From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Sun Mar  2 12:29:22 2003
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sun, 02 Mar 2003 12:29:22 -0800
Subject: Roger Needham Died - from The Register
Message-ID: <5.1.1.6.2.20030302122746.02cf5dc0@idiom.com>

--------------------
Obit: Roger Needham
By Guy Kewney, Newswireless.net
Posted: 02/03/2003 at 12:13 GMT

Sadly, we record the death of Roger Needham, computer pioneer...

There isn't much more to say, except that the man who was the reason 
Microsoft set up its research centre in Cambridge, England, has had to lay 
down his life's work. Cancer ended a legend.

He once told me that it was his idea that Microsoft stopped spending money 
on patenting its research ideas, and instead, to make the results available 
to other researchers. I wish I'd known him long enough to have some other 
stories to pass on myself; he left a long legacy of people who attributed 
their inspiration to having worked with him.

Here's what his CV at Microsoft Research says:

Roger M Needham, born 1935, was in computing at Cambridge since 1956. His 
1961 PhD thesis was on the application of digital computers to problems of 
classification and grouping. In 1962 he joined the Computer Laboratory, 
then called the Mathematical Laboratory, and has been on the faculty since 
1963. He took a leading role in Cambridge projects in operating systems, 
time sharing systems, memory protection, local area networks, and 
distributed systems over the next twenty years.

Roger worked at intervals on a variety of topics in security, (his main 
research interest while with Microsoft) being particularly known for work 
with Schroeder on authentication protocols (1978) and with Burrows and 
Abadi on formalism for reasoning about them (1989).

Roger graduated from the University of Cambridge in Mathematics and 
Philosophy in 1956, and then took the Diploma in Numerical Analysis and 
Automatic Computing in 1957. He had been in computing at Cambridge ever 
since. He succeeded Maurice Wilkes as Head of the Computer Laboratory from 
1980 to 1995, was promoted Professor in 1981, elected to the Royal Society 
in 1985 and the Royal Academy of Engineering in 1993. He was appointed 
Pro-Vice-Chancellor in 1996.

I only met him a couple of times, both times when Microsoft was doing 
corporate hospitality to publicise the work it was doing in the Cambridge 
research facility. He was as knowledgeable as any rumour could have 
suggested; and as tolerant of an ignorant journalist as any academic could 
ever be. And I shall never get to know him, now.

Guy Kewney is the editor/publisher of Newswireless.Net

-----------------------------------------------


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From Somebody  Sun Mar  2 11:09:05 2003
From: Somebody (Somebody)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2003 14:09:05 -0500
Subject: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short   Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
Message-ID: <mailman.714.1576007628.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

Bob,

Technically, since their signal speed is slower than light, even
transmission lines act as storage devices.

Wire tapping is now legal.


<Somebody>
----- Original Message -----
From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
To: Clippable <rah at shipwright.com>
Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2003 3:04 PM
Subject: Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short
Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)


>
> --- begin forwarded text
>
>
> Status: RO
> Date: Sun, 02 Mar 2003 14:27:00 -0500
> To: Tim Dierks <tim at dierks.org>, "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>,
>    cryptography at wasabisystems.com
> From: "Ronald L. Rivest" <rivest at mit.edu>
> Subject: Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short
>   Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
>
>
> Yes, I was amazed at this ruling as well.
>
> This ruling seems to fly in the face of the likely intent of
> Congress when it passed Wiretap Act.
>
> If things continue in this direction, we will soon have
> rulings and regulations that say:
>
>      -- Carriers must put all calls in storage for a minimum
>         period of time, sufficient to allow wiretapping.
>         (Indeed, regulation may not be necessary, as digitization and
>          buffering of communications is common practice; the
>          transient use of storage to effect communications
>          efficiency and reliability should not provide a wiretap
>          loophole.)
>
>      -- Wiretapping is OK for any phone calls that are routed
>         through a satellite.
>
>      -- It is OK for the government to house soldiers in your
>         house, as long as there is even the tiniest opening somewhere in
>         your house (e.g. a window open, or a chimney flue)
>         so that "inside" and "outside" connect.
>
>      -- Etc.
>
> I can also see a market developing for "storage-free" communications
> carriers.  What happens when you inquire of your carrier as to
> whether it can provide such a guarantee or option?
>
>          Cheers,
>          Ron
>
> At 09:42 PM 3/1/2003, Tim Dierks wrote:
> >At 01:39 PM 2/27/2003 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
> >>At 9:01 AM -0500 on 2/27/03, BNA Highlights wrote:
> >> > WIRETAP ACT DOES NOT COVER MESSAGE 'IN STORAGE' FOR SHORT
> >> > PERIOD
> >> > BNA's Electronic Commerce & Law Report reports that a
> >> > federal court in Massachusetts has ruled that the federal
> >> > Wiretap Act does not prohibit the improper acquisition of
> >> > electronic communications that were "in storage" no matter
> >> > how ephemeral that storage may be. The court relied on Konop
> >> > v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc., which held that no Wiretap Act
> >> > violation occurs when an electronic communication is
> >> > accessed while in storage, "even if the interception takes
> >> > place during a nanosecond 'juncture' of storage along the
> >> > path of transmission."  Case name is U.S. v. Councilman.
> >> > Article at
> >> > <http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/eip.nsf/is/a0a6m6y1k8>
> >> > For a free trial to source of this story, visit
> >> > http://web.bna.com/products/ip/eplr.htm
> >
> >This would seem to imply to me that the wiretap act does not apply to any
> >normal telephone conversation which is carried at any point in its
transit
> >by an electronic switch, including all cell phone calls and nearly all
> >wireline calls, since any such switch places the data of the ongoing call
> >in "storage" for a tiny fraction of a second.
> >
> >  - Tim
> >
> >
> >
> >---------------------------------------------------------------------
> >The Cryptography Mailing List
> >Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to
> >majordomo at wasabisystems.com
>
> Ronald L. Rivest
> Room 324, 200 Technology Square, Cambridge MA 02139
> Tel 617-253-5880, Fax 617-258-9738, Email <rivest at mit.edu>
>
> --- end forwarded text
>
>
> --
> -----------------
> R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
> "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
> [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
> experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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From mab at research.att.com  Sun Mar  2 16:06:41 2003
From: mab at research.att.com (Matt Blaze)
Date: Sun, 02 Mar 2003 19:06:41 -0500
Subject: Roger Needham Died - from The Register 
In-Reply-To: Message from Bill Stewart <bill.stewart@pobox.com> 
   of "Sun, 02 Mar 2003 12:29:22 PST." <5.1.1.6.2.20030302122746.02cf5dc0@idiom.com> 
Message-ID: <200303030006.h2306fM30295@fbi.crypto.com>

