dangers of TCPA/palladium

[Ben Laurie]

Mike Rosing wrote:
>>Why exactly is this so much more of a threat than, say, flash BIOS
>>upgrades?  The BIOS has a lot more power over your machine than the
>>TPM does.
> 
> 
> The difference is fundamental: I can change every bit of flash in my BIOS.
> I can not change *anything* in the TPM.  *I* control my BIOS.  IF, and
> only IF, I can control the TPM will I trust it to extend my trust to
> others.  The purpose of TCPA as spec'ed is to remove my control and
> make the platform "trusted" to one entity.  That entity has the master
> key to the TPM.
> 
> Now, if the spec says I can install my own key into the TPM, then yes,
> it is a very useful tool.  It would be fantastic in all the portables
> that have been stolen from the FBI for example.  Assuming they use a
> password at turn on, and the TPM is used to send data over the net,
> then they'd know where all their units are and know they weren't
> compromised (or how badly compromised anyway).
> 
> But as spec'ed, it is very seriously flawed.

Although the outcome _may_ be like this, your understanding of the TPM 
is seriously flawed - it doesn't prevent your from running whatever you 
want, but what it does do is allow a remote machine to confirm what you 
have chosen to run.

It helps to argue from a correct starting point.

Cheers,

Ben.

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