voting

[David Jablon]

>David Jablon wrote:
>> [...] Where is the "privacy problem" with
>> Chaum receipts when Ed and others still have the freedom to refuse
>> theirs or throw them away?

At 11:43 AM 4/16/04 -0700, Ed Gerck wrote:
>The privacy, coercion, intimidation, vote selling and election integrity
>problems begin with giving away a receipt that is linkable to a ballot. 

These problems begin elsewhere.  Whether a receipt would add any
new problem depends on further analysis.

>It is not relevant to the security problem whether a voter may destroy 
>his receipt, so that some receipts may disappear. What is relevant is 
>that voters may HAVE to keep their receipt or... suffer retaliation...
>not get paid... lose their jobs... not get a promotion... etc. Also
>relevant is that voters may WANT to keep their receipts, for the same
>reasons.

These are all relevant issues, and the system needs to be considered
as a whole.

The threat of coercion is present regardless of whether there's a
system-provided receipt, linkable, anonymous, or none. For example,
I might be told that after I vote I'll come face-to-face with a thug around
the corner, who will ask who I voted for, and who has a knack for
spotting liars. Or I may be told there's a secret camera in the booth.
Or I may think I'm at risk in simply showing up to vote, due to my public
party affiliation records, physical appearance, etc.

These issues must be addressed, and these concerns show that the
integrity of receipt validation must be ensured to at least the same
degree as the integrity of vote casting.  But *absolute* voter privacy
seems like an unobtainable goal, and it should not be used to trump
other important goals, like accountability.

-- David