studios intend to
escalate their battle against illegal movie downloading by targeting the
popular BitTorrent network and those who operate its servers, the movie
industry's lobbying arm is set to announce.

 The civil suits against server operators marks the next step in the Motion
Picture Assn. of America's (MPAA) anti-piracy campaign, which started last
month with lawsuits against individuals who shared movies on peer-to-peer
services.

 In addition to civil lawsuits filed in the United States, a news
conference at the MPAA's offices in Washington on Tuesday also will detail
how international law enforcement has aided these anti-piracy efforts.
Further details of the event were not available.

 MPAA president and CEO Dan Glickman is set to make the announcement along
with Travis Kalanick, CEO of Red Swoosh, which develops private P2P
networks, and Mark Ishikawa, CEO of BayTSP, which offers file-branding and
-tracking applications.

 BitTorrent can rapidly transfer large files among many people, leading to
interest among legitimate users who recognize the technology's efficiency
and speed.

 While it is among the fastest-growing P2P networks, BitTorrent is
different from its predecessors in several respects. Unlike other networks,
where users can search for a file, BitTorrent users must go to a Web site
to get a "torrent file" and connect to a server to find other users who
have the file. The network relies on these "tracker" servers to manage
users' downloads by knowing who has the file and connecting users for
uploading and downloading.

 Because downloaders swap portions of a file with one another, the
file-trading functions like a collective swarm rather than a series of
individual connections to a single server.

 Sources say the MPAA is not necessarily going after BitTorrent's
developer, Bram Cohen, only the server operators.

 The major motion picture studios filed their first round of civil lawsuits
in mid-November, initially targeting about 200 people who allegedly made
movies available on P2P services. The record industry, through the RIAA,
pioneered this practice and has now filed about 7,000 civil cases, most of
which have been settled for a few thousand dollars.

 The MPAA estimates that the studios lose about $3.5 billion annually to
physical piracy like bootlegged DVDs but does not have a ready figure for
Internet-related losses.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec 14 13:49:27 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 22:49:27 +0100
Subject: [i2p] weekly status notes [dec 14] (fwd from jrandom@i2p.net)
Message-ID: <20041214214927.GP9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from jrandom <jrandom at i2p.net> -----


From tkaitchuck at comcast.net  Tue Dec 14 23:51:24 2004
From: tkaitchuck at comcast.net (Tom Kaitchuck)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 01:51:24 -0600
Subject: [i2p] Threat model
Message-ID: <mailman.1114.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

I found the following in a text file lying arround on my harddrive. I vaguely
remember writing planning to get it added to the threat model page on
i2p.net, it's a little out of date and probably needs some corrections, but
at this point it would probably be safer, to let someone else do that, as I
have put it off this long :)

Anyway:

Listening ISP

If your ISP decides to listen in to all your internet traffic the most they
could determine is that you are running the I2P software. They cannot tell
what sort of data you are transferring, because all traffic over I2P is
encrypted and is padded. Because I2P also tunnels it's traffic before it
reaches it's final destination they cannot determine who you are transferring
data to. Finally they cannot even tell IF you are even doing any transferring
because your router will be routing other people's traffic even if you are
not at your computer at the time.

Listening Peers

I2P does not assume any other person on the network is trustworthy. Not even
the person you are talking with. It defends your identity as follows:
Suppose you have a destination you want to connect to.
First your router sends a message to another node on the network encrypted
with it's public key.
That message tells it to connect to a third node.
You then send a message encrypted with the third nodes public key to it
THROUGH the second node.
That node is then instructed to connect to the ultimate destination.
This way, you can talk to whom ever is at the ultimate destination, and they
don't know who you are, just what you say.
The node that is connected to the end destination, is not directly connected
you so they don't know who you are. Nor do they know what you are saying (it
is encrypted).
The node that is connected to you does not know what you are saying or who you
are talking to.
So, nobody knows both the sender and the receiver and only they know what is
being said.
If the person that you are communicating with is also using I2P, they will
take the same steps on their end to protect their own identity. So, if BOTH
of the nodes you select for your tunnel are malicious then they could only
determine that "you are saying something to someone".
However this can be extended to an arbitrary number of nodes! If you need to
be more careful about your identity, you can use more than two nodes, or if
you don't particularly need anonymity for a particular application, you could
use less. This also means that even if all intermediate nodes selected by
both sides are compromised, together they still cannot prove that you and the
person you were in fact talking to the person you were talking to, let alone
what was said!

Man in the Middle

A common attack to many secure systems is called the Man in the Middle attack.
Basically someone pretends to be the person that you are trying to connect
to, and then relays what you say to that person pretending to be you. This
attack does not work against I2P. This is because in I2P you don't know the
actual IP of the person you are connecting to. You only know their public
key. You can use this key to lookup the IP of the node that you can contact
them through in the network database. Because this message is signed it
cannot be forged. This means an attacker would have no way to fool you into
connecting to them. Also even if a third party intercepted the traffic,
because you know their public key from the start, they would have no way of
being able to decrypt any of what was sent.

Social Engineering

Social Engineering consists of someone contacting you and lying to you in
order to convince you to tell them some important piece of information. I2P
cannot protect you if you want to give out some information no more than your
phone can prevent you from giving your bank account number to people who are
trying to steal your money. The important thing to remember is that, under NO
circumstances will you ever need to give out ANY information over I2P. Do not
ever tell anyone your real name, physical address, internet address, or any
technical information about your computer that you don't know the
significance of. If you wouldn't give out that information in real life to a
total stranger then don't give it out to one over I2P, no matter how
trustworthy they sound. If you are having trouble with I2P always go the the
websight: www.i2p.net and read the FAQs and Documentation there. There is
also a mailing list and an IRC chat you can go to if you are having problems.

Exploits in other software

It is not possible for the I2P developers to fix bugs in other programs on
your computer, however the software does the best it can to prevent these
from being used to reveal your identity on the network. First when you are
browsing I2P through your web brouser it is setup to use a proxy which
connects to the software on your local machine. This prevents anyone from
putting a link or Java applit on an I2P sight that connects to the internet
directly. So if after you have enabled the proxy and you attempt to go to a
sight that is on the World Wide Web you will simply get a error message. If
you still want to be able to brouse the WWW and be anonymous follow the
instruction for setting up your browser to use an outbound proxy over I2P
(squid.i2p). This way your normal web traffic will be routed through the I2P
network to ensure your anonymity.

The other thing I2P can do is filter HTML so that certain features cannot be
used. However this does not make it impossible for a web page to compromise
your identity. The reason for this is that Images and binary files cannot be
filtered based on their content. So it is possible for a virus to come in
through your webbrouser by viewing a malformed image if your webbrouser has a
bug that makes it vulnerable in this way. The safest thing to do is to make
sure that you are using the latest version of your webbrouser and keep it up
to date. Internet Explorer is also not recommended if you are concerned about
viruses. You can get an open source web brouser from www.mozilla.org.

One other thing I2p does is directly assign what is called MIME information to
some files. This makes it much harder for someone to make a file of one type,
which your brouser would open believing to be safe, and then discover it is
another. This means that some types of files won't open or launch directly
from your webbrouser, instead you have to save them to you harddisk before
opening them. It is also important to remember that you should not run
programs from untrusted sources. So do not run any program you downloaded
from I2P unless you can verify that it's checksum is the same as the version
distributed by the person/organization that produces that program. If there
is some fix for I2P or client software for I2P it will be announced with
instructions and md5 or sha1 ckecksums for all files on www.i2p.net. To find
the checksum of a file: on Unix/BSD/Linux/MacOSX run `md5sum filename` or
`sha1 filename`. On windows you can download a tool to do this from
http://www.md5summer.org/ or http://www.jonelo.de/java/jacksum or
http://axcrypt.sourceforge.net/.

If you really want to be sure your computer is safe you could make it such
that all your traffic goes through I2P. This way even when your computer runs
programs that connect to the normal internet you are still safe. This
functionality will be added at some point.
_______________________________________________
i2p mailing list
i2p at i2p.net
http://i2p.dnsalias.net/mailman/listinfo/i2p

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From isn at c4i.org  Wed Dec 15 00:27:10 2004
From: isn at c4i.org (InfoSec News)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 02:27:10 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [ISN] Done the crime, now it's Mitnick's time
Message-ID: <mailman.1115.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

http://www.theage.com.au/news/Next/Done-the-crime-now-its-Mitnicks-time/2004/12/13/1102786984190.html

By Patrick Gray
December 14, 2004
Next

After a five-month delay, the Department of Immigration has granted
the world's most notorious convicted cyber-criminal, Kevin Mitnick, a
visa to travel to Australia next year to consult to local companies,
accept speaking engagements and promote his new book, scheduled for
release in March.

It will be Mitnick's first visit to Australia and one of his few trips
outside the US and Europe.

Mitnick spent more than five years in jail for his exploits, which
included hacking into Motorola, Novell, Fujitsu, Sun Microsystems and
Nokia to steal software code. Since his release in 2000, he has worked
as a security consultant and written two books, The Art of Deception
[1] and The Art of Intrusion [2].

Mitnick will fly to Melbourne on March 2 to deliver a keynote speech
to an as yet unnamed company. He will fly back to the US the following
week to start a book tour, returning to Australia in April to conduct
a workshop.

Mitnick is best known for his uncanny ability to trick employees into
revealing sensitive information, a technique called "social
engineering".

He cites the theft of two customs computers from Sydney International
Airport by three men in August last year as one example of a social
engineering attack in Australia.

"A lot of companies in Australia are vulnerable," Mitnick says. "That
was a pure social engineering attack. We all know they weren't after
the hardware, they were after the data."

Both of Mitnick's books are about security but many people will be
more eager to read the one he plans to start writing on January 21,
2007, when a court order that stops him from profiting from his crimes
expires.

"I'm definitely doing an autobiography," he says. "It's going to focus
on the adventure, the things I did when I was a fugitive, how I lived
my life and what was going through my head, the close calls nobody
knows about. It will be the Catch Me If You Can of cyberspace."

Catch Me If You Can [3] was an autobiography written in 1980 by Frank
Abagnale jnr, a con man who passed himself off as a Pan Am pilot while
forging $US2.5 million in fake cheques.

There have been books written about Mitnick's exploits, most famously
Takedown, written by New York Times journalist John Markoff and
Tsutomo Shimomura, one of Mitnick's victims, which was made into a
movie.

But Mitnick says the real story hasn't been told. He has been
portrayed as the "Osama bin-Mitnick of the internet", he says, and he
wants to set the record straight. Mitnick launched a legal action
against the producers of the Takedown movie, which was settled out of
court.

Although Mitnick spent two years on the run from the FBI in the US
living under assumed names, he doesn't expect law enforcement to take
much interest in his travels these days.

"The only time they call me is when they need my help," Mitnick says.
"They don't contact me because they're suspicious I'm doing anything
wrong."

Mitnick has just finished a vulnerability assessment of a US credit
union. Much of his work involves technical testing and doesn't rely on
his mastery of social engineering.

"I'm doing vulnerability penetration tests, I'm going into companies
and hardening their systems and network," he says. "It's all
technical, no social engineering."

A penetration test is work well suited to Mitnick's talents. Similar
to the fictional hackers in the 1992 movie, Sneakers, for a fee, he
breaks into companies' networks, submitting a report detailing
security weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Before his release, Mitnick had never been out of the US, with the
exception of Canada and Mexico.

As much as he enjoys seeing the world, Mitnick confesses he is afraid
of flying.

"I hate to fly, man, I hate it. I have to get some sleeping pills to
knock me out."


[1] http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/076454280X/c4iorg
[2] http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0764569597/c4iorg
[3] http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0767905385/c4iorg



_________________________________________
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From anonymous at remailer.metacolo.com  Tue Dec 14 18:55:27 2004
From: anonymous at remailer.metacolo.com (Anonymous Sender)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 02:55:27 +0000 (UTC)
Subject: Police given computer spy powers
Message-ID: <b58e15063cb1f33e2cb987bcd7d31480@remailer.metacolo.com>

Police given computer spy powers
http://smh.com.au/news/National/Police-given-computer-spy-powers/2004/12/12/1102786954590.html
("smhguy/pass" to access)

By Rob O'Neill
December 13, 2004
Federal and state police now have the power to use computer spyware to gather evidence in a broad range of investigations after legal changes last week.

The Surveillance Devices Act allows police to obtain a warrant to use software surveillance technologies, including systems that track and log keystrokes on a computer keyboard. The law applies to the Australian Federal Police and to state police investigating Commonwealth offences.

Critics have called the law rushed and imbalanced, saying police will be able to secretly install software to monitor email, online chats, word processor and spreadsheets entries and even bank personal identification numbers and passwords.

Irene Graham, executive director of watchdog Electronic Frontiers Australia, said the law went too far in allowing police surveillance.

"The legislation has been passed without the proper scrutiny and the ALP is too afraid to stick to their guns and oppose it," she said.

Ms Graham also believed the act could override parts of the Telecommunications Interception Act, which tightly regulated telecommunications monitoring.
AdvertisementAdvertisement

A spokesperson for the federal Attorney-General, Philip Ruddock, denied this, saying the act specifically said it should not be read to override the Telecommunications Interception Act.

The spokesperson said there were protections in the legislation, including reporting to Parliament and allowing reviews by the Ombudsman.

In addition to redefining the kinds of surveillance devices that can be used, the Surveillance Devices Act allows surveillance for offences far less serious than those allowed under the Telecommunications Interception Act. Warrants to intercept telecommunications can only be obtained to investigate offences carrying a maximum jail term of seven years or more. However, Surveillance Devices Act warrants can be obtained for offences carrying a maximum sentence of three years.

Ms Graham said the three-year benchmark was too low and the act went too far in setting out circumstances in which police could use surveillance devices.

A warrant could be obtained under the act if an officer had reasonable grounds to suspect an offence had been or might be committed and a surveillance device was necessary to obtain evidence. They can also be obtained in child recovery cases.

The act also has secrecy provisions making it an offence to publish information on an application for, or the existence of, a surveillance warrant.

The Government said the act would consolidate and modernise the law. Mr Ruddock said the power of Commonwealth law enforcement using surveillance devices lagged behind what technology made possible and what was permitted in other jurisdictions.

However, Electronic Frontiers is concerned that key-logging software can even record words written and then deleted or changed and thoughts that are not intended for communication.




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 15 05:21:04 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 08:21:04 -0500
Subject: Israeli Airport Security Questioning Re: CRYPTO-GRAM, December 
  15, 2004
In-Reply-To: <4.2.2.20041214234057.00ab35a8@127.0.0.1>
References: <4.2.2.20041214234057.00ab35a8@127.0.0.1>
Message-ID: <p06110419bde5e890e361@[68.167.57.91]>

At 11:41 PM -0600 12/14/04, Bruce Schneier wrote:
>     Security Notes from All Over:  Israeli
>       Airport Security Questioning
>
>
>http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/12/security_notes.html
>
>In both "Secrets and Lies" and "Beyond Fear," I discuss a key
>difference between attackers and defenders: the ability to concentrate
>resources.  The defender must defend against all possible attacks,
>while the attacker can concentrate his forces on one particular avenue
>of attack.  This precept is fundamental to a lot of security, and can
>be seen very clearly in counterterrorism.  A country is in the position
>of the interior; it must defend itself against all possible terrorist
>attacks: airplane terrorism, chemical bombs, threats at the ports,
>threats through the mails, lone lunatics with automatic weapons,
>assassinations, etc, etc, etc.  The terrorist just needs to find one
>weak spot in the defenses, and exploit that.  This concentration versus
>diffusion of resources is one reason why the defender's job is so much
>harder than the attackers.
>
>This same principle guides security questioning at the Ben Gurion
>Airport in Israel.  In this example, the attacker is the security
>screener and the defender is the terrorist.  (It's important to
>remember that "attacker" and "defender" are not moral labels, but
>tactical ones.  Sometimes the defenders are the good guys and the
>attackers are the bad guys.  In this case, the bad guy is trying to
>defend his cover story against the good guy who is attacking it.)
>
>Security is impressively tight at the airport, and includes a
>potentially lengthy interview by a trained security screener.  The
>screener asks each passenger questions, trying to determine if he's a
>security risk.  But instead of asking different questions -- where do
>you live, what do you do for a living, where were you born -- the
>screener asks questions that follow a storyline:  "Where are you
>going?  Who do you know there?  How did you meet him?  What were you
>doing there?"  And so on.
>
>See the ability to concentrate resources?  The defender -- the
>terrorist trying to sneak aboard the airplane -- needs a cover story
>sufficiently broad to be able to respond to any line of
>questioning.  So he might memorize the answers to several hundred
>questions.  The attacker -- the security screener -- could ask
>questions scattershot, but instead concentrates his questioning along
>one particular line.  The theory is that eventually the defender will
>reach the end of his memorized story, and that the attacker will then
>notice the subtle changes in the defender as he starts to make up answers.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 15 05:21:33 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 08:21:33 -0500
Subject: Safe Personal Computing (was Re: CRYPTO-GRAM, December 15,
  2004)
In-Reply-To: <4.2.2.20041214234057.00ab35a8@127.0.0.1>
References: <4.2.2.20041214234057.00ab35a8@127.0.0.1>
Message-ID: <p0611041abde5ea7153f3@[68.167.57.91]>

At 11:41 PM -0600 12/14/04, Bruce Schneier wrote:
>             Safe Personal Computing
>
>
><http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/12/safe_personal_c.html>
>
>I am regularly asked what average Internet users can do to ensure their
>security.  My first answer is usually, "Nothing--you're screwed."
>
>But that's not true, and the reality is more complicated.  You're
>screwed if you do nothing to protect yourself, but there are many
>things you can do to increase your security on the Internet.
>
>Two years ago, I published a list of PC security recommendations.  The
>idea was to give home users concrete actions they could take to improve
>security.  This is an update of that list: a dozen things you can do to
>improve your security.
>
>General:  Turn off the computer when you're not using it, especially if
>you have an "always on" Internet connection.
>
>Laptop security:  Keep your laptop with you at all times when not at
>home; treat it as you would a wallet or purse.  Regularly purge
>unneeded data files from your laptop.  The same goes for PDAs.  People
>tend to store more personal data--including passwords and PINs--on PDAs
>than they do on laptops.
>
>Backups:  Back up regularly.  Back up to disk, tape or CD-ROM.  There's
>a lot you can't defend against; a recent backup will at least let you
>recover from an attack.  Store at least one set of backups off-site (a
>safe-deposit box is a good place) and at least one set
>on-site.  Remember to destroy old backups.  The best way to destroy
>CD-Rs is to microwave them on high for five seconds.  You can also
>break them in half or run them through better shredders.
>
>Operating systems:  If possible, don't use Microsoft Windows.  Buy a
>Macintosh or use Linux.  If you must use Windows, set up Automatic
>Update so that you automatically receive security patches.  And delete
>the files "command.com" and "cmd.exe."
>
>Applications:  Limit the number of applications on your machine.  If
>you don't need it, don't install it.  If you no longer need it,
>uninstall it.  Look into one of the free office suites as an
>alternative to Microsoft Office.  Regularly check for updates to the
>applications you use and install them.  Keeping your applications
>patched is important, but don't lose sleep over it.
>
>Browsing:  Don't use Microsoft Internet Explorer, period.  Limit use of
>cookies and applets to those few sites that provide services you
>need.  Set your browser to regularly delete cookies.  Don't assume a
>Web site is what it claims to be, unless you've typed in the URL
>yourself.  Make sure the address bar shows the exact address, not a
>near-miss.
>
>Web sites:  Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption does not provide any
>assurance that the vendor is trustworthy or that its database of
>customer information is secure.
>
>Think before you do business with a Web site.  Limit the financial and
>personal data you send to Web sites--don't give out information unless
>you see a value to you.  If you don't want to give out personal
>information, lie.  Opt out of marketing notices.  If the Web site gives
>you the option of not storing your information for later use, take
>it.  Use a credit card for online purchases, not a debit card.
>
>Passwords:  You can't memorize good enough passwords any more, so don't
>bother.  For high-security Web sites such as banks, create long random
>passwords and write them down.  Guard them as you would your cash:
>i.e., store them in your wallet, etc.
>
>Never reuse a password for something you care about.  (It's fine to
>have a single password for low-security sites, such as for newspaper
>archive access.) Assume that all PINs can be easily broken and plan
>accordingly.
>
>Never type a password you care about, such as for a bank account, into
>a non-SSL encrypted page.  If your bank makes it possible to do that,
>complain to them.  When they tell you that it is OK, don't believe
>them; they're wrong.
>
>E-mail:  Turn off HTML e-mail.  Don't automatically assume that any
>e-mail is from the "From" address.
>
>Delete spam without reading it.  Don't open messages with file
>attachments, unless you know what they contain; immediately delete
>them.  Don't open cartoons, videos and similar "good for a laugh" files
>forwarded by your well-meaning friends; again, immediately delete them.
>
>Never click links in e-mail unless you're sure about the e-mail; copy
>and paste the link into your browser instead.  Don't use Outlook or
>Outlook Express.  If you must use Microsoft Office, enable macro virus
>protection; in Office 2000, turn the security level to "high" and don't
>trust any received files unless you have to.  If you're using Windows,
>turn off the "hide file extensions for known file types" option; it
>lets Trojan horses masquerade as other types of files.  Uninstall the
>Windows Scripting Host if you can get along without it.  If you can't,
>at least change your file associations, so that script files aren't
>automatically sent to the Scripting Host if you double-click them.
>
>Antivirus and anti-spyware software:  Use it--either a combined program
>or two separate programs.  Download and install the updates, at least
>weekly and whenever you read about a new virus in the news.  Some
>antivirus products automatically check for updates.  Enable that
>feature and set it to "daily."
>
>Firewall:  Spend $50 for a Network Address Translator firewall device;
>it's likely to be good enough in default mode.  On your laptop, use
>personal firewall software.  If you can, hide your IP address.  There's
>no reason to allow any incoming connections from anybody.
>
>Encryption:  Install an e-mail and file encryptor (like
>PGP).  Encrypting all your e-mail or your entire hard drive is
>unrealistic, but some mail is too sensitive to send in the
>clear.  Similarly, some files on your hard drive are too sensitive to
>leave unencrypted.
>
>None of the measures I've described are foolproof.  If the secret
>police wants to target your data or your communications, no
>countermeasure on this list will stop them.  But these precautions are
>all good network-hygiene measures, and they'll make you a more
>difficult target than the computer next door.  And even if you only
>follow a few basic measures, you're unlikely to have any problems.
>
>I'm stuck using Microsoft Windows and Office, but I use Opera for Web
>browsing and Eudora for e-mail.  I use Windows Update to automatically
>get patches and install other patches when I hear about them.  My
>antivirus software updates itself regularly.  I keep my computer
>relatively clean and delete applications that I don't need.  I'm
>diligent about backing up my data and about storing data files that are
>no longer needed offline.
>
>I'm suspicious to the point of near-paranoia about e-mail attachments
>and Web sites.  I delete cookies and spyware.  I watch URLs to make
>sure I know where I am, and I don't trust unsolicited e-mails.  I don't
>care about low-security passwords, but try to have good passwords for
>accounts that involve money.  I still don't do Internet banking.  I
>have my firewall set to deny all incoming connections.  And I turn my
>computer off when I'm not using it.
>
>That's basically it.  Really, it's not that hard.  The hardest part is
>developing an intuition about e-mail and Web sites.  But that just
>takes experience.
>
>Others have disagreed with these recommendations:
><http://www.getluky.net/archives/000145.html>
><http://www.berylliumsphere.com/security_mentor/2004/12/heres-another-re
>ally-good-twelve.html> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?Z3772560A>
>
>My original essay on the topic:
><http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#8>
>
>This essay previously appeared on CNet:
><http://news.com.com/Who+says+safe+computing+must+remain+a+pipe+dream/20
>10-1071_3-5482340.html> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?V6872560A>

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 15 06:02:05 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 09:02:05 -0500
Subject: DaimlerChrysler's Chief Has Armored Mercedes Stolen
Message-ID: <p0611045abde5f37e72ef@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&sid=aRaEXeRubjHc>

Bloomberg


 DaimlerChrysler's Chief Has Armored Mercedes Stolen

 Nov. 22 (Bloomberg) -- DaimlerChrysler AG Chief Executive Officer Juergen
Schrempp had his S600 Mercedes-Benz armored limousine stolen while it was
parked on a street in Stuttgart, the German city in which the carmaker is
based.

 The black company car, which is worth about 800,000 euros ($1 million),
disappeared on the night of Oct. 26, police spokesman Klaus-Peter Arand
said in a telephone interview. The limousine, which sports a 12-cylinder
engine and is equipped with a broadcasting device to help retrieve the car,
hasn't yet been found, the police said.

 Schrempp, 60, has been CEO of DaimlerChrysler since 1995. Hartmut Schick,
a spokesman for the world's fifth-largest carmaker, confirmed the theft
without giving details.

 The S600 is the top limousine with the Mercedes brand. The cheapest
version of the car costs 129,398 euros, according to the company's Web
site. The stolen vehicle had bullet-proof windows, ``finger-thick'' steel
plates as part of its chassis as well as tires designed to keep it running
even when flat, Bild-Zeitung reported today.

 The car was probably stolen by the ``Russian mafia,'' the German newspaper
said, citing an unidentified investigator.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 15 06:29:46 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 09:29:46 -0500
Subject: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs
Message-ID: <p06110462bde5fab523e0@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/15/cryptography_research/print.html>

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT

The Register ; Internet and Law ; Digital Rights/Digital Wrongs ;


Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs
By Faultline (peter at rethinkresearch.biz)
Published Wednesday 15th December 2004 11:49 GMT

Analysis Just about a year from today, if not sooner, if we believe the
outpourings of both the DVD Forum and the Blu-Ray Disc Association, we will
be able to go out to the shops and buy blue laser, high definition, high
density DVDs in two completely different designs. We will also be able to
buy the players and recorders by then, as well as studio content from
virtually every major studio in the world, on one or the other system.

If you believe the hype, DVD manufacturers will likely have to buy in two
types of DVD manufacturing equipment. Households will have to buy two DVD
players. Consumers will have to buy one PC with one type of high density
DVD player and buy another separate player to read the other format of disk.
We neither believe the hype, nor understand the argument between the two
formats. Surely a single format is better for everyone, but it appears not.
Every round of format wars that have gone on since the original VHS Betamax
wars, has been split, and the result a draw, and it looks like this one
will be too.

In the end the devices are likely to be virtually identical. The Sony-
Panasonic-Philips camp that inspired the Blu-ray version may have slightly
more capacity on their discs, that's the official view right now, but it
might change. They also have devices out right now and have had them for
over a year, but they are very expensive, up at around $2,000 and are not
the volume versions that will be able to play pre-recorded material.
Eventually these devices will be about 10 per cent more than DVD players
are now.

The DVD Forum backed Toshiba and NEC technology may be slightly cheaper for
studios to manufacture, but then again we only have the word of Toshiba on
that, and most DVD producers seem set on supporting both.

The disks need to play on PCs, as well as DVDs and games consoles, and it
is unlikely that anyone is going to shoot themselves in the foot by making
a disc that is incompatible with any of these devices.

So Microsoft's VC 9 codec has to be supported, as does the prevalent MPEG2
and H.264 codecs, and nobody is planning to argue the toss about the
quality of sound from Dolby. So there is a chance that all of the software
on top of these disks is going to be identical.

In the end all of the Blu-ray manufacturers are still in the DVD Forum, and
given that the Blu-ray leaders make about 90 per cent of the worlds DVD
players and that half of the studios have backed the DVD Forum standard,
their players may well end up playing both formats. The early consumers may
well be asking "What's the difference" a year from now having little clue
as to how different the two technologies are, under the "hood."

But what if they each choose a different way to protect the content on
their disks? How much danger would that put the two groups in?

The Content Scrambling System of the DVD has come in for a lot of criticism
over the years, as piracy has become relatively rampant. It was designed
more or less as a speed bump to put off anyone other than the professional
pirate. But then along came the internet, and it has become possible for
anyone to download CSS circumvention or to read up, on various websites,
how to go about it. The speed bump has been somewhat flattened and it needs
reinforcement in the next technology.

So it falls to these same companies to build something for the studios that
will be rather harder and more persuasive, to act as a hurdle against
piracy for these new DVDs. In fact an organization called Advanced Access
Content System (AACS), formed back in July by such notables as IBM, Intel,
Microsoft, Panasonic, Sony, Toshiba, Disney and Warner Brothers has come
together in order to create a decent speed bump against piracy that should
last at least for the next decade, a decade during which broadband lines
improve to the point where it will be child's play to download even a high
definition movie.

The definition of what is required has been very clear from the studios.
They want a system that has the ability for the security logic to be
renewed and which should also have some form of forensic marking in order
to help track pirates.

At the heart of this protection system will be the safety of the revenue of
all the major studios, which now get way in excess of 50 per cent of any
given film's revenues from DVD sales.

Faultline talked over such a system with its authors this week, who are
optimistic about its bid to become the new, but more sophisticated CSS for
the next generation DVD disk.

Cryptographic Research's senior security architect, who also mockingly
refers to himself as "chief anti-pirate" is Carter Laren, and Cryptography
Research is both realistic about just what it takes to stop pirates and how
difficult that is, as well as optimistic that the two competing
associations are set to choose its own submission as the basis for this
protection system.

Cryptography Research (CR) is just a 15 man intellectual property company,
but it was single handedly responsible for discovering how professional
pirates use Differential Power Analysis to read encryption keys and break
complex coding systems thought to be uncrackable, and has also come up with
circumvention strategies. Virtually all the intellectual property around
DPA is held by CR and is licensed all over the world. CR also wrote the
SSL3 secure sockets layer security version for the IETF.

Put simply DPA is a system of "listening" to power distribution on
semiconductors as they read encryption keys. Circumvention comes from
balancing out all power use when an encryption key is being applied so that
it cannot be read just by observing which circuits are active.

If it appears to you that DPA is really about making it harder for the
"professional" pirate who makes a fortune from illicit manufacture of
pirated goods, rather than about stopping college kids from using P2P
networks to swap files, then you'd be right.

"We would rather chase professional pirates than College students," says
Laren, and this shows in his strategy to build a protection system.

What CR has built, he calls Self Protecting Digital Content or SPDC. In
effect this is a form of content that is no longer passive and includes
code that can execute in a specially constructed SPDC virtual machine that
resides in each player.

The logic behind this approach is that so far Digital Rights Management
systems have tried to both support a trust chain, a way of moving
decryption keys around between devices, as well as allowing the expression
of rules to decide what usage is allowed with that content.

What CR does instead is much simpler and more direct. It tries to cut off
any player that has been used for mass piracy.

"When a pirate makes a copy of a film encoded as SPDC, the output file is
cryptographically bound to a set of player decryption keys. So it is easy
when looking at a pirated work on a peer to peer network, or any copies
found on copied DVDs, to identify which player made those copies," said
Laren "When the content owner sends out any further content it can contain
on it a revocation of just the player that was used to make a pirated copy."

"We picture a message popping up on a screen saying something like 'Disney
movies won't play on your player any more please call this number for
further information.' Or perhaps 'To fix this please call Disney with your
credit card,' something like that anyway.

"We know that pirates can make copies by tapping the MPEG stream with
modified players, or by making a bit for bit copy of the disk, or by using
an analog attack (catching the film stream on the way to the TV over aerial
cabling and re-digitizing it). But using this cryptographical binding we
have forensic marking visible on the copy."

The neat thing about this process is that if someone makes copies for their
own use, that can be enabled. Private individuals could be allowed to make
copies for other players, even for their friends, and that's no problem.

It's only when a pirated copy is discovered coming back to a content owner
(presumably watching P2P sites) that a player will get revoked, and that is
only effective on content made after that point, with the revocation
message in it.

When asked Laren said, "No, this is not the same as fingerprinting or
watermarking. When you generate a fingerprint you are making each copy that
is sold, slightly different and that has some cost implications when
stamping disks. Our forensic information is being created by the player's
virtual machine at the time it is played (copied) so all the disks can be
identical."

The virtual machine players create movie outputs that are artistically
identical but each one is altered if some minor way. This alteration is
just the changing of a few bits of data every few seconds, so every 50
frames or so. And the CR system works such that if ten separate players are
used in collusion in a copying process, taking samples of frames from each,
it will not only identify one of the players, but all of them and they can
be revoked from all future content.

"The big problem for studios is piracy based on film copies that have no
digital identifiers. Because they can be sent around the internet with no
chance of catching the original copier and then you have to go after the
P2P user."

"The problem now is that everything in this market has accelerated. There
are time constraints in that all the studios want to move to better
protection as soon as the new disk formats come out and that is set for the
end of next year. This means that AACS has to get its skates on if the
players for this market are not to be launched ahead of its choice of
security system.

By that time, if the CR system, or any other system, is to be used, the
virtual machine players need to be integrated onto the two format in time
for testing and studio acceptance to take place prior to the end of 2005.

CR has in fact dropped any attempt to have its actual encryption
technologies used in this process. The disk formats will accept RSA or AES
128 bit encryption or both, but CR says this doesn't matter.

"The cryptographic portion of this is pretty easy to solve and any
cryptographer that knows what he is doing can do a good job of that. So we
have withdrawn from that part of the spec and we're just putting forward
the binding process to our virtual machine," said Laren.

The virtual machine is based on a stripped down DLX processor. CR has taken
out the floating point arithmetic and we've made a few changes for the sake
of extra security. The DLX is a 32-bit pipelined embedded RISC CPU
architecture that has come out of academia and was originally designed for
teaching, but is not too unlike the ARM or any other RISC device.

It can be built in hardware, expressed in a hardware language like the
Verilog Hardware Description Language and CR has a reference implementation
in the C programming language.

As for the business model of CR, it plans to charge no royalty to the
consumer electronics manufacturers, and adheres to the principle of
charging the businesses whose security problems it solves, in this case the
studios. So it plans to charge, perhaps as little as a couple of cents, for
each HD disk that is pressed using the technology.

What if only one of the two disk formats agrees to install the player in
their HD DVD players? "Well if one format gets its security broken, then
that is a basis for suppliers to switch to the other format isn't it," says
Laren in a clearly rehearsed sales pitch.

But in the end, Self Protecting Digital Content remain only a speed bump.
For real pirates, buying a new player every time they get a set of keys
revoked is just an inconvenience, but for someone that is casually taking
content and placing it on the internet, the loss of function on their
personal devices will certainly reduce the activity to only the seriously
committed.

"We realize that all we are doing is enabling the game that goes on between
the pirate and the content owners. We see revocation of keys through this
system as taking last mover advantage away from the pirates, and giving it
back to the content owners," concludes Laren.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 15 06:38:08 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 09:38:08 -0500
Subject: [ISN] Done the crime, now it's Mitnick's time
Message-ID: <p0611047fbde5fcbf9e3e@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text



From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 15 07:14:14 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 10:14:14 -0500
Subject: Do 'Ocean's Twelve'-Style Heists Really Happen?
Message-ID: <p0611048ebde604a9792e@[68.167.57.91]>

This popped up in my "bearer" filter this morning...

Cheers,
RAH
-------

<http://www.mtv.com/movies/news/articles/1494863/12142004/story.jhtml>

MTV.com - Movies - News
  12.14.2004 9:03 PM EST

Reel To Real: Do 'Ocean's Twelve'-Style Heists Really Happen?
Sometimes, but the real-life criminals can't possibly be as hot as George
Clooney and Brad Pitt.



 While dodging nemesis Terry Benedict (Andy Garcia), Danny Ocean (Clooney)
and Rusty Ryan (Pitt) plan the biggest and most difficult job of their
now-storied careers. As the stakes rise higher and higher, even Ocean's
straight-arrow wife, Tess (Roberts), gets involved. With astronomical
amounts being bandied about, we couldn't help but wonder: What was the
biggest heist ever pulled?

The Real Story: There have been quite a few enormous heists over the years,
several of which bear mentioning here. Art thieves tend to pull the biggest
scores (in terms of dollar value, if not creativity). In 1991, in a heist
worthy of Ocean's crew, thieves made off with 20 paintings worth about $500
million from the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam, Holland. The robbers pulled
a basic "smash and grab," going up a ladder and through a window and
heading back out with some of Van Gogh's most famous works, including "The
Potato Eaters" and "Still Life With Sunflowers." However, in a very
un-Ocean move, the thieves - after presumably panicking - ditched the
paintings not far from the museum. Still, according to "Guinness World
Records," it was technically the greatest art robbery ever. 

 The biggest heist in U.S. history - and the biggest "successful" art heist
- was a $300 million score from Boston's Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in
1990. The thieves - who pulled the old "walk in the front door dressed like
cops" routine - made off with works by Vermeer, Rembrandt and Manet. All of
the paintings are still missing, and the perpetrators are still at large.
CNN.com reported in 2002 that the FBI is still actively investigating the
case, so perhaps that whole "crime doesn't pay" thing will enter in at some
point.

 Some thieves prefer to kick it old-school, including the man behind the
world's largest mugging, which took place in London in 1990 (a good year
for crime, it seems). In a heist typical of Matt Damon's Linus, a man
mugged a courier carrying a briefcase containing 300 bearer bonds worth a
total of $435 million. Pretty impressive, except that within hours every
major bank had been informed that the bonds were stolen, rendering them
virtually worthless.

 Finally, our favorite heist - history's richest jewel robbery - truly
smacks of the skilled Ocean crew. The heist took place at the Antwerp
Diamond Center in Antwerp, Belgium, and netted the thieves an estimated
$100 million in gems. No alarms were triggered, the bombproof vault doors
were not tampered with and there was no sign of a break-in, so no one knows
when 123 of the 160 vaults were actually emptied. The crime was discovered
on February 17, 2003, and, according to BBC News, is believed to have been
carried out by a veteran group of Italian thieves known only as the School
of Turin.

 While the heists carried out by Ocean and his gang are highly improbable,
they are not altogether impossible. And, just like in the movies, things
don't always go in the thieves' favor. One major difference between reel
and real on this one, though: We doubt that any of these professional
criminals are as hot as Clooney and Pitt.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 15 02:56:16 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 11:56:16 +0100
Subject: [i2p] Threat model (fwd from tkaitchuck@comcast.net)
Message-ID: <20041215105616.GW9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Tom Kaitchuck <tkaitchuck at comcast.net> -----


From plhhr at myexcel.com  Wed Dec 15 07:41:25 2004
From: plhhr at myexcel.com (Sam Bermudez)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 19:41:25 +0400 (CST)
Subject: New, revollutionaary peenjs enlaargment tool! cocksure
Message-ID: <6879526.kam67NsT358@stadium070.exponentiate49sina.com>

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From mv at cdc.gov  Wed Dec 15 19:58:27 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 19:58:27 -0800
Subject: Gait advances in emerging biometrics
Message-ID: <41C107E3.7F8CE979@cdc.gov>

At 12:31 PM 12/14/04 -0500, Sunder wrote:
>Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/14/alt_biometrics/
>Gait advances in emerging biometrics
>
>By John Leyden (john.leyden at theregister.co.uk)
>Published Tuesday 14th December 2004 15:07 GMT
>
>"Great Juno comes; I know her by her gait."
>William Shakespeare, The Tempest
>
>Retinal scans, finger printing or facial recognition get most of the
>publicity but researchers across the world are quietly labouring away
at
>alternative types of biometrics.
>
>Recognition by the way someone walk (their gait), the shape of their
ears,
>the rhythm they make when they tap and the involuntary response of ears
to
>sounds all have the potential to raise the stock of biometric
techniques.
>According to Professor Mark Nixon, of the Image Speech and Recognition
>Research Group at the University of Southampton, each has unique
>advantages which makes them worth exploring.

Look up Johansson, et al.  Point light displays.  Yes you can tell
sex, age, etc., from the ratios of rotational axes, etc, but a stone
in the shoe is a bitch.

All faith is in drivers' licenses, a total joke, I got gummies on your
'prints, all your time-derivatives are mine.

But grant$ are good, and flavor$ of DARPA be bitchin.




From measl at mfn.org  Wed Dec 15 18:03:23 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 20:03:23 -0600 (CST)
Subject: The Values-Vote Myth
In-Reply-To: <11333f79a0677bc8c4e80bf3c425a4a1@dizum.com>
References: <11333f79a0677bc8c4e80bf3c425a4a1@dizum.com>
Message-ID: <20041215200258.F1390@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Mon, 8 Nov 2004, Nomen Nescio wrote:

> J.A. Terranson schrieb:
>
> > This election *proves* that at least half the electorate, about 60
> > million people, are just Useless Eaters, who should be eagerly
> > awaiting their Trip Up The Chimneys.
>
> Wow! A Tim May copycat!
> (Both the 'useless eaters' and the 'chimney'!)

You idiot: that wasn't a "copycat", it was a *tribute*.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Wed Dec 15 12:57:50 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 20:57:50 +0000
Subject: Do 'Ocean's Twelve'-Style Heists Really Happen?
In-Reply-To: <p0611048ebde604a9792e@[68.167.57.91]>
References: <p0611048ebde604a9792e@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <20041215205750.GA24735@arion.soze.net>

On 2004-12-15T10:14:14-0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> 
> This popped up in my "bearer" filter this morning...
> 
> Cheers,
> RAH
> -------
> 
> <http://www.mtv.com/movies/news/articles/1494863/12142004/story.jhtml>
> 
> MTV.com - Movies - News
>   12.14.2004 9:03 PM EST
> 
> Reel To Real: Do 'Ocean's Twelve'-Style Heists Really Happen?
> Sometimes, but the real-life criminals can't possibly be as hot as George
> Clooney and Brad Pitt.

http://home.earthlink.net/~kinnopio/news/news040922.htm
(it's gone, but google still has it cached)

"The Bank Job will have Statham playing a real-life bank robber. The
plot is based on the true story of Britain's biggest bank robbery ever:
In 1971 the Baker Street bank in London was robbed, no arrests were ever
made, and none of the money was ever found.  It's a story that hasn't
been told in 30 years because of a government-issued gag order."

The incident is also discussed briefly here:
http://www.lukeford.net/profiles/profiles/ross_bell.htm

There is some doubt whether the heist was real... if it did happen, it's
been covered up for so long that finding any real proof would be
difficult.  It could be a scam just to make money off of a movie.




From isn at c4i.org  Wed Dec 15 23:01:50 2004
From: isn at c4i.org (InfoSec News)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 01:01:50 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [ISN] An Indonesian's Prison Memoir Takes Holy War Into Cyberspace
Message-ID: <mailman.1116.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Forwarded from: William Knowles <wk at c4i.org>

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62095-2004Dec13.html

By Alan Sipress
Washington Post Foreign Service
December 14, 2004

JAKARTA, Indonesia -- After Imam Samudra was charged with engineering
the devastating Bali nightclub bombings two years ago, he taunted his
police accusers in court, then greeted his death sentence with the
cry, "Infidels die!"

So when Samudra published a jailhouse autobiography this fall, it was
not surprising that it contained virulent justifications for the Bali
attacks, which killed 202 people, most of them foreign tourists.

But tucked into the back of the 280-page book is a chapter of an
entirely different cast titled "Hacking, Why Not?" There, Samudra
urges fellow Muslim radicals to take the holy war into cyberspace by
attacking U.S. computers, with the particular aim of committing credit
card fraud, called "carding." The chapter then provides an outline on
how to get started.

The primer on carding is rudimentary, according to U.S. and Indonesian
cybercrime experts, but they said the chapter provides a rare glimpse
into the mounting threat posed by terrorists using Internet fraud to
finance their operations.

"The worry is that an army of people doing cybercrime could raise a
great deal of money for other activities that terrorists are carrying
out," said Alan Paller, research director of the Sans Institute, a
U.S. Internet-security training company.

Samudra, 34, is among the most technologically savvy members of Jemaah
Islamiah, an underground Islamic radical movement in Southeast Asia
that is linked to al Qaeda. He sought to fund the Bali attacks in part
through online credit card fraud, according to Indonesian police. They
said Samudra's laptop computer revealed an attempt at carding, but it
was unclear whether he had succeeded.

Internet crime experts said Samudra's book seems unprecedented as a
tool for recruiting radical Muslims into a campaign of online fraud
and building networks of fundraisers.

"This is exactly the kind of advice you would give someone who wanted
to get started in cybercrime," said Paller, who reviewed a translation
of the chapter. "It doesn't focus on a specific technique, but focuses
on how you find techniques and focuses on connecting with other people
to act loosely together."

Titled "Me Against the Terrorist!" the book depicts Samudra on the
cover in a now-classic pose from his trial last year in Bali. He is
clad in a white shirt and white Muslim skullcap, with his right arm
outstretched and a single finger raised as he lectures the judges.

Four thousand copies in Indonesian have been issued by a small
publisher and are selling for about $4 each in at least seven cities
across the islands of Java and Sumatra, said Achmad Michdan, Samudra's
attorney, who wrote the forward. Michdan said the publisher is
planning a second run and is considering translating the book into
English, French and Arabic. Profits benefit Samudra's wife and
children. Samudra remains on death row.

Most of the book is a memoir that tracks Samudra from his early
schooling in Java, through his arms training in the Afghan mountains,
his exile in Malaysia and his return to Indonesia. It includes
arguments for killing Western civilians and bitter critiques of U.S.
policy in Israel, Afghanistan and Iraq, including photographs of
Muslim civilian casualties.

Toward the end, Samudra informs readers that the United States is not
as invincible as they might think.

"It would not be America if the country were secure. It would not be
America if its computer network were impenetrable," he writes at the
beginning of the hacking chapter. He continues by urging fellow
militants to exploit this opening: "Any man-made product contains
weakness because man himself is a weak creature. So it is with the
Americans, who boast they are a strong nation."

The chapter is less a how-to manual than a course of study for
aspiring hackers and carders. Samudra directs them to specific
Indonesian-language Web sites that provide instruction. For those who
find these sites too sophisticated, he counsels first learning
computer programming languages, in particular Linux, and suggests
several other Web sites, including one run by young Muslims. Then he
advises learning about hacking by finding mentors through online
chats. He lists six chat rooms as sources.

Next, Samudra discusses the process of scanning for Web sites
vulnerable to hacking, then moves on to a three-page discussion on the
basics of online credit card fraud and money laundering.

"This is hacking for dummies," said Evan F. Kohlmann, a U.S.
consultant on international terrorism who also reviewed the chapter.
"But in this day and age, you don't have to be an expert hacker to
have a tremendous impact."

Kohlmann and other cyberterrorism experts said the kind of online
fraud preached by Samudra is becoming increasingly attractive as a
source of funding for al Qaeda operatives in several regions of the
world.

One of the chief hazards posed by Samudra's book is that it could
direct religious extremists into the company of more accomplished
hackers. Indonesian police assert their country now has more online
credit card fraud than any other in the world.

"If you succeed at hacking and get into carding, be ready to make more
money within three to six hours than the income of a policeman in six
months," Samudra tells his readers. "But don't do it just for the sake
of money."

He adds, "Remember, the main duty of Muslims is jihad in the name of
God, to raise arms against the infidels, especially now the United
States and its allies."

Samudra had first sought to finance the Bali nightclub attacks by
ordering the robbery of a shop selling gold jewelry in western Java.
The heist allegedly netted five pounds of gold and $500. Then he
turned to more lucrative targets on the Internet, police and
prosecutors said.

At Samudra's trial, police testified that his computer had been used
to communicate in chat rooms with others involved in online credit
card fraud and contained information on ways to obtain credit card
details.

Petrus Reinhard Golose, head of cybercrimes investigations for the
Indonesian police, said in an interview that Samudra had asked for
religious permission to conduct carding from Abubakar Baasyir, the
radical cleric and alleged head of Jemaah Islamiah now on trial in
Jakarta in connection with terrorist bombings, including the one in
Bali. Golose said police did not know whether Baasyir had blessed
Samudra's Internet activities.

Special correspondent Noor Huda Ismail contributed to this report.



*==============================================================*
"Communications without intelligence is noise;  Intelligence
without communications is irrelevant." Gen Alfred. M. Gray, USMC
----------------------------------------------------------------
C4I.org - Computer Security, & Intelligence - http://www.c4i.org
*==============================================================*



_________________________________________
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From adam at cypherspace.org  Thu Dec 16 02:50:22 2004
From: adam at cypherspace.org (Adam Back)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 05:50:22 -0500
Subject: pgp "global directory" bugged instructions
Message-ID: <20041216105022.GA12885@bitchcake.off.net>

So PGP are now running a pgp key server which attempts to consilidate
the inforamtion from the existing key servers, but screen it by
ability to receive email at the address.

So they send you an email with a link in it and you go there and it
displays your key userid, keyid, fingerprint and email address.

Then it says:

| Please verify that the email address on this key, adam at hashcash.org,
| is your email address, and is properly configured to send and
| receive PGP secured email.
|
| If the information is correct, click 'Accept'. By clicking 'Accept',
| your key will be published to the directory, where other PGP users
| will be able to retrieve it in order to encrypt messages to you and
| verify signed messages from you.
|
| If this information is incorrect, click 'Cancel'. By clicking
| 'Cancel', this key will not be published. You may then submit
| another key with the correct information.

So here's the problem: it does not mention anything about checking
that this is your fingerprint.  If it's not your fingerprint but it is
your email address you could end up DoSing yourself, or at least
perpetuating a imposter key into the new supposedly email validated
keyserver db.

(For example on some key servers there are keys with my name and email
that are nothing to do with me -- they are pure forgeries).

Suggest they add something to say in red letters check the fingerprint
AND keyid matches your key.

Adam




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 15 23:58:33 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 08:58:33 +0100
Subject: [wearables] Nokia cellular cameras (fwd from ew206@cam.ac.uk)
Message-ID: <20041216075833.GP9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from Mr Ellis Weinberger <ew206 at cam.ac.uk> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 16 06:52:19 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 09:52:19 -0500
Subject: Blunkett hands in cards after prints found on visa
Message-ID: <p06110425bde75135b727@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/15/blunkett_checks_out/print.html>

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT

The Register ; Internet and Law ; Digital Rights/Digital Wrongs ;

 Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/15/blunkett_checks_out/

Blunkett hands in cards after prints found on visa
By John Lettice (john.lettice at theregister.co.uk)
Published Wednesday 15th December 2004 23:11 GMT

David Blunkett, UK Home Secretary and prime mover behind the British ID
card scheme, resigned this evening after further revelations concerning the
residency application of his lover's nanny. Emails seen by Sir Alan Budd's
enquiry made it clear that - contrary to Home Office denials - the letter
to the nanny warning of a possible 12 month delay had been dealt with by
his office.

This was critical to Blunkett's defence. He had claimed that he merely
checked over the initial application, and when over the weekend it was
claimed (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/13/blunkett_bashes_dti/) that
he had produced the letter from the immigration service in a meeting with
senior civil servants, a Home Office spokesman insisted that he had had "no
contact with the letter at all, at any stage."

In a statement (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4099761.stm)
tonight, Blunkett concedes that Budd's enquiry has identified "a fax and an
exchange of emails between my office and the Immigration and Nationality
Directorate" based on the letter that he had had "no contact" with. He says
that he was "always aware"of this letter, "but did not remember holding a
copy. I have no recollection of dealing with this in any way... I have no
recollection of issuing instructions to deal with the application, but only
to continuing the elimination of the backlog in general".

The email is reported to have said "no favours but slightly quicker." We at
The Register feel that we would have trouble figuring out how that works
even if we were sober. Which we are not entirely; but, since you ask, this
evening's Privacy International Christmas bash went rather better than one
could possibly have expected. Education Secretary Charles Clarke wins the
ID scheme poisoned chalice. He commented that there would be continuity
between his approach and Blunkett's; the immigration status of any
paramours which Clarke may or may not have is not known at time of press.
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 16 06:59:49 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 09:59:49 -0500
Subject: [ISN] An Indonesian's Prison Memoir Takes Holy War Into 
  Cyberspace
Message-ID: <p06110427bde7534933c7@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text



From hal at finney.org  Thu Dec 16 10:16:27 2004
From: hal at finney.org (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 10:16:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Off-the-Record Messaging (IM plugin)
Message-ID: <20041216181627.897F657E2C@finney.org>

> Nikita Borisov and Ian Goldberg have released
> Off-the-Record Messaging (http://www.xelerance.com/mirror/otr/),

It looks like Ian Goldberg's site might be a more authoritative source,
http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/ .

One interesting feature is authentication + deniability.  You know who
you are talking to, but afterwards anyone who captured a transcript can't
prove who said it.  Usually we do authentication with digital signatures,
but the problem is that binds you to what you say and it can be used
against you afterwards.

OTR does it by signing the key exchange which creates a MAC key for each
direction.  (A MAC is a keyed hash which is then applied to each message.)
Each message gets MAC'd and this way you know that the messages are
authentic and untampered.

This already protects you against your conversant; both of you know the
MAC keys in each direction (one knows them in order to MAC new messages;
the other knows them in order to verify the MAC), so each guy can
forge messages created by the other guy and create a bogus transcript.
That means that neither person can publish a transcript and credibly
claim that it authentically represents what was said.

Then, there's another trick: when you are through with them you publish
your MAC keys, in the clear.  This does not compromise secrecy; all of
the data is encrypted with a different key.  But it means that now, anyone
could in retrospect forge a transcript showing you saying anything at all.
And that of course means that no such transcript has any credibility in
terms of providing cryptographic evidence of what you said.

Hal




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 16 01:28:55 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 10:28:55 +0100
Subject: EU Moves Forward with Data Retention
Message-ID: <20041216092855.GT9221@leitl.org>

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/12/16/0052222
Posted by: samzenpus, on 2004-12-16 07:47:00

   from the find-out-what-you-said-last-week dept.
   KokoBonobo writes " euobserver.com reports on [1]controversial
   proposals to require EU service operators to retain data about
   telephone calls and e-mails as part of an overall fight against crime
   and terrorism. The retained data would not only consist of logs, but
   of entire conversations and contents of the e-mails and SMS messages.
   This [2]document from the [3]European Commission's Information Society
   goes into further detail."

   [4]Click Here

References

   1. http://www.euobserver.com/?aid=17906&sid=9
   2.
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ecomm/doc/useful_information/
library/public_consult/data_retention/consultation_data_retention_30_7_04.pdf
   3. http://europa.eu.int/information_society/index_en.htm
   4.
http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=5671&alloc_id=12342&site_id=1&request_id=1128523&o
p=click&page=%2farticle%2epl

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 16 03:28:36 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 12:28:36 +0100
Subject: Gait advances in emerging biometrics
In-Reply-To: <41C107E3.7F8CE979@cdc.gov>
References: <41C107E3.7F8CE979@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20041216112836.GA9221@leitl.org>

On Wed, Dec 15, 2004 at 07:58:27PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:

> Look up Johansson, et al.  Point light displays.  Yes you can tell
> sex, age, etc., from the ratios of rotational axes, etc, but a stone
> in the shoe is a bitch.

Isolated biometrics are nigh to useless. But integrated, they become
increasingly more and more difficult to fool. Some of it is cheap, too.
There are phase-evaluating 2d integrated sensors which have a depth of up to
7 m, which are very cheap in principle. Mounted in a gate, this will give you
face/ear/head geometry. Calculating a fingerprint from a topology map is
something any embedded can do. With IR/NIR you'll get a skin pigmentation
map.

Teraherz will give you body geometry. Olfactorics will give you volatile MHC
fragments, and thus a hash of your immune diversity (and your current
perfume). Add gait recognition, and you've got a real rich telebiometrics
signature.

Anyone who owns that infrastructure is even more dangerous than who 0wns the
voting machines. The perfect enabler to establish a totalitarian control
system.

> All faith is in drivers' licenses, a total joke, I got gummies on your
> 'prints, all your time-derivatives are mine.
>
> But grant$ are good, and flavor$ of DARPA be bitchin.

Absolutely. It's like owning a mint for grant money.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From mix at anon.lcs.mit.edu  Thu Dec 16 09:20:01 2004
From: mix at anon.lcs.mit.edu (lcs Mixmaster Remailer)
Date: 16 Dec 2004 17:20:01 -0000
Subject: Off-the-Record Messaging (IM plugin)
Message-ID: <20041216172001.14321.qmail@nym.alias.net>

Nikita Borisov and Ian Goldberg have released
Off-the-Record Messaging (http://www.xelerance.com/mirror/otr/),
an IM plugin for private communication providing not only
the usual encryption and authentication, but also deniability and
perfect forward secrecy.  Deniability avoids digital signatures on
messages (while preserving authenticity and integrity), so there is no
hard-to-deny proof you wrote anything in particular; in fact, there is a
toolkit to help people forge messages, making it extra-hard to pin
things on you.  Perfect forward secrecy means that your past messages
and conversations remain protected even if your keys are compromised.

You can read the OTR protocol description, download the
source code for the gaim-otr plugin, or grab a gaim-otr binary package for
Debian or Fedora Core.




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec 16 18:46:51 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 18:46:51 -0800
Subject: Gait advances in emerging biometrics
Message-ID: <41C2489B.4D655027@cdc.gov>

At 12:28 PM 12/16/04 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>
>Anyone who owns that infrastructure is even more dangerous than who
0wns the
>voting machines.

Very nice quote.

Can I get an insurance policy on you, with me as beneficiary?




From jon at pgp.com  Thu Dec 16 21:28:59 2004
From: jon at pgp.com (Jon Callas)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 21:28:59 -0800
Subject: pgp "global directory" bugged instructions
In-Reply-To: <p0611042cbde75537a797@[68.167.57.91]>
References: <p0611042cbde75537a797@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <8E1B9EAA-4FEC-11D9-8399-000D9344F9D6@pgp.com>

Thanks for the bug report. We appreciate your help in fine-tuning the 
language in the verification emails of the beta test of the PGP Global 
Directory. We noticed this one, ourselves, and put out an improvement 
to it on Tuesday. Please check it over and see what you think of the 
improved version.

If you would like to send bug reports to us directly, please feel free 
to send them to beta at pgp.com. Cypherpunks and Cryptography are both 
inefficient ways to get them to us, as Cryptography waits for Perry to 
approve the post, and Cypherpunks waits for Bob Hettinga to forward it.

However, the Global Directory does not consolidate information from any 
other keyservers. It is a replacement for the old keyserver, 
keyserver.pgp.com, and will take over that venerable old server's job 
once beta test is concluded. We are, however, migrating a number of 
keys from the old keyserver to that one.

Think of the new keyserver as a mix between traditional keyservers, 
mailing list servers like mailman, and a robot CA. Its intent is to 
improve upon the older keyservers by giving some modicum of assurance 
that keys in it belong to someone, as well as allowing someones to 
recover from forgetting their passphrase.

	Jon

On 16 Dec 2004, at 7:13 AM, R.A. Hettinga wrote:

>
> --- begin forwarded text
>
>
> Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 05:50:22 -0500
> From: Adam Back <adam at cypherspace.org>
> To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks at minder.net>
> Cc: Cryptography <cryptography at metzdowd.com>
> Subject: pgp "global directory" bugged instructions
> User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i
> Sender: owner-cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>
> So PGP are now running a pgp key server which attempts to consilidate
> the inforamtion from the existing key servers, but screen it by
> ability to receive email at the address.
>
> So they send you an email with a link in it and you go there and it
> displays your key userid, keyid, fingerprint and email address.
>
> Then it says:
>
> | Please verify that the email address on this key, adam at hashcash.org,
> | is your email address, and is properly configured to send and
> | receive PGP secured email.
> |
> | If the information is correct, click 'Accept'. By clicking 'Accept',
> | your key will be published to the directory, where other PGP users
> | will be able to retrieve it in order to encrypt messages to you and
> | verify signed messages from you.
> |
> | If this information is incorrect, click 'Cancel'. By clicking
> | 'Cancel', this key will not be published. You may then submit
> | another key with the correct information.
>
> So here's the problem: it does not mention anything about checking
> that this is your fingerprint.  If it's not your fingerprint but it is
> your email address you could end up DoSing yourself, or at least
> perpetuating a imposter key into the new supposedly email validated
> keyserver db.
>
> (For example on some key servers there are keys with my name and email
> that are nothing to do with me -- they are pure forgeries).
>
> Suggest they add something to say in red letters check the fingerprint
> AND keyid matches your key.
>
> Adam
>
> --- end forwarded text
>
>
> -- 
> -----------------
> R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
> "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
> [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
> experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>
-- 
Jon Callas
CTO, CSO
PGP Corporation         Tel: +1 (650) 319-9016
3460 West Bayshore      Fax: +1 (650) 319-9001
Palo Alto, CA 94303     PGP: ed15 5bdf cd41 adfc 00f3
USA                          28b6 52bf 5a46 bc98 e63d


-- 
Jon Callas
CTO, CSO
PGP Corporation         Tel: +1 (650) 319-9016
3460 West Bayshore      Fax: +1 (650) 319-9001
Palo Alto, CA 94303     PGP: ed15 5bdf cd41 adfc 00f3
USA                          28b6 52bf 5a46 bc98 e63d


________________________________________________________________
This message could have been secured by PGP Universal. To secure
future messages from this sender, please click this link:

https://keys.pgp.com/b/b.e?r=cypherpunks%40minder.net&n=NsqztWUvWFO%2Be83dnF4HAw%3D%3D




From eugen at leitl.org  Thu Dec 16 13:01:23 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 22:01:23 +0100
Subject: USPS Service Kiosks Taking Pictures of Customers 
Message-ID: <20041216210122.GZ9221@leitl.org>

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/12/16/1418246
Posted by: michael, on 2004-12-16 15:11:00

   from the say-cheese dept.
   [1]NW writes "According to [2]FOIA documents obtained by EPIC new
   Postal Service self-service postage machines take portrait-style
   photographs of customers and retain them for 30 days." IBM is the
   [3]contractor behind the kiosks. Note that the kiosk is supposed to
   not complete the transaction if it determines the photograph has been
   compromised, so simply covering the camera is unlikely to work. As the
   cost of cameras and digital storage approaches zero, is it inevitable
   that every machine you interact with will take your photograph and
   store it?

   [4]Click Here

References

   1. http://www.shaftek.org/blog/
   2. http://www.epic.org/privacy/postal/
   3. http://www-1.ibm.com/kiosk/government.html
   4.
http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=5717&alloc_id=12468&site_id=1&request_id=5057586&o
p=click&page=%2farticle%2epl

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Thu Dec 16 19:38:57 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 03:38:57 +0000
Subject: pgp "global directory" bugged instructions
In-Reply-To: <20041216105022.GA12885@bitchcake.off.net>
References: <20041216105022.GA12885@bitchcake.off.net>
Message-ID: <20041217033857.GA738@arion.soze.net>

On 2004-12-16T05:50:22-0500, Adam Back wrote:
> 
> So PGP are now running a pgp key server which attempts to consolidate
> the inforamtion from the existing key servers, but screen it by
> ability to receive email at the address.
> ...
> So here's the problem: it does not mention anything about checking
> that this is your fingerprint.

What about the fact that they're tying key validity to valid email
addresses, when the two have nothing to do with each other?  A key does
not need to have an associated email address, or the latter could be
purposely incorrect.

If this is their idea of key verification, they're going to exclude
perfectly legitimate keys from this new database.




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 17 04:55:13 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 07:55:13 -0500
Subject: Report: Govt secrecy hurting warfighters
Message-ID: <p0611040bbde88776daf6@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20041215-075709-5911r>

United Press International:

Report: Govt secrecy hurting warfighters
By Shaun Waterman
UPI Homeland and National Security Editor
 Published 12/15/2004 8:19 PM


WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 (UPI) -- The current system for protecting government
information is outdated, almost unworkable and makes the "information flow
to the war fighter ... excessively constricted," according to a report
prepared for the Department of Defense by a secretive scientific advisory
panel.

 The panel, known as the Jason Group, reviewed the system used to classify
sensitive government information at the request of the Office of Defense
Research and Engineering in the Pentagon.

 The group concluded that the classification system is so unwieldy --
especially in battlefield situations -- that it is often bypassed
altogether by frustrated military personnel and "ought to be radically
changed."

 "Users," the report stated, "see an overly rigid, out of date,
bureaucratic structure of information classification ... and an individual
clearance process that is glacially slow, and under which large numbers of
fighting men and women are, in practical terms, unclearable."

 As a result, the report said, "under-classification of documents -- often
quietly justified as necessary for ease in transporting documents between
meeting sites -- is a well known practice." For example, the report said
that imagery from the top-secret Predator unmanned aerial reconnaissance
vehicle is unclassified, with troops relying on "an ad hoc system of
operational practices" to protect it.

 "The current situation of out of date or operationally unimplementable
rules, combined with widespread violation of those rules, is a bad place to
be," concludes the report, a copy of which was obtained by United Press
International from the Federation of American Scientist's Project on
Government Secrecy.

 J. William Leonard, the federal government's secrecy watchdog, agreed in
broad terms with the report's critique.

 "I drawn a vast distinction between the tactical military environment and
the bureaucracy here in Washington," Leonard, who runs the Information
Security Oversight Office, told UPI.

