Thanks, Lucky, for helping to kill gnutella

[Bram Cohen]

AARG!Anonymous wrote:

> If only there were a technology in which clients could verify and yes,
> even trust, each other remotely.  Some way in which a digital certificate
> on a program could actually be verified, perhaps by some kind of remote,
> trusted hardware device.  This way you could know that a remote system was
> actually running a well-behaved client before admitting it to the net.
> This would protect Gnutella from not only the kind of opportunistic
> misbehavior seen today, but the future floods, attacks and DOSing which
> will be launched in earnest once the content companies get serious about
> taking this network down.

Before claiming that the TCPA, which is from a deployment standpoint
vaporware, could help with gnutella's scaling problems, you should
probably learn something about what gnutella's problems are first. The
truth is that gnutella's problems are mostly that it's a screamer
protocol, and limiting which clients could connect would do nothing to fix
that.

Limiting which clients could connect to the gnutella network would,
however, do a decent job of forcing to pay people for one of the
commercial clients. In this way it's very typical of how TCPA works - a
non-solution to a problem, but one which could potentially make money, and
has the support of gullible dupes who know nothing about the technical
issues involved.

> Be sure and send a note to the Gnutella people reminding them of all
> you're doing for them, okay, Lucky?

Your personal vendetta against Lucky is very childish.

-Bram Cohen

"Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent"
                                        -- John Maynard Keynes


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