e voting

[John Washburn]

I agree.  The paper printout may be unconnected to fraudulent tally
numbers produced later for publication.  This is better than the literal
nothing produced at present.

There is a small chance many voters could use there receipts to counter
fraudulent tally in low-vote ward.

-----Original Message-----
From: Roy M. Silvernail [mailto:roy at rant-central.com] 
Sent: Friday, November 21, 2003 12:12 PM
To: cypherpunks at lne.com
Subject: Re: e voting

On Friday 21 November 2003 12:19, Tim May wrote:
> On Nov 21, 2003, at 8:16 AM, Major Variola (ret.) wrote:
> > Secretary of State Kevin Shelley is expected to announce today that
as
> > of 2006, all electronic voting machines in California must be able
to
> > produce a paper printout that voters can check to make sure their
votes
> > are properly recorded.
> >
> >
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-shelley21nov21,1,847438.story?
> > coll=la-headlines-california
>
> Without the ability to (untraceably, unlinkably, of course) verify
that
> this vote is "in the vote total," and that no votes other than those
> who actually voted, are in the vote total, this is all meaningless.

Quite true.  But given the fact that we don't have that ability *now*,
what 
exactly is the difference?  Other than streamlining and centralizing the

present distributed corruption?