Fwd: Re: Quantum Computing Puts Encrypted Messages at Risk (fwd)

[Jim Choate]

Random photons in optical systems are easy to get at hight speed, a flame.

BEC's also have the capability to make some significant breaks in the
security of optical encryption. For example, one can trap a photon in a
BEC, measure it's parameters at one of the BEC-component atoms, then
re-emit the photon without changing its state (the trick is we are
measuring a part of the photon not the entire photon, and the photon is
standing still - frozen in time).



> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> Date: Sun, 14 Jul 2002 15:24:48 +0200
> From: Amir Herzberg <amir at herzberg.name>
> To: cryptography at wasabisystems.com
> Subject: Fwd: Re: Quantum Computing Puts Encrypted Messages at Risk
> 
> 
> >At 20:50 11/07/2002, Ian wrote:
> >>When I first read The Code Book (Simon Singh), I drooled endlessly at
> >>the idea of Unbreakable Encryption, until I became a little more
> >>cynical. I questioned Dr Singh on this when he came and gave a lecture
> >>in Cheltenham UK recently, and his best answer was that QKD is so secure
> >>because "its a different kind of system. Its not like conventional
> >>encryption." [synopsis - not direct quotation]. I'm not thorougly
> >>convinced.
> >>
> >>Can anyone (politely) prove this mere outsider wrong?
> >
> >I am also not a physicist. So I share your skepticism about relying for 
> >security on physic theories which I don't understand, and furthermore 
> >which may evolve and refine over time.
> >
> >However, as many people are excited about Quantum crypto, I really would 
> >like to put my skepticism aside and understand what is its cryptographic 
> >significance, say if we accept the physics as valid (for ever or at least 
> >`long enough`). In particular I'm considering whether I should and can 
> >cover this area in my book. I must admit I haven't yet studied this area 
> >carefully, so my questions may be naive, if so please excuse me (and your 
> >answer will be doubly appreciated). Some questions:
> >
> >1. Quantum key encryption seems to require huge amounts of truly random 
> >bits at both sender and receiver. This seems impractical as (almost) truly 
> >random bits are hard to produce (especially at high speeds). Is there a fix?
> >2. After the transmission, the receiver is supposed to tell the sender how 
> >it set its polarization; how is this authenticated? If it isn't we are 
> >obviously susceptible to man in the middle attack.
> >3. It seems the quantum link must connect directly from sender to 
> >receiver. How can this help provide end to end security on the Internet? 
> >Or are we back to private networks?
> >4. As to quantum computation signalling the end of `crypto as we know 
> >it`... Is it fair to say this may end only the mechanisms built on 
> >discrete log and/or factoring, but not shared key algorithms like AES and 
> >some of the other public key algorithms?
> >
> >Best, Amir Herzberg
> 
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Amir Herzberg
> See http://amir.herzberg.name/book.html for draft chapters from 
> `Introduction to Cryptography,
> Secure Communication and Commerce`, and link to lectures. Comments 
> appreciated.
> 
> 
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