Fwd: Afghan - Clinton Turned Down Files On Bin Laden

[Steve Schear]

>>Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2001 01:23:11 -0600
>>To: Afghan Group:;
>>From: Larry Lloyd <Larry at Lloyd1.Com>
>>Subject: Afghan - Clinton Turned Down Files On Bin Laden
>>
>>DRUDGE REPORT
>>
>>FRI NOV 30 2001
>>
>>Sudan Tried To Give Clinton Administration Files On Bin Laden
>>
>>NEW YORK --Vanity fair has obtained letters and memorandums that document 
>>approaches made by Sudanese intelligence officials and other emissaries 
>>to members of the Clinton administration to share information about many 
>>of the 22 terrorists on the government's most-wanted list, including: 
>>Osama bin Laden.
>>
>>Vanity Fair is set to unleash the story in January 2002 editions, 
>>publishing sources tell the Drudge Report.
>>
>>MORE
>>
>>THE MUKHABARAT, A SUDANESE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, spent the early to 
>>mid-1990s amassing copious amounts of information on bin Laden and his 
>>cohorts at a time when they were relatively unknown and their activities 
>>limited, author David Rose reports. From the fall of 1996 until weeks 
>>before the September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, the 
>>Mukhabarat made repeated efforts to share its files on terrorists with 
>>the U.S. On more than one occasion senior F.B.I. officials wanted to 
>>accept the offers, but were apparently overruled by the State Department.
>>
>>FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT and her assistant secretary 
>>for Africa, Susan Rice, declined to comment for this story.
>>
>>ACCORDING TO TIM CARNEY, THE LAST U.S. AMBASSADOR to Sudan, whose posting 
>>ended in 1997, "The fact is, they were opening the doors, and we weren't 
>>taking them up on it. The U.S. failed to reciprocate Sudan's willingness 
>>to engage us on some serious questions of terrorism. We can speculate 
>>that this failure had serious implications-at least for what happened at 
>>the U.S. Embassies in 1998. In any case, the U.S. lost access to a mine 
>>of material on bin Laden and his organization." He tells Rose, "It was 
>>worse than a crime. It was a fuckup."
>>
>>HOW COULD THIS HAVE HAPPENED? CARNEY CONTENDS that U.S. intelligence 
>>failed because it became "politicized": the message from Sudan did not 
>>fit conventional wisdom at the State Department and the C.I.A., and so it 
>>was disregarded, again and again. Rose writes that the simple answer is 
>>that the Clinton administration had accused Sudan of sponsoring 
>>terrorism, and refused to believe that anything it did to prove its bona 
>>fides could be genuine. At the same time, perceptions in Washington were 
>>influenced by C.I.A. reports that were wildly inaccurate, some the result 
>>of deliberate disinformation.
>>
>>ROSE REPORTS THAT, HAD U.S. AGENCIES EXAMINED the Mukhabarat files in 
>>1996 when they first had the chance the prospects of preventing 
>>subsequent al-Qaeda attacks would have been much greater. Gutbi al-Mahdi, 
>>the Mukhabarat's director general between 1997 and 2000, claims that if 
>>the F.B.I. had taken his offer in February 1998, the embassy bombings 
>>could have been prevented: "They had very little information at that 
>>time: they were shooting in the dark. Had they engaged with Sudan, they 
>>could have stopped a lot of things." Rose writes that as late as the end 
>>of 1995, bin Laden was not judged important enough by the C.I.A. or the 
>>F.B.I. for anyone to mention him to U.S. Ambassador Don Petterson when 
>>Petterson talked to the Sudanese about terrorism, an indication that the 
>>U.S. knew very little about bin Laden's organization or lethal capacity. 
>>"My recollection is that when I made representations about terrorist 
>>organizations Osama bin Laden did not figure," Petterson says. "We in 
>>Khartoum were not really concerned about him."