 "Under certain circumstances," like an imminent threat of terrorism, or on
the battlefield, "there can be greater damage caused by classifying and not
sharing information."

 Leonard said that amendments to the classification system after Sept. 11,
2001, had given more flexibility to agencies to share classified
information -- even with people not authorized to see it -- under such
emergency circumstances.

 Even in day-to-day operations, he said, "The system provides a degree of
flexibility to agencies. But," he added, "there is very little realization
of this. I'm concerned that not enough use is made of this flexibility."

 But the report pointed out that this flexibility is very hard to calibrate.

 "In the present system there is no way to turn up or down the knob that
governs the tradeoff between security and operational needs. There is no
way, in time of war or in a particular area of operations, to 'moderately
increase' all players' access to secret information ... there are too few
steps between highly secret and totally open," it stated.

 The report pointed out that the current system was devised in the 1940s
and has remained basically unchanged since, despite the enormous revolution
in information wrought by the advent of personal computers and the Internet.

 "The classification system is a product of the industrial age, not the
information age we live in now," Leonard said.

 "It is a document-centered system," Leonard continued. "We need a new
framework for guarding national security information that is more suited to
the information age and accounts for the huge changes there have been in
the last 60 years."

 The Jason Group report concluded with a call for just such a system, one
based on transactional risk -- that is the chance that any given
transaction will be compromised, rather than on assigning a level of
classification to a document based on the potential damage caused by
disclosure.

 "It is obvious that the one-time display of a classified document on a
(secure) computer terminal to a (cleared) individual -- which we can call
'soft access' -- is inherently less risky than providing that same
individual with a paper copy of the same document -- 'hard access.'"

 But Leonard pointed out that the current government rules only tell
agencies what they can classify, not what they must keep secret. Each
government agency uses the rules as the basis for its own classification
guidance.

 "A lot of the concepts and recommendations of the report could be
implemented to some extent under the current system, if agencies issued new
classification guidance that took more account of the changed circumstances
we now find," he said.

 Such calls may fall on more fertile ground than they have in the past.

 Porter Goss, now the director of the central intelligence and the man
charged with managing the whole classification system, told UPI last year
that over-classification was a persistent problem in U.S. intelligence
agencies.

 "The problem is, it's a ratchet," he said. "It only turns one way. There
are very serious consequences for failure to classify sensitive
information. There tend to be no adverse consequences -- at least not to
someone's career -- of classifying something that doesn't need to be
classified."

 The Jason Group report is the latest in a series of recent critiques of
the classification system, but the first to identify under-classification
as a problem. Most previous critiques have focused on the reverse problem.

 For instance, the Sept. 11 commission found in its final report that
"current security requirements nurture over-classification" -- making
documents secret when they do not really need to be -- and found that, in
turn, to be a barrier to the information sharing between agencies and with
local law enforcement that is vital to the fight against terrorism.

 The commission's Chairman Tom Kean, the former GOP governor of New Jersey,
has said that one of the great surprises of the unprecedented access he and
his fellow commissioners were given to highly classified government
documents was finding out how much of it he already knew from reading the
newspapers.

 In a similar vein, the official in charge of information security at the
Pentagon told a congressional panel Aug. 24 that at least half of the
information the U.S. government classifies every year should not be kept
secret.

 Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Counter Intelligence and Security
Carol Haave testified before a House panel led by Rep. Chris Shays, R-Conn.

 Shays called the system for safeguarding the nation's secrets
"incomprehensibly complex" and "so bloated it often does not distinguish
between the critically important and the comically irrelevant."

 The panel heard examples of information that was classified by one agency,
then released by another; information that was redacted from one part of a
document by an agency, but published in another part of the same document;
and information that an agency insisted should be classified until it was
pointed out it was available on the agency's own Web site.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From measl at mfn.org  Fri Dec 17 07:16:08 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:16:08 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [Antisocial] Sept. 11 Conspiracy Theorist Offers $100,000 Prize
   (fwd)
Message-ID: <20041217091553.L13274@ubzr.zsa.bet>

Thursday, Dec. 16, 2004
Sept. 11 Conspiracy Theorist Offers $100,000 Prize

NEW YORK (Reuters) - Jimmy Walter has spent more than $3 million
promoting a conspiracy theory the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States were "an inside job" and he is offering more cash to anyone who
proves him wrong.

The millionaire activist is so convinced of a government cover-up he is
offering a $100,000 reward to any engineering student who can prove the
World Trade Center buildings crashed the way the government says.

"Of course, we expect no winners," Walter, 57, heir to an $11 million
fortune from his father's home building business, said in a telephone
interview from California on Wednesday.

He said a panel of expert engineers would judge submissions from the
students.

Next month, he also launches a nationwide contest seeking alternative
theories from college and high school students about why New York's
World Trade Center collapsed. The contest offers $10,000 to the best
alternative theory, with 100 runner-up awards of $1,000. Winners will be
chosen next June.

The World Trade Center's twin towers were destroyed after hijackers
slammed two commercial airliners into them. The attack in New York
killed 2,749 people.

Various official investigations give no credence to Walter's theory. A
Sept. 11 commission spokesman did not return calls seeking comment.

Walter insists there had to be explosives planted in the twin towers to
cause them to fall as they did, and also rejects the official
explanation for the damage done at the Pentagon.

"We have all the proof," said Walter, citing videotapes and testimony
from witnesses.

"It wasn't 19 screw-ups from Saudi Arabia who couldn't pass flight
school who defeated the United States with a set of box cutters," he
said. He dismissed the official Sept. 11 commission report, saying, "I
don't trust any of these 'facts."'

Walter has spent millions of dollars to bolster support for his case,
running full-page ads in The New York Times, the Wall Street Journal,
The New Yorker and Newsweek, as well as alternative newspapers and
30-second TV spots.

He points to a Zogby poll he commissioned last summer that showed 66
percent of New Yorkers wanted the 9/11 investigation reopened.

Walter has spent about 30 percent of his net worth on his efforts.

"I am a patriot fighting the real traitors who are destroying our
democracy. I resent it when they call me delusional," he said.




From zmkmpho at btinternet.com  Fri Dec 17 04:26:09 2004
From: zmkmpho at btinternet.com (Millicent Broussard)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 11:26:09 -0100 EST
Subject: Get the mads you need now fast shjppijng! tape
Message-ID: <4738526.22.949152473@bail-e21.eudoramail.com>

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From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 17 03:48:35 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 12:48:35 +0100
Subject: Gait advances in emerging biometrics
In-Reply-To: <41C2489B.4D655027@cdc.gov>
References: <41C2489B.4D655027@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <20041217114835.GG9221@leitl.org>

On Thu, Dec 16, 2004 at 06:46:51PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:

> Very nice quote.
>
> Can I get an insurance policy on you, with me as beneficiary?

Heh. Your tinfoil hat factor is way higher than mine.

(Also, politics isn't about people on the Net. It's about people marching in
the
streets).

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Dec 17 13:55:58 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 13:55:58 -0800
Subject: Gait advances in emerging biometrics
Message-ID: <41C355EE.634AAACF@cdc.gov>

At 12:48 PM 12/17/04 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>(Also, politics isn't about people on the Net. It's about people
marching in
>the
>streets).

And RPGs.  Lots and lots of RPGs.
And MANPADS.




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 17 14:33:57 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 17:33:57 -0500
Subject: [Antisocial] Sept. 11 Conspiracy Theorist Offers $100,000
  Prize (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <20041217091553.L13274@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F39D570AB2D61BB911C14009BAF0@phx.gbl>

"I am a patriot fighting the real traitors who are destroying our
democracy. I resent it when they call me delusional," he said.

Tee hee hee...






>From: "J.A. Terranson" <measl at mfn.org>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: [Antisocial] Sept. 11 Conspiracy Theorist Offers $100,000 Prize   
>(fwd)
>Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:16:08 -0600 (CST)
>
>Thursday, Dec. 16, 2004
>Sept. 11 Conspiracy Theorist Offers $100,000 Prize
>
>NEW YORK (Reuters) - Jimmy Walter has spent more than $3 million
>promoting a conspiracy theory the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United
>States were "an inside job" and he is offering more cash to anyone who
>proves him wrong.
>
>The millionaire activist is so convinced of a government cover-up he is
>offering a $100,000 reward to any engineering student who can prove the
>World Trade Center buildings crashed the way the government says.
>
>"Of course, we expect no winners," Walter, 57, heir to an $11 million
>fortune from his father's home building business, said in a telephone
>interview from California on Wednesday.
>
>He said a panel of expert engineers would judge submissions from the
>students.
>
>Next month, he also launches a nationwide contest seeking alternative
>theories from college and high school students about why New York's
>World Trade Center collapsed. The contest offers $10,000 to the best
>alternative theory, with 100 runner-up awards of $1,000. Winners will be
>chosen next June.
>
>The World Trade Center's twin towers were destroyed after hijackers
>slammed two commercial airliners into them. The attack in New York
>killed 2,749 people.
>
>Various official investigations give no credence to Walter's theory. A
>Sept. 11 commission spokesman did not return calls seeking comment.
>
>Walter insists there had to be explosives planted in the twin towers to
>cause them to fall as they did, and also rejects the official
>explanation for the damage done at the Pentagon.
>
>"We have all the proof," said Walter, citing videotapes and testimony
>from witnesses.
>
>"It wasn't 19 screw-ups from Saudi Arabia who couldn't pass flight
>school who defeated the United States with a set of box cutters," he
>said. He dismissed the official Sept. 11 commission report, saying, "I
>don't trust any of these 'facts."'
>
>Walter has spent millions of dollars to bolster support for his case,
>running full-page ads in The New York Times, the Wall Street Journal,
>The New Yorker and Newsweek, as well as alternative newspapers and
>30-second TV spots.
>
>He points to a Zogby poll he commissioned last summer that showed 66
>percent of New Yorkers wanted the 9/11 investigation reopened.
>
>Walter has spent about 30 percent of his net worth on his efforts.
>
>"I am a patriot fighting the real traitors who are destroying our
>democracy. I resent it when they call me delusional," he said.




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 17 17:56:41 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 20:56:41 -0500
Subject: Where Aquarius Went
Message-ID: <p061104afbde93bc81efa@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/19/books/review/19HITCHEN.html?8bu=&oref=login&pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

December 19, 2004

Where Aquarius Went
 By CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS


 HIPPIE
By Barry Miles.
 Illustrated. 384 pp. Sterling Publishing. $24.95.

WHAT'S GOING ON?
 California and the Vietnam Era.
Edited by Marcia A. Eymann and Charles Wollenberg.
Illustrated. 209 pp. Oakland Museum of California/University of California
Press. Paper, $49.95.

 BACK FROM THE LAND
 How Young Americans Went to Nature in the 1970's, and Why They Came Back.
 By Eleanor Agnew.
 Illustrated. 274 pp. Ivan R. Dee. $27.50.

IN the summer of 1989 I was a speaker at a memorial for Abbie Hoffman. This
was a rolling and unstructured all-day event, but at the closing moment the
stage held the simultaneous presence of Bobby Seale, Norman Mailer, Amiri
Baraka, William Kunstler, Terry Southern, Allen Ginsberg and one or two
others whose names collectively spelled ''sixties.'' Camera lights popped
and there were many independent filmmakers squinting through lenses. I
later wanted a photograph of myself in this lineup, but was told after
exhaustive inquiries that none of the organizers or participants could lay
hands on even one. Thus I rediscovered the metaphysical truth that if you
claim to recall the decade you were not really there. (Also, if you lay any
claim to have been commemorating the high points of the 60's after a lapse
of two further decades there is no proof that you were there, either.)

 Yet photographs (plus a certain pungent reek that some people, such as
myself, never actually inhaled) are the best mnemonic prompting. To turn
the shiny pages of ''Hippie'' is to breathe deeply. My copy fell open at a
manifesto by Frank Zappa, in which he admitted that ''A freak is not a
freak if ALL are freaks,'' and went on to assert that ''Looking and acting
eccentric IS NOT ENOUGH.'' How true. And yet, what a long time it took to
find that out. Here they all are: Jim Morrison and Jimi Hendrix, Janis
Joplin and Brian Jones -- this book includes a good deal of the British
scene -- Bob Dylan and Timothy Leary. (The latter, the last time I saw him
in the early 90's, was planning to have himself cryogenically frozen but
was ''not to be reanimated during a Republican administration.'')
Occasionally, there is a picture that jars. What exactly is Martin Luther
King Jr. doing in a book with a title like this? He is standing on a road
outside Selma under a billowing Stars and Stripes. He's wearing a suit and
tie. He's not even trying to look or act eccentric, let alone freakish.

 The marketing of the 60's has come to necessitate the blending of quite
discrepant images: the dogs of Selma and the bearded Puritans of the Cuban
revolution, along with the moon-faced narcissists and dropouts of
Haight-Ashbury and the groupie-draped avatars of rock. (Francis Ford
Coppola later managed this subliminal association even better, synthesizing
the music of The Doors with the near-psychedelic bloom of napalm in the
verdant foliage.) This would be another way of saying that the days of love
and peace had their sordid and nasty side, too. The Haight-Ashbury section
of San Francisco was idyllic for about five minutes before the following
famous flier was distributed:

 ''Pretty little 16-year-old middle-class chick comes to the Haight to see
what it's all about & gets picked up by a 17-year-old street dealer who
spends all day shooting her full of speed again & again, then feeds her
3,000 mikes & raffles off her temporarily unemployed body for the biggest
Haight Street gang bang since the night before last. The politics & ethics
of ecstasy.''

 The ''3,000 mikes'' there are micrograms of LSD (''Lucy in the Sky with
Diamonds'' in the Sergeant Pepper ecstatic version) and represent 12 times
the ''normal'' dose. I still know people who undertook such voyages of the
imagination, or had them inflicted upon themselves, and who never quite
came back.

 It is conventional to say that ''the 60's'' of the herbivorous -- in both
senses -- Woodstock ended with the homicidal events of the Rolling Stones
concert at Altamont (where Hell's Angels beat and stabbed a man to death in
front of the stage) and with the sadistic fiesta of Charles Manson on Cielo
Drive in Beverly Hills. Why is it conventional to say this? Largely because
it is true. The Christlike beard of John Lennon mutates into the Judas-like
visage of ''Charlie,'' whose disciples were robotic and spaced-out sadists.
It was an open secret even at the time that some of the supposed
''communes'' were places of twisted, paranoid cultism -- the pseudo-Satanic
''Process'' group was one such warning -- and in retrospect the subsequent
events of Jonestown seem easy to predict.

 Yet Frank Zappa and John Lennon were icons on the wall of Vaclav Havel,
who had always considered himself a ''60's person'' and, two decades later,
helped bring down an unsmiling authoritarianism without a shot being fired
-- and to the accompaniment of a joyous effusion of rock music, jazz,
improvised theater and blue jeans. To the extent that the decade had a
moral seriousness that could be transmitted forward, this inhered in the
partly spontaneous opposition to an unjust war in Indochina, and to the
coincidence of this movement with the battle for civil rights. To this day,
there are people who are convinced that they took part in these struggles
just by being young and alive at the time, and who have the beads and the
Dylan albums to prove it. A great merit of ''What's Going On?'' is that it
recreates, more in words than pictures -- though there are some arresting
photographs -- the especially tough way in which this was all fought out in
the nation's most various and politicized state (if I may say that without
offending New York readers). It was in the San Francisco Bay Area,
especially, that the convergence of campus rebels, black militants and
antiwar activists was most vividly on show. Many of the activists were
short-haired and white-shirted Marxists of one stripe or another, who
leafleted factories and served in the field with indentured farmworkers
while trying to ''shut down'' the bases and induction centers that serviced
the hideous war on the other side of the Pacific. Easy as it is to mock the
atmosphere of Berkeley -- ''Berserkely'' -- in those days, there was a
thread that connected the free speech movement to the freedom riders and to
the exposure of depraved statecraft overseas, and this volume restores that
connection with exemplary force. A rather telling chapter, toward the end
of the book, recounts the long battle to build a Vietnam memorial in Orange
County, Calif., this time to honor the many thousands of Vietnamese who
fought against Ho Chi Minh and whose refugee families constitute one of the
largest minorities in the state. It's brave of the editors to have included
what many people think of as an irony of history -- an irony that is at
their own expense.

 The friends I just mentioned, who took LSD and never quite returned from
the trip, are in a different category from the friends who left town and
seemingly disappeared altogether. Every now and then, one would hear people
talk in mysterious tones about log cabins or geodesic domes on virgin land
in Vermont or Montana, and the growing of organic vegetables. John Denver's
song ''Country Roads'' made West Virginia a favored destination. Then there
would be a brisk exit from the blighted city, with a car towing an
assortment of furniture, tools, pets and sometimes children. The pull of
nature and authenticity, so imbricated in the original material of the
American Dream, had overcome the easy temptations of materialism. For me,
there are only two really memorable scenes in ''Easy Rider.'' The first is
when Jack Nicholson edges in from the side of the screen and we know at
once that something has happened to American acting. The second is when
Fonda and Hopper pull up at a remote rural commune where, among other
things, bearded boys and full-skirted girls are broadcasting seeds into
furrows from improvised sacks. (''You can tell just by looking,'' said a
comrade of mine at the time, ''that nothing's gonna grow in those furrows
except footprints.'') There was always a slight embarrassment to be
experienced when these would-be Amish came sidling back to town, to resume
work in brokerages and banks and universities. To this day, that especially
vile reminder of the epoch -- the graying and greasy ponytail trailing off
the balding pate -- is their living memorial.

 Eleanor Agnew's lovely memoir of this movement of primal innocence is at
once honest and hilarious. She recaptures the period with unerring skill: a
period when the Apollo mission had shown us our fragile, blue planetary
home from outer space, thus promoting (first) ''The Whole Earth Catalog''
and (second) a mentality that despised the science and innovation necessary
for the taking of that photograph in the first place.

 Countless educated young Americans went off the map, in pursuit of Walden
or some other version of bucolic utopia. They learned to chop wood and
sometimes to grow crops, and they got hypothermia and piles.

 Irving Howe, when attacked for being a sellout by some young master of
certitude at Columbia University, turned on his tormentor and hissed: ''You
know what you're going to be? You're going to end up as a dentist.'' This
was meant, in the context, as an impressive put-down of bourgeois
aspirations. Yet here is John Armstrong, from a family of dentists in
Michigan, who is introduced to us by Agnew with the perfect pitch she
brings to quotations. Armstrong ''started a premed program in college but
'quickly discovered that medicine wasn't my bag, which shouldn't be
misconstrued to mean that I had the slightest clue as to what my bag might
be.' '' With his new wife Darma -- a name that just might be coincidental
-- he embarked on homesteading in the Upper Peninsula of his home state and
found it very snowy indeed.

 It was probably just as well that neither he nor Darma needed the services
of a dentist -- surely one of civilization's great boons -- during the time
when they were frozen in. Agnew is at her driest and wittiest when she
describes the reaction of her sodbusting ''sisters,'' in particular, to the
hygienic arrangements and then to the knotty question of natural
childbirth. More than one agreed to have a baby on a kitchen table before
getting pregnant again and heading as fast as possible back to town for
''serious numbing drugs.''

 If you look back to the founding document of the 60's left, which was the
Port Huron statement (also promulgated in Michigan), you will easily see
that it was in essence a conservative manifesto. It spoke in vaguely
Marxist terms of alienation, true, but it was reacting to bigness and
anonymity and urbanization, and it betrayed a yearning for a lost agrarian
simplicity. It forgot what Marx had said, about the dynamism of capitalism
and ''the idiocy of rural life.'' Earlier 18th- and 19th-century American
communards had often been fleeing or preparing for a coming Apocalypse, and
their emulators in the 1960's and 1970's followed this trope as well,
believing everything they read about the impending crash, or the exhaustion
of the world's resources. The crazy lean-to of the Unabomber began to take
dim shape at that period, even if many of the new pioneers were more
affected by the work of the pacific Tolstoy or of C. Wright Mills (who used
to recommend, if memory serves, that people should build their own cars as
well as their own houses).

 Is there a moral to point out here? Of course there is. Maybe more than
one. The first is that, as Agnew deftly notes, more of her friends ought to
have read about the Joad family before setting out. The second is that not
all was wasted or futile. Everybody in society now has a better idea of our
relationship with the natural order and our kinship with animals, and we
are no longer so casual about what once seemed the endless bounty of our
environment. In some ways, we have the ''love generation'' to thank for
this. Meanwhile, though, the anti-globalization movement has started to
reject modernity altogether, to set its sights on laboratories and on the
idea of the division of labor, and to adopt symbols from Fallujah as the
emblems of its resistance. Conservatism cannot and does not, despite
itself, remain static. It mutates into something far more reactionary than
anything from which the hippies were ever fleeing.

 Christopher Hitchens is a columnist for Vanity Fair and a visiting
professor at New School University. His collection of essays, ''Love,
Poverty and War,'' has just been published.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Dec 17 22:15:28 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 22:15:28 -0800
Subject: [Antisocial] Sept. 11 Conspiracy Theorist 
Message-ID: <41C3CB00.18489F2F@cdc.gov>

At 05:33 PM 12/17/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>"I am a patriot fighting the real traitors who are destroying our
>democracy. I resent it when they call me delusional," he said.
>
>Tee hee hee...

Indeed.  The dude shows that
1. ability to inherit $$$ doesn't imply brains
2. he should take a structural engineering class
3. he might appreciate the hubris of Architects (tm) but that requires
#2

If he really gave a shat he'd investigate the RDX stored in the
Murrah building, next to daycare, but that was just a (.mil trained)
'Merican,
not a bunch of specops Ay-rabs.

JYA may be Architects (snicker) but methinks he groks structures,
and even if not, his cryptome penance absolves him from the sins
of the artsy.

PS: heard some fedscum mention 'militia and other terrorists' the other
day, what would Gen George W think?

(Ans: The general would ask, why do we not guillotine the bastards?)




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Dec 17 22:19:57 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 22:19:57 -0800
Subject: Frank Zappa, american composer
Message-ID: <41C3CC0D.6D62A5DB@cdc.gov>

At 08:56 PM 12/17/04 -0500, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
>the shiny pages of ''Hippie'' is to breathe deeply. My copy fell open
at a
>manifesto by Frank Zappa, in which he admitted that ''A freak is not a
>freak if ALL are freaks,'' and went on to assert that ''Looking and
acting
>eccentric IS NOT ENOUGH.'' How true.

I didn't bother wasting my attention enough to see if FZ was deemed
a freak or not in this article.  I will tell you that he was not into
pharmaceuticals but was one of the finest american composers
of the last century ---and Tipper Gore[1] will burn in hell for wasting
his time.  If you want to appreciate his brilliance, the _yellow shark_
album (which puts to music the US form required of immigrants)
will inform you.

[1] A publicly known mentally ill person who spawned drug-abusing
future citizens and slept with liars.




From mv at cdc.gov  Fri Dec 17 22:51:46 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 22:51:46 -0800
Subject: Flaw with lava lamp entropy source
Message-ID: <41C3D381.966E743D@cdc.gov>

I've been running a 1970s-era lava lamp for some time, and found
that it can enter a stable attractor where you get a non-circulating
blob o' wax at the bottom.  While Walker et al.'s (?) LL video entropy
source is cute/clever, the general lesson we can take from this is to be
careful
that physical sources do not fail.  Cooling the lamp and restarting it
seems to have put it back into a quasi-random physical trajectory.
I suppose my visual observation counts as an online entropic monitor
that any physical source apparently should have.

This was driven by a 40 watt bulb and the ambient temperature dropped
when it
stabilized.  Shaking did not restart it; only cooling and then reheating
did.

Now back to your regularly scheduled war crimes.




From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com  Fri Dec 17 23:40:00 2004
From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 23:40:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Israeli Airport Security Questioning Re: CRYPTO-GRAM,
  December 15, 2004
In-Reply-To: <p06110419bde5e890e361@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <20041218074000.77001.qmail@web21206.mail.yahoo.com>

>--- "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote:
> At 11:41 PM -0600 12/14/04, Bruce Schneier wrote:

>  The theory is that eventually
> the defender will
> >reach the end of his memorized story, and that the
> attacker will then
> >notice the subtle changes in the defender as he
> starts to make up answers.

Not necessarily. 

The difference here is that Bad_Guy is visiting the
country for the first time. Now, there are fewer
questions to ask.

 The idea is Mr.Bad_Guy gives minimal information
there by restricting the questions that can be asked.
Its just that the Bad_Guy should be trained to give
out least information. That way there is no need to
remember hundreds of answers.


Sarad.






		
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From BAGPKFIEVTA at delphi.com  Sat Dec 18 01:27:32 2004
From: BAGPKFIEVTA at delphi.com (Andy Cummings)
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2004 02:27:32 -0700
Subject: New revollutionaary peenjs enlaargment tool! solicit
Message-ID: <8886qy492fxr05674$5441289$x14yqz8@Trinidadad867dt88jat83v>

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From jamesd at echeque.com  Sat Dec 18 11:51:28 2004
From: jamesd at echeque.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2004 11:51:28 -0800
Subject: Flaw with lava lamp entropy source
In-Reply-To: <41C3D381.966E743D@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <41C419C0.13095.130BABCE@localhost>

    --
On 17 Dec 2004 at 22:51, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> I've been running a 1970s-era lava lamp for some time, and
> found that it can enter a stable attractor where you get a
> non-circulating blob o' wax at the bottom.  While Walker et
> al.'s (?) LL video entropy source is cute/clever, the general
> lesson we can take from this is to be careful that physical
> sources do not fail.

These days the video entropy source is not a lava lamp, but a
lens cap - in the dark, the ccds generate significant thermal
noise, which (unlike chaotic noise) cannot fail, unless someone
immerses the camera in liquid helium. 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
     YIh62RYRs2hLkj/bbMuhph73iWN9Kmjo6IJ27mBf
     4RyyRBC0ayoxtSug4pB9k+d7sjGlnt3gsa6yVYFy5




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 18 10:25:21 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2004 13:25:21 -0500
Subject: Is There Censorship?
Message-ID: <p061104a6bde93bb91b79@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/19/books/review/19DONADIO.html?8bu=&pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

December 19, 2004
ESSAY

Is There Censorship?
 By RACHEL DONADIO


In accepting a lifetime achievement award from the National Book Foundation
at a black-tie gala in Manhattan last month, Judy Blume, the doyenne of
young-adult fiction, delivered herself of the following admonition: ''Your
favorite teacher -- the one who made literature come alive for you, the one
who helped you find exactly the book you needed when you were curious, or
hurting, the one who was there to listen to you when you felt alone --
could become the next target.''

 A target, that is, of censorship. Blume's books, which address sexuality
and religion with a frankness that has made many a grown-up squeamish, have
been among the books most frequently banned from public school libraries
over the years, and so the author certainly knows whereof she speaks. Yet
there was something slightly alarmist in Blume's remarks. In somber,
insistent tones, she spoke as if the authorities were lurking behind the
doors of the Marriott Marquis ballroom ready to burst in at any moment and
break up the party.

 Blume's speech perfectly captured the mood in certain literary circles
these days, where air once thick with now banned cigarette smoke instead
hangs heavy with talk of the C-word. But the kind of censorship Blume has
faced concerns individual libraries choosing not to lend her books, or
placing restrictions on who can borrow them. It isn't about government
harassment, even though that's what Blume seemed to be implying.

 The definition of censorship has loosened so much that the word has become
nearly devoid of meaning. Long gone are the days when the government banned
racy books like D. H. Lawrence's ''Lady Chatterley's Lover,'' Henry
Miller's ''Tropic of Cancer'' or James Joyce's ''Ulysses.'' When it comes
to the written word, censorship debates are no longer about taste and
decency -- although those issues are much in the news concerning the visual
arts, television and radio. Instead, the debate over books tends to center
on geopolitics, national security and foreign policy.

 Today, most defenders of the written word are focusing their energies on
opposing certain sections of the USA Patriot Act, chief among them Section
215, which states that federal investigators can review library and
bookstore records under certain circumstances in terrorism investigations.
Larry Siems, the director of international programs at the PEN American
Center, strikes an oft-heard chorus when he denounces ''the growing use of
government surveillance and government intrusion into your creative
space.'' This, in turn, feeds a concern ''that the government is able to
see more deeply into our intellectual lives,'' Siems says.

 Where there is smoke, there may very well be fire, but there may also be
mirrors. It's often hard to draw the line between perception and practice,
between how certain government regulations are viewed and how they're
actually being enforced. The very mention of the Patriot Act is enough to
drive many publishers, writers, librarians, bookstore owners, readers and
concerned citizens into a near-paranoid frenzy at the idea that the
government is intruding into their personal business, although few can cite
specific instances in which that is the case.

 Indeed, the marketing department of any given publishing house probably
has far more power over free expression in America than any government
office; if it decides a smart book won't sell, the publisher may not sign
it. Attitudes are rampant, but facts are harder to find. And ultimately,
grandstanding and self-righteousness obscure the fact that some cases do
approach government censorship.

 Consider two recent lawsuits. This fall, a group of publishers and Shirin
Ebadi, a lawyer and leading women's rights advocate in Iran who won the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2003, filed two separate lawsuits against the Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, which places
serious restrictions on importing written work by authors in Iran, Sudan,
Cuba and other countries under United States trade embargo. Under these
regulations, buying the rights to unwritten books or making significant
editorial changes to written works without a license is considered
''providing a service,'' and therefore akin to trading with the enemy,
something punishable with jail time and fines of up to $1 million.
Publishers argue that this regulation violates the First Amendment.

 OFAC devotes most of its resources to investigating terrorist financing
and narcotics trafficking, and the regulations are largely intended for
those aims. Some of the regulations at issue have been on the books for
decades -- the Trading With the Enemy Act dates to 1917 -- and since the
80's amendments have been added to exempt ''informational materials'' from
being subject to sanctions. But the current fuss dates back to this spring,
when the Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a particularly stiff
response to a query from the Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers, which wanted to publish papers by scientists from countries
under embargo. The Treasury office ruled that the institute could edit a
manuscript from a country under embargo, and engage in peer review, but
that making any ''substantive or artistic alterations or enhancements of
the manuscript'' would be illegal without a license. Likewise, no publisher
could market a book and no literary agent could sign an author from an
embargoed country without a license.

 This sent the publishers through the roof. In September, Arcade, an
independent publisher; the international writers' organization PEN; the
Association of American University Presses; and a division of the
Association of American Publishers filed suit against the foreign assets
office. ''I think that censorship is the biggest danger that could confront
this country, aside from physical attack,'' Richard Seaver, the editor in
chief of Arcade Publishing, said in a recent interview in his comfortably
cluttered Manhattan office. ''Censorship is never dead. It can always rear
its ugly head. The danger is greater today than in the past 30 years.''

 A month later, Ebadi -- the Iranian human rights lawyer (and Iran's first
Nobelist), who under the rules can't sell her memoir to an American
publisher -- filed her own suit, along with the Strothman Agency of Boston,
which can't officially represent her. Ebadi raised the censorship question
in an Op-Ed article in The Times last month (which she could publish
because newspapers are exempt from some of the regulations). ''If even
people like me -- those who advocate peace and dialogue -- are denied the
right to publish their books in the United States with the assistance of
Americans, then people will seriously question the view of the United
States as a country that advocates democracy and freedom everywhere,'' she
wrote. ''What is the difference between the censorship in Iran and this
censorship in the United States? Is it not better to encourage a dialogue
between Iranians and the American public?''

 Salman Rushdie, the president of the board of trustees of the PEN American
Center and an old hand at such debates, wrote in a declaration as part of
the suit: ''Writers in Iran, Cuba and Sudan cannot publish freely in their
own countries. It is a tragic and dangerous irony that Americans may not
freely publish the works of those writers here, either.'' Publishers say
several books have been suspended or canceled pending the ruling, including
''City of Columns: Historic Architecture of Havana'' by Alejo Carpentier
(Smithsonian Institution Press), ''The Encyclopedia of Cuban Music''
(Temple University Press) and a paper by geologists at Shiraz University in
Iran for an issue of the journal Mathematical Geology. ''Even if there
isn't a single case where they actually prosecuted, there's a famous
chilling effect,'' says Leon Friedman, a lawyer for PEN and Arcade who
helped bring the lawsuit. ''Publishers just won't take a chance.''

 Molly Millerwise, a spokeswoman for the Treasury Department, declined to
comment on the lawsuits. She says that over the years, no more than a dozen
license applications have been submitted, most of them since last year, and
none have been denied, although some are still pending. She says the
department encourages publishers to approach them with queries.

 So why don't the publishers simply apply for a license? Just ask any
self-respecting publisher. ''I'm not going to ask permission,'' Seaver
says. ''That's the Iranian way of doing things.'' He says Arcade is going
full speed ahead with ''Strange Times, My Dear: The PEN Anthology of
Contemporary Iranian Literature,'' which is due out in April. He
acknowledges that the lawsuit might help draw attention to the book. ''I
think libraries will be more attentive because they will have to be.
Booksellers, too.''

 You can't help getting the sense that there is a certain amount of public
relations going on here. Ebadi could conceivably have sold the rights to
her memoirs in Britain, and the British publisher could have subsequently
sold the American rights. But that wasn't the point. ''American readers
deserve to be hearing directly from someone like Ebadi,'' says Wendy
Strothman, the literary agent and former publishing executive who is
informally representing Ebadi. Strothman says Ebadi might well have been
able to get a license ''because of her stature as a Nobel laureate,'' but
the lawsuit was ''a matter of principle.'' It's also not entirely clear
whether the Treasury Department would allow an American publisher to import
such a work from Britain. ''There are so many weighing factors,''
Millerwise says.

 Ebadi hasn't yet written her memoir. In her statement to the court, which
reads a little like a book proposal, Ebadi says her book would discuss
''how I became a lawyer, a judge and a law professor despite the obvious
and often official obstacles women in Iran have had to face.''

 There certainly does seem to be a market for Iranian women's memoirs. Both
lawsuits cite the success of Azar Nafisi's best-selling ''Reading Lolita in
Tehran,'' about a group of women who met weekly in secret to read forbidden
works of Western literature, and of ''Persepolis,'' Marjane Satrapi's
graphic novel about growing up during the Iranian revolution. Nafisi
emigrated to Washington in 1997, and Satrapi now lives in France; neither
could have published her book in Iran. For her part, Nafisi says she finds
the Treasury Department regulations ''mind-boggling,'' and has written a
letter to the court supporting Ebadi's suit. ''I understand sometimes there
might be sanctions,'' Nafisi says. ''The point about this law is the people
it will hurt are the people who have been suppressed in that country
anyway.'' She continues: ''The principle of publishing should be
understanding, should be more knowledge. On principle I think you have to
publish even Ayatollah Khomeni!''

 Although the Treasury rules have been on the books for ages, the lawsuits
play into the literary world's general dislike of the Bush administration.
When the regulations ''reached international ears, it was a very clear
example to the international community of a kind of American cultural
closed-mindedness,'' Larry Siems of PEN says. ''I spent a lot of time
explaining to my international colleagues that this was not this
administration's doing.''

 Both lawsuits may very well be settled in the coming months. In November
the Treasury Department asked for a one-month extension so it could file
its response to the suits in January. ''The reason for the requested
extension is that the parties anticipate that there may be developments
with a possibly significant effect on the posture of the case, such that
the briefing may need to be refocused or may even prove unnecessary,'' the
Treasury Department's attorney wrote to the judge, according to a copy of
the letter provided by the Strothman Agency's lawyer. The group of
publishers received a similar letter, one of its lawyers said. Both sets of
plaintiffs agreed to the extension. It remains to be seen whether the
Treasury Department will adjust its regulations or rule only on those
specific cases.

 Meanwhile, these lawsuits have provided many in the literary and
publishing world with a cause -- one that's far more concrete than nebulous
fears about the Bush administration or the Patriot Act. And it's certainly
more satisfying to focus on censorship than on the future of publishing. It
also seems to get the creative juices flowing. ''There's always a clash, an
underlying tension, between politics, which is basically trying to keep the
status quo, and literature, which is constantly questioning the status
quo,'' Nafisi says. ''This tension between politics and culture is healthy.
Each of us are playing our roles.'' You might say that all this conflict
about infringements -- both real and perceived -- on free expression bodes
well for free expression.

 Rachel Donadio is a writer and editor at the Book Review.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 18 11:01:48 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2004 14:01:48 -0500
Subject: The end of the world: A brief history
Message-ID: <p061104a4bde93b0af25e@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=3490697>

The Economist

 The end of the world

A brief history

Dec 16th 2004


Why do end-of-time beliefs endure?




A VERICHIP is a tiny, implantable microchip with a unique identification
number that connects a patient to his medical records. When America's Food
and Drug Administration recently approved it for medical use in humans, the
news provoked familiar worries in the press about privacy-threatening
technologies. But on the notice boards of raptureready.com, the talk was
about a drawback that the FDA and the media seemed to have overlooked. Was
the VeriChip the "mark of the beast"?

 Raptureready.com runs an online service for the millions of born-again
Christians in America who believe that an event called the Rapture is
coming soon. During the Rapture, Christ will return and whisk believers
away to join the righteous dead in heaven. From there, they will have the
best seats in the house as the unsaved perish in a series of spectacular
fires, wars, plagues and earthquakes. (Raptureready.com advises the
soon-to-depart to stick a note on the fridge to brief those left
behind-husbands, wives and in-laws-about the horrors in store for them.)

 Furnished with apocalyptic tracts from the Bible, believers scour news
dispatches for clues that the Rapture is approaching. Some think
implantable chips are a sign. The Book of Revelation features a "mark" that
the Antichrist makes everybody wear "in their right hand, or in their
foreheads". Rapturists have more than a hobbyist's idle interest in
identifying this mark. Anyone who accepts it spends eternity roasting in
the sulphurs of hell. (And, incidentally, the European Union may be "the
matrix out of which the Antichrist's kingdom could grow.")

 Christians have kept faith with the idea that the world is just about to
end since the beginnings of their religion. Jesus Himself hinted more than
once that His second coming would happen during the lifetime of His
followers. In its original form, the Lord's Prayer, taught by Jesus to his
disciples, may have implored God to "keep us from the ordeal".

 Men have been making the same appeal ever since. In 156AD, a fellow called
Montanus, pronouncing himself to be the incarnation of the Holy Spirit,
declared that the New Jerusalem was about to come crashing down from the
heavens and land in Phrygia-which, conveniently, was where he lived. Before
long, Asia Minor, Rome, Africa and Gaul were jammed with wandering
ecstatics, bitterly repenting their sins and fasting and whipping
themselves in hungry anticipation of the world's end. A bit more than a
thousand years later, the authorities in Germany were stamping out an
outbreak of apocalyptic mayhem among a self-abusing sect called the secret
flagellants of Thuringia. The disciples of William Miller, a 19th-century
evangelical American, clung ecstatically to the same belief as the
Montanists and the Thuringians. A thick strand of Christian history
connects them all, and countless other movements.

Don't get left behind

 Apocalyptic belief renews itself in ingenious ways. Belief in the Rapture,
which enlivens the familiar end-of-time narrative with a compellingly
dramatic twist, appears to be a modern phenomenon: John Nelson Darby, a
19th-century British evangelical preacher, was perhaps the first to
popularise the idea. (Darby's inspiration was a passage in St Paul's letter
to the Thessalonians, which talks about the Christian dead and true
believers being "caught up together" in the clouds.) It is not easy to say
how many Americans believe in Darby's concept of Rapture. But a dozen
novels that dramatise the event and its gripping aftermath-the "Left
Behind" series-have sold more than 40m copies.

New apocalyptic creeds have even sprung from those sticky moments when the
world has failed to end on schedule. (Social scientists call this
"disconfirmation".) When the resurrected Christ failed to show up for
Miller's disciples on the night of October 22nd 1844, press scribblers
mocked the "Great Disappointment" mercilessly. But even as they jeered, a
farmer called Hiram Edson snuck away from the vigil to pray in a barn,
where he duly received word of what had happened. There had been a great
event after all-but in heaven, not on Earth. This happening was that Jesus
had begun an "investigative judgment of the dead" in preparation for his
return. Thus was born the Church of Seventh-day Adventists. They were not
the only ones to rise above apparent setbacks to the prophesies by which
they set such store: the Jehovah's Witnesses of the persistently
apocalyptic Watchtower sect survived no fewer than nine disconfirmations
every few years between 1874 and 1975.


Which way to Armageddon?

Why do end-of-time beliefs endure? Social scientists love to set about this
question with earnest study of the people who subscribe to such ideas. As
part of his investigation into the "apocalyptic genre" in modern America,
Paul Boyer of the University of Wisconsin asks why so many of his fellow
Americans are "susceptible" to televangelists and other "popularisers".
>From time to time, sophisticated Americans indulge the thrillingly
terrifying thought that nutty, apocalyptic, born-again Texans are guiding
not just conservative social policies at home, but America's agenda in the
Middle East as well, as they round up reluctant compatriots for the last
battle at Armageddon. (It's a bit south of the Lake of Galilee in the plain
of Jezreel.)

 Behind these attitudes sits the assumption that apocalyptic thought
belongs-or had better belong-to the extremities of human experience. On
closer inspection, though, that is by no means true.

 Properly, the apocalypse is both an end and a new beginning. In Christian
tradition, the world is created perfect. There is then a fall, followed by
a long, rather enjoyable (for some) period of moral degeneration. This
culminates in a decisive final battle between good (the returned Christ)
and evil (the Antichrist). Good wins and establishes the New Jerusalem and
with it the 1,000-year reign of King Jesus on Earth.

 This is the glorious millennium that millenarians await so eagerly.
Millenarians tend to place history at a moment just before the decisive
final showdown. The apocalyptic mind looks through the surface reality of
the world and sees history's epic, true nature: "apocalypse" comes from the
Greek word meaning to uncover, or disclose.

 Norman Cohn, a British historian, places the origin of apocalyptic thought
with Zoroaster (or Zarathustra), a Persian prophet who probably lived
between 1500 and 1200BC. The Vedic Indians, ancient Egyptians and some
earlier civilisations had seen history as a cycle, which was for ever
returning to its beginning. Zoroaster embellished this tepid plot. He added
goodies (Ahura Mazda, the maker and guardian of the ordered world), baddies
(the spirit of destruction, Angra Mainyu) and a happy ending (a glorious
consummation of order over disorder, known as the "making wonderful", in
which "all things would be made perfect, once and for all"). In due course
Zoroaster's theatrical talents came to Christians via the Jews.


 This basic drama shapes all apocalyptic thought, from the tenets of tribal
cargo cults to the beliefs of UFO sects. In 1973, Claude Vorilhon, a
correspondent for a French racing-car magazine, claimed to have been
whisked away in a flying saucer, in which he had spent six days with a
green chap who spoke fluent French. The alien told Mr Vorilhon that the
Frenchman's real name was Rael, that humans had misread the Bible and that,
properly translated, the Hebrew word Elohim (singular: Eloha) did not mean
God, as Jews had long supposed, but "those who came from the sky".


The alien then revealed that his species had created everything on Earth in
a space laboratory, and that the aliens wanted to return to give humans
their advanced technology, which would transform the world utterly. First,
however, Rael needed financial contributions to build the aliens an embassy
in Jerusalem, because otherwise they would not feel welcome (a bit lame,
this explanation). Although the Israeli government has not yet given its
consent, the Raelians-those persuaded by Rael's account-continue to welcome
donations in anticipation of a change of heart.

 The Raelians' claim to be atheists who belong to the secular world must
come as no surprise to Mr Cohn, who has long detected patterns of religious
apocalyptic thought in what is supposedly rational, secular belief. He has
traced "egalitarian and communistic fantasies" to the ancient-world idea of
an ideal state of nature, in which all men are genuinely equal and none is
persecuted. As Mr Cohn has put it, "The old religious idiom has been
replaced by a secular one, and this tends to obscure what otherwise would
be obvious. For it is the simple truth that, stripped of their original
supernatural sanction, revolutionary millenarianism and mystical anarchism
are with us still."


Nicholas Campion, a British historian and astrologer, has expanded on Mr
Cohn's ideas. In his book, "The Great Year", Mr Campion draws parallels
between the "scientific" historical materialism of Marx and the religious
apocalyptic experience. Thus primitive communism is the Garden of Eden, the
emergence of private property and the class system is the fall, the final
gasps of capitalism are the last days, the proletariat are the chosen
people and the socialist revolution is the second coming and the New
Jerusalem.

 Hegel saw history as an evolution of ideas that would culminate in the
ideal liberal-democratic state. Since liberal democracy satisfies the basic
need for recognition that animates political struggle, thought Hegel, its
advent heralds a sort of end of history-another suspiciously apocalyptic
claim. More recently, Francis Fukuyama has echoed Hegel's theme. Mr
Fukuyama began his book, "The End of History", with a claim that the world
had arrived at "the gates of the Promised Land of liberal democracy". Mr
Fukuyama's pulpit oratory suited the spirit of the 1990s, with its
transformative "new economy" and free-world triumphs. In the disorientating
disconfirmation of September 11th and the coincident stockmarket collapse,
however, his religion has lost favour.

 The apocalyptic narrative may have helped to start the motor of
capitalism. A drama in which the end returns interminably to the beginning
leaves little room for the sense of progress which, according to the
19th-century social theories of Max Weber, provides the religious licence
for material self-improvement. Without the last days, in other words, the
world might never have had 65-inch flat-screen televisions. For that
matter, the whole American project has more than a touch of the apocalypse
about it. The Pilgrim Fathers thought they had reached the New Israel. The
"manifest destiny" of America to spread its providential liberty and
self-government throughout the North American continent (not to mention the
Middle East) smacks of the millennium and the New Jerusalem.

 Science treasures its own apocalypses. The modern environmental movement
appears to have borrowed only half of the apocalyptic narrative. There is a
Garden of Eden (unspoilt nature), a fall (economic development), the usual
moral degeneracy (it's all man's fault) and the pressing sense that the
world is enjoying its final days (time is running out: please donate now!).
So far, however, the green lobby does not appear to have realised it is
missing the standard happy ending. Perhaps, until it does, environmentalism
is destined to remain in the political margins. Everyone needs redemption.

Watch this spacesuit

 Noting an exponential acceleration in the pace of technological change,
futurologists like Hans Moravec and Ray Kurzweil think the world inhabits
the "knee of the curve"-a sort of last-days set of circumstances in which,
in the near future, the pace of technological change runs quickly away
towards an infinite "singularity" as intelligent machines learn to build
themselves. From this point, thinks Mr Moravec, transformative "mind fire"
will spread in a flash across the cosmos. Britain's astronomer royal, Sir
Martin Rees, relegates Mr Kurzweil and those like him to the "visionary
fringe". But Mr Rees's own darkly apocalyptic book, "Our Final Hour",
outdoes the most colourful of America's televangelists in earthquakes,
plagues and other sorts of fire and brimstone.


 So there you have it. The apocalypse is the locomotive of capitalism, the
inspiration for revolutionary socialism, the bedrock of America's manifest
destiny and the undeclared religion of all those pseudo-rationalists who,
like The Economist, champion the progress of liberal democracy. Perhaps,
deep down, there is something inside everyone which yearns for the New
Jerusalem, a place where, as a beautiful bit of Revelation puts it:

God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more
death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain;
for the former things are passed away.

Yes, perhaps. But, to be sure, not everyone agrees that salvation, when it
comes, will appear clothed in a shiny silver spacesuit.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 18 12:59:20 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2004 15:59:20 -0500
Subject: A.C.L.U.'s Search for Data on Donors Stirs Privacy Fears
Message-ID: <p0611040dbdea4a919772@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/18/national/18aclu.html?ei=5006&en=1fb103f41ec09d84&ex=1104037200&partner=ALTAVISTA1&pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

December 18, 2004

A.C.L.U.'s Search for Data on Donors Stirs Privacy Fears
 By STEPHANIE STROM


he American Civil Liberties Union is using sophisticated technology to
collect a wide variety of information about its members and donors in a
fund-raising effort that has ignited a bitter debate over its leaders'
commitment to privacy rights.

 Some board members say the extensive data collection makes a mockery of
the organization's frequent criticism of banks, corporations and government
agencies for their practice of accumulating data on people for marketing
and other purposes.

 Daniel S. Lowman, vice president for analytical services at Grenzebach
Glier & Associates, the data firm hired by the A.C.L.U., said the software
the organization is using, Prospect Explorer, combs a broad range of
publicly available data to compile a file with information like an
individual's wealth, holdings in public corporations, other assets and
philanthropic interests.

 The issue has attracted the attention of the New York attorney general,
who is looking into whether the group violated its promises to protect the
privacy of its donors and members.

"It is part of the A.C.L.U.'s mandate, part of its mission, to protect
consumer privacy," said Wendy Kaminer, a writer and A.C.L.U. board member.
"It goes against A.C.L.U. values to engage in data-mining on people without
informing them. It's not illegal, but it is a violation of our values. It
is hypocrisy."

The organization has been shaken by infighting since May, when the board
learned that Anthony D. Romero, its executive director, had registered the
A.C.L.U. for a federal charity drive that required it to certify that it
would not knowingly employ people whose names were on government terrorism
watch lists.

A day after The New York Times disclosed its participation in late July,
the organization withdrew from the charity drive and has since filed a
lawsuit with other charities to contest the watch list requirement.

The group's new data collection practices were implemented without the
board's approval or knowledge, and were in violation of the A.C.L.U.'s
privacy policy at the time, said Michael Meyers, vice president of the
organization and a frequent and strident internal critic. Mr. Meyers said
he learned about the new research by accident Nov. 7 in a meeting of the
committee that is organizing the group's Biennial Conference in July.

He objected to the practices, and the next day, the privacy policy on the
group's Web site was changed. "They took out all the language that would
show that they were violating their own policy," he said. "In doing so,
they sanctified their procedure while still keeping it secret."

Attorney General Eliot Spitzer of New York appears to be asking the same
questions. In a Dec. 3 letter, Mr. Spitzer's office informed the A.C.L.U.
that it was conducting an inquiry into whether the group had violated its
promises to protect the privacy of donors and members.

 Emily Whitfield, a spokeswoman for the A.C.L.U., said the organization was
confident that its efforts to protect donors' and members' privacy would
withstand any scrutiny. "The A.C.L.U. certainly feels that data privacy is
an extremely important issue, and we will of course work closely with the
state attorney general's office to answer any and all questions they may
have," she said.

Robert B. Remar, a member of the board and its smaller executive committee,
said he did not think data collection practices had changed markedly. He
recalled that the budget included more money to cultivate donors but said
he did not know what specifically was being done.

 Mr. Remar said he did not know until this week that the organization was
using an outside company to collect data or that collection had expanded
from major donors to those who contribute as little as $20. "Honestly, I
don't know the details of how they do it because that's not something a
board member would be involved in," he said.

 The process is no different than using Google for research, he said,
emphasizing that Grenzebach has a contractual obligation to keep
information private.

 The information dispute is just the latest to engulf Mr. Romero. When the
organization pulled out of the federal charity drive, it rejected about
$500,000 in expected donations. Mr. Romero said that when he signed the
enrollment certification, he did not think the A.C.L.U. would have to run
potential employees' names through the watch lists to meet requirements.

The board's executive committee subsequently learned that Mr. Romero had
advised the Ford Foundation, his former employer, to follow the nation's
main antiterrorism law, known as the Patriot Act, in composing language for
its grant agreements, helping to ensure that none of its money
inadvertently underwrites terrorism or other unacceptable activities. The
A.C.L.U., which has vigorously contended that the act threatens civil
liberties, had accepted $68,000 from Ford under the new terms by then.

 The board voted in October to return the money and reject further grants
from Ford and the Rockefeller Foundation, which uses similar language in
its grant agreements.

In 2003, Mr. Romero waited several months to inform the board that he had
signed an agreement with Mr. Spitzer to settle a complaint related to the
security of the A.C.L.U.'s Web site. The settlement, signed in December
2002, required the agreement to be distributed to the board within 30 days,
and Mr. Romero did not hand it out until June 2003.

He told board members that he had not carefully read the agreement and that
he did not believe it required him to distribute it, according to a
chronology compiled by Ms. Kaminer.

Many nonprofit organizations collect information about their donors to help
their fund-raising, using technology to figure out giving patterns, net
worth and other details that assist with more targeted pitches.

Because of its commitment to privacy rights, however, the A.C.L.U. has
avoided the most modern techniques, according to minutes of its executive
committee from three years ago. "What we did then wasn't very sophisticated
because of our stance on privacy rights," said Ira Glasser, Mr. Romero's
predecessor.

Mr. Glasser, who resigned in 2001, said the group had collected basic data
on major donors and conducted a ZIP code analysis of its membership for an
endowment campaign while he was there. He said it had done research on
Lexis/Nexis and may have looked at S.E.C. filings.

Mr. Meyers said he learned on Nov. 7 that the A.C.L.U.'s data collection
practices went far beyond previous efforts. "If I give the A.C.L.U. $20, I
have not given them permission to investigate my partners, who I'm married
to, what they do, what my real estate holdings are, what my wealth is, and
who else I give my money to," he said.

 On Nov. 8, the privacy statement on the A.C.L.U. Web site was replaced
with an "Online Privacy Policy." Until that time, the group had pledged to
gather personal information only with the permission of members and donors.
It also said it would not sell or transfer information to a third party or
use it for marketing.

 Those explicit guarantees were eliminated from the Web site after Mr.
Meyers raised his concerns about the new data-mining program at the Nov. 7
meeting.

 After learning of Mr. Spitzer's inquiry, the executive committee of the
board took up the data-mining issue on Dec. 14. Board members are allowed
to listen in on any executive committee meeting, and Mr. Meyers asked the
panel to participate in its conference call.

 The first item on the agenda was whether he could be on the line. The
executive committee voted 9 to 1 to bar him and had a staff member inform
him that the meeting was of the board of the A.C.L.U. Foundation, not the
group's executive committee, and thus he was excluded.

 Mr. Remar, who has been a board member for 18 years, said board members
had been asked to leave executive committee meetings during personnel
discussions, but Mr. Meyers said it was a first.

Mr. Remar said the data collection efforts were a function of the
foundation, and thus the executive committee had met as the foundation
board.

But Mr. Romero convened a meeting of the executive committee, and Mr.
Spitzer's letter was addressed to the A.C.L.U., with no mention of the
foundation.

Mr. Meyers said his exclusion raises a profound issue for other board
members. "Their rationale for excluding me implicitly means that they can't
share anything with the board, but the board as a whole has fiduciary
responsibilities," he said. "How can board members do their duty if
information is withheld from them?"

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Sat Dec 18 22:13:21 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2004 22:13:21 -0800
Subject: [Antisocial] Sept. 11 Conspiracy Theorist
Message-ID: <41C51C00.EC7F6D8B@cdc.gov>

At 06:12 AM 12/19/04 +0100, Anonymous wrote:
>Major Variola typed:
>
>> PS: heard some fedscum mention 'militia and other terrorists' the
other
>> day, what would Gen George W think?
>
>which fedscum, do you have a mentionable source, &c.?

I haven't found the source, I recall that I heard it.  Might have been a

quickie comment on eg the Crystal Cathedral shooter.
(Their depressed music conductor who alas didn't
take Schuller out.)

>reminds of the Reno quote, "They have computers and... other weapons of
mass
>destruction."

..They have computers, they're tappin' phone lines, you know that ain't
allowed..




From mv at cdc.gov  Sat Dec 18 22:22:53 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2004 22:22:53 -0800
Subject: Militia or other Terrorists?
Message-ID: <41C51E3D.C1781EEB@cdc.gov>

>> PS: heard some fedscum mention 'militia and other terrorists' the
other
>> day, what would Gen George W think?
>
>which fedscum, do you have a mentionable source, &c.?

It was ATF, about some gun-robbers; it seems to be a reply to trollbait
by the Faux news channel or spontaneous dreck.




http://www.gunmuse.com/News/Are%20they%20Terrorist%20or%20Militia

Are they Terrorist or MilitiaBY GunMuse

 That was the question asked and answered to by Fox News to the ATF in
Michigan Gun
 store robberies. This is a prime example of where we see our gun
organizations failing to
 take action. Those words are not interchangeable. The Clinton
administration tried to
 make it that way while they rewrote the constitution via executive
orders, and gave away
 federal lands and national treasures (Like the liberty bell) to the
United Nations.

 This is a defamation of character to interchange these words.
Militias are required to by
 the constitution to be a citizen protection from government corruption
and abuse of power
 on its own people.  Its the very reason that the military can not be
used to police US
 citizens for any reason.

 More than 300 firearms have been stolen from local dealers in a short
period of time.  The
 thieves were caught on film using a shotgun to blast open the front
door running to the
 back display cases and grabbing as many pistols as they could carry and
were gone in
 less than 1 minute and 15 seconds.  The ATF said they already had
suspects and had
 issued a federal search warrant in the case and then was asked the
question.  Are the
 robbers terrorist or Militia?  Lumping American patriots and believers
in a strong
 constitutional government in the same boat as those who attacked New
York.




From nobody at paranoici.org  Sat Dec 18 21:12:48 2004
From: nobody at paranoici.org (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 06:12:48 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [Antisocial] Sept. 11 Conspiracy Theorist
In-Reply-To: <41C3CB00.18489F2F@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <81b47cc548c5a9ff25f12337afcae192@paranoici.org>

Major Variola typed:

> If he really gave a shat he'd investigate the RDX stored in the
> Murrah building, next to daycare, but that was just a (.mil trained)
> 'Merican,
> not a bunch of specops Ay-rabs.

the proper pejorative is "'Merkin."

> JYA may be Architects (snicker) but methinks he groks structures,
> and even if not, his cryptome penance absolves him from the sins
> of the artsy.
> 
> PS: heard some fedscum mention 'militia and other terrorists' the other
> day, what would Gen George W think?

which fedscum, do you have a mentionable source, &c.?

reminds of the Reno quote, "They have computers and... other weapons of mass
destruction."




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec 19 07:25:32 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 10:25:32 -0500
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts 
  Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We  Put You There?
Message-ID: <p0611045bbdeb4d563ec4@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig3/monahan1.html>

 LewRockwell.com

Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts Before Throwing
You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why We Put You There?

by  Nicholas Monahan

    ?  ??  ??  ??  

This morning I'll be escorting my wife to the hospital, where the doctors
will perform a caesarean section to remove our first child. She didn't want
to do it this way - neither of us did - but sometimes the Fates decide
otherwise. The Fates or, in our case, government employees.

 On the morning of October 26th Mary and I entered Portland International
Airport, en route to the Las Vegas wedding of one of my best friends.
Although we live in Los Angeles, we'd been in Oregon working on a film, and
up to that point had had nothing but praise to shower on the city of
Portland, a refreshing change of pace from our own suffocating metropolis.

 At the security checkpoint I was led aside for the "inspection" that's all
the rage at airports these days. My shoes were removed. I was told to take
off my sweater, then to fold over the waistband of my pants. My baseball
hat, hastily jammed on my head at 5 AM, was removed and assiduously
examined ("Anything could be in here, sir," I was told, after I asked what
I could hide in a baseball hat. Yeah. Anything.) Soon I was standing on one
foot, my arms stretched out, the other leg sticking out in front of me `la
a DUI test. I began to get pissed off, as most normal people would. My
anger increased when I realized that the newly knighted federal employees
weren't just examining me, but my 712 months pregnant wife as well. I'd
originally thought that I'd simply been randomly selected for the more
excessive than normal search. You know, Number 50 or whatever. Apparently
not though - it was both of us. These are your new threats, America:
pregnant accountants and their sleepy husbands flying to weddings.

After some more grumbling on my part they eventually finished with me and I
went to retrieve our luggage from the x-ray machine. Upon returning I found
my wife sitting in a chair, crying. Mary rarely cries, and certainly not in
public. When I asked her what was the matter, she tried to quell her tears
and sobbed, "I'm sorry...it's...they touched my breasts...and..." That's
all I heard. I marched up to the woman who'd been examining her and
shouted, "What did you do to her?" Later I found out that in addition to
touching her swollen breasts - to protect the American citizenry - the
employee had asked that she lift up her shirt. Not behind a screen, not off
to the side - no, right there, directly in front of the hundred or so
passengers standing in line. And for you women who've been pregnant and
worn maternity pants, you know how ridiculous those things look. "I felt
like a clown," my wife told me later. "On display for all these people,
with the cotton panel on my pants and my stomach sticking out. When I sat
down I just lost my composure and began to cry. That's when you walked up."

Of course when I say she "told me later," it's because she wasn't able to
tell me at the time, because as soon as I demanded to know what the federal
employee had done to make her cry, I was swarmed by Portland police
officers. Instantly. Three of them, cinching my arms, locking me in
handcuffs, and telling me I was under arrest. Now my wife really began to
cry. As they led me away and she ran alongside, I implored her to calm
down, to think of the baby, promising her that everything would turn out
all right. She faded into the distance and I was shoved into an elevator, a
cop holding each arm. After making me face the corner, the head honcho told
that I was under arrest and that I wouldn't be flying that day - that I was
in fact a "menace."

It took me a while to regain my composure. I felt like I was one of those
guys in The Gulag Archipelago who, because the proceedings all seem so
unreal, doesn't fully realize that he is in fact being arrested in a public
place in front of crowds of people for...for what? I didn't know what the
crime was. Didn't matter. Once upstairs, the officers made me remove my
shoes and my hat and tossed me into a cell. Yes, your airports have prison
cells, just like your amusement parks, train stations, universities, and
national forests. Let freedom reign.

 After a short time I received a visit from the arresting officer. "Mr.
Monahan," he started, "Are you on drugs?"

Was this even real? "No, I'm not on drugs."

"Should you be?"

"What do you mean?"

"Should you be on any type of medication?"

"No."

"Then why'd you react that way back there?"

You see the thinking? You see what passes for reasoning among your domestic
shock troops these days? Only "whackos" get angry over seeing the woman
they've been with for ten years in tears because someone has touched her
breasts. That kind of reaction - love, protection - it's mind-boggling!
"Mr. Monahan, are you on drugs?" His snide words rang inside my head. This
is my wife, finally pregnant with our first child after months of failed
attempts, after the depressing shock of the miscarriage last year, my wife
who'd been walking on a cloud over having the opportunity to be a
mother...and my anger is simply unfathomable to the guy standing in front
of me, the guy who earns a living thanks to my taxes, the guy whose family
I feed through my labor. What I did wasn't normal. No, I reacted like a
drug addict would've. I was so disgusted I felt like vomiting. But that was
just the beginning.

An hour later, after I'd been gallantly assured by the officer that I
wouldn't be attending my friend's wedding that day, I heard Mary's voice
outside my cell. The officer was speaking loudly, letting her know that he
was planning on doing me a favor... which everyone knows is never a real
favor. He wasn't going to come over and help me work on my car or move some
furniture. No, his "favor" was this: He'd decided not to charge me with a
felony.

 Think about that for a second. Rapes, car-jackings, murders, arsons -
those are felonies. So is yelling in an airport now, apparently. I hadn't
realized, though I should have. Luckily, I was getting a favor, though. I
was merely going to be slapped with a misdemeanor.

 "Here's your court date," he said as I was released from my cell. In
addition, I was banned from Portland International for 90 days, and just in
case I was thinking of coming over and hanging out around its perimeter,
the officer gave me a map with the boundaries highlighted, sternly warning
me against trespassing. Then he and a second officer escorted us off the
grounds. Mary and I hurriedly drove two and a half hours in the rain to
Seattle, where we eventually caught a flight to Vegas. But the officer was
true to his word - we missed my friend's wedding. The fact that he'd been
in my own wedding party, the fact that a once in a lifetime event was
stolen from us - well, who cares, right?

Upon our return to Portland (I'd had to fly into Seattle and drive back
down), we immediately began contacting attorneys. We aren't litigious
people - we wanted no money. I'm not even sure what we fully wanted. An
apology? A reprimand? I don't know. It doesn't matter though, because we
couldn't afford a lawyer, it turned out. $4,000 was the average figure
bandied about as a retaining fee. Sorry, but I've got a new baby on the
way. So we called the ACLU, figuring they existed for just such incidents
as these. And they do apparently...but only if we were minorities. That's
what they told us.

 In the meantime, I'd appealed my suspension from PDX. A week or so later I
got a response from the Director of Aviation. After telling me how, in the
aftermath of 9/11, most passengers not only accept additional airport
screening but welcome it, he cut to the chase:

"After a review of the police report and my discussions with police staff,
as well as a review of the TSA's report on this incident, I concur with the
officer's decision to take you into custody and to issue a citation to you
for disorderly conduct. That being said, because I also understand that you
were upset and acted on your emotions, I am willing to lift the Airport
Exclusion Order...."

Attached to this letter was the report the officer had filled out. I'd like
to say I couldn't believe it, but in a way, I could. It's seemingly
becoming the norm in America - lies and deliberate distortions on the part
of those in power, no matter how much or how little power they actually
wield.

