Other uses of TCPA

James A. Donald jamesd at echeque.com
Mon Aug 5 14:11:49 PDT 2002


    --
On 4 Aug 2002 at 14:30, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> All I am really asking for is someone to acknowledge that I have
> provided information to them which makes them see TCPA as less
> dangerous and damaging than they had thought based on the false
> information which has been circulating.  I don't see how anyone
> can deny this.  The caricature of TCPA that most people believe
> is very bad.  The truth is not so bad. Logically, you *have* to
> believe that TCPA is not as bad as you thought, when you are
> provided with the truth.

Your account of TCPA is that smooth and reassuring account given
in the TCPA FAQ
http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf

When I read the more technical account
http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/main%20v1_1b.pdf , and
http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TCPA_PCSpecificSpecification_v100
.pdf ,
I do not see anything so reassuring.  I see scary
phrases like "root of trust".

These more technical specs give lots of irrelevant detail, and
very little detail that is actually informative.   We get a
mixture of smooth sales talk, and blind-em-with-bafflegab
technical vagueness.

Some of the details in the technical spec seem inconsistent with
the smooth and reassuring account.  For example:
: : 	"The replacement of code in the platform must be
: : 	performed by a platform manufacturer approved method
: : 	or agent.  This allows the manufacturer to establish
: : 	an upgrade method ...."
This seems to the say that the TPM has non read write storage 
containing non volatile code that is privileged, and can be
changed, but not however by the user.

This would imply that the TPM could be used to enforce any policy
whatever, and not necessarily a policy so benevolent as that
promised in the sales talk versions of the white papers.

You have told us that the TPM is turned off by default, but "off"
is merely an off flag, not a full physical off.  According to the
technical spec
: : 	"The core root of trust measurement (CRTM) MUST be an
: : 	immutable feature of the platform's initialization
: : 	code that executes on platform reset."
This is not what most people mean by "off".   It provides the
physical capability to prohibit unauthorized software from
running, even if the nice salesman tells us that capability will
never be used.

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
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     AxOIYHF+xyLE0spg6FCaankLLpAULiyK8SWbS3TD
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