Crypto-making vs Crypto-breaking

[Eric Cordian]

Tim writes:

> I'll take this challenge, silly as it is.

Yes, please humor me.  I do so yearn to be entertained.

> By "any crypto designed by mankind" I assume you are excluding one-time
> pads, which are not breakable by any amount of computer power and any
> amount of mathematical knowledge. I assume you are referring to public 
> key approaches, where _conceivably_ mathematical advances or almost
> inconceivable advances in computer power could result in PK ciphers 
> being broken.

I would exclude one-time pads equal in length to the message.  I would
include all public key crypto, and all use of symmetric block ciphers
where an attacker given both the correct key and a wrong key could tell
which was which.

Let's assume the "technology" in box two can do big exponential searches
almost instantly.

> Assuming your conditions are exactly as you state, I would of course 
> pick box number ONE.

> We still outnumber those in government, and what they have to hide is
> mostly of little interest to me or my causes (troop movements, submarine
> positions, etc.). Also, they can easily fall back to courier-delivered
> one-time pads, which are not part of the assumption, as I see it. (If 
> you are including even one-time pads being broken, then you are assuming
> magic, which is not interesting.)

While government secrets may be of little importance to you, governments
might very well be harmed if all those years worth of secure phone
conversations, faxes, and other communications stored in the archives of 
various intelligence agencies were suddenly decrypted en masse and made 
public.  

Consider the economic impact of SSL no longer hiding your credit card 
numbers from hackers, or ssh being no more secure than telnet.

The cost of having no secure communications without the parties meeting to 
exchange one-time pads generated by nuclear decay would run into the many 
billions.   

> Thus, having a way to securely and untraceably communicate and transact
> business is much more important than being able to read THEIR bullshit
> communications.

> That was easy.

> And the cool thing is that every indication is that cipher-making is 
> still pulling away from cipher-breaking by leaps and bounds, so it 
> looks to me that we are falling further into the right choice.

Cough.

-- 
Eric Michael Cordian 0+
O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division
"Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"