Remailer Phases

[Meyer Wolfsheim]

On Tue, 7 Aug 2001, Joseph Ashwood wrote:

> > >   2. Operator probably trustworthy
> >
> > Impossible, and unnecessary. Don't assume any remops are trustworthy.
>
> Actually it is absolutely necessary. If all operators are willing to
> collude, then your precious anonymity is completely lost. A simple 
> tracing methodology can establish this. The first remailer operator 
> tracks the 
> exact outgoing message to the next collusion, the second tracks to the 
> third, etc until the message escapes, then the colluding operators track 
> back through
> the list of remailers, linking based on the intermediate value being 
> sent,
> until it reaches operator 1 who knows the sending address. This assumes 
> a best case of the sender determining the path taken through encryption. 
> Worst case the first operator can reveal the information to everyone.
>                         Joe

Run your own remailer. Chain through it at some point. As long as you 
trust yourself, there is no threat.

Who of the current remops do you trust? Why?


-MW-