Sad, sad news.

Roger's pioneering contributions to our art speak (volumes) for
themselves, and our field is diminished by the loss of his future
insights.

But I will miss him most for his enormous generosity, his sharp wit,
and his personal integrity.

-matt



> --------------------
> Obit: Roger Needham
> By Guy Kewney, Newswireless.net
> Posted: 02/03/2003 at 12:13 GMT
> 
> Sadly, we record the death of Roger Needham, computer pioneer...
> 
> There isn't much more to say, except that the man who was the reason 
> Microsoft set up its research centre in Cambridge, England, has had to lay 
> down his life's work. Cancer ended a legend.
> 
> He once told me that it was his idea that Microsoft stopped spending money 
> on patenting its research ideas, and instead, to make the results available 
> to other researchers. I wish I'd known him long enough to have some other 
> stories to pass on myself; he left a long legacy of people who attributed 
> their inspiration to having worked with him.
> 
> Here's what his CV at Microsoft Research says:
> 
> Roger M Needham, born 1935, was in computing at Cambridge since 1956. His 
> 1961 PhD thesis was on the application of digital computers to problems of 
> classification and grouping. In 1962 he joined the Computer Laboratory, 
> then called the Mathematical Laboratory, and has been on the faculty since 
> 1963. He took a leading role in Cambridge projects in operating systems, 
> time sharing systems, memory protection, local area networks, and 
> distributed systems over the next twenty years.
> 
> Roger worked at intervals on a variety of topics in security, (his main 
> research interest while with Microsoft) being particularly known for work 
> with Schroeder on authentication protocols (1978) and with Burrows and 
> Abadi on formalism for reasoning about them (1989).
> 
> Roger graduated from the University of Cambridge in Mathematics and 
> Philosophy in 1956, and then took the Diploma in Numerical Analysis and 
> Automatic Computing in 1957. He had been in computing at Cambridge ever 
> since. He succeeded Maurice Wilkes as Head of the Computer Laboratory from 
> 1980 to 1995, was promoted Professor in 1981, elected to the Royal Society 
> in 1985 and the Royal Academy of Engineering in 1993. He was appointed 
> Pro-Vice-Chancellor in 1996.
> 
> I only met him a couple of times, both times when Microsoft was doing 
> corporate hospitality to publicise the work it was doing in the Cambridge 
> research facility. He was as knowledgeable as any rumour could have 
> suggested; and as tolerant of an ignorant journalist as any academic could 
> ever be. And I shall never get to know him, now.
> 
> Guy Kewney is the editor/publisher of Newswireless.Net
> 
> -----------------------------------------------
> 
> 
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> The Cryptography Mailing List
> Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at wasabisystems.com





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From rah at shipwright.com  Sun Mar  2 17:59:11 2003
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2003 20:59:11 -0500
Subject: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short  
 Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
Message-ID: <E18pfHS-0004zw-00@maynard.mail.mindspring.net>


--- begin forwarded text



From mv at cdc.gov  Tue Mar  4 10:20:36 2003
From: mv at cdc.gov (Major Variola (ret))
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2003 10:20:36 -0800
Subject: Rogue Vally Cypherpunks Physical Meeting Mar 13
Message-ID: <3E64EE74.13C2EB70@cdc.gov>


At 08:55 AM 3/4/03 -0800, cypherpunk-vin at vmeng.com wrote:
>What are Cypherpunks?     A group of thinkers, programmers and
>researchers dedicated to preserve everyone's  freedom of speech
>through action.
>        * believers in crypto-anarchy,
>         * leaning towards libertarianism,
>         * most importantly, cypherpunks write code!

To pick a nit, and clarify something for lurkers, feds, reporters, grand
juries
and the like: IMHO "believers in crypto anarchy" sounds like a religion.

The phrase even parses ambiguously, which may
be a feature to the already clued but isn't to those trying to suss you
out.
I'm not a "believer" but an observer and analyzer.  And BTW I don't like
all the effects
of crypto tech but I have been forced to recognize and consider some of
them on this list.

"Students of cryptos effect on society" might work.  I'm not sure how
to fit "anarchy" into there without starting to sound like a rant.
"Crypto"
might even be too specific as things like interception technology and
commerce-systems are also of interest.

"Students of crypto's anarchy-tending effect.."?  But when some tech
is convincingly shown to be anarchy-minimizing or fascist-promoting,
I think the rational CP does not lose interest.  Drop the "anarchy";
"effects on society" should be enough.

Just my $.02.  Its your shindig.




From mjm at lsil.com  Tue Mar  4 12:12:42 2003
From: mjm at lsil.com (Michael Motyka)
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2003 12:12:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: CAPSII protest...
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0303041142590.14416-100000@pctglinux.lsil.com>


Yes Tyler, there is something nasty you can do that will not get you
nabbed. It requires the following equipment :

 airline ticket ( aisle seat )
 large pizza with the works
 quart of yogurt
 one dozen raw oysters
 one package of M&Ms
 ipecac syrup ( or a wafer-thin mint )

Just imagine the effect if almost every flight had one (:or more:)
passengers barfing buckets of primordial goo soon after takeoff.
Works just as well for trains and buses. It requires massive 
participation and a large, but not necessarily strong, stomach. I think it 
expresses quite well how recent events affect us all.