 The gist of his report was this: From the get go I wasn't following the
screener's directions. I was "squinting my eyes" and talking to my wife in
a "low, forced voice" while "excitedly swinging my arms." Twice I began to
walk away from the screener, inhaling and exhaling forcefully. When I'd
completed the physical exam, I walked to the luggage screening area, where
a second screener took a pair of scissors from my suitcase. At this point I
yelled, "What the %*&$% is going on? This is &*#&$%!" The officer, who'd
already been called over by one of the screeners, became afraid for the TSA
staff and the many travelers. He required the assistance of a second
officer as he "struggled" to get me into handcuffs, then for "cover" called
over a third as well. It was only at this point that my wife began to cry
hysterically.

 There was nothing poetic in my reaction to the arrest report. I didn't
crumple it in my fist and swear that justice would be served, promising to
sacrifice my resources and time to see that it would. I simply stared.
Clearly the officer didn't have the guts to write down what had really
happened. It might not look too good to see that stuff about the pregnant
woman in tears because she'd been humiliated. Instead this was the official
scenario being presented for the permanent record. It doesn't even matter
that it's the most implausible sounding situation you can think of. "Hey,
what the...godammit, they're taking our scissors, honey!" Why didn't he
write in anything about a monkey wearing a fez?

True, the TSA staff had expropriated a pair of scissors from our toiletries
kit - the story wasn't entirely made up. Except that I'd been locked in
airport jail at the time. I didn't know anything about any scissors until
Mary told me on our drive up to Seattle. They'd questioned her about them
while I was in the bowels of the airport sitting in my cell.

 So I wrote back, indignation and disgust flooding my brain.

 "[W]hile I'm not sure, I'd guess that the entire incident is captured on
video. Memory is imperfect on everyone's part, but the footage won't lie. I
realize it might be procedurally difficult for you to view this, but if you
could, I'd appreciate it. There's no willful disregard of screening
directions. No explosion over the discovery of a pair of scissors in a
suitcase. No struggle to put handcuffs on. There's a tired man, early in
the morning, unhappily going through a rigorous procedure and then reacting
to the tears of his pregnant wife."

 Eventually we heard back from a different person, the guy in charge of the
TSA airport screeners. One of his employees had made the damning statement
about me exploding over her scissor discovery, and the officer had deftly
incorporated that statement into his report. We asked the guy if he could
find out why she'd said this - couldn't she possibly be mistaken? "Oh,
can't do that, my hands are tied. It's kind of like leading a witness - I
could get in trouble, heh heh." Then what about the videotape? Why not
watch that? That would exonerate me. "Oh, we destroy all video after three
days."

 Sure you do.

A few days later we heard from him again. He just wanted to inform us that
he'd received corroboration of the officer's report from the officer's
superior, a name we didn't recognize. "But...he wasn't even there," my wife
said.

 "Yeah, well, uh, he's corroborated it though."

That's how it works.

"Oh, and we did look at the videotape. Inconclusive."

But I thought it was destroyed?

On and on it went. Due to the tenacity of my wife in making phone calls and
speaking with relevant persons, the "crime" was eventually lowered to a
mere citation. Only she could have done that. I would've simply accepted
what was being thrown at me, trumped up charges and all, simply because I'm
wholly inadequate at performing the kowtow. There's no way I could have
contacted all the people Mary did and somehow pretend to be contrite.
Besides, I speak in a low, forced voice, which doesn't elicit sympathy.
Just police suspicion.

 Weeks later at the courthouse I listened to a young DA awkwardly read the
charges against me - "Mr. Monahan...umm...shouted obscenities at the
airport staff...umm... umm...oh, they took some scissors from his suitcase
and he became...umm...abusive at this point." If I was reading about it in
Kafka I might have found something vaguely amusing in all of it. But I
wasn't. I was there. Living it.

I entered a plea of nolo contendere, explaining to the judge that if I'd
been a resident of Oregon, I would have definitely pled "Not Guilty."
However, when that happens, your case automatically goes to a jury trial,
and since I lived a thousand miles away, and was slated to return home in
seven days, with a newborn due in a matter of weeks...you get the picture.
"No Contest" it was. Judgment: $250 fine.

 Did I feel happy? Only $250, right? No, I wasn't happy. I don't care if
it's twelve cents, that's money pulled right out of my baby's mouth and fed
to a disgusting legal system that will use it to propagate more incidents
like this. But at the very least it was over, right? Wrong.

 When we returned to Los Angeles there was an envelope waiting for me from
the court. Inside wasn't a receipt for the money we'd paid. No, it was a
letter telling me that what I actually owed was $309 - state assessed court
costs, you know. Wouldn't you think your taxes pay for that - the state
putting you on trial? No, taxes are used to hire more cops like the
officer, because with our rising criminal population - people like me -
hey, your average citizen demands more and more "security."

Finally I reach the piece de resistance. The week before we'd gone to the
airport my wife had had her regular pre-natal checkup. The child had
settled into the proper head down position for birth, continuing the
remarkable pregnancy she'd been having. We returned to Portland on Sunday.
On Mary's Monday appointment she was suddenly told, "Looks like your baby's
gone breech." When she later spoke with her midwives in Los Angeles, they
wanted to know if she'd experienced any type of trauma recently, as this
often makes a child flip. "As a matter of fact..." she began, recounting
the story, explaining how the child inside of her was going absolutely
crazy when she was crying as the police were leading me away through the
crowd.

 My wife had been planning a natural childbirth. She'd read dozens of
books, meticulously researched everything, and had finally decided that
this was the way for her. No drugs, no numbing of sensations - just that
ultimate combination of brute pain and sheer joy that belongs exclusively
to mothers. But my wife is also a first-time mother, so she has what is
called an "untested" pelvis. Essentially this means that a breech birth is
too dangerous to attempt, for both mother and child. Therefore, she's now
relegated to a c-section - hospital stay, epidural, catheter, fetal
monitoring, stitches - everything she didn't want. Her natural birth has
become a surgery.

 We've tried everything to turn that baby. Acupuncture, chiropractic
techniques, underwater handstands, elephant walking, moxibustion, bending
backwards over pillows, herbs, external manipulation - all to no avail.
When I walked into the living room the other night and saw her plaintively
cooing with a flashlight turned onto her stomach, yet another suggested
technique, my heart almost broke. It's breaking now as I write these words.

I can never prove that my child went breech because of what happened to us
at the airport. But I'll always believe it. Wrongly or rightly, I'll
forever think of how this man, the personification of this system, has
affected the lives of my family and me. When my wife is sliced open, I'll
be thinking of him. When they remove her uterus from her abdomen and lay it
on her stomach, I'll be thinking of him. When I visit her and my child in
the hospital instead of having them with me here in our home, I'll be
thinking of him. When I assist her to the bathroom while the incision heals
internally, I'll be thinking of him.

 There are plenty of stories like this these days. I don't know how many
I've read where the writer describes some breach of civil liberties by
employees of the state, then wraps it all up with a dire warning about what
we as a nation are becoming, and how if we don't put an end to it now, then
we're in for heaps of trouble. Well you know what? Nothing's going to stop
the inevitable. There's no policy change that's going to save us. There's
no election that's going to put a halt to the onslaught of tyranny. It's
here already - this country has changed for the worse and will continue to
change for the worse. There is now a division between the citizenry and the
state. When that state is used as a tool against me, there is no longer any
reason why I should owe any allegiance to that state.

And that's the first thing that child of ours is going to learn.

December 21, 2002

Nick Monahan works in the film industry. He writes out of Los Angeles where
he lives with his wife and as of December 18th, his beautiful new son.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec 19 07:50:11 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 10:50:11 -0500
Subject: Identity theft isn't always online crime
Message-ID: <p0611044abdeb4d2432f5@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.indystar.com/articles/3/203066-4663-P.html>



Color of Money: Michelle Singletary
Identity theft isn't always online crime

December 19, 2004
  


Although online shopping has its risks, your credit-card number and other
personal information are just as likely to be stolen in a very low-tech way.

To identity thieves, a crowded mall is like Chuck E. Cheese is to children
-- a paradise of commotion. Criminals are just waiting for you to leave
your purse unattended or open as you hustle around looking for holiday
gifts. They love men who carry their wallets in easy-to-pick places.

According to an American Express study, consumers have a lot to learn about
protecting themselves against identity theft.

While 77 percent claim they take precautions to secure their information,
nearly half still make the mistake of carrying their Social Security
numbers in their wallets. Twenty-eight percent of those surveyed don't
check to see if a Web site is secure when shopping online.

Here are some tips to help you avoid being a victim of holiday identity
thieves:

* Write "check photo ID" in ink on the back of your credit card near your
signature. This is an effective way of getting cashiers to check the credit
card against your photo identification.

* Michael J. Zmistowski, a financial adviser in Tampa, Fla., sent this tip
to his clients: While shopping, watch out for anyone standing nearby who
has a cell phone with a camera. Someone can easily take a clear picture of
the data on your credit card.

* Come January, you may not want to look at your credit-card statements.
But you must. Open them immediately and check for unfamiliar purchases. In
fact, keep all the receipts from your holiday shopping sprees in one place
so you can cross- check them with your statements.

* Don't be a victim of "phishing," in which crooks send e-mails that look
as if they come from legitimate companies requesting certain information.
According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group, phishing e-mails persuade up
to 5 percent of recipients to respond. When they do, consumers typically
provide information such as credit-card, bank and Social Security numbers
or user names and passwords -- resulting in identity theft. Be suspicious
of e-mail that is sent to you unsolicited.

* Buy a shredder and use it, especially to destroy any store receipts with
your full credit-card number.

* If you shop online, make sure the site is secure. According to the Better
Business Bureau, sites that have technology to secure transactions will
have "https" instead of "http" in the Web address of the page that asks for
credit-card information. Another indication the site is secure is an icon
of a locked padlock.

* If you suspect that your identity has been stolen, don't wait until after
the holidays to report the crime. You need to contact your creditors and
the three major credit bureaus immediately. You need to call only one
credit bureau to place fraud alerts on all three of your credit reports.

A fraud alert is supposed to result in creditors contacting you before
opening any new accounts or making changes to your existing accounts.

The Federal Trade Commission has a link on its Web site outlining steps to
take if you are a victim of identity theft. Go to www.ftc.gov, and click on
the link for consumers.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From measl at mfn.org  Sun Dec 19 08:53:26 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 10:53:26 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
   Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We  Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <p0611045bbdeb4d563ec4@[68.167.57.91]>
References: <p0611045bbdeb4d563ec4@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <20041219104655.L28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>

Several points come to mind:

(1) Mr. Monahan seems to think that lies on police reports are an artifact
of 9/11.  Welcome to the real world Mr. Monahan.

(2) Monahan, and those like him who continue to fly, have nobody to blame
but themselves: if you continue to feed these assholes by buying those
tickets, then you have it coming: simple economics.  If people refuse to
fly, this will stop.

(3) As to the ACLU, again, welcome to the real world.  Many of us have
been down that road before you Mr. Monahan - while the ACLU is not a bad
thing per se, they are a lot like the cops and courts: they are not there
for any one individual, there are there for "the big picture".  And the
Big Picture requires money, which means you must be a minority (since how
can anyone of the majority ever be "oppressed"?).  In a nutshell, Fuck The
ACLU.

(4) Lastly, as to your cesarian, fuck you and your wife, and her
cesearean.  We don't give a shit about your personal problems, just like
you don't care about ours.  Sure, it makes for a pulpy little story, but
when you get right down to it, do we really care?  No.  Because, again,
you helped to create this beast you are now bitching about, and after it
bit you, you *continued to fly*, and thereby feed it some more.

--
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner






On Sun, 19 Dec 2004, R.A. Hettinga wrote:

> Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 10:25:32 -0500
> From: R.A. Hettinga <rah at shipwright.com>
> To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
> Subject: Coffee, Tea,
>      or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts Before Throwing You in a
>     Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why We Put You There?
>
>
> <http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig3/monahan1.html>
>
>  LewRockwell.com
>
> Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts Before Throwing
> You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why We Put You There?
>
> by  Nicholas Monahan
>
>     ?  ??  ??  ??
>
> This morning I'll be escorting my wife to the hospital, where the doctors
> will perform a caesarean section to remove our first child. She didn't want
> to do it this way - neither of us did - but sometimes the Fates decide
> otherwise. The Fates or, in our case, government employees.
>
>  On the morning of October 26th Mary and I entered Portland International
> Airport, en route to the Las Vegas wedding of one of my best friends.
> Although we live in Los Angeles, we'd been in Oregon working on a film, and
> up to that point had had nothing but praise to shower on the city of
> Portland, a refreshing change of pace from our own suffocating metropolis.
>
>  At the security checkpoint I was led aside for the "inspection" that's all
> the rage at airports these days. My shoes were removed. I was told to take
> off my sweater, then to fold over the waistband of my pants. My baseball
> hat, hastily jammed on my head at 5 AM, was removed and assiduously
> examined ("Anything could be in here, sir," I was told, after I asked what
> I could hide in a baseball hat. Yeah. Anything.) Soon I was standing on one
> foot, my arms stretched out, the other leg sticking out in front of me `la
> a DUI test. I began to get pissed off, as most normal people would. My
> anger increased when I realized that the newly knighted federal employees
> weren't just examining me, but my 712 months pregnant wife as well. I'd
> originally thought that I'd simply been randomly selected for the more
> excessive than normal search. You know, Number 50 or whatever. Apparently
> not though - it was both of us. These are your new threats, America:
> pregnant accountants and their sleepy husbands flying to weddings.
>
> After some more grumbling on my part they eventually finished with me and I
> went to retrieve our luggage from the x-ray machine. Upon returning I found
> my wife sitting in a chair, crying. Mary rarely cries, and certainly not in
> public. When I asked her what was the matter, she tried to quell her tears
> and sobbed, "I'm sorry...it's...they touched my breasts...and..." That's
> all I heard. I marched up to the woman who'd been examining her and
> shouted, "What did you do to her?" Later I found out that in addition to
> touching her swollen breasts - to protect the American citizenry - the
> employee had asked that she lift up her shirt. Not behind a screen, not off
> to the side - no, right there, directly in front of the hundred or so
> passengers standing in line. And for you women who've been pregnant and
> worn maternity pants, you know how ridiculous those things look. "I felt
> like a clown," my wife told me later. "On display for all these people,
> with the cotton panel on my pants and my stomach sticking out. When I sat
> down I just lost my composure and began to cry. That's when you walked up."
>
> Of course when I say she "told me later," it's because she wasn't able to
> tell me at the time, because as soon as I demanded to know what the federal
> employee had done to make her cry, I was swarmed by Portland police
> officers. Instantly. Three of them, cinching my arms, locking me in
> handcuffs, and telling me I was under arrest. Now my wife really began to
> cry. As they led me away and she ran alongside, I implored her to calm
> down, to think of the baby, promising her that everything would turn out
> all right. She faded into the distance and I was shoved into an elevator, a
> cop holding each arm. After making me face the corner, the head honcho told
> that I was under arrest and that I wouldn't be flying that day - that I was
> in fact a "menace."
>
> It took me a while to regain my composure. I felt like I was one of those
> guys in The Gulag Archipelago who, because the proceedings all seem so
> unreal, doesn't fully realize that he is in fact being arrested in a public
> place in front of crowds of people for...for what? I didn't know what the
> crime was. Didn't matter. Once upstairs, the officers made me remove my
> shoes and my hat and tossed me into a cell. Yes, your airports have prison
> cells, just like your amusement parks, train stations, universities, and
> national forests. Let freedom reign.
>
>  After a short time I received a visit from the arresting officer. "Mr.
> Monahan," he started, "Are you on drugs?"
>
> Was this even real? "No, I'm not on drugs."
>
> "Should you be?"
>
> "What do you mean?"
>
> "Should you be on any type of medication?"
>
> "No."
>
> "Then why'd you react that way back there?"
>
> You see the thinking? You see what passes for reasoning among your domestic
> shock troops these days? Only "whackos" get angry over seeing the woman
> they've been with for ten years in tears because someone has touched her
> breasts. That kind of reaction - love, protection - it's mind-boggling!
> "Mr. Monahan, are you on drugs?" His snide words rang inside my head. This
> is my wife, finally pregnant with our first child after months of failed
> attempts, after the depressing shock of the miscarriage last year, my wife
> who'd been walking on a cloud over having the opportunity to be a
> mother...and my anger is simply unfathomable to the guy standing in front
> of me, the guy who earns a living thanks to my taxes, the guy whose family
> I feed through my labor. What I did wasn't normal. No, I reacted like a
> drug addict would've. I was so disgusted I felt like vomiting. But that was
> just the beginning.
>
> An hour later, after I'd been gallantly assured by the officer that I
> wouldn't be attending my friend's wedding that day, I heard Mary's voice
> outside my cell. The officer was speaking loudly, letting her know that he
> was planning on doing me a favor... which everyone knows is never a real
> favor. He wasn't going to come over and help me work on my car or move some
> furniture. No, his "favor" was this: He'd decided not to charge me with a
> felony.
>
>  Think about that for a second. Rapes, car-jackings, murders, arsons -
> those are felonies. So is yelling in an airport now, apparently. I hadn't
> realized, though I should have. Luckily, I was getting a favor, though. I
> was merely going to be slapped with a misdemeanor.
>
>  "Here's your court date," he said as I was released from my cell. In
> addition, I was banned from Portland International for 90 days, and just in
> case I was thinking of coming over and hanging out around its perimeter,
> the officer gave me a map with the boundaries highlighted, sternly warning
> me against trespassing. Then he and a second officer escorted us off the
> grounds. Mary and I hurriedly drove two and a half hours in the rain to
> Seattle, where we eventually caught a flight to Vegas. But the officer was
> true to his word - we missed my friend's wedding. The fact that he'd been
> in my own wedding party, the fact that a once in a lifetime event was
> stolen from us - well, who cares, right?
>
> Upon our return to Portland (I'd had to fly into Seattle and drive back
> down), we immediately began contacting attorneys. We aren't litigious
> people - we wanted no money. I'm not even sure what we fully wanted. An
> apology? A reprimand? I don't know. It doesn't matter though, because we
> couldn't afford a lawyer, it turned out. $4,000 was the average figure
> bandied about as a retaining fee. Sorry, but I've got a new baby on the
> way. So we called the ACLU, figuring they existed for just such incidents
> as these. And they do apparently...but only if we were minorities. That's
> what they told us.
>
>  In the meantime, I'd appealed my suspension from PDX. A week or so later I
> got a response from the Director of Aviation. After telling me how, in the
> aftermath of 9/11, most passengers not only accept additional airport
> screening but welcome it, he cut to the chase:
>
> "After a review of the police report and my discussions with police staff,
> as well as a review of the TSA's report on this incident, I concur with the
> officer's decision to take you into custody and to issue a citation to you
> for disorderly conduct. That being said, because I also understand that you
> were upset and acted on your emotions, I am willing to lift the Airport
> Exclusion Order...."
>
> Attached to this letter was the report the officer had filled out. I'd like
> to say I couldn't believe it, but in a way, I could. It's seemingly
> becoming the norm in America - lies and deliberate distortions on the part
> of those in power, no matter how much or how little power they actually
> wield.
>
>  The gist of his report was this: From the get go I wasn't following the
> screener's directions. I was "squinting my eyes" and talking to my wife in
> a "low, forced voice" while "excitedly swinging my arms." Twice I began to
> walk away from the screener, inhaling and exhaling forcefully. When I'd
> completed the physical exam, I walked to the luggage screening area, where
> a second screener took a pair of scissors from my suitcase. At this point I
> yelled, "What the %*&$% is going on? This is &*#&$%!" The officer, who'd
> already been called over by one of the screeners, became afraid for the TSA
> staff and the many travelers. He required the assistance of a second
> officer as he "struggled" to get me into handcuffs, then for "cover" called
> over a third as well. It was only at this point that my wife began to cry
> hysterically.
>
>  There was nothing poetic in my reaction to the arrest report. I didn't
> crumple it in my fist and swear that justice would be served, promising to
> sacrifice my resources and time to see that it would. I simply stared.
> Clearly the officer didn't have the guts to write down what had really
> happened. It might not look too good to see that stuff about the pregnant
> woman in tears because she'd been humiliated. Instead this was the official
> scenario being presented for the permanent record. It doesn't even matter
> that it's the most implausible sounding situation you can think of. "Hey,
> what the...godammit, they're taking our scissors, honey!" Why didn't he
> write in anything about a monkey wearing a fez?
>
> True, the TSA staff had expropriated a pair of scissors from our toiletries
> kit - the story wasn't entirely made up. Except that I'd been locked in
> airport jail at the time. I didn't know anything about any scissors until
> Mary told me on our drive up to Seattle. They'd questioned her about them
> while I was in the bowels of the airport sitting in my cell.
>
>  So I wrote back, indignation and disgust flooding my brain.
>
>  "[W]hile I'm not sure, I'd guess that the entire incident is captured on
> video. Memory is imperfect on everyone's part, but the footage won't lie. I
> realize it might be procedurally difficult for you to view this, but if you
> could, I'd appreciate it. There's no willful disregard of screening
> directions. No explosion over the discovery of a pair of scissors in a
> suitcase. No struggle to put handcuffs on. There's a tired man, early in
> the morning, unhappily going through a rigorous procedure and then reacting
> to the tears of his pregnant wife."
>
>  Eventually we heard back from a different person, the guy in charge of the
> TSA airport screeners. One of his employees had made the damning statement
> about me exploding over her scissor discovery, and the officer had deftly
> incorporated that statement into his report. We asked the guy if he could
> find out why she'd said this - couldn't she possibly be mistaken? "Oh,
> can't do that, my hands are tied. It's kind of like leading a witness - I
> could get in trouble, heh heh." Then what about the videotape? Why not
> watch that? That would exonerate me. "Oh, we destroy all video after three
> days."
>
>  Sure you do.
>
> A few days later we heard from him again. He just wanted to inform us that
> he'd received corroboration of the officer's report from the officer's
> superior, a name we didn't recognize. "But...he wasn't even there," my wife
> said.
>
>  "Yeah, well, uh, he's corroborated it though."
>
> That's how it works.
>
> "Oh, and we did look at the videotape. Inconclusive."
>
> But I thought it was destroyed?
>
> On and on it went. Due to the tenacity of my wife in making phone calls and
> speaking with relevant persons, the "crime" was eventually lowered to a
> mere citation. Only she could have done that. I would've simply accepted
> what was being thrown at me, trumped up charges and all, simply because I'm
> wholly inadequate at performing the kowtow. There's no way I could have
> contacted all the people Mary did and somehow pretend to be contrite.
> Besides, I speak in a low, forced voice, which doesn't elicit sympathy.
> Just police suspicion.
>
>  Weeks later at the courthouse I listened to a young DA awkwardly read the
> charges against me - "Mr. Monahan...umm...shouted obscenities at the
> airport staff...umm... umm...oh, they took some scissors from his suitcase
> and he became...umm...abusive at this point." If I was reading about it in
> Kafka I might have found something vaguely amusing in all of it. But I
> wasn't. I was there. Living it.
>
> I entered a plea of nolo contendere, explaining to the judge that if I'd
> been a resident of Oregon, I would have definitely pled "Not Guilty."
> However, when that happens, your case automatically goes to a jury trial,
> and since I lived a thousand miles away, and was slated to return home in
> seven days, with a newborn due in a matter of weeks...you get the picture.
> "No Contest" it was. Judgment: $250 fine.
>
>  Did I feel happy? Only $250, right? No, I wasn't happy. I don't care if
> it's twelve cents, that's money pulled right out of my baby's mouth and fed
> to a disgusting legal system that will use it to propagate more incidents
> like this. But at the very least it was over, right? Wrong.
>
>  When we returned to Los Angeles there was an envelope waiting for me from
> the court. Inside wasn't a receipt for the money we'd paid. No, it was a
> letter telling me that what I actually owed was $309 - state assessed court
> costs, you know. Wouldn't you think your taxes pay for that - the state
> putting you on trial? No, taxes are used to hire more cops like the
> officer, because with our rising criminal population - people like me -
> hey, your average citizen demands more and more "security."
>
> Finally I reach the piece de resistance. The week before we'd gone to the
> airport my wife had had her regular pre-natal checkup. The child had
> settled into the proper head down position for birth, continuing the
> remarkable pregnancy she'd been having. We returned to Portland on Sunday.
> On Mary's Monday appointment she was suddenly told, "Looks like your baby's
> gone breech." When she later spoke with her midwives in Los Angeles, they
> wanted to know if she'd experienced any type of trauma recently, as this
> often makes a child flip. "As a matter of fact..." she began, recounting
> the story, explaining how the child inside of her was going absolutely
> crazy when she was crying as the police were leading me away through the
> crowd.
>
>  My wife had been planning a natural childbirth. She'd read dozens of
> books, meticulously researched everything, and had finally decided that
> this was the way for her. No drugs, no numbing of sensations - just that
> ultimate combination of brute pain and sheer joy that belongs exclusively
> to mothers. But my wife is also a first-time mother, so she has what is
> called an "untested" pelvis. Essentially this means that a breech birth is
> too dangerous to attempt, for both mother and child. Therefore, she's now
> relegated to a c-section - hospital stay, epidural, catheter, fetal
> monitoring, stitches - everything she didn't want. Her natural birth has
> become a surgery.
>
>  We've tried everything to turn that baby. Acupuncture, chiropractic
> techniques, underwater handstands, elephant walking, moxibustion, bending
> backwards over pillows, herbs, external manipulation - all to no avail.
> When I walked into the living room the other night and saw her plaintively
> cooing with a flashlight turned onto her stomach, yet another suggested
> technique, my heart almost broke. It's breaking now as I write these words.
>
> I can never prove that my child went breech because of what happened to us
> at the airport. But I'll always believe it. Wrongly or rightly, I'll
> forever think of how this man, the personification of this system, has
> affected the lives of my family and me. When my wife is sliced open, I'll
> be thinking of him. When they remove her uterus from her abdomen and lay it
> on her stomach, I'll be thinking of him. When I visit her and my child in
> the hospital instead of having them with me here in our home, I'll be
> thinking of him. When I assist her to the bathroom while the incision heals
> internally, I'll be thinking of him.
>
>  There are plenty of stories like this these days. I don't know how many
> I've read where the writer describes some breach of civil liberties by
> employees of the state, then wraps it all up with a dire warning about what
> we as a nation are becoming, and how if we don't put an end to it now, then
> we're in for heaps of trouble. Well you know what? Nothing's going to stop
> the inevitable. There's no policy change that's going to save us. There's
> no election that's going to put a halt to the onslaught of tyranny. It's
> here already - this country has changed for the worse and will continue to
> change for the worse. There is now a division between the citizenry and the
> state. When that state is used as a tool against me, there is no longer any
> reason why I should owe any allegiance to that state.
>
> And that's the first thing that child of ours is going to learn.
>
> December 21, 2002
>
> Nick Monahan works in the film industry. He writes out of Los Angeles where
> he lives with his wife and as of December 18th, his beautiful new son.




From skquinn at speakeasy.net  Sun Dec 19 09:51:45 2004
From: skquinn at speakeasy.net (Shawn K. Quinn)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 11:51:45 -0600
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
  	Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We  	Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <20041219104655.L28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <p0611045bbdeb4d563ec4@[68.167.57.91]> 	
  <20041219104655.L28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <1103478706.7020.13.camel@xevious>

On Sun, 2004-12-19 at 10:53 -0600, J.A. Terranson wrote:
> (1) Mr. Monahan seems to think that lies on police reports are an
> artifact of 9/11.  Welcome to the real world Mr. Monahan.

I can concur with this, though it wouldn't surprise me if lying on
police reports has increased since then.

> (2) Monahan, and those like him who continue to fly, have nobody to
> blame but themselves: if you continue to feed these assholes by buying
> those tickets, then you have it coming: simple economics.  If people
> refuse to fly, this will stop.

He may not have a choice. There are three choices for intracity travel
in the US: air, automobile (I'm lumping intracity buses in with personal
cars here for a reason that will be obvious later), and train. 

First, let's look at automobile travel, which includes buses. There is
one major intracity bus company left and that's Greyhound. They tend to
be cheap, and thus attract people who can't afford to fly. The only
advantage over driving your own car, is you don't have to worry about
doing the driving yourself ("Go Greyhound and leave the driving to us"
if you remember the old commercials). Generally, automobile travel is
nearly unworkable if you're going farther than, say, a 10-hour drive or
about 500 miles.

As for Amtrak (the last passenger rail line left), well, that may be
just as bad in most cases. I have heard that the government subsidies of
Amtrak are being dropped to lower and lower levels, and as such they are
not making enough money to operate at acceptable standards to most of
us. Read misc.transport.rail sometime and you will see what I mean.
Also, you don't get there that much faster than with automobile travel,
and I think it may actually cost more.

> (3) As to the ACLU, again, welcome to the real world.  Many of us have
> been down that road before you Mr. Monahan - while the ACLU is not a
> bad thing per se, they are a lot like the cops and courts: they are
> not there for any one individual, there are there for "the big
> picture".  And the Big Picture requires money, which means you must be
> a minority (since how can anyone of the majority ever be
> "oppressed"?).  In a nutshell, Fuck The ACLU.

I wouldn't speak so ill of the ACLU. Groups like the ACLU are just about
the last thing standing between what's left of our democracy and an
outright dictatorship.

White people aren't even necessarily the "majority" anymore.

> (4) Lastly, as to your cesarian, fuck you and your wife, and her
> cesearean.  We don't give a shit about your personal problems, just
> like you don't care about ours.  Sure, it makes for a pulpy little
> story, but when you get right down to it, do we really care?  No.
> Because, again, you helped to create this beast you are now bitching
> about, and after it bit you, you *continued to fly*, and thereby feed
> it some more.

This is downright insensitive. (Mr. Monahan, if you actually get to read
this, Terranson does *not* represent the views of all of us in the
least.) I really have a good mind to archive this and send it back to
you when your wife gets pregnant and something similar happens to you.

And again, he likely didn't continue to fly because he wanted to. See #2
above.

-- 
Shawn K. Quinn <skquinn at speakeasy.net>




From measl at mfn.org  Sun Dec 19 10:01:56 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 12:01:56 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
   Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We   Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <1103478706.7020.13.camel@xevious>
References: <p0611045bbdeb4d563ec4@[68.167.57.91]> 
  <20041219104655.L28241@ubzr.zsa.bet> 
  <1103478706.7020.13.camel@xevious>
Message-ID: <20041219115706.K28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sun, 19 Dec 2004, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:

> He may not have a choice.

Bullshit.  100% bullshit.  Unless you are trying to cover a lot of lake,
flying is an option, not a requirement.  Driving sucks - I do it a lot,
and hate every mile of it - but it *is* an option.

Remember the buses.  Remember what happened when "them negroes got uppity
and stopped taking the bus"?


> > (4) Lastly, as to your cesarian, fuck you and your wife, and her
> > cesearean.  We don't give a shit about your personal problems, just
> > like you don't care about ours.  Sure, it makes for a pulpy little
> > story, but when you get right down to it, do we really care?  No.
> > Because, again, you helped to create this beast you are now bitching
> > about, and after it bit you, you *continued to fly*, and thereby feed
> > it some more.
>
> This is downright insensitive. (Mr. Monahan, if you actually get to read
> this, Terranson does *not* represent the views of all of us in the
> least.) I really have a good mind to archive this and send it back to
> you when your wife gets pregnant and something similar happens to you.

Archive any fucking thing you want, and send it to whomever you like,
whenever you like.  Insensitive?  Maybe.  But it's true as well.  I have
zero tolerance for you and Monahan and those like you, who will feed this
bitch while continuing to complain.

Put up or shut up.  Fly or don't.  But if you're going to feed this
fucker, then you *will* eventually pay this kind of price - and you will
have DESERVED IT.  If for no other reason than you helped to heap it upon
other through your financial support.


> And again, he likely didn't continue to fly because he wanted to. See #2
> above.

And, again, Bullshit.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From skquinn at speakeasy.net  Sun Dec 19 10:24:14 2004
From: skquinn at speakeasy.net (Shawn K. Quinn)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 12:24:14 -0600
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
  	Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We   	Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <20041219115706.K28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <p0611045bbdeb4d563ec4@[68.167.57.91]> 	
  <20041219104655.L28241@ubzr.zsa.bet> 
  <1103478706.7020.13.camel@xevious> 	
  <20041219115706.K28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <1103480655.7020.17.camel@xevious>

On Sun, 2004-12-19 at 12:01 -0600, J.A. Terranson wrote:
> On Sun, 19 Dec 2004, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:
> 
> > He may not have a choice.
> 
> Bullshit.  100% bullshit.  Unless you are trying to cover a lot of
> lake, flying is an option, not a requirement.  Driving sucks - I do it
> a lot, and hate every mile of it - but it *is* an option.

If you need to get from, say, Houston to Seattle, in less than a full
day, how is driving an option?

> Remember the buses.  Remember what happened when "them negroes got
> uppity and stopped taking the bus"?

Those were local transit buses, not intercity buses. Huge difference.

-- 
Shawn K. Quinn <skquinn at speakeasy.net>




From jya at pipeline.com  Sun Dec 19 12:43:46 2004
From: jya at pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 12:43:46 -0800
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's  
  Breasts Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying  
  About Why We Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <20041219104655.L28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <p0611045bbdeb4d563ec4@[68.167.57.91]> 
  <p0611045bbdeb4d563ec4@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <E1Cg5AV-00016f-00@blount.mail.mindspring.net>

Excellent rejoinder to Mr. Monahan. The same could be
said of the Internet, hell, make a leap, same applies to 
the government. Stop using the Net and digital security 
and privacy problems will vanish. Stop paying taxes and 
the gov will disappear. Nothing about 9/11 changed that.

Well, the Net got more invasive and the gov more
intrusive. Still, just give them both up, retreat to the
hilltop or Okefenokee or no census nabe, eat spiders 
and snakes and varmints or even better get eaten by 
them, your cold dead middle finger marking the scene 
of dawinism off the grid.

Meanwhile a small fat-bellied band in the heartland of
birght-lit luxury will crow at the rigged suicide of another 
useless eater, the group log on to Rummie's inbox to type, 
thanks old man, those invites to defiance work wonders 
to red dot the hot blood bitchers.

Burp, hiccup, lick lobe, suck snot, poot, pat glock, order
more fodder, clap for market uptick, bray for another
Walter Reed amputee refit Dell-modeled efficient.




From measl at mfn.org  Sun Dec 19 10:51:29 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 12:51:29 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
   Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We    Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <1103480655.7020.17.camel@xevious>
References: <p0611045bbdeb4d563ec4@[68.167.57.91]> 
  <20041219104655.L28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>  
  <1103478706.7020.13.camel@xevious> 
  <20041219115706.K28241@ubzr.zsa.bet> 
  <1103480655.7020.17.camel@xevious>
Message-ID: <20041219124705.H28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Sun, 19 Dec 2004, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:

> If you need to get from, say, Houston to Seattle, in less than a full
> day, how is driving an option?

Farm the work out.  Or pass on the job.  Or take a plane.  Or drive - the
are *all* options.  None of them are *requirements*.


> > Remember the buses.  Remember what happened when "them negroes got
> > uppity and stopped taking the bus"?
>
> Those were local transit buses, not intercity buses. Huge difference.

Scale of distance is the only difference.  Either you support the system
or you don't.  I don't: I either drive to jobs (charging for mileage) or I
pass on them, rather than take part in the police state that is todays air
system.  You have the very same choices.  The argument eveyone is making
here is that it is too much of an inconvenience (financial or otherwise),
*not* to fly.  Sorry, but that's just pure self-serving BS.

You either work against the problem, or you live with the problem you have
(a) helped to create and (b) actively work to maintain (with your ticket
dollars).  If you choose to maintain the system, then you have no business
bitching when it turns it's jaundiced eyes towards you.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sun Dec 19 10:23:53 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 13:23:53 -0500
Subject: [Antisocial] Sept. 11 Conspiracy Theorist
In-Reply-To: <41C51C00.EC7F6D8B@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F1642C9862EC582ACB7CF759BA10@phx.gbl>

"..They have computers, they're tappin' phone lines, you know that ain't
allowed.."

Zappa...Heads...Crimson? A profile is emerging here! Either that or you 
recently broke into your dad's vinyl collection...

-TD



>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Re: [Antisocial] Sept. 11 Conspiracy Theorist
>Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2004 22:13:21 -0800
>
>At 06:12 AM 12/19/04 +0100, Anonymous wrote:
> >Major Variola typed:
> >
> >> PS: heard some fedscum mention 'militia and other terrorists' the
>other
> >> day, what would Gen George W think?
> >
> >which fedscum, do you have a mentionable source, &c.?
>
>I haven't found the source, I recall that I heard it.  Might have been a
>
>quickie comment on eg the Crystal Cathedral shooter.
>(Their depressed music conductor who alas didn't
>take Schuller out.)
>
> >reminds of the Reno quote, "They have computers and... other weapons of
>mass
> >destruction."
>
>..They have computers, they're tappin' phone lines, you know that ain't
>allowed..




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Sun Dec 19 13:23:44 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 16:23:44 -0500
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
  Before Throwing  You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <20041219104655.L28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F1247CAC35E81A63549C8709BA10@phx.gbl>

"(4) Lastly, as to your cesarian, fuck you and your wife, and her
cesearean.  We don't give a shit about your personal problems, just like
you don't care about ours.  Sure, it makes for a pulpy little story, but
when you get right down to it, do we really care?  No.  Because, again,
you helped to create this beast you are now bitching about, and after it
bit you, you *continued to fly*, and thereby feed it some more."

Funny how most Americans only wake up after it happens to them.

Case in point? How 'bout that proud-n-patriotic lady in "Farenheit 911"? As 
far as I could tell, prior to her son's death she was all in favor of the 
Attack on Iraq and even encouraged her son to "serve" (I hate that fucking 
word)...the only thing that changed her mind was that HER son was killed 
(the piles of dead Iraqis in their own country didn't matter and hell nor 
did the other dead US soldiers).

So when she was hanging around in front of the White House I didn't have a 
hell of a lot of sympathy.

-TD


>From: "J.A. Terranson" <measl at mfn.org>
>To: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>CC: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts   
>Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why  We  
>Put You There?
>Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 10:53:26 -0600 (CST)
>
>Several points come to mind:
>
>(1) Mr. Monahan seems to think that lies on police reports are an artifact
>of 9/11.  Welcome to the real world Mr. Monahan.
>
>(2) Monahan, and those like him who continue to fly, have nobody to blame
>but themselves: if you continue to feed these assholes by buying those
>tickets, then you have it coming: simple economics.  If people refuse to
>fly, this will stop.
>
>(3) As to the ACLU, again, welcome to the real world.  Many of us have
>been down that road before you Mr. Monahan - while the ACLU is not a bad
>thing per se, they are a lot like the cops and courts: they are not there
>for any one individual, there are there for "the big picture".  And the
>Big Picture requires money, which means you must be a minority (since how
>can anyone of the majority ever be "oppressed"?).  In a nutshell, Fuck The
>ACLU.
>
>(4) Lastly, as to your cesarian, fuck you and your wife, and her
>cesearean.  We don't give a shit about your personal problems, just like
>you don't care about ours.  Sure, it makes for a pulpy little story, but
>when you get right down to it, do we really care?  No.  Because, again,
>you helped to create this beast you are now bitching about, and after it
>bit you, you *continued to fly*, and thereby feed it some more.
>
>--
>Yours,
>
>J.A. Terranson
>sysadmin at mfn.org
>0xBD4A95BF
>
>  Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
>upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
>destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
>freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
>healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
>whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
>poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
>biologically and ecologically sustainable.
>
>The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
>indicates that mental illness starts at the top.
>
>Rev Dr Michael Ellner
>
>
>
>
>
>
>On Sun, 19 Dec 2004, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
>
> > Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 10:25:32 -0500
> > From: R.A. Hettinga <rah at shipwright.com>
> > To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
> > Subject: Coffee, Tea,
> >      or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts Before Throwing You 
>in a
> >     Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why We Put You There?
> >
> >
> > <http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig3/monahan1.html>
> >
> >  LewRockwell.com
> >
> > Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts Before 
>Throwing
> > You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why We Put You There?
> >
> > by  Nicholas Monahan
> >
> >     ?  ??  ??  ??
> >
> > This morning I'll be escorting my wife to the hospital, where the 
>doctors
> > will perform a caesarean section to remove our first child. She didn't 
>want
> > to do it this way - neither of us did - but sometimes the Fates decide
> > otherwise. The Fates or, in our case, government employees.
> >
> >  On the morning of October 26th Mary and I entered Portland 
>International
> > Airport, en route to the Las Vegas wedding of one of my best friends.
> > Although we live in Los Angeles, we'd been in Oregon working on a film, 
>and
> > up to that point had had nothing but praise to shower on the city of
> > Portland, a refreshing change of pace from our own suffocating 
>metropolis.
> >
> >  At the security checkpoint I was led aside for the "inspection" that's 
>all
> > the rage at airports these days. My shoes were removed. I was told to 
>take
> > off my sweater, then to fold over the waistband of my pants. My baseball
> > hat, hastily jammed on my head at 5 AM, was removed and assiduously
> > examined ("Anything could be in here, sir," I was told, after I asked 
>what
> > I could hide in a baseball hat. Yeah. Anything.) Soon I was standing on 
>one
> > foot, my arms stretched out, the other leg sticking out in front of me 
>`la
> > a DUI test. I began to get pissed off, as most normal people would. My
> > anger increased when I realized that the newly knighted federal 
>employees
> > weren't just examining me, but my 712 months pregnant wife as well. I'd
> > originally thought that I'd simply been randomly selected for the more
> > excessive than normal search. You know, Number 50 or whatever. 
>Apparently
> > not though - it was both of us. These are your new threats, America:
> > pregnant accountants and their sleepy husbands flying to weddings.
> >
> > After some more grumbling on my part they eventually finished with me 
>and I
> > went to retrieve our luggage from the x-ray machine. Upon returning I 
>found
> > my wife sitting in a chair, crying. Mary rarely cries, and certainly not 
>in
> > public. When I asked her what was the matter, she tried to quell her 
>tears
> > and sobbed, "I'm sorry...it's...they touched my breasts...and..." That's
> > all I heard. I marched up to the woman who'd been examining her and
> > shouted, "What did you do to her?" Later I found out that in addition to
> > touching her swollen breasts - to protect the American citizenry - the
> > employee had asked that she lift up her shirt. Not behind a screen, not 
>off
> > to the side - no, right there, directly in front of the hundred or so
> > passengers standing in line. And for you women who've been pregnant and
> > worn maternity pants, you know how ridiculous those things look. "I felt
> > like a clown," my wife told me later. "On display for all these people,
> > with the cotton panel on my pants and my stomach sticking out. When I 
>sat
> > down I just lost my composure and began to cry. That's when you walked 
>up."
> >
> > Of course when I say she "told me later," it's because she wasn't able 
>to
> > tell me at the time, because as soon as I demanded to know what the 
>federal
> > employee had done to make her cry, I was swarmed by Portland police
> > officers. Instantly. Three of them, cinching my arms, locking me in
> > handcuffs, and telling me I was under arrest. Now my wife really began 
>to
> > cry. As they led me away and she ran alongside, I implored her to calm
> > down, to think of the baby, promising her that everything would turn out
> > all right. She faded into the distance and I was shoved into an 
>elevator, a
> > cop holding each arm. After making me face the corner, the head honcho 
>told
> > that I was under arrest and that I wouldn't be flying that day - that I 
>was
> > in fact a "menace."
> >
> > It took me a while to regain my composure. I felt like I was one of 
>those
> > guys in The Gulag Archipelago who, because the proceedings all seem so
> > unreal, doesn't fully realize that he is in fact being arrested in a 
>public
> > place in front of crowds of people for...for what? I didn't know what 
>the
> > crime was. Didn't matter. Once upstairs, the officers made me remove my
> > shoes and my hat and tossed me into a cell. Yes, your airports have 
>prison
> > cells, just like your amusement parks, train stations, universities, and
> > national forests. Let freedom reign.
> >
> >  After a short time I received a visit from the arresting officer. "Mr.
> > Monahan," he started, "Are you on drugs?"
> >
> > Was this even real? "No, I'm not on drugs."
> >
> > "Should you be?"
> >
> > "What do you mean?"
> >
> > "Should you be on any type of medication?"
> >
> > "No."
> >
> > "Then why'd you react that way back there?"
> >
> > You see the thinking? You see what passes for reasoning among your 
>domestic
> > shock troops these days? Only "whackos" get angry over seeing the woman
> > they've been with for ten years in tears because someone has touched her
> > breasts. That kind of reaction - love, protection - it's mind-boggling!
> > "Mr. Monahan, are you on drugs?" His snide words rang inside my head. 
>This
> > is my wife, finally pregnant with our first child after months of failed
> > attempts, after the depressing shock of the miscarriage last year, my 
>wife
> > who'd been walking on a cloud over having the opportunity to be a
> > mother...and my anger is simply unfathomable to the guy standing in 
>front
> > of me, the guy who earns a living thanks to my taxes, the guy whose 
>family
> > I feed through my labor. What I did wasn't normal. No, I reacted like a
> > drug addict would've. I was so disgusted I felt like vomiting. But that 
>was
> > just the beginning.
> >
> > An hour later, after I'd been gallantly assured by the officer that I
> > wouldn't be attending my friend's wedding that day, I heard Mary's voice
> > outside my cell. The officer was speaking loudly, letting her know that 
>he
> > was planning on doing me a favor... which everyone knows is never a real
> > favor. He wasn't going to come over and help me work on my car or move 
>some
> > furniture. No, his "favor" was this: He'd decided not to charge me with 
>a
> > felony.
> >
> >  Think about that for a second. Rapes, car-jackings, murders, arsons -
> > those are felonies. So is yelling in an airport now, apparently. I 
>hadn't
> > realized, though I should have. Luckily, I was getting a favor, though. 
>I
> > was merely going to be slapped with a misdemeanor.
> >
> >  "Here's your court date," he said as I was released from my cell. In
> > addition, I was banned from Portland International for 90 days, and just 
>in
> > case I was thinking of coming over and hanging out around its perimeter,
> > the officer gave me a map with the boundaries highlighted, sternly 
>warning
> > me against trespassing. Then he and a second officer escorted us off the
> > grounds. Mary and I hurriedly drove two and a half hours in the rain to
> > Seattle, where we eventually caught a flight to Vegas. But the officer 
>was
> > true to his word - we missed my friend's wedding. The fact that he'd 
>been
> > in my own wedding party, the fact that a once in a lifetime event was
> > stolen from us - well, who cares, right?
> >
> > Upon our return to Portland (I'd had to fly into Seattle and drive back
> > down), we immediately began contacting attorneys. We aren't litigious
> > people - we wanted no money. I'm not even sure what we fully wanted. An
> > apology? A reprimand? I don't know. It doesn't matter though, because we
> > couldn't afford a lawyer, it turned out. $4,000 was the average figure
> > bandied about as a retaining fee. Sorry, but I've got a new baby on the
> > way. So we called the ACLU, figuring they existed for just such 
>incidents
> > as these. And they do apparently...but only if we were minorities. 
>That's
> > what they told us.
> >
> >  In the meantime, I'd appealed my suspension from PDX. A week or so 
>later I
> > got a response from the Director of Aviation. After telling me how, in 
>the
> > aftermath of 9/11, most passengers not only accept additional airport
> > screening but welcome it, he cut to the chase:
> >
> > "After a review of the police report and my discussions with police 
>staff,
> > as well as a review of the TSA's report on this incident, I concur with 
>the
> > officer's decision to take you into custody and to issue a citation to 
>you
> > for disorderly conduct. That being said, because I also understand that 
>you
> > were upset and acted on your emotions, I am willing to lift the Airport
> > Exclusion Order...."
> >
> > Attached to this letter was the report the officer had filled out. I'd 
>like
> > to say I couldn't believe it, but in a way, I could. It's seemingly
> > becoming the norm in America - lies and deliberate distortions on the 
>part
> > of those in power, no matter how much or how little power they actually
> > wield.
> >
> >  The gist of his report was this: From the get go I wasn't following the
> > screener's directions. I was "squinting my eyes" and talking to my wife 
>in
> > a "low, forced voice" while "excitedly swinging my arms." Twice I began 
>to
> > walk away from the screener, inhaling and exhaling forcefully. When I'd
> > completed the physical exam, I walked to the luggage screening area, 
>where
> > a second screener took a pair of scissors from my suitcase. At this 
>point I
> > yelled, "What the %*&$% is going on? This is &*#&$%!" The officer, who'd
> > already been called over by one of the screeners, became afraid for the 
>TSA
> > staff and the many travelers. He required the assistance of a second
> > officer as he "struggled" to get me into handcuffs, then for "cover" 
>called
> > over a third as well. It was only at this point that my wife began to 
>cry
> > hysterically.
> >
> >  There was nothing poetic in my reaction to the arrest report. I didn't
> > crumple it in my fist and swear that justice would be served, promising 
>to
> > sacrifice my resources and time to see that it would. I simply stared.
> > Clearly the officer didn't have the guts to write down what had really
> > happened. It might not look too good to see that stuff about the 
>pregnant
> > woman in tears because she'd been humiliated. Instead this was the 
>official
> > scenario being presented for the permanent record. It doesn't even 
>matter
> > that it's the most implausible sounding situation you can think of. 
>"Hey,
> > what the...godammit, they're taking our scissors, honey!" Why didn't he
> > write in anything about a monkey wearing a fez?
> >
> > True, the TSA staff had expropriated a pair of scissors from our 
>toiletries
> > kit - the story wasn't entirely made up. Except that I'd been locked in
> > airport jail at the time. I didn't know anything about any scissors 
>until
> > Mary told me on our drive up to Seattle. They'd questioned her about 
>them
> > while I was in the bowels of the airport sitting in my cell.
> >
> >  So I wrote back, indignation and disgust flooding my brain.
> >
> >  "[W]hile I'm not sure, I'd guess that the entire incident is captured 
>on
> > video. Memory is imperfect on everyone's part, but the footage won't 
>lie. I
> > realize it might be procedurally difficult for you to view this, but if 
>you
> > could, I'd appreciate it. There's no willful disregard of screening
> > directions. No explosion over the discovery of a pair of scissors in a
> > suitcase. No struggle to put handcuffs on. There's a tired man, early in
> > the morning, unhappily going through a rigorous procedure and then 
>reacting
> > to the tears of his pregnant wife."
> >
> >  Eventually we heard back from a different person, the guy in charge of 
>the
> > TSA airport screeners. One of his employees had made the damning 
>statement
> > about me exploding over her scissor discovery, and the officer had 
>deftly
> > incorporated that statement into his report. We asked the guy if he 
>could
> > find out why she'd said this - couldn't she possibly be mistaken? "Oh,
> > can't do that, my hands are tied. It's kind of like leading a witness - 
>I
> > could get in trouble, heh heh." Then what about the videotape? Why not
> > watch that? That would exonerate me. "Oh, we destroy all video after 
>three
> > days."
> >
> >  Sure you do.
> >
> > A few days later we heard from him again. He just wanted to inform us 
>that
> > he'd received corroboration of the officer's report from the officer's
> > superior, a name we didn't recognize. "But...he wasn't even there," my 
>wife
> > said.
> >
> >  "Yeah, well, uh, he's corroborated it though."
> >
> > That's how it works.
> >
> > "Oh, and we did look at the videotape. Inconclusive."
> >
> > But I thought it was destroyed?
> >
> > On and on it went. Due to the tenacity of my wife in making phone calls 
>and
> > speaking with relevant persons, the "crime" was eventually lowered to a
> > mere citation. Only she could have done that. I would've simply accepted
> > what was being thrown at me, trumped up charges and all, simply because 
>I'm
> > wholly inadequate at performing the kowtow. There's no way I could have
> > contacted all the people Mary did and somehow pretend to be contrite.
> > Besides, I speak in a low, forced voice, which doesn't elicit sympathy.
> > Just police suspicion.
> >
> >  Weeks later at the courthouse I listened to a young DA awkwardly read 
>the
> > charges against me - "Mr. Monahan...umm...shouted obscenities at the
> > airport staff...umm... umm...oh, they took some scissors from his 
>suitcase
> > and he became...umm...abusive at this point." If I was reading about it 
>in
> > Kafka I might have found something vaguely amusing in all of it. But I
> > wasn't. I was there. Living it.
> >
> > I entered a plea of nolo contendere, explaining to the judge that if I'd
> > been a resident of Oregon, I would have definitely pled "Not Guilty."
> > However, when that happens, your case automatically goes to a jury 
>trial,
> > and since I lived a thousand miles away, and was slated to return home 
>in
> > seven days, with a newborn due in a matter of weeks...you get the 
>picture.
> > "No Contest" it was. Judgment: $250 fine.
> >
> >  Did I feel happy? Only $250, right? No, I wasn't happy. I don't care if
> > it's twelve cents, that's money pulled right out of my baby's mouth and 
>fed
> > to a disgusting legal system that will use it to propagate more 
>incidents
> > like this. But at the very least it was over, right? Wrong.
> >
> >  When we returned to Los Angeles there was an envelope waiting for me 
>from
> > the court. Inside wasn't a receipt for the money we'd paid. No, it was a
> > letter telling me that what I actually owed was $309 - state assessed 
>court
> > costs, you know. Wouldn't you think your taxes pay for that - the state
> > putting you on trial? No, taxes are used to hire more cops like the
> > officer, because with our rising criminal population - people like me -
> > hey, your average citizen demands more and more "security."
> >
> > Finally I reach the piece de resistance. The week before we'd gone to 
>the
> > airport my wife had had her regular pre-natal checkup. The child had
> > settled into the proper head down position for birth, continuing the
> > remarkable pregnancy she'd been having. We returned to Portland on 
>Sunday.
> > On Mary's Monday appointment she was suddenly told, "Looks like your 
>baby's
> > gone breech." When she later spoke with her midwives in Los Angeles, 
>they
> > wanted to know if she'd experienced any type of trauma recently, as this
> > often makes a child flip. "As a matter of fact..." she began, recounting
> > the story, explaining how the child inside of her was going absolutely
> > crazy when she was crying as the police were leading me away through the
> > crowd.
> >
> >  My wife had been planning a natural childbirth. She'd read dozens of
> > books, meticulously researched everything, and had finally decided that
> > this was the way for her. No drugs, no numbing of sensations - just that
> > ultimate combination of brute pain and sheer joy that belongs 
>exclusively
> > to mothers. But my wife is also a first-time mother, so she has what is
> > called an "untested" pelvis. Essentially this means that a breech birth 
>is
> > too dangerous to attempt, for both mother and child. Therefore, she's 
>now
> > relegated to a c-section - hospital stay, epidural, catheter, fetal
> > monitoring, stitches - everything she didn't want. Her natural birth has
> > become a surgery.
> >
> >  We've tried everything to turn that baby. Acupuncture, chiropractic
> > techniques, underwater handstands, elephant walking, moxibustion, 
>bending
> > backwards over pillows, herbs, external manipulation - all to no avail.
> > When I walked into the living room the other night and saw her 
>plaintively
> > cooing with a flashlight turned onto her stomach, yet another suggested
> > technique, my heart almost broke. It's breaking now as I write these 
>words.
> >
> > I can never prove that my child went breech because of what happened to 
>us
> > at the airport. But I'll always believe it. Wrongly or rightly, I'll
> > forever think of how this man, the personification of this system, has
> > affected the lives of my family and me. When my wife is sliced open, 
>I'll
> > be thinking of him. When they remove her uterus from her abdomen and lay 
>it
> > on her stomach, I'll be thinking of him. When I visit her and my child 
>in
> > the hospital instead of having them with me here in our home, I'll be
> > thinking of him. When I assist her to the bathroom while the incision 
>heals
> > internally, I'll be thinking of him.
> >
> >  There are plenty of stories like this these days. I don't know how many
> > I've read where the writer describes some breach of civil liberties by
> > employees of the state, then wraps it all up with a dire warning about 
>what
> > we as a nation are becoming, and how if we don't put an end to it now, 
>then
> > we're in for heaps of trouble. Well you know what? Nothing's going to 
>stop
> > the inevitable. There's no policy change that's going to save us. 
>There's
> > no election that's going to put a halt to the onslaught of tyranny. It's
> > here already - this country has changed for the worse and will continue 
>to
> > change for the worse. There is now a division between the citizenry and 
>the
> > state. When that state is used as a tool against me, there is no longer 
>any
> > reason why I should owe any allegiance to that state.
> >
> > And that's the first thing that child of ours is going to learn.
> >
> > December 21, 2002
> >
> > Nick Monahan works in the film industry. He writes out of Los Angeles 
>where
> > he lives with his wife and as of December 18th, his beautiful new son.




From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Dec 19 17:21:34 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 2004 20:21:34 -0500
Subject: Clarke faces ID cards rebellion
Message-ID: <p0611040bbdebd9851a6f@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/uk_news/politics/4109681.stm>

The BBC

Sunday, 19 December, 2004, 23:41 GMT

 Clarke faces ID cards rebellion Charles Clarke faces his first real test
as home secretary on Monday with a possible backbench rebellion over the
controversial ID cards bill.

 Up to 30 Labour MPs could oppose the scheme during a Commons debate.

 Mr Clarke, who took on the post on Thursday after David Blunkett quit, has
rejected calls to "pause" on the bill.

 Conservative leader Michael Howard also faces a challenge to his authority
as he fights a shadow cabinet battle to get his party to back the measures.

 Jail terms

Senior Tory team members are expected to "go missing" rather than fall into
line.

 "  I certainly shall not pause - I will go ahead with the legislation "
 Home Secretary Charles Clarke



 Mr Clarke is expected to try and win over opponents to the scheme by
saying officials who secretly accessed information they were not allowed to
see would face up to two years in jail.

 He is also expected to announce cut-price ID cards for the elderly and
those on lower incomes.

 But that could push up the estimated #85 price tag, for the card and a
passport, for middle class voters.

 Speaking on his first day in office, Mr Clarke said he would "go ahead"
with the legislation.

 "But the question of how you put it into effect and what you do is a
matter of debate," he said.

 'Reconsider plans'

 Critics argue that introducing the cards would be a costly scheme with no
specific aim.

 Ministers say it would help the fight against terrorism, illegal
immigration and organised crime.

 But opponents say that similar schemes in other countries have not
prevented attacks like the Madrid rail bombing.

 Some Labour backbenchers have joined the Liberal Democrats in calling for
the plans to be reconsidered.

 'Real opportunity'

 On Sunday, Lib Dem leader Charles Kennedy repeated his call for a "pause"
in considering the legislation.

 "  If you were running a family or a business would you have the second
reading... tomorrow or would you pause to reflect and see what you might do
about it in the New Year "
 Charles Kennedy



 He told BBC's Breakfast with Frost programme that Mr Clarke had a "real
opportunity" on Monday following the departure of Mr Blunkett.

 "If you were running a family or a business would you have the second
reading of the Identity Cards Bill tomorrow or would you pause to reflect
and see what you might do about it in the New Year?

 "That is the sensible way to go about it but I think this government has
got itself so much into tram lines now that it is not behaving sensibly at
all."

 The first cards would be issued in 2008 and, when he was introducing the
bill, Mr Blunkett suggested Parliament could decide in 2011 or 2012 whether
to make it compulsory for everybody to own the cards, although not to carry
them.

 The new bill would also create new criminal offences on the possession of
false identity documents.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 20 05:03:55 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 08:03:55 -0500
Subject: All Horsemen, All the Time: On the Open Internet, a Web of Dark
   Alleys
Message-ID: <p06110433bdec7d9e9118@[68.167.57.91]>

Horsemen of the Infocalypse, that is...

Cheers,
RAH
-------

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/20/technology/20covert.html?th=&pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

December 20, 2004

On the Open Internet, a Web of Dark Alleys
 By TOM ZELLER Jr.


The indictment early this month of Mark Robert Walker by a federal grand
jury in Texas might have seemed a coup for the government in its efforts to
police terrorist communications online. Mr. Walker, a 19-year-old student,
is accused, among other things, of using his roommate's computer to
communicate with - and offer aid to - a federally designated terrorist
group in Somalia and with helping to run a jihadist Web site.

 "I hate the U.S. government," is among the statements Mr. Walker is said
to have posted online. "I wish I could have been flying one of the planes
on Sept. 11."

By international terror standards, it was an extremely low-level bust. But
the case, which was supposedly broken only after Mr. Walker's roommate
tipped off the police, highlights the near impossibility of tracking
terrorist communications online.

 Even George J. Tenet, the former director of central intelligence,
speaking on the vulnerabilities of the nation's computer networks at a
technology security conference on Dec. 1, noted the ability of terrorists
to "work anonymously and remotely to inflict enormous damage at little cost
or risk to themselves." He called for a wholesale taming of cyberspace.

 "I know that these actions would be controversial in this age where we
still think the Internet is a free and open society with no control or
accountability," Mr. Tenet said, "But, ultimately, the Wild West must give
way to governance and control."

Even if the government is able to shore up its networks against attack -
one of many goals set forth by the intelligence reform bill passed last
week - the ability of terrorists and other dark elements to engage in
covert communications online remains a daunting security problem, and one
that may prove impossible to solve.

 Late last month, an Internet privacy watchdog group revealed that the
Central Intelligence Agency had contributed money for a counterterrorism
project that promised, among other things, an automated surveillance system
to monitor conversations on Internet chat rooms. Developed by two computer
scientists at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, N.Y., as part of a
National Science Foundation program called Approaches to Combat Terrorism,
the chat room project takes aim at the possibility that terrorists could
communicate through crowded public chat channels, where the flurry of
disconnected, scrolling messages makes it difficult to know who is talking
to whom. The automated software would monitor both the content and timing
of messages to help isolate and identify conversations.

 Putting privacy concerns aside, some Internet specialists wonder whether
such projects, even if successful, fail to acknowledge the myriad other
ways terrorists can plot and communicate online. From free e-mail accounts
and unsecured wireless networks to online programs that can shield Internet
addresses and hide data, the opportunities to communicate covertly are
utterly available and seemingly endless.

Even after the Sept. 11 attacks, "the mass media, policy makers, and even
security agencies have tended to focus on the exaggerated threat of
cyberterrorism and paid insufficient attention to the more routine uses
made of the Internet," Gabriel Weimann, a professor of communication at
Haifa University in Israel, wrote in a report for the United States
Institute of Peace this year. "Those uses are numerous and, from the
terrorists' perspective, invaluable."

 Todd M. Hinnen, a trial attorney with the United States Justice
Department's computer crime division, wrote an article on terrorists' use
of the Internet for Columbia Science and Technology Law Review earlier this
year. "There's no panacea," Mr. Hinnen said in an interview. "There has
always been the possibility of meeting in dark alleys, and that was hard
for law enforcement to detect."

 Now, every computer terminal with an Internet connection has the potential
to become a dark alley.

 Shortly after Sept. 11, questions swirled around steganography, the
age-old technique of hiding one piece of information within another. A
digital image of a sailboat, for instance, might also invisibly hold a
communiqui, a map or some other hidden data. A digital song file might
contain blueprints for a desired target.

 But the troubling truth is that terrorists rarely have to be technically
savvy to cloak their conversations. Even simple, prearranged code words can
do the job when the authorities do not know whose e-mail to monitor or
which Web sites to watch. Interviews conducted by Al Jazeera, the Arab
television network, with the terror suspects Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and
Ramzi bin al-Shibh two years ago (both have since been arrested), suggested
that the Sept. 11 attackers communicated openly using prearranged code
words. The "faculty of urban planning," for instance, referred to the World
Trade Center. The Pentagon was the "faculty of fine arts."

 Other reports have suggested that Mohammed Atta, suspected of being the
leader of the Sept. 11 hijackers, transmitted a final cryptic message to
his co-conspirators over the Internet: "The semester begins in three more
weeks. We've obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law,
the faculty of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of
engineering."

And increasingly, new tools used to hide messages can quickly be found with
a simple Web search. Dozens of free or inexpensive steganography programs
are available for download. And there is ample evidence that terrorists
have made use of encryption technologies, which are difficult to break. The
arrest in Pakistan in July of Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, thought to be an Al
Qaeda communications specialist, for instance, yielded a trove of ciphered
messages from his computers.

Still, the mere act of encrypting a message could draw attention, so
numerous software programs have been developed to hide messages in other
ways.

 At one Web site, spammimic.com, a user can type in a phrase like "Meet me
at Joe's" and have that message automatically converted into a lengthy bit
of prose that reads like a spam message: "Dear Decision maker; Your e-mail
address has been submitted to us indicating your interest in our briefing!
This is a one-time mailing there is no need to request removal if you won't
want any more," and so forth.

The prose is then pasted into an e-mail message and sent. A recipient
expecting the fake spam message can then paste it into the site's decoder
and read the original message.

 Another free program will convert short messages into fake dialogue for a
play. And still simpler schemes require no special software at all - or
even the need to send anything.

