[IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

Tyler Durden camera_lumina at hotmail.com
Fri Apr 23 07:09:46 PDT 2004


"I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field
with high success rate?   Destroy the data and the passphrases don't
help."

Well, what if there were 3 passwords:

1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will actually be 
smart enough to look beyond this...that's why they have guns)
2)One for real data...this is what you're hiding
3) One for plausible real data, BUT when this one's used, it also destroys 
the real data as it opens the plausible real data.

Of course, some really really smart MwG (or the cool suits standing behind 
them) will be able to detect that data is being destroyed, but statistically 
speaking that will be much rarer.

-TD



>From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv at cdc.gov>
>To: "cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap   
>push
>Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 11:53:07 -0700
>
>At 05:56 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
> >On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> >
> >> At 12:09 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> >> >
> >> >Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? How do you
>prove
> >> >somebody is using encryption on a steganographic channel?
> >>
> >> Torture, of the sender, receiver, or their families, has worked
>pretty
> >> well.
> >> If you're good you don't even leave marks.
> >
> >However, it's not entirely reliable. At some point, the suspect tells
>you
> >what you want to hear, whether or not it is the truth, just so you
>leave
> >him alone. It can even happen that the suspect convinces himself that
>what
> >he really did what he was supposed to do.
>
>Interrogators check out each confession.  First ones won't work, bogus
>keys.  Just noise.  Second confession reveals pork recipes hidden in
>landscape
>pictures.  Beneath that layer of filesystem is stego'd some
>porn.  Beneath that, homosexual porn.    But your interrogators
>want the address book stego'd beneath that.  They know that these
>are stego distraction levels, uninteresting to them.  You'll give it to
>them eventually.  If you give them a believable but fake one,
>it will damage innocents or true members of your association.
>
> >This brings another ofren underestimated problem into the area of
> >cryptosystem design, the "rubberhose resistance".
>
>My comments were written with that in mind.  I'm familiar with
>filesystems
>(etc) with layers of deniable stego.
>
>I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field
>with high success rate?   Destroy the data and the passphrases don't
>help.
>
>
>

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