Remailer Phases

[Joseph Ashwood]

Let me see if I've got your personal fantasy correct, because that's all it
is. You believe that it is best to design a protocol that is somewhat
resistant, and simply ignore it's faults. I strongly disagree, doing that is
to put it bluntly stupid. The real game is to design a protocol and make
it's strengths and weaknesses known. Anything else is just more stupidity.
And for the record, I'm far from new.
                        Joe

----- Original Message -----
From: "David Honig" <honig at sprynet.com>
To: "Joseph Ashwood" <ashwood at msn.com>; <cypherpunks at einstein.ssz.com>
Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2001 12:01 PM
Subject: CDR: Re: re: Remailer Phases


> At 09:05 PM 8/7/01 -0500, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "A. Melon" <juicy at melontraffickers.com>
> >Subject:  re: Remailer Phases
> >
> >
> >> >   2. Operator probably trustworthy
> >>
> >> Impossible, and unnecessary. Don't assume any remops are trustworthy.
> >
> >Actually it is absolutely necessary. If all operators are willing to
> >collude, then your precious anonymity is completely lost.
>
> Joe, you're obviously new to the game.
>
> The game is, design a protocol where you are resistant to some, but not
> complete collusion (aka node failure).  And analyze as best you can your
> protocol's fault tree, including succeptibility to collusion.