Forbidden Knowledge (Banned Research, Part II)

[Sampo Syreeni]

On Tue, 3 Jul 2001, Tim May wrote:

>There _might_ be a bunch of failed implant attempts, failed attempts to
>bring a fertilized egg to term. [...] But no particular "imminent danger"
>requiring police action to protect the safety of others.

This is of course just a part of a general tendency, the broadening of law
to cover risk (e.g. mandatory seatbelts), indirect harm (e.g. the idea of
currency transaction taxation to "stabilize" exchange rates), thought crime
(e.g. hacking, copyright violation and the diaries-as-child-porn stuff),
harm through inaction (e.g. not helping a suffocating person) and
"injustice" (e.g. nondiscrimation statutes; my own views are in flux over
this one). I.e., people increasingly consider law in terms of consequences,
not actions. I can't see how this is a surprise to anyone on the list.

>The real issue is about a move toward "permission requirements" for
>research.

And also the fact that people increasingly view such licencing as part of
the government's legitimate sphere of influence, or even its responsibility.
Somewhere along the line ordinary people seem to have lost the idea that by
default everything is allowed, and have come to think that before one can do
something, the state can, and so has to, guarantee that there are no
unfortunate consequences (e.g. FDA requirements on new pharmaceuticals).
Hence, regulation based on possibilities instead of outcomes.

>The real issue, as readers of my stuff will know, is the creation and
>support of guilds: licensing is a rent-seeking mechanism.

One might extend that to people with at least some familiarity with
libertarian theory.

>How long before it carries over to other areas in biology?

I think something similar to this is already happening, only indirectly
through patents on basic bioresearch tools. It isn't legislation, but the
centralization sure makes state control a helluva lot easier, plus gives
tonnes of legitimate sounding excuses for the King's men to go over your
possessions.

>Why not restrict computer virus research?

Hasn't it been, already? If I'm not mistaken, people already go to prison
for writing viruses. Ditto for hacking tools, TPM circumvention software,
and soon probably spamming tools as well.

>Or nanotech research?

We'll have to wait for that until the critters do something useful, or the
general public believes that is an imminent "threat".

>-- the "ban on bomb-making instructions" proposed by the usual suspects is
>a variant on this issue.

Mm. I've always thought of this sort of thing as more of a spinoff of the
conventional censorship discourse.

Might be there is a difference, though, as Plain Old Censorship is usually
advocated because the material itself is "harmful", while we now operate on
the added spin of "stuff that enables you to do Bad Things". That's
obviously a bit broader in that it covers just about all functional
science/technology, even if the stuff per se does not incite the reader to
*do* anything.

>-- and as with "precursor chemicals," chemicals which _could_ be made into
>methamphetamines or Sarin or other banned items, there will be bans on
>"precursor knowledge."

The patent argument above ties nicely with this one.

>It's the groundwork, the precursor knowledge, that the government is now
>cracking down on. A very disturbing trend.

I think the Rael crackdown is more a display of common irrationality than
the kind of deviousness you attribute to it. "But we need to do *something*
about it!"

>-- fortunately, these "warning shots" will perhaps accelerate a transition
>into cypherspace.

Or, if you are right about the precursor knowledge bit, a fresh attack on
crypto infrastructure. This time it would probably start by associating
crypto with pedophiles -- lately national security seems to have lost its
most corrosive appeal.

Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy, mailto:decoy at iki.fi, gsm: +358-50-5756111
student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front