 In one plan envisioned by Mr. Hinnen in his law review article, a group
need only provide the same user name and password to all of its members,
granting them all access to a single Web-based e-mail account. One member
simply logs on and writes, but does not send, an e-mail message. Later, a
co-conspirator, perhaps on the other side of the globe, logs on, reads the
unsent message and then deletes it.

 "Because the draft was never sent," Mr. Hinnen wrote, the Internet service
provider "does not retain a copy of it and there is no record of it
traversing the Internet - it never went anywhere." The message would be
essentially untraceable.

 Michael Caloyannides, a computer forensics specialist and a senior fellow
at Mitretek Systems, a nonprofit scientific research organization based in
Falls Church, Va., said the nature of a networked universe made it possible
for just about anyone to communicate secretly. Conspirators do not even
need to rely on code-hiding programs, because even automated teller
machines can be used to send signals, Dr. Caloyannides explained,

 A simple withdrawal of $20 from an account in New York might serve as an
instant message to an accomplice monitoring the account electronically from
halfway around the world, for example.

Dr. Caloyannides, who will conduct a workshop next May for government
officials and others trying to track terrorist communications, also pointed
to hundreds of digitally encrypted messages daily on public Usenet
newsgroups. The messages often come from faked e-mail accounts; the
intended recipients are often unknown. But a covert correspondent expecting
a secret communiqui at a particular newsgroup need only download a batch of
messages and then use an encryption key on one with some prearranged
subject line, "like 'chocolate cake,' " Dr. Caloyannides said.

 Lt. Col. Timothy L. Thomas, an analyst at the United States Army's Foreign
Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., wrote last year in the
journal Parameters, the U.S. Army War College quarterly, that the threat of
cyberplanning may be graver than the threat of terrorist attacks on the
world's networks.

 "We used to talk about the intent of a tank," Colonel Thomas explained in
an interview. "If you saw one, you knew what it was for. But the intent of
electrons - to deliver a message, deliver a virus, or pass covert
information - is much harder to figure."

This has long frustrated intelligence analysts, according to James Bamford,
an author and a specialist on the National Security Agency.

 "In the cold war days, you knew which communications circuits to watch,"
he said. "We knew that most of it was high-frequency anyway, so we had the
place surrounded by high-frequency intercepts. Those frequencies weren't
going anywhere, so you just sat there with the headphones on and listened."

 The problem now, Mr. Bamford said, is that the corridors for communication
have become infinite and accessible to everyone. "You just don't sit and
listen to a particular channel," he said. "It's all over the place. It's a
'needle in the haystack' problem that you have."

 Russ Rogers, a former Arab linguist with the National Security Agency and
the Defense Information Systems Agency, said he feared security agencies
might not realize how dense the haystack has become.

 "We've become a little bit arrogant," said Mr. Rogers, the author of a new
book, "Hacking a Terror Network: The Silent Threat of Covert Channels,"
which uses fictional situations to highlight the ways terrorists can
communicate secretly online.

 "We feel like we created the Internet, that we've mastered the network,"
Mr. Rogers said. "But we're not paying attention to how it's being used to
work against us."

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 20 05:44:17 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 08:44:17 -0500
Subject: Paging Black Unicorn (was  RE: Costs of Money Laundering 
  Enforcement)
Message-ID: <p06110436bdec85d57e1d@[68.167.57.91]>

Contact him directly, please...

Cheers,
RAH
--------

--- begin forwarded text



From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 20 05:44:24 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 08:44:24 -0500
Subject: Paging Black Unicorn, Part 2: Money Laundering in the Geodesic 
  Economy
Message-ID: <p06110437bdec870dc75c@[68.167.57.91]>

Here's the article in question...

Cheers,
RAH
-------

<http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/JIBC/9703-12.htm>
JIBC

Hettinga's Best of the Month

Money Laundering in the Geodesic Economy
 From Robert Hettinga
 Email:rah at shipwright.com
 URL: http://www.shipwright.com
 Robert Hettinga is a financial cryptography strategy and policy consultant
in Boston. He is founder of the First International Conference on Financial
Cryptography (FC97), the International Financial Cryptography Association,
the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, and the e$ and e$pam mail lists. He
is also financial cryptography editor of JIBC.
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn at schloss.li>
To: Multiple recipients of <e$@thumper.vmeng.com>

On Fri, 13 Jun 1997 mfarncombe at cc.ernsty.co.uk wrote:

>   Hi all,
>
>   I suspect that one of the principal things that the Feds are
>   worried about is the potential for money-laundering.


 This is a loaded statement. Money laundering is only a concern in so far
as it means government control over the economy is diminished. (And to the
extent that it allows one to seize the funds a their title converts the to
United States at the instant of commission).

 Money laundering is a "tack on" offense. (Much like, say, mail fraud). The
number of original cases which derive from actual money laundering
investigation is vanishingly small. Instead it is usually added on to an
indictment when the defendant is or has been under investigation for
something else.

 Because money laundering statutes are generally phrased something like
"knowingly concealing the proceeds of a criminal act," usually you find the
criminal act first and then look to see if attempts were made to conceal
the funds. Professional money launderers are rarely caught.
>   At the moment, conversion of money from illegal sources  (drug
>   sales, extortion by terrorists, major theft etc) into the legal
>   economy (equities, bonds, property  etc) is difficult because
>   any financial institution is obliged, in most parts of the
>   world, to obtain proof of identity of its  clients and toreport
>   suspicions of wrongdoing.


 I disagree rather strongly. Currently the favorate method is to hand the
cash, in bulk, to the professional money launderer who, on the spot, cuts a
clean bank check (perhaps from a reputable import/export or realestate
company) for the cash amount minus fee (5-20% usually). The launderer takes
all the risk in the process, including smuggling the funds out, hashing
them through iterations and (usually) returning them right back into the
United States as legitimate overseas investment. It's like the separation
of capital and management skill. The money launderer is free to concentrate
100% of his time to managing his extensive laundering empire, the hundreds
or thousands of shells and webs of accounts and maintains the liquidity to
drop 5 million on the notice of a phone call.
>   Hence, I suspect, the $750 limit.
>   The reason for this check is that it is otherwise very easy to
>   shuffle funds back and forth between financial instruments to
>   confuse the  trail and defeat the cops.


 The $750 limit is going to do about nothing for the problem of money money
laundering. It will inconvenience the casual launderer, and that is about
all. What it will do is put a significant cost on the head of the consumer.
A CTR costs a bank between $5 and $15 to file today (according to the ABA).
$17 if you listen to the Report of the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering.

 In 1993 the 368 largest banks (assets over $1 billion) filed 4.5 million
CTRs. The cost was estimated at $72 million dollars. (John Byrne, General
Counsel, American Bankers Association). 10,765,000 CTRs were filed in 1994.
About .5% are marked "suspicious."

 Now the $750 limit? The number of reports to be filed is staggering and
.5% is beyond government to police properly without 5,000 new hires. No,
clearly the $750 limit is not to catch money launderers, but to create and
perpetuate detailed transactions record keeping.

 FinCEN is much more useful to link transactions to defendents in non-money
laundering cases. "What do you mean you weren't in California in May? Our
records show you accepted two wire transfers there on the 15th and the
16th."

 And consider this. If I build a machine which has a 95% accuracy rate in
detecting money laundering, that is to say that it will identify a given
transaction as money laundering or legitimate with 95% accuracy, I still
have a serious problem. Given 10,000 transactions, with .2% (20)
representing money laundering we find the following figures: 19 (95% of 20)
money laundering transactions will be flagged as illegal 1 (5% of 20)
laundering transaction will be incorrectly flagged as legal. 500 (5% of
10,000) legitimate transactions will be incorrectly flagged as illegal.

 For every one money laundering transaction flagged there will be 26
legitimate transactions flagged and only about 3.6% of all the flagged
transactions will actually be illegitimate. Now consider all this in
context. There are over 700,000 wire transfers a day amounting to over $2
trillion. About half go through FedWIRE and CHIPS. SWIFT is harder to count.

 The most pro-government figures have somewhere on the order of $400bln a
YEAR being laundered. The figure I used above (.2% of transactions are
money laundering) is high by orders of magnitude. Depending on who's
figures you use it's more like 0.008%.
>   I can't subscribe to the full libertarian view that there's no
>   such thing as right and wrong, only freedoms and restrictions.
>   Because of this, I think we have to accept that the  Feds have a
>   valid concern, as instant and frequent movement of large sums
>   of untraceable, impersonal e-cash would mean that the only way
>   to stop money laundering would be to check the identity of
>   anyone converting real-cash into e-cash.  Now that does perturb
>   me...


 What you do not address is what is wrong with money laundering. Money
laundering was never a crime until 1986 in the United States, [Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986 (Codified @ sections 1956 and 1957 of Title
17 of the U.S. Code)] and then only made so because it fit in the "war on
drugs."

 The result: Total financial transparency in the U.S. Money laundering is a
created offense. Also consider that becuase current efforts to curb money
laundering are basically useless, you may see identity checking anyhow.
(The $750 limit is basicially an identity checking provision already).
Money laundering is a crime because the drug market in the United States is
so substantial it is impossible to police it without following the money.
You can't do that unless you have near financial transparency.
>   Given the response of governments to anything untaxed (eg
>   running drugs that aren't tobacco), these  regulations could
>   stay with us for years to come.  Has anyone got another
>   foolproof scheme to foil e$-laundering?



 Deep down even you seem to recognize that Money Laundering has nothing to
do with catching criminals. It's all about control and revenue. The feds
would do better to concentrate intelligence assets (more so than now) on
counter narcotics and do their best to schedule raids to seize cash when
it's sitting around than to track every transaction on the planet. I don't
have it here, but if anyone is interested I had a report on the costs of
Money Laundering enforcement I can try and dig up.

 One of the interesting figures was the number of dollars spent to stop one
dollar from being laundered (Around $35,000 as I recall) and the number
spent to seize one dollar of laundered money (Around $110,000).
>   Martin Farncombe,Ernst & Young UK
>   (views represented are  personal, not corporate)
--



-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Mon Dec 20 08:56:49 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 11:56:49 -0500
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
  Before Throwing  You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <20041219124705.H28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F259FCFACB82C65747CC83C9BA20@phx.gbl>

Well, there's a TINY little hole in your logic here...

>Scale of distance is the only difference.  Either you support the system
>or you don't.  I don't: I either drive to jobs (charging for mileage) or I
>pass on them, rather than take part in the police state that is todays air
>system.  You have the very same choices.  The argument eveyone is making
>here is that it is too much of an inconvenience (financial or otherwise),
>*not* to fly.  Sorry, but that's just pure self-serving BS.

For one, Flying can easily be a requirement, not an option. But that's 
besides the point here.

The real point is that some Super-JAT could (5 years from now when there are 
ubiquitous highway checkpoints) argue that "walking from NYC to Boston may 
be difficult but it IS possible". Or of course (after Tenent's vision for 
the internet is realized) "You could simply Fedex those files, you don't 
need to use the internet"

...and so on...it get silly after this though.

-TD




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 20 10:08:58 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 13:08:58 -0500
Subject: Best-Kept Secrets
Message-ID: <p0611047dbdecc5806a8f@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.sciam.com/print_version.cfm?articleID=000479CD-F58C-11BE-AD0683414B7F0000>


Scientific American:
  
December 20, 2004

Best-Kept Secrets

Quantum cryptography has marched from theory to laboratory to real products

By Gary Stix

 At the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Laboratory, Charles Bennett is known
as a brilliant theoretician--one of the fathers of the emerging field of
quantum computing. Like many theorists, he has not logged much experience
in the laboratory. His absentmindedness in relation to the physical world
once transformed the color of a teapot from green to red when he left it on
a double boiler too long. But in 1989 Bennett and colleagues John A. Smolin
and Gilles Brassard cast caution aside and undertook a groundbreaking
experiment that would demonstrate a new cryptography based on the
principles of quantum mechanics.

 The team put together an experiment in which photons moved down a
30-centimeter channel in a light-tight box called "Aunt Martha's coffin."
The direction in which the photons oscillated, their polarization,
represented the 0s or 1s of a series of quantum bits, or qubits. The qubits
constituted a cryptographic "key" that could be used to encrypt or decipher
a message. What kept the key from prying eavesdroppers was Heisenberg's
uncertainty principle--a foundation of quantum physics that dictates that
the measurement of one property in a quantum state will perturb another. In
a quantum cryptographic system, any interloper tapping into the stream of
photons will alter them in a way that is detectable to the sender and the
receiver. In principle, the technique provides the makings of an
unbreakable cryptographic key.

 Today quantum cryptography has come a long way from the jury-rigged
project assembled on a table in Bennett's office. The National Security
Agency or one of the Federal Reserve banks can now buy a
quantum-cryptographic system from two small companies--and more products
are on the way. This new method of encryption represents the first major
commercial implementation for what has become known as quantum information
science, which blends quantum mechanics and information theory. The
ultimate technology to emerge from the field may be a quantum computer so
powerful that the only way to protect against its prodigious code-breaking
capability may be to deploy quantum-cryptographic techniques.

 The arrival of the quantum computer may portend the eventual demise of
ciphers based on factorization.

The challenge modern cryptographers face is for sender and receiver to
share a key while ensuring that no one has filched a copy. A method called
public-key cryptography is often used to distribute the secret keys for
encryption and decoding of a full-length message. The security of
public-key cryptography depends on factorization or other difficult
mathematical problems. It is easy to compute the product of two large
numbers but extremely hard to factor it back into the primes. The popular
RSA cipher algorithm, widely deployed in public-key cryptography, relies on
factorization. The secret key being transferred between sender and receiver
is encrypted with a publicly available key, say, a large number such as
408,508,091 (in practice, the number would be much larger). It can be
decrypted only with a private key owned by the recipient of the data, made
up of two factors, in this case 18,313 and 22,307.

 The difficulty of overcoming a public-key cipher may hold secret keys
secure for a decade or more. But the advent of the quantum information
era--and, in particular, the capability of quantum computers to rapidly
perform monstrously challenging factorizations--may portend the eventual
demise of RSA and other cryptographic schemes. "If quantum computers become
a reality, the whole game changes," says John Rarity, a professor in the
department of electrical and electronics engineering at the University of
Bristol in England.

 Unlike public-key cryptography, quantum cryptography should remain secure
when quantum computers arrive on the scene. One way of sending a
quantum-cryptographic key between sender and receiver requires that a laser
transmit single photons that are polarized in one of two modes. In the
first, photons are positioned vertically or horizontally (rectilinear
mode); in the second, they are oriented 45 degrees to the left or right of
vertical (diagonal mode). In either mode, the opposing positions of the
photons represent either a digital 0 or a 1. The sender, whom
cryptographers by convention call Alice, sends a string of bits, choosing
randomly to send photons in either the rectilinear or the diagonal modes.
The receiver, known as Bob in crypto-speak, makes a similarly random
decision about which mode to measure the incoming bits. The Heisenberg
uncertainty principle dictates that he can measure the bits in only one
mode, not both. Only the bits that Bob measured in the same mode as sent by
Alice are guaranteed to be in the correct orientation, thus retaining the
proper value.

 After transmission, Bob then communicates with Alice, an exchange that
need not remain secret, to tell her which of the two modes he used to
receive each photon. He does not, however, reveal the 0- or 1-bit value
represented by each photon. Alice then tells Bob which of the modes were
measured correctly. They both ignore photons that were not observed in the
right mode. The modes measured correctly constitute the key that serves as
an input for an algorithm used to encrypt or decipher a message.

 If someone tries to intercept this stream of photons--call her Eve--she
cannot measure both modes, thanks to Heisenberg. If she makes the
measurements in the wrong mode, even if she resends the bits to Bob in the
same way she measured them, she will inevitably introduce errors. Alice and
Bob can detect the presence of the eavesdropper by comparing selected bits
and checking for errors.

 Beginning in 2003, two companies--id Quantique in Geneva and MagiQ
Technologies in New York City--introduced commercial products that send a
quantum-cryptographic key beyond the 30 centimeters traversed in Bennett's
experiment. And, after demonstrating a record transmission distance of 150
kilometers, NEC is to come to market with a product at the earliest next
year. Others, such as IBM, Fujitsu and Toshiba, have active research
efforts.

 The products on the market can send keys over individual optical-fiber
links for multiple tens of kilometers. A system from MagiQ costs $70,000 to
$100,000. "A small number of customers are using and testing the system,
but it's not widely deployed in any network," comments Robert Gelfond, a
former Wall Street quantitative trader who in 1999 founded MagiQ
Technologies.

 Some government agencies and financial institutions are afraid that an
encrypted message could be captured today and stored for a decade or
more--at which time a quantum computer might decipher it. Richard J.
Hughes, a researcher in quantum cryptography at Los Alamos National
Laboratory, cites other examples of information that must remain
confidential for a long time: raw census data, the formula for Coca-Cola or
the commands for a commercial satellite. (Remember Captain Midnight, who
took over HBO for more than four minutes in 1986.) Among the prospective
customers for quantum-cryptographic systems are telecommunications
providers that foresee offering customers an ultrasecure service.

 The first attempts to incorporate quantum cryptography into actual
networks--rather than just point-to-point connections--have begun. The
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has funded a project to connect
six network nodes that stretch among Harvard University, Boston University
and BBN Technologies in Cambridge, Mass., a company that played a critical
role in establishing the Internet. The encryption keys are sent over
dedicated links, and the messages ciphered with those keys are transmitted
over the Internet. "This is the first continuously running operational
quantum-cryptography network outside a laboratory," notes Chip Elliott of
BBN, who heads the project. The network, designed to merely show that the
technology works, transfers ordinary unclassified Internet traffic. "The
only secrets I can possibly think of here are where the parking spaces
are," Elliott says. Last fall, id Quantique and a partner, the Geneva-based
Internet services provider Deckpoint, put on display a network that allowed
a cluster of servers in Geneva to have its data backed up at a site 10
kilometers away, with new keys being distributed frequently through a
quantum-encrypted link.

 The current uses for quantum cryptography are in networks of limited
geographic reach. The strength of the technique--that anyone who spies on a
key transmittal will change it unalterably--also means that the signals
that carry quantum keys cannot be amplified by network equipment that
restores a weakening signal and allows it to be relayed along to the next
repeater. An optical amplifier would corrupt qubits.

 To extend the distance of these links, researchers are looking beyond
optical fibers as the medium to distribute quantum keys. Scientists have
trekked to mountaintops--where the altitude minimizes atmospheric
turbulence--to prove the feasibility of sending quantum keys through the
air. One experiment in 2002 at Los Alamos National Laboratory created a
10-kilometer link. Another, performed that same year by QinetiQ, based in
Farnborough, England, and Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich, stretched
23 kilometers between two mountaintops in the southern Alps. By optimizing
this technology--using bigger telescopes for detection, better filters and
antireflective coatings--it might be possible to build a system that could
transmit and receive signals over more than 1,000 kilometers, sufficient to
reach satellites in low earth orbit. A network of satellites would allow
for worldwide coverage. The European Space Agency is in the early stages of
putting together a plan for an earth-to-satellite experiment. (The European
Union also launched an effort in April to develop quantum encryption over
communications networks, an effort spurred in part by a desire to prevent
eavesdropping by Echelon, a system that intercepts electronic messages for
the intelligence services of the U.S., Britain and other nations.)

 Ultimately cryptographers want some form of quantum repeater--in essence,
an elementary form of quantum computer that would overcome distance
limitations. A repeater would work through what Albert Einstein famously
called "spukhafte Fernwirkungen," spooky action at a distance. Anton
Zeilinger and his colleagues at the Institute of Experimental Physics in
Vienna, Austria, took an early step toward a repeater when they reported in
the August 19, 2004, issue of Nature that their group had strung an
optical-fiber cable in a sewer tunnel under the Danube River and stationed
an "entangled" photon at each end. The measurement of the state of
polarization in one photon (horizontal, vertical, and so on) establishes
immediately an identical polarization that can be measured in the other.

 Entanglement spooked Einstein, but Zeilinger and his team took advantage
of a link between two entangled photons to "teleport" the information
carried by a third photon a distance of 600 meters across the Danube. Such
a system might be extended in multiple relays, so that the qubits in a key
could be transmitted across continents or oceans. To make this a reality
will require development of esoteric components, such as a quantum memory
capable of actually storing qubits without corrupting them before they are
sent along to a subsequent link. "This is still very much in its infancy.
It's still in the hands of physics laboratories," notes Nicolas Gisin, a
professor at the University of Geneva, who helped to found id Quantique and
who has also done experiments on long-distance entanglement.

 A quantum memory might be best implemented with atoms, not photons. An
experiment published in the October 22 issue of Science showed how this
might work. Building on ideas of researchers from the University of
Innsbruck in Austria, a group at the Georgia Institute of Technology
detailed in the paper how two clouds of ultracold rubidium atoms could be
entangled and, because of the quantum linkage, could be inscribed with a
qubit, the clouds storing the qubit for much longer than a photon can. The
experiment then transferred the quantum state of the atoms, their qubit,
onto a photon, constituting information transfer from matter to light and
showing how a quantum memory might output a bit. By entangling clouds, Alex
Kuzmich and Dzmitry Matsukevich of Georgia Tech hope to create repeaters
that can transfer qubits over long distances.

 Entanglement spooked Einstein, but researchers have used the phenomenon to
"teleport" quantum information.

The supposed inviolability of quantum cryptography rests on a set of
assumptions that do not necessarily carry over into the real world. One of
those assumptions is that only a single photon represents each qubit.
Quantum cryptography works by taking a pulsed laser and diminishing its
intensity to such an extent that typically it becomes unlikely that any
more than one in 10 pulses contains a photon--the rest are dark--one reason
that the data transfer rate is so low. But this is only a statistical
likelihood. The pulse may have more than one photon. An eavesdropper could,
in theory, steal an extra photon and use it to help decode a message. A
software algorithm, known as privacy amplification, helps to guard against
this possibility by masking the values of the qubits.

 But cryptographers would like to have better photon sources and detectors.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is one of many
groups laboring on these devices. "One very interesting area is the
development of detectors that can tell the difference between one, two or
more photons arriving at the same time," says Alan Migdall of NIST.
Researchers there have also tried to address the problem of slow
transmission speed by generating quantum keys at a rate of one megabit per
second--100 times faster than any previous efforts and enough to distribute
keys for video applications.

 Quantum cryptography may still prove vulnerable to some unorthodox
attacks. An eavesdropper might sabotage a receiver's detector, causing
qubits received from a sender to leak back into a fiber and be intercepted.
And an inside job will always prove unstoppable. "Treachery is the primary
way," observes Seth Lloyd, an expert in quantum computation at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "There's nothing quantum mechanics
can do about that." Still, in the emerging quantum information age, these
new ways of keeping secrets may be better than any others in the codebooks.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 20 10:11:02 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 13:11:02 -0500
Subject: International meet on cryptology in Chennai
Message-ID: <p0611047ebdecc603892b@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.chennaionline.com/colnews/newsitem.asp?NEWSID=%7BE75EFF46-873D-4942-884A-69B736936D6B%7D&CATEGORYNAME=Tamil+Nadu>


Chennai Online News Service - View News

 Dec 20, 2004 Mon
 Dharana
  
International meet on cryptology in Chennai
Search for More News

 Chennai, Dec 19: A three-day international conference on cryptology will
get underway here tomorrow with the aim of providing secure communication
to the business and military sectors.

Over 140 researchers in the field, including some from abroad, would
participate in the conference, Dr M S Vijyaraghavan, executive director,
Society for Electronics Transactions and Security (SETS), told reporters
here today.

Cryptography is the art of providing secure information over insecure
channels. It encodes texts and provides a method of decoding. Cryptanalysis
is the art of breaking into cryptographic information.

The new science - cryptology - was a study of both, he said.

India had not made any headway in cryptology, he said and added that the
conference would help develop this in a big way.

President A P J Abdul Kalam would address the participants through video
conferencing. Dr R Chidambaram, principal scientific adviser, Government of
India, would inaugurate the conference. (Our Correspondent)


  
Published: Sunday, December 19, 2004


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 20 10:17:07 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 13:17:07 -0500
Subject: Trouble On The Cards
Message-ID: <p06110482bdecc6e5be3f@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.mirror.co.uk/printable_version.cfm?method=printable_version_mirror&objectid=14995733&siteid=50143>
TROUBLE ON THE CARDS



 By Bob Roberts Deputy Political Editor

  

PLANS to bring in compulsory ID cards are to be hit by a double rebellion
in the Commons today.

Up to 30 Labour MPs are expected to oppose controversial Government moves
to introduce the cards by 2008.

And Tory leader Michael Howard - who has given his backing to the cards -
is also facing a revolt by his own MPs as up to 40 "go missing" in the vote.

Senior Tory Damian Green yesterday branded the cards "authoritarian" and
said: "They will make us less free without making us safer."

And Mr Howard's own head of policy David Cameron says the cards are a
"waste of money". Earlier he said: "Is it time for national identity cards
to deal with the problems of illegal immigration, crime and foreign
visitors abusing our NHS? My answer is 'No'."

Campaign group No2ID called the plan "pointless, expensive and an abuse of
human rights".

National group co-ordinator Mark Littlewood warned demonstrations would
follow. He said: "With the level of opposition we're experiencing, a
backlash on the scale of the anti-war demonstrations looks likely."

Yesterday Liberal Democrat leader Charles Kennedy urged the government to
delay the plan, to give time to "pause and reflect". He added: "That is the
sensible way to go about it but I think this Government has got itself so
much into tram lines now that it is not behaving sensibly at all."

If a large number of Tories fail to vote on the Bill it could plunge Mr
Howard into a new leadership crisis.

But incoming Home Secretary Charles Clarke is expected to sweep aside calls
for a delay when he faces the Commons for the first time in his new role.
He insisted: "I certainly shall not pause. I will go ahead with the
legislation.

"Identity cards are a means of trying to create a secure society. I have
always been a supporter."

Despite the rebels, the Bill introducing the cards is expected to be voted
through by a combination of loyal Tories and Labour MPs.

Mr Clarke is expected to announce that the poor and pensioners will get
cut-price ID cards to ease the cost, predicted to be around #85.

The former Education Secretary will also promise tough punishments for
anybody caught abusing the sensitive personal information which will be
held on a massive computerised database.

And he will insist cards will help the fight against terrorism, organised
crime and illegal immigration.

The credit card-sized documents will be issued from 2008 to anyone who
applies for or renews a passport.

The proposals were first introduced by David Blunkett.

The ID cards will carry "biometric" details about each bearer, such as
fingerprints or an electronic scan of the iris of the eye.

These details - along with a photograph, signature, date of birth, address
and nationality - will also be stored on the central register.

Officials will be able to compare data on the card with the register,
theoretically making them impossible to fake.

 

 
 Top



 

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com  Mon Dec 20 10:58:47 2004
From: kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com (John Kelsey)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 13:58:47 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
Subject: Flaw with lava lamp entropy source
Message-ID: <4628410.1103569127542.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>

>From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd at echeque.com>
>Sent: Dec 18, 2004 2:51 PM
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Re: Flaw with lava lamp entropy source

...
>These days the video entropy source is not a lava lamp, but a
>lens cap - in the dark, the ccds generate significant thermal
>noise, which (unlike chaotic noise) cannot fail, unless someone
>immerses the camera in liquid helium. 

Do you (does anyone) know of any papers that have formally analyzed this entropy source?  

>    --digsig
>         James A. Donald

--John




From kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com  Mon Dec 20 11:16:04 2004
From: kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com (John Kelsey)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 14:16:04 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
Subject: Israeli Airport Security Questioning Re: CRYPTO-GRAM,
  December  15, 2004
Message-ID: <8858298.1103570165232.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>

>The difference here is that Bad_Guy is visiting the
>country for the first time. Now, there are fewer
>questions to ask.

But that's a common enough situation that the questioners are going to be ready for it.  And I bet a lot of the point of their questioning is just to see if they detect signs of stress where they expect to.  If you are a smart person who does something like this 20 times a day, you'll soon get a really good feel for when something odd is going on.  Also, any kind of in-depth questioning is likely to uncover a lot of fraudulent claims.  If I say I'm a chemical engineer, it's not going to take much depth of knowledge for the questioner to find out I don't know things any chemical engineer would know, for example.  (It wouldn't be hard to come up with some computerized system for pulling up lists of questions like this.  Like, someone says he's Catholic, and you ask him who was born without sin as a direct result of the immaculate conception, or ask him to say a Hail Mary.)  So this might force you to tell more of the truth, which makes it easier to profile you.  

And this is all physical / procedural security.  You're not building an unclimbable wall, you're building lots of challenging speedbumps.  No doubt a real intelligence agent would be good at getting through this kind of screening, but that doesn't mean most of the people who want to blow up planes would be any good at it!  

>Sarad.

--John




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 20 11:33:20 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 14:33:20 -0500
Subject: Grateful Dead's former lyricist finds tough fight against
  searches
Message-ID: <p06110408bdecd8fe5e23@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.contracostatimes.com/mld/cctimes/news/10453495.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp>

Posted on Sun, Dec. 19, 2004

Grateful Dead's former lyricist finds tough fight against searches

By Mary Anne Ostrom


John Perry Barlow, former Grateful Dead lyricist and current cyber-rights
activist, had hoped to use his arrest on drug charges to shed light on how
the Transportation Security Administration conducts its baggage searches.

While most defendants caught by airport security with small amounts of
contraband typically plead guilty to misdemeanor charges, Barlow decided to
fight. He was arrested after a baggage screener at San Francisco
International Airport in 2003 found small amounts of marijuana and
hallucinogens in an Advil bottle in his checked luggage. He was immediately
pulled off a Delta flight and handcuffed. He spent all day in San Mateo
County Jail.

But Judge Harry Papadakis, a retired Fresno judge, ruled Wednesday that the
search of Barlow's checked luggage was reasonable under the U.S.
Constitution, and now he must face trial next spring on the charges in San
Mateo Superior Court.

"I'm distressed," Barlow said after the ruling, calling it a blow to civil
rights. "What the judge is saying is that when you are going to travel, you
make yourself subject to any search no matter how thorough; the search can
be as wide as possible."

Barlow had claimed he was the subject of an unlawful search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment; the screener can look in checked baggage for
explosives and incendiary devices that might be used to blow up an
airplane, his attorney argued, but not drugs.

It was a pair of laser gloves Barlow used at the Burning Man festival that
initially caught the baggage screener's attention when an X-ray machine
showed wires, electrodes and batteries in checked luggage.

Barlow's attorney had tried to convince the judge that his client's case
would expose the federal agency's baggage check policies as nothing but "a
stalking horse" for much broader criminal investigations. The defense did
elicit testimony from airport police that they work closely with the
Transportation Security Administration, Drug Enforcement Agency and baggage
screening contractors to act on drug tips, but that's not what led to
Barlow's arrest.

The screener, Sandra Ramos, testified Wednesday that when she opened up
Barlow's hanging bag, she unzipped one of two compartments. Instead of
finding the gloves, she found a large bottle of Advil. She told prosecutors
she opened the bottle and dumped out the pills because it seemed much
heavier than a normal bottle should be and possibly could have contained
explosive material. And that's when she found the marijuana -- less than a
quarter of an ounce -- and some fungus-like material that turned out to be
hallucinogenic mushrooms. She then unzipped the other side and found the
gloves.

Law enforcement officials also identified the club drug ketamine and
hypodermic needles in the luggage and later found Ecstasy in Barlow's
wallet.

Barlow is facing five misdemeanor counts. He has said the marijuana was for
medicinal purposes and that the needles were used to inject hay fever
medication.

But from the start of Wednesday's hearing, the key issue was not drugs: It
was how much testimony on Transportation Security Administration procedures
would be allowed.

San Mateo County Deputy District Attorney Aaron Fitzgerald argued that
Barlow "was on a fishing expedition" in his attempt to open up the
government's policies and procedures. Two government attorneys representing
the federal agency sat directly behind Fitzgerald, arguing several times
that witnesses could not answer defense questions because information such
as how X-ray equipment is used and how workers are trained could "make it
easier for terrorists." The judge sided with the prosecution at nearly
every turn.

As co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Barlow has never been
shy about condemning the government for what he sees as restricting
freedoms. Wednesday's hearing drew more than half a dozen cyber activists.

During a hearing recess, before the ruling, Barlow told reporters, "If you
are going to have a free country, you certainly have to understand the
circumstances under which you can be searched and detained."

As for the laser gloves, Barlow showed up in court with them Wednesday. In
fact, Barlow packed them in the same suitcase that had been the subject of
the search.

"The gloves made it through court security today," he said. "Nobody said a
thing."

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com  Mon Dec 20 11:48:27 2004
From: kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com (John Kelsey)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 14:48:27 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
   Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We  Put You There?
Message-ID: <7604996.1103572109186.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>

>From: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
>Sent: Dec 19, 2004 4:23 PM
>Subject: Re: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts Before Throwing You in a Cell at the >Airport and Then Lying About Why We Put You There?

...
>Funny how most Americans only wake up after it happens to them.

Why would this be a surprise?  This is surely the way it is with most people, hence the famous old quote about "...and when they came for me, there was no one left to complain."  

I wonder how long it will take 'till TSA adops some kind of internal policing policies with some teeth, to deal with the claims about women being felt up, people being turned away from planes for reading the wrong book, or whatever.  Probably sometime after a successful lawsuit costs them a few million dollars, alas.  

...
>-TD

--John




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 20 11:54:57 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 14:54:57 -0500
Subject: Digipass Starts to Make a Mark
Message-ID: <p06110414bdecde6aa352@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110348908376704197,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal

      December 20, 2004

Digipass Starts to Make a Mark
Vasco Enhances Online Security
 As Web Banks Gain Popularity

By STEVE DE BONVOISIN
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
December 20, 2004


BRUSSELS -- Life-insurance salesman Renaud Bruneels, 34 years old, says he
doesn't have time to take care of "life's little administrative issues" by
visiting a bank during regular business hours.

The Belgian has solved the problem by becoming one of 12 million users
world-wide of Vasco Data Security International Inc.'s Digipass. The
pocket-size gadget, which looks like a calculator, lets him use a single
password to pay everything from garbage fees to phone bills over the
Internet.

INSIDE TECH

1
See complete coverage2 of Europe's technology sector, from cellphones to
software.

"It gives me the level of security I need to ... do all my banking
transactions," Mr. Bruneels says.

Vasco, which is based in Brussels and Chicago, is riding an uptick in
online banking -- particularly in Europe, which has moved ahead of the
U.S.; the company believes that the U.S. market will take off within the
next two years, as banks roll out the service to retail customers.

Digipass can be used to access anything online, from bank accounts to
secure servers to a corporate intranet. Given a username and password, it
issues a one-time code to be used for purchases or transactions on the Web.
Because the code only works once, hackers who infiltrate a computer can't
use it again. The added level of security sets the Digipass system apart
from other online transactions via mobile handsets or laptop computers.

Vasco was founded in 1997 by Digipass inventor Jan Valcke, a Belgian, and
Ken Hunt, an American who ran an online-authentication software company.
But after the Internet bubble burst in 2000, customers hesitated to invest
in Internet banking security.

Digipass "came out a little too early ... when the big focus was on viruses
and not on identity theft," said Edward Ching, technology analyst at Rodman
& Renshaw in New York.

The stock fell from a high of $25 ($18.81) in February 2000 to under $1 in
early 2003, forcing Vasco to delist from Nasdaq's National Market and move
on to the SmallCap Market.

In 2002, Mr. Hunt took over as chief executive. Vasco switched to "just in
time" production, and spent hundreds of thousands of dollars training
resellers to tackle the corporate-access market.

In November, the company posted its third consecutive quarterly sales
increase. Vasco forecasts 2004 sales will rise between 23% and 25% from
$22.87 million in 2003, and on Thursday Vasco said it expects 2005 sales to
grow 35% to 45% with gross margins in the range of 60% to 65%.

On Friday, Vasco shares fell eight cents to $6.40 in 4 p.m. Nasdaq Stock
Market trading.

Vasco still faces stiff competition. It has only about $10 million in cash,
putting it at a disadvantage against U.S. rival RSA Security Inc., when
chasing big contracts. In September, RSA signed a landmark deal with Time
Warner Inc.'s America Online service to provide authentication for users
signing into their online e-mail accounts.

"We don't have the brand recognition we deserve," says Mr. Hunt, who admits
Vasco wasn't even invited to bid on the Time Warner contract. As a result,
the company has increased its presence in trade shows together with
partners such as Novell Inc. and Lucent Technologies Inc., and is bringing
prospective and current clients together in workshops to help them solve
operational problems.

More than 100 million households world-wide now bank online, and that
number is expected to triple to 300 million or more households by the end
of the decade. Europe has taken the lead. About 37% of all Internet users
on the Continent bank online, as opposed to 17% in the U.S., according to
reports from research firms Gartner and Forrester Research. The number of
Europeans carrying out financial transactions on the Net is expected to
rise to 130 million by 2007, compared with 67 million Americans.

Banks are Digipass's main customers. "Digipass is the most secure system
available and the one which offers the greatest mobility," said Liliane
Tackaert, spokeswoman for Belgo-Dutch banking giant Fortis NV. About
775,000 of the bank's clients in Belgium and Luxembourg use the service.

Rabobank, of the Netherlands, Europe's biggest online bank in terms of
online customers, has more than two million Digipasses in use.

Vasco hopes it will become a lead supplier for the new European EMV payment
card next year. Developed jointly by Europay International, MasterCard Inc.
and Visa International, the card requires a PIN number in addition to a
usual signature when buying goods in a shop, as well as a one-time code --
such as the one generated by Digipass -- to buy goods online or over the
phone. In addition to Vasco, Xiring, of Suresnes, France, and U.S.-based
ActivCard Corp., Fremont, California, are in the running.

Outside Europe, Digipass is pushing into new markets, signing up banks in
countries ranging from Singapore to Argentina.

Sales in the U.S. -- a potentially huge market -- accounted for just 16% of
group turnover in the third quarter. Phishing and other scams in the U.S.
have made potential customers more suspicious about banking over the
Internet, making some banks unwilling to invest in authentication products
such as Digipass.

Wachovia Corp., Charlotte, North Carolina, is Vasco's only large U.S.
banking client and the use of Digipass is limited to corporate-banking
users.

Laurence Leinbach, head of Wachovia's online banking operations, said that
until now, U.S. banks have invested in such security only for
high-potential corporate customers. "There is a very different
authentication philosophy between corporate banking and retail banking in
the U.S.," added Mr. Leinbach.

That could change. As identity fraud mounts, Mr. Leinbach predicts banks
will take a closer look at authentication products. "Expect to see changes
within the next 24 months in the majority of retail banks," he said.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From FabrizioA at nedcor.com  Mon Dec 20 05:15:42 2004
From: FabrizioA at nedcor.com (Astengo, F. (Fabrizio))
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 15:15:42 +0200
Subject: Costs of Money Laundering Enforcement
Message-ID: <mailman.1117.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Hi Robert,

Have the link here, but after further reading of the section, it would seem
that it was not really your article, just a quote of it. I simply read the
top section and assumed it was yourself replying to the comments, but after
further analysis it would seem not.

Heres the link anyways:

<http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/JIBC/9703-12.htm>http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/JIBC/9703-12.htm

Im still trying to source this doc, and quote from that page:
"
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn at schloss.li>
To: Multiple recipients of <e$@thumper.vmeng.com>

On Fri, 13 Jun 1997 mfarncombe at cc.ernsty.co.uk wrote:
"

(This is of course the section I missed :-) )

If you are aware, would I contact Black Unicorn or MFarncombe in this
regard? Im still not too clear who is replying to whom on the article.

Thanking you
Fabrizio Astengo



-----Original Message-----
From: R.A. Hettinga [<mailto:rah at shipwright.com>mailto:rah at shipwright.com]
Sent: 20 December 2004 14:54
To: Astengo, F. (Fabrizio)
Subject: Re: Costs of Money Laundering Enforcement


At 10:56 AM +0200 12/20/04, Astengo, F. (Fabrizio) wrote:
>Was reading an article on the web where you made reference to:

Send me the link, it might help.

Cheers,
RAH
--
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation
<<http://www.ibuc.com/>http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'


Nedbank Limited Reg No 1951/000009/06
Directors: WAM Clewlow (Chairman)  Prof MM Katz (Vice-chairman)  ML Ndlovu
(Vice-chairman)  TH Nyasulu (Vice-chairman)  TA Boardman (Chief Executive) 
CJW Ball  MWT Brown  RG Cottrell  BE Davison  N Dennis+  Prof B Figaji  MJ
Levett  JB Magwaza  ME Mkwanazi  PF Nhleko  JVF Roberts+ 
CML Savage  JH Sutcliffe+  (+British)     Company Secretary: GS Nienaber
01.07.2004

This email and any accompanying attachments may contain confidential and
proprietary information.  This information is private and protected by law
and, accordingly, if you are not the intended recipient, you are requested
to delete this entire communication immediately and are notified that any
disclosure, copying or distribution of or taking any action based on this
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Emails cannot be guaranteed to be secure or free of errors or viruses.  The
sender does not accept any liability or responsibility for any
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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 20 19:10:11 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 22:10:11 -0500
Subject: Rice University Computer Scientists Find a Flaw in Google's New
   Desktop Search Program
Message-ID: <p0611044fbded446f8cf3@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://nytimes.com/2004/12/20/technology/20flaw.html?pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

December 20, 2004

Rice University Computer Scientists Find a Flaw in Google's New Desktop
Search Program
 By JOHN MARKOFF


AN FRANCISCO, Dec. 19 - A Rice University computer scientist and two of his
students have discovered a potentially serious security flaw in the desktop
search tool for personal computers that was recently distributed by  Google.

The glitch, which could permit an attacker to secretly search the contents
of a personal computer via the Internet, is what computer scientists call a
composition flaw - a security weakness that emerges when separate
components interact. "When you put them together, out jumps a security
flaw," said Dan Wallach, an assistant professor of computer science at Rice
in Houston, who, with two graduate students, Seth Fogarty and Seth Nielson,
discovered the flaw last month. "These are subtle problems, and it takes a
lot of experience to ferret out this kind of flaw," Professor Wallach said.

Google introduced a test version of the desktop search tool on Oct. 14, and
it can be downloaded at no cost. The program indexes material on a user's
local hard disk and then blends Web search results with local user
information like electronic mail, text documents and other files. The flaw
would permit a search to reveal only small portions of the files.

The way the software tool is designed, a user's queries, but no locally
stored information, is distributed via the Internet. But by reading user
queries sent to its search service, Google is able to place its AdWords
text advertisements next to the search results displayed in a user's
browser window.

In a statement over the weekend, the company said that it had been notified
of the flaw by the computer researchers in late November and had begun
distributing a new version of the desktop search engine that repairs the
potential security hole. Google's introduction of a desktop search tool has
touched off a competition with its closest Web search service competitors,
Microsoft and  Yahoo.

 Microsoft made a test version of its desktop search tool available last
Monday as part of its MSN toolbar suite, and Yahoo has said that it will
begin testing a similar search tool in January.

The Rice University researchers said that they had not yet examined
Microsoft's desktop search program, but noted that the service did not
appear to integrate Web and local search results in the same manner as the
Google tool.

The researchers said that the Google security weakness lay in the way that
Google Desktop was designed to intercept outgoing network connections from
the user's computer.

The program looks for traffic that appears to be going to Google.com and
then inserts results from a user's hard disk for a particular search. They
found that it was possible to trick the Google desktop search program into
inserting those results into other Web pages where an attacker could read
them.

 An attack would require a user to visit the attacker's Web site first, and
any type of Web browser could make a user vulnerable. Google said there was
no evidence that any such attacks had occurred.

 The Rice group was able to create a Java program that makes network
connections back to the computer from where it was downloaded and then make
it appear as if it were asking for a search at Google.com. That was enough
to fool the Google desktop software into providing the user's search
information. The program was able to do anything with the results,
including transmitting them back to the attacking site.

"This began as a student project to study how Google Desktop worked and to
see if there were any security flaws," said Professor Wallach. "We started
by wondering how Google did the local search integration. Once we figured
out how it worked, it wasn't too much extra work to break it."

The researchers said that Google had responded quickly to their alert last
month and had begun releasing a corrected version of the program on Dec. 10.

 The Google desktop program includes an update feature that permits the
company to automatically install new versions of the program on users'
computers without user intervention or knowledge.

The Rice researchers said that it was possible for users to tell if their
version of the Google program had been patched by examining the "about"
page from the Google Desktop icon in the browser task bar. Version numbers
above 121,004 indicate a newer edition of the program.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From skquinn at speakeasy.net  Mon Dec 20 21:30:52 2004
From: skquinn at speakeasy.net (Shawn K. Quinn)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 23:30:52 -0600
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
  	Before Throwing  You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About
  Why We 	Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F259FCFACB82C65747CC83C9BA20@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F259FCFACB82C65747CC83C9BA20@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <1103607052.11154.7.camel@xevious>

On Mon, 2004-12-20 at 11:56 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> Well, there's a TINY little hole in your logic here...

  [J.A. Terranson wrote:]
> >Scale of distance is the only difference.  Either you support the system
> >or you don't.  I don't: I either drive to jobs (charging for mileage) or I
> >pass on them, rather than take part in the police state that is todays air
> >system.  You have the very same choices.  The argument eveyone is making
> >here is that it is too much of an inconvenience (financial or otherwise),
> >*not* to fly.  Sorry, but that's just pure self-serving BS.
> 
> For one, Flying can easily be a requirement, not an option. But that's 
> besides the point here.
> 
> The real point is that some Super-JAT could (5 years from now when there are 
> ubiquitous highway checkpoints) argue that "walking from NYC to Boston may 
> be difficult but it IS possible". Or of course (after Tenent's vision for 
> the internet is realized) "You could simply Fedex those files, you don't 
> need to use the internet"

Agreed, if you want or need to get between cities faster than land-based
travel will allow, flying is in fact a requirement. That was, in fact,
my point. (Would anyone actually resort to walking between NYC and
Boston?)

As an aside, I often jokingly used the phrase "the only broadband
connections we would have would be UPS and FedEx" back in the days when
DSL and cable modem connections were not as ubitiquous (yes I know
satellite is also an option but it's $DEITY-awful slow and only usable
for the most basic of needs). However, regulation of the Internet such
that couriers would be the only feasible way to move large amounts of
data around (burned to CD or DVD as the case may be) is not a joking
matter in the least.

-- 
Shawn K. Quinn <skquinn at speakeasy.net>




From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com  Mon Dec 20 23:58:59 2004
From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 23:58:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Israeli Airport Security Questioning Re: CRYPTO-GRAM,
  December 15, 2004
In-Reply-To: <8858298.1103570165232.JavaMail.root@kermit.psp.pas.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <20041221075859.3511.qmail@web21207.mail.yahoo.com>

--- John Kelsey <kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com> wrote:


>  If I say I'm a
> chemical engineer, it's not going to take much depth
> of knowledge for the questioner to find out I don't
> know things any chemical engineer would know, for
> example.  (It wouldn't be hard to come up with some
> computerized system for pulling up lists of
> questions like this.  Like, someone says he's
> Catholic, and you ask him who was born without sin
> as a direct result of the immaculate conception, or
> ask him to say a Hail Mary.)  So this might force
> you to tell more of the truth, which makes it easier
> to profile you.  

There must be trained and educated people and they
don't even have to lie. Speaking out their entire life
minus the six months to two years at a terrorist
training camp still will not give any useful info to
the questioner.

However, as you mentioned a well trained officer will
quickly be able to detect stress patterns and be a
sign of warning. For lesser people,it is a decent
test.

Sarad.


		
__________________________________ 
Do you Yahoo!? 
Send holiday email and support a worthy cause. Do good. 
http://celebrity.mail.yahoo.com




From jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com  Tue Dec 21 00:08:49 2004
From: jtrjtrjtr2001 at yahoo.com (Sarad AV)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 00:08:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: International meet on cryptology in Chennai
In-Reply-To: <p0611047ebdecc603892b@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <20041221080850.61459.qmail@web21204.mail.yahoo.com>

--- "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com> wrote:



They call it IndoCrypt
http://www-rocq.inria.fr/codes/indocrypt2004/

Sarad.


		
__________________________________ 
Do you Yahoo!? 
Meet the all-new My Yahoo! - Try it today! 
http://my.yahoo.com 




From measl at mfn.org  Tue Dec 21 04:31:54 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 06:31:54 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
   Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We  Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F259FCFACB82C65747CC83C9BA20@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F259FCFACB82C65747CC83C9BA20@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041221062400.T41362@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Mon, 20 Dec 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:

> Well, there's a TINY little hole in your logic here...
>
> >Scale of distance is the only difference.  Either you support the system
> >or you don't.  I don't: I either drive to jobs (charging for mileage) or I
> >pass on them, rather than take part in the police state that is todays air
> >system.  You have the very same choices.  The argument eveyone is making
> >here is that it is too much of an inconvenience (financial or otherwise),
> >*not* to fly.  Sorry, but that's just pure self-serving BS.
>
> For one, Flying can easily be a requirement, not an option.

You keep asserting this, but at the same time fail to provide an example.
Please show how flying "can easily be a requirement, not an option".  One
legitimate example will suffice.


> But that's besides the point here.

No - that's the entire point here.


> The real point is that some Super-JAT could (5 years from now when there are
> ubiquitous highway checkpoints) argue that "walking from NYC to Boston may
> be difficult but it IS possible". Or of course (after Tenent's vision for
> the internet is realized) "You could simply Fedex those files, you don't
> need to use the internet"

So, your position is that we should not take action now, because we may
have to take the same action later?

If people would assert their economic powers today through refusal to fund
the airlines, the same threat would prevent your example from being
possible in the future.  The only reason your "walking" scenario is even a
little plausible is because TheMan/G'mint/etc., knows that there will be
no pushback on *any* front.

Also, not that while airlines are heavily regulated, they are not
(theoretically at least) publicly funded, and as such, your "right" to use
them is limited - whereas roads are public property, and will be a lot
harder to place prohibitions upon.  A real boycott of airlines would take
only days to bring both the airlines and the TSA to it's knees - the
economic impact would be both national in scope and immediate in effect:
you can make no legitimate argument for not addressing the TSA problem
head on.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From measl at mfn.org  Tue Dec 21 04:34:31 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 06:34:31 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
   Before Throwing  You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About
  Why We  Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <1103607052.11154.7.camel@xevious>
References: <BAY24-F259FCFACB82C65747CC83C9BA20@phx.gbl>
  <1103607052.11154.7.camel@xevious>
Message-ID: <20041221063230.U41362@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Mon, 20 Dec 2004, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:

> Agreed, if you want
                 ^^^^

And this, ladies and gentlemen, is what it boils down to.  You *want*
things your own way, but you are too fucking spoiled to fight fo it - so
instead you whine and moan.

Put up or shut up.

Either you fight it with your most effective weapon (dollars), or you
actively support it (again, with dollars).  There is no middle ground.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 21 06:23:30 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 09:23:30 -0500
Subject: A Bronx Curbside Whisper: 'Hey, Need a Tuneup?'
Message-ID: <p0611045ebded44a89a4c@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://nytimes.com/2004/12/19/nyregion/19bronx.html?pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

December 19, 2004

A Bronx Curbside Whisper: 'Hey, Need a Tuneup?'
 BY ANDREA ELLIOTT


he men saunter up and down a littered block of Third Avenue in the Bronx,
casting sidelong glances at passing cars. When the cars slow down, the men
mouth silent promises of a cheap fix. When the drivers pull over, the men
scan for cops before sliding up to the curb.

It is a singular hustle. There are no drugs or sex. Instead, the hoods of
the cars fly open and the men get to work, pulling out greasy tools to
perform every mechanical remedy from oil changes to hair-raising tuneups
and axle replacements, right on the street.

In the vast underground of New York's economy, street mechanics hold a
peculiar if utilitarian place. For people who balk at a $30 oil change,
there is Country, a 41-year-old Virginia native who charges a third of
that, jacking up his clients' cars as rush-hour traffic creeps by. In the
expert hands of Chino and Heavy, a $200 brake job costs half as much, parts
included.

 On busy days, cars line Third Avenue like sick patients, propped up by
metal jacks, worn-out tires flung to the side. The mechanics disappear
underneath, their boots peeking out, their tools splayed on asphalt outside
the neon blink of auto parts shops.

Sometimes ingenious, sometimes deceptive, they form a blue-collar rung in
the city's freelance work ladder. They are mobile, carrying their tools in
wheeled suitcases, on call around the clock by cellphone or pager. They
draw clients from as far as Connecticut and Rhode Island. Some even wear
uniforms, and the best ones travel on distant missions, reviving
broken-down cars on roadsides from Boston to Atlantic City.

"I'm like an ambulance," said Luis Mares, 40, who installs rebuilt
alternators for as little as $85. "Where there's trouble, I go."

The flourishing, although illegal, street business blends comical
improvisation with corporate savvy. But as it does in any profession, the
talent ranges. Some mechanics leave customers careering away brakeless.
Many make a mess, with discarded oil and strewn parts. And hovering over
them all is the constant threat of the police, who issue tickets to the men
tirelessly, leading to hundreds of dollars in fines and repeated stays in
jail. Yet week after week, the mechanics stubbornly return to the same
street to eke out a living on their own terms.

"This is New York," said Country, who would give only his street name and
who has been issued, he said, 42 summonses in the last two years. "If
you're not on your feet, you're on your butt."

Street mechanics ply their trade all over the city. They can be found near
Shea Stadium in Queens and around Pacific Street and Fourth Avenue in
Brooklyn. But perhaps nowhere are they more brazenly visible than on Third
Avenue from East 161st to 163rd Streets, in the Melrose Commons section of
the South Bronx.

 On any given day, up to 15 mechanics work the street, competing for
clients. Repairs begin after noon (the late hours are among the perks of
the job) and pick up around 5 p.m., when customers leave their jobs and
stop by for a new timing belt change or a brake adjustment. Paydays are the
peak. Saturdays are prime: the best mechanics can pocket $400 in one day,
saving clients the steeper prices charged by Pep Boys or Jiffy Lube.

 "I can't afford to go to the shop," said Howard Dawson, 66, a retired
Amtrak repairman who regularly takes his '93 Cadillac Fleetwood to the
street. "One hand's got to wash the other."

The Third Avenue mechanics, like most workers, operate in a hierarchy.

At the top are the owners of the auto parts stores, who moved to the street
starting in the early 1970's. The mechanics came uninvited around the same
time, like weeds in a garden. They formed a symbiotic relationship with the
stores' employees. The stores sell parts to customers who often need a
mechanic to install them and the mechanics will send their clients to the
stores.

 "You help me and I'll help you," explained Humberto Ortiz, 56, a salesman
at Ocampo Auto Electric on Third Avenue.

At the bottom of the ladder are the "helpers" - mechanics in training who
earn much of their pay by luring clients. They, too, have street names that
in the mores of the South Bronx are assigned more than chosen. There is
Little Mexico, Dominica and Mouse. Not by coincidence, they share several
traits: they are small in build, move quickly and seem to have an outsized
view of their own mechanical abilities.

"Every time I see them doing something heavy, they look stuck in it," said
Luis Martinez, who goes by Chino and is among the street's veterans.

 Tales abound of jobs the helpers started and botched, only to be saved by
the street's experts. But unlike other would-be street mechanics, whose bad
reputations result in swift excommunication, these helpers have clung to
their place on the street. They tend to live off small jobs, not always
involving cars.

 "I walk this dog for $2," said Little Mexico, stabbing two fingers in the
air as a tiger-colored pit bull named Puppy yanked him away.

 Some mechanics admit they work to support a drug habit. Others say they
are "clean" and look upon their entrepreneurship as a career choice. Two
Third Avenue mechanics - Pernell Dingle and Elliot Rodriguez - claim they
graduated "Mechanic of the Year" from Alfred E. Smith High School, two
decades ago. (An official at the school, Jeff Block, confirmed that both
men got mostly A's. "Dingle owes us $8," he added, for an automotive
encyclopedia he never returned.)

 Chino, who has dozens of regular clients, takes his job especially
seriously, arriving promptly at noon with a yellow plastic tool case. He
wears one of his six navy blue uniforms, washed and pressed by his wife.
"Who would you hire: a guy who looked like a bum or me?" he says.

One recent weekday, Mr. Martinez is swiftly dismantling the innards of a
shiny black Lincoln Town Car to change the alternator. His hands maneuver
expertly around the radiator tank, the power steering wheel tank, several
hoses and the engine belt. (He learned the trade as a boy, taking apart
engines in his backyard in the Soundview section of the Bronx.) Mr.
Martinez's client watches closely and then instructs his gum-chewing
girlfriend, who is seated behind the faux-fur covered wheel, to rev the
engine.

The engine roars. A Betty Boop air freshener flutters from the rearview
mirror. The job is almost done.

"I promised him more power," said Mr. Martinez, 40, who has worked on the
street for a decade. "Now we'll check." The two men jump into the car and
head off. Not only do clients get test drives, some get credit.

 "I've got about $200 in the street right now," Mr. Martinez said.

He keeps a stack of his clients' business cards. One is a plumber, another
a lawyer. Then there is the candy wholesaler whose fuel pump went bad on a
trip to Boston. He paid Mr. Martinez $400 to fix it. Recruiters from auto
repair shops visit the street from time to time, looking for potential
hires, but Mr. Martinez is quick to rebuff them. He makes enough on his
own, he says - about $40,000 a year.

 "You walk into my house right now, you won't want to leave," said Mr.
Martinez, who lives in a housing project a few blocks away. "Big-screen TV.
Surround-sound system." He sends his stepdaughter to a Catholic school and
vacations in Puerto Rico twice a year.

 The only nuisance, he concedes, are the tickets and occasional trips to
jail. Mr. Martinez has been locked up twice, for two days each time. Some
mechanics pay their tickets as dutifully as other people pay taxes. Mr.
Dingle, on the other hand, has not paid one of his more than 50 tickets and
has been jailed 17 times.

"I tell them to put me in my regular cell," said Mr. Dingle, 44, as he
stood on the street one early evening. "The cops know me by name." A few
minutes later, a Chevy Impala with tinted windows slowly glided by.

 "See that little black car?" said Country. "That's the captain. He's out
scouting."

Street mechanics violate a number of city codes seemingly written with them
in mind: on the street it is illegal to repair vehicles, remove vehicle
parts or discard oil. Each violation can carry a fine of $100.

 But fines were rare, the mechanics said, until 2000, when the 42nd
Precinct made "quality of life" issues a sudden priority and the police
began cracking down on the trade. It was a sign of new times: the South
Bronx was transforming, block by block, amid sweeping plans for urban
renewal.

 These days, the police know the mechanics well. They know, for instance,
that Frankie Rosado flashes his worn brown tool belt at passing cars the
way a prostitute might lift her skirt.

 "If I'm looking at a car, I'm guilty," said Mr. Rosado, 44.

One recent weekday, the security guards at the Bronx Criminal Courthouse on
East 161st Street gave Mr. Rosado a familiar nod as he emptied his pockets:
fuses, bulbs and screws. He navigated the building like he was walking
through his own kitchen. He turned without looking, smiled at a guard who
winked back, and approached a man sitting before a computer.

"When's my next court date?" he asked. With so many tickets, he had lost
track. His latest offense, written up on a pink summons dated Sept. 29, was
for "dismantling." The man behind the desk lifted a plump arm, "Monique"
tattooed across it in curly letters, and clicked on a mouse.

"Somebody's always messing with you somewhere," said the man as he searched
the Rosados on the screen. "Frankie C.?"

 "That's my son," Mr. Rosado said.

Seconds later, the dates were found and Mr. Rosado took off in search of
more work.

The street mechanic world is organic to South Bronx life, but like other
underground trades, it is increasingly at odds with the borough's evolving
self-image. The Melrose Commons area is awash in new development: stately
town houses, a gleaming BP gas station, and a $250 million criminal
courthouse close to completion. Even the three-block stretch where the
mechanics work is destined to become part of a new $30 million campus for
Boricua College.

The mechanics shrug it all off, doubtful that new buildings will extinguish
the need for bargain car repairs. Some of their clients, they laugh, are
off-duty police officers. One of them, Edward Sanchez, dropped by recently
to have the alternator changed on his 1993 Nissan Maxima.

 "For me, it's better if I see somebody working on the street than making
problems, stealing in stores," said Mr. Sanchez, 29, who flashed his badge
to prove he works as an auxiliary police officer. "Maybe it's not legal,
but I give them credit. They're trying to survive."

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Tue Dec 21 07:20:22 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 10:20:22 -0500
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
  Before Throwing  You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <20041221062400.T41362@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F316818837F54EE3B29599D9BA30@phx.gbl>

JAT wrote...

>You keep asserting this, but at the same time fail to provide an example.
>Please show how flying "can easily be a requirement, not an option".  One
>legitimate example will suffice.

Later. (Actually, I didn't 'keep asserting this', but that's a separate 
matter)

>So, your position is that we should not take action now, because we may
>have to take the same action later?

Well, that's a good point...I think I viewed your previous analysis on a 
more philosophical level (because that's how it was phrased), but when you 
put it this way it starts to make some sense. In other words, avoiding 
travel whenever possible will (when added to sheeple starting to do the same 
because of all the terible screening stories) eventually start putting some 
squeeze on the airlines. (But then again, DC has plenty of our tax dollars 
ready to bail out an incompetent set of airline managers.) It won't hurt at 
least.


As for the former, I am suprised you even need examples...asking for them 
weakens your main point.
There are plenty of examples to be had, and I'll give you an easy one. 
You're a hot looking, leggy and not super-bright saleschick that ALWAYS 
makes the sale in person (read: Big Bonuses), and much less frequently over 
the phone (read: failed sales quotas and eventual layoff). Your territory is 
"Northwest" meaning Oregon, NO Cal, Washington, Vancouver, and lots of those 
weird states over there like Idaho and whatnot. You can't possibly drive 
fast enough to make all your meetings in your territory. Will you...

1) Phone it in
2) Do some kind of lameass video conferencing
3) Fly
4) Get a job at McDonalds

tiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktik

RIIIIING! Times up...




From measl at mfn.org  Tue Dec 21 08:38:10 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 10:38:10 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
   Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We  Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F316818837F54EE3B29599D9BA30@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F316818837F54EE3B29599D9BA30@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041221102956.C41362@ubzr.zsa.bet>

On Tue, 21 Dec 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:

> put it this way it starts to make some sense. In other words, avoiding
> travel whenever possible will (when added to sheeple starting to do the same
> because of all the terible screening stories) eventually start putting some
> squeeze on the airlines.

I expect that "eventually" in this context would == (hours to [one or two]
days)


> (But then again, DC has plenty of our tax dollars ready to bail out an
> incompetent set of airline managers.) It won't hurt at least.

Even DC can't bail out *all* the airlines.  That kind of boycott *would*
hurt, and hurt badly.  And *fast*.


> As for the former, I am suprised you even need examples...asking for them
> weakens your main point.
> There are plenty of examples to be had, and I'll give you an easy one.
> You're a hot looking, leggy and not super-bright saleschick that ALWAYS
> makes the sale in person (read: Big Bonuses), and much less frequently over
> the phone (read: failed sales quotas and eventual layoff). Your territory is
> "Northwest" meaning Oregon, NO Cal, Washington, Vancouver, and lots of those
> weird states over there like Idaho and whatnot. You can't possibly drive
> fast enough to make all your meetings in your territory. Will you...
>
> 1) Phone it in
> 2) Do some kind of lameass video conferencing
> 3) Fly
> 4) Get a job at McDonalds

First of all, this is a *great* example of why flying is an *option*, and
not a "requirement".  That said, option number 4 is the obvious choice -
however, our leggy bimbo's mileage may vary.

The people of this country have long lost their voice for anything but
whining about how bad things are.  Since collectively, our economic voice
is our loudest voice, it is the one that should be used for the effecting
of immediate and comprehensive change.  The various non-arguments against
this all amount to the same thing: "we want change, but we don't want to
have to do anything that might also have any kind of unpleasantness
associated with it".  Fuck that shit.  Either you believe that this shit
is wrong, and you are willing to put your money where your mouth is, or
you can STFU when the nice TSA lady jams her fist up your ass looking for
a reason to show you who's really in charge here.

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 21 07:43:21 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 10:43:21 -0500
Subject: 'Video Miners' Use Hidden Cameras in Stores
Message-ID: <p0611047dbdedf419b9dd@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110357897849105150,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal

      December 21, 2004

 MARKETING



'Video Miners' Use
 Hidden Cameras in Stores
'Video Miners' Use Cameras
 Hidden in Stores to Analyze
 Who Shops, What They Like

By JOSEPH PEREIRA
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
December 21, 2004; Page B1


BRAINTREE, Mass. -- Stepping into a Gap store at the South Shore Shopping
Plaza on a recent evening, Laura Munro became a research statistic.

Twelve feet above her, a device resembling a smoke detector, mounted on the
ceiling and equipped with a hidden camera, took a picture of her head and
shoulders.

