[IP] Open Source TCPA driver and white papers (fwd)

[David Howe]

at Friday, January 24, 2003 4:53 PM, Mike Rosing <eresrch at eskimo.com>
was seen to say:
> Thanks Eugen,  It looks like the IBM TPM chip is only a key
> store read/write device.  It has no code space for the kind of
> security discussed in the TCPA.  The user still controls the machine
> and can still monitor who reads/writes the chip (using a pci bus
> logger for example).  There is a lot of emphasis on TPM != Palladium,
> and TPM != DRM.  TPM can not control the machine, and for DRM to work
> the way RIAA wants, TPM won't meet their needs.  TPM looks pretty
> useful as it sits for real practical security tho, so I can see why
> IBM wants those !='s to be loud and clear.
Bearing in mind though that DRM/Paladium won't work at all if it can't
trust its hardware - so TPM != Paladium, but TPM (or an improved TPM) is
a prerequisite.