Sealing wax & eKeyboard

[Trei, Peter]

> ----------
> From: 	Tyler Durden[SMTP:camera_lumina at hotmail.com]
> Sent: 	Wednesday, July 16, 2003 9:38 PM
> To: 	sunder at sunder.net
> Cc: 	shaddack at ns.arachne.cz; timcmay at got.net; cypherpunks at minder.net
> Subject: 	Re: Sealing wax & eKeyboard
> 
> I don't think a virtual keyboard is necessarily a bad idea in this case. I
> 
> live in a densely populated neighborhood in NYC. SOmeone is ALWAYS in my 
> home, and in the rare cases nobody's here we turn on our alarm. This does 
> not mean some visual surveillance of my keyboard is impossible, but it 
> greatly reduces the number of parties with the desire and resources to 
> attempt such a surveillance. And the reason this matters is because I can 
> download such a virtual keyboard for pennies (thus causing the need for
> VERY 
> costly forms of surveillance by nullifying keystroke loggers), and cause
> the 
> cost of surveillance to rise probably far more than exponentially. This is
> a 
> good thing (from my point of view!) in and of itself, but imagine if a
> large 
> number of people thought this way, encrypting even the most trivial of 
> communications.
> 
> -TD
> 
> 
Lets not forget optical TEMPEST - remember a few months ago,
when it was demonstrated that the image on a CRT could
be reconstructed just from the light it reflected on walls? The
point where the electron beam is hitting the phosphors is 
much brighter than the rest of the screen, and by syncing a
fast photodetector to monitor scan rates, you can reconstruct
the image on a screen in a distant room just by viewing the
backwash light through a telescope.

Peter