The image was fed to a computer and shipped to a database in Chicago, where
ShopperTrak RCT Corp., a consumer research firm, keeps count of shoppers
nationwide using 40,000 cameras placed in stores and malls.

ShopperTrak, whose profile has risen this holiday season as appetite grows
for more real-time shopping data, is a leader in "video mining" -- an
emerging field in marketing research enabled by technology that can analyze
video images without relying on human eyes.

ShopperTrak says it doesn't take pictures of faces. The company worries
that shoppers would perceive that as an invasion of privacy. But nearly all
of its videotaping is done without the knowledge of the people being taped.

"I didn't even know there was a camera up there," says Ms. Munro, a
public-transit manager who popped into the mall on her way home from work
to find a gift for her 12-year-old daughter.

Using proprietary software to gauge the size of the images of people, a
ShopperTrak computer determined that Ms. Munro was an adult, not a child,
and thus a bona fide shopper. Weeding out youngsters is critical in
accurately calculating one of the valuable bits of data ShopperTrak sells
-- the percentage of shoppers that buys and the percentage that only
browses. It arrives at this data, including the so-called conversion rate,
by comparing the number of people taped entering the store with the number
of transactions.

Ms. Munro's visit was tallied up twice: once as a visitor to the Gap and
once in a national count of shoppers. Gap Inc., of San Francisco, pays
ShopperTrak for the tally of Gap shoppers. ShopperTrak sells the broader
data -- gleaned from 130 retail clients and 380 malls -- to economists,
bankers and retailers.

ShopperTrak takes into account how much shoppers spend, data that it gets
from credit-card companies and banks, and extrapolates outward to the
entire retail landscape. "We can get sales and traffic figures that are
identical to the government's, two months before they can issue their
report," says Bill Martin, ShopperTrak's founder and president.

Of the millions of shoppers videotaped daily in the U.S., many are aware
that security cameras are watching to detect shoplifting. In some cases,
stores post signs to disclose such monitoring. But there is far less
awareness by consumers that they are being filmed for market research.

ShopperTrak discloses its clients -- a list that includes Gap and its
Banana Republic unit; Limited Brands Inc., of Columbus, Ohio, and its
Victoria's Secret chain; PaylessShoe Source Inc., of Topeka, Kan; American
Eagle Outfitters Inc., of Warrendale, Pa.; and Children's Place Retail
StoresInc., of Secaucus, N.J.

Several other research companies that videotape shoppers say they sign
agreements with clients in which they pledge not to disclose their names.
They say their clients want the taping to be secret -- and worry shoppers
would feel alienated or complain of privacy invasion if they knew.

Katherine Albrecht, founder and director of Caspian, a Cambridge, Mass.,
consumer-advocacy group, says consumers have "no idea such things as video
tracking are going on" and should be informed. When she tells them about
such activities, she says the response she often hears is, "Isn't this
illegal, like stalking? Shouldn't there be a law against it?" There aren't
any state laws forbidding retailers from videotaping shoppers for research
-- although in New Jersey last week, Caesars Atlantic City Hotel Casino was
fined $80,000 for videotaping the breasts and legs of female employees and
customers with cameras intended for security.

Some research companies' cameras, with lenses as small as a quarter, can
provide data on everything from the density of shopping traffic in an aisle
to the reactions of a shopper gazing at the latest plasma TV set. The cash
register is a popular spot for cameras, too. But cameras can be found in
banks, fast-food outlets and hotel lobbies (but not guest rooms).

Video miners say their research cameras are less invasive than security
cameras, because their subjects aren't scrutinized as closely as security
suspects. Images, they say, are destroyed when the research is done.

Robert Bulmash, founder of the Private Citizen Inc., of Naperville, Ill.,
which advocates for privacy rights, says that being in a retailer's store
doesn't give a retailer "the right to treat me like a guinea pig." He says
he wonders about assurances that images are destroyed, since there isn't
any way to verify such claims. The pictures "could be saved somewhere in
that vast digital universe and some day come back to haunt us," he says.

Already, video images can be subpoenaed from retailers for law-enforcement
purposes. Technology capable of matching a photo with an individual's
identity, say from credit-card transactions, "has certainly arrived," says
Rajeev Sharma, a Penn State University computer science professor who has
launched a company that is creating shopper-monitoring systems. It isn't
certain whether retailers are availing themselves of the know-how. Credit
card companies currently aren't sharing individuals' financial information
with retailers, he adds, but retailers have their own customer databases as
the result of loyalty cards, store credit cards and other in-house
programs. Theoretically, they could link a transaction at a cash register
with the face of a shopper appearing on the videotape.

Dr. Sharma's start-up, Advanced Interfaces Inc., of State College, Pa., is
expected this week to launch a Web site, videomining.com, highlighting the
company's patented "computer vision" technologies.

In a pilot project conducted last year in the Philadelphia area, Advanced
Interfaces set up nine cameras in each of two McDonald's Corp. restaurants
to find out which consumer types would find a new salad item most
appealing. The research was done without consumers' knowledge, says Dr.
Sharma, who is Advanced Interfaces' chief executive.

Seven of the cameras were already in place for security purposes and needed
only to be reconfigured using Advanced's sensors. Two additional cameras
were positioned in the ceiling directly over cash registers. By measuring
the shapes of people's faces, the sensors were able to provide a breakdown
of the fast-food customers by race, gender and age group, he says. The
videos also revealed the length of time customers spent waiting in line or
looking at the menu before ordering. Mr. Sharma declined to discuss the
findings.

All of the video was subsequently destroyed, he says. "Only the computers
and no humans saw the pictures of the customers," Mr. Sharma says. Advanced
is conducting similar consumer-behavior analysis this holiday season for
three other retailers that Mr. Sharma declined to identify.

Video mining is being spurred by digital video cameras. Unlike their analog
counterparts, digital video cameras can be programmed so that the images
can be quickly read by computers -- taking only hours to complete tasks
that might have taken weeks for humans to do.

In a recent assignment that Kahn Research Group, of Huntersville, N.C.,
completed for American Express Co., computers took only a couple of days to
sift through 64 hours of tape. Kahn researchers hid four cameras near the
checkout counter at a couple of supermarkets in Southern California to
study whether American Express gift cards should be displayed off in a spot
by themselves, or lumped with competing brands near the cash registers.

Researchers were interested in customers' facial expressions and eye
movements as they spotted the gift cards, and whether they walked to a
display to pick up a card. Kahn cameras, each the size of a golf ball, were
hidden behind the displays. The devices were programmed to detect fast-eye
movement, smiles and frowns, says Greg Kahn, the company's CEO.

The research, which involved filming 2,000 shoppers, was "really not
invasive," Mr. Kahn says. "Nobody knew they were being recorded and our
work didn't interfere with the store environment. Had we tried to interview
people, the process would have taken much longer."

And had people known they were being taped, he says, "I know many of the
shoppers would have stuck their hands in front of the camera lens and
refused to be recorded."

A spokeswoman for American Express described the project as a "pilot
program ... that's not for public consumption" and declined to comment
further.

It isn't clear whether the American public will be as tolerant of secret
market research using videotape as they are of security cameras. There are
29 million cameras videotaping people in airports, government buildings,
offices, schools, stores and elsewhere, according to one widely cited
estimate in the security industry.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 21 07:55:32 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 10:55:32 -0500
Subject: E-protection necessary for nation's security: Kalam
Message-ID: <p06110484bdedf7be9477@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.newkerala.com/news-daily/news/features.php?action=fullnews&id=49160
p>

E-protection necessary for nation's security: Kalam

 [Business India]: Chennai, Dec 21 : India was moving into an "era of
e-business, e-marketing, e-commerce and e-banking" and encryption
technology to protect network communication was the only way to ensure the
nation's security, said President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam.

The president was addressing scientists here Monday evening at the 5th
International Conference on Cryptology in India via videoconferencing.

Reminding his audience that Indian mathematician Srinivasa Ramanujam's work
was being applied in communication networks today, Kalam said:
"Cryptography is a wealth generator and wealth protector."

Noting that India was the only country in the world with a huge linguistic
diversity and more than 3,000 languages, he asked: "Can we make use of this
diversity to our advantage by using different languages as a cryptographic
tool?"

Addressing several hundred delegates from all over the world, who had
gathered here for the three day conference that began Monday, Kalam said:
"Nations that are capable of generating and managing information in a
secure way will become world leaders and economic superpowers"

He called for state-of-the-art technology at competitive costs in India, to
secure Indian e-systems.

Inaugurating the conference, hosted by the Institute of Mathematical
Sciences and the Society for Electronic Transactions (SETS), principal
scientific advisor to the central government R. Chidambaram said the
science of encryption was the "only know-how" technologists had to protect
e-systems.

Information flows over open networks. And to secure this information is "of
social, political, commercial and strategic" importance, Chidambaram said.

He asked Indian scientists for research inputs into standardisation
processes, called 'advanced encryption standard' it could develop quickly
in India.

Experts from various countries, including France, South Korea, Australia,
Belgium and Germany are attending the meet.

During the conference, 147 scientific papers on the art and science of
encryption will be presented.

Cryptology is the science of hiding information through codes. Mathematical
systems provide some of the best encryptions the world has so far
generated. It is also the art of breaking down codes and getting at secrets.

--Indo-Asian News Service

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 21 08:10:43 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 11:10:43 -0500
Subject: Roads Gone Wild: No street signs. No crosswalks. No accidents.
Message-ID: <p0611047abdedf2c26942@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.12/traffic_pr.html>



Wired 12.12:

Roads Gone Wild 
No street signs. No crosswalks. No accidents. Surprise: Making driving seem
more dangerous could make it safer.
By Tom McNichol 


Hans Monderman is a traffic engineer who hates traffic signs. Oh, he can
put up with the well-placed speed limit placard or a dangerous curve
warning on a major highway, but Monderman considers most signs to be not
only annoying but downright dangerous. To him, they are an admission of
failure, a sign - literally - that a road designer somewhere hasn't done
his job. "The trouble with traffic engineers is that when there's a problem
with a road, they always try to add something," Monderman says. "To my
mind, it's much better to remove things."


Monderman is one of the leaders of a new breed of traffic engineer - equal
parts urban designer, social scientist, civil engineer, and psychologist.
The approach is radically counterintuitive: Build roads that seem
dangerous, and they'll be safer.

 Monderman and I are tooling around the rural two-lane roads of northern
Holland, where he works as a road designer. He wants to show me a favorite
intersection he designed. It's a busy junction that doesn't contain a
single traffic signal, road sign, or directional marker, an approach that
turns eight decades of traditional traffic thinking on its head.

 Wearing a striped tie and crisp blue blazer with shiny gold buttons,
Monderman looks like the sort of stout, reliable fellow you'd see on a
package of pipe tobacco. He's worked as a civil engineer and traffic
specialist for more than 30 years and, for a time, ran his own driving
school. Droll and reserved, he's easy to underestimate - but his ideas on
road design, safety, and city planning are being adopted from Scandinavia
to the Sunshine State.

 Riding in his green Saab, we glide into Drachten, a 17th-century village
that has grown into a bustling town of more than 40,000. We pass by the
performing arts center, and suddenly, there it is: the Intersection. It's
the confluence of two busy two-lane roads that handle 20,000 cars a day,
plus thousands of bicyclists and pedestrians. Several years ago, Monderman
ripped out all the traditional instruments used by traffic engineers to
influence driver behavior - traffic lights, road markings, and some
pedestrian crossings - and in their place created a roundabout, or traffic
circle. The circle is remarkable for what it doesn't contain: signs or
signals telling drivers how fast to go, who has the right-of-way, or how to
behave. There are no lane markers or curbs separating street and sidewalk,
so it's unclear exactly where the car zone ends and the pedestrian zone
begins. To an approaching driver, the intersection is utterly ambiguous -
and that's the point.

 Monderman and I stand in silence by the side of the road a few minutes,
watching the stream of motorists, cyclists, and pedestrians make their way
through the circle, a giant concrete mixing bowl of transport. Somehow it
all works. The drivers slow to gauge the intentions of crossing bicyclists
and walkers. Negotiations over right-of-way are made through fleeting eye
contact. Remarkably, traffic moves smoothly around the circle with hardly a
brake screeching, horn honking, or obscene gesture. "I love it!" Monderman
says at last. "Pedestrians and cyclists used to avoid this place, but now,
as you see, the cars look out for the cyclists, the cyclists look out for
the pedestrians, and everyone looks out for each other. You can't expect
traffic signs and street markings to encourage that sort of behavior. You
have to build it into the design of the road."

It's no surprise that the Dutch, a people renowned for social
experimentation in practically every facet of life, have embraced new ideas
in traffic management. But variations of Monderman's less-is-more approach
to traffic engineering are spreading around the globe, showing up in
Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US.

In Denmark, the town of Christianfield stripped the traffic signs and
signals from its major intersection and cut the number of serious or fatal
accidents a year from three to zero. In England, towns in Suffolk and
Wiltshire have removed lane lines from secondary roads in an effort to slow
traffic - experts call it "psychological traffic calming." A dozen other
towns in the UK are looking to do the same. A study of center-line removal
in Wiltshire, conducted by the Transport Research Laboratory, a UK
transportation consultancy, found that drivers with no center line to guide
them drove more safely and had a 35 percent decrease in the number of
accidents.

In the US, traffic engineers are beginning to rethink the dictum that the
car is king and pedestrians are well advised to get the hell off the road.
In West Palm Beach, Florida, planners have redesigned several major
streets, removing traffic signals and turn lanes, narrowing the roadbed,
and bringing people and cars into much closer contact. The result: slower
traffic, fewer accidents, shorter trip times. "I think the future of
transportation in our cities is slowing down the roads," says Ian Lockwood,
the transportation manager for West Palm Beach during the project and now a
transportation and design consultant. "When you try to speed things up, the
system tends to fail, and then you're stuck with a design that moves
traffic inefficiently and is hostile to pedestrians and human exchange."

The common thread in the new approach to traffic engineering is a
recognition that the way you build a road affects far more than the
movement of vehicles. It determines how drivers behave on it, whether
pedestrians feel safe to walk alongside it, what kinds of businesses and
housing spring up along it. "A wide road with a lot of signs is telling a
story," Monderman says. "It's saying, go ahead, don't worry, go as fast as
you want, there's no need to pay attention to your surroundings. And that's
a very dangerous message."

We drive on to another project Monderman designed, this one in the nearby
village of Oosterwolde. What was once a conventional road junction with
traffic lights has been turned into something resembling a public square
that mixes cars, pedestrians, and cyclists. About 5,000 cars pass through
the square each day, with no serious accidents since the redesign in 1999.
"To my mind, there is one crucial test of a design such as this," Monderman
says. "Here, I will show you."


 With that, Monderman tucks his hands behind his back and begins to walk
into the square - backward - straight into traffic, without being able to
see oncoming vehicles. A stream of motorists, bicyclists, and pedestrians
ease around him, instinctively yielding to a man with the courage of his
convictions.

 From the beginning, a central premise guiding American road design was
that driving and walking were utterly incompatible modes of transport, and
that the two should be segregated as much as possible.

 The planned suburban community of Radburn, New Jersey, founded in 1929 as
"a town for the motor age," took the segregation principle to its logical
extreme. Radburn's key design element was the strict separation of vehicles
and people; cars were afforded their own generously proportioned network,
while pedestrians were tucked safely away in residential "super blocks,"
which often terminated in quiet cul de sacs. Parents could let kids walk to
the local school without fearing that they might be mowed down in the
street. Radburn quickly became a template for other communities in the US
and Britain, and many of its underlying assumptions were written directly
into traffic codes.

 The psychology of driver behavior was largely unknown. Traffic engineers
viewed vehicle movement the same way a hydraulics engineer approaches water
moving through a pipe - to increase the flow, all you have to do is make
the pipe fatter. Roads became wider and more "forgiving" - roadside trees
were cut down and other landscape elements removed in an effort to decrease
fatalities. Road signs, rather than road architecture, became the chief way
to enforce behavior. Pedestrians, meanwhile, were kept out of the traffic
network entirely or limited to defined crossing points.

The strict segregation of cars and people turned out to have unintended
consequences on towns and cities. Wide roads sliced through residential
areas, dividing neighborhoods, discouraging pedestrian activity, and
destroying the human scale of the urban environment.

The old ways of traffic engineering - build it bigger, wider, faster -
aren't going to disappear overnight. But one look at West Palm Beach
suggests an evolution is under way. When the city of 82,000 went ahead with
its plan to convert several wide thoroughfares into narrow two-way streets,
traffic slowed so much that people felt it was safe to walk there. The
increase in pedestrian traffic attracted new shops and apartment buildings.
Property values along Clematis Street, one of the town's main drags, have
more than doubled since it was reconfigured. "In West Palm, people were
just fed up with the way things were, and sometimes, that's what it takes,"
says Lockwood, the town's former transportation manager. "What we really
need is a complete paradigm shift in traffic engineering and city planning
to break away from the conventional ideas that have got us in this mess.
There's still this notion that we should build big roads everywhere because
the car represents personal freedom. Well, that's bullshit. The truth is
that most people are prisoners of their cars."

 Today some of the most car-oriented areas in the US are rethinking their
approaches to traffic, mainly because they have little choice. "The old way
doesn't work anymore," says Gary Toth, director of project planning and
development for the New Jersey Department of Transportation. The 2004 Urban
Mobility Report, published by the respected Texas Transportation Institute,
shows that traffic congestion is growing across the nation in towns and
cities of all sizes. The study's conclusion: It's only going to get worse.

Instead of widening congested highways, New Jersey's DOT is urging
neighboring or contiguous towns to connect their secondary streets and add
smaller centers of development, creating a series of linked minivillages
with narrow roads, rather than wide, car-choked highways strewn with malls.
"The cities that continue on their conventional path with traffic and land
use will harm themselves, because people with a choice will leave," says
Lockwood. "They'll go to places where the quality of life is better, where
there's more human exchange, where the city isn't just designed for cars.
The economy is going to follow the creative class, and they want to live in
areas that have a sense of place. That's why these new ideas have to catch
on. The folly of traditional traffic engineering is all around us."

Back in Holland, Monderman is fighting his own battle against the folly of
traditional traffic engineering, one sign at a time. "Every road tells a
story," Monderman says. "It's just that so many of our roads tell the story
poorly, or tell the wrong story."

As the new approach to traffic begins to take hold in the US, the road
ahead is unmarked and ambiguous. Hans Monderman couldn't be happier.



How to Build a Better Intersection: Chaos = Cooperation

1. Remove signs: The architecture of the road - not signs and signals -
dictates traffic flow.

2. Install art: The height of the fountain indicates how congested the
intersection is.

 3. Share the spotlight: Lights illuminate not only the roadbed, but also
the pedestrian areas.

4. Do it in the road: Cafis extend to the edge of the street, further
emphasizing the idea of shared space.

5. See eye to eye: Right-of-way is negotiated by human interaction, rather
than commonly ignored signs.

6. Eliminate curbs: Instead of a raised curb, sidewalks are denoted by
texture and color.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From ghicks at cadence.com  Tue Dec 21 11:52:01 2004
From: ghicks at cadence.com (Gregory Hicks)
Date: December 21, 2004 11:52:01 PM EST
Subject: 9/11 Legislation Launches Misguided Data-Mining and Domestic
Message-ID: <mailman.1118.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Surveillance Schemes
Reply-To: Gregory Hicks <ghicks at cadence.com>

 From the EFFector 17.45 (21 Dec 04)

 9/11 Legislation Launches Misguided Data-Mining and Domestic
Surveillance Schemes

On Friday, President Bush signed into law the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), launching several flawed
"security" schemes that EFF has long opposed.  The media has focused on
turf wars between the intelligence and defense communities, but the
real story is how IRTPA trades basic rights for the illusion of
security.  For instance:

~ Section 1016 - a.k.a. "TIA II" ~

A clause authorizing the creation of a massive "Information Sharing
Environment" (ISE) to link "all appropriate Federal, State, local, and
tribal entities, and the private sector."

This vast network would link the information in public and private
databases, posing the same kind of threat to our privacy and freedom
that the notorious Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) program did.
Yet the IRTPA contains no meaningful safeguards against unchecked data
mining other than directing the President to issue guidelines.  It also
includes a definition of "terrorist information" that is frighteningly
broad.

~ Section 4012 and Sections 7201-7220 - a.k.a. "CAPPS III" ~

A number of provisions that provide the statutory basis for "Secure
Flight," the government's third try at a controversial
passenger-screening system that has consistently failed to pass muster
for protecting passenger privacy.

The basic concept: the government will force commercial air carriers to
hand over your private travel information and compare it with a
"consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist."  It will also
establish a massive "counterterrorist travel intelligence"
infrastructure that calls for travel data mining ("recognition of
travel patterns, tactics, and behavior exhibited by terrorists").

It's not clear how the government would use the travel patterns of
millions of Americans to catch the small number of individuals
worldwide who are planning terrorist attacks.  In fact, this approach
has been thoroughly debunked by security experts.  (See
<http://www.schneier.com/essay-052.html>.)  What is clear is that the
system will create fertile ground for constitutional violations and the
abuse of private information.  The latest Privacy Act notice on Secure
Flight shows that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
still doesn't have a plan for how long the government will keep your
private information, nor has it mapped out adequate procedures for
correcting your "file" if you are wrongly flagged as a terrorist.

~ Section 6001 - a.k.a. "PATRIOT III" ~

Straight from the infamous "PATRIOT II" draft legislation leaked to the
public last year comes a provision that allows the government to use
secret foreign intelligence warrants and wiretap orders against people
unconnected to any international terrorist group or foreign nation.
This represents yet another step in the ongoing destruction of even the
most basic legal protections for those whom the government suspects are
terrorists.

~ Sections 7208-7220 - a.k.a. "Papers, Please" ~

Just as EFF, the ACLU, and a number of other civil liberties groups
feared, IRTPA creates the basis for a de facto national ID system using
biometrics.  Driven by misguided political consensus, the law calls for
a "global standard of identification" and minimum national standards
for birth certificates, driver's licenses and state ID cards, and
Social Security cards and numbers.  It also directs the Secretary of
Homeland Security to establish new standards for ID for domestic air
travelers.

Identification is not security.  Indeed, the 9/11 Commission report
revealed that a critical stumbling block in identifying foreign
terrorists is the inability to evaluate *foreign* information and
records.  Yet we are placing disproportionate emphasis on domestic
surveillance, opening the door to a standardized "internal passport" -
the hallmark of a totalitarian regime.

For this piece online:
<http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/002172.php>

For the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA):
<http://news.findlaw.com/usatoday/docs/terrorism/irtpa2004.pdf>

If you care about preserving your privacy and basic constitutional
freedoms, help us fight the good fight by joining EFF today:
<https://secure.eff.org/>

-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as eugen at leitl.org
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

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----- End forwarded message -----
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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From skquinn at speakeasy.net  Tue Dec 21 09:57:08 2004
From: skquinn at speakeasy.net (Shawn K. Quinn)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 11:57:08 -0600
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
  	Before Throwing  You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About
  Why We  	Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <20041221063230.U41362@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <BAY24-F259FCFACB82C65747CC83C9BA20@phx.gbl> 	
  <1103607052.11154.7.camel@xevious> 
  <20041221063230.U41362@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <1103651828.11154.15.camel@xevious>

[Note, I'm on the list, and I don't need two copies of every message in
this thread]

On Tue, 2004-12-21 at 06:34 -0600, J.A. Terranson wrote:
> On Mon, 20 Dec 2004, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:
> 
> > Agreed, if you want
>                  ^^^^
> 
> And this, ladies and gentlemen, is what it boils down to.  You *want*
> things your own way, but you are too fucking spoiled to fight fo it - so
> instead you whine and moan.

Did you even read the rest of the post?

Let me requote what I actually wrote, in its entirety.

> Agreed, if you want or need to get between cities faster than land-based
> travel will allow, flying is in fact a requirement. That was, in fact, my point. 

If you *need* to be somewhere 1000 miles or more away within a few
hours, driving, riding Greyhound, or riding Amtrak are NOT OPTIONS.

If you *need* to get to Hawaii, Puerto Rico, etc., driving, riding
Greyhound, or riding Amtrak are NOT OPTIONS.

-- 
Shawn K. Quinn <skquinn at speakeasy.net>




From jrandom at i2p.net  Tue Dec 21 12:49:34 2004
From: jrandom at i2p.net (jrandom)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 12:49:34 -0800
Subject: [i2p] weekly status notes [dec 21]
Message-ID: <mailman.1119.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Ev'nin folks, time for our status update

* Index
1) 0.4.2.4 & 0.4.2.5
2) 0.5 strategy
3) naming
4) eepsite roundup
5) ???

1) 0.4.2.4 & 0.4.2.5

With last week's 0.4.2.4 release, we saw the deployment of some new
load balancing algorithms to throttle tunnel participation based on
actual bandwidth usage, along side peer profiling updates to select
peers better through a wider sample of data.  This has done pretty
well at both choking tunnel participation when necessary and finding
good peers when possible.

Another major update in that release was a change to how we verify
time synchronization - rather than just checking the time sync once
during connection establishment, peers now periodically send
messages to each other with their current time, and if the time
received is too far skewed, the connection is dropped.  This has
helped kick a few routers who were skewing off the net until they
recovered (which is good), and the vast majority of peers have been
quite close to 'correct' (you can see the clock skew on the
/oldconsole.jsp page)

With that, the network has been performing pretty well, but we were
still seeing the occational bulk disconnect.  After some debugging
we tracked down an unintentional and wholely unnecessary DNS lookup
that occurred whenever a router sent a message to a peer who has a
hostname specified.  This not only wasted time, but it wasted time
within the jobqueue - essentially injecting a whole lot of lag for
no reason.  With that lookup removed, the router handled much
better under heavily congested situations, but we were still seeing
those occational bulk disconnects.  After digging around in the
stats and logging, we came up with a plausible theory that explains
why those disconnects have been occurring - blaming them almost
entirely on those DNS lookups.  To test that theory (and to deploy
some other goodies), we pushed out the 0.4.2.5 release this
afternoon.

We'll see how it goes.

* 2) 0.5 strategy

As the roadmap [1] says, the next planned release is 0.5, including
a revised tunnel pool and encryption/id technique.  Avoiding a
big explanation (see [2], [3], [4], and a tiny bit of [5]), we will
do this in two stages - first revamp the tunnel pooling and
push that out as an interim release, debugging what is necessary,
then revamp the encryption/id stuff, pushing that out as 0.5.  Oh,
and of course, once the algorithms for the pooling and encryption
updates are in pretty good shape, they'll be posted up here and on
the website for review.

Along the way though, there will probably be small bugfix releases
unrelated to the 0.5 stuff, but I don't have any specifically
planned.

[1] http://www.i2p.net/roadmap
[2] http://www.i2p.net/todo#tunnelId
[3] http://www.i2p.net/todo#ordering
[4] http://www.i2p.net/todo#tunnelLength
[5] http://www.i2p.net/todo#batching

* 3) naming

Yikes, now that I think about it, I really don't want to talk
about naming yet - just download Ragnarok's latest addressbook
app (2.0.1) from http://ragnarok.i2p/, check out susi's web
based manager at http://susi.i2p/susidns/manager, and dig
through the stats at http://orion.i2p/ and
http://susi.i2p/susisworld.html

* 4) eepsite roundup

There have been some notable developments on various eepsites worth
mentioning:

= http://frosk.i2p/ - I2PContent doc updates
= http://orion.i2p/ - new form to submit your keys to
= http://piespy.i2p/ - neat graphs of the irc channels
= http://forum.fr.i2p/ - french language forum
= http://pastebin.i2p/ - stop flooding the channels!

Of course, there have also been updates to other sites as well,
plus some other new sites - check orion.i2p and sort the list by
'last updated' to review (or just go to 'em all ;)

5) ???

I know there's lots more going on, so please, swing on by the
meeting in a few minutes and we can chat 'bout stuff.

=jr
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1KM+uQo7D6BjHAA99DwVyS0=
=/T/b
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_______________________________________________
i2p mailing list
i2p at i2p.net
http://i2p.dnsalias.net/mailman/listinfo/i2p

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 21 10:04:34 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 13:04:34 -0500
Subject: RAH's postings.
In-Reply-To: <017630AA6DF2DF4EBC1DD4454F8EE29704776BD3@rsana-ex-hq1.NA.RSA.NET>
References: <017630AA6DF2DF4EBC1DD4454F8EE29704776BD3@rsana-ex-hq1.NA.RSA.NET>
Message-ID: <p061104b7bdee14e66a27@[68.167.57.91]>

At 10:23 AM -0500 12/21/04, Somebody wrote:
>What the hell does an article about gypsy
>mechanics have to do with cypherpunks?

I plead anarchic markets, m'lord. Emerging phenomena, and all that, in
spite all regulation to the contrary.

Which was why I sent the traffic thing as well. No laws (or regulation) is
better rules, in many interesting cases.

> It may
>be interesting to you, but it's off-topic,

You may say that, I couldn't possibly comment.

> and
>voluminous.

That's what your 'd' key is for.

If that's not good enough, perhaps an addition to your kill-file is in
order. Or you need assistance in creating a filter for your mailer?

Cheers,
RAH


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 21 11:19:32 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 14:19:32 -0500
Subject: Border Patrol hails new ID system
Message-ID: <p061104c3bdee278ec987@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041220-103705-9177r>

The Washington Times
 www.washingtontimes.com

Border Patrol hails new ID system
By Jerry Seper
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published December 21, 2004
Border Patrol agents assigned to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
identified and arrested 23,502 persons with criminal records nationwide
through a new biometric integrated fingerprint system during a three-month
period beginning in September, CBP officials said yesterday.
     Most of those arrested were foreign nationals.
     "This 21st-century biometric identification technology is a critical
law-enforcement tool for our CBP Border Patrol agents," said CBP
Commissioner Robert C. Bonner. "It allows CBP Border Patrol agents to
quickly identify criminals by working faster, smarter and employing
technology to better secure the nation."
     Mr. Bonner has described the new system as "absolutely critical" to
CBP's priority mission of keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of
the country, adding that it gives the agents the ability to identify those
with criminal backgrounds "we could never have identified before."
     The program, known as the Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS), is a biometric identification technology
enabling Border Patrol agents to search CBP's Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT) and the FBI's criminal fingerprint database
simultaneously, CBP spokesman Mario Villarreal said.
     It allows Border Patrol agents to rapidly identify people with
outstanding warrants and criminal histories by electronically comparing a
live-scanned 10-fingerprint entry against a comprehensive national database
of previously captured fingerprints, he said.
     The IAFIS/IDENT system went on line this year at all 148 Border Patrol
station throughout the country. It began as a pilot project in San Diego,
where it was employed at the Border Patrol's Brown Field, Calif., station,
and at the Calexico, Calif., port of entry.
     During the three-month period this year, the agents identified and
detained 84 homicide suspects, 37 kidnapping suspects, 151 sexual assault
suspects, 212 robbery suspects, 1,238 suspects for assaults of other types,
and 2,630 suspects implicated in dangerous narcotics-related charges.
     CBP is the unified border agency within the Department of Homeland
Security charged with the management, control and protection of the
nation's borders at and between the ports of entry. CBP is charged with
keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the country while enforcing
hundreds of U.S. laws.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Tue Dec 21 11:57:44 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 14:57:44 -0500
Subject: RAH's postings.
In-Reply-To: <p061104b7bdee14e66a27@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F12F9BA520E9BAFE7E5D0249BA30@phx.gbl>

I actually found the mechanics' article quite interesting. I think it's what 
anarchy starts to look like in the real world...ie, there are still laws 
'somewhere', but they end up functioning like a 'value add' or quality 
control. I've argued on numerous occasions that NYC already has some very 
anarchic elements.

I also found it useful from a very practical persepctive...I've got good 
names to ask for in case I need some cheap (or discrete!) work done.

-TD

>From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: RAH's postings.
>Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 13:04:34 -0500
>
>At 10:23 AM -0500 12/21/04, Somebody wrote:
> >What the hell does an article about gypsy
> >mechanics have to do with cypherpunks?
>
>I plead anarchic markets, m'lord. Emerging phenomena, and all that, in
>spite all regulation to the contrary.
>
>Which was why I sent the traffic thing as well. No laws (or regulation) is
>better rules, in many interesting cases.
>
> > It may
> >be interesting to you, but it's off-topic,
>
>You may say that, I couldn't possibly comment.
>
> > and
> >voluminous.
>
>That's what your 'd' key is for.
>
>If that's not good enough, perhaps an addition to your kill-file is in
>order. Or you need assistance in creating a filter for your mailer?
>
>Cheers,
>RAH
>
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 21 15:33:44 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 18:33:44 -0500
Subject: RAH's postings.
In-Reply-To: <73ee4df272370369c7ef95c391fc2a99@paranoici.org>
References: <73ee4df272370369c7ef95c391fc2a99@paranoici.org>
Message-ID: <p061104e4bdee62899ca0@[68.167.57.91]>

At 11:47 PM +0100 12/21/04, Anonymous wrote:
>RAH, if you want to anonymize a quoted email, it helps if you remove the
>In-Reply-To: and References: headers.

Doh.

Not the first time that's happened, either.

*Gotta* remember that cut and paste thing...



Yours in header suppression,
RAH

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Dec 21 19:16:18 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 19:16:18 -0800
Subject: [Antisocial] Sept. 11 Conspiracy Theorist
Message-ID: <41C8E702.438AB11E@cdc.gov>

At 01:23 PM 12/19/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>"..They have computers, they're tappin' phone lines, you know that
ain't
>allowed.."
>
>Zappa...Heads...Crimson? A profile is emerging here! Either that or you

>recently broke into your dad's vinyl collection...

Very funny.  My walls o' vinyl are, BTW, licenses to KaZaa the content
in more convenient forms.

Here, this will amuse you.  Only last week did I burn my first audio
CD.  The week before, my first data CD.  Before that, it was hot backups

and ZIP disks.   Yes, we're 4 years into the 21st century.  Dig.

As far as "Dad's", well, how many five year olds know Waits, Krimso,
and Einsturzende, but know nothing of Brittny?

I recently recycled a computer fan guard into the AA site of a
mock toy RPG, using styro cups as the grenade and a broken plastic
gun as the handle.  Compleat with balaclava on the young-un.
Stick that in your chillum and process it.

And have a nice solstice.




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Dec 21 19:17:58 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 19:17:58 -0800
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
   Before   Throwing  You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About
  Why  We Put   You There?
Message-ID: <41C8E766.F473C01D@cdc.gov>

At 04:23 PM 12/19/04 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>Funny how most Americans only wake up after it happens to them.

As EC said, the only we understand is dead Merkins.

>Case in point? How 'bout that proud-n-patriotic lady in "Farenheit
911"? As
>far as I could tell, prior to her son's death she was all in favor of
the
>Attack on Iraq and even encouraged her son to "serve" (I hate that
fucking

Karma rules, mofo.




From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Dec 21 19:20:00 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 19:20:00 -0800
Subject: Israeli Airport Security Questioning Re: CRYPTO-GRAM, 
  December  15,   2004
Message-ID: <41C8E7E0.19588A3C@cdc.gov>

At 02:16 PM 12/20/04 -0500, John Kelsey wrote:
>No doubt a real intelligence agent would be good at getting through
this kind of screening, but that doesn't mean most of the people who
want to blow up planes would be any good at it!

You really continue to understimate the freedom fighters, don't you?
(The first) King George did the same.




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec 21 10:38:12 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 19:38:12 +0100
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
  Before Throwing  You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We  	Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <1103651828.11154.15.camel@xevious>
References: <BAY24-F259FCFACB82C65747CC83C9BA20@phx.gbl>
  <1103607052.11154.7.camel@xevious>
  <20041221063230.U41362@ubzr.zsa.bet>
  <1103651828.11154.15.camel@xevious>
Message-ID: <20041221183812.GL9221@leitl.org>

On Tue, Dec 21, 2004 at 11:57:08AM -0600, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:

> If you *need* to get to Hawaii, Puerto Rico, etc., driving, riding
> Greyhound, or riding Amtrak are NOT OPTIONS.

Emigration is always an option, though. Quite a few have done that already.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From reeuqklxtjdqp at netzero.net  Tue Dec 21 18:59:58 2004
From: reeuqklxtjdqp at netzero.net (Freda Judd)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 19:59:58 -0700 (CST)
Subject: The new and revollutionaary peenjs enlaargment tool! argonaut
Message-ID: <3561717656170.e182ZRKhguP178@bedford8.salami24mindspring.net>

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From justin-cypherpunks at soze.net  Tue Dec 21 12:05:44 2004
From: justin-cypherpunks at soze.net (Justin)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 20:05:44 +0000
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
  Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why
  We Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <20041221102956.C41362@ubzr.zsa.bet>
References: <BAY24-F316818837F54EE3B29599D9BA30@phx.gbl>
  <20041221102956.C41362@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <20041221200544.GA23086@arion.soze.net>

On 2004-12-21T10:38:10-0600, J.A. Terranson wrote:
> On Tue, 21 Dec 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:
> 
> > put it this way it starts to make some sense. In other words, avoiding
> > travel whenever possible will (when added to sheeple starting to do the same
> > because of all the terible screening stories) eventually start putting some
> > squeeze on the airlines.
> 
> I expect that "eventually" in this context would == (hours to [one or two]
> days)

Academic.  Everyone will not boycott, so the time frame will increase.

> > (But then again, DC has plenty of our tax dollars ready to bail out an
> > incompetent set of airline managers.) It won't hurt at least.
> 
> Even DC can't bail out *all* the airlines.  That kind of boycott *would*
> hurt, and hurt badly.  And *fast*.

Never play chicken with the federal government.  They can bail out all
the airlines (minus one: they don't need to bail out Southwest
Airlines).  They'd just need to raise taxes or increase the debt,
neither of which is a major impediment.

> > 1) Phone it in
> > 2) Do some kind of lameass video conferencing
> > 3) Fly
> > 4) Get a job at McDonalds
> 
> First of all, this is a *great* example of why flying is an *option*, and
> not a "requirement".  That said, option number 4 is the obvious choice -
> however, our leggy bimbo's mileage may vary.

This is a bit misleading.  The leggy bimbo can choose option 4 if she's
not smart enough to do something else... like _local_ sales, or even
starting up a psychic reading shop and making lots of money from other
bimbos.




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec 21 13:20:27 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 22:20:27 +0100
Subject: [i2p] weekly status notes [dec 21] (fwd from jrandom@i2p.net)
Message-ID: <20041221212027.GP9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from jrandom <jrandom at i2p.net> -----


From nobody at paranoici.org  Tue Dec 21 14:47:07 2004
From: nobody at paranoici.org (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 23:47:07 +0100 (CET)
Subject: RAH's postings.
In-Reply-To: <p061104b7bdee14e66a27@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <73ee4df272370369c7ef95c391fc2a99@paranoici.org>

Someone wrote:
> 
> At 10:23 AM -0500 12/21/04, Somebody wrote:

RAH, if you want to anonymize a quoted email, it helps if you remove the
In-Reply-To: and References: headers.

> >What the hell does an article about gypsy
> >mechanics have to do with cypherpunks?
> 
> I plead anarchic markets, m'lord. Emerging phenomena, and all that, in
> spite all regulation to the contrary.
> 
> Which was why I sent the traffic thing as well. No laws (or regulation) is
> better rules, in many interesting cases.
> 
> > It may
> >be interesting to you, but it's off-topic,
> 
> You may say that, I couldn't possibly comment.
> 
> > and
> >voluminous.
> 
> That's what your 'd' key is for.
> 
> If that's not good enough, perhaps an addition to your kill-file is in
> order. Or you need assistance in creating a filter for your mailer?

P.T., there's not much technical discussion here.  Stick to cryptography-l
if you don't care about streetside auto repair.




From dave at farber.net  Tue Dec 21 21:03:50 2004
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 00:03:50 -0500
Subject: [IP] 9/11 Legislation Launches Misguided Data-Mining and Domestic
Message-ID: <mailman.1120.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Surveillance Schemes
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.619)
Reply-To: dave at farber.net



Begin forwarded message:


From isn at c4i.org  Wed Dec 22 00:23:59 2004
From: isn at c4i.org (InfoSec News)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 02:23:59 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [ISN] REVIEW: "Malicious Cryptography", Adam L. Young/Moti Yung
Message-ID: <mailman.1121.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Forwarded from: "Rob, grandpa of Ryan, Trevor, Devon & Hannah"
<rslade at sprint.ca>

BKMLCRPT.RVW   20041012

"Malicious Cryptography", Adam L. Young/Moti Yung, 2004,
0-7645-4975-8, U$45.00/C$64.99/UK#29.99
%A   Adam L. Young
%A   Moti Yung
%C   5353 Dundas Street West, 4th Floor, Etobicoke, ON   M9B 6H8
%D   2004
%G   0-7645-4975-8
%I   John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
%O   U$45.00/C$64.99/UK#29.99 416-236-4433 fax: 416-236-4448
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0764549758/robsladesinterne
  http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0764549758/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0764549758/robsladesin03-20
%P   392 p.
%T   "Malicious Cryptography: Exposing Cryptovirology"

Both the foreword and the introduction are turgid, and bloated with
excessive verbiage, while never giving a clear indication of what the
book is actually about.  Does it have to do with viruses at all?  Is
it about the use of cryptography in any kind of criminal or unethical
endeavour?  The initial material does not make this clear.
Occasionally the text becomes so flowery that sentences have no
meaning at all.

The lack of clarity is not assisted by the creation of new and
idiosyncratic terms, or the use of existing jargon in non-standard
ways.  In chapter one, a fictional and glacially slow trip through the
mind of a virus writer, we are told that self-checking modules that
some programs use to detect modification in their own code are
"beneficial Trojans" or "battleprogs."  The term multipartite is
defined in such a way that merely copying the program into RAM (Random
Access Memory) qualifies: that would make every virus ever written,
and every program, for that matter, multipartite.  "Kleptogram" is
used throughout the book, but only defined (and not very clearly) in
the last chapter.  Releasing any virus is seen as having something to
do with "information warfare," which would agree with many
sensationalistic journalists who have written on the subject, but
would probably surprise legitimate experts such as Dorothy Denning.
"Virology" itself (and the more specialized "cryptovirology") is an
excellent term for computer virus research--it just isn't used very
widely.  There is a glossary: it defines commonly known terms and does
not define the specialized jargon that the authors have used.

The confusion is not limited to terminology.  There is no technical
sense to the statement (on page twenty five) that a certain layer of
the network stack is "high enough to facilitate rapid software
development" (compilers don't care where their software ends up) but
low enough to escape detection (files, processes, and network packets
are all visible).  A disk locking program, as described, would have no
effect on the operations of a remote access trojan.  And, of course,
our fictional protagonist is constantly creating new versions of the
mythical "undetectable" virus, without there being any indication of
how this might be done.

(The fictional aspects of the book are not limited to chapter one.
Throughout the work, examples are taken from fiction: it certainly
feels like more illustrations come from works like "Shockwave Rider"
and "Alien" than from real life.)

Chapter two starts to get a bit better.  The authors introduce the
idea of using asymmetric cryptography in order to create a virus (or
other piece of malware) that, rather than merely destroying data,
provides for a reversible denial of access to data, and therefore the
possibility of extortion.  The idea is academically interesting, but
there might be a few practical details to be worked out.

Chapter three seems to move further into the academic realm, with an
interesting overview of issues in regard to the generation of random,
or pseudorandom, numbers.  There is also an initial exploration of
anonymity, with an insufficient description of "mix networks" (onion
routing being one example).  A little more discussion of anonymity
starts off chapter four, which then moves on to another use of
asymmetric cryptography in malware: the "deniable" recovery of stolen
information, via distribution over public channels.  Cryptocounters,
which could be used to store generational or other information about
the spread of a virus, without such data being accessible to virus
researchers, are discussed in chapter five.  Chapter six looks at
aspects of searching for, and retrieving, information without
disclosing the fact that an exploration is occurring.  However, much
of the material appears to be some highly abstract solutions rather
desperately in search of problems.  Varying the extortion scenario,
chapter seven proposes a viral network that could retaliate for
disinfection of any node by threatening disclosure of sensitive
information.  While the analysis of the structure of the attack is
sound, the assumption of payoffs, coercion, and undetectability leave
something to be desired.

Chapter eight examines the standard antiviral processes (signature
scanning, activity monitoring, and change detection) with some
miscellaneous explorations, although the discussion is prejudiced by
the assumption that we are dealing with traditional (and no longer
widely used) file infectors.  Trojan horse programs are not terribly
well defined in chapter nine.  (I was amused at the disclaimer given
when the issue of "salami" scams was raised: I have found reliable
evidence for only one, extremely minor, instance of the device.)
Subliminal channels are means of passing information via cryptographic
keys, but chapter ten is not very clear in regard to their use.
SETUPs (Secretly Embedded Trapdoor with Universal Protection) are
discussed in chapter eleven, although the authors appear to admit that
this is only an academic exercise: there are easier attacks.  Another
form is discussed in chapter twelve.

Does this book fulfill its function?  That rather depends on what the
intent of the work was, which is far from clear.  Was the text
intended to be a reference for some interesting topics in
cryptography?  The verbiage and lack of structure would be a
difficulty for those seeking to use it so.  Is the publication
directed at the general public?  The audience of those who read number
theoretical manuscripts for fun might be a bit limited.  (I've got to
say that "Algebraic Aspects of Cryptography" [cf. BKALASCR.RVW] was an
easier read, and it makes no pretence of being other than an
scholastic paper.)

Is the volume supposed to be a serious warning against new forms of
malware?  The inclusion of a great deal of extraneous content and the
lack of clear explanations or examples of some basic concepts limit
the value of the work in this regard.  In addition, much of the
material concentrates on building more malign malware, rather than
dealing with defence against it.  (I'm not too worried about vxers
getting ideas from Young and Yung: implementing crypto properly is a
painstaking task, and from almost twenty years experience of studying
blackhat products and authors, I'm fairly sure there'd be lots of bugs
in what might be released.  On the other hand, somebody in a
government office might be working on Magic Lantern version 3.01 ...)

For those seriously involved in the study of viruses and malware this
book has some interesting points that should be examined, but little
of practical use.  For ardent students of cryptography, the work notes
some interesting areas of work.  For those seeking examples of writing
styles to emulate, please look elsewhere.

copyright Robert M. Slade, 2004   BKMLCRPT.RVW   20041012


======================  (quote inserted randomly by Pegasus Mailer)
rslade at vcn.bc.ca      slade at victoria.tc.ca      rslade at sun.soci.niu.edu
        I'm out of my mind, but feel free to leave a message.
http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev    or    http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade



_________________________________________
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From Novmgtco at aol.com  Wed Dec 22 04:54:11 2004
From: Novmgtco at aol.com (Novmgtco at aol.com)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 07:54:11 EST
Subject: Richard Rahn's "Do We Need a National ID Card?" (The Washington Times)
Message-ID: <mailman.1122.1576007653.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

The Washington Times
www.washingtontimes.com

Do we need a national ID card?
By Richard W. Rahn
Published December 22, 2004

Are you in favor of a national identity card? Even though many Americans
are against the idea of a national identity card, it is coming. In fact, in
many ways, it is already here. Every American citizen and every foreign
worker in America is required to have a Social Security card. Your Social
Security card is only supposed to be used to gain employment and receive
Society Security benefits, but try applying for credit without giving your
Social Security number -- and most often you will be turned down.

You cannot board an airliner or certain trains, cash a check, go to a
hospital, obtain a hotel room or even enter some office buildings without
showing a photo ID. You cannot travel to foreign countries without a
passport. Yes, we have no national ID card but, instead, we are required to
have many ID cards just to engage in the normal activities of life.

We are torn on the issue of a national ID because we do not want big
brother government to monitor us (we all know the potential horrors from
the Gestapo and sci-fi movies).

On the other hand, we understand the legitimate needs of many purveyors of
public and private services to know who we are. We also worry about the
theft of our identity. We want to be able to provide our medical history to
those who need it to help us in a medical emergency, but we don't want
those who might abuse or embarrass us with that knowledge to have the
information.

In the current world, we are required to know and give more passwords than
most of us can remember to access our bank and credit card accounts,
frequent flyer accounts, e-mail and Internet providers, and other
information service accounts.

If the question posed at the beginning of this commentary was: "Would you
be in favor of a card that could prove your ID while at the same time
protect you from giving information about yourself (including medical and
financial information) that you do not wish to provide?" I am sure that
more people would give a yes response.

The fact is we do not need nor should we have a government issued national
ID card. What we need is for the government to specify for what purposes
and when it positively must know our identity, and what constitutes
acceptable proof. Private organizations, such as airlines, banks and
merchants already do the same thing. Then the private sector will develop
the most user-privacy-friendly and cost-effective devices. Tiny computer
chips containing all of the necessary biometric information coupled with
nearly unbreakable encryption have already been developed. Consumers will
be able to choose what information they wish to have stored in such
devices, and who is allowed to have access to what. The chips can be placed
in "smart cards," cell phones and PDAs, or even implanted in the body.

In my ideal world, the government would know with certainty who has voted
(but not their vote), who is coming into the country, to whom it is making
payments and from whom it is receiving taxes. I would like to be able to
prove my identity to government agencies, airlines, banks, etc., and have
access to all my password accounts and computers, and deliver such
additional information about myself to those I choose to (such as my
medical history to a hospital in case of an emergency), while protecting
all my information from those with whom I choose not to share it.

In addition, I do not want to have to carry more than one device with me
(such as a card or PDA), nor do I want to have to remember any passwords.

Fortunately, the current technology will indeed allow all of the above (my
thumbprint could give me access to my PDA with all of the passwords, etc.).

The Government Passport Agency is in the process of developing new
passports to prevent counterfeiting and to give more secure ID. In reality,
it is not necessary for us to have passports. What is necessary is for the
government to know whether or not I am a U.S. citizen when I am entering
the country, and whether or not I should be detained because of some
criminal act. If I provide the government with a high quality ID, including
proof of citizenship, they should instantaneously be able to determine if I
am on a wanted list (including my foreign travel history). The idea of
having passports stamped is not only obsolete and useless, but just plain
silly. (Obviously, foreign governments would also have to agree to do away
with the existing passport system, to get the full advantages of the new
private ID systems.)

Again, we do not need a government issued ID. Those who require information
about us (including government agencies) should merely specify what
information they need and what forms are acceptable. Private companies can
then compete to give us the most secure, cost-effective, user-friendly
personal information and protection ID devices and systems.


Richard W. Rahn is a senior fellow of the Discovery Institute and an
adjunct scholar of the Cato Institute.


--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"Several times a week, to enter a TV studio say, or to board a plane, I
have to produce a tiny picture of my face."  -- Christopher Hitchens




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 22 05:10:15 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 08:10:15 -0500
Subject: [ISN] REVIEW: "Malicious Cryptography", Adam L. Young/Moti Yung
Message-ID: <p0611042ebdef22a5a3f5@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text



From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 22 00:22:13 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 09:22:13 +0100
Subject: [IP] 9/11 Legislation Launches Misguided Data-Mining and
  Domestic Surveillance Schemes (fwd from dave@farber.net)
Message-ID: <20041222082213.GN9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 22 06:53:55 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 09:53:55 -0500
Subject: Do We Need a National ID Card?
Message-ID: <p0611043cbdef2eba78db@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text



From ptrei at rsasecurity.com  Wed Dec 22 07:14:48 2004
From: ptrei at rsasecurity.com (Trei, Peter)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 10:14:48 -0500
Subject: RAH's postings.
Message-ID: <017630AA6DF2DF4EBC1DD4454F8EE29704776BD6@rsana-ex-hq1.NA.RSA.NET>

I wasn't actually expecting anonymity. I wrote directly to
RAH, asking him politely to edit down his posts, and simply
post a few lines and a pointer. Not pointing out his
faults in public was simply good manners. His response boils
down to 'fuck you'.

Cypherpunks has a very loose charter, but it is not the
'everything and anything RAH thinks is neat' list.

Peter

>
> Someone wrote:
> >
> > At 10:23 AM -0500 12/21/04, Somebody wrote:
>
> RAH, if you want to anonymize a quoted email, it helps if you
> remove the
> In-Reply-To: and References: headers.
>
> > >What the hell does an article about gypsy
> > >mechanics have to do with cypherpunks?
> >
> > I plead anarchic markets, m'lord. Emerging phenomena, and
> all that, in
> > spite all regulation to the contrary.




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 22 08:03:55 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 11:03:55 -0500
Subject: RAH's postings.
In-Reply-To: <017630AA6DF2DF4EBC1DD4454F8EE29704776BD6@rsana-ex-hq1.NA.RSA.NET>
References: <017630AA6DF2DF4EBC1DD4454F8EE29704776BD6@rsana-ex-hq1.NA.RSA.NET>
Message-ID: <p06110440bdef4a4cef24@[68.167.57.91]>

At 10:14 AM -0500 12/22/04, Trei, Peter wrote:
>His response boils
>down to 'fuck you'.


"*You* may say that. *I* couldn't *possibly* comment."
     -- Francis Urquhart, (the original FU), in Michael Dobbs 'House of Cards'

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"I guess it's disingenuous to argue with someone who spews truth from every
orifice."  --Aaron Evans




From crawdad at fnal.gov  Wed Dec 22 09:13:05 2004
From: crawdad at fnal.gov (Matt Crawford)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 11:13:05 -0600
Subject: Do We Need a National ID Card?
In-Reply-To: <p0611043cbdef2eba78db@[68.167.57.91]>
References: <p0611043cbdef2eba78db@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <BE67B7AE-543C-11D9-8548-000A95A0BF96@fnal.gov>

On Dec 22, 2004, at 8:53, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> Do we need a national ID card?

The comment period on NIST's draft FIPS-201 (written in very hasty  
response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-12) ends  
tomorrow.  The draft, as written, enables use of the card by "Smart  
IEDs" and for improved selection of kidnapping victims.

One cabinet department's Associate CIO for Cybersecurity said of this  
project, "Eventually this is going to lead to a national ID card."

Refs:
http://csrc.nist.gov/piv-project/
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-12.html
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/draft-FIPS_201-110804- 
public1.pdf




From steve49152 at yahoo.ca  Wed Dec 22 08:44:54 2004
From: steve49152 at yahoo.ca (Steve Thompson)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 11:44:54 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts
    Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About
  Why  We  Put You There?
In-Reply-To: <20041219104655.L28241@ubzr.zsa.bet>
Message-ID: <20041222164454.3386.qmail@web51808.mail.yahoo.com>

The subject header is very nice.

 --- "J.A. Terranson" <measl at mfn.org> wrote: 
> Several points come to mind:
> 
> (1) Mr. Monahan seems to think that lies on police reports are an
> artifact
> of 9/11.  Welcome to the real world Mr. Monahan.

You say that like it's a bad thing.  The real world, that is.  Most people
find that the real world isn't all bad, and get on with their lives.
 
> (2) Monahan, and those like him who continue to fly, have nobody to
> blame
> but themselves: if you continue to feed these assholes by buying those
> tickets, then you have it coming: simple economics.  If people refuse to
> fly, this will stop.

Oh, it's even simpler to deal with than that.  Technology (for real this
time) will eventually make air travel, at it's current state-of-the-art,
obsolete, thus obviating the immediate inconveniences that spur like
complaints.  It's all simply a matter of obtaining the proper perspective.
 
> (3) As to the ACLU, again, welcome to the real world.  Many of us have
> been down that road before you Mr. Monahan - while the ACLU is not a bad
> thing per se, they are a lot like the cops and courts: they are not
> there
> for any one individual, there are there for "the big picture".  And the
> Big Picture requires money, which means you must be a minority (since
> how
> can anyone of the majority ever be "oppressed"?).  In a nutshell, Fuck
> The
> ACLU.

This is fairly cogent.  In the real world, large bureaucracies are not so
good at handling a wide variety of different things.  Corporations usually
specialize in one major product area, and don't do so well when they
expand into areas that differ too much from their core product.  Don't
blame the ACLU too much, it's really not their fault if they fail to fully
leverage their expertise and influence in every single case.
 
> (4) Lastly, as to your cesarian, fuck you and your wife, and her
> cesearean.  We don't give a shit about your personal problems, just like
> you don't care about ours.  Sure, it makes for a pulpy little story, but

That's strange.  I find that one's personal life is never really much of a
concern to for most people in our society.  I know a large number of
people, personally, who give virtually no thought to their own lives
outside of work.  Myself, I am also inclined in that direction.  

Today, most of the people I know are out satisfying their Christmas
obligations.  And while those who choose to enjoy the season are fully
engaged in the spirit of merrymaking, it is very nice that at least the
holiday is entirely voluntary.  So far, I have not had to fight off any
Christmas carolers, nor have I received any unpleasant gifts (although I
will tell you more later about the non-Jewish group I saw recently that
seemed to be confused by Chanukah).  Which is why, incidentally, that I
rarely have to care about my personal life.  As much as can be expected,
my personal life caries on in the best way possible, thus requiring none
of the time and attention that would be better directed elsewhere.

> when you get right down to it, do we really care?  No.  Because, again,
> you helped to create this beast you are now bitching about, and after it
> bit you, you *continued to fly*, and thereby feed it some more.

These things happen from time to time.  The best advice that you could
give to the original author would be to suggest that he relax and wait
until the incident passes.
 

Regards,

Steve


(Sent only to Mr. Terranson yesterday, thought
it would amuse the list and so resent.)

______________________________________________________________________ 
Post your free ad now! http://personals.yahoo.ca




From kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com  Wed Dec 22 09:51:31 2004
From: kelsey.j at ix.netcom.com (John Kelsey)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 12:51:31 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
Subject: Israeli Airport Security Questioning Re: CRYPTO-GRAM, 
  December   15,  2004
Message-ID: <22959957.1103737891460.JavaMail.root@misspiggy.psp.pas.earthlink.net>

>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>Sent: Dec 21, 2004 10:20 PM
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Re: Israeli Airport Security Questioning Re: CRYPTO-GRAM,  December  15,  2004

>At 02:16 PM 12/20/04 -0500, John Kelsey wrote:
>>No doubt a real intelligence agent would be good at getting through
>>this kind of screening, but that doesn't mean most of the people who
>>want to blow up planes would be any good at it!

>You really continue to understimate the freedom fighters, don't you?
>(The first) King George did the same.

Maybe so.  It's clearly added cost to the attackers--they have to select not just the subset of volunteers willing to blow themselves up on the plane, but the subset of *those* who can also keep cool under rapid-fire questioning of their cover story.  The attackers probably have to either spend a lot of time rehearsing their cover stories, or have to keep their cover stories very close to their actual lives and interests, which makes profiling easier.  Both of these cut way down on the total pool of attackers available.  

My assumption is that national intelligence agencies can probably afford to do this--they can probably filter through a lot more possible candidates to get field agents who can handle a cover story well, for example, since they can hire openly, rather than quietly recruiting from madrassa students or something.  Their training facilities can be centralized and stay in one place, rather than being a camp in the desert somewhere that has to be abandoned frequently, and they can develop a lot of expertise in training people to survive intensive questioning without fumbling their cover story.   

--John




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Dec 22 11:13:52 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 14:13:52 -0500
Subject: An interesting thread...Hacking Bluetooth
Message-ID: <BAY24-F38A944B4F87B03979277279BA40@phx.gbl>

There's some guy ("German Guy") spouting some coherent-sounding conspiracy 
theories over here:

http://www.godlikeproductions.com/bbs/message.php?page=23&topic=10&message=54181&mpage=1&showdate=12/18/04

I wouldn't normally post something like this, but the guy's done a little 
bit of homework on a huge variety of topics, so it's really an excellent 
hoax, seen from a distance.

Here's on thing giving me some doubts, though (but of course if this is true 
he may have just pulled it from Google somewhere):

"Here4s another myth: you cannot hack bluetooth from a distance of more than 
40 metres. Not true. My technical partner Felix can crack it at over half a 
kilometre. Which is why he enjoys driving around so much in areas where we 
know British, American, Israeli or Russian ops are living or working. The 
great thing about many German cities is that most affordable residences are 
within metres of the street anyway."

Any comments?

-TD




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 22 13:25:14 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 16:25:14 -0500
Subject: Finally, the Killer PKI Application
Message-ID: <p06110444bdef9695d0d6@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://sys-con.com/story/print.cfm?storyid=47592>

(SYS-CON)(Printview)

Finally, the Killer PKI Application
Web Services as an application - and a challenge
December 22, 2004
Summary
Enterprise PKI has a bad name. Complex, costly, difficult to deploy and
maintain - all these criticisms have dogged this technology since it first
appeared. To the dismay of so many CIOs, few applications have stepped up
to make effective use of PKI. But this may soon change: Web services
promotes a security model that demands the flexibility that an enterprise
PKI deployment can offer.
By Scott Morrison 

Enterprise PKI has a bad name. Complex, costly, difficult to deploy and
maintain - all these criticisms have dogged this technology since it first
appeared. To the dismay of so many CIOs, few applications have stepped up
to make effective use of PKI. But this may soon change: Web services
promotes a security model that demands the flexibility that an enterprise
PKI deployment can offer.

 The Trend Away from Channel-Level Security
If you lumped all the existing, production-level Web services applications
together, and categorized their security models, you would probably
discover some interesting trends. First, an awful lot of these don't
address security at all, which probably owes more to the relative
immaturity of Web services technology than to a conscious choice on the
part of developers. The bulk of the remainder will simply delegate security
entirely to SSL - or in some cases, a VPN connection.

 SSL isn't a bad choice. It provides confidentiality and integrity.
Automatic sequence numbering stands guard against replay attacks. Servers
are always authenticated using a certificate that binds the server's DNS
name to the Subject, a strategy to defeat man-in-the-middle and
impersonation attacks. This does rely heavily on the integrity of the DNS
system, but by and large it is viewed as an acceptable risk. SSL even
offers optional client-side certificate authentication, which is powerful,
though in practice rarely implemented.

 Probably the most unheralded quality of SSL is channel continuity. Once a
session is set up - and once the client and server mutually authenticate
(with the client using a certificate under SSL, through HTTP
authentication, or an application-level means such as forms) - a level of
trust is established on the open socket so that it is available for
multiple transactions without repeating this lengthy process each time.
There is great value in a transparently maintained security context, and it
is easy to take for granted.

 Of course, one of the reasons behind SSL's success on the Web was that,
although it utilizes public key cryptography, it doesn't need full-blown
PKI. Most SSL-enabled Web servers use certs issued by the "browser cartel,"
those CAs fortunate enough to have their root certificates automatically
installed within the trust store of the most popular browsers. And with the
exception of a few early consumer banking products - which have largely
been abandoned - almost nobody steps up to the baroque logistics of
client-side certificates on the Web. The ability to delegate PKI to a third
party greatly simplified security on the Web; this was one of the reasons
SSL became good enough for most online transactions, even when challenged
in the early days by technically elegant, though complex, solutions like
SET (Secure Electronic Transaction).

 But SSL's greatest weakness is that it is oriented toward synchronous
transactions, requiring a direct connection between participants. It's like
an encrypted telephone conversation, which is probably something alien to
you and me, but I suppose that James Bond uses it regularly. Both parties
need to be available, multiple passes are necessary to set up a secure
context, and all of the information - the critical points alongside the
mundane ("how's the weather in London?") - is encrypted wholesale, which
can be a costly processor burden.

 This is why SSL is an insufficient security model for Web services.
Despite the name - an unfortunate one that is probably one of the great
misnomers in the history of technology - Web services isn't really about
the Web. In one realization, it does use existing Web infrastructure,
including HTTP transport, Web application servers, etc. However, Web
services is fundamentally a one-way messaging paradigm for computer
communications, composed around a simple XML message structure with an
extensible header model.

 Web service messages may not piggyback on HTTP at all. They might flow
across a message-oriented middleware (MOM) such as IBM's MQSeries, or be
carried asynchronously by that other ubiquitous infrastructure, SMTP. SOAP
messages are designed to flow through a network of intermediates, not
unlike IP packets being passed between routers. Intermediates may be
required to view header information to make processing decisions based on
application-level protocol. A channel-based security model, one that
encrypts everything and requires synchronous responses from a receiver,
simply isn't appropriate in such a Web services architecture.

 Security in the Message
The solution to this problem, as put forth in standards by OASIS and the
W3C, is to absorb security into the message itself. That is, provide a
means of authentication, integrity, and confidentiality that is integral to
the message, and completely decoupled from transport channels. Thus, the
message security remains consistent and trustworthy whether it flows over
regular HTTP across a P2P network using proprietary protocols, is persisted
to a file, or even printed onto a piece of paper. Ironically, it's closer
to the time-honored cryptographic tradition of writing encrypted
information into a message and sending it via a messenger than it is to Mr.
Bond's fancy, synchronous encrypting telephone. This may strike you as
lower tech, but a security model that supports asynchronous messaging has
great architectural advantages.