This may be a new form of civil disobedience. I hereby place it in the 
public domain for the benfit of all mankind.

I wonder if there's a lab test for ipecac?

(:

-- 




From smb at research.att.com  Wed Mar  5 11:30:54 2003
From: smb at research.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin)
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2003 14:30:54 -0500
Subject: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03) 
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sun, 02 Mar 2003 20:59:11 EST."
             <E18pfHS-0004zw-00@maynard.mail.mindspring.net> 
Message-ID: <20030305193054.18B187B4D@berkshire.research.att.com>

In message <E18pfHS-0004zw-00 at maynard.mail.mindspring.net>, "R. A. Hettinga" wr
ites:
>
>--- begin forwarded text
>
>
>Status: RO
>From: Somebody
>To: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
>Subject: Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short   Perio
>d (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
>Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2003 14:09:05 -0500
>
>Bob,
>
>Technically, since their signal speed is slower than light, even
>transmission lines act as storage devices.
>
>Wire tapping is now legal.
>

No, that's not waht the decision means.  Access to stored messages also 
requires court permission.  The (U.S.) ban on wiretapping without judicial
permission is rooted in a Supreme Court decision, Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
(http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=389&invol=347)
which held that a wiretap is a search which thus required a warrant.  I 
don't think there's ever been any doubt that seizing a stored message 
required a warrant.  But in an old case (OLMSTEAD v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928))
the Court had held that the Fourth Amendment only protected material 
things, and therefore *not* conversations monitored via a wiretap.  
That decision was overturned in Katz.

The crucial difference, from a law enforcement perspective, is how hard 
it is to get the requisite court order.  A stored message order is 
relatively easy; a wiretap order is very hard.  Note that this 
distinction is primarily statutory, not (as far as I know) 
constitutional.  

		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me)
		http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of "Firewalls" book)



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From tim at dierks.org  Wed Mar  5 11:40:20 2003
From: tim at dierks.org (Tim Dierks)
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2003 14:40:20 -0500
Subject: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short
  Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03) 
In-Reply-To: <20030305193054.18B187B4D@berkshire.research.att.com>
References: <Your message of "Sun, 02 Mar 2003 20:59:11 EST." <E18pfHS-0004zw-00@maynard.mail.mindspring.net>
Message-ID: <5.2.1.0.2.20030305143458.0b2cdf38@dierks.org>

At 02:30 PM 3/5/2003 -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> >From: Somebody
> >
> >Technically, since their signal speed is slower than light, even
> >transmission lines act as storage devices.
> >
> >Wire tapping is now legal.
>
>The crucial difference, from a law enforcement perspective, is how hard
>it is to get the requisite court order.  A stored message order is
>relatively easy; a wiretap order is very hard.  Note that this
>distinction is primarily statutory, not (as far as I know)
>constitutional.

Furthermore, it's apparently not illegal for a non-governmental actor to 
retrieve stored information which they have access to, although it might be 
illegal for them to wiretap a communication even if they had access to the 
physical medium over which it travels.

I disagree with "Somebody"'s claim; I don't think that claim would go 
anywhere in court, since a transmission clearly falls under the category of 
"wire communication", and it's clear that transmission lines are the very 
entities the wiretap act has always been intended to protect, so Congress' 
intent is quite clear, regardless of any argument about "storage".

  - Tim



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From schear at attbi.com  Mon Mar 10 18:02:20 2003
From: schear at attbi.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2003 18:02:20 -0800
Subject: New release of Invisible IRC available
Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20030310180001.0480e5f8@mail.attbi.com>



  IIP 1.1.0 (stable) is released. (2003-03-10)

Invisible IRC Project is a three-tier, peer distributed network designed to 
be a secure and private transport medium for high speed, low volume, 
dynamic content. Features:

     * Perfect Forward Security using Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol
     * Constant session key rotation
     * 128 bit Blowfish node-to-node encryption
     * 160 bit Blowfish end-to-end encryption
     * Chaffed traffic to thwart traffic analysis
     * Secure dynamic routing using cryptographically signed namespaces for 
node identification
     * Node level flood control
     * Seamless use of standard IRC clients
     * Gui interface
     * Peer distributed topology for protecting the identity of users
     * Completely modular in design, all protocols are plug-in capable

The IIP software is released under the GPL license and is available for 
Windows 98/ME/NT/2000/XP, *nix/BSD and Mac OSX.

http://invisiblenet.net/


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From schear at attbi.com  Tue Mar 11 13:17:57 2003
From: schear at attbi.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2003 13:17:57 -0800
Subject: Groove shills for the DoD: Kapor quits board
Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20030311131602.047d0eb0@mail.attbi.com>

Software Pioneer Quits Board of Groove
By JOHN MARKOFF


SAN FRANCISCO, March 10 — Mitchell D. Kapor, a personal computer industry 
software pioneer and a civil liberties activist, has resigned from the 
board of Groove Networks after learning that the company's software was 
being used by the Pentagon as part of its development of a domestic 
surveillance system.

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/11/business/11PRIV.html


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From eccmaili at math.uwaterloo.ca  Tue Mar 11 13:35:24 2003
From: eccmaili at math.uwaterloo.ca (ECC 2003)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2003 16:35:24 -0500 (EST)
Subject: 2nd announcement for ECC 2003
Message-ID: <mailman.715.1576007628.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>

------------------------------------------------------------------
THE 7TH WORKSHOP ON ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY (ECC 2003)

University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

August 11, 12 & 13 2003

SECOND ANNOUNCEMENT		      March 11, 2003


ECC 2003 is the seventh in a series of annual workshops dedicated 
to the study of elliptic curve cryptography and related areas. 
The main themes of ECC 2003 will be:
- The discrete logarithm problem.
- Efficient parameter generation and point counting.  
- Provably secure cryptographic protocols. 
- Efficient software and hardware implementation. 
- Side-channel attacks.
- Deployment of elliptic curve cryptography.

