Privacy-enhancing uses for TCPA

[Jay Sulzberger]

On Tue, 6 Aug 2002, Seth David Schoen wrote:

< ... />

> This is not to say that trusted computing systems don't have interesting
> advantages (and disadvantages) for privacy.
>
> --
> Seth David Schoen <schoen at loyalty.org> | Reading is a right, not a feature!

I think that giving root of your machine to an entity you do not trust is
not reasonable, even if it is claimed that the control so given is a
partial and compartmentalized control.  It is even more unreasonable in
case the entity has repeatedly declared

1. their deep and abiding distrust of you

2. their minimal demand to have root on all the world's general purpose
computers forever

3. their intent to obtain 2 by government mandate.

If we wish to improve security and privacy, then let us improve ssh and
GNUPG so that they can actually be installed and used by more people.  It
is better to think about and to work on our own systems than to waste time
and money and effort on discovering the endless "flaws" and "inadequacies"
and "dangers" and the endless amusing Panglossian "advantages" of
TCPA/Palladium.

TCPA/Palladium has several faces, but one of the most important faces is
"deception, division, and diversion".  It is not a good idea to work on
improving the designs of our openly declared enemies.  Nor is it good to
spend much time examining tiny irrelevant details of TCPA/Palladium.  Every
such discussion I have seen starts by making the crudest errors in formal
logic.  Here is one important such error:

"See this tiny part of the system does not, in and of itself in isolation,
'give root' to the Englobulators, hence TCPA/Palladium is partway OK.".

oo--JS.