Intel Security processor + a question

[Major Variola (ret)]

At 07:40 PM 10/18/02 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote:
>Well,I disagree about psuedo random number generation, sort of.
>First, if I have PSR sequence of the known variety (ie, ANSI or ITU),
and if
>it's mapped to some telecom standard (DS-1/3, OC-3/12/48/192), then my
test
>set can and should be able to lock onto that sequence. This is true
whether
>that telecom signal is raw PRBS, or if it has been mapped into the
payload
>(you use different test sets).

1. Shift reg sequences are cryptographically weak.

2. Re-synch'ing with a PR stream is useful for some apps, true.

3. In crypto, we consider the adversary who claims to have a true RNG
but
instead is faking us out with an opaque PRNG.  If We are not privvy to
the
PRNG algorithm (or key) then we can't tell if its truly random or not.

>With encrypted info who knows? I would think that testing if there's
monkey
>business might boil down to algorithms--ie, if certain bit patterns
happen
>too often, then something's wrong...

Bit-bias is trivial to correct (see Shannon).  Take a look at Prof.
Marsaglia's
"Diehard" suite of statistical-structural tests for a real obstacle
course.  But
no such "does it look random" test can tell good PRNG from TRNG.
You must peek under the hood.