It is hoped that the meeting will continue to encourage and 
stimulate further research on the security and implementation 
of elliptic curve cryptosystems and related areas, and encourage 
collaboration between mathematicians, computer scientists and 
engineers in the academic, industry and government sectors.

Attendees of ECC 2003 might also wish to attend SAC 2003 
(Ottawa, Aug 14-15) and CRYPTO 2003 (Santa Barbara, Aug 17-21).


SPONSORS:     
  Certicom Corp.     
  MITACS     
  Motorola
  University of Essen  
  University of Waterloo


ORGANIZERS:     
  Gerhard Frey            (University of Essen)
  Darrel Hankerson	  (Auburn University)      
  Alfred Menezes          (University of Waterloo)
  Christof Paar           (Ruhr-Universitat Bochum)
  Edlyn Teske             (University of Waterloo)     
  Scott Vanstone          (University of Waterloo)
    

CONFIRMED SPEAKERS:
  Hans Dobbertin          (Ruhr-Universitat Bochum, Germany)
  Florian Hess            (University of Bristol, UK)
  Hugo Krawczyk           (Technion, Israel, and IBM Research, USA)
  Tanja Lange             (Ruhr-Universitat Bochum, Germany)
  Reynald Lercier         (Centre d'Electronique de L'Armement, France)
  Ben Lynn                (Stanford University, USA)
  William Martin          (National Security Agency, USA)
  Christof Paar           (Ruhr-Universitat Bochum, Germany)
  John Proos              (University of Waterloo, Canada)
  Jean-Jacques Quisquater (Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium)
  Pankaj Rohatgi          (IBM Research, USA)
  Victor Shoup            (New York University, USA)
  Jerome Solinas          (National Security Agency, USA)
  Edlyn Teske             (University of Waterloo, Canada)


CONFERENCE PROGRAMME:

There will be approximately 15 invited lectures (and no contributed
talks), with the remaining time used for informal discussions. There
will be both survey lectures as well as lectures on latest research
developments. All lectures will be held on the campus of the University
of Waterloo. Further details of the programme and lecture rooms will
be provided in the third announcement.


REGISTRATION:
  
There will be a registration fee this year of $250 Cdn or $170 US
or Euros 160 ($150 Cdn or $100 US or Euros 90 for full-time graduate 
students). PLEASE REGISTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AS SPACE IS LIMITED FOR 
THIS WORKSHOP; REGISTRATION IS ON A FIRST-COME FIRST-SERVE BASIS. 
We cannot process a registration until all fees are paid in full. 
The deadline for all fees to be paid and registration completed has 
been set for the 1st of August, 2003.  To register, complete, in full, 
the attached REGISTRATION FORM and return it along with your payment to:
Mrs. Adrienne Richter, C&O Dept., University of Waterloo, Waterloo,
Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1. You can also send your registration form by
fax (519-725-5441) or by email (ecc2003 at math.uwaterloo.ca). 
Confirmation of your registration will be sent by email when payment 
is received in full.


------------------------cut from here---------------------------------
ECC 2003 CONFERENCE              REGISTRATION FORM

Fullname:
_________________________________________________________

Affiliation:
_________________________________________________________

Address:
_________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________

E-Mail Address:
_________________________________________________________

Telephone #:
_________________________________________________________

Registration Fee: Please check the appropriate box:

[ ] Registration .......$250.00 CAD ..............$________

[ ] Registration .......$170.00 USD ..............$________

[ ] Registration .......Euro 160.00 ..............$________

[ ] Full-time Student ..$150.00 CAD ..............$________

[ ] Full-time Student ..$100.00 USD ..............$________

[ ] Full-time Student ..Euro  90.00 ..............$________

Registration Fee includes Banquet: Attending [ ] Yes  [ ] No

                                  Vegetarian [ ] Yes  [ ] No

TOTAL AMOUNT PAYABLE: ............................$________


    **Make Cheque/Money Order Payable to:  ECC 2003

    Credit Card Payments:

                [  ] Visa                  [  ] MasterCard

Cardholder's Name: ________________________________________________

Card Number: ______________________________________________________

Expiration Date: __________________________________________________

Signature: ________________________________________________________

Additional Information: ___________________________________________

-------------------------cut from here-------------------------------


TRAVEL:

Kitchener-Waterloo is approximately 100km/60miles from Pearson
International Airport in Toronto.  Ground transportation to
Kitchener-Waterloo can be pre-arranged with Airways Transit.

TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM TORONTO AIRPORT PROVIDED BY AIRWAYS TRANSIT

It is advisable to book your transportation between the Pearson Airport,
Toronto, and Waterloo in advance to receive the advance booking rate of
$38 CAD per person, one way, with Airways Transit (open 24 hours a day).
Please quote "ECC2003" when making your reservation. Airways is a 
door-to-door service; they accept cash (Cdn or US funds), MasterCard, 
Visa and American Express.

Upon arrival:
Terminal 1: proceed to Ground Transportation Booth, Arrivals Level.
Terminal 2: proceed to Airways Transit desk, Arrivals Level, Area E.
Terminal 3: proceed to Ground Transportation Booth, Arrivals Level,
                between Doors B and C. 

You can make a reservation through their web site:
  www.airwaystransit.com 
Or, you can complete the form below and send by mail or 
fax (519-886-2141) well in advance of your arrival to 
Airways Transit. They will not fax confirmations:  your fax 
transmission record is confirmation of your reservation. 

