dangers of TCPA/palladium

[Lucky Green]

Anonymous writes:
> 
> Adam Back writes:
> > To address privacy with for example Brands digital credentials, the 
> > underlying cryptography may be harder to understand, or at 
> least less 
> > familiar, but I don't think using a toolkit based on Brands digital 
> > credentials would be significantly harder than using an identity or 
> > attribute based PKI toolkit.  Similar for Chaum's 
> credentials or other 
> > approach.
> 
> Sure, but how many pages would it take in the spec to 
> describe the protocol?  Especially given their turgid 
> technical-writer prose? Brands took a whole book to describe 
> his credentials thoroughly.
> 
> In any case, I agree that something like this would be an 
> excellent enhancement to the technology.  IMO it is very much 
> in the spirit of TCPA. I suspect they would be very open to 
> this suggestion.

Though routinely professing otherwise, evidently Anonymous knows nothing
of the spirit of the TCPA: I proposed the use of blinding schemes to the
TCPA as far back as 2 years ago as a substitute to the Privacy CAs
schemes which are subject to potential collusion. I believe
"unreceptive", rather than "very much open to this suggestion" would
more accurately describe the TCPA's spirit Anonymous holds so high.

--Lucky Green


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