Challenge to David Wagner on TCPA

[lynn.wheeler at firstdata.com]

it is relative common  for authentication hardware tokens with asymmetric
crypto to never divulge the private key .... there is big issue then
whether 1) the key pair is actually generated on the chip (and never
divulged) or 2) the keys are generated externally and injected into the
chip (with special compensating procedures that the chip never leaks the
private key ... and there is no record kept by the generation/injection
process).

specifications for asymmetric cryptography for data encryption may include
key escrow of the private key (allowing business continuity for data that
has been encrypted with the public key).



lucky green <shamrock at cypherpunks.to on 8/6/2002 4:04 am wrote:
                                                                                   
                                                                                   
                                                                                   



Probably not surprisingly to anybody on this list, with the exception of
potentially Anonymous, according to the TCPA's own TPM Common Criteria
Protection Profile, the TPM prevents the owner of a TPM from exporting
the TPM's internal key. The ability of the TPM to keep the owner of a PC
from reading the private key stored in the TPM has been evaluated to E3
(augmented). For the evaluation certificate issued by NIST, see:

http://niap.nist.gov/cc-scheme/PPentries/CCEVS-020016-VR-TPM.pdf

> If I buy a lock I expect that by demonstrating ownership I
> can get a replacement key or have a locksmith legally open it.

It appears the days when this was true are waning. At least in the PC
platform domain.

--Lucky


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