-------------------------cut from here---------------------------------
AIRWAYS TRANSIT ADVANCE BOOKING FORM - ECC 2003

ARRIVAL INFORMATION:

____________________________________________________________
Surname					First name

____________________________________________________________
Toronto Arrival Date		Airline		Flight #

____________________________________________________________
Arrival Time				Arriving From

____________________________________________________________
Destination in Kitchener/Waterloo		No. in party

DEPARTURE INFORMATION:

____________________________________________________________
Surname					First name

____________________________________________________________
Toronto Departure Date		Airline		Flight #

____________________________________________________________
Departure Time		Flight #		Destination

____________________________________________________________
Pickup From				No. in party

____________________________________________________________
Signature					Date

Send or Fax to:

Airways Transit
99A Northland Road
Waterloo, Ontario
Canada, N2V 1Y8

Fax:           (519) 886-2141
Telephone:     (519) 886-2121
-----------------------------cut form here--------------------------------


ACCOMMODATIONS:

There is a limited block of rooms set aside on a first-come 
first-serve basis at the Waterloo Inn for the evenings of
August 10, 11, 12 and 13, and at the Comfort Inn for the 
evenings of August 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. Please note that
the Waterloo Inn is sold out for the evening of August 9.

COMFORT INN 
Address:       190 Weber Street North, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2J 3H4
Phone:         (519) 747-9400
Rate:          $80 Cdn plus taxes/night for a single or double room
               Please quote "ECC 2003" when making your reservation
Availability:  Evenings of August 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
Cut-off date:  July 7, 2003

WATERLOO INN
Address:       475 King Street North, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2J 2Z5
Phone:         (519) 884-0222
Fax:           (519) 884-0321
Toll Free:     1-800-361-4708
Website:       www.waterlooinn.com
Rate:          $118 Cdn plus taxes/night for a single or double room
               Please quote "ECC 2003" when making your reservation
Availability:  Evenings of August 10, 11, 12, 13 
Cut-off date:  June 29, 2003


Other hotels close to the University of Waterloo are:

  UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO CONFERENCE CENTRE
  (on-campus accommodation; no air conditioning)
  Ron Eydt Village, Box 16610, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N3J 4C1
  Phone: 519-884-5400, 519-746-7599 
  Website: www.conferences.uwaterloo.ca (see "Room Registration")
  Approx rate: $52 Cdn plus taxes/night

  DESTINATION INN
  547 King Street North, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 5Z7
  Phone: (519) 884-0100
  Website: www.destinationinn.com
  Approx rate: $73 Cdn plus taxes/night
  
  BEST WESTERN INN
  St. Jacobs Country Inn
  50 Benjamin Road East, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2V 2J9
  Phone:   (519) 884-9295
  Website: www.stjacobscountryinn.com
  Approx rate: $129 Cdn plus taxes/night
  
  THE WATERLOO HOTEL
  2 King Street North, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2J 2W7
  Phone: (519) 885-2626
  Website: www.countryinns.org/inn_waterloo.html
  Approx rate: $120-160 Cdn plus taxes/night
  

HOTEL TO CONFERENCE TRANSPORTATION:

A shuttle to/from the campus will be available each day of the
conference from the Waterloo Inn and Comfort Inn only. Place 
and times for pickup and drop-off will be provided in the 
final announcement.


FURTHER INFORMATION:

For further information or to return your Registration, please contact:

Mrs. Adrienne Richter
Department of Combinatorics & Optimization
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1
e-mail:  ecc2003 at math.uwaterloo.ca
Fax:     (519) 725-5441
Phone:   (519) 888-4027

If you did not receive this announcement by email and would like to 
be added to the mailing list for the third announcement, please send 
email to ecc2003 at math.uwaterloo.ca. The announcements are also 
available from the web site  www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca

------------------------------------------------------------------

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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From rah at shipwright.com  Wed Mar 12 03:16:19 2003
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2003 06:16:19 -0500
Subject: 2nd announcement for ECC 2003
Message-ID: <E18t4qg-0002H0-00@maynard.mail.mindspring.net>


--- begin forwarded text



From njohnsn at njohnsn.com  Wed Mar 12 19:13:40 2003
From: njohnsn at njohnsn.com (Neil Johnson)
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2003 21:13:40 -0600
Subject: Brinwear at Benetton.
In-Reply-To: <10B6AAC2-54CD-11D7-B5D7-000A956B4C74@got.net>
References: <10B6AAC2-54CD-11D7-B5D7-000A956B4C74@got.net>
Message-ID: <200303122113.40543.njohnsn@njohnsn.com>


RFID technology for libraries ...

http://www.demco.com/CGI-BIN/LANSAWEB?PROCFUN+LWDCWEB+LWDC025+PRD+ENG+FUNCPARMS+ZZWSESSID(A0200):29762251880047332521+ZZWNAVPAG(A0100):PROMO+DATESEQ(A0140):31210321918+FC_AZZWHDRCMP:DEMCO_HEADER+FC_AZZWNEWZON:ADM+FC_AZZWNAVPAG:PRODUCT+FC_AZZWNEWHDR:DEMCO_HEADER+FC_AZZWCATCDE:+FC_AW_KEYMSCD:+FC_SW_PRDBBID:7483

So the man can now know what books you taking on the flight (Hopefully not the 
flight training manual for the aircraft).

-- 
Neil Johnson
http://www.njohnsn.com
PGP key available on request.




From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Thu Mar 13 22:32:46 2003
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2003 22:32:46 -0800
Subject: Brumley & Boneh timing attack on OpenSSL
Message-ID: <5.1.1.6.2.20030313222547.02e84e40@idiom.com>

 From Slashdot: 
http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=03/03/14/0012214&mode=thread&tid=172
David Brumley and Dan Boneh write:
"Timing attacks are usually used to attack weak computing devices such as 
smartcards.
We show that timing attacks apply to general software systems.
Specifically, we devise a timing attack against OpenSSL.
Our experiments show that we can extract private keys from a
OpenSSL-based server such as Apache with mod_SSL and stunnel
running on a machine in the local network. Our results demonstrate that
timing attacks against widely deployed network servers are practical.
Subsequently, software should implement defenses against timing attacks.
Our paper can be found at Stanford's Applied Crypto Group.
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/ssl-timing.html  "

Schmoo Group response on cryptonomicon.net
http://www.cryptonomicon.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=263&mode=&order=0&thold=0
Apparently OpenSSL has code to prevent the timing attack,
but it's often not compiled in (I'm not sure how much that's for
performance reasons as opposed to general ignorance?)

