[IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

[Major Variola (ret)]

At 09:23 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
>Innocents could be a good "cannon fodder" that can bring a lot of
>backslash and alienation aganst the goons, stripping them from public
>support.

Yes, this has been discussed before, in addition to using it
retributionally --finger some deserving civil servant's offspring.
But eventually they'll come back to you wanting names that
turn out to be legit, and reveal yet more names.

Which is not to say that such countermeasures aren't valuable
for the *warning time* your colleages get as a result.



>> filesystems (etc) with layers of deniable stego.
>Are there any decent implementations for Linux/BSD/NT?

I haven't looked recently.  One property that such a FS or app should
have is
that it is useful for something *else* besides stego & duress layers.
Maybe
a watermark :-) management tool that can embed multiple watermarks that
don't
interfere.  Hmm... a meaty problem... tasty, with heavy theory sauce..


>> I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field
>> with high success rate?   Destroy the data and the passphrases don't
>> help.
>
>There are magnesium rods on the camping market, sold as firestarters
for
>very bad weather.

One can also buy mag ribbon which is more convenient than the
mini-ingots
you are referring to.  I know that pyrotechs coat Mg curls and the like
with
blackpowder paste (apply wet then dry).  A coil of coated ribbon and a
rocket-igniter
would make a neat little daughterboard :-)   Just don't take it on an
airplane.
There are patents on similar, of course.

Testing might get expensive unless you can get destructive-test dongles
cheaply,
and how much effort do you expend trying to read the data?