 In the Oasis Web Services Security (WSS) standard, each SOAP message
stands alone, and can have security applied uniquely. It includes
mechanisms for encrypting any content in the message at a very finely
grained level. For example, rather than applying a cipher to the entire
message, only those parts that are deemed necessary to cryptographically
secure need be encrypted, such as a credit card number. This means that
public parts of a message, such as header fields that might be relevant to
an intermediate making a routing decision, can be left in the clear.

 Of course, any part of a SOAP message is subject to modification by an
attacker as it traverses potentially hostile networks. To address this, WSS
provides a mechanism to sign message content, with a granularity identical
to encryption. Thus, not only can a message author encrypt the credit card
element, they can sign it to ensure that no substitution in transit goes
undetected. The same protection can be extended to unencrypted, public
elements, such as timestamps inserted into the header.

 A Role for PKI
WSS goes to great lengths to remain flexible and not to specify a
particular encryption/signing technology. It's certainly possible to build
a WSS-compliant system based on shared secrets that are exchanged
out-of-band of the WSS specification (though this disqualifies a
transaction from any claims to nonrepudiation, as well as subjecting it to
a toxic list of potential security flaws). Nevertheless, you would be
hard-pressed to find a vendor's WSS implementation that isn't based on
public key infrastructure. Furthermore, everyone is building systems
predicated to have key pairs on both sides of a transaction: at the message
producer (client), and the message consumer (server). So PKI is back.

 This is good news if you spent a lot of money a few years back on a large,
enterprise-wide PKI rollout. It was painful, and probably unrecognized, but
now the investment may finally be realized. If you avoided PKI until now,
Web services may be the application that forces your organization to
swallow this often bitter pill.

 The Typical Pattern
To understand why PKI is so essential to the typical WSS implementation, it
helps to examine a common interaction model (see Figure 1). A single
message is secured for transmission between two parties. This is a
sessionless scenario, meaning that there is no prenegotiated, temporary
security token shared between parties. In other words, there is no shared
secret between the producer and the consumer, such as a key used for
symmetric encryption and HMAC signing. Emerging standards, such as
WS-Secure Conversation and WS-Trust, provide for negotiated security tokens
and define well-known key derivation mechanisms similar to SSL's session
key scheme. In this instance, we are illustrating how a message can be
secured directly using only the key pair and certificate held by the
producer, and the certificate for the consumer.

 Figure 2 shows a map of the message exchanged between the producer and the
consumer. In this simplified message, the body has been encrypted using a
two-step process described in WSS. First the producer generates a random
symmetric key to encrypt the body content, using a symmetric algorithm like
triple-DES or AES. A specialized security header describes the exact
algorithm and key length. Note the contrast here to SSL, which supports
negotiation of cipher suites and key lengths. This is largely to
accommodate a diversity of clients, any of whom may be subject to
cryptography export restrictions. Here we assume a prior, out-of-band
agreement on cipher capabilities.

 So how does this shared secret become, well, shared? It's pretty simple.
The producer encrypts this symmetric key with the consumer's public key,
ensuring that only that party can decrypt the message. This encrypted key
is then embedded in the security header, with a reference to the key pair
needed to unlock it (often, this is implemented using the subject key
identifier field from the receiver's certificate). In the security header,
anyone can read the encrypted key, but only the designated receiver can
decrypt it, and use it to further decipher the message content. Thus, no
complex, multipass protocol is required to negotiate a security session
key. Each message stands alone.

 Encryption, however, is only one component of the security story, albeit
an important one. As it stands, the encrypted message body is subject to
substitution by a malicious party, as are critical header fields such as
the timestamp, which is necessary for servers to uniquely identify messages
and apply an effective replay defense. Furthermore, the consumer has no
means to authenticate the message producer: encryption for a particular
receiver does not identify the author - the message could have come from
anyone.

 To address this shortcoming, our message producer calculates digests of
the encrypted message body and critical header fields, and places these
into yet another block in the security header. It signs this block,
aggregating the digested components into a single, simultaneous
integrity/origin authentication statement. The producer includes its
certificate (or a reference to it) in the security header so that the
receiver can validate the signature and follow any certificate chain in the
certificate to a trust anchor. Now the consumer can have confidence that a
specific producer authored the message, it was not altered in transit, and
most importantly, that it was designated specifically for this consumer.

 What is important to recognize here is that all parties in this
transaction have key pairs and certificates. Without PKI, the model doesn't
work.

 Conclusion
Clearly, Web services is a great opportunity for PKI, but it's also a great
challenge. Most vendors' toolkits have a deliberately vague coupling to
commercial PKI systems. As always, it's what the standards loosely describe
that becomes the source of problems. Interfacing to a particular key store
type or location, coercing servers to check CRLs or use OCSP can be
troublesome. It's best to start proactively, rolling out your PKI system
before its services are demanded by a Web services application. And the
demand will come. SSL is sufficient for Web-like, client/server
application, but large enterprise computing is built on asynchronous
messaging; this is where Web services will shine, and where PKI will become
essential.


About the author


Scott Morrison is director of Architecture at Layer 7 Technologies. Layer 7
provides technology for managing and coordinating Web services security and
transaction policy across loosely coupled systems (more)


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From anish at myrealbox.com  Wed Dec 22 08:50:16 2004
From: anish at myrealbox.com (Anish)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 16:50:16 -0000
Subject: International meet on cryptology in Chennai
In-Reply-To: <p0611047ebdecc603892b@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <200412221650.iBMGoMnF026550@outmail.freedom2surf.net>

Hi all,
 I thought I should add one more piece of information; it didn't say which
conference it was. It is Indocrypt 2004
(http://www-rocq.inria.fr/codes/indocrypt2004/).
Regards
Anish

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com
[mailto:owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com] On Behalf Of R.A. Hettinga
Sent: 20 December 2004 18:11
To: cryptography at metzdowd.com; cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
Subject: International meet on cryptology in Chennai

<http://www.chennaionline.com/colnews/newsitem.asp?NEWSID=%7BE75EFF46-873D-4
942-884A-69B736936D6B%7D&CATEGORYNAME=Tamil+Nadu>


Chennai Online News Service - View News

 Dec 20, 2004 Mon
 Dharana
  
International meet on cryptology in Chennai
Search for More News

 Chennai, Dec 19: A three-day international conference on cryptology will
get underway here tomorrow with the aim of providing secure communication
to the business and military sectors.

Over 140 researchers in the field, including some from abroad, would
participate in the conference, Dr M S Vijyaraghavan, executive director,
Society for Electronics Transactions and Security (SETS), told reporters
here today.

Cryptography is the art of providing secure information over insecure
channels. It encodes texts and provides a method of decoding. Cryptanalysis
is the art of breaking into cryptographic information.

The new science - cryptology - was a study of both, he said.

India had not made any headway in cryptology, he said and added that the
conference would help develop this in a big way.

President A P J Abdul Kalam would address the participants through video
conferencing. Dr R Chidambaram, principal scientific adviser, Government of
India, would inaugurate the conference. (Our Correspondent)


  
Published: Sunday, December 19, 2004


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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From roy at rant-central.com  Wed Dec 22 13:56:25 2004
From: roy at rant-central.com (Roy M. Silvernail)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 16:56:25 -0500
Subject: An interesting thread...Hacking Bluetooth
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F38A944B4F87B03979277279BA40@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F38A944B4F87B03979277279BA40@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <41C9ED89.4090708@rant-central.com>

Tyler Durden wrote:

> There's some guy ("German Guy") spouting some coherent-sounding 
> conspiracy theories over here:
>
> http://www.godlikeproductions.com/bbs/message.php?page=23&topic=10&message=54181&mpage=1&showdate=12/18/04 
>
>
> I wouldn't normally post something like this, but the guy's done a 
> little bit of homework on a huge variety of topics, so it's really an 
> excellent hoax, seen from a distance.
>
> Here's on thing giving me some doubts, though (but of course if this 
> is true he may have just pulled it from Google somewhere):
>
> "Here4s another myth: you cannot hack bluetooth from a distance of 
> more than 40 metres. Not true. My technical partner Felix can crack it 
> at over half a kilometre. Which is why he enjoys driving around so 
> much in areas where we know British, American, Israeli or Russian ops 
> are living or working. The great thing about many German cities is 
> that most affordable residences are within metres of the street anyway."
>
> Any comments?

http://www.engadget.com/entry/3093445122266423/

I believe they went a bit over a kilometer at Defcon (against a knowing 
volunteer, so they say) from a hotel rooftop.

The rest sounds perfectly plausible, as well.  WEP is Swiss cheese, guys 
tell their girlfriends too much and girlfriends gossip amongst themselves.

Nothing to see here.  Move along.

-- 
Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
"It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT
SpamAssassin->procmail->/dev/null->bliss
http://www.rant-central.com




From ericm at lne.com  Wed Dec 22 20:36:36 2004
From: ericm at lne.com (Eric Murray)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 20:36:36 -0800
Subject: An interesting thread...Hacking Bluetooth
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F25E62BCC3FA4BB1F433D59BA50@phx.gbl>; from
  camera_lumina@hotmail.com on Wed, Dec 22, 2004 at 09:48:01PM -0500
References: <20041222223658.GK9221@leitl.org>
  <BAY24-F25E62BCC3FA4BB1F433D59BA50@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041222203636.A15479@slack.lne.com>

On Wed, Dec 22, 2004 at 09:48:01PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> Oh no, it gets really interesting. He claims to be an ex-German TLA-type 
> (how many Ls do German TLAs normally have?), and had advanced knowledge of 
> 9/11. That's not super-implausible.

[..]

> Me? I suspect he just pulled all this shit from David Emory's shows and then 
> added some nice google tech searches.

[..]

> I was hoping someone knew about this and had already hacked this hoax, 


If he sounds like Dave Emory, then there isn't much debunking that's required.

Food for thought and grounds for further research,

Eric




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Wed Dec 22 18:48:01 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 21:48:01 -0500
Subject: An interesting thread...Hacking Bluetooth
In-Reply-To: <20041222223658.GK9221@leitl.org>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F25E62BCC3FA4BB1F433D59BA50@phx.gbl>

Oh no, it gets really interesting. He claims to be an ex-German TLA-type 
(how many Ls do German TLAs normally have?), and had advanced knowledge of 
9/11. That's not super-implausible.

What's really interesting is that he claims the German TLAs have a new round 
of strong evidence showing that there's a nuke buried in Houston somewhere 
that's going to be set off on 12/27. He's tied in all sorts of shadowy 
agencies along with internal politcs causing the info not to be acted upon.

Even that would be worthy of ignoring, but he's actually told this story 
extremely well, naming fairly obscure (but real) names in the intelligence 
community and so on. The guy's posts have actually made some serious waves 
on a bunch of boards.

Me? I suspect he just pulled all this shit from David Emory's shows and then 
added some nice google tech searches. WiFi I know was cracked wide open a 
while back, and that wasn't exactly a secret (it's the reason for 802.11x). 
BUT, add knowledge of this to the conspiracy theories to the politics and 
you have a guy who has gone to great lengths to create an excellent hoax. 
Indeed, one can only imagine that the reason for something like this has to 
go way beyond mere hoaxing (eg, the guy's a neo-Nazi?)

I was hoping someone knew about this and had already hacked this hoax, 
because so far I haven't seen anything that conclusively debunks this guy.

-TD




>From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: An interesting thread...Hacking Bluetooth
>Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 23:36:58 +0100
>
>On Wed, Dec 22, 2004 at 02:13:52PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
>
> > "Here4s another myth: you cannot hack bluetooth from a distance of more
> > than 40 metres. Not true. My technical partner Felix can crack it at 
>over
> > half a kilometre. Which is why he enjoys driving around so much in areas
>
>The official record right now is 1.74 km:
>
>	http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/49907
>	http://trifinite.org/trifinite_stuff_bluebug.html#news
>
>No doubt you can do much better with a large dish, and good alignment, as
>well as a clear line of sight.
>
> > where we know British, American, Israeli or Russian ops are living or
> > working. The great thing about many German cities is that most 
>affordable
> > residences are within metres of the street anyway."
> >
> > Any comments?
>
>Bluetooth attacks aren't exactly new. No idea what else that tinfoil-hatted
>person is spouting.
>
>--
>Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
>______________________________________________________________
>ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
>8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net
>
>[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From eugen at leitl.org  Wed Dec 22 14:36:58 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 23:36:58 +0100
Subject: An interesting thread...Hacking Bluetooth
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F38A944B4F87B03979277279BA40@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F38A944B4F87B03979277279BA40@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041222223658.GK9221@leitl.org>

On Wed, Dec 22, 2004 at 02:13:52PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:

> "Here4s another myth: you cannot hack bluetooth from a distance of more
> than 40 metres. Not true. My technical partner Felix can crack it at over
> half a kilometre. Which is why he enjoys driving around so much in areas

The official record right now is 1.74 km:

	http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/49907
	http://trifinite.org/trifinite_stuff_bluebug.html#news

No doubt you can do much better with a large dish, and good alignment, as
well as a clear line of sight.

> where we know British, American, Israeli or Russian ops are living or
> working. The great thing about many German cities is that most affordable
> residences are within metres of the street anyway."
>
> Any comments?

Bluetooth attacks aren't exactly new. No idea what else that tinfoil-hatted
person is spouting.

--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec 23 00:06:17 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2004 00:06:17 -0800
Subject: All your wavelengths belong to us (or Powell, or the SS)
Message-ID: <41CA7C79.81A0A7E3@cdc.gov>

The FCC is trying to shut down a guerilla radio station in DC
calling for protests during Bush's January re-anoint^H^H^H^H^H

Google for it.




From isn at c4i.org  Thu Dec 23 01:15:25 2004
From: isn at c4i.org (InfoSec News)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2004 03:15:25 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [ISN] Robbers' quandary: Getting rid of the cash
Message-ID: <mailman.1123.1576007654.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4117961.stm

By Gavin Stamp
BBC News business reporter
22 December, 2004

Pulling off one of the largest and most daring cash robberies of all
time is one thing.

Disposing successfully of the loot and enjoying the benefits is
another matter.

For the criminals who have made off with more than #20m from the
headquarters of Northern Bank in Belfast, the problems may only just
be beginning.

Firstly, they will have to contend with the huge worldwide publicity
that their heist has generated.


'Massive headache'

Police in the United Kingdom and across Europe will be hot on their
trail while shopkeepers from Ballymena to Brighton will be alert to
any large or unusual purchases for the next few weeks.

Secondly, the sheer size of the robbers' hoard could turn out to be a
millstone around their necks.

Getting rid of #20m without causing huge suspicion is likely to tax
even the most resourceful and determined of criminal minds.

Not only do the stolen notes each have their own serial number, making
them easy to identify but the majority are denominated in Northern
Ireland currency.

Although this is accepted throughout the United Kingdom, far fewer
notes of this type tend to be in circulation outside Northern Ireland,
making any effort to disperse them in England more risky.

"They have a massive headache," says John Horan, a money laundering
expert with accountants Harbinson Mulholland. "To some extent, they
have been the victims of their own success."

Furthermore, the laws governing reporting of suspicious money flows
have been tightened up over the past two years, making it far harder
for the criminals to discreetly invest their loot in a piece of real
estate or an Old Master.


Suspicious minds

While banks have always had a legal responsibility to report
suspicions of potential money laundering, the Proceeds of Crime Act
passed in 2003 has extended this obligation to a whole raft of
businesses and professionals.

"If they're thinking of buying property, that's a bad idea because
property developers, estate agents and conveyancing lawyers are
regulated and all have an obligation to report their suspicions," says
Mr Horan.

"Thinking of buying a Matisse or a nice Rembrandt? That's a bad idea
too because high value dealers such as auction houses are also
regulated."

The robbers still have a number of options, money laundering experts
agree, although they are limited.


If they plan to keep the money within the United Kingdom without
resorting to burying it, setting up a front company is the most likely
option.

"They can set up a fake company which can be used to nominally provide
services and invoices for those services," says Trevor Mascarenhas, a
partner at Phillipsohn Crawfords Berwald, a law firm specialising in
fraud and money laundering.

"They can then take the cash and put it through the system, paying tax
on what they purport to provide and try to legitimise the money."


Overseas options

To do this successfully, says Mr Horan, they would need the assistance
of an expert money launderer who would expect to take a major cut of
the proceeds.

More likely, however, is that the robbers will attempt to smuggle the
money out of United Kingdom in multiple consignments so as not to
jeopardise the entire haul.

Drug laundering organisations in South America and Russian criminal
gangs operating across Europe may provide a ready conduit for the
money, channelling it through banks willing not to ask too many
questions.

According to Ian Hopkins, a senior consultant with corporate
investigators Carratu International, Colombia is one destination the
robbers may consider.

"There are places like that which are not too concerned where the
money comes from. There are banks which will take their 2% to 3% and
deal with the rest of the money."

The money could even ultimately find its way back into the British
economy through offshore businesses and accounts.

Whatever the fate of the money, most experts believe the robbers may
have taken on more than they can chew.

"I would be very surprised if they expected to steal #20m," says Mr
Hopkins. "It is like the Great Train Robbery. They are likely to be
surprised and not a little panicked about how much they have got."



_________________________________________
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 23 06:00:59 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2004 09:00:59 -0500
Subject: [ISN] Robbers' quandary: Getting rid of the cash
Message-ID: <p06110459bdf07f2d55a9@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text



From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Dec 23 06:35:29 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2004 09:35:29 -0500
Subject: An interesting thread...Hacking Bluetooth
In-Reply-To: <20041222203636.A15479@slack.lne.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F97E24C0CCA9EC7D143E689BA50@phx.gbl>

No way it's Dave Emory...they did an IP Traceroute and the guy appears to be 
in Germany. If you've listened to Emory's shows, you'd know from some of his 
technical statements that he most likely wouldn't be capable of this. I also 
simply can't imagine him bothering with something like this.

On the other hand, the perpetrator of this hoax knows a decent amount about 
a variety of subjects (including technical ones). After sleeping on it, I'm 
starting to think he's actually some kind of German conspiracy 'theorist' 
who's actually been snooping the WiFi, etc...of some interesting locations. 
He probably saw a "pattern" and convinced himself he had to save the world.

It's a very interesting thread to say the least. Forget whether Paul 
Wolfowitz has some "Hidden Hand" master plan...it'll probably make 
Dis-information History one day.

-TD

>From: Eric Murray <ericm at lne.com>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Re: An interesting thread...Hacking Bluetooth
>Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 20:36:36 -0800
>
>On Wed, Dec 22, 2004 at 09:48:01PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote:
> > Oh no, it gets really interesting. He claims to be an ex-German TLA-type
> > (how many Ls do German TLAs normally have?), and had advanced knowledge 
>of
> > 9/11. That's not super-implausible.
>
>[..]
>
> > Me? I suspect he just pulled all this shit from David Emory's shows and 
>then
> > added some nice google tech searches.
>
>[..]
>
> > I was hoping someone knew about this and had already hacked this hoax,
>
>
>If he sounds like Dave Emory, then there isn't much debunking that's 
>required.
>
>Food for thought and grounds for further research,
>
>Eric




From ralf at fimaluka.org  Thu Dec 23 04:59:49 2004
From: ralf at fimaluka.org (Ralf-Philipp Weinmann)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2004 13:59:49 +0100
Subject: News on the Skype reverse-engineering front
Message-ID: <871C9AE3-54E2-11D9-A3A0-000A95AF0670@fimaluka.org>

I thought this might be of interest for the list, but haven't seen it 
mentioned/discussed here: Some progress has been made 
reverse-engineering the Skype protocol [1]. No details on the crypto 
implementation yet, but first attempts to understand the P2P model they 
use.

Cheers,
Ralf

[1] S. A. Baset and H. Schulzrinne
     An Analysis of the Skype Peer-to-Peer Internel Telephony Protocol
     http://arxiv.org/pdf/cs.NI/0412017

[2] H.T. Kung: CS143: Computer Networks (P2P VoIP)
     http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs143/slides/2004-12-02-p2p-voip.pdf




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 23 12:11:43 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2004 15:11:43 -0500
Subject: Camera Phone Criminals Targeting Holiday Shoppers
Message-ID: <p061104abbdf0d5f4ac96@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.local6.com/print/4019956/detail.html>

local6.com

Camera Phone Criminals Targeting Holiday Shoppers

Identity Theft Is Fastest Growing Crime In Florida

POSTED: 6:36 am EST December 23, 2004
UPDATED: 6:54 am EST December 23, 2004

ORLANDO, Fla. -- Thieves armed with camera cell phones are using the
devices to steal credit card numbers, bank account numbers and even ATM
numbers from holiday shoppers, according to a Local 6 News report.
 Police said that criminals who are able to get close enough to a person's
personal information can snap a photo of the card or bank account number,
and steal the number.

Orange County sheriff's deputies said they are aware of the latest identity
theft -- the fastest growing crime in Florida.

"It's real easy to capture someone's information by standing behind
somebody, pointing to where they can get personal information," Orange
County sheriff's spokesman Carlos Torres said. "As the technology gets more
advanced, criminals get more advanced with it."

Police said whatever information a shopper pulls out in public is subject
to being photographed and used to a criminal's advantage, Local 6 News
reported.
Central Florida resident Robert Devers said his aunt was likely the victim
of a camera phone criminal.

"My aunt's ATM account was wiped out, because someone was able to get a
hold of her PIN number," Devers said.

There have been no arrests in connection with Devers case.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From jamesd at echeque.com  Fri Dec 24 09:18:12 2004
From: jamesd at echeque.com (James A. Donald)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 2004 09:18:12 -0800
Subject: Finally, the Killer PKI Application
In-Reply-To: <p06110444bdef9695d0d6@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <41CBDED4.1198.1C0B076@localhost>

    --
> <http://sys-con.com/story/print.cfm?storyid=47592>
>
> (SYS-CON)(Printview)
>
> Finally, the Killer PKI Application Web Services as an 
> application - and a challenge December 22, 2004 Summary 
> Enterprise PKI has a bad name. Complex, costly, difficult to 
> deploy and maintain - all these criticisms have dogged this 
> technology since it first appeared.

Because PKI sucks.

> To the dismay of so many CIOs, few applications have stepped 
> up to make effective use of PKI.

Because PKI sucks.

> A Role for PKI WSS goes to great lengths to remain flexible
> and not to specify a particular encryption/signing
> technology.

Or in other words, due to the fact that PKI sucks, they have 
left the door open for a replacement.

>  now the investment may finally be realized.

I don't think so. 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
     wBk2DrWHeXk89xcxEqBeSgid7cCLVSNvu1z47YJW
     4VzhTnreELC1p4yrs3eDjP2/svE8kzr6HxxP9ToWm




From measl at mfn.org  Fri Dec 24 08:56:07 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 2004 10:56:07 -0600 (CST)
Subject: DOJ: IRS Summons are unenforceable. (fwd)
Message-ID: <20041224105551.O4466@ubzr.zsa.bet>

This just gets weirder and weirder!  In their attempt to prevent the
Petition, DOJ is asserting that the IRS is essentially a non-entity.
Except when they take you to prison.  Or something like that...


--------------------------------------------------------------------


http://www.givemeliberty.org/RTPLawsuit/update04-Dec-22.htm


In Defense of the Petition Clause:

Battles Now Underway on Three Fronts

2nd Circuit Directs DOJ to Explain
Lack of IRS Summons Enforcement Authority


As is now widely known, since July of 1999 the We The People organization
has led a nationwide legal and educational attack on the federal
government, utilizing the force of .popular constitutionalism.. This
assault has come in the form of an intelligent and rational exercise of
the First Amendment Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances, relating
to the government.s imposition of an unconstitutional, direct,
un-apportioned tax on labor.

What is also known is that in November of 2002, three additional Petitions
for Redress were added to the People.s overall Petition process. These
Petitions are related to the Constitution.s war powers clauses versus the
Iraq Resolution, the privacy and due process clauses versus the USA
Patriot Act, and the money and debt limiting clauses versus the Federal
Reserve System.

It is also widely known that the People.s Petitions for Redress have been
legally served on the highest ranking officials of the Executive and
Legislative branches of the federal government, including the President
and leadership of the Congress and every member of Congress, the Attorney
General, Treasury Secretary, and Commissioner of the IRS. Undoubtedly,
these officials know about the We The People Foundation and the Petitions
for Redress of Grievances.

What.s more, with dismay, the People watched their servant government.s
reaction: they have seen the government trespass on the People.s First
Amendment Right to Petition by striking out against the Petitioners --
infringing on that unalienable Right, rather than respond by answering
their questions.

The People decided to fight back . to defend against this invasion of
their Right to Petition. Nearly two thousand joined the fight this year by
becoming named plaintiffs in the lawsuit aimed at getting the federal
courts to declare the meaning of the Right to Petition, including the
Right of the People to retain their money until their grievances are
redressed if the government decides not to properly and honestly respond
as the Constitution commands.

What has not been widely known is that parallel battles in defense against
the government.s invasion of the People.s Right to Petition are now being
fought on a total of three judicial fronts by the We The People
organization. What follows is an update of the primary lawsuit and
breaking news regarding significant developments in a related case that
has reached the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. This second case was brought
by Chairman Bob Schulz, as the sole plaintiff, against the IRS.  We will
discuss the third case in a future article.


Ed. Note: Many of the following linked .PDF documents are large. It is
suggested that you
RIGHT-CLICK  to Save (i.e., download) the files to your computer before
attempting
to open them using the (free) Adobe Reader software.

Update -- The Primary Battle:
We The People v. The United States

On July 19, 2004, this case was initiated in the U.S. District Court in
the District of Columbia. An Amended Complaint was filed in early
September.

On September 30, 2004, as we had previously reported, the government filed
a Motion to Dismiss our complaint.

On November 12, 2004, Mark Lane and Bob Schulz filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to the government.s motion to dismiss.

We asked constitutional scholar and attorney John Wolfgram to review and
comment on our Opposition memorandum. Wolfgram called the Memorandum
.Splendid.Brilliant.. Click here for Wolfgram.s comments.

Wofgram is the author of the article, .How the Judiciary Stole the Right
To Petition,. which was published in 31 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. (Summer
2000).

Wolfgram has a B.A. Degree (University of Wisconsin) and a J.D. Degree
(Southwestern University 1977). Wolfgram founded the Constitutional
Defender Association in 1989 to advance Petition Clause Principles.
Its name derives from the observation that the practical value of a
Constitution depends on the effective enforcement of constitutional rights
and limits against government, by the people. Wolfgram argues that the
Petition Clause is the People's Right to redress government violations of
the Constitution - the Constitution's Defense system against government
usurpation and oppression.

According to the rules of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, the government had until November 17, 2004 to reply to our
Memorandum in Opposition to the government.s Motion to Dismiss. However,
DOJ filed a Motion for more time, due in part, to .the gravity of the
relief sought..

We thought this to be an odd reason because the only relief we are seeking
is a declaration of our Rights under the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment, and an end to unconstitutional retaliation against those who
Petition for Redress. However, the court granted the request. DOJ's reply
is due today, December 22, 2004.

After reading the government.s motion to dismiss our complaint, our
Memorandum in Opposition (dated 11/12/04), and the government.s reply (due
12/22/04), the court will decide to deny or grant the government.s motion
to dismiss. If the court denies the government.s motion to dismiss, the
government may appeal that decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals. If the
government does not appeal the court.s denial of its motion to dismiss,
the case will move to the discovery phase, in advance of trial. On the
other hand, if the court grants the government.s motion to dismiss, we
will appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals.

On November 12, 2004, Mark Lane and Bob Schulz filed a Motion to Amend our
complaint, in order to add hundreds of named plaintiffs, to narrow the
issues and to cure a minor issue in our complaint.  The government has
opposed our Motion to Amend the complaint and we have replied to the
government.s opposition. We are also awaiting the court.s decision on our
Motion to Amend. Right-Click to download the Second Amended Complaint.


A Second Front:  Schulz v. IRS

A second front has been established in the People.s defense against the
government.s invasion of our First Amendment Right to Petition. Bob Schulz
has sued the IRS for interfering with his Right to Petition for Redress.

The government decided to retaliate against the leaders of the Petition
process, including Bob Schulz in his personal capacity and as Chairman of
the WTP organization. The government served Schulz with a Summons,
demanding that Schulz turn over certain personal records to the IRS.

Schulz immediately sued the IRS in the US District court. In his
complaint, Schulz asked the Court to quash the IRS Summons on the grounds
that the IRS did not have a legitimate purpose, that the IRS was
infringing on his First Amendment Right to Petition and his Right to
associate with others of like mind, and that the Summons was nothing more
than harassment and impermissible retaliation.
Right-click here for the Memorandum of Law.

The IRS, as defendant, did not respond to the lawsuit. They never made an
appearance in District Court! Eventually, Schulz motioned the District
Court for a default judgment. The District Court issued its decision,
holding that the court was prevented by law from quashing an IRS Summons.

Schulz immediately appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (see Schulz.s Appellant Brief). The IRS, through its attorney, the
U.S. Department of Justice, decided to make an appearance in the court of
Appeals. DOJ, through its Senior Counsel, Robert Storch, filed a
Respondent.s Brief. Schulz filed his Reply Brief.

Oral argument was held last week on December 13, 2004.

At oral argument, DOJ argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction
and could not quash the Summons served on Schulz because the Summons
legally meant nothing. Ironically, in order to scuttle Schulz.s case by
asserting lack of jurisdiction, and to avoid a judicial skirmish directly
debating the Summons authority of the IRS, DOJ argued before the three
appellate justices that the IRS Summons was legally .unenforceable,.
therefore Schulz was under no legal obligation to respond to it, denying
the court subject matter jurisdiction.

Schulz disagreed. He argued that Reisman was dispositive, that in Reisman,
the US Supreme Court recognized the jurisdiction of the federal courts in
such matters, by declaring the right of a person served with an IRS
Summons to respond to the Summons by taking the IRS to a US District
Court.  Schulz also argued that under Powell, the IRS was required to
appear in court to prove its purpose in issuing the Summons was a
legitimate purpose. Finally, Schulz argued that the court had jurisdiction
on the ground that the Summons was, in fact, an IRS .enforcement action.
with significant adverse, statutorily prescribed consequences (including
arrest for contempt), if he either ignored the Summons or failed to give
the IRS what it was demanding of Schulz. See IRC Sections 7604 & 7210.

During argument, one of the justices inquired of Storch, .If there is no
legal obligation to respond to IRS Summons, then why didn't the IRS simply
print a disclaimer on the Summons itself informing people that they did
not have to respond to the Summons?. Storch could not answer the question.

In a highly unusual move, the appellate court ordered DOJ to submit a
memorandum to the Court by December 23, 2004, further explaining to the
court why DOJ believes people do not have to respond to IRS Summons, why
people will suffer no consequences if they ignore such Summons, and why
the court is without power to grant Schulz.s request to quash the Summons.
In response, Storch, the Senior Counsel in the office of the US Attorney,
repeatedly asserted he did not understand this area of the law and would
have to engage IRS officials to draft the Memorandum requested by the
Court.

RIGHT-Click here to save (download) a copy of the audio file containing
the oral arguments made by Schulz and the DOJ before the 2nd Circuit Court
of Appeals on December 13, 2004 to your computer.


The Third Front

A third battle in defense against the government.s attempt to seize power
from the People by acting without authority, and in defense of the
People.s Right to Petition is now being waged. This battle also involves
the practical application and legal enforcement of the Right to Petition
by withholding taxes.

Specifically, the case involves property taxes and the commitment of seven
families who have "bet the farm" in defense of their constitutionally
protected Rights.  We will provide details in a future article.


Just The Beginning

Although we have made considerable progress since our primary judicial
work commenced just months ago, and it appears the government is having
measured difficulty with our efforts thus far, we want to remind everyone
that our battle to secure the Right to Petition -- and restore
Constitutional Order -- will likely be long, and without doubt, very
costly.

Although many are fighting hard and sacrifices have been made, there
remains much to be done -- including moving the District Court for
Injunctive protections for all the lawsuit Plaintiffs, generating a
critical mass of public awareness, and defending our Rights through trial
Court, the Courts of Appeal, and through to the Supreme Court.

We ask each of you to help us remain focused on our common objectives and
strategies and share, as you are able, in the substantial burdens of this
landmark, righteous, and necessary cause.

Please consider a year-end, tax-deductible donation so that you and your
family may soon enjoy Freedom as our Founders and our Creator intended.


PLEASE REMEMBER DICK SIMKANIN

After four requests for more time, Simkanin's attorney is apparently about
ready to file his Brief on Behalf of Appellant Simkanin. One would argue
that it is better to take the time to prepare a persuasive and winning
argument than to rush the appeal brief and fall short.

Although it shocks the senses to consider what Dick Simkanin and his wife
Carol have endured in defense of Liberty, Dick's sprit remains very strong
and positive.  He has asked us to remind people not to forget him and that
he always looks forward to "mail call". Please consider dropping Dick a
note.

Dick's address is:

Richard Michael Simkanin
30383-177 Unit F
FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
P.O. BOX 7000
TEXARKANA, TX 75505-7000



Join the RTP lawsuit as a Plaintiff and learn about the long-forgotten
Right to Petition.
in the Lawsuit Information Center. Remember, there is NO cost to become a
Plaintiff.




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 24 13:37:41 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 2004 16:37:41 -0500
Subject: U.S. passport privacy: Over and out?
Message-ID: <p0611043dbdf23c6db2e1@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2004/12/22/news/passport.html>

 



U.S. passport privacy: Over and out?

By Hiawatha Bray The Boston Globe
 Thursday, December 23, 2004


 It's December 2005 and you're all set for Christmas in Vienna. You have
your most fashionable cold-weather gear, right down to Canada's national
red maple leaf embroidered on your jacket and backpack, to conceal your
American citizenship from hostile denizens of Europe.

 But your secret isn't really safe. As you stroll through the terminal, you
pass a nondescript man with a briefcase. The briefcase contains a powerful
radio scanner, and simply by walking past, you've identified yourself as an
American. Without laying a finger on you, the man has electronically
"skimmed" the data in your passport.

 Science fiction? The American Civil Liberties Union doesn't think so.
Neither does Bruce Schneier, software engineer and author of multiple books
on computer security, nor Katherine Albrecht, a privacy activist in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. They are all worried about a State Department
plan to put radio identification tags in all future U.S. passports,
beginning next year.

 That way, American passport data can be read merely by waving it past a
radio detector. But whose radio detector? That's what worries many people.

 "Somebody can identify you as an American citizen from across the street
because of the passport in your back pocket," said Albrecht, founder of a
Web site concerned with the matter, spychips.com. "You're a walking target."

 Nonsense, replies a State Department spokeswoman, Kelly Shannon. "We're
going to prevent the unauthorized skimming of the data," Shannon said.

 The U.S. government thinks the new passports will be harder to forge and
easier to verify than the current model, without causing undue risk of
identity theft.

 It is all part of the continuing debate over radio frequency
identification systems, also known as RFID. Tags that let people zoom
through a highway toll booth contain an RFID chip. Many American pets have
them embedded under their skin and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
has approved doing the same for people, to provide reliable medical
information to emergency room doctors.

 But privacy advocates like Albrecht contend that government agencies and
big corporations want to embed RFID chips into virtually every product,
giving them the ability to track almost every move that people make.

 The RFID chips contain a tiny bit of information that is transmitted via
radio when the chip comes within range of a reading device. The chip could
broadcast a simple code number, or it could contain a lot more information,
like a traveler's name, nationality and digital photograph. This is what
the chips planned for future U.S. passports will do, part of a plan to make
the passport system more secure.

 But according to government documents released by the civil liberties
union, early versions of the system allowed detection of personal data by a
snoop 30 feet, or 9 meters, away. Shannon, of the State Department,
dismissed this research, saying the equipment needed to capture the data
was too complex and heavy to be used undercover.

 That is not much comfort to Schneier, the computer security expert.
"Technology only gets better," he said. "It never gets worse."

 Schneier figures that would-be spies and snoops will find ways to pick up
signals from the passport chips.

 The chips might be made more secure by encrypting the data they contain.
That way, it would be useless even if intercepted. But the State Department
opposes that idea, because immigration officials in many poor countries
cannot afford the necessary decryption gear.

 "Encryption limits the global interoperability of the passport," said Shannon.

 Why use a radio-based identity system at all? Smart chips, like those
found in some credit cards, are plentiful and cheap, and they don't
broadcast. You slide them through a chip reader that instantly scoops up
the data.

 But the International Civil Aviation Organization, which sets global
standards for passports, has decided on the use of a "noncontact"
technology - another way of saying radio-based identification.

 So will Americans be stuck with high-tech passports that beam their
personal data to all comers? Not necessarily. Turns out there's a simple
fix: a passport cover made of aluminum foil. It would form what engineers
call a Faraday cage, after Michael Faraday, the 19th-century British
physicist who discovered the characteristics of electromagnetic waves.

 Wrap an RFID chip inside a Faraday cage, and the electromagnetic waves
from the chip reader can't get in and activate the chip.

 The State Department says it may use the principle to give travelers an
added sense of security. No, there won't be rolls of aluminum foil included
with every passport. Instead, the passport cover may include a network of
wires woven into the fabric. Fold the passport shut, and there's your
Faraday cage.

 Even Schneier agrees that a properly shielded passport cover should solve
the problem. He wonders why this wasn't included in the original plans for
the new passports.

 "It took a bunch of criticism before they even mentioned it," Schneier
said. And he hopes the anti-snooping technology is thoroughly tested before
the new passports are introduced next spring.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 24 13:37:44 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 2004 16:37:44 -0500
Subject: A Force Field in Flat Gray to Protect a Wireless Network
Message-ID: <p0611043cbdf23c3aa6df@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/23/technology/circuits/23pain.html?pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

December 23, 2004

A Force Field in Flat Gray to Protect a Wireless Network
 Adam Baer


s wireless networks have proliferated, computer security companies have
come up with increasingly complex defenses against hackers: password
protection, encryption, biometrics. Insulating the interior of a house,
apartment or office from radio-wave interference is a simpler concept that
has yet to become a popular consumer strategy, but a new product called
DefendAir from Force Field Wireless could change that.

Available online at forcefieldwireless.com, the product is a latex house
paint that has been laced with copper and aluminum fibers that form an
electromagnetic shield, blocking most radio waves and protecting wireless
networks. Priced at $69 a gallon and available only in flat gray (it can be
used as a primer), one coat shields Wi-Fi, WiMax and Bluetooth networks
operating at frequencies from 100 megahertz to 2.4 gigahertz.

 Two or three coats will achieve the paint's maximum level of protection,
good for networks operating at up to five gigahertz. Force Field Wireless
also sells a paint additive ($34 for a 32-ounce container, enough to treat
a gallon of paint) and $39 window-shield films.

 Harold Wray, a Force Field Wireless spokesman, said the paint must be
carefully applied. "Radio waves find leaks," he said.

 It should be applied selectively, he said, because it might hinder the
performance of radios, televisions and cellphones. "Our main goal is to
shield your wireless radio waves from hackers and outside interference," he
said. "Plus, today, many people watch cable television." Adam Baer

Copyrigh
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 24 19:46:38 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 2004 22:46:38 -0500
Subject: Stolen passports missed at U.S. borders
Message-ID: <p06110423bdf27866c187@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041223-113834-2445r>

The Washington Times
 www.washingtontimes.com

Stolen passports missed at U.S. borders
By Jerry Seper
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published December 24, 2004
Foreign nationals applying for admission to the United States using stolen
passports have "little reason to fear being caught" and usually are
admitted, even when their fraudulent documents have been posted on the
government's computerized "lookout" lists, a report said.
     The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General said
in a 40-page report that of the 176 foreign nationals who its investigators
identified as having used a stolen passport in an attempt to enter the
United States from 1998 to 2003, 136 were admitted.
     "While most persons using stolen passports to enter illegally into the
United States may be simply violating immigration laws, some could have
more sinister intentions," said the department's acting inspector general,
Richard L. Skinner.
     The report, completed in November but made public this week, also said
when U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers received new reports
of stolen passports, they did not routinely review existing admission
records to determine whether any already had been used.
     Even if there was such a procedure, the report said, CBP had no way to
give the information on the stolen passports to U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security's investigative arm.
     "While the 136 successful entries using stolen passports is a
relatively small number, it is significant for several reasons," Mr.
Skinner said. "First, the passports were obtained by criminal acts. Second,
though small, the number could and should be zero, at least for those
admissions that occurred after lookouts were posted. Third, there was no
law-enforcement pursuit once it was recognized an illegal entry had
occurred."
     Mr. Skinner said actionable information was reported and logged in the
lookout system, yet entry was accomplished, "defeating a costly apparatus
established precisely to prevent such an occurrence."
     The inspector general's probe targeted travelers from the 27 foreign
countries for whom a visa is not required, including France, Germany and
Britain.
     Although those travelers were told in October to present either a
machine-readable passport or a U.S. visa, CBP has given officials at ports
of entry the discretionary authority to grant one-time exemptions in an
effort to facilitate travel.
     President Bush also has signed legislation delaying until October 2005
the requirement for visa-waiver countries to include biometrics in their
passports.
     Mr. Skinner said the "vast numbers of stolen passports available"
presented a significant challenge for U.S. immigration authorities, noting
that Interpol estimated last year that more than 10 million lost and stolen
passports are in circulation.
     CBP records show that during 2003, more than 12.7 million travelers to
the United States from visa-waiver countries were inspected at ports of
entry -- nearly 35,000 a day -- and that 4,368 fraudulent passports were
intercepted. The United States had 40.4 million international visitors last
year.
     According to the inspector general's report, of the 98 foreign
nationals who did not have lookouts posted for their stolen passports
before their attempted U.S. entry, 79 were admitted -- a rate of 81
percent. Of those 78 aliens who had posted lookouts on their passports, 57
gained entry -- a rate of 73 percent.
     Of those 57 who gained entry despite "lookouts" on their passports, 33
did so after the September 11 attacks.
     The report also said that 18 aliens whose passports had posted
lookouts were referred by immigration officers to secondary inspections for
more intensive interviews, but got in anyway.
     "We could not determine from the secondary inspections records, the
inspectors' rationale for admitting the aliens with lookouts for the stolen
passports," Mr. Skinner said, describing the records as nonexistent or "so
sketchy that they were not useful."
     Mr. Skinner's report made several recommendations:
     *Primary inspectors should refer foreign nationals to secondary
inspections when their passports are the subject of a lookout.
     *The inspectors should record in detail the results of the secondary
inspections and justifications for any subsequent admission.
     *There should be a supervisory review and approval of a decision to
admit an alien who was the subject of a lookout.
     *Inspectors should enter new names into the lookout database on a
timely basis.
     *CBP should initiate routine reviews of admission records to identify
prior uses of stolen passports.
     *Information on the successful use of stolen passports should be
reported to ICE for investigation.
     Homeland Security Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson, who oversees CBP and
ICE, said the inspector general's report had reached "overly broad and
generalized conclusions" based on a limited study.
     But he said CBP agreed with the recommendations and had taken "prudent
steps" to address them.
     Mr. Skinner also recommended that ICE develop procedures to
investigate, locate and remove from the United States foreign nationals who
have used stolen passports to gain entry to the country and to report the
outcomes of its investigations to CBP.
     For those aliens who used stolen passports that have terrorist links,
he said, ICE should investigate their activities while in the United States
and determine their whereabouts.
     Mr. Hutchinson said efforts were under way to ensure that ICE
investigated all questionable cases.
     CBP inspects the millions of foreign nationals arriving at the
nation's land, sea and air ports of entry to determine their eligibility
for admission. Secondary inspections are sought when more detailed
information is required. ICE is responsible for enforcing immigration law
in the nation's interior.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 25 16:59:48 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2004 19:59:48 -0500
Subject: Banks Test ID Device for Online Security
Message-ID: <p061104bcbdf3bc72b5c1@[68.167.57.91]>

Okay. So AOL and Banks are *selling* RSA keys???

Could someone explain this to me?

No. Really. I'm serious...

Cheers,
RAH
--------


<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/24/technology/24online.html?oref=login&pagewanted=print&position=>

The New York Times

December 24, 2004

Banks Test ID Device for Online Security
 By JENNIFER A. KINGSON


or years, banks gave away toasters to people who opened checking accounts;
soon they may be distributing a more modern kind of appliance.

Responding to an increase in Internet fraud, some banks and brokerage firms
plan to begin issuing small devices that would help their customers prove
their identities when they log on to online banking, brokerage and
bill-payment programs.

 E*Trade Financial intends to introduce such a product in the first few
months of 2005. And  U.S. Bancorp says it will test a system, though it has
not given a timetable.

The devices, which are hand-held and small enough to attach to a keychain,
are expected to cost customers roughly $10. They display a six-digit number
that changes once a minute; people seeking access to their accounts would
type in that number as well as a user name and password. The devices are
freestanding; they do not plug into a computer.

Some banks, like  Wachovia of Charlotte, N.C., and  Commerce Bancshares of
Kansas City, Mo., already use these hardware tokens to identify employees
and corporate customers, and say they are evaluating the technology for
retail banking use. Others, like Fidelity Investments and  Bank of America,
are researching the matter.

"Every single major bank is considering it," said James Van Dyke, principal
and founder of Javelin Strategy and Research of Pleasanton, Calif., which
advises financial services companies on payments and technology issues.

 Although there are drawbacks in terms of cost and convenience - as well as
questions about what would happen if a customer lost the device or it were
stolen - there is growing pressure from bank regulators to add safeguards
of this type to online financial services. In a report last week, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which insures bank deposits, said
that existing authentication systems were not secure enough and that an
extra layer of security should be added to the sign-in process.

"The financial services industry's current reliance on passwords for remote
access to banking applications offers an insufficient level of security,"
the F.D.I.C.'s report said. Two-factor authentication, which typically
includes a memorized password and a hardware security device, "has the
potential to eliminate, or significantly reduce, account hijacking," it
said.

To be sure, there are many ways to add the kind of security that the agency
is seeking, and any number of technology vendors eager to supply products.
The F.D.I.C. evaluated some possible alternatives, including smart cards,
which are plastic cards with embedded microprocessor chips; biometrics,
which identify people by their fingerprints, voice or physical
characteristics; and shared secrets, in which a customer is asked a
question that, in theory, only he or she could answer.

But the system that has so far taken root in the market is the one that
relies on number-changing hardware tokens, which have the shape and feel of
the plastic security devices that people click to unlock their cars.

Several large banks in Europe and Australia - including Credit Suisse,  ABN
Amro and Rabobank - already issue these tokens to customers, sometimes
making them bear the cost of the device. In the United States in September,
America Online introduced a program, AOL Passcode, that lets subscribers
buy the keychain device for $9.95 and use it for authentication purposes,
at a subscriber fee of $1.95 to $4.95 a month, depending on the number of
screen names linked to it.

Proponents of these devices are aware that they present other problems.
Financial companies are concerned about making online banking less
convenient and about adding fees for the hardware token. Customers with
accounts at several institutions may wind up with an unwieldy number of
tokens or swamp call centers with questions about the new systems.

Several foreign banks have made the tokens mandatory for online customers.
E*Trade, which is expected to be the first United States financial
institution to introduce the program for retail customers, will make it
optional and charge for the device.

Joshua S. Levine, chief technology officer at E*Trade, said the technology
seemed to provide the "comfort that most people want." And "when you have
your money at stake," he said, "you really want to feel comfortable."

E*Trade has been testing its program for the last two months, giving the
devices free to 200 interested customers. So far, the tests have attracted
customers with high incomes who conduct many transactions and tend to be
knowledgeable about technology, Mr. Levine said. "Based on the feedback
these customers have been giving us," he added, "we feel it will be very
successful."

 A hardware token is only one way to increase security. At E*Trade,
customers who want to conduct wire transfers must wait for a confirmation
number to be sent to their cellphones or personal digital assistants, then
enter that number to complete the transaction, Mr. Levine said.

 People who sign up for the E*Trade hardware tokens and lose them will have
to call customer service to authenticate themselves, he said.

U.S. Bancorp plans to try out a system involving hardware tokens that will
be based on technology from  VeriSign, the Internet security company. The
bank declined to add details.

 The urgency surrounding the issue is linked to an increase in "phishing,"
the practice of sending fraudulent e-mail messages en masse to bait people
into disclosing sensitive information. Newer scams involve "malware," which
can install itself on a computer through e-mail or pop-up ads, detect when
someone starts to use an online banking program or make a credit card
payment, and then record the person's keystrokes and capture account
details. The victims do not even have to do something foolhardy like giving
away account numbers or passwords.

"We're just seeing new stuff out there all the time," said Dave Jevans,
chairman of the Anti-Phishing Working Group, a coalition of companies in
financial services and information technology. But he added: "I don't think
people need to be any more scared than going to an A.T.M. at nighttime.
They need to be cautious; don't do silly things."

People who run antivirus software on their home computers, who have
installed firewalls to guard against incursions, and who take other
security precautions need not worry so much about the proliferation of
online threats, security experts say. But they add that these people are
probably not in the majority.

 Some bankers say they are leery about rushing to install new systems that
may not solve all the problems. Concerns over phishing have "provoked some
of the government agencies to come up with simple solutions to very complex
problems," said John Carlson, a former regulator with the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency who is now a senior director at BITS, the
technology arm of the Financial Services Roundtable, a trade group.

"Consumer acceptance and ease of use are huge issues," he said.

At Wachovia, which offers both hardware tokens and digital certificates to
corporate customers, Joanne Young, the wholesale business manager for
e-commerce, says that the certificates are easier to use, although unlike
the tokens, they are not portable from one machine to another. When she
telecommutes, "I always have to find my hardware token on my computer at
home," Ms. Young said. "My kids are always moving it on my desk."

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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From rah at shipwright.com  Sat Dec 25 17:00:01 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2004 20:00:01 -0500
Subject: AOL Help : About AOL® PassCode
Message-ID: <p061104bdbdf3bd50e9c7@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://help.channels.aol.com/article.adp?catId=6&sCId=415&sSCId=4090&articleId=217623>
Have questions? Search AOL Help articles and tutorials:



How To:
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Products and Services >>  AOL® PassCode

 About AOL® PassCode

After purchasing and receiving your AOL® PassCode, go to AOL Keyword:
PassCode and this screen appears, allowing you to secure your screen name
to your AOL PassCode. On this screen you can also release your screen name
from AOL PassCode, change service plans and order additional AOL PassCodes.

Account Status

This area lists your current AOL PassCode service plan, including the
secured and unsecured screen names within the plan. If the maximum number
of screen names in your service plan are secured to your AOL PassCode, the
Manage Service Plan button will appear.

View PassCode Account Activity

Displays a screen listing a summary of your AOL PassCode account activity,
such as the date you purchased your subscription, ordered AOL PassCode
devices and details such as the price plan ordered and the quantity of AOL
PassCodes ordered.

Secure Screen Name

To help protect your screen name with AOL PassCode, you need to secure your
screen name to your specific AOL PassCode device. Each AOL PassCode has a
unique serial number engraved on its back. By associating your screen name
with a specific AOL PassCode serial number, the AOL service will know which
six-digit number needs to be entered at each sign-on, helping to protect
your screen name from unauthorized access.

To secure a screen name to your AOL PassCode
	1.  	Sign on to the AOL® service with the screen name you want to
secure to your AOL PassCode.
	2.  	Go to AOL Keyword: PassCode.
	3.  	Click Secure Screen Name.
	4.  	Type the eight-digit serial number engraved on the back of your
AOL PassCode.
	5.  	Type the six-digit number displayed on the front of your AOL
PassCode.
	6.  	Click Save. A confirmation screen appears. This change takes
effect immediately and will be enforced the next time you sign on to the
AOL service. Whenever you sign on to the AOL service using the screen name
that you secured to AOL PassCode, you will be required to enter the
six-digit number on the front of your AOL PassCode.

Release Screen Name

When the screen name you signed on to the AOL service with has already been
secured to your AOL PassCode, the Secure Screen Name button changes to
Release Screen Name.

If you no longer want to use AOL PassCode, you must release your screen
name from your AOL PassCode so that you will no longer need to enter a
six-digit code when you sign on to any AOL service.

To release your screen name from your AOL PassCode
	1.  	Sign on to the AOL service with the screen name you want to
release from your AOL PassCode.
	2.  	Go to AOL Keyword: PassCode.
	3.  	Click Release Screen Name. The Secure Screen Name button changes
to Release Screen Name when that particular screen name is secured to AOL
PassCode.
	4.  	Enter the answer to your account security question. For more
information, see What is an Account Security Question.
	5.  	Type the eight-digit serial number engraved on the back of your
AOL PassCode.
	6.  	Type the six-digit number displayed on the front of your AOL
PassCode.
	7.  	Click Save. This change takes effect immediately, and removes the
AOL PassCode protection for subsequent sign-ons.

Manage Service Plan

Displays a screen with AOL PassCode service plan options, allowing you to
change your current service plan.

Order more PassCodes

Displays a screen allowing you to order additional AOL PassCodes.



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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 27 07:54:21 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 10:54:21 -0500
Subject: Make Your Computer Programs, Data Invisible to Everyone Except 
  Yourself with MyInvisibleDisk - Infobahn Sdn. Bhd.
Message-ID: <p06110401bdf5e09530b6@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.prleap.com/pr_3046.html>

  

  
 Home   |   About Us   |   Contact PR Leap   |   FAQ   |   RSS Feeds   | 
Resources   |   Sign Up   |   Login / Submit Press Release

Recent News  |  News Releases by Category

 See More Related Computers News
News Released: December 27, 2004

Make Your Computer Programs, Data Invisible to Everyone Except Yourself
with MyInvisibleDisk

 (PRLEAP.COM) MyInvisibleDisk uses an existing free space on your computer
drives and create a vault-like container to store all your secret programs
and data. It functions similarly to your C-drive on your computer. The
real-time encryption technology used is based on the Advanced Encryption
Standard with 256-bit keys, which was approved by the National Security
Agency (U.S.A.) to protect U.S. government top-level secrets in June 2003.
This
 is considerably stronger than the 112-bit Triple-Data Encryption Standard
technology used by local banks and governmental agencies.

 One of MyInvisibleDisk's unique features is being immune against all
hardware and software keystroke recorders which are the scourge of all
password-based security systems. By adopting a keyboard-free approach,
users can expect unrivaled security with a powerful, elegantly simple
click-and-use interface.

 MyInvisibleDisk also uses proprietary techniques to remove, safely and
silently, all possible traces of encryption usage on the user's computer
including the computer's page-file without any changes to the computer
registry. It also has the unique ability to morph into a harmless-looking
application tool in the absence of a genuine key or faced with a tampered
key.

 According to Bruce Schneier, a world-renown author, cryptography and
computer security expert, "In the real world, key management is the hardest
part of cryptography. Designing secure cryptographic algorithms and
protocols isn't easy, but you can rely on a large body of academic
research. Keeping the keys secret is much harder". MyInvisibleDisk is
unique, being probably the only publicly available product to emphasize on
its numerous key-management functionalities.

 MyInvisibleDisk is currently available in two versions, Professional and
Enterprise for computers using Windows XP. The Professional version is
suitable for single-computer users; the Enterprise version can protect up
to a maximum of eight computers with a single USB device. Companies can
purchase different combinations of these two products.

 MyInvisibleDisk prices starts at the special introductory offer of RM680
(US$179) per computer. Reseller and OEM enquiries are welcomed.

 About Infobahn Sdn. Bhd.
 We are an independent, specialty IT software developer with
highly-experienced staff. Our key strengths are in designing customized
systems involving cryptography and artificial intelligence for financial
markets.


Contact Information
 S. K. Wong
 Infobahn Sdn. Bhd.
 Email Infobahn Sdn. Bhd.
 60 3 58824581

  
  
  

  
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releases are solely responsible for the accuracy of their content.

 ) 2003 Condesa, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Use of our service is governed
by our Privacy Policy and Terms of Service.
  

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 27 13:45:45 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 16:45:45 -0500
Subject: Natural selection acts on the quantum world
Message-ID: <p0611040ebdf61db684ac@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.nature.com/news/2004/041220/pf/041220-12_pf.html> Close window??

Published online: 23 December 2004


 Natural selection acts on the quantum world

Philip Ball

Objective reality may owe its existence to a 'darwinian' process that
advertises certain quantum states.

If observing the world tends to change it, how come we all see the same
butterfly?


A team of US physicists has proved a theorem that explains how our
objective, common reality emerges from the subtle and sensitive quantum
world.

If, as quantum mechanics says, observing the world tends to change it, how
is it that we can agree on anything at all? Why doesn't each person leave a
slightly different version of the world for the next person to find?

Because, say the researchers, certain special states of a system are
promoted above others by a quantum form of natural selection, which they
call quantum darwinism. Information about these states proliferates and
gets imprinted on the environment. So observers coming along and looking at
the environment in order to get a picture of the world tend to see the same
'preferred' states.

If it wasn't for quantum darwinism, the researchers suggest in Physical
Review Letters1, the world would be very unpredictable: different people
might see very different versions of it. Life itself would then be hard to
conduct, because we would not be able to obtain reliable information about
our surroundings... it would typically conflict with what others were
experiencing.

Taking stock

The difficulty arises because directly finding out something about a
quantum system by making a measurement inevitably disturbs it. "After a
measurement," say Wojciech Zurek and his colleagues at Los Alamos National
Laboratory in New Mexico, "the state will be what the observer finds out it
is, but not, in general, what it was before."

 They survive monitoring by the environment to leave 'descendants' that
inherit their properties. ?

Wojciech Zure
Physicist, Los Alamos National Laboratory in New MexicoBecause, as Zurek
says, "the Universe is quantum to the core," this property seems to
undermine the notion of an objective reality. In this type of situation,
every tourist who gazed at Buckingham Palace would change the arrangement
of the building's windows, say, merely by the act of looking, so that
subsequent tourists would see something slightly different.

Yet that clearly isn't what happens. This sensitivity to observation at the
quantum level (which Albert Einstein famously compared to God constructing
the quantum world by throwing dice to decide its state) seems to go away at
the everyday, macroscopic level. "God plays dice on a quantum level quite
willingly," says Zurek, "but, somehow, when the bets become macroscopic he
is more reluctant to gamble." How does that happen?

Quantum mush

The Los Alamos team define a property of a system as 'objective', if that
property is simultaneously evident to many observers who can find out about
it without knowing exactly what they are looking for and without agreeing
in advance how they'll look for it.

Physicists agree that the macroscopic or classical world (which seems to
have a single, 'objective' state) emerges from the quantum world of many
possible states through a phenomenon called decoherence, according to which
interactions between the quantum states of the system of interest and its
environment serve to 'collapse' those states into a single outcome. But
this process of decoherence still isn't fully understood.

"Decoherence selects out of the quantum 'mush' states that are stable, that
can withstand the scrutiny of the environment without getting perturbed,"
says Zurek. These special states are called 'pointer states', and although
they are still quantum states, they turn out to look like classical ones.
For example, objects in pointer states seem to occupy a well-defined
position, rather than being smeared out in space.

The traditional approach to decoherence, says Zurek, was based on the idea
that the perturbation of a quantum system by the environment eliminates all
but the stable pointer states, which an observer can then probe directly.
But he and his colleagues point out that we typically find out about a
system indirectly, that is, we look at the system's effect on some small
part of its environment. For example, when we look at a tree, in effect we
measure the effect of the leaves and branches on the visible sunlight that
is bouncing off them.

But it was not obvious that this kind of indirect measurement would reveal
the robust, decoherence-resistant pointer states. If it does not, the
robustness of these states won't help you to construct an objective reality.

Now, Zurek and colleagues have proved a mathematical theorem that shows the
pointer states do actually coincide with the states probed by indirect
measurements of a system's environment. "The environment is modified so
that it contains an imprint of the pointer state," he says.

All together now

Yet this process alone, which the researchers call 'environment-induced
superselection' or einselection2, isn't enough to guarantee an objective
reality. It is not sufficient for a pointer state merely to make its
imprint on the environment: there must be many such imprints, so that many
different observers can see the same thing.


Happily, this tends to happen automatically, because each individual's
observation is based on only a tiny part of the environmental imprint. For
example, we're never in danger of 'using up' all the photons bouncing off a
tree, no matter how many people we assemble to look at it.

This multiplicity of imprints of the pointer states happens precisely
because those states are robust: making one imprint does not preclude
making another. This is a Darwin-like selection process. "One might say
that pointer states are most 'fit'," says Zurek. "They survive monitoring
by the environment to leave 'descendants' that inherit their properties."

"Our work shows that the environment is not just finding out the state of
the system and keeping it to itself", he adds. "Rather, it is advertising
it throughout the environment, so that many observers can find it out
simultaneously and independently."

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 27 13:47:49 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 16:47:49 -0500
Subject: LAPD: We Know That Mug
Message-ID: <p0611040cbdf61da78120@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,66142,00.html>

Wired News

LAPD: We Know That Mug 
Associated Press

Story location: http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,66142,00.html

08:33 AM Dec. 26, 2004 PT

LOS ANGELES -- The Los Angeles Police Department is experimenting with
facial-recognition software it says will help identify suspects, but civil
liberties advocates say the technology raises privacy concerns and may not
identity people accurately.

 "It's like a mobile electronic mug book," said Capt. Charles Beck of the
gang-heavy Rampart Division, which has been using the software. "It's not a
silver bullet, but we wouldn't use it unless it helped us make arrests."


 But Ramona Ripston, executive director of the American Civil Liberties
Union of Southern California, said the technology was unproven and could
encourage profiling on the basis of race or clothing.

 "This is creeping Big Brotherism," Ripston said. "There is a long history
of government misusing information it gathers."

 The department is seeking about $500,000 from the federal government to
expand the use of the technology, the Los Angeles Times reported Saturday.
Police have been testing it on Alvarado Street just west of downtown Los
Angeles.

 In one recent incident, two officers suspected two men illegally riding
double on a bicycle of being gang members. If they were, they may have been
violating an injunction that barred those named in a court documents from
gathering in public and other activities.

 As the officers questioned the men, Rampart Division Senior Lead Officer
Mike Wang pointed a hand-held computer with an attached camera at one of
the men. Facial-recognition software compared his image to those of recent
fugitives, as well as to dozens of members of local gangs.

 Within seconds, the screen displayed nine faces that had contours similar
to the man's. The computer said the image of one particular gang member
subject to the injunction was 94 percent likely to be a match.

 That enough to trigger a search that yielded a small amount of
methamphetamine. The man did turn out to be the gang member, and was
arrested on suspicion of violating the injunction by possessing illegal
drugs. The city attorney's office has not yet decided whether to charge the
man.

 The LAPD has been using two computers donated by their developer, Santa
Monica company Neven Vision, which wanted field-testing of its technology.
The computers are still considered experimental.

 The Rampart Division has used the devices about 25 times in the two months
officers have been testing them. The technology has resulted in 16 arrests
for alleged criminal contempt of a permanent gang injunction, and three
arrests on outstanding felony warrants.

 On one occasion, the computer was used to clear a man the officers
suspected of being someone else, police said.

 So far, the city attorney has filed seven injunction cases in arrests that
involved the technology. A judge dismissed a case after questioning the
technology, but it has been refiled. Suspects in two cases pleaded guilty.

 Other experiments with facial-recognition software have had mixed results.
Officials in Tampa, Fla., stopped using it last year because it didn't
result in arrests. And a Boston's Logan International Airport in 2002, two
systems failed 96 times to identify people who volunteered to help test it.
The technology correctly identified 153 other volunteers.

 Luis Li, chief of the Los Angeles city attorney's criminal branch, said
the technology should not present legal problems because it was used only
as an initial means of identification.

 "If you are standing in the street, you have no expectation of privacy,"
he said.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 27 13:49:01 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 16:49:01 -0500
Subject: 2004: The Year That Promised Email Authentication
Message-ID: <p0611040bbdf61da27fe5@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.circleid.com/print/855_0_1_0/>
 

CircleID

2004: The Year That Promised Email Authentication

By: Yakov Shafranovich
>From CircleID
Addressing Spam
December 27, 2004

 As the year comes to a close, it is important to reflect on what has been
one of the major actions in the anti-spam arena this year: the quest for
email authentication. With email often called the "killer app" of the
Internet, it is important to reflect on any major changes proposed, or
implemented that can affect that basic tool that many of us have become to
rely on in our daily lives. And, while many of the debates involved myriads
of specialized mailing lists, standards organizations, conferences and even
some government agencies, it is important for the free and open source
software (FOSS) community as well as the Internet community at large, to
analyze and learn lessons from the events surrounding email authentication
in 2004.

 "THE GHOST OF CHRISTMAS PAST"

 The quest for email authentication did not start from scratch.
Authentication systems are a well known field in computer security, and
have been researched for quite some time. Nevertheless, it is only during
this past year that email authentication has gained a prominent push mainly
due to the ever increasing spam problem. As well known, the original email
architecture and protocols was not designed for an open network such as the
Internet. Therefore, the original designers failed to predict the virtual
tidal wave of junk email that took advantage of lack of authentication in
the Internet email. As the result, a junk email filter is considered one of
the essential tools any Internet citizen must have in his toolkit today.

