CNN.com on Remailers

[David Honig]

At 06:56 PM 12/17/01 -0600, Jim Choate wrote:
>On Mon, 17 Dec 2001, Trei, Peter wrote:
>
>> Yes, I have read the letter - they need to treat input from known remailers
>> differently due to worries over spam and flooding attacks, so they treat 
>> other known remailers as priviliged sources of high volume traffic.

Can't spam be repelled by not forwarding email not encrypted to
the remailer's key?  

>> This does not invalidate my point - that such special treatment could lead
>> a remop into legal problems. We have two different problems, with mutually
>> undesirable solutions.
>
>If the sending node doesn't know about the destination node, how does it
>konw where to send the traffic (even if the sender provides the address)?
>The reality is that the remailers must 'know' of each other one way or
>another. Simply being part of a 'remailer network' (anonymous or not)
>tends to already put one in a 'conspiratorial' situation.

Isn't it sufficient for a remailer node to publicly broadcast
its existance (and the protocols it handles)?  This seems to work
and there is no cooperation required --just a one-way broadcast.

Mere advertising is not evidence of a conspiracy.