They also comment (as did somebody on Slashdot) that
"this is distinct from the timing attack described in the paper
by Canvel, Hiltgen, Vaudenay, and Vuagnoux last month."
That one's an implementation problem and hard to exploit.
http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/memo_ssl.shtml
http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=03/02/20/1956229


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From timcmay at got.net  Mon Mar 17 20:59:31 2003
From: timcmay at got.net (Tim May)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2003 20:59:31 -0800
Subject: Journalists, Diplomats, Others Urged to Evacuate City
Message-ID: <67E6F672-58FE-11D7-80BA-0003930F2360@got.net>


Journalists, diplomats, inspectors, and civil servants are being urged 
to evacuate the capital. A timetable of 48 hours has been given.

"The Evil Doers will be rooted out and the Evil Ones punished," said 
one spokesman.

However, as of midnight, Eastern Standard Time, there is no evidence 
that Washington residents are taking these warnings seriously.



Needless to say, this is not a threat. I am 3000 miles away, relatively 
safe on my hilltop. Being the survivalist that I have been for much of 
the past 30 years, I have a pantry closet filled with canned goods, 
rice, cereal. And I have a generator, which I expect not to use much. 
And solar battery rechargers (sufficient to recharge AAs and Ds for my 
various small radios, even recharge my laptop...this in case my 
24-packs of AAs and Ds run out, or my several lead cell battery packs, 
etc.). And I have my perimeter alarms, my solar-powered intrusion 
alarms, my rifles, my handguns, my shotguns, my other weapons, my water 
filters, my colleagues. I don't expect to need this stuff, but I am, as 
always, happy to be able to  just stay at home on my hill and watch the 
chaos unfold.

About the threat to Washington: I think it's relatively high. A nerve 
gas attack on buildings or the Metro seems likely. (The Japanese AUM 
cult had Sarin, but was inept. A more capable, military-trained 
operative has had many months to get into D.C. and wait for the obvious 
time to attack. And he need not even be a suicide bomber. A cannister 
of VX with a reliable timer is child's play.

If I were Declan, I'd get out of Dodge.

--Tim May




From rot1955 at attbi.com  Mon Mar 17 22:37:39 2003
From: rot1955 at attbi.com (rick)
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2003 22:37:39 -0800
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <000801c2ed18$df021990$c77ba8c0@homem26hqkys67>

http://www.outwar.com/page.php?x=513854

CRACK HERE
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From pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz  Mon Mar 17 05:09:44 2003
From: pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2003 01:09:44 +1200
Subject: Brumley & Boneh timing attack on OpenSSL
Message-ID: <200303171309.h2HD9iG17136@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>

Bill Stewart <bill.stewart at pobox.com> writes:

>Schmoo Group response on cryptonomicon.net
>http://www.cryptonomicon.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=263&mode=&order=0&thold=0
>Apparently OpenSSL has code to prevent the timing attack,
>but it's often not compiled in (I'm not sure how much that's for
>performance reasons as opposed to general ignorance?)

I had blinding code included in my crypto code for about 3 years,
when not a single person used it in all that time I removed it
again (actually I think it's probably still there, but disconnected).
I'm leaning strongly towards "general ignorance" here...

Peter.

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From schear at attbi.com  Fri Mar 21 19:24:20 2003
From: schear at attbi.com (Steve Schear)
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2003 19:24:20 -0800
Subject: Spammers Would Be Made To Pay Under IBM Research Proposal
In-Reply-To: <E18wYDO-0004vA-00@smtp10.atl.mindspring.net>
Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20030321191443.0491ccf8@mail.attbi.com>


>Spammers Would Be Made To Pay Under IBM Research Proposal
>
>By Tony Kontzer, InformationWeek, InternetWeek
>Mar 20, 2003 (8:45 PM)
>URL: http://www.internetweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=7900141
>
>Companies and consumers alike have been looking to two primary aids in the 
>battle to stem the flood of spam. On the practical side, they're turning 
>to a seemingly endless parade of filters and other software products 
>designed to slow the tide of unwanted E-mail by doing things such as 
>checking messages against known spam, using textual clues to glean whether 
>a message is spam, or blocking the IP addresses of known spammers. On the 
>more hopeful side, they're pressuring legislators for federal laws banning 
>spam.
>
>IBM researchers say both approaches miss the target--that the software 
>approach amounts to a constant game of trying to stay one step ahead of 
>spammers, while legislation, if and when it comes, won't be able to 
>address spam coming from outside U.S. borders. As a result, they've come 
>up with another approach: Make spammers pay to send messages. It sounds 
>absurdly simple, and Scott Fahlman, a research staff member at IBM's 
>Watson Research Center, says it is. Fahlman is trying to build momentum 
>behind a concept he's calling the "charity stamp" approach, which would 
>force anyone sending unsolicited messages to pay to reach recipients 
>participating in the program unless they had an authenticated code.

