IP: USSID 18 - Procedures on NSA collection data on "U.S. persons"(fwd)

Eugene Leitl Eugene.Leitl at lrz.uni-muenchen.de
Fri Oct 12 21:46:51 PDT 2001




-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://www.lrz.de/~ui22204/">leitl</a>
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---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2001 16:54:18 -0400
From: David Farber <dave at farber.net>
Reply-To: farber at cis.upenn.edu
To: ip-sub-1 at majordomo.pobox.com
Subject: IP: USSID 18 - Procedures on NSA collection data on "U.S. persons"


>Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2001 11:52:34 -0500
>From: John Lyon <jelyon at jelyon.com>
>To: dave at farber.net
>X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.472)
>
>Out of curiosity I went hunting for info on the United States Signals
>Intelligence Directives (USSIDs) I had to be aware of in a former line of work.
>
>Much to my surprise, USSID 18, which outlines procedures for the NSA's
>collection of data on "U.S. persons" was declassified just over a year ago.
>
>I thought the document might be of interest to IPers, especially at this time.
>
>An introduction, and links to the archives can be found at:
>
>      http://cipherwar.com/news/00/nsa_surveillance.htm
>
>(From the site above:)
>
>In the aftermath of revelations in the 1970s about NSA interception of the
>communications of anti-war and other political activists new procedures
>were established governing the interception of communications involving
>Americans. The version of USSID 18 currently in force was issued in July
>1993 and "prescribes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities
>to ensure that the missions and functions of the United States SIGINT
>System (USSS) are conducted in a manner that safeguards the constitutional
>rights of U.S. persons."
>
>(And a bit from USSID 18, itself - any errors in transcription are my fault:)
>
>SECTION 1 - PREFACE
>
>1.1. (U) The Fourth Amendment ot the Unites States Constitution protects
>all U.S. persons anywhere in the world and all persons within the United
>States from unreasonable searches and seizures by any person or agency
>acting on behalf of the U.S. Government. The Supreme Court has ruled that
>the interception of electronic communications is a search and seizure
>within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It is therefore mandatory that
>signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations be conducted pursuant to
>procedures which meet the reasonableness requirements of the fourth
>amendment.
>
>1.2. (U) In determining whether United States SIGING System (USSS)
>operations are "reasonable," it is necessary to balance the U.S.
>Government's need for foreign intelligence information and the privacy
>interests of persons protected by the Fourth Amendment. Striking that
>balance has consumed much time and effort by all branches of the United
>States Government. The results of that effort are reflected in the
>references listed in Section 2 below. Together, these references require
>the minimization of U.S. person information collected, processed, retained
>or disseminated by the USSS. The purpose of this document is to implement
>these minimization requirements.
>
>1.3. (U) Several themes run throughout this USSID. The most important is
>that intelligence operation and the protection of constitutional rights are
>not incompatible. It is not necessary to deny legitimate foreign
>intelligence collection or suppress legitimate foreign intelligence
>information to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. Persons.
>
>1.4. (U) Finally, these minimization procedures implement the
>constitutional principle of "reasonableness" by giving different categories
>of individuals and entities different levels of protection. These levels
>range from the stringent protection accorded U.S. citizens and permanent
>resident aliens in the United States to provisions relating to foreign
>diplomats in the U.S. These differences reflect yet another main theme of
>these procedures, that is, that the focus of all foreign intelligence
>operation is on foreign entities and persons.
>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>JEL
>


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