Traceable infrastructure

[Anonymous Coredump]

      All the more reason to morph freenet/mojo to mix duties, maybe even
create a worm version 
that gives no evidence of it's existence, other than some increase in traffic.

   What happened to melontrafficers.com BTW? 

Declan McCullagh wrote:

  On Sun, Aug 05, 2001 at 04:07:14PM +0300, Sampo Syreeni wrote:
  > Now, the above is of course fiction, for now at least. But keeping such
  > widescale attacks on the infrastructure part of the threat model is not,
  > IMHO, a bad idea. The discussions on stego, disposable remailers, physical
  > broadcast technology and the like are part of that, and serve to lay the
  > groundwork in case shit one day does hit the fan.

  Last I checked, the vast bulk of remailers were in North America and
  Europe. Given sufficient provocation (Bush twins kidnapped, Osama
  talking biochemwomdterror in DC), I could easily see a coordinated set
  of pre-dawn raids to "gather evidence" and seize computers as part of
  a criminal investigation. Obviously the servers would have to be held
  as potential evidence for a trial - did they keep logs? our techs will
  find out - which could take a decade. This would cripple the current
  remailer network and generate almost no public outcry beyond the
  cypherpunks and such.

  -Declan