>Of course none of this is news to many readers on this list.  A number of 
>people in the crypto/cypherpunk community (e.g, Adam Back, Eric S. 
>Johansson and Ben Laurie) have worked for some time to develop the 
>mathematics and code to launch proof-of-concept e-stamp systems based on 
>either Proof-of-Work algorithims or real value.  Recently Microsoft also 
>unveiled a similar project PennyBlack 
>http://research.microsoft.com/research/sv/PennyBlack/


steve


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From eugen at leitl.org  Sat Mar 22 00:51:22 2003
From: eugen at leitl.org (Eugen Leitl)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2003 09:51:22 +0100 (CET)
Subject: Brumley & Boneh timing attack on OpenSSL (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0303220947570.15394-100000@hydrogen.leitl.org>


Some clarification by Peter Gutmann <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz> on why 
cryptlib doesn't do timing attack resistance default:

Peter Gutmann <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz>:
 
cryptlib was never intended to be a high-performance SSL server (the docs are
fairly clear on this), and I don't think anyone is using it to replace Apache
or IIS.  OTOH it is used in a number of specialised environments such as closed
environments, embedded systems and mainframes.  For example two real-world uses
of the cryptlib SSL server are in embedded environment A and mainframe
environment B.

  In A, the processing is handled by a low-power embedded processor.  It takes
  10-15s to perform an SSL handshake, and that's after the code has been
  optimised to death to squeeze every possible bit of performance out of it.
  Performing the necessary 1.5M queries at 15s each would take approximately 8
  1/2 months at 100% CPU load (meaning that the device is unable to perform any
  other operations in that entire time).  This is unlikely to go unnoticed,
  given that it's polled from other devices for status updates.

  In B, CPU resources are so scarce that the implementation uses null cipher
  suites because it can't afford the overhead of even RC4 for encryption
  (admittedly this required a custom code hack, cryptlib doesn't normally
  support null encryption suites).  After about 100 or so attempts at a full
  SSL handshake, klaxons would sound and blue-suited troops would deploy onto
  the raised flooring to determine where all the CPU time is going.

In neither of these environments (and various similar ones) would a side-
channel attack requiring 1M or so queries (e.g. this one, or the Bleichenbacher
attack, or the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa attack, which cryptlib shouldn't be
vulnerable to since I'm paranoid about error reporting) be terribly feasible.
OTOH blinding does produce a noticeable slowdown for a process that's already
regarded by its users as unacceptably slow and/or CPU-intensive (I have some
users who've hacked the key-exchange process to use fixed shared keys because
they just can't spare the CPU time to do a real handshake, e.g. by injecting
the shared key into the SSL session cache so you just do a pseudo-resume for
each new connection).  For this reason, cryptlib makes the use of sidechannel-
attack-protection an optional item, which must be selected by the user (via use
of the blinding code, now admittedly I should probably make this a bit easier
to do in future releases than having to hack the source :-).  This is not to
downplay the seriousness of the attack, merely to say that in some cases the
slowdown/CPU consumption vs.attack risk doesn't make it worthwhile to defend
against.



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From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Sat Mar 22 12:25:58 2003
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2003 12:25:58 -0800
Subject: Brumley & Boneh timing attack on OpenSSL (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.44.0303220947570.15394-100000@hydrogen.leitl.or
 g>
Message-ID: <5.1.1.6.2.20030322121904.02ebe2d8@idiom.com>

At 09:51 AM 03/22/2003 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>Some clarification by Peter Gutmann <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz> on why
>cryptlib doesn't do timing attack resistance default:
>
>Peter Gutmann <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz>:
>cryptlib was never intended to be a high-performance SSL server (the docs are
>fairly clear on this), and I don't think anyone is using it to replace Apache
>or IIS.  OTOH it is used in a number of specialised environments such as 
>closed
...
>  For this reason, cryptlib makes the use of sidechannel-
>attack-protection an optional item, which must be selected by the user 
>(via use
>of the blinding code, now admittedly I should probably make this a bit easier
>to do in future releases than having to hack the source :-).  This is not to
>downplay the seriousness of the attack, merely to say that in some cases the
>slowdown/CPU consumption vs.attack risk doesn't make it worthwhile to defend
>against.

If it's not meant to be a high-performance server, then slowing it down
another 20% by doing RSA timing things is probably fine for most uses,
and either using compiler flags or (better) friendlier options of some sort
to turn off the timing resistance is probably the better choice.

I'm not sure how flexible things need to be - real applications of the
openssl code include non-server things like certificate generation,
and probably some reasonable fraction of the RSA or DH calculations
don't need to be timing-protected, but many of them are also things
that aren't CPU-consumption-critical either.




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From dfc at anize.org  Sat Mar 22 14:12:59 2003
From: dfc at anize.org (Douglas F. Calvert)
Date: 22 Mar 2003 17:12:59 -0500
Subject: Keysigning @ CFP2003
Message-ID: <1048371179.24681.32.camel@liberate.anize.org>

GPG/PGP Keysigning @ Computers, Freedom and Privacy 2003
April 2nd, 9:45pm (First BoF Session)
                                                                                                                     
I will be organizing a keysigning session for CFP2003. Please submit
your keys to cfp-keys at anize.org and I will print out sheets with key
information in order to speed up the process. Bring a photo ID and a
copy of your key information so that you can verify what is on the
printout. A list of submitted keys and a keyring will be available on:
                                                                                                                     
http://anize.org/cfp2003/
                                                                                                                     
Thank you...
                                                                                                                     

-- 
+  Douglas Calvert dfc at anize.org http://anize.org/dfc/ +
|   Key Id 0xC9541FB2  http://anize.org/dfc-keys.asc   |
|       [X] User wants to receive encrypted mail       |
+| 0817 30D4 82B6 BB8D 5E66  06F6 B796 073D C954 1FB2 |+
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From rah at shipwright.com  Mon Mar 31 07:49:05 2003
From: rah at shipwright.com (R. A. Hettinga)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2003 10:49:05 -0500
Subject: GPS phones confiscated from reporters in Iraq
Message-ID: <E19046Y-00033n-00@maynard.mail.mindspring.net>

http://www.newscientist.com/news/print.jsp?id=ns99993567

New Scientist

GPS phones confiscated from reporters in Iraq 



15:26 31 March 03 

Will Knight



Satellite phones with built-in Global Positioning System (GPS)
capabilities have been confiscated from journalists travelling with US
troops inside Iraq, due to fears that they could inadvertently reveal
their positions.

