Deniable URLs....

[Tyler Durden]

Peter Fairbrother wrote...

>From: Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186 at zen.co.uk>
>To: Thomas Shaddack <shaddack at ns.arachne.cz>,   "cypherpunks at lne.com"  
><cypherpunks at lne.com>
>Subject: Re: Anonglish (was: Re: Authenticating Meat)
>Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2003 15:42:41 +0100
>
>Thomas Shaddack wrote:
>
> > On Sat, 26 Apr 2003, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> >> But seriously, you've just mentioned what's called "textual analysis".
> >> Spelling errors and other idiosyncratic choices can be used
> >> to "pierce the veil" of anonymity.  That's what did in Dr. Kaczynski,
> >> who pissed on the FBI for over a decade, until his brother recognized
> >> his text.
> >
> > Couldn't there be a standard English-based language, "Anonglish", with a
> > subset of English grammatical rules, human-readable (though maybe with 
>its
> > own idiosyncrazies) and machine-parseable, which appearance would not 
>give
> > many more clues than that Anonglish was used? Something where grammar
> > rules would be few, strict, and easy to machine-check, spelling as well,
> > and still be readable to anyone who knows "standard" English? Possibly
> > with a "translator" from "normal" English (of course with the necessity 
>to
> > read the translation, correct eventual semantical mistakes introduced by
> > rearranging the words, and "anonspell-check" the result)?
> >
> > That would put textual analysis from comparing the errors characteristic
> > for a given person to comparing of trains of thoughts, which is much 
>more
> > difficult, much less being a "reliable proof", and practically 
>impossible
> > for very short messages.
>
>I'm starting to do something slightly similar, for different reasons. It's
>part of a deniable encryption project.
>
>If you have perfect compression, and you encrypt a message which has been
>compressed, any decryption will look sensible.
>
>This means that you don't need long keys, that brute force attacks won't
>work, and that any supposed decryption is deniable. Unfortunately it's
>theoretically impossible to achieve, and difficult to usefully approach,
>perfect compression.
>
>
>What _is_ possible, at least in theory, is super-perfect compression,
>wherein the set of possible messages is reduced. The way I am attempting to
>do it is quite similar to your proposal, but there's a long way to go yet!
>
>
>
>There's an August 2001 thread in the sci.crypt.research archives called
>"Grammar/dictionary-based compression for deniability:" in which I explain 
>a
>bit more about it (or rather, about an earlier version). The "super" bit
>solves, at least in theory, the unicity problems.
>
>
>--
>Peter Fairbrother

Well, a thought just popped into my head. Basically, why not have the 
message actually be a URL and a password pointing to the message?

A convolved fake message would be an alternate URL ponting to the deniable 
text.

-TD


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