 The push towards email authentication started in earnest with the
publication of a proposal called RMX by a German engineer called Hadmut
Danisch in early 2003. While other previous proposals have been published,
none have gained any kind of traction. Hadmut's proposal on the other hand
coincided with the opening of the Anti-Spam Research Group (ASRG) of the
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF), which as an affiliate body of the
IETF. The IETF created and currently maintains the Internet email
standards, and an IETF affiliate was a logical body to work on addressing
the spam problem on the Internet at large. Being that the ASRG brought
together a sizable chunk of the anti-spam world, RMX gained more exposure
that none of the previous work in the field ever had. What followed was a
succession of proposals forked off the original RMX proposal until the
spring of 2004 when most of them were basically confined to the dustbin of
history together with RMX. In the end, only two proposals with any sizable
following were left: Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and Microsoft's
Caller-ID.

 The author of SPF, Meng Wong, managed to attract a large community to his
proposal, giving it a much larger deployed base than any competitor. In
many ways this effort can be compared to some of the open source projects,
except this time this was an open standard rather than a piece of software.
On the other side of the ring, so to speak, was Microsoft which surprised
the email world with their own proposal called Caller-ID at the RSA
conference in early 2004. Eventually, the IETF agreed to consider
standardization of email authentication by opening a working group called
MARID in March of 2004. With the merger of SPF and Microsoft's new
Sender-ID proposal, hopes were running high about the coming success of
email authentication and the coming demise of spam. Yet, ironically this
working group earned itself a record by being one of the shortest in the
existence of the IETF - it has lasted a little over six months until being
formally shutdown in September of 2004.

 "ALL THAT IS GOLD DOES NOT GLITTER"

 During the work of IETF's MARID group the quest for the email
authentication begun to permeate circles outside the usual cadre of
anti-spam geeks. Technology publications, and even the mass media have
begun to take note of the efforts occurring on an obscure mailing list
tucked away among 200 other even more obscure groups, prodded in many cases
by the public relations spokesmen of various companies in the anti-spam
space, including Microsoft. Yet in many ways that was one of the fatal
blows to the group and any hope of a common standard for email
authentication.

 Several major issues arose during the operation of the working group. The
first major issue that has been bubbling beneath the surface was technical
in nature. SPF has come from a group of proposals that worked with the
parts of the email infrastructure that was unseen by most users. This
included email servers that exchanged email among ISPs and were unseen. In
the technical lingo this type of authentication was known as "path
authentication". It focused on authenticating the path the message took
place between servers, and dealt with machines instead of end users.
Sender-ID approached the problem from a different viewpoint. Prodded by
financial companies and the fact that Microsoft itself makes more email
client software than server software, Sender-ID dealt with the end user. It
focused on "message authentication", based on the path the message took.
While the goals make have been admirable, many technical questions arose as
to whether Sender-ID would work. Most of them were rooted in the basic
differences between path authentication vs. message authentication, and
remained unresolved.

 The second major issue that arose was one of intellectual property rights.
Microsoft filed for patents on parts of Sender-ID and was not forthcoming
with information during the operation of the MARID WG. While the actual
patent application were eventually published towards the end of life of the
WG that came too late. The damage to the trust among the group members, and
different parts of the community has already been done. The main point of
contention was not necessarily the patents applications themselves - rather
it was the mandatory patent license that Microsoft had drawn up. The
language in the Sender-ID patent license was construed in a way that
prevents use by any software licensed under the General Public License
(GPL). Whether that was intentional or not we may never know, but the trust
between Microsoft and the FOSS community which was strenuous at best was
broken.

 The third major issue which played itself outside the mailing lists and
hallways of the anti-spam world was the media. Given that the spam problem
was only increasing, the media pounced on what was seen as the golden grail
for stopping spam. Unfortunately, as most reporters are not knowledgeable
in either Internet architecture or email protocols, they frequently
reported email authentication as the final cure for spam. These created
great expectations for email authentication which were blown away once the
hard truth settled in: email authentication did not stop spam. Unlike what
many had believed, email authentication did not address the spam problem
directly. Rather, it was only the first step towards a larger solution with
reputation and accreditation systems planned for the future. However, as
this truth sunk in, many of the companies and community members were not as
positive towards email authentication as before.

 The various disagreements, technical and non-technical, led some of the
group participants to create their own alternatives proposals or look to
crypto-solutions such as Yahoo's DomainKeys. As a result, any useful work
of the MARID group slowed to a crawl with the IETF eventually shutting down
the group. A major factor in that decision was letters from two large
members in the FOSS community against Sender-ID: the Apache Foundation and
the Debian Project.

 "LET'S VISIT UNCLE SAM"

 With the shutdown of MARID WG in September of 2004, both Sender-ID and SPF
were left to fend for their own. While some have assumed that Sender-ID was
left of the dead after being rejected by the IETF shortly before the
closure of MARID, Microsoft was quietly gathering support for Sender-ID
among the industry. Microsoft's goals become clear at the FTC's Email
Authentication Summit in November of 2004: Sender-ID was pushed as an
accepted email authentication standard to be mandated by the FTC. Among the
sizable PR gains that Microsoft gained was the endorsement of Sender-ID by
AOL, and a letter signed by representatives of 25 major email companies and
ISPs, a list which curiously included Meng Wong, the author of SPF. The PR
advantage was so great, that SPF was not even listed on the FTC's website
for the conference. At the same time, other alternative proposals such as
CSV and BATV have begun promulgating among the industry, all of which born
during the death throes of MARID.

 The SPF community being faced with the choice of joining or rejecting
Sender-ID, was split. Majority of the community as judging by the mailing
list traffic opposed Sender-ID/SPF combination. Nevertheless, some members
including Meng Wong, the original author, endorsed Sender-ID. This has led
to a lot of infighting with an election of an "SPF Council". At this time,
the SPF community is the midst of a political discussion about its future.

 At the same time, a separate low-key effort in the IETF is taking place to
address some of the cryptography solutions for Internet email. Proposals
such as Yahoo's DomainKeys, Cisco's IdentifiedMail, etc. seek to achieve
"message authentication" promised by Sender-ID but on a much more solid
technical ground and with less IPR and PR issues. This effort is purposely
left low key with even the mailing list itself hard to find, and certainly
no media stories promising the end of spam. The IETF-MAILSIG effort as this
is now called seeks to avoid the same problems that doomed MARID with hopes
of developing useful technologies to reduce spam. Nevertheless, this effort
was high-key enough for some of the companies involved to show case it at
the FTC's summit. Needless to say, the FTC is staying silent on its plans.

 WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS

 While we still don't have workable email authentication, the Sender-ID/SPF
saga did accomplish a lot in many other ways. These events have shown to
the technology community at large that the FOSS world plays an ever
increasing role in the Internet as whole. The Apache Foundation and the
Debian Project carried enough weight to the IETF to consider their opinion,
marking probably the first time that FOSS opinions carried significant
weight in the standards process.

 This debacle has also lead to an increased awareness of the growing
problems in the patent system with Sender-ID being cited as a prime example
of a patent system gone wrong. While smaller sagas such as PanIP's rampage
on small e-businesses, Acacia's assault of video streaming and other
similar incidents have been happening for a while, the Sender-ID/IETF story
has brought this issue to the forefront of the Internet community for at
least a short time. What has followed has been positive developments with
governments, corporations and individuals recognizing the increasing
problems in today's patent system and some beginning to seek reform.
 As for spam, Microsoft, Cisco, the SPF community and many others are still
working on it. Some of the positive developments coming out of the
Sender-ID episode have been an increased awareness of how the email
architecture actual works and the increased realization that better
coordination among the Internet community is necessary.

 As for email authentication - there is still 2005...

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From ge at linuxbox.org  Mon Dec 27 10:39:48 2004
From: ge at linuxbox.org (Gadi Evron)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 20:39:48 +0200
Subject: Cell phones for eavesdropping - finally some public "chatter"
Message-ID: <mailman.1124.1576007654.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

/Pun intended on the subject line!/

Okay, so, we have all known cell phones are "dangerous".

Stepping out of the cellular protocols security and vendor-side systems, and
forgetting for a second about interception of transmissions through the air,
Trojan horses/worms that may install themselves on the cell phone and even
bluetooth risks, there is the long talked of risk of "operating" a regular
un-tampered cell phone from a far and the risk of modified devices.

Sorry for stating the obvious, but cell phones are transmitters.

For years now paranoid people and organizations claim that eavesdropping
through a cell phone is a very valid risk. Much like somebody pressing
"send" by mistake during a sensitive meeting is a very valid yet different
risk.

Some of the stricter organizations ask you to do anything from (top to
bottom) storing the cell phone in a safe, through shutting it off or
removing the battery, and all the way to *only* "don't have that around here
while we are in a meeting". Then again.. *most* haven't even heard of this
risk.

Forgetting even this risk, many of us even ignore the obvious. I usually ask
people who talk to me while I'm on the phone "even if the NSA (for example)
is not interested in what I have to say or not capable of intercepting it
and even that I don't care if they heard my conversations...  Should the
person I talk to hear our conversation?"

Lately there seems to be some more awareness about the "dangers" of cell
phones. Knowing which risk is more of a threat than the other is another
issue.

It seems to me that other than in the protocols, where there has been a
serious learning curve (and GPRS seems very promising), cellular companies
keep doing the same mistakes, and we can see the security problems of the PC
world reappearing in cell phones, much like those of the main frames
re-appeared in PC's (to a level).

History repeated.  Heck, I can't even disable Java or the web browser in
most cellular computers (we really should refer to them as computers now).

Here are some URL's on the subject:

Here is one about modified cell phones, which also mentions the risk of
eavesdropping through a cell phone as mentioned above:
http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/200206/msg0003
1.html

Here is a product for sale, a cellular phone BUILT for eavesdropping:
http://wirelessimports.com/ProductDetail.asp?ProductID=347

Also, check out the IEEE Pervasive article that mentions this problem area,
although discusses more the issue of malware:
http://csdl.computer.org/comp/mags/pc/2004/04/b4011abs.htm

Or Google for "symbian +virus", for example.

Thanks go to David Dagon for the links.

------ End of Forwarded Message


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To manage your subscription, go to
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----- End forwarded message -----
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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
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8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
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[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Dec 27 20:53:09 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 23:53:09 -0500
Subject: Scientists close to network that defies hackers
Message-ID: <p06110401bdf69502f321@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://news.ft.com/cms/s/a0dcf3f0-5874-11d9-9940-00000e2511c8.html>

The Financial Times



Scientists close to network that defies hackers
By Clive Cookson, Science Editor
Published: December 28 2004 02:00 | Last updated: December 28 2004 02:00
Scientists have taken what they say is a big step towards an intrinsically
secure computer network which banks and other institutions could use to
transmit data without risk of hacking.

Toshiba Research Europe is one of several laboratories around the world
racing to commercialise quantum cryptography, a technology that uses
quantum mechanics to generate unbreakable codes. The Cambridge-based
company says it has produced the first system robust enough to run
uninterruptedly for long periods without human intervention.

The Toshiba researchers have tested the system with MCI, the international
telecommunications company, and plan next year to carry out trials with
financial institutions in London.

Secure digital communication uses long prime numbers as keys to encode data
at one end and decode at the other. Inquantum cryptography, individual
photons - light particles - transmit the secret keys down optical fibres.
Each photon carries a digital bit of information, depending on its
polarisation. To outwit hackers, the keys are changed many times a second.

The extreme delicacy of these quantum bits is both the strength and
weakness of quantum cryptography. On the positive side, a hacker cannot
eavesdrop on the data transmission without changing it and alerting sender
and receiver to the breach of security. But the system is easily disturbed
by tiny fluctuations such as temperature changes in the transmission
apparatus or movements in the optical fibres.

Previous quantum cryptography transmissions have lasted only for minutes
and required continual adjustment by experts, says Andrew Shields, head of
Toshiba's quantum information group. His laboratory managed to extend the
running time to a week's "entirely automated and uninterrupted session".

The Cambridge researchers stabilised the system and reduced the error rate
by sending a bright "guardian pulse" of light down the fibres immediately
after each information-carrying photon.

Mr Shields said: "The technology is now sufficiently mature to be used in
real-world situations and we are currently discussing applications with
interested parties. In the first instance we expect quantum cryptography to
be used in companies' private networks - for example, to provide secure
traffic in a link between two sites within a metropolitan area."

Besides Japanese-owned Toshiba, large electronics companies competing to
commercialise quantum cryptography include NEC of Japan and Hewlett-Packard
of the US. There are also two start-ups, Magiq Technologies of the US and
ID Quantique of Switzerland, with first generation quantum cryptography
products on the market, although sales have not been large.
-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From cripto at ecn.org  Mon Dec 27 22:22:08 2004
From: cripto at ecn.org (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2004 07:22:08 +0100 (CET)
Subject: "State of Fear" by Michael Crichton
Message-ID: <561ca279f91249247d40941346025144@ecn.org>

Just finished reading it (It was a Christmas present).

The story involves the heroes foiling a plot by eco-terrorists who attempt to create "natural" disasters in an effort to push their agenda regarding global warming. 

Along the way the Crichton presents a pretty convincing argument that scientists don't really have a good enough understanding of our climate to really estimate the impacts of mankind and that many of the events claimed to be evidence of global warming are statistically insignificant and contain a huge amounts of bias. In addition, he provides references to many examples where mankind has failed miserably at trying to "manage and preserve" the environment.

He also makes a feast (literally, read the book :-) ) of Hollywood stars who push environmental causes and claim to pine for the more "simplistic and environmentally friendly" life of native islanders all the while living in their huge mansions, driving their SUV's and traveling around the world in private jets.

The title "State of Fear" comes the concept well known to many on the list that best way to control society is via fear. In this case fear of global warming. 

There are a lot of footnotes and an extensive bibliography of the current research both supporting and debunking global warming.

It will interesting to see if this book makes it into a movie (It almost seems like a rebuttal of the movie "The Day After Tomorrow"). 

Crichton's other books include, "The Andromeda Strain" (I'm sure most of us old-timers on the list will recognize that one), "Disclosure", "Airframe", and (the one most new subscribers will recognize), "Jurassic Park".

I recommend taking a look.




From rah at shipwright.com  Tue Dec 28 08:08:30 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2004 11:08:30 -0500
Subject: Jet Is an Open Secret in Terror War
Message-ID: <p0611040ebdf734775353@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A27826-2004Dec26?language=printer>

The Washington Post

washingtonpost.com
Jet Is an Open Secret in Terror War


By Dana Priest
 Washington Post Staff Writer
 Monday, December 27, 2004; Page A01

 The airplane is a Gulfstream V turbojet, the sort favored by CEOs and
celebrities. But since 2001 it has been seen at military airports from
Pakistan to Indonesia to Jordan, sometimes being boarded by hooded and
handcuffed passengers.

 The plane's owner of record, Premier Executive Transport Services Inc.,
lists directors and officers who appear to exist only on paper. And each
one of those directors and officers has a recently issued Social Security
number and an address consisting only of a post office box, according to an
extensive search of state, federal and commercial records.

 Bryan P. Dyess, Steven E. Kent, Timothy R. Sperling and Audrey M. Tailor
are names without residential, work, telephone or corporate histories --
just the kind of "sterile identities," said current and former intelligence
officials, that the CIA uses to conceal involvement in clandestine
operations. In this case, the agency is flying captured terrorist suspects
from one country to another for detention and interrogation.

The CIA calls this activity "rendition." Premier Executive's Gulfstream
helps make it possible. According to civilian aircraft landing permits, the
jet has permission to use U.S. military airfields worldwide.

 Since Sept. 11, 2001, secret renditions have become a principal weapon in
the CIA's arsenal against suspected al Qaeda terrorists, according to
congressional testimony by CIA officials. But as the practice has grown,
the agency has had significantly more difficulty keeping it secret.

According to airport officials, public documents and hobbyist plane
spotters, the Gulfstream V, with tail number N379P, has been used to whisk
detainees into or out of Jakarta, Indonesia; Pakistan; Egypt; and Sweden,
usually at night, and has landed at well-known U.S. government refueling
stops.

As the outlines of the rendition system have been revealed, criticism of
the practice has grown. Human rights groups are working on legal challenges
to renditions, said Morton Sklar, executive director of the World
Organization for Human Rights USA, because one of their purposes is to
transfer captives to countries that use harsh interrogation methods
outlawed in the United States. That, he said, is prohibited by the U.N.
Convention on Torture.

The CIA has the authority to carry out renditions under a presidential
directive dating to the Clinton administration, which the Bush
administration has reviewed and renewed. The CIA declined to comment for
this article.

 "Our policymakers would never confront the issue," said Michael Scheuer, a
former CIA counterterrorism officer who has been involved with renditions
and supports the practice. "We would say, 'Where do you want us to take
these people?' The mind-set of the bureaucracy was, 'Let someone else do
the dirty work.' "

 The story of the Gulfstream V offers a rare glimpse into the CIA's secret
operations, a world that current and former CIA officers said should not
have been so easy to document.

 Not only have the plane's movements been tracked around the world, but the
on-paper officers of Premier Executive Transport Services are also
connected to a larger roster of false identities.

 Each of the officers of Premier Executive is linked in public records to
one of five post office box numbers in Arlington, Oakton, Chevy Chase and
the District. A total of 325 names are registered to the five post office
boxes.

An extensive database search of a sample of 44 of those names turned up
none of the information that usually emerges in such a search: no previous
addresses, no past or current telephone numbers, no business or corporate
records. In addition, although most names were attached to dates of birth
in the 1940s, '50s or '60s, all were given Social Security numbers between
1998 and 2003.

The Washington Post showed its research to the CIA, including a chart
connecting Premier Executive's officers, the post office boxes, the 325
names, the recent Social Security numbers and an entity called Executive
Support OFC. A CIA spokesman declined to comment.

According to former CIA operatives experienced in using "proprietary," or
front, companies, the CIA likely used, or intended to use, some of the 325
names to hide other activities, the nature of which could not be learned.
The former operatives also noted that the agency devotes more effort to
producing cover identities for its operatives in the field, which are
supposed to stand up under scrutiny, than to hiding its ownership of a
plane.

The CIA's plane secret began to unravel less than six weeks after the Sept.
11, 2001, attacks.

On Oct. 26, 2001, Masood Anwar, a Pakistani journalist with the News in
Islamabad, broke a story asserting that Pakistani intelligence officers had
handed over to U.S. authorities a Yemeni microbiologist, Jamil Qasim Saeed
Mohammed, who was wanted in connection with the October 2000 bombing of the
USS Cole.

 The report noted that an aircraft bearing tail number N379P, and parked in
a remote area of a little-used terminal at the Karachi airport, had whisked
Mohammed away about 2:40 a.m. Oct. 23. The tail number was also obtained by
The Post's correspondent in Pakistan but not published.

The News article ricocheted among spy-hunters and Web bloggers as a
curiosity for those interested in divining the mechanics of the new
U.S.-declared war on terrorism.

At 7:54:04 p.m. Oct. 26, the News article was posted on FreeRepublic.com,
which bills itself as "a conservative news forum."

Thirteen minutes later, a chat-room participant posted the plane's
registered owners: Premier Executive Transport Services Inc., of 339
Washington St., Dedham, Mass.

"Sounds like a nice generic name," one blogger wrote in response. "Kind of
like Air America" -- a reference to the CIA's secret civilian airlines that
flew supplies, food and personnel into Southeast Asia, including Laos,
during the Vietnam War.

Eight weeks later, on Dec. 18, 2001, American-accented men wearing hoods
and working with special Swedish security police brought two Egyptian
nationals onto a Gulfstream V that was parked at night at Stockholm's
Bromma Airport, according to Swedish officials and airport personnel
interviewed by Swedish television's "Cold Facts" program. The account was
confirmed independently by The Post. The plane's tail number: N379P.

 Wearing red overalls and bound with handcuffs and leg irons, the men, who
had applied for political asylum in Sweden, were flown to Cairo, according
to Swedish officials and documents. Ahmed Agiza was convicted by Egypt's
Supreme Military Court of terrorism-related charges; Muhammad Zery was set
free. Both say they were tortured while in Egyptian custody. Sweden has
opened an investigation into the decision to allow them to be rendered.

A month later, in January 2002, a U.S.-registered Gulfstream V landed at
Jakarta's military airport. According to Indonesian officials, the plane
carried away Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni, an Egyptian traveling on a
Pakistani passport and suspected of being an al Qaeda operative who had
worked with shoe bomber suspect Richard C. Reid. Without a hearing, he was
flown to Egypt. His status and whereabouts are unknown. The plane's tail
number was not noted, but the CIA is believed to have only one of the
expensive jets.

 Over the past year, the Gulfstream V's flights have been tracked by plane
spotters standing at the end of runways with high-powered binoculars and
cameras to record the flights of military and private aircraft.

 These hobbyists list their findings on specialized Web pages. According to
them, since October 2001 the plane has landed in Islamabad; Karachi;
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Dubai; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Baghdad; Kuwait City;
Baku, Azerbaijan; and Rabat, Morocco. It has stopped frequently at Dulles
International Airport, at Jordan's military airport in Amman and at
airports in Frankfurt, Germany; Glasglow, Scotland, and Larnaca, Cyprus.

Premier Executive Transport Services was incorporated in Delaware by the
Prentice-Hall Corporation System Inc. on Jan. 10, 1994. On Jan. 23, 1996,
Dean Plakias, a lawyer with Hill & Plakias in Dedham, filed incorporation
papers with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts listing the company's
president as Bryan P. Dyess.

 According to public documents, Premier Executive ordered a new Gulfstream
V in 1998. It was delivered in November 1999 with tail number N581GA, and
reregistered for unknown reasons on March 2000 with a new tail number,
N379P. It began flights in June 2000, and changed the tail number again in
December 2003.

Plakias did not return several telephone messages seeking comment. He told
the Boston Globe recently that he simply filed the required paperwork. "I'm
not at liberty to discuss the affairs of the client business, mainly for
reasons I don't know," he told the Globe. Asked whether the company exists,
Plakias responded: "Millions of companies are set up in Massachusetts that
are just paper companies."

A lawyer in Washington, whose name is listed on a 1996 IRS form on record
at the Secretary of the Commonwealth's office in Massachusetts -- and whose
name is whited out on some copies of the forms -- hung up the phone last
week when asked about the company.

 Three weeks ago, on Dec. 1, the plane, complete with a new tail number,
was transferred to a new owner, Bayard Foreign Marketing of Portland, Ore.,
according to FAA records. Its registered agent in Portland, Scott Caplan,
did not return phone calls.

 Like the officers at Premier Executive, Bayard's sole listed corporate
officer, Leonard T. Bayard, has no residential or telephone history. Unlike
Premier's officers, Bayard's name does not appear in any other public
records.

 Researchers Margot Williams and Julie Tate contributed to this report.
Williams has since left The Washington Post.

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From dave at farber.net  Tue Dec 28 13:11:00 2004
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2004 16:11:00 -0500
Subject: [IP] Cell phones for eavesdropping - finally some
 public "chatter"
Message-ID: <mailman.1125.1576007654.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


------ Forwarded Message
From: RISKS List Owner <risko at csl.sri.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2004 11:49:56 -0800 (PST)
To: <risks-resend at csl.sri.com>
Subject: [RISKS] Risks Digest 23.64



From non_secure at yahoo.com  Tue Dec 28 22:13:46 2004
From: non_secure at yahoo.com (Joe Schmoe)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2004 22:13:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: something to test ...
Message-ID: <20041229061346.82320.qmail@web53303.mail.yahoo.com>

A test message.

--Josh


		
__________________________________ 
Do you Yahoo!? 
Yahoo! Mail - Find what you need with new enhanced search.
http://info.mail.yahoo.com/mail_250




From eugen at leitl.org  Tue Dec 28 13:47:46 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2004 22:47:46 +0100
Subject: [IP] Cell phones for eavesdropping - finally some public
  "chatter" (fwd from dave@farber.net)
Message-ID: <20041228214746.GE9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From vinnie at vmeng.com  Wed Dec 29 10:07:46 2004
From: vinnie at vmeng.com (Vinnie Moscaritolo)
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 2004 10:07:46 -0800
Subject: In war on terrorism, U.S. drafts shops to be on guard
Message-ID: <mailman.1126.1576007654.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

 In war on terrorism, U.S. drafts shops to be on guard

 By Steve Johnson
 Knight Ridder Newspapers

 SAN JOSE, Calif. - It may surprise some people to learn that one of the
linchpins in this nation's war on terrorism is the Bin & Barrel Mini Mart
in Fremont, Calif.

 Manager Sonia Cheema certainly was when her dad bought the store in October.

 Under federal rules still being fine-tuned, she discovered, the Bin &
Barrel - like thousands of other businesses - must have a written plan for
foiling money-laundering terrorists. It also must have a "compliance
officer" to ensure the plan is heeded, train its employees to spot shady
transactions and regularly audit its own performance.


 That's not all.

 While not widely known, the Bin & Barrel and every other U.S. business
must steer clear of people on the government's 192-page list of "specially
designated nationals," which has more than 5,000 names and is updated
frequently. Otherwise, business people could face huge fines and a long
stay in prison.

 "Oh gosh! Imagine one person coming to cash a check and going through a
list," said the 25-year-old Cheema, who has temporarily stopped cashing
checks and processing money orders, at least until she understands the
federal rules better. "It's going to be a lot of work. ... I don't think
it's worth it."

 Previously, banks were pretty much the only businesses that had to worry
about money launderers. But that changed after the terrorist attacks on
Sept. 11.

 On Sept. 24, 2001, President Bush signed an executive order barring
business dealings with anyone on the specially designated list, which
includes the names and aliases of suspected terrorists, drug kingpins and
their associates. Those failing to comply can be fined $10 million and
jailed up to 10 years.

 That was followed a month later by enactment of the USA Patriot Act, which
forces "financial institutions"- broadly defined to include everything from
liquor stores to pawn shops - to have detailed programs for combating money
launderers. Under its enforcement provisions, business operators face
potential $500,000 fines and 10-year prison terms.

 The Patriot Act already is in effect for casinos, mutual funds,
credit-card firms, banks and "money service businesses" like the Bin &
Barrel, which offer such things as check cashing and money transfers.

 Still others - jewelers, vehicle dealers, travel agents, loan companies,
investment firms and people involved in real estate closings - are waiting
for the government to issue their regulations under the act.

 As word about the law spreads, many business people don't like what they
are hearing.

 "A lot of our members are just starting to wake up to all of the things
they are required to do," said Karen Penafiel, assistant vice president for
advocacy for the Building Owners & Managers Association International. When
the group's executive committee held a briefing on the act in November, she
said, "there was a sense that, 'you've got to be kidding."'

 Expecting businesses - especially tiny ones - to keep track of terrorists
strikes some people as silly.

 "It's just lame," said Pat Kennedy, who owns Alpine Recreation, a Morgan
Hill, Calif., RV dealership. "I'm trying to imagine any local terrorist
picking up his motor home and doing a little camping."

 Palo Alto, Calif., attorney Jonathan Axelrad has similar concerns about
the law's potential application to venture capital funds. Forcing the
funds' managers to monitor money laundering "would simply be an expensive,
unnecessary burden," he said, because the risks and withdrawal limits of
such investments would likely be unattractive to terrorists.

 But terrorists are capable of using a wide range of businesses and
purchases - including recreational vehicles - to hide their assets,
according to federal officials, who insist the new rules already are paying
off.

 They note that from Feb. 18, 2003, through Nov. 9, 2004, they received
tips from various financial institutions about suspicious activity in 129
terrorism-related cases. That resulted in 648 grand jury subpoenas, nine
arrests and two indictments.

 Even so, compliance with the act has been spotty so far.

 William Fox, director of the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, told Congress in September that only 21,058 of the
estimated 200,000 money service businesses nationwide had registered with
his agency, as required under the Patriot Act.

 Although firms that handle small transactions are exempt under the law, he
testified, "we believe there are a significant number of money services
business required to register that have failed to do so."

 The reason for that isn't clear. But even among companies that have heard
of the law, many remain perplexed about its provisions.

 "There is mass confusion out in the business world on this," said
Christopher Myers, an attorney who recently did an analysis of the laws'
implications for real-estate companies.

 Some critics blame the law's vague wording. Consider its decree that
anyone involved in real estate closings have procedures for deterring money
laundering. In addition to buyers and sellers, industry experts say, that
wording could apply to mortgage lenders, appraisers, surveyors, title
insurers, escrow agents, environmental consultants and city building
inspectors.

 Similar uncertainty surrounds Bush's order forbidding all 5.6 million of
the nation's businesses from having dealings with anyone on the specially
designated nationals list, which can be viewed at
www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/.

 Because the list of 5,000-plus names is regularly updated, many companies
are using sophisticated software to check it against their customers'
names. But the cost of software can range from $1,000 to well over
$100,000. And it's not foolproof.

 "Inevitably, there will be many 'false positives' with the use of this
software," according to a notice published by the Treasury Department's
Office of Foreign Assets Control, which oversees the list. So to clarify if
a customer is really on the list, the notice advises, business operators
may have to go to the additional trouble of contacting their software
supplier or the Treasury Department.

 In addition, depending on the type and size of the transactions involved,
many businesses must fill out detailed "suspicious activity reports" and
file them with the federal government within 30 days of discovering a
customer is on the list.

 The Office of Foreign Assets Control has made public the names of some
large businesses that have gotten fines or other penalties for failing to
ensure their customers weren't on the list. But Molly Millerwise refused to
disclose the names of any small businesses punished for such violations.

 "That's not available," she told the Mercury News. "It's nothing we have
made public."

 Nonetheless, she said, small-business owners could wind up in big trouble
if they assume they won't be prosecuted, adding that, "everyone is
responsible for compliance."

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 29 11:26:14 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 2004 14:26:14 -0500
Subject: In war on terrorism, U.S. drafts shops to be on guard
Message-ID: <p061104d7bdf8b4d06a01@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text



From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Dec 29 11:28:18 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 2004 14:28:18 -0500
Subject: [fc-announce] FC05 Preliminary Program Now Online
Message-ID: <p061104d6bdf8b27bde29@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text


User-Agent: Microsoft-Entourage/11.1.0.040913
From: "Stuart E. Schechter" <ses at ll.mit.edu>
To: <fc-announce at ifca.ai>
Subject: [fc-announce] FC05 Preliminary Program Now Online
Sender: fc-announce-admin at ifca.ai
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 2004 11:37:27 -0500

The program and preliminary schedule can be found at:
   http://www.ifca.ai/fc05/program.html

   An official call for participation will be sent out as soon as
registration is open.  (We expect this to be early next week.)

   If you've yet to make travel arrangements, I would encourage you to stay
in Dominica on Thursday night (3/3) or longer to avoid a rush to the airport
after the morning program.  In the past, attendees who have stayed after the
conference have found that this is an excellent time to meet with others.


Keynote Speakers
================

Lynne Coventry (NCR)
Bezalel Gavish (Southern Methodist University)

Panel Sessions
==============

Financial Technology in the Developing World
    Allan Friedman (Harvard) - Organizer
    Alessandro Acquisti (CMU)
    H William Burdett, Jr. (Foley & Lardner, LLP)
    Jon Peha (CMU)

Phishing
    Steve Myers (Indiana University) - Organizer
    Drew Dean (SRI)
    Stuart Stubblebine (Stubblebine Research Labs)
    Richard Clayton (Cambridge, UK)
    Markus Jakobsson (Indiana University CACR)

Research Papers
===============

Fraud within Asymmetric Multi-Hop Cellular Networks
    Gildas Avoine (EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland)

Information-Theoretic Security Analysis of Physical Uncloneable Functions
    P. Tuyls
    B. Skoric
    S. Stallinga
    A.H. Akkermans
    W. Ophey (Philips Research Laboratories, The Netherlands)

Views, Reactions and Impact of Digitally-Signed Mail in e-Commerce.
    Simson L. Garfinkel
    Jeffrey I. Schiller
    Erik Nordlander (MIT)
    David Margrave (Amazon.com)
    Robert C. Miller (MIT)

Identity-based Partial Message Recovery Signatures
(or How to Shorten ID-based Signatures)
    Fangguo Zhang (Sun Yat Sen University, P.R.China)
    Yi Mu
    Willy Susilo (University of Wollongong, Australia)

How to Non-Interactively Update a Secret
    Eujin Goh (Stanford University)
    Philippe Golle (Palo Alto Research Center)

Interactive Diffie-Hellman Assumptions with Applications
to Password-Based Authentication
    Michel Abdalla
    David Pointcheval (Ecole Normale Superieure)

Achieving Fairness in Private Contract Negotiation
    Keith Frikken
    Mikhail Atallah (Purdue University)

Protecting Secret Data from Insider Attacks
    David Dagon
    Wenke Lee
    Richard Lipton (Georgia Tech)

RFID Traceability A Multilayer Problem
    Gildas Avoine
    Philippe Oechslin (EPFL Lausanne Switzerland)

A User-Friendly Approach to Human Authentication of Messages
    Jeff King
    Andre dos Santos (Georgia Tech)

Countering Identity Theft through Digital Uniqueness,
Location Cross-Checking, and Funneling
    P.C. van Oorschot (Carleton University)
    S. Stubblebine (Stubblebine Research Labs)

Policy-Based Cryptography and Applications
    Walid Bagga
    Refik Molva (Eurecom)

A Privacy Protecting Coupon System
    Liqun Chen (HP Laboratories)
    Matthias Enzmann (Fraunhofer SIT)
    Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (University of Bochum)
    Markus Schneider (Fraunhofer SIT)
    Michael Steiner (IBM T.J. Watson)

Analysis of a Multi-Party Fair Exchange Protocol and Formal
Proof of Correctness in the Strand Space model
    Steve Kremer
    Aybek Mukhamedov
    Eike Ritter (University of Birmingham, UK)

Secure Biometric Authentication for Weak Computational Devices
    Mikhail J. Atallah
    Keith B. Frikken (Purdue)
    Michael T. Goodrich (UC Irvine)
    Roberto Tamassia (Brown)

Small Coalitions Cannot Manipulate Voting
    Edith Elkind (Princeton University)
    Helger Lipmaa (Helsinki University of Technology)

Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-Unit Auctions
    Felix Brandt (Stanford)
    Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University)

Risk Assurance for Hedge Funds using Zero Knowledge Proofs
    Michael Szydlo (RSA Security/Independent)

Testing Disjointness of Private Datasets
    Aggelos Kiayias (University of Connecticut)
    Antonina Mitrofanova (Rutgers University)

Time Capsule Signature
    Yevgeniy Dodis (NYU)
    Dae Hyun Yum (POSTECH)

Probabilistic Escrow of Financial Transactions
with Cumulative Threshold Disclosure
    Stanislaw Jarecki (UC Irvine)
    Vitaly Shmatikov (UT Austin)

Approximation in Message Authentication
    Giovanni Di Crescenzo
    Richard Graveman (Telcordia)
    Gonzalo Arce
    Renwei Ge (U Delaware)

Systems & Applications Presentations
====================================

Securing Sensitive Data with the Ingrian DataSecure Platform
    Andrew Koyfman (Ingrian Networks)

Ciphire Mail Email Encryption
    Lars Eilebrecht (Ciphire Labs)


_______________________________________________
fc-announce mailing list
fc-announce at ifca.ai
http://mail.ifca.ai/mailman/listinfo/fc-announce

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Thu Dec 30 07:06:26 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 10:06:26 -0500
Subject: 2004: The Year That Promised Email Authentication
In-Reply-To: <p0611040bbdf61da27fe5@[68.167.57.91]>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F40CCC0B2E68095288833589B9C0@phx.gbl>

I see RAHWEH is back from visiting the relatives...

-TD



>From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>To: cryptography at metzdowd.com, cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: 2004: The Year That Promised Email Authentication
>Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 16:49:01 -0500
>
><http://www.circleid.com/print/855_0_1_0/>
>
>
>CircleID
>
>2004: The Year That Promised Email Authentication
>
>By: Yakov Shafranovich
> >From CircleID
>Addressing Spam
>December 27, 2004
>
>  As the year comes to a close, it is important to reflect on what has been
>one of the major actions in the anti-spam arena this year: the quest for
>email authentication. With email often called the "killer app" of the
>Internet, it is important to reflect on any major changes proposed, or
>implemented that can affect that basic tool that many of us have become to
>rely on in our daily lives. And, while many of the debates involved myriads
>of specialized mailing lists, standards organizations, conferences and even
>some government agencies, it is important for the free and open source
>software (FOSS) community as well as the Internet community at large, to
>analyze and learn lessons from the events surrounding email authentication
>in 2004.
>
>  "THE GHOST OF CHRISTMAS PAST"
>
>  The quest for email authentication did not start from scratch.
>Authentication systems are a well known field in computer security, and
>have been researched for quite some time. Nevertheless, it is only during
>this past year that email authentication has gained a prominent push mainly
>due to the ever increasing spam problem. As well known, the original email
>architecture and protocols was not designed for an open network such as the
>Internet. Therefore, the original designers failed to predict the virtual
>tidal wave of junk email that took advantage of lack of authentication in
>the Internet email. As the result, a junk email filter is considered one of
>the essential tools any Internet citizen must have in his toolkit today.
>
>  The push towards email authentication started in earnest with the
>publication of a proposal called RMX by a German engineer called Hadmut
>Danisch in early 2003. While other previous proposals have been published,
>none have gained any kind of traction. Hadmut's proposal on the other hand
>coincided with the opening of the Anti-Spam Research Group (ASRG) of the
>Internet Research Task Force (IRTF), which as an affiliate body of the
>IETF. The IETF created and currently maintains the Internet email
>standards, and an IETF affiliate was a logical body to work on addressing
>the spam problem on the Internet at large. Being that the ASRG brought
>together a sizable chunk of the anti-spam world, RMX gained more exposure
>that none of the previous work in the field ever had. What followed was a
>succession of proposals forked off the original RMX proposal until the
>spring of 2004 when most of them were basically confined to the dustbin of
>history together with RMX. In the end, only two proposals with any sizable
>following were left: Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and Microsoft's
>Caller-ID.
>
>  The author of SPF, Meng Wong, managed to attract a large community to his
>proposal, giving it a much larger deployed base than any competitor. In
>many ways this effort can be compared to some of the open source projects,
>except this time this was an open standard rather than a piece of software.
>On the other side of the ring, so to speak, was Microsoft which surprised
>the email world with their own proposal called Caller-ID at the RSA
>conference in early 2004. Eventually, the IETF agreed to consider
>standardization of email authentication by opening a working group called
>MARID in March of 2004. With the merger of SPF and Microsoft's new
>Sender-ID proposal, hopes were running high about the coming success of
>email authentication and the coming demise of spam. Yet, ironically this
>working group earned itself a record by being one of the shortest in the
>existence of the IETF - it has lasted a little over six months until being
>formally shutdown in September of 2004.
>
>  "ALL THAT IS GOLD DOES NOT GLITTER"
>
>  During the work of IETF's MARID group the quest for the email
>authentication begun to permeate circles outside the usual cadre of
>anti-spam geeks. Technology publications, and even the mass media have
>begun to take note of the efforts occurring on an obscure mailing list
>tucked away among 200 other even more obscure groups, prodded in many cases
>by the public relations spokesmen of various companies in the anti-spam
>space, including Microsoft. Yet in many ways that was one of the fatal
>blows to the group and any hope of a common standard for email
>authentication.
>
>  Several major issues arose during the operation of the working group. The
>first major issue that has been bubbling beneath the surface was technical
>in nature. SPF has come from a group of proposals that worked with the
>parts of the email infrastructure that was unseen by most users. This
>included email servers that exchanged email among ISPs and were unseen. In
>the technical lingo this type of authentication was known as "path
>authentication". It focused on authenticating the path the message took
>place between servers, and dealt with machines instead of end users.
>Sender-ID approached the problem from a different viewpoint. Prodded by
>financial companies and the fact that Microsoft itself makes more email
>client software than server software, Sender-ID dealt with the end user. It
>focused on "message authentication", based on the path the message took.
>While the goals make have been admirable, many technical questions arose as
>to whether Sender-ID would work. Most of them were rooted in the basic
>differences between path authentication vs. message authentication, and
>remained unresolved.
>
>  The second major issue that arose was one of intellectual property 
>rights.
>Microsoft filed for patents on parts of Sender-ID and was not forthcoming
>with information during the operation of the MARID WG. While the actual
>patent application were eventually published towards the end of life of the
>WG that came too late. The damage to the trust among the group members, and
>different parts of the community has already been done. The main point of
>contention was not necessarily the patents applications themselves - rather
>it was the mandatory patent license that Microsoft had drawn up. The
>language in the Sender-ID patent license was construed in a way that
>prevents use by any software licensed under the General Public License
>(GPL). Whether that was intentional or not we may never know, but the trust
>between Microsoft and the FOSS community which was strenuous at best was
>broken.
>
>  The third major issue which played itself outside the mailing lists and
>hallways of the anti-spam world was the media. Given that the spam problem
>was only increasing, the media pounced on what was seen as the golden grail
>for stopping spam. Unfortunately, as most reporters are not knowledgeable
>in either Internet architecture or email protocols, they frequently
>reported email authentication as the final cure for spam. These created
>great expectations for email authentication which were blown away once the
>hard truth settled in: email authentication did not stop spam. Unlike what
>many had believed, email authentication did not address the spam problem
>directly. Rather, it was only the first step towards a larger solution with
>reputation and accreditation systems planned for the future. However, as
>this truth sunk in, many of the companies and community members were not as
>positive towards email authentication as before.
>
>  The various disagreements, technical and non-technical, led some of the
>group participants to create their own alternatives proposals or look to
>crypto-solutions such as Yahoo's DomainKeys. As a result, any useful work
>of the MARID group slowed to a crawl with the IETF eventually shutting down
>the group. A major factor in that decision was letters from two large
>members in the FOSS community against Sender-ID: the Apache Foundation and
>the Debian Project.
>
>  "LET'S VISIT UNCLE SAM"
>
>  With the shutdown of MARID WG in September of 2004, both Sender-ID and 
>SPF
>were left to fend for their own. While some have assumed that Sender-ID was
>left of the dead after being rejected by the IETF shortly before the
>closure of MARID, Microsoft was quietly gathering support for Sender-ID
>among the industry. Microsoft's goals become clear at the FTC's Email
>Authentication Summit in November of 2004: Sender-ID was pushed as an
>accepted email authentication standard to be mandated by the FTC. Among the
>sizable PR gains that Microsoft gained was the endorsement of Sender-ID by
>AOL, and a letter signed by representatives of 25 major email companies and
>ISPs, a list which curiously included Meng Wong, the author of SPF. The PR
>advantage was so great, that SPF was not even listed on the FTC's website
>for the conference. At the same time, other alternative proposals such as
>CSV and BATV have begun promulgating among the industry, all of which born
>during the death throes of MARID.
>
>  The SPF community being faced with the choice of joining or rejecting
>Sender-ID, was split. Majority of the community as judging by the mailing
>list traffic opposed Sender-ID/SPF combination. Nevertheless, some members
>including Meng Wong, the original author, endorsed Sender-ID. This has led
>to a lot of infighting with an election of an "SPF Council". At this time,
>the SPF community is the midst of a political discussion about its future.
>
>  At the same time, a separate low-key effort in the IETF is taking place 
>to
>address some of the cryptography solutions for Internet email. Proposals
>such as Yahoo's DomainKeys, Cisco's IdentifiedMail, etc. seek to achieve
>"message authentication" promised by Sender-ID but on a much more solid
>technical ground and with less IPR and PR issues. This effort is purposely
>left low key with even the mailing list itself hard to find, and certainly
>no media stories promising the end of spam. The IETF-MAILSIG effort as this
>is now called seeks to avoid the same problems that doomed MARID with hopes
>of developing useful technologies to reduce spam. Nevertheless, this effort
>was high-key enough for some of the companies involved to show case it at
>the FTC's summit. Needless to say, the FTC is staying silent on its plans.
>
>  WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
>
>  While we still don't have workable email authentication, the 
>Sender-ID/SPF
>saga did accomplish a lot in many other ways. These events have shown to
>the technology community at large that the FOSS world plays an ever
>increasing role in the Internet as whole. The Apache Foundation and the
>Debian Project carried enough weight to the IETF to consider their opinion,
>marking probably the first time that FOSS opinions carried significant
>weight in the standards process.
>
>  This debacle has also lead to an increased awareness of the growing
>problems in the patent system with Sender-ID being cited as a prime example
>of a patent system gone wrong. While smaller sagas such as PanIP's rampage
>on small e-businesses, Acacia's assault of video streaming and other
>similar incidents have been happening for a while, the Sender-ID/IETF story
>has brought this issue to the forefront of the Internet community for at
>least a short time. What has followed has been positive developments with
>governments, corporations and individuals recognizing the increasing
>problems in today's patent system and some beginning to seek reform.
>  As for spam, Microsoft, Cisco, the SPF community and many others are 
>still
>working on it. Some of the positive developments coming out of the
>Sender-ID episode have been an increased awareness of how the email
>architecture actual works and the increased realization that better
>coordination among the Internet community is necessary.
>
>  As for email authentication - there is still 2005...
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From dave at farber.net  Thu Dec 30 07:41:33 2004
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 10:41:33 -0500
Subject: [IP] The Shadow Internet
Message-ID: <mailman.1127.1576007654.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


------ Forwarded Message
From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne at warpspeed.com>
Reply-To: <dewayne at warpspeed.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 02:50:03 -0800
To: Dewayne-Net Technology List <dewayne-net at warpspeed.com>
Subject: [Dewayne-Net] The Shadow Internet

[Note:  The other part of the story that 'Wired Magazine' just did in
their Jan. '05 issue on the Darknet.  DLH]

The Shadow Internet 
They start with a single stolen file and pump out bootleg games and
movies by the millions. Inside the pirate networks that are terrorizing
the entertainment business.
By Jeff HowePage
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.01/topsite.html>

Just over a year ago, a hacker penetrated the corporate servers at
Valve, the game company behind the popular first-person shooter
Half-Life. He came away with a beta version of Half-Life 2. "We heard
about it," says 23-year-old Frank, a well-connected media pirate.
"Everyone thought it would get bootlegged in Europe." Instead, the
hacker gave the source code to Frank - it turned out that he was a
friend of a friend - so that Frank could give Half-Life 2 to the world.
"I was like, 'Let's do this thing, yo!'" he says. "I put it on
Anathema. After that, it was all over."

Anathema is a so-called topsite, one of 30 or so underground, highly
secretive servers where nearly all of the unlicensed music, movies, and
videogames available on the Internet originate. Outside of a pirate
elite and the Feds who track them, few know that topsites exist. Even
fewer can log in.

  Within minutes of appearing on Anathema, Half-Life 2 spread. One file
became 30 files became 3,000 files became 300,000 files as Valve stood
helplessly by watching its big Christmas blockbuster turn into a lump
of coal. The damage was irreversible - the horse was out of the barn,
the county, and the state. The original Half-Life has sold more than 10
million games and expansion packs since its late 1998 release.
Half-Life 2's official release finally happened in November, after
almost a year of reprogramming.

  When Frank (who, like all the pirates interviewed for this article, is
identified by a pseudonym) posted the Half-Life 2 code to Anathema, he
tapped an international network of people dedicated to propagating
stolen files as widely and quickly as possible.

  It's all a big game and, to hear Frank and others talk about "the
scene," fantastic fun. Whoever transfers the most files to the most
sites in the least amount of time wins. There are elaborate rules, with
prizes in the offing and reputations at stake. Topsites like Anathema
are at the apex. Once a file is posted to a topsite, it starts a rapid
descent through wider and wider levels of an invisible network,
multiplying exponentially along the way. At each step, more and more
pirates pitch in to keep the avalanche tumbling downward. Finally,
thousands, perhaps millions, of copies - all the progeny of that
original file - spill into the public peer-to-peer networks: Kazaa,
LimeWire, Morpheus. Without this duplication and distribution structure
providing content, the P2P networks would run dry. (BitTorrent, a
faster and more efficient type of P2P file-sharing, is an exception.
But at present there are far fewer BitTorrent users.)

It's a commonly held belief that P2P is about sharing files. It's an
appealing, democratic notion: Consumers rip the movies and music they
buy and post them online. But that's not quite how it works.

  In reality, the number of files on the Net ripped from store-bought
CDs, DVDs, and videogames is statistically negligible. People don't
share what they buy; they share what is already being shared - the
countless descendants of a single "Adam and Eve" file. Even this is
probably stolen; pirates have infiltrated the entertainment industry
and usually obtain and rip content long before the public ever has a
chance to buy it.

  The whole shebang - the topsites, the pyramid, and the P2P networks
girding it all together - is not about trading or sharing at all. It's
a broadcast system. It takes a signal, the new U2 single, say, and
broadcasts it around the world. The pirate pyramid is a perfect
amplifier. The signal becomes more robust at every descending level,
until it gets down to the P2P networks, by which time it can be
received by anyone capable of typing "U2" into a search engine.

This should be good news for law enforcement. Lop off the head (the
topsites), and the body (the worldwide trade in unlicensed media) falls
lifeless to the ground. Sounds easy, but what if you can't find the
head? As in any criminal conspiracy, it takes years of undercover work
to get inside. An interview subject warned me against even mentioning
Anathema in this article: "You do not need some 350-pound hit man with
a Glock at your front door."

  The upper reaches of the network are a "darknet," hidden behind layers
of security. The sites use a "bounce" to hide their IP address, and
members can log in only from trusted IP addresses already on file. Most
transmissions between sites use heavy-duty encryption. Finally, they
continually change the usernames and passwords required to log in.
Estimates say this media darknet distributes more than half a million
movies every day. It's also, by any reading of the law, a vast criminal
enterprise engaged in wholesale copyright infringement.

  But the Feds are getting smarter. Last spring, the FBI and US
Department of Justice launched a series of raids codenamed Fastlink.
Working with cops in Sweden, the Netherlands, and eight other
countries, the operation seized more than 200 computers. One
confiscated server alone contained 65,000 pirated titles. Fastlink
rubbed out a few topsites, but new ones filled the void. The flow of
illicit games and movies slowed briefly, then resumed. In April,
federal agents interrogated Frank and impounded all his computer
equipment. So far, no charges have been filed. "But the Feds had no
idea about Half-Life," he boasts. "I was never connected to that shit.
If they found out, I'd be in jail."

Bruce Forest, a self-described "elder statesman" in the piracy scene,
started ripping and trading in the ancient days of the late '80s. While
he no longer actively traffics in bootlegged media, he maintains
contacts that give him access to the most exclusive topsites. What the
topsites don't know is that three years ago, Forest came in from the
cold. "Basically, I'm a double agent," he concedes. "Though I don't
fink anyone out. I'm not a cop."

As a consultant for one of the world's largest entertainment companies,
Forest notifies his bosses whenever one of their movies appears on a
topsite. Thanks to his unparalleled access, he enjoys a bird's-eye view
of the scene. And because he's ostensibly on the right side of the law,
he's uncommonly open with information. This makes him an anomaly within
the paranoid byways of the media darknet.

  Forest runs his business from the first floor of his rural Connecticut
home. He's in his mid-40s but moves with jerky, adolescent energy. His
brown hair is in perpetual disarray, and he pads around his office with
bare feet, dressed in cargo shorts and a faded polo. Gold and platinum
albums from his days as a producer at Island Records, MCA, and Arista
line one wall. A baroque array of computer equipment fills the next,
including 13 CPUs and 16 external hard drives (for a total of 3
terabytes of storage). His desk runs the length of the room and
supports five full-size LCD displays. I hear a soft ping. "That tells
me a movie just made its first appearance on a topsite." He points to a
window on the monitor. It shows an innocent-looking list of files from
an FTP site. The uppermost file says, "Hellboy.SCREENER.Proper.READ NFO
PRE VCD." Translation: The DVD of one of the year's biggest box office
hits has been pirated two months before its intended release date. "The
FBI would kill to be sitting here looking at this," he says.

Even first-run movies get ripped. "Remember what happened to The Hulk?"
he asks. On June 6, two weeks before its official release, a near-final
version of The Hulk showed up online. To hear studio executives tell
it, the bootleg went straight to the P2P networks and spread like a
contagion.

"Bullshit," says Forest. "Trying to distribute The Hulk through the
P2Ps would take months, not hours." That's because files on the public
file-sharing networks, where no single node is much more powerful than
the next, spread at a glacial pace. Furthermore, when users connect to
a P2P network - FastTrack, for example - they connect only to a small
proportion of the number of other users connected at the same time. So
unless a topsite seeds a file across the P2P network, the odds are slim
that someone searching for a copy will actually find it.

  Forest pushes a hand through his hair, leaving it standing on end, and
rotates in his Aeron to look me in the eye. "Here's what actually
happened: Universal gave the workprint to its Manhattan ad agency. Then
the print got to SMF. And bam!" SMF, Forest explains, is a piracy group
that specializes in acquiring movies in theatrical release.

Before the folks at SMF could release the movie to a topsite, they had
to compress it - from roughly 9 Gbytes to 700 Mbytes, small enough to
fit on a single CD. Now the film drops. Forest won't say to which
topsite SMF first posted The Hulk, only that "SMF had affiliations with
certain sites, so it must have been one of those."

[snip]

Archives at: <http://Wireless.Com/Dewayne-Net>
Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com>


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From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 30 08:08:13 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 11:08:13 -0500
Subject: The story of Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen--from the KGB's 
  point of view.
Message-ID: <p0611044bbdf9d2254b7d@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.opinionjournal.com/la/?id=110006088>

OpinionJournal

WSJ Online


BOOKSHELF

The Man Who Stole the Secrets
The story of Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen--from the KGB's point of view.

BY EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN
Thursday, December 30, 2004 12:01 a.m. EST

Recently a number of former CIA officers received an invitation from the
Spy Museum in Washington to attend a luncheon for former KGB Col. Victor
Cherkashin. The event, as the invitation said, would afford "a
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to dine and dish with an extraordinary
spymaster." In the heyday of the Cold War, such an offer, delivered with
slightly more discretion, might have been the prelude to a KGB recruitment
operation. Now it's merely the notice for a book party celebrating yet
another memoir by a former KGB officer recounting how the KGB duped the CIA.

 In this case, there is a great deal to tell. Victor Cherkashin served in
the KGB from 1952, when Stalin was still in power, until the Soviet Union
disintegrated in 1991. During most of that time his mission was to organize
KGB operations aimed at undermining the integrity, confidence and morale of
the CIA. He seems to have been good at his job. His big opportunity came
when he was the deputy KGB chief at the Soviet Embassy in Washington
between 1979 and 1985.

 Those years were the height of a ferocious spy war within the Cold War. In
"Spy Handler," Mr. Cherkashin describes in detail how he helped convert two
American counterintelligence officers--one well-placed in the CIA's Soviet
Russia Division, the other in the FBI--into moles. Their names are
notorious now, but over the course of a decade Aldrich Ames and Robert
Hanssen operated with anonymous stealth, compromising most of the CIA's and
FBI's espionage efforts in the Soviet Union.

 But that wasn't the end of Mr. Cherkashin's glory. Returning to Moscow, he
helped run "dangle" operations in which KGB-controlled diplomats feigned a
willingness to be recruited by their American counterparts, only to hand
over disinformation when they were finally "recruited." Thus when the CIA
came around to investigating why its agents were being compromised in
Russia, the KGB sent the CIA a disinformation agent, for example, to paint
false tracks away from its moles. This agent--"Mr. X"--offered to betray
the Soviet Union for $5,000. When the CIA snapped up the bait, Mr. X
pointed it to its own secret communication center in Warrenton, Va.,
falsely claiming that the KGB was electronically intercepting data from its
computers. The purpose, of course, was to divert the agency away from the
mole, who continued betraying CIA secrets for eight more years.
 Told from the KGB's vantage point, Mr. Cherkashin's story provides a
gripping account of its successes in the spy war. He shows Mr. Hanssen to
have been an easily managed and highly productive "penetration" who
operated via the unusual tradecraft of dead drops, leaving material at
designated locations where it could be transferred without spy and handler
ever meeting. (Indeed, the KGB never knew Mr. Hanssen's identity.) Mr.
Ames, for his part, was a more complex case, since he had come under
suspicion and the KGB had to concern itself with throwing the CIA off his
trail. That America's counterespionage apparatus allowed both men to
operate as long as they did is a testament to its complacency as much as to
the KGB's cleverness.

 And indeed, Mr. Cherkashin skillfully torments his former adversary, the
CIA, by attributing a large part of the KGB's success to the incompetence
of the CIA leadership, or its madness. He asserts, in particular, that the
CIA had been "all but paralyzed" by the "paranoia" of James Jesus Angleton,
the CIA's longtime counterintelligence chief, who suspected that the KGB
had planted a mole in the CIA's Soviet Russia division.

 Mr. Cherkashin is right that Mr. Angleton's concern retarded, if not
"paralyzed," CIA operations in Russia. After all, if the CIA was indeed
vulnerable to KGB penetration, as Mr. Angleton believed, it had to assume
that its agents in Russia would be compromised and used for disinformation.
This suspicion would recommend a certain caution or tentativeness, to say
the least. Mr. Cherkashin's taunt about Mr. Angleton's "paranoia" echoed
what was said by Mr. Angleton's critics in the CIA, who resented his
influence, believing that polygraph tests and other security measures
immunized the CIA against such long-term penetration.

 But of course Mr. Angleton was right, too. On Feb. 21, 1994, Mr. Ames, the
CIA officer who had served in the Soviet Russia division, was arrested by
the FBI. He confessed that he had been a KGB mole for almost a decade and
had provided the KGB with secrets that compromised more than 100 CIA
operations in Russia. Mr. Hanssen was caught seven years later.

 Since Mr. Cherkashin had managed the recruitment of Mr. Ames and helped
with that of Mr. Hanssen, his accusation that Mr. Angleton was paranoid for
suspecting the possibility of a mole has the exquisite irony of a stalker
following his victim in order to tell him that he is not being followed.
Mr. Cherkashin adds a further twist by suggesting that Mr. Angleton's
"paranoia" made it easier for the KGB to recruit demoralized CIA officers
as moles. According to this tortured logic, if the CIA--and its
counterintelligence staff--had acted more ostrich-like, by denying the
existence of moles in its ranks, the KGB would never have found Aldrich
Ames or penetrated the agency in other ways.
 Mr. Cherkashin, who received the Order of Lenin for his work against the
CIA, now runs a security company in Moscow. Because his side lost the Cold
War, he is free to travel to Washington to toast his former adversaries
(and present them with autographed copies of "Spy Handler"). The
unauthorized revealing of KGB secrets is against the law in Vladimir
Putin's Russia, and Mr. Cherkashin says that he does not plan to bring out
an edition there. But why not? It's hard to imagine that the authorities
would find much to object to.

Mr. Epstein's "The Big Picture: The New Logic of Money and Power in
Hollywood" will be published in February. You can buy "Spy Handler" from
the OpinionJournal bookstore.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 30 08:29:37 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 11:29:37 -0500
Subject: As Investigations Proliferate, Big Banks Feel Under the Gun
Message-ID: <p06110454bdf9dc7fb881@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110436575482112446,00.html>

The Wall Street Journal

      December 30, 2004

 PAGE ONE


Checking Accounts
 As Investigations Proliferate,
 Big Banks Feel Under the Gun
Links to Cash-Transfer Firms
 Raise Troubling Questions
 About Money Laundering
A Probe of Bank of America

By GLENN R. SIMPSON
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
December 30, 2004; Page A1


NEW YORK -- Until last year, federal prosecutors say, a tiny Brooklyn
ice-cream shop was a vital cog in al Qaeda's global fund-raising operation.

Carnival French Ice Cream sold only the occasional cone from its
ground-floor nook in a four-story walk-up in the Park Slope neighborhood.
Its real function, according to the government, was to move money.

The shop took in $22 million between 1997 and 2003, the Justice Department
alleges in federal court filings in New York. Prosecutors believe that
Carnival diverted much of that money to a radical sheik in Yemen working
with Osama bin Laden. The funds departed New York via the most modern and
efficient method the American financial-services industry has to offer: an
account at J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.

The Carnival case, according to prosecutors, illustrates how since the late
1990s, major U.S. banks doing business with suspect money-transfer outfits
like the Brooklyn shop have wired billions of dollars into and out of New
York for suspected terrorist and criminal organizations. One
Yemeni-American man has been convicted of lying to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in the Carnival probe, and three others await trial on
money-laundering and related charges.

Prosecutors haven't accused J.P. Morgan Chase of wrongdoing related to
Carnival. But the bank and some of its major rivals now find themselves in
law enforcement's cross hairs, as regulators and prosecutors crack down on
what they say is widespread abuse in the $50 billion international
money-transfer industry.

Bank executives say they are being asked to bear a heavy burden in seeking
to root out criminals who use them to move money. The executives say they
are avidly trying to comply, but the authorities counter that the industry
must do even more. One unintended consequence of this friction is that
banks are simply dropping many small money-transfer businesses as clients,
a move that could hurt millions of poor immigrants who send cash to
relatives overseas.

All of this activity is taking place in the shadow of sensational
revelations earlier this year about how Riggs National Corp., a storied
institution in Washington, for years failed to make required reports to
regulators about hundreds of millions of dollars in suspicious
transactions. The Riggs affair involved transactions by foreign officials.
But as with some cases involving storefront money-transmitters, Riggs was
shown to have failed to sound an alarm over large and seemingly dubious
money movements.

Now, Robert Morgenthau, the local district attorney in Manhattan, has
threatened to indict Bank of America Corp. on money-laundering charges
related to a suspect Latin American firm, according to federal
law-enforcement officials who have been briefed on the matter. Mr.
Morgenthau, in an interview, acknowledges that he is talking with the bank
over how to resolve allegations that it transferred hundreds of millions of
dollars for a Uruguayan money-transmitting business linked to drug
trafficking, tax fraud and other financial crimes.

Bank of America spokeswoman Shirley Norton says it "does not comment on its
relations with customers or communications with regulators and law
enforcement." She adds that the bank takes its anti-money-laundering
responsibilities "extremely seriously," and is "routinely cooperating and
partnering with law enforcement to investigate and help prosecute any
individuals who might attempt to misuse our banking operations."

Shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress toughened
requirements on banks to investigate their own customers and alert the
government to fishy activity. But a spate of recent fines, criminal
investigations and prosecutions is raising questions about how effectively
banks are fulfilling their role as front-line cops in the offensive against
financial impropriety.

In May, regulators imposed a $25 million fine on Riggs for its lapses; a
federal criminal investigation is pending. In October, AmSouth Bancorp. of
Birmingham, Ala., agreed to a pay $50 million in penalties for what federal
banking regulators and prosecutors say was a breakdown in its
money-laundering controls. And in November, The Wall Street Journal
reported that Bank of New York Co. is negotiating with federal prosecutors
to pay a fine of perhaps $24 million to avert a potential criminal
indictment on charges that it failed to report suspicious activity at one
of its branches. Bank of New York escaped criminal penalty in 2000 when a
former executive and her husband pleaded guilty to laundering as much as $5
billion in suspect funds from Russia in the 1990s.

Some banking executives say that the government underestimated the
challenges of outsourcing to the industry so much of an expensive and
unpopular task. Simultaneously executing and scrutinizing trillions of
dollars in daily transactions, the executives argue, is a profound
logistical challenge.

By analogy, says William McDavid, general counsel at J.P. Morgan Chase,
"think if you're running a railroad, and we say to you, 'We want you to
monitor everyone who takes your train and see if their trip is
legitimate.' " Still, he says J.P. Morgan Chase is spending tens of
millions of dollars to comply with the law, adding in-house lawyers and
accountants and new computer software for self-monitoring.

Regulators say they appreciate the logistical challenges banks face, but
they note that this year's big cases aren't instances of banks missing an
occasional check. Rather, banks seem to have ignored numerous transactions
that should have raised red flags. Senior executives of Riggs, for
instance, overlooked huge cash transactions by Saudi diplomats whom
American law enforcement suspects of channeling money to extremist Islamic
causes.

The Bank Secrecy Act requires banks to keep basic data on account holders
-- such as the identities of all beneficial owners and their sources of
income -- and to file reports with the government when they do anything
defined by federal regulators as inherently "suspicious," such as the
wiring of large sums by obscure companies in jurisdictions with notoriously
weak regulation. The act also requires banks to report any cash transaction
of $10,000 or more.

Even after Congress toughened the law, ambiguities remain. The USA Patriot
Act, enacted in late 2001, added a new requirement that banks give more
scrutiny to "high risk" customers. But it is unclear precisely what that
term means. Similarly, the law was changed to require banks to conduct
"special due diligence" on certain foreign financial firms with which they
do business. But it isn't clear, American banks say, whether that applies
only to foreign banks or also to overseas money-transfer companies.

Morgenthau Probe

INDUSTRY UNDER SCRUTINY Some major cases from 2004 that raise questions
about banks' self-policing:

* Riggs: Fined $25 million for failing to alert regulators to hundreds of
millions of dollars of suspicious transfers involving foreign officials; a
criminal investigation is pending.
 
