why OpenPGP is preferable to S/MIME (Re: NAI pulls out the DMCA stick)

[jamesd at echeque.com]

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On 23 May 2002 at 21:58, Adam Back wrote:
> This won't achieve the desired effect because it will just
> destroy the S/MIME trust mechanism.  S/MIME is based on the
> assumption that all CAs are trustworthy.  Anyone can forge any
> identity for clients with that key installed.  S/MIME isn't
> really compatible with the web of trust because because of the
> two tier trust system -- all CAs are assumed trustworthy and all
> users are not able to sign anything.

Or to say the same thing in slightly different words, all CAs are
perfectly and equally trustworthy, and all users are
untrustworthy.

This system is inherently authoritarian.  Because that authority
must be restricted for it to be useful, it is inherently a pain in
the ass to administer, with inherently high administrative costs.
Like socialism, S/MIME results in bureacracy, delay, expense, and
inefficiency. 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
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