privacy regulations suck also (Re: Formal apology)

[Paul Sholtz]

> I've been thinking about the current trend in privacy regulations
> also.  I came to the same conclusion.  My bank sent me a shiny new
> leaflet explaining their privacy position.  It wasn't even an
> especially desirable or equitable position, but they presumably felt
> the new regulations obliged them to write it.  I'm thinking: "so how
> do the laws that caused this leaflet to be written help my privacy?"

Yes, of course they will. They are designed to give you choice over how
personal information is to be used. They will help orders of magnitude more
than any "anonymization" technology ever will (reasons to follow)

> These laws are almost exclusively about *handling* of data, rather
> than questioning the fact that the data is collected in the first
> place.  (Well there is a principle that they should have a reason for
> collecting it, and/or that they get consent, but they do have some
> reason to have pretty much all the data they collect by their
> standards.)

I'm not sure what world you live in, but this point about not needing to
collection infomration in the first place is barely a realistic way to
conduct business in any way that I'm familiar with. Have you ever tried
going to the doctor for basically anything? It's REALLY REALLY hard for him
to treat you unless you tell him what's wrong, what your medical history is,
and he is able to associate this information w/ YOU.

I've done a little research on some of these "anonymization" protocols (like
the cocaine auction by Ross Anderson:
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fms27/cocaine/), and it seems like they are
interesting mathematical curiosities, but that they don't model reality very
well. No cocaine dealer on earth will do business anonymously. The reason is
because "risky" businesses like this require an inordinately high level of
trust, which the dealer cannot get from anonymous transactions.

The dealer must make ABSOLUTELY certain that the person w/ whom he is
dealing is NOT a government agent, and in the case that he gets shafted by a
customer, he needs to know enough personal information about that customer
to come after him guns blazing, killing him and preferrably taking out most
of his immediate family too.

Granted, the cocaine dealer has an interest in erasing any financial records
of said transaction (i.e., dealing in cash and money laundering), but now
we're talking about cash (or something like it; in general cash can be
traced if it "wants" to be), not about anonymity or about "concealing"
personal information in the course of a business transaction.

> So here's the problem: these laws will if anything make it less
> visible what information companies and governments have on you because
> they will restrict uses.  How the data is handled and used isn't the
> problem, the problem is that the information is collected, and
> available to law enforcement, national intelligence and your average
> dick (private detective).

The purpose of the laws is to make MORE visible the information that
businesses and government have on you. None of these laws call for
"restricting" the use of information, unless of course you the consumer are
requesting the restriction, in which case the laws mandate that said
organization must comply with the restriction.

Like I said before, the information MUST be collected in order to perform
most normal business transactions (especially in health and finance). The
way the information is handled and used has TREMENDOUS implications for
privacy. I'm not sure why you think that the "way" the information is
handled has "nothing" to do w/ privacy.. uhh.. to most people working in the
privacy field, this has EVERYTHING to do w/ privacy..

> Privacy to me means being able to keep my affairs private from
> governments if I choose.  The UK princple allowing you to use any name
> you want (so long as it is not for committing fraud or a crime) is
> agood one.  (I'm hoping that using an alias does not affect the legal
> systems evaluation of the severity of the crime -- and that there are
> no "use of an alias in the commission of a crime" types things in
> effect though I don't know the details).

That is an interesting definition of privacy, but it is really a subset of
the more general definition that is more widely used in the industry, which
is namely the ability to control secondary uses of personal information.
Your example about the UK allowing you to use multiple names seems to me to
be a classic case of what one would call "security through obscurity." Most
professionals would consider this to be EXTREMLEY weak security (or, in your
case, privacy).. I'm not sure why you think this makes you more secure or
private than a legal/economic/technical regime that allows you property
rights over personal information.. 

> So the solution appears to be technological countermeasures, and
> repealing laws.  Neither of which appear even remotely likely within
> the political system.  The political system has a systemic desire to
> create more laws.  Every new law introduces more problems.  The people
> writing the laws don't know the technology, they are control freaks,
> and pander to media and take bribes and broker favors with special
> interest groups.  So at this point I firmly believe in "write code not
> laws", and think that "cypherpunks write code" is important. 

I'm not certain what you mean by "technological countermeasures". If you
mean "anonymization" technology, or "zero-knowledge proofs", you can talk
till you're blue in the face and it still won't happen, although that has
nothing to do w/ the current political system. It has to do w/ the fact that
businessmen won't conduct business w/ people they can't trust (ie., people
who are anonymous) and even IF they could, the economic reality is that
NOTHING in the infrastructure (of banks, hospitals, retail, etc) is even
remotely prepared for this, so why bother talking about it?

Better to guarantee privacy through systems that engender communication of
adequate amounts of personal information for the transaction at hand
(whether financial, medical or retail), but that ensure trusted handling of
the info on the transaction is complete..

Paul Sholtz
PrivacyRight, Inc. - www.privacyright.com
Chief Technology Officer