Risks of belief in identities

[Declan McCullagh]

It's important to be clear about what characteristics of a national ID
card are objectionable. Among those may be a requirement that it be
shown on demand, that it be tied to databases that track movements,
etc. What is disturbing about a national ID card is not the fact that
it's standardized, for instance, but an array of features that could
crop up elsewhere.

It is possible to imagine a scenario where a database-linked,
biometric-tied system using driver's licenses is worse -- that is,
more privacy-invasive -- than some forms of a "national ID card."

I posted more on a SiliconValley.com roundtable recently:
http://forums.siliconvalley.com/discussion/msgshow.cfm/msgboard=5968009897410465&msg=8036926450156813&page=1&idDispSub=5145094516046185

-Declan

On Wed, Nov 21, 2001 at 06:33:22PM -0000, Anonymous wrote:
> >From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann at csl.sri.com>
> >Subject: Risks of belief in identities
> >
> >For those of you who might believe that national ID cards might be a good
> >idea, check out the December 2001 *Commun.ACM* Inside Risks column by me
> >and Lauren Weinstein, previewed on my Web site
> >   http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/insiderisks.html
> 
> The criticisms in this essay have nothing to do with national ID cards
> per se.  The points have nothing to do with the cards being national,
> with them proving ID, or with them being in the form of a card for
> that matter.  What the essay really argues against is any attempt to
> prove that someone has been checked for a certain property by showing
> a document.  Documents can be forged, biometrics are imperfect, and the
> employees who issue the documents can be bribed.
> 
> By this argument, we should have no driver's licenses, credit cards,
> or paper cash for that matter.  Everything stuffed into your wallet
> is useless.  Any one of those items could be forged or could have been
> given to you improperly.  But we find them to be useful anyway.
> 
> In actuality, no one in politics is seriously pushing for a national
> ID card.  However they are talking about having an air travel card
> which would allow holders to go through an expedited security check.
> Neumann's arguments apply just as strongly against such a card (which
> need not have ID printed on it at all), further proving that he is not
> in fact opposing a national ID card but any kind of carried credential.