Reporters "embedded" with the troops have been asked to hand over
satellite telephones operated by Thuraya Satellite Telecommunications,
a communications company based in Abu Dhabi. The restriction is
limited to units near the war's front-line and is expected to be
temporary, a spokesman for US central command in Qatar told New
Scientist .

A spokeswoman for the US Department of Defense added that reporters
with unaffected satellite phones would be asked to share them and that
military communications equipment would be made available when
possible. Replacement phones could also be sent to the front line.

Richard Langley, a GPS expert at the University of New Brunswick,
Canada, says US military commanders may be concerned that positioning
information embedded in signals sent by the Thuraya phones could be
intercepted and used by Iraqi forces to locate and attack US troops.

"It's not impossible, although it would be rather difficult," Langley
told New Scientist . "The signals are line-of-sight [from handset to
satellite] so very little would leak out and be interceptable on the
ground."


Ground station intercept 

It would be easier to intercept the signal as it arrives from the
satellite at the network operator's ground station, he says. But even
in this case, any interceptor would still have to crack the encryption
protecting the signal.

An alternative concern is that the US military are worried that
computers used to store call information are vulnerable to cyber
attack. "Perhaps the concern was that there would be a log of these
positions kept on a computer somewhere," Langley says.

Positional information captured by any means would only be useful for
as long as the caller remained in the same place, he notes: "Anyone
wanting to use the information would have to work quickly."

Thuraya telephones can connect to GSM mobile phone networks when they
are available, and a satellite network when in more remote areas. The
phones can also be used as a GPS receiver, determining its position by
communicating with satellites in the GPS constellation.

If the GPS functionality is switched on, the caller's co-ordinates are
automatically embedded in the voice signal sent to the communications
satellites.


-- 
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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From bill.stewart at pobox.com  Mon Mar 31 12:23:56 2003
From: bill.stewart at pobox.com (Bill Stewart)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2003 12:23:56 -0800
Subject: art can make a difference, and traffic routing games
In-Reply-To: <3E887E19.67773E50@cdc.gov>
Message-ID: <5.1.1.6.2.20030331122051.02d9e640@idiom.com>


At 09:42 AM 03/31/2003 -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>PS Bill: How did management like the news
>channels calling the Baghdad CO an "AT&T Building" :-)

I didn't catch that one, but as the token phone company guy here,
the fact that they started off Desert Scam by blowing up the
phone company building with a cruise missile did piss me off...


What our management _does_ need to clue into is the recent
Michigan law banning VPNs/NAT/routers/etc. - the similar laws
proposed in a number of other states only applied in cases of fraud
or theft of service, but the Michigan one was badly worded.




From die at die.com  Mon Mar 31 20:17:42 2003
From: die at die.com (Dave Emery)
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2003 23:17:42 -0500
Subject: Run a remailer, go to jail?
In-Reply-To: <87k7ejmken.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
References: <87k7ejmken.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
Message-ID: <20030401041741.GS13933@pig.die.com>

On Fri, Mar 28, 2003 at 01:10:56PM -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> 
> http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/archives/000336.html
> 
> Quoting:
> 
>         Here is one example of the far-reaching harmful effects of
>         these bills. Both bills would flatly ban the possession, sale,
>         or use of technologies that "conceal from a communication
>         service provider ... the existence or place of origin or
>         destination of any communication".
> 
> -- 
> Perry E. Metzger		perry at piermont.com


	For those on this list in the Boston area there is a hearing
scheduled on the Mass Bill at 10 Am in Room 222 of the Mass State House
in Boston.

	It was introduced in Mass by a Rep Stephen Tobin of Boston and listed
on the state website as "legislation to establish a crime of illegal
internet and broadband access"

-- 
	Dave Emery N1PRE,  die at die.com  DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass 02493
PGP fingerprint 1024D/8074C7AB 094B E58B 4F74 00C2 D8A6 B987 FB7D F8BA 8074 C7AB

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From ken at freeswan.ca  Mon Mar 31 21:00:15 2003
From: ken at freeswan.ca (Ken Bantoft)
Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2003 00:00:15 -0500 (EST)
Subject: [sfs-dev] ANNOUNCE: Patriot S/WAN 1.0 Released!
Message-ID: <mailman.716.1576007628.31620.cypherpunks-legacy@lists.cpunks.org>



Hi Folks, 

JuanJo Ciarlante and I are pleased to announce the release of Patriot 
S/WAN v1.0.  What is this exactly?  Read on...

Those of you who've followed Super FreeS/WAN development will have noticed 
our current trend of supporting less and less secure ciphers, including 
the NULL cipher, and last month, Single DES.

We've decided to take this one step futher, since there is alot of 
uncertainty these days with crypto export regulations for US Citizens.  So 
we've forked Super FreeS/WAN and disabled the high grade ciphers.  Thanks 
to a special grant from the US Government, JuanJo was able to take the 
time to write the ipsec_rot13 module, so we can finally support rot13 
encryption for VPNs!  This means the package can be freely exported out of 
the US with no restrictions, even to countries like Iraq and Afghanistan.

You can download Patriot S/WAN from http://www.freeswan.ca/code/patriotswan 
or http://downloads.freeswan.ca/patriotswan today, and start building 
VPN's while still allowing the US Government to eavesdrop on all of your 
communications.  Never worry about a court-ordered wiretap again!




-- 
Ken Bantoft                The Unoffical FreeS/WAN Site:
ken at freeswan.ca            http://www.freeswan.ca
                           PGP Key: finger ken at bantoft.org
The memory management on the PowerPC can be used to 
frighten small children.	-- Linus Torvalds



_______________________________________________
Super FreeS/WAN development mailing list
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--- end forwarded text


-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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