* J.P. Morgan Chase: Transferred millions of dollars for a Brooklyn
ice-cream shop that allegedly sent money to an al Qaeda ally in Yemen; the
bank wasn't prosecuted.
 
* Bank of America: Under investigation in New York for its alleged role in
transferring funds for a money transmitter in Uruguay purportedly tied to
the narcotics trade; other major banks could be drawn into the case.
 
* Bank of New York: Negotiating with federal prosecutors to pay a fine of
perhaps $24 million to avert a potential criminal indictment on charges
that it failed to report suspicious activity at one of its branches.
 
* AmSouth: Agreed to pay $50 million in penalties for what federal banking
regulators and prosecutors say was a breakdown in its money-laundering
controls.
 
* ABN Amro: New York branch of Dutch banking giant reached an agreement
with the Federal Reserve in July to overhaul its compliance operation and
shed its ties to banks in Eastern Europe and Russia; Treasury and Justice
department inquiries are pending.

Source: WSJ research

In the Bank of America investigation, Mr. Morgenthau, the veteran Manhattan
district attorney, says the bank has transferred hundreds of millions of
dollars for a money transmitter in Uruguay called Lespan SA and its
affiliates. The prosecutor and federal officials familiar with the matter
say they suspect the money has come from Colombian drug trafficking and
other criminal activity.

Alvaro Barriero, an official at Lespan subsidiary Gales Casa Cambio in
Montevideo, says Lespan hasn't engaged in any illegal activity. The firm
has a very active legal-compliance department, he says.

The Bank of America investigation could get much broader and sweep in other
major banks as well. A related local prosecution earlier this year -- in
which Mr. Morgenthau's office obtained the conviction of a New York money
transmitter operating without a license -- yielded a mountain of data about
wire transfers involving Lespan by Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase,
Citigroup Inc. and Wachovia Corp. Mr. Morgenthau's staff is now reviewing
transactions related to all four banks.

At The Wall Street Journal's request, the data-analysis firm I2 Inc.
examined the wire transfers from the New York case, more than 300,000
transactions between 1997 and early 2003. The analysis found that the four
banks, among others, moved hundreds of millions of dollars between New York
and Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil at the behest of obscure firms in the
British Virgin Islands, a well-known financial-secrecy haven.

"It's a matter of major concern that there was this gap in our supervision
and control" of the financial system, Mr. Morgenthau says.

According to American and Brazilian officials, much of the money appears to
have come from a lawless enclave known as the Tri-Border Area, a free-trade
zone on the borders of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. The officials say
the area is dominated by organized criminal groups, including narcotics
traffickers and people raising money -- by means of smuggling and copyright
piracy -- for the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah. American and
Brazilian investigators are looking at whether the big banks made an effort
to determine how small firms in Uruguay and Paraguay could possibly have
taken in so much cash from legitimate commerce. The investigators are also
examining whether the banks inquired into the ownership of the British
Virgin Islands companies.

Brazilian Investigation

The Brazilian government jointly is investigating political corruption, tax
evasion and other alleged financial crimes involving Lespan. In connection
with its probe, Brazilian officials have sent a 100-page document to the
U.S. Justice Department, seeking assistance from American investigators.
The Brazilian document confirms major aspects of the Journal's computer
analysis of the more than 300,000 wire transfers that came to light in the
local New York case. The Brazilian document, which became publicly
available through filings in U.S. federal courts, names Wachovia and
several other banks as conduits for Lespan.

The Journal's analysis of the evidence introduced in the local New York
case provides only a sampling of this complex set of bank relationships
with Lespan. The analysis shows that Lespan used Citigroup's Citibank unit
to move nearly $142 million to New York. Wachovia wired at least $38
million into and out of Lespan's operations in South America. Lespan relied
on Bank of America to move at least $8.8 million, the records show. All
told, the analysis of the records shows that Lespan used major banks to
move at least $265 million between the U.S. and Latin America.

J.P. Morgan Chase spokeswoman Judith Miller says, "Preventing money
laundering is one of the highest priorities at J.P. Morgan Chase."
Citigroup stopped doing business with Lespan in 2001 after detecting
possible money-laundering, according to bank records and people familiar
with the matter. A spokeswoman for Wachovia, Mary Eshet, says the bank has
strong policies to prevent money laundering. She declines to comment
further.

Dropping Transmitters

Big banks are scrambling to beef up their internal compliance staffs and
acquire the latest software designed to flag suspicious transactions. One
industry reaction that caught the government by surprise is that some banks
are hastily ridding themselves of many of their money-transmitter clients.
That threatens to hurt the money-transfer industry, which mainly serves the
working immigrant poor.

In a letter distributed this fall, Citibank informed money transmitters
that they are "no longer considered a part of our target market." The
letter gave recipients two weeks to find a new bank.

Transmitters charge a fee to move funds for people who generally don't have
bank accounts. The firms depend upon banks to carry out the transfers -- a
mutually lucrative arrangement -- and have long operated with little
regulation, making them vulnerable to exploitation by criminals and
terrorists. It was only after it became known that the Sept. 11, 2001, plot
was financed in large part through such transmitters that they were
targeted by regulators.

The largest money-transmitting companies, such as Western Union, a unit of
First Data Corp., have compliance units and elaborate surveillance systems.
Even with those protections, Western Union has come under closer scrutiny
by regulators. A majority of the industry consists of small independent
outfits that generally don't have much in the way of internal policing. The
industry exports a total of more than $20 billion from the U.S. every year.

Government officials are worried now that if money transferers can't go to
banks, they will only be more likely to seek illegal methods of shipping
cash. "It does no one any good if banks refuse to take these businesses --
that just encourages them to go underground," William Fox, the director of
the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, said in a
statement. "A transparent money-services sector is vital to the health of
the world's economy."

David Landsman, executive director of the National Money Transmitters
Association, said in a recent letter to his members that he has warned U.S.
officials that up to 75% of the check-cashing and transfer firms in New
York could soon go out of business. Mr. Landsman says in an interview that
nearly all transmitters are legitimate and that they play a vital role in
providing cash to developing economies. Without them, immigrant workers
will be forced to pay much higher bank fees to wire money home, he predicts.

Yemeni Connection

Prosecutors have alleged that Carnival French Ice Cream was primarily an
unlicensed money-transmission operation for Yemeni immigrants. Between
Sept. 11, 2001, and last year, when it was shut down, the shop allegedly
moved at least $5.3 million out of the country through J.P. Morgan Chase.
Some of that money came from charitable collections at mosques.

Yet, according to J.P. Morgan Chase officials, there was little about
Carnival that generated suspicion. In Park Slope, neighbors say the
business fit right in with a pizza parlor, a cellphone store, a laundromat
and other small shops on an ethnically mixed block.

The firm opened its first account in 1982 with Manufacturer's Hanover,
which was later acquired by Chase Manhattan, which merged with J.P. Morgan.
Over the years, Yemeni immigrants associated with Carnival set up a series
of at least 10 other accounts at various other New York banks in the names
of other small businesses, such as Prospect Deli in Brooklyn. Funds then
flowed among the accounts, creating the appearance of a network of small
businesses, perhaps jointly owned by a group of immigrant entrepreneurs, as
is common in some big cities.

In reality, the government alleges, the other accounts were "feeder
accounts" designed to avoid suspiciously large deposits into Carnival's
primary Morgan account. These feeder accounts generally made deposits to
Carnival's account below the $10,000 level that triggers a report to the
federal government.

Once channeled into the main Carnival account, the money was wired to Yemen
and other countries. But the feeders were a fraud, the FBI alleges in
filings in U.S. District Court in Brooklyn. Prospect Deli, the FBI says,
pumped some $3.8 million into Carnival's J.P. Morgan Chase account from
December 1997 to April 2003, even though the deli went out of business in
2000.

While Carnival allegedly tried to hide its activity from the bank, an FBI
agent involved in the case described in an arrest-warrant affidavit a
number of "suspicious banking activities" for an account controlled by the
ice-cream shop. The store's gross receipts from merchandise sales totaled
less than $200,000 annually, FBI Agent Sharon Hassell said in the April
2003 sworn statement. Yet millions were wire-transferred out of its J.P
Morgan Chase account "to a myriad of individuals, companies and foreign
bank accounts, including banks in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the United Arab
Emirates, Canada, Thailand and China."

J.P. Morgan Chase officials say they never suspected Carnival. They point
out that on an average day, the bank processes more than 320,000 wire
payments valued at nearly $2.3 trillion.

By the end of 2005, J. P. Morgan Chase says it will have spent more than
$20 million on improved transaction-monitoring systems and software. In the
future, the bank's new protections will detect and flag customers like
Carnival, bank officials say.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Thu Dec 30 12:41:27 2004
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 12:41:27 -0800
Subject: Dept Homeland Security Research Conference in Boston, April  
  27-28
Message-ID: <6.0.3.0.0.20041230123640.03a7f238@pop.idiom.com>

Not sure what mailing list this came from, but the DHS is running
a shindig in Boston in April, if anybody wants to drop by.
I've de-MIME-ified it, so it may be a bit harder to read.


From: DHS Homeland Security Conference [mailto:anzentech at app.topica.com]
Sent: Wednesday, December 29, 2004 5:45 PM
Subject: Conference for Public/Private R&D Partnerships in Homeland
Security, CFP

Dear Colleague,
You are invited to participate in this inaugural, must-attend, national
event, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and
Technology Directorate, scheduled for April 27 & 28, 2005 in Boston, to
encourage public-private partnering among scientists and engineers from
government, national laboratories, universities, research institutes, and
private sector firms investing in R&D.  Private sector and university-based
scientists can benefit from the technologies and technical approaches
developed and deployed by the national and DHS labs.  The laboratories in
turn can explore leveraging opportunities with leading private sector and
university-based research programs.
Please take a moment to consider submitting a paper presenting your
research at this conference. If you cannot submit a paper, attend and learn
what others are doing and how you can work with them. We are also seeking
conference cosponsors and exhibitors from both public and private sector
organizations. Visit the conference web site,
www.homelandsecurityresearchconference.org
<http://anzentech.c.topica.com/maac1jvabcT5eaIcCidcadIdN1/> , for more
details often. It is constantly being updated.


Working Together: Conference on Public/Private R&D Partnerships in Homeland
Security
Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science & Technology
Directorate
         April 27 & 28, 2005
         The Seaport Hotel and World Trade Center
         Boston, Massachusetts, USA

Call for Technical Papers
The First Annual Working Together: Conference on Public/Private Research &
Development (R&D) Partnerships in Homeland Security

This two-day Conference will focus on state-of-the-art science and
technology to anticipate, prevent, respond to, and recover from
high-consequence chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives
and cyber terrorist threats. The conference will also address protection of
the nation's critical infrastructure, and the harnessing of science and
intelligence to reduce threat and risk.
The objectives of this inaugural event are to encourage public-private
partnering among scientists and engineers from government, national
laboratories, universities and research institutes, and private sector
firms investing in R&D, to address the collective science and technology
research goals of the U.S. homeland security community. Private sector and
university-based scientists can benefit from the technologies and technical
approaches developed and deployed by the national and DHS labs.  The
laboratories in turn can explore leveraging opportunities with leading
private sector and university-based research programs.

Through plenary and breakout sessions, posters and a companion Exhibition
Conference Participants will:
7  learn about DHS awareness, countermeasures and response and recovery
goals;
7  address the most pressing technical challenges;
7  identify the most critical knowledge gaps;
7  be introduced to the core capabilities of national and DHS laboratories,
and the Departments university-based homeland security centers; and

Background
DHS is committed to science and technology leadership, and the creation of
an enduring national capability for homeland security.  Toward this end,
the DHS S&T Directorate supports and recognizes technical excellence in
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) of homeland security
technologies; encourages collaborations and partnerships among RDT&E
performers across the homeland security science and technology complex;
actively disseminates knowledge generated through the execution of RDT&E
programs and university-based homeland security centers; and to the
greatest extent practical, enhances visibility and recognition of
scientists and engineers dedicated to homeland security missions.

Technical Topics
We are seeking papers on the following topics:
7  Threat Characterization for:  Chemical, Biological, Radiological /
Nuclear, Conventional Explosives (CBRNE)
7  Threat and Vulnerability Assessment including:  Knowledge Discovery
(Semantic Graphs), Technology-based Emerging Threats (e.g., terrorist
exploitation of advances in nanotechnology and biotechnology), Advanced
Risk Modeling, Simulation and Analysis for Decision Support, Modeling and
Simulation (Cognition and Behavior), Discrete Sciences, Visual Analytics
7  Sensors including: Performance Improvement, Next-Generation Designs, and
Architecture for Devices and Systems
7  Forensics and Attribution for Chemical and Biological Events
7  Chemical Countermeasures Including:  Detection (TICs and TIMs),
Surveillance/Detection (Low Volatility/Chemical Warfare Agents)
7  Biological Countermeasures including:  Agricultural Security,
Surveillance (Situational Awareness)
7  Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures including:  Passive and Active
Detection
7  Explosives Detection including: Bulk and Trace Detection and Nanosensors
7  Methods to Disarm/Defeat Conventional Explosives
7  Critical Infrastructure Protection and Cyber Security
including:  Addressing Insider Threat, Large Scale Situational Awareness
7  Post-Event Recovery and Restoration from events involving the use of
chemical and biological agents and nuclear and radioactive materials (e.g.,
improvised nuclear devices and radiological dispersion devices).

Information and Important Dates
Abstracts should be submitted in MS Word and limited to a maximum of 250
words. On the same page, the author(s) title, name, address, phone, fax,
email and organization affiliation must be submitted. In addition, a
maximum of 100-word biography of the presenting author is required on a
separate page.
Electronic versions of abstracts and papers should be submitted via the
conference website. Detailed instructions about the electronic submission
process will be published on the website. All electronic submissions will
be acknowledged via email.
         Abstract deadline:                        February 7, 2005
         Speaker Notification:                     March 1, 2005
         Final Paper Deadline:                  At the Conference
For more information on the First Annual National Homeland Security R&D
Conference, please refer to website:
www.homelandsecurityresearchconference.org

Call for Sponsors and Exhibitors
We are seeking conference cosponsors and exhibitors from public and private
sector organizations.
For more information on sponsorship opportunities, please email:
dhsconferencesponsorships at anzentechpartners.com
<mailto:dhsconferencesponsorships at anzentechpartners.com> .
For more information on exhibit opportunities, please email
dhsconferenceexhibits at anzentechpartners.com
<mailto:dhsconferenceexhibits at anzentechpartners.com> .

Call for Preliminary Registration
If you are interested in attending this conference, please email us at
dhsconference at anzentechpartners.com
<mailto:dhsconference at anzentechpartners.com> . To make sure you receive our
notices, please configure your spam filter to accept this email address.

Conference Organizer
DHS S&T - The Department of Homeland Securitys Science and Technology
Directorate is the primary research and development arm of the
Department.  It provides Federal, state, and local officials with the
technology and capabilities to protect the homeland.



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----
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From dave at farber.net  Thu Dec 30 11:30:27 2004
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 14:30:27 -0500
Subject: [IP] more on  The Shadow Internet
Message-ID: <mailman.1128.1576007654.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


------ Forwarded Message
From: Marc <marcaniballi at hotmail.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 14:27:05 -0500
To: <dave at farber.net>
Subject: RE: [IP] The Shadow Internet

Dear Dave;

I find the entire piece to be rather amusing and I wonder if the source
isn't a card carrying neo-conservative. The concept of these "dark nets"
terrorizing anyone is ridiculous. Terrorism is the act of instilling extreme
and usually generalized fear, and consequent action (or inaction) in an
enemy/oppressor through excessive and/or seemingly random acts of violence
usually involving significant loss of "innocent" life.

What is the motivation of these "pirates?" It certainly isn't "booty;" They
won't be getting rich by ripping and broadcasting media! It seems to me
(having absolutely no direct personal experience of this corner of the net),
that these folks do it to simply prove it can be done, and to prove they can
do it better and faster. It strikes me that this makes it very difficult to
eliminate this type of network. The usual methodology for crime syndicate
elimination involves finding the money flow and stopping it and following it
upstream - here however, there is no money flow! And since the community is
very closed, highly distributed and has the best tech a "crime" syndicate
could ask for, it becomes somewhat more problematic, especially introducing
jurisdiction issues that can in some cases render the activity innocuous to
local law!

Cutting off the head of these broadcast networks is impossible - they are
hydralike, and when you take out one head, the others instantly become
immune to the previous style of attack.

I have long subscribed to the concept that "soft piracy" shows the world an
inefficiency that is impeding progress/evolution. In the 80s it was software
piracy; the message? Too expensive and not useful enough! In western society
this problem is being addressed fairly well, and piracy of software such as
Windows (ignoring counterfeiters who resell, etc.) is more of a recreational
sport than a serious impact on Microsoft. In the emerging economies piracy
is still rampant, and will be until the average person can easily
afford/justify the expense. Now, in the media world with CDs and DVDs, we
have a similar situation. A VHS tape of a new release movie was $20 and a
vinyl LP was $12 20 years ago. The technology has improved (one can hope!!)
and volume is high enough to allow for scale economy to kick in - why are
DVDs still $30+ and CDs $20+ ?!! Same game, different industry - possibly a
more insidious game this time, because with software one can plainly see
increasing capability with decreasing/static prices as a general trend - not
so with media. (Recent developments such as iTunes aside).

In my opinion, modern soft piracy is a necessary component to technological,
commercial and social evolution - so long as it is the type of piracy that
is founded on fun, not profit.

Regards,


Marc Aniballi


-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ip at v2.listbox.com [mailto:owner-ip at v2.listbox.com] On Behalf Of
David Farber
Sent: December 30, 2004 1:14 PM
To: Ip
Subject: [IP] more on The Shadow Internet

I strongly agree but don't think it is just poor use of words, It has a very
specific use and aim which is NOT nice.

Dave
------ Forwarded Message
From: Rich Kulawiec <rsk at gsp.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 11:33:25 -0500
To: David Farber <dave at farber.net>
Cc: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne at warpspeed.com>
Subject: Re: [IP] The Shadow Internet

On Thu, Dec 30, 2004 at 10:41:33AM -0500, David Farber quoted:

> Inside the pirate networks that are terrorizing the entertainment
business.

Please.  I would like to suggest that anyone who uses the words stemming
from "terror" in any context which does _not_ involve death, injury,
torture, rape, etc. be repeatedly pummeled upside the head with a copy of
the closest available unabridged dictionary -- preferably wielded by someone
who has been an actual victim of actual terror and thus has a clue what it
means.

---Rsk

------ End of Forwarded Message


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______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

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From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 30 11:54:03 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 14:54:03 -0500
Subject: eBay Dumps Passport, Microsoft Calls It Quits
Message-ID: <p061104afbdfa0a4c74c7@[68.167.57.91]>

<http://www.techweb.com/article/printableArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=IUVVYXUECEG4MQSNDBGCKHSCJUMEKJVN?articleID=56800077&site_section=700029>


 eBay Dumps Passport, Microsoft Calls It Quits
 By TechWeb News
 December 30, 2004 (12:51 PM EST)
 URL:  http://www.techweb.com/wire/ebiz/56800077

Another Online auction site eBay announced Wednesday that it will soon drop
support for Microsoft's Passport for log-in to the site and discontinuing
alerts sent via Microsoft's .Net alerts. Microsoft responded by saying that
it will stop marketing Passport to sites outside its own stable.

 As of late January, eBay will no longer display the Passport button on
sign-in pages nor allow users to log in using their Passport accounts.
Instead, members must log-in directly through eBay.

 Likewise, eBay's dumping .Net alerts, which means that eBay customers who
want to receive alerts -- for such things as auction closings, outbids, and
auction wins -- will have to make other arrangements. The free-of-charge
eBay Toolbar, for instance, can be used to set up alerts going to the
desktop, while alerts to phones, PDAs, or pagers can be created from the
user's My eBay page.

 eBay was one of the first to jump on the Passport bandwagon in 2001, but
is only the latest site to leap off. Job search site Monster.com, for
instance, dropped Passport in October.

 Microsoft has decided to stop marketing its sign-on service to other Web
sites, the Los Angeles Times confirmed Thursday. The pull-back, which had
been long predicted by various analysts, follows a stormy life for
Passport, which among other things, suffered a pair of security breakdowns
in the summer of 2003 that could have led to hackers stealing users' IDs.

 Microsoft also pulled its  online directory of sites using Passport --
perhaps because the list would have been depressingly short -- stating in
the online notice that "We have discontinued our Site Directory, but you'll
know when you can use your Passport to make sign-in easier. Just look for
the .NET Passport Sign In button!"

 Passport will continue to be the sign-on service for various Microsoft
properties, including the Hotmail e-mail service and MSN.com.


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From gbroiles at GMAIL.COM  Thu Dec 30 16:19:51 2004
From: gbroiles at GMAIL.COM (Greg Broiles)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 16:19:51 -0800
Subject: [CYBERIA] On-line Purchase Denied
Message-ID: <mailman.1129.1576007654.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

On Thu, 30 Dec 2004 17:04:45 -0600, Mikus Grinbergs <mikus at bga.com> wrote:
> For the second time in a month, I've had an on-line purchase
> denied.  When I ask my credit card company, they say the
> refusal did not originate with them.  And when I ask the
> merchant, they say they have contracted out the credit
> verification, and do not know what criteria are being used.
>
> The only potential explanation that I can think of is that
> my e-mail address points to an ALIAS of my ISP.  Thus if
> the credit verification process attempts to reverse-lookup
> the (DYNAMIC!!) IP-address I used in requesting the purchase,
> the domain-name returned for that IP-address would not match
> the e-mail domain-name I told the merchant.  [But that *is*
> my correct e-mail address;  I've used it for many years in
> making many many on-line purchases.]
>
> Being told in effect "you're not good enough to buy from us"
> seems a strange approach towards gaining new customers.

But from the merchant's perspective, it's very difficult to know
whether or not you're a customer, or a thief.

Admittedly, that's not a very friendly posture to adopt relative to
new business.

However, if you're trying to buy something physical that the merchant
is supposed to ship, a failed transaction is much worse than no
transaction. If a bad guy orders something with a bad credit card
number, and it gets shipped, the merchant is out-of-pocket for their
wholesale cost for the item, order processing costs, shipping costs, a
chargeback fee from their credit card processor, and a bunch of
administrative time spent dealing with the bad order. (And, if you
want to be really picky, they also may have lost the profit they'd
have made if they were able to sell the same item to a real customer,
if the item is in short supply.)

If the order never happens, they haven't lost a thing - and, worst
case, return the unsold merchanidse to their supplier, or sell it at a
reduced price. That's a lot better than the outcome described above.

The credit card payment system is set up so that the selling merchant
loses if the transaction fails. (It is theoretically possible for them
to shift the risk onto the bank(s) involved - but the rules to be
followed are complicated enough, and burdensome enough, that it's
easier to conceptualize them as "merchant loses".)

Thus, merchants become relatively conservative about the transactions
they'll accept - they might refuse a transaction if the source IP for
the transaction doesn't seem reasonable relative to the shipping
address, if the shipping address doesn't match the card's billing
address, if the buyer can't provide the three-digit verification code
printed on the back of the credit card, or if the shipping address is
to a country known for being the source of a lot of fraudulent
activity. This makes life difficult for honest people in those
countries to order things over the Internet - but the current setup
also makes life difficult for honest people to sell things without
getting screwed.

So far, there's no easy answer, either. You could look at transaction
systems where the risk of failure is allocated to the buyer, not the
merchant, such as E-gold; or systems such as Paypal, where there's an
intermediary who attempts to police everyone's behavior to make
transactions work reasonably. (although those attempts are imperfect,
like most things in this world.)

This difficulty is an unavoidable consequence of legislation intended
to, ironically, protect consumers - primarily the body of federal
legislation controlling consumer credit and consumer debt collection,
together with the FTC's regulations implementing the same. If a
merchant believes that the cost of failure multiplied by the
likelihood of failure is greater than the expected profit on the
transaction, they'll decline to enter into the transaction.

If you change the rules so that consumers and vendors can contract
around the rules allocating risk, then riskier transactions are
economically feasible, but bad things will happen, and sometimes they
will happen to innocent consumers who will complain to their
legislators .. and so on.

--
Greg Broiles, JD, EA
gbroiles at gmail.com (Lists only. Not for confidential communications.)
Law Office of Gregory A. Broiles
San Jose, CA


**********************************************************************
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Off-Topic threads: http://www.lawlists.net/mailman/listinfo/cyberia-ot
Need more help? Send mail to: Cyberia-L-Request at listserv.aol.com
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--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mv at cdc.gov  Thu Dec 30 18:02:21 2004
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 18:02:21 -0800
Subject: [IP] Cell phones for eavesdropping 
Message-ID: <41D4B32D.DE3414D6@cdc.gov>

>From: Gadi Evron <ge at linuxbox.org>
>Subject: Cell phones for eavesdropping - finally some public "chatter"

Of course, the low-budget govt snoops go for the basestations
and landline links.

The pending cell phone virus which calls 911 should be a real hoot.

I wonder if cell virii can carry a voice payload which they can
inject as well.  Or do we have to wait a few (viral) generations
for that?




From dave at farber.net  Thu Dec 30 16:53:48 2004
From: dave at farber.net (David Farber)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 19:53:48 -0500
Subject: [IP] more on The Shadow Internet
Message-ID: <mailman.1130.1576007654.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>


------ Forwarded Message
From: Joel M Snyder <Joel.Snyder at Opus1.COM>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 17:18:55 -0700
To: <dave at farber.net>
Cc: Ip <ip at v2.listbox.com>, <dpaull at svpal.org>
Subject: Re: [IP] more on The Shadow Internet

> Is it really possible that the government is unable to identify
> the topsites and find out which servers connect to them?

It's harder than you might think.  Let's say you have some person who
you think is A Bad Guy.  If they're a US person, and you're USG, then
you can probably get their ISP to let you tap their wires.  After you go
to a judge.

OK, so that's fine, except that everything they do is encrypted.  We
can't decrypt that (wrong part of the USG), but fortunately the IP
address is not encrypted.

So that leads us off to some OTHER ISP.  Let's, for the sake of
argument, assume that the ISP is in the US.  Now USG treks over to that
ISP and says "we want to peek."  The ISP says "no," of course, so USG
goes back to Judge and gets a warrant and ISP (if you're lucky) suddenly
becomes cooperative.  Except that the server is one of ten thousand
piece-o-junk Linux boxes that some hosting company stuck in the data
center which they sell web sites off at $2.50/month and so the best
thing the ISP can do is point you at the box and disclose who is paying
the bill.

OK, go back to the judge, go back to the hosting company that owns the
boxes and say "show us."  The hosting company says, "that system is
being rented by a light bulb distributor out of Reno." (I'm putting them
in the US to make things easier, OK?)  The hosting company passes over
the passwords, the USG logs in (MAYBE or maybe not) and assuming that
they don't screw it up (MAYBE or maybe not) they discover that the light
bulb distributor has no idea what the hell is going on except that they
used to pay $2.50 a month and now they're about to get a $1300 bandwidth
bill, which they're going to take out of their system administrator's
salary for using 'p4ssword' as the password.

Anyway, enough of this easy stuff: now the trail gets interesting---the
logs show that the connections to this box come from Canada.  No, let's
make it Korea.  So what is Mr. G-man going to do?  Yeah, he'll send off
a couple of email messages which will either (a) get ignored or (b) get
response telling him to get a Korean search warrant.

And then it stops, because Mr. G-man ain't got no Korean judge and he
ain't got no budget to go over to Korea and plead his case.

But let's say that he does.  By this time, the trail is so cold that the
logs are gone (if there were any logs in the first place, which there
generally are not), and now he's got to go back to Step 1, or maybe Step
2 or Step 3 but this time he's got to find a German judge or an Italian
judge and so on and so on...

Now, if the money were REALLY big and the problem were REALLY
aggravating and this was the "once a year case that we want to send out
press releases on," maybe he'd get some budget to deal with this.  But
they seem to do this about once a year, maybe twice if there's an
election.  Fundamentally, though, without someone driving the
investigation via major powerful and highly funded friends in
Washington, it's not going to happen.

The existence of large piles of bandwidth concentrated in very large
rooms which have thousands of poorly protected servers in them across at
least 5 continents means that without really trying very hard the folks
who want to keep things a secret are able to do that, simply by being
mobile, IP-wise, finding new systems to hack into (trivial), and keeping
  redundant piles of data around.  With a very small amount of care, you
could hide your steps from all but the best funded and most persistent
of investigators.

And what might be interesting to Wired and its readers probably doesn't
match the drugs-and-terrorism program at the Dep't of Justice.

I've got people ONE hop away from me who WANT to cooperate but cannot
produce the necessary logs to even point at who the bad guys are that
are breaking into their machines.

jms

--
Joel M Snyder, 1404 East Lind Road, Tucson, AZ, 85719
Phone: +1 520 324 0494 (voice)  +1 520 324 0495 (FAX)
jms at Opus1.COM    http://www.opus1.com/jms    Opus One


------ End of Forwarded Message


-------------------------------------
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To manage your subscription, go to
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______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From rah at shipwright.com  Thu Dec 30 17:37:28 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 20:37:28 -0500
Subject: [CYBERIA] On-line Purchase Denied
Message-ID: <p061104f0bdfa5db0009d@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text



From juicy at melontraffickers.com  Fri Dec 31 04:28:32 2004
From: juicy at melontraffickers.com (A.Melon)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 04:28:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: happy newyear's eve
Message-ID: <5d7a5367a33651cae734dd0d58fe03d8@melontraffickers.com>

Angleton, James Hugh	ssdi	215-50-2639	1888-12-05	1973-04	NCR businessman, former Col., wife Carmen Mercedes Moreno, Boise, ID
Angleton, James Jesus	unres		1917-12-09	1987-05-11	CIA/OSS, possibly b. 1918- Col. James Hugh Angleton, Carmen Mercedes Moreno, Boise, ID
Asimov, Isaac	ssdi	055-24-6410	1920-01-02	1992-04-06	author, source of the laws of robotics
Bissell, Richard Mervin	ssdi	129-10-9645	1909-10-18	1994-02-15	CIA
Boggs, Thomas Hale, Sr.	missing	433-01-1763	1914-02-15	1972-10-16	congressperson
Bulger, James Joseph "Whitey"	missing				a.k.a. Thomas Baxter; mob, Winter Hill Gang
Casey, William James	ssdi	130-12-7576	1913-03-13	1987-05-06	CIA
Colby, William Egan	ssdi	577-28-7679	1920-01-04	1996-04-27	CIA
Connally, John Bowden	ssdi	466-03-9768	1917-02-27	1993-06-15	TX Governor; hit during JFK assassination
Cooper, John Sherman	ssdi	361-09-8366	1901-08-23	1991-02-21	senator; warren commission
Crick, Francis Harry Compton	unres		1916-06-08	2004-07-28	co-discoverer of DNA
Cunanan, Andrew Phillip	unres		1969-08-31	1997-07-23	murdered Gianni Versace
Deming, William Edwards	ssdi	085-26-4468	1900-10-14	1993-12-20	production/management expert
Dick, Philip Kindred	ssdi	550-38-3080	1928-12-16	1982-03-02	writer, sci-fi
Dijkstra, Edsger Wybe	ssdi	459-67-5076	1930-05-11	2002-08-06	computer scientist
Dirac, Paul Adrien Maurice	ssdi	153-36-3061	1902-08-08	1984-10-20	founder of quantum mechanics
Disney, Walter "Walt"	ssdi	562-10-0296	1901-12-05	1966-12-15	inventor
Donovan, William Joseph	pre-ss		1883-01-01	1959-02-08	lawyer, OSS
Dulles, Allen Welsh	ssdi	086-28-2350	1893-04-07	1969-01-29	CIA; warren commission
Eisenhower, Dwight David "Ike"	ssdi	572-64-0315	1890-10-14	1969-03-28	president
Feynman, Richard Phillips	ssdi	098-03-1009	1918-05-11	1988-02-15	physicist
Forrestal, James Vincent	pre-ss		1892-02-15	1949-05-22	first Secretary of Defense, suicide
Foster, Vincent Walker, Jr.	ssdi	429-80-1132	1945-01-15	1993-07-20	lawyer
Geisel, Theodor Seuss	ssdi	552-38-5014	1904-03-02	1991-09-24	Dr. Seuss
Genovese, Catherine "Kitty"	unres		1935	1964-03-13	murder victim
Giancana, Sam "Momo"	ssdi	326-18-6902	1908-05-24	1975-06-19	mafia, possible CIA assassination (ssdi: b. 06-15)
Harris, Eric	ssdi	284-82-1478	1981-04-09	1999-04-20	Columbine
Helms, Richard McGarrah	ssdi	317-01-6292	1913-03-30	2002-10-23	CIA
Herbert, Frank Patrick	ssdi	549-26-9691	1920-10-08	1986-02-11	writer, sci-fi
Hiss, Alger	ssdi	087-32-7727	1904-11-11	1996-11-15	KGB spy
Hoffa, James Riddle "Jimmy"	missing		1913-02-14	1975-07-30	mafia
Hoffman, Abbott "Abbie"	ssdi	030-28-6194	1936-11-30	1989-04-15	radical
Hoover, John Edgar	ssdi	577-60-1114	1895-01-01	1972-05-15	FBI
Johnson, Lyndon Baines	ssdi	577-60-6128	1908-08-27	1973-01-22	president
Jones, James Warren "Jim"	ssdi	303-32-5942	1931-05-13	1978-11-18	cultist
Katzenbach, Nicholas	ssdi	335-03-1844	1901-02-26	1972-12	attorney general
Kennedy, Robert Francis "Bobby"	ssdi	026-24-0879	1925-11-20	1968-06-06	U.S. Attorney General
King, Martin Luther, Jr.	ssdi	253-36-3980	1929-01-15	1968-04-04	revolutionary
Klebold, Dylan	ssdi	524-45-5481	1981-09-11	1999-04-20	Columbine
Korzybski, Alfred Habdank Skarbek	pre-ss		1879-07-03	1950-03-01	founder of General Semantics
Lansky, Meyer	ssdi	109-03-8534	1902-07-04	1983-01-15	mafia
Leary, Timothy Francis	ssdi	032-07-5410	1920-10-22	1996-05-31	LSD
Lee, Brandon	unres		1965-02-01	1993-03-31	The Crow
Lee, Bruce	ssdi	564-58-5856	1940-11-27	1973-07-20	martial artist (ssdi: b. 11-24)
McCloy, John Jay	ssdi	578-32-5244	1895-03-31	1989-03-11	World Bank president; warren commission
McCone, John Alex	ssdi	562-09-7959	1902-01-04	1991-02-14	CIA
McVeigh, Timothy James	ssdi	129-58-4709	1968-04-23	2001-06-11	executed for the OKC bombing
Miler, Newton B.	ssdi	481-03-5505	1900-10-28	1992-01-25	CIA, in the CIA SIG
Mortensen, Norma Jeane	pre-ss		1926-06-01	1962-08-05	Marilyn Monroe; playboy, suicide
Nixon, Richard Milhous	ssdi	567-68-0515	1913-01-09	1994-04-22	president
Offie, Carmel	ssdi	578-44-7515	1909-09-22	1972-06	CIA, don juan
Orlov, Igor "Sasha"	ssdi	578-54-4451	1922-01-01	1982-05	CIA, KGB mole; aka Alexander Koptatzky
Oswald, Lee Harvey	unres	433-54-3937	1939-10-18	1963-11-24	alleged JFK assassin
Pauling, Linus Carl	ssdi	545-44-4297	1901-02-28	1994-08-19	chemist
Pearl, Daniel	ssdi	547-35-3986	1963-10-10	2002-01-31	journalist
Elvis Presley	ssdi	409-52-2002	1935-01-08	1977-08-16	singer
Rand, Ayn	ssdi	571-32-9405	1905-02-02	1982-03-06	writer; born Alissa Zinovievna Rosenbaum
Ray, James Earl	ssdi	728-09-4027	1928-03-10	1998-04-23	assassin (MLK)
Reagan, Ronald Wilson	unres		1911-02-06	2004-06-05	U.S. president
Richardson, Elliot Lee	ssdi	028-18-8016	1920-07-20	1999-12-31	lawyer, politician, Nixon-related (ssdi: d. 12-15)
Rocca, Raymond G.	ssdi	227-60-1579	1917-02-22	1993-11-11	CIA/OSS, Angleton
Rocca, George Raymond	ssdi	378-92-8331	1925-01-27	2000-09-21	CIA/OSS, alternate possibility
Rockefeller, Nelson	ssdi	056-09-0954	1908-07-08	1979-01-26	vice president 41, NY governor
Ruby, Jack Leon	unres	359-10-5891	1911	1967-01-03	JFK-related, killed LHO; b. Jacob Leon Rubenstein
Russell, Richard, Jr.	ssdi	256-70-0796	1897-11-02	1971-01-21	senator; warren commission
Ryan, Thelma "Patricia" Catherine	ssdi	568-09-8510	1912-03-16	1993-06	first lady (Nixon)
Sagan, Carl Edward	ssdi	338-30-6096	1934-11-09	1996-12-20	astronomer
Salk, Jonas	ssdi	578-38-3944	1914-10-28	1995-06-23	biologist
Shannon, Claude Elwood	ssdi	096-16-3629	1916-04-30	2001-02-24	mathematician
Simpson, Nicole Brown	ssdi	573-72-9948	1959-05-19	1994-06-13	ex-wife of O.J. Simpson
Spann, Johnny Micheal	ssdi	416-21-6382	1969-03-01	2001-11-25	CIA
Teller, Edward	ssdi	348-28-0765	1908-01-15	2003-09-09	physicist
Thurmond, James Strom	ssdi	250-64-5145	1902-12-05	2003-06-26	senator
Tolson, Clyde Anderson	ssdi	577-60-2204	1900-05-22	1975-04-15	FBI assoc. director under Hoover
Tordella, Louis William	ssdi	579-44-0892	1911-05-01	1996-01-10	NSA
Trafficante, Santo, Jr.	ssdi	265-50-2785	1914-11-15	1987-03-17	mob
Truman, Harry	ssdi	488-40-6969	1884-05-08	1972-12-26	president
Warren, Earl	ssdi	563-66-5198	1891-03-19	1974-07-09	supreme court justice; warren commission
White, Harry Dexter	pre-ss		1892-10	1948-08-16	worldbank, IMF, communist spy, SecTreas
Whitman, Charles Joseph	unres		1941-06-23	1966-08-01	murderer
Zelazny, Roger Joseph	ssdi	289-32-9071	1937-05-13	1995-06-14	sci-fi writer
Zorn, Max August	ssdi	307-40-0356	1906-06-06	1993-03-09	mathematician




From isn at c4i.org  Fri Dec 31 02:30:34 2004
From: isn at c4i.org (InfoSec News)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 04:30:34 -0600 (CST)
Subject: [ISN] Online Banks Will Be Liable for 'Hacking' Damages in 2006
Message-ID: <mailman.1131.1576007654.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200412/200412300030.html

Park Jong-se
Dec. 30, 2004

Starting from 2006, financial institutions will be held responsible
for any damage consumers may suffer at the hands of hackers or from
malfunctioning computer systems while engaging in financial
transactions on the Internet.

The government adopted a financial e-transaction bill during a vice
ministerial meeting Thursday. The bill will be discussed at a Cabinet
meeting scheduled for Jan. 4 before being submitted to the National
Assembly.

According to the bill, if consumers incur damages or loss while
engaging in e-banking because of an incident caused by a third factor,
such as a case of hacking or computer system meltdowns, financial
institutions or e-banking service providers will be liable.

An exception that grants financial institutions immunity is also
included in the bill. If consumers cause a problem deliberately or by
their own mistakes, they will be held accountable.

The bill states that consumers' identification number, secret code and
certified document, all of which are essential prerequisites for
e-banking, should be issued only when consumers apply for them and
after their identity has been confirmed. It also mandates that
transaction records should be kept.



_________________________________________
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




From mllist at vaste.mine.nu  Thu Dec 30 20:18:20 2004
From: mllist at vaste.mine.nu (Vaste)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 05:18:20 +0100
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Common interest, finding trading partners
Message-ID: <mailman.1132.1576007654.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

One of the reasons e.g. BitTorrent works so great is that when you
receive a piece from someone, you can trade it for another piece with
anyone else in the swarm without that piece. This works since everyone
on a torrent (typically) are interested in the same file. With
multi-file torrents this assumption is extended to several files as well.

In the file-based filesharing world (ed2k, gnutella) the same assumption
hold, but but only for one file. And with batchtorrents, this assumption
might brake even with torrent; one might only want a few files, (and
e.g. using Azureus not even request the other files).

Still, two people downloading an episode from same tv-series are quite
likely to be interested in the same files, and thus they might benefit
from trading.

Has any research been done on how these peers with common interests can
 find each other?

Mainly it's about finding the peer with the most coinciding interest.
Still, other factors play in, such as the resources available (does the
peer lack trading partners, i.e. has bandwidth to spare?) in finding a
good match. On the networklevel it might also be good to find a balance
between finding the "best" peer and creating a well-connected network
(avoiding cliques and bottlenecks). Moreover, as interest's change over
time, how should this be handled? (The more coinciding the interests,
the longer it should take for them to deviate from each other.)

This is question is quite similar to finding a peer with pieces of a
file you're interested in (that you don't already have). (The difference
being that in the former, you search for _potential_ bearers of the
piece.) Here the problem of matching a large number of preferences shows
(namely the pieces; there are usually quite a few of them). The same
things happens with many (especially small) files.

In the search-layer I believe this is usually handled either not at all
(random) or in a binary way (complete file vs. only pieces of it), and
leaving the details to the strict peer-to-peer chatting. Would there be
any point in using more detailed information of finished pieces in the
search layer? Would there be any use to use different resolutions (e.g.
10 pieces resolution might be: piece 1-10: none finished, 11-20: all,
21-29: some)?

An interesting take on this is the perspective of piece-based networks,
where one searches for every piece separately. Here it's even more
obvious how much one would benefit from finding people interested in the
same file (the same pieces). Yet, introducing things such as patches, it
would be pleasing to have a solution that didn't depend on peers wanting
the exactly same pieces (defined by the file), but just roughly the same.

/Vaste
_______________________________________________
p2p-hackers mailing list
p2p-hackers at zgp.org
http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences

----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]




From rah at shipwright.com  Fri Dec 31 06:35:49 2004
From: rah at shipwright.com (R.A. Hettinga)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 09:35:49 -0500
Subject: Korean Online Banks Will Be Liable for 'Hacking' Damages in
  2006
Message-ID: <p061104fbbdfb13f4b97d@[68.167.57.91]>

--- begin forwarded text



From measl at mfn.org  Fri Dec 31 08:38:54 2004
From: measl at mfn.org (J.A. Terranson)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 10:38:54 -0600 (CST)
Subject: happy newyear's eve
In-Reply-To: <BAY24-F1E813E916AF82B1C8CE0D9B9D0@phx.gbl>
References: <BAY24-F1E813E916AF82B1C8CE0D9B9D0@phx.gbl>
Message-ID: <20041231103838.L15034@ubzr.zsa.bet>

Seems pretty obvious to me...


On Fri, 31 Dec 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:

> Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 11:03:44 -0500
> From: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>
> To: juicy at melontraffickers.com, cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
> Subject: RE: happy newyear's eve
>
>
> Uhhh...OK. Wanna explain the purpose of this? I'm not clever enough to get
> it.
>
> -TD
>
> >From: "A.Melon" <juicy at melontraffickers.com>
> >To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
> >Subject: happy newyear's eve
> >Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 04:28:32 -0800 (PST)
> >
> >Angleton, James Hugh	ssdi	215-50-2639	1888-12-05	1973-04	NCR businessman,
> >former Col., wife Carmen Mercedes Moreno, Boise, ID
> >Angleton, James Jesus	unres		1917-12-09	1987-05-11	CIA/OSS, possibly b.
> >1918- Col. James Hugh Angleton, Carmen Mercedes Moreno, Boise, ID
> >Asimov, Isaac	ssdi	055-24-6410	1920-01-02	1992-04-06	author, source of the
> >laws of robotics
> >Bissell, Richard Mervin	ssdi	129-10-9645	1909-10-18	1994-02-15	CIA
> >Boggs, Thomas Hale,
> >Sr.	missing	433-01-1763	1914-02-15	1972-10-16	congressperson
> >Bulger, James Joseph "Whitey"	missing				a.k.a. Thomas Baxter; mob, Winter
> >Hill Gang
> >Casey, William James	ssdi	130-12-7576	1913-03-13	1987-05-06	CIA
> >Colby, William Egan	ssdi	577-28-7679	1920-01-04	1996-04-27	CIA
> >Connally, John Bowden	ssdi	466-03-9768	1917-02-27	1993-06-15	TX Governor;
> >hit during JFK assassination
> >Cooper, John Sherman	ssdi	361-09-8366	1901-08-23	1991-02-21	senator; warren
> >commission
> >Crick, Francis Harry Compton	unres		1916-06-08	2004-07-28	co-discoverer of
> >DNA
> >Cunanan, Andrew Phillip	unres		1969-08-31	1997-07-23	murdered Gianni
> >Versace
> >Deming, William
> >Edwards	ssdi	085-26-4468	1900-10-14	1993-12-20	production/management expert
> >Dick, Philip Kindred	ssdi	550-38-3080	1928-12-16	1982-03-02	writer, sci-fi
> >Dijkstra, Edsger Wybe	ssdi	459-67-5076	1930-05-11	2002-08-06	computer
> >scientist
> >Dirac, Paul Adrien Maurice	ssdi	153-36-3061	1902-08-08	1984-10-20	founder
> >of quantum mechanics
> >Disney, Walter "Walt"	ssdi	562-10-0296	1901-12-05	1966-12-15	inventor
> >Donovan, William Joseph	pre-ss		1883-01-01	1959-02-08	lawyer, OSS
> >Dulles, Allen Welsh	ssdi	086-28-2350	1893-04-07	1969-01-29	CIA; warren
> >commission
> >Eisenhower, Dwight David
> >"Ike"	ssdi	572-64-0315	1890-10-14	1969-03-28	president
> >Feynman, Richard Phillips	ssdi	098-03-1009	1918-05-11	1988-02-15	physicist
> >Forrestal, James Vincent	pre-ss		1892-02-15	1949-05-22	first Secretary of
> >Defense, suicide
> >Foster, Vincent Walker, Jr.	ssdi	429-80-1132	1945-01-15	1993-07-20	lawyer
> >Geisel, Theodor Seuss	ssdi	552-38-5014	1904-03-02	1991-09-24	Dr. Seuss
> >Genovese, Catherine "Kitty"	unres		1935	1964-03-13	murder victim
> >Giancana, Sam "Momo"	ssdi	326-18-6902	1908-05-24	1975-06-19	mafia, possible
> >CIA assassination (ssdi: b. 06-15)
> >Harris, Eric	ssdi	284-82-1478	1981-04-09	1999-04-20	Columbine
> >Helms, Richard McGarrah	ssdi	317-01-6292	1913-03-30	2002-10-23	CIA
> >Herbert, Frank Patrick	ssdi	549-26-9691	1920-10-08	1986-02-11	writer,
> >sci-fi
> >Hiss, Alger	ssdi	087-32-7727	1904-11-11	1996-11-15	KGB spy
> >Hoffa, James Riddle "Jimmy"	missing		1913-02-14	1975-07-30	mafia
> >Hoffman, Abbott "Abbie"	ssdi	030-28-6194	1936-11-30	1989-04-15	radical
> >Hoover, John Edgar	ssdi	577-60-1114	1895-01-01	1972-05-15	FBI
> >Johnson, Lyndon Baines	ssdi	577-60-6128	1908-08-27	1973-01-22	president
> >Jones, James Warren "Jim"	ssdi	303-32-5942	1931-05-13	1978-11-18	cultist
> >Katzenbach, Nicholas	ssdi	335-03-1844	1901-02-26	1972-12	attorney general
> >Kennedy, Robert Francis "Bobby"	ssdi	026-24-0879	1925-11-20	1968-06-06	U.S.
> >Attorney General
> >King, Martin Luther,
> >Jr.	ssdi	253-36-3980	1929-01-15	1968-04-04	revolutionary
> >Klebold, Dylan	ssdi	524-45-5481	1981-09-11	1999-04-20	Columbine
> >Korzybski, Alfred Habdank Skarbek	pre-ss		1879-07-03	1950-03-01	founder of
> >General Semantics
> >Lansky, Meyer	ssdi	109-03-8534	1902-07-04	1983-01-15	mafia
> >Leary, Timothy Francis	ssdi	032-07-5410	1920-10-22	1996-05-31	LSD
> >Lee, Brandon	unres		1965-02-01	1993-03-31	The Crow
> >Lee, Bruce	ssdi	564-58-5856	1940-11-27	1973-07-20	martial artist (ssdi: b.
> >11-24)
> >McCloy, John Jay	ssdi	578-32-5244	1895-03-31	1989-03-11	World Bank
> >president; warren commission
> >McCone, John Alex	ssdi	562-09-7959	1902-01-04	1991-02-14	CIA
> >McVeigh, Timothy James	ssdi	129-58-4709	1968-04-23	2001-06-11	executed for
> >the OKC bombing
> >Miler, Newton B.	ssdi	481-03-5505	1900-10-28	1992-01-25	CIA, in the CIA SIG
> >Mortensen, Norma Jeane	pre-ss		1926-06-01	1962-08-05	Marilyn Monroe;
> >playboy, suicide
> >Nixon, Richard Milhous	ssdi	567-68-0515	1913-01-09	1994-04-22	president
> >Offie, Carmel	ssdi	578-44-7515	1909-09-22	1972-06	CIA, don juan
> >Orlov, Igor "Sasha"	ssdi	578-54-4451	1922-01-01	1982-05	CIA, KGB mole; aka
> >Alexander Koptatzky
> >Oswald, Lee Harvey	unres	433-54-3937	1939-10-18	1963-11-24	alleged JFK
> >assassin
> >Pauling, Linus Carl	ssdi	545-44-4297	1901-02-28	1994-08-19	chemist
> >Pearl, Daniel	ssdi	547-35-3986	1963-10-10	2002-01-31	journalist
> >Elvis Presley	ssdi	409-52-2002	1935-01-08	1977-08-16	singer
> >Rand, Ayn	ssdi	571-32-9405	1905-02-02	1982-03-06	writer; born Alissa
> >Zinovievna Rosenbaum
> >Ray, James Earl	ssdi	728-09-4027	1928-03-10	1998-04-23	assassin (MLK)
> >Reagan, Ronald Wilson	unres		1911-02-06	2004-06-05	U.S. president
> >Richardson, Elliot Lee	ssdi	028-18-8016	1920-07-20	1999-12-31	lawyer,
> >politician, Nixon-related (ssdi: d. 12-15)
> >Rocca, Raymond G.	ssdi	227-60-1579	1917-02-22	1993-11-11	CIA/OSS, Angleton
> >Rocca, George Raymond	ssdi	378-92-8331	1925-01-27	2000-09-21	CIA/OSS,
> >alternate possibility
> >Rockefeller, Nelson	ssdi	056-09-0954	1908-07-08	1979-01-26	vice president
> >41, NY governor
> >Ruby, Jack Leon	unres	359-10-5891	1911	1967-01-03	JFK-related, killed LHO;
> >b. Jacob Leon Rubenstein
> >Russell, Richard, Jr.	ssdi	256-70-0796	1897-11-02	1971-01-21	senator;
> >warren commission
> >Ryan, Thelma "Patricia" Catherine	ssdi	568-09-8510	1912-03-16	1993-06	first
> >lady (Nixon)
> >Sagan, Carl Edward	ssdi	338-30-6096	1934-11-09	1996-12-20	astronomer
> >Salk, Jonas	ssdi	578-38-3944	1914-10-28	1995-06-23	biologist
> >Shannon, Claude Elwood	ssdi	096-16-3629	1916-04-30	2001-02-24	mathematician
> >Simpson, Nicole Brown	ssdi	573-72-9948	1959-05-19	1994-06-13	ex-wife of
> >O.J. Simpson
> >Spann, Johnny Micheal	ssdi	416-21-6382	1969-03-01	2001-11-25	CIA
> >Teller, Edward	ssdi	348-28-0765	1908-01-15	2003-09-09	physicist
> >Thurmond, James Strom	ssdi	250-64-5145	1902-12-05	2003-06-26	senator
> >Tolson, Clyde Anderson	ssdi	577-60-2204	1900-05-22	1975-04-15	FBI assoc.
> >director under Hoover
> >Tordella, Louis William	ssdi	579-44-0892	1911-05-01	1996-01-10	NSA
> >Trafficante, Santo, Jr.	ssdi	265-50-2785	1914-11-15	1987-03-17	mob
> >Truman, Harry	ssdi	488-40-6969	1884-05-08	1972-12-26	president
> >Warren, Earl	ssdi	563-66-5198	1891-03-19	1974-07-09	supreme court justice;
> >warren commission
> >White, Harry Dexter	pre-ss		1892-10	1948-08-16	worldbank, IMF, communist
> >spy, SecTreas
> >Whitman, Charles Joseph	unres		1941-06-23	1966-08-01	murderer
> >Zelazny, Roger Joseph	ssdi	289-32-9071	1937-05-13	1995-06-14	sci-fi writer
> >Zorn, Max August	ssdi	307-40-0356	1906-06-06	1993-03-09	mathematician
>
>
>

-- 
Yours,

J.A. Terranson
sysadmin at mfn.org
0xBD4A95BF

 Civilization is in a tailspin - everything is backwards, everything is
upside down- doctors destroy health, psychiatrists destroy minds, lawyers
destroy justice, the major media destroy information, governments destroy
freedom and religions destroy spirituality - yet it is claimed to be
healthy, just, informed, free and spiritual. We live in a social system
whose community, wealth, love and life is derived from alienation,
poverty, self-hate and medical murder - yet we tell ourselves that it is
biologically and ecologically sustainable.

The Bush plan to screen whole US population for mental illness clearly
indicates that mental illness starts at the top.

Rev Dr Michael Ellner




From camera_lumina at hotmail.com  Fri Dec 31 08:03:44 2004
From: camera_lumina at hotmail.com (Tyler Durden)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 11:03:44 -0500
Subject: happy newyear's eve
In-Reply-To: <5d7a5367a33651cae734dd0d58fe03d8@melontraffickers.com>
Message-ID: <BAY24-F1E813E916AF82B1C8CE0D9B9D0@phx.gbl>

Uhhh...OK. Wanna explain the purpose of this? I'm not clever enough to get 
it.

-TD

>From: "A.Melon" <juicy at melontraffickers.com>
>To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: happy newyear's eve
>Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 04:28:32 -0800 (PST)
>
>Angleton, James Hugh	ssdi	215-50-2639	1888-12-05	1973-04	NCR businessman, 
>former Col., wife Carmen Mercedes Moreno, Boise, ID
>Angleton, James Jesus	unres		1917-12-09	1987-05-11	CIA/OSS, possibly b. 
>1918- Col. James Hugh Angleton, Carmen Mercedes Moreno, Boise, ID
>Asimov, Isaac	ssdi	055-24-6410	1920-01-02	1992-04-06	author, source of the 
>laws of robotics
>Bissell, Richard Mervin	ssdi	129-10-9645	1909-10-18	1994-02-15	CIA
>Boggs, Thomas Hale, 
>Sr.	missing	433-01-1763	1914-02-15	1972-10-16	congressperson
>Bulger, James Joseph "Whitey"	missing				a.k.a. Thomas Baxter; mob, Winter 
>Hill Gang
>Casey, William James	ssdi	130-12-7576	1913-03-13	1987-05-06	CIA
>Colby, William Egan	ssdi	577-28-7679	1920-01-04	1996-04-27	CIA
>Connally, John Bowden	ssdi	466-03-9768	1917-02-27	1993-06-15	TX Governor; 
>hit during JFK assassination
>Cooper, John Sherman	ssdi	361-09-8366	1901-08-23	1991-02-21	senator; warren 
>commission
>Crick, Francis Harry Compton	unres		1916-06-08	2004-07-28	co-discoverer of 
>DNA
>Cunanan, Andrew Phillip	unres		1969-08-31	1997-07-23	murdered Gianni 
>Versace
>Deming, William 
>Edwards	ssdi	085-26-4468	1900-10-14	1993-12-20	production/management expert
>Dick, Philip Kindred	ssdi	550-38-3080	1928-12-16	1982-03-02	writer, sci-fi
>Dijkstra, Edsger Wybe	ssdi	459-67-5076	1930-05-11	2002-08-06	computer 
>scientist
>Dirac, Paul Adrien Maurice	ssdi	153-36-3061	1902-08-08	1984-10-20	founder 
>of quantum mechanics
>Disney, Walter "Walt"	ssdi	562-10-0296	1901-12-05	1966-12-15	inventor
>Donovan, William Joseph	pre-ss		1883-01-01	1959-02-08	lawyer, OSS
>Dulles, Allen Welsh	ssdi	086-28-2350	1893-04-07	1969-01-29	CIA; warren 
>commission
>Eisenhower, Dwight David 
>"Ike"	ssdi	572-64-0315	1890-10-14	1969-03-28	president
>Feynman, Richard Phillips	ssdi	098-03-1009	1918-05-11	1988-02-15	physicist
>Forrestal, James Vincent	pre-ss		1892-02-15	1949-05-22	first Secretary of 
>Defense, suicide
>Foster, Vincent Walker, Jr.	ssdi	429-80-1132	1945-01-15	1993-07-20	lawyer
>Geisel, Theodor Seuss	ssdi	552-38-5014	1904-03-02	1991-09-24	Dr. Seuss
>Genovese, Catherine "Kitty"	unres		1935	1964-03-13	murder victim
>Giancana, Sam "Momo"	ssdi	326-18-6902	1908-05-24	1975-06-19	mafia, possible 
>CIA assassination (ssdi: b. 06-15)
>Harris, Eric	ssdi	284-82-1478	1981-04-09	1999-04-20	Columbine
>Helms, Richard McGarrah	ssdi	317-01-6292	1913-03-30	2002-10-23	CIA
>Herbert, Frank Patrick	ssdi	549-26-9691	1920-10-08	1986-02-11	writer, 
>sci-fi
>Hiss, Alger	ssdi	087-32-7727	1904-11-11	1996-11-15	KGB spy
>Hoffa, James Riddle "Jimmy"	missing		1913-02-14	1975-07-30	mafia
>Hoffman, Abbott "Abbie"	ssdi	030-28-6194	1936-11-30	1989-04-15	radical
>Hoover, John Edgar	ssdi	577-60-1114	1895-01-01	1972-05-15	FBI
>Johnson, Lyndon Baines	ssdi	577-60-6128	1908-08-27	1973-01-22	president
>Jones, James Warren "Jim"	ssdi	303-32-5942	1931-05-13	1978-11-18	cultist
>Katzenbach, Nicholas	ssdi	335-03-1844	1901-02-26	1972-12	attorney general
>Kennedy, Robert Francis "Bobby"	ssdi	026-24-0879	1925-11-20	1968-06-06	U.S. 
>Attorney General
>King, Martin Luther, 
>Jr.	ssdi	253-36-3980	1929-01-15	1968-04-04	revolutionary
>Klebold, Dylan	ssdi	524-45-5481	1981-09-11	1999-04-20	Columbine
>Korzybski, Alfred Habdank Skarbek	pre-ss		1879-07-03	1950-03-01	founder of 
>General Semantics
>Lansky, Meyer	ssdi	109-03-8534	1902-07-04	1983-01-15	mafia
>Leary, Timothy Francis	ssdi	032-07-5410	1920-10-22	1996-05-31	LSD
>Lee, Brandon	unres		1965-02-01	1993-03-31	The Crow
>Lee, Bruce	ssdi	564-58-5856	1940-11-27	1973-07-20	martial artist (ssdi: b. 
>11-24)
>McCloy, John Jay	ssdi	578-32-5244	1895-03-31	1989-03-11	World Bank 
>president; warren commission
>McCone, John Alex	ssdi	562-09-7959	1902-01-04	1991-02-14	CIA
>McVeigh, Timothy James	ssdi	129-58-4709	1968-04-23	2001-06-11	executed for 
>the OKC bombing
>Miler, Newton B.	ssdi	481-03-5505	1900-10-28	1992-01-25	CIA, in the CIA SIG
>Mortensen, Norma Jeane	pre-ss		1926-06-01	1962-08-05	Marilyn Monroe; 
>playboy, suicide
>Nixon, Richard Milhous	ssdi	567-68-0515	1913-01-09	1994-04-22	president
>Offie, Carmel	ssdi	578-44-7515	1909-09-22	1972-06	CIA, don juan
>Orlov, Igor "Sasha"	ssdi	578-54-4451	1922-01-01	1982-05	CIA, KGB mole; aka 
>Alexander Koptatzky
>Oswald, Lee Harvey	unres	433-54-3937	1939-10-18	1963-11-24	alleged JFK 
>assassin
>Pauling, Linus Carl	ssdi	545-44-4297	1901-02-28	1994-08-19	chemist
>Pearl, Daniel	ssdi	547-35-3986	1963-10-10	2002-01-31	journalist
>Elvis Presley	ssdi	409-52-2002	1935-01-08	1977-08-16	singer
>Rand, Ayn	ssdi	571-32-9405	1905-02-02	1982-03-06	writer; born Alissa 
>Zinovievna Rosenbaum
>Ray, James Earl	ssdi	728-09-4027	1928-03-10	1998-04-23	assassin (MLK)
>Reagan, Ronald Wilson	unres		1911-02-06	2004-06-05	U.S. president
>Richardson, Elliot Lee	ssdi	028-18-8016	1920-07-20	1999-12-31	lawyer, 
>politician, Nixon-related (ssdi: d. 12-15)
>Rocca, Raymond G.	ssdi	227-60-1579	1917-02-22	1993-11-11	CIA/OSS, Angleton
>Rocca, George Raymond	ssdi	378-92-8331	1925-01-27	2000-09-21	CIA/OSS, 
>alternate possibility
>Rockefeller, Nelson	ssdi	056-09-0954	1908-07-08	1979-01-26	vice president 
>41, NY governor
>Ruby, Jack Leon	unres	359-10-5891	1911	1967-01-03	JFK-related, killed LHO; 
>b. Jacob Leon Rubenstein
>Russell, Richard, Jr.	ssdi	256-70-0796	1897-11-02	1971-01-21	senator; 
>warren commission
>Ryan, Thelma "Patricia" Catherine	ssdi	568-09-8510	1912-03-16	1993-06	first 
>lady (Nixon)
>Sagan, Carl Edward	ssdi	338-30-6096	1934-11-09	1996-12-20	astronomer
>Salk, Jonas	ssdi	578-38-3944	1914-10-28	1995-06-23	biologist
>Shannon, Claude Elwood	ssdi	096-16-3629	1916-04-30	2001-02-24	mathematician
>Simpson, Nicole Brown	ssdi	573-72-9948	1959-05-19	1994-06-13	ex-wife of 
>O.J. Simpson
>Spann, Johnny Micheal	ssdi	416-21-6382	1969-03-01	2001-11-25	CIA
>Teller, Edward	ssdi	348-28-0765	1908-01-15	2003-09-09	physicist
>Thurmond, James Strom	ssdi	250-64-5145	1902-12-05	2003-06-26	senator
>Tolson, Clyde Anderson	ssdi	577-60-2204	1900-05-22	1975-04-15	FBI assoc. 
>director under Hoover
>Tordella, Louis William	ssdi	579-44-0892	1911-05-01	1996-01-10	NSA
>Trafficante, Santo, Jr.	ssdi	265-50-2785	1914-11-15	1987-03-17	mob
>Truman, Harry	ssdi	488-40-6969	1884-05-08	1972-12-26	president
>Warren, Earl	ssdi	563-66-5198	1891-03-19	1974-07-09	supreme court justice; 
>warren commission
>White, Harry Dexter	pre-ss		1892-10	1948-08-16	worldbank, IMF, communist 
>spy, SecTreas
>Whitman, Charles Joseph	unres		1941-06-23	1966-08-01	murderer
>Zelazny, Roger Joseph	ssdi	289-32-9071	1937-05-13	1995-06-14	sci-fi writer
>Zorn, Max August	ssdi	307-40-0356	1906-06-06	1993-03-09	mathematician




From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 31 06:56:54 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 15:56:54 +0100
Subject: [IP] The Shadow Internet (fwd from dave@farber.net)
Message-ID: <20041231145653.GC9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 31 08:15:32 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 17:15:32 +0100
Subject: [IP] more on  The Shadow Internet (fwd from dave@farber.net)
Message-ID: <20041231161532.GF9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----


From eugen at leitl.org  Fri Dec 31 08:45:11 2004
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 17:45:11 +0100
Subject: [IP] more on The Shadow Internet (fwd from dave@farber.net)
Message-ID: <20041231164511.GM9221@leitl.org>

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave at farber.net> -----