>>
>>SOME OF THE MUKHABARAT'S FILES IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS who played central 
>>roles in the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 
>>August 1998; others chart the backgrounds and movements of al-Qaeda 
>>operatives who are said to be linked directly to the atrocities of 
>>September 11. Among those profiled:
>>
>>Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, another of those named on the F.B.I.'s 
>>most-wanted list, who set the plot for the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings 
>>rolling during two trips he made to Nairobi in the spring of 1998 from 
>>Khartoum, where he was apparently working for al-Qaeda. Rose writes that 
>>had the F.B.I. accepted al-Mahdi's February offer, it might have foiled 
>>Mohammed's plans by stepping in when he rented a villa in Kenya, gathered 
>>the bombers at the Hilltop Hotel in Nairobi, or helped stuff a pickup 
>>truck with TNT.
>>
>>Two men carrying Pakistani passports and using the names Sayyid Iskandar 
>>Suliman and Sayyid Nazir Abbass, who arrived in Khartoum from Kenya a few 
>>days after the 1998 embassy bombings and rented an apartment overlooking 
>>the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum. They appeared to be reconnoitering for a 
>>possible future attack and are believed to be members of al-Qaeda. They 
>>also stayed at the Hilltop Hotel in Nairobi-the base used by other 
>>members of the embassy-bombing conspiracy. Sudan arrested the two men and 
>>offered to extradite them for trial, but the U.S. did not respond, 
>>instead opting to bomb the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, 
>>which was found to have no connection to bin Laden but made vaccines and 
>>medicine and had contracts with the U.N.
>>
>>Wadih al-Hage, bin Laden's former private secretary, now serving life 
>>without parole after his conviction in New York for his role in the 1998 
>>embassy bombings, who was logged and photographed in Sudan. He is said to 
>>have moved among bin Laden's cells and across four continents-information 
>>that surely would have been helpful in cramping al-Qaeda's style had it 
>>been grasped in 1996.
>>
>>Mamdouh Mahmoud Salim, a Sudanese born to Iraqi parents and an Afghan-war 
>>veteran who worked for two bin Laden companies until 1995. Salim provides 
>>a link to the New York suicide hijackers. From 1995 to 1998, he made 
>>frequent visits to Germany, where a Syrian trader, Mamoun Darkazanli, had 
>>signing powers over his bank account. Darkazanli has allegedly procured 
>>electronic equipment for al-Qaeda. Both men attended the same Hamburg 
>>mosque as Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, who flew the two planes into 
>>the World Trade Center.
>>
>>ACCORDING TO AL-MAHDI, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE kept tabs on the entire 
>>bin Laden "clique": "We had a lot of information: who they are, who are 
>>their families, what is their education. We knew what they were doing in 
>>the country, what is their relationship with Osama bin Laden. And [had] 
>>photographs of them all." A senior official from Egyptian intelligence, 
>>who has worked closely with the Mukhabarat, substantiates the account: 
>>"They knew all about them: who they were, where they came from. They had 
>>copies of their passports, their tickets; they knew where they went. Of 
>>course that information could have helped enormously. It is the history 
>>of those people."
>>
>>THE MUKHABARAT ALSO UNCOVERED A WEALTH OF information about bin Laden's 
>>connection to Egyptian Islamic Jihad, including the fact that he hosted 
>>its founder, al-Zawahiri, in 1992. The group has since effectively merged 
>>with al-Qaeda. Yahia Hussien Baviker, the Mukhabarat's deputy chief since 
>>1998, says, "These files on the Egyptians could have been of great value 
>>to U.S. intelligence. If we'd had communication with the U.S., we could 
>>have been on the same wavelength. We could have exchanged notes." A 
>>C.I.A. source tells Rose, "If anyone in the world understands the 
>>Egyptian side of this network, it's Sudan."
>>
>>IT WAS NOT UNTIL MAY 2000 THAT THE U.S. SENT A JOINT F.B.I.-C.I.A. team 
>>to Sudan to investigate whether it was harboring terrorists; the country 
>>was given a clean bill of health in the summer of 2001. Just a few weeks 
>>prior to the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration requested 
>>Sudan's information on al-Qaeda.
>>
>>THE JANUARY ISSUE OF VANITY FAIR HITS NEWSSTANDS in New York on December 
>>5 and nationally on December 11.