TCPA ad nauseum

[Mike Rosing]

On Fri, 9 Aug 2002, AARG! Anonymous wrote:

> Of course his analysis is spoiled by an underlying paranoia.  So let me
> ask just one question.  How exactly is subversion of the TPM a greater
> threat than subversion of your PC hardware today?  How do you know that
> Intel or AMD don't already have back doors in their processors that
> the NSA and other parties can exploit?  Or that Microsoft doesn't have
> similar backdoors in its OS?  And similarly for all the other software
> and hardware components that make up a PC today?
>
> In other words, is this really a new threat?  Or are you unfairly blaming
> TCPA for a problem which has always existed and always will exist?

The difference is that *anyone* can see what goes on inside an Intel or
AMD processor.  Only the key holder of the TPM can see inside the
"protected" code space.  You can't put back doors into the code now
because the code is visible to all users.  The purpose of crypto is to
hide information even tho the attacker can see all the machinery work.
If you don't want to have the machinery visible, then use a sealed